Der vorliegende Aufsatz stellt das Erbe der Kantischen Theorie der Konstitutions- und Regulationsleistung der Erfahrung – die Analytik der Grundsätze – dar, das unserer Auffassung nach zur Begründung der rein spekulativen Philosophie Hegels führt. In diesem Zusammenhang werden einerseits die transzendental-konstitutiven Grundsätze – Axiome der Anschauung und Antizipationen der Wahrnehmung – und andererseits die transzendental-regulativen Grundsätze – Analogien der Erfahrung und Postulate des empirischen Denkens überhaupt – als grundlegendes Material der Exegese benutzt. Als Resultat der Deutung erscheint das Problem des (...) Doppel-Verhältnisses zwischen Erfahrung und Verstandesgrundsätzen. Ein solches Verhältnis entfaltet sich nicht nur als die erfahrungsmäßige Verwirklichung der Grundsätze, sondern auch als die grundsätzliche Ermöglichung der Erfahrung. Der notwendige Charakter der Wahrheit in transzendentaler Hinsicht begründet sich dabei durch die allgemeine Beziehung der transzendentalen Grundsätze des reinen Verstandes zur Gesamtheit der Erfahrung. Es wird die These vertreten, dass die Auffassung der Natur – d.h. die das Dasein der Erscheinungen in der Zeit ermöglichende Einheit – das Hauptvermächtnis Kants für den Deutschen Idealismus im Allgemeinen und für Hegels Philosophie im Besonderen darstellt. (shrink)

Der Denkweg Hegels kann als ein Bildungsprozess von Einheitsbegriffen angesehen werden. Dieser Weg lässt sich in zwei Phasen einteilen: eine spekulative und eine vorspekulative Phase. Die These dieses Aufsatzes besteht darin, dass der Begriff der Einheit sich innerhalb beider Phasen jenes Denkweges entwickelte und dabei die gleichen allgemeinen Formen annimmt. Von daher kann der Weg dieses Denkens durch einen Doppel-Begriff, den der spekulativen und den der vorspekulativen Einheit, rekonstruiert werden. Im Blick auf das Ganze lässt sich also sagen, dass beide (...) Phasen am Ende durch die fundamentale Entscheidung Hegels eines „Eingreifens in das Leben der Menschen“ verbunden sind. Und die letzte Form der Einheit in der spekulativen Phase – die der absoluten Idee – wird dementsprechend eine gewisse aufgehobene Bewegung der Subjektivität und der Objektivität sein, an der sich die Einheit als Freiheit zeigt. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the notion of truth is so closely linked to the notion of justification that it is not possible to access the truth, even with the best reasons upon which a justification is supported. -/- I’ll show that the notions of truth and reality can only be inferred from our experience of the world, in which our social practices can be verified or disproved, and if our hypotheses are accepted or refuted. I maintain that we (...) can only access realities which we constitute in relation to one of several possible conceptual frameworks. These conceptual frameworks are not transcendental entities nor are they established definitively, they are social constructs. This means that the conceptual frameworks are constituted by the social practices of the subjects. We understand that social practices are institutionalized groups of actions undertaken by members of a community and directed toward the consecution of an end. These actions presuppose that the beliefs, norms and values are shared by members of an epistemic community. Olivé (1999: 135-42). -/- This article begins by presenting Rorty’s counter-proposal for the notion of truth, in relation to which I put forward the principal theses of onto-epistemological pluralism. Subsequently, I develop the idea of inter-subjective contextual justification and I show that this posture, although it does depend on specific conditions for justification, is not arbitrary. -/- I demonstrate the relevance of onto-epistemological pluralism and the need to adequately substantiate our beliefs and decision making, by presenting the case of parents guided by a notion of ´post-truth´ who decide not to vaccinate their children against measles based on insufficiently justified subjective reasons. A fact that is having serious harmful consequences to health, particularly among young children. (shrink)

Este artículo busca responder a la siguiente pregunta: ¿Qué tipo de relación sostiene la Ciencia de la lógica con la tradición metafísica? Hay en ello un doble motivo de reflexión: por un lado, se trata de distinguir los sentidos de la crítica y los de la transformación científica de la metafísica tanto en Kant como en Hegel, y, por otro lado, de concebir el inicio [Anfang] y el principio [Prinzip] de la Lógica como dos modos de relación que permitirían hacer (...) tal distinción aunque únicamente de manera introductoria. El inicio de esta Lógica es así el primer fin de un círculo que vuelve a abrirse; anverso del límite, o estudio lógico de reverso fenomenológico; unidad de un carácter genitivo doble ‒de la Ciencia de la conciencia y del Concepto de la Ciencia‒, que hace del saber puro el fin del inicio fenomenológico, y al mismo tiempo el inicio de su propia exposición. Inicio inmanente al desarrollo de la Ciencia y que es por lo tanto un momento de saber-puro-ser. Es, dicho en breve, el inicio de una Lógica pura, objetiva y subjetiva, ya liberada de la oposición en sí/concepto, y que al ser el desarrollo del pensar objetivo se constituye en el “sistema de la razón pura”. (shrink)

Discrimination is a central epistemic capacity but typically, theories of discrimination only use discrimination as a vehicle for analyzing knowledge. This paper aims at developing a self-contained theory of discrimination. Internalist theories of discrimination fail since there is no compelling correlation between discriminatory capacities and experiences. Moreover, statistical reliabilist theories are also flawed. Only a modal theory of discrimination is promising. Versions of sensitivity and adherence that take particular alternatives into account provide necessary and sufficient conditions on discrimination. Safety in (...) contrast is not sufficient for discrimination as there are cases of safety that are clearly instances of discrimination failure. The developed account of discrimination between objects will be extended to discrimination between kinds and between types. (shrink)

Este capítulo examina una posible preocupación filosófica especializada por la técnica en la práctica filosófica colombiana. Se argumenta, según las fuentes consultadas: una génesis, un desarrollo; con unas rupturas, continuidades y una consolidación reciente de una comunidad académica en el asunto. Este hecho cultural se registra en un corpus documental compuesto por artículos de revistas especializadas de filosofía, obras de filósofos colombianos, memorias de congresos nacionales de filosofía en los que registran coloquios y ponencias en esta materia, en los currículos (...) de los programas de filosofía, tanto en pregrado como posgrado, en los que aparecen cátedras en filosofía de la técnica o tecnologías, y proyectos de investigación con tesis en esta especialidad. Estas y otras prácticas académicas permiten concluir de la existencia de una discusión filosófica de la técnica; similar a lo que sucede en otros países de Iberoamérica y a nivel mundial. Para desglosar tal conjetura en este apartado se precisa cómo surge la deliberación de la técnica en la tradición filosófica. Luego, se examina cómo emerge el tema en el contexto filosófico colombiano, y puntualiza la obra de Danilo Cruz Vélez en torno a una filosofía de la técnica. Finalmente, se llegará a unas conclusiones parciales que demuestren los aportes de la comunidad filosófica colombiana en dicha temática. La demostración de la hipótesis se sustenta teórica y metodológicamente con dos criterios: uno hermenéutico, con técnicas de interpretación filológica, histórica, filosófica y otro bibliométrico, los cuales permiten una reconstrucción, síntesis, análisis e interpretación de las deliberaciones del tema, desde 1964 al 2018. (shrink)

El presente artículo busca responder las siguientes preguntas: ¿Cómo fue que la idea del pensamiento infinito llegó a constituirse en el motivo central de la filosofía de Hegel?, y ¿cuál fue el derrotero que recorrió su pensamiento hasta alcanzar aquella concepción lógico-silogística de la filosofía, según la cual la Idea de esta Ciencia llega a ser la última determinación del Espíritu absoluto, y a su vez, este Espíritu absoluto se convierte en la unidad definitiva de la Ciencia enciclopédica? Una vía (...) plausible para responder a estas interrogantes consiste en poder caracterizar las configuraciones más importantes de aquella concepción de la filosofía, ocurridas al interior de la fase de pensamiento enciclopédico, a partir del seguimiento de sus conceptos culminantes –la Idea y el Espíritu absoluto. (shrink)

Este artículo intenta elucidar el carácter dual de la razón que ha propuesto la filosofía de Hegel. A partir de ello investiga la coincidencia que logran estos dos momentos, la negatividad y la creatividad de la razón con la realidad efectiva [Wirklichkeit], proponiendo una serie de pares categoriales que nos permitan pensar este específico doble concepto de razón y su posible vínculo con la primera obra de Slavoj Žižek, El sublime objeto de la ideología. Abstract: This paper tries to clarify (...) the dual nature of reason proposed by Hegel's philosophy. Based on this research the coincidence that achieve these two moments, negativity and creativity of reason with actuality [Wirklichkeit], proposing a series of categorical couple that allow us to think this double specific concept of reason, and its possible link to the first work of Slavoj Žižek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. (shrink)

Author: Ioanna Bartsidi (Université Paris Nanterre). Translated by Pedro Sepúlveda Zambrano (UCSH). Gérard Gérard Lebrun (1930-1999) fue un historiador de la filosofía francés y estudioso de Hegel influido por el estructuralismo y la epistemología histórica francesa. Su libro de 1972 La patience du concept marcó el campo de los estudios hegelianos y se convirtió en un referente para las lecturas «no metafísicas» contemporáneas de Hegel en Francia. Insistiendo en la oposición entre discurso representacional y especulativo, Lebrun presenta el pensamiento de (...) Hegel como una filosofía no dogmática, a-sistemática y antifundacionalista de la creación de sentido. Para comprender plenamente lo que está en juego en la interpretación postestructuralista de Lebrun sobre Hegel, este trabajo propone comprenderla como una respuesta al antihegelianismo vehemente de los grandes filósofos franceses de los años 1960 y 1970. Para ello, en primer lugar, intento situar La patience du concept en su contexto filosófico a partir de una lectura comparada del Prefacio de Louis Althusser a Para leer El capital (1965) de Louis Althusser y El orden del discurso (1971) de Michel Foucault. Sostengo que la conceptualización de Lebrun de «lo especulativo hegeliano» como discurso pretende defender a Hegel contra las acusaciones de logocentrismo. Por último, subrayo el uso que Lebrun hace del concepto althusseriano de «corte epistemológico» contra el propio Althusser, en lo que considero un intento de formular una crítica del antihegelianismo como ideología «predicativa». (shrink)

Modal knowledge accounts that are based on standards possible-worlds semantics face well-known problems when it comes to knowledge of necessities. Beliefs in necessities are trivially sensitive and safe and, therefore, trivially constitute knowledge according to these accounts. In this paper, I will first argue that existing solutions to this necessity problem, which accept standard possible-worlds semantics, are unsatisfactory. In order to solve the necessity problem, I will utilize an unorthodox account of counterfactuals, as proposed by Nolan, on which we also (...) consider impossible worlds. Nolan’s account for counterpossibles delivers the intuitively correct result for sensitivity i.e. S’s belief is sensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge of necessities and insensitive in intuitive cases of knowledge failure. However, we acquire the same plausible result for safety only if we reject his strangeness of impossibility condition and accept the modal closeness of impossible worlds. In this case, the necessity problem can be analogously solved for sensitivity and safety. For some, such non-moderate accounts might come at too high a cost. In this respect, sensitivity is better off than safety when it comes to knowing necessities. (shrink)

El presente escrito ofrece una serie de reflexiones acerca del concepto especulativo del saber. Con este fin, son reconstruidas las doctrinas del ser y del concepto en sus dimensiones sistemáticas. El acto de “decidirse a filosofar” y la noción de totalidad exhibirán, al final del camino, el sentido circular del “discurso del método hegeliano”.

This book is primarily about checking and only derivatively about knowing. Checking is a very common concept for describing a subject’s epistemic goals and actions. Surprisingly, there has been no philosophical attention paid to the notion of checking. In Part I, I develop a sensitivity account of checking. To be more explicit, I analyze the internalist and externalist components of the epistemic action of checking which include the intentions of the checking subject and the necessary externalist features of the method (...) used. Crucially, successfully checking whether p is true requires using a method that is sensitive with respect to p, i.e. a method that would not indicate that p, if p were false. In Part II, I use the distinction between knowing and checking to explain central puzzles about knowledge, particularly puzzles centering on knowledge closure, puzzles concerning bootstrapping and the skeptical puzzle. Moreover, the book clarifies a dispute about modal epistemology, concerning the application of the sensitivity principle. By arguing that sensitivity is necessary for checking but not knowing, I explain where our persisting intuitions about sensitivity have their place in epistemology. (shrink)

This paper provides a reinterpretation of some of the most influential skeptical arguments, Agrippa’s trilemma, meta-regress arguments, and Cartesian external world skepticism. These skeptical arguments are reasonably regarded as unsound arguments about the extent of our knowledge. However, reinterpretations of these arguments tell us something significant about the preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. These results contribute to the ongoing debates about the nature and resolvability of deep disagreement. The variety of skeptical arguments shows that we must distinguish different types (...) of deep disagreement. Moreover, the reinterpretation of skeptical arguments elucidates that deep disagreement cannot be resolved via argumentation. (shrink)

The orthodox view about sensitivity and induction has it that beliefs formed via induction are insensitive. Since inductive knowledge is highly plausible, this problem is usually regarded as a reductio argument against sensitivity accounts of knowledge. Some adherents of sensitivity defend sensitivity against this objection, for example by considering backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals. All these extant views about sensitivity and induction have to be revised, since the problem of sensitivity and induction is a different one. Regardless of whether we allow (...) backtracking interpretations of counterfactuals, some instances of induction yield insensitive beliefs whereas others yield sensitive ones. These results are too heterogenous for providing a plausible sensitivity-account of inductive knowledge. Induction remains a serious problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge. (shrink)

The discussion about deep disagreement has gained significant momentum in the last several years. This discussion often relies on the intuition that deep disagreement is, in some sense, rationally irresolvable. In this paper, I will provide a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Such a theory is interesting in its own right, since it conflicts with the view that rational attitudes and procedures are paradigmatic tools for resolving disagreement. Moreover, I will suggest replacing discussions about deep disagreement with an analysis of (...) rationally irresolvable disagreement, since this notion can be more clearly defined than deep disagreement and captures the basic intuitions underlying deep disagreement. I will first motivate this project by critically assessing the current debate about deep disagreement. I then detail the notions of rationality and resolvable disagreement which are crucial for a suitable theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement before sketching various instances of rationally irresolvable disagreement. Finally, I argue for replacing theories of deep disagreement with theories of rationally irresolvable disagreement, an approach that has significant advantages over existing theories of deep disagreement which focus on hinge propositions or fundamental epistemic principles. (shrink)

According to virtue epistemology, the main aim of education is the development of the cognitive character of students (Pritchard, 2014, 2016). Given the proliferation of technological tools such as ChatGPT and other LLMs for solving cognitive tasks, how should educational practices incorporate the use of such tools without undermining the cognitive character of students? Pritchard (2014, 2016) argues that it is possible to properly solve this ‘technology-education tension’ (TET) by combining the virtue epistemology framework with the theory of extended cognition (...) (EXT) (Clark and Chalmers, 1998). He argues that EXT enables us to consider tools as constitutive parts of the students’ cognitive system, thus preserving their cognitive character from technologically induced cognitive diminishment. The first aim of this paper is to show that this solution is not sufficient to solve the TET. Second, I aim to offer a complementary and more encompassing framework of tool-use to address the TET. Then, I apply it to the educational uses of ChatGPT as the most notable example of LLM, although my arguments can be extended to other generative AI systems. To do so, in Sect. 1.1, I present Pritchard’s framework of cognitive character and virtue epistemology applied in education, to which I am committed in this treatment. In Sects. 2 and 3, I respectively illustrate Pritchard’s (2014) solution to the TET, and I highlight the general limitations of his proposal. Thus, in Sect. 4.1 I characterize ChatGPT as a computational cognitive artifact using Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts. In Sect. 4.2, I introduce my proposal, which combines Pritchard’s account of virtue epistemology with Fasoli’s (2017, 2018) taxonomy of cognitive artifacts to address the TET. Finally, in Sect. 5.1, I present some epistemically virtuous uses of ChatGPT in educational contexts. To conclude, I argue in favor of a multidisciplinary approach for analyzing educational activities involving AI technologies such as ChatGPT. (shrink)

Offering a solution to the skeptical puzzle is a central aim of Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge. It is well-known that this account faces serious problems. However, because of its simplicity and its explanatory power, the sensitivity principle has remained attractive and has been subject to numerous modifications, leading to a of sensitivity accounts. I will object to these accounts, arguing that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face two problems. First, they deliver a far too heterogeneous picture of higher-level beliefs about (...) the truth or falsity of one's own beliefs. Second, this problem carries over to bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Some beliefs formed via bootstrapping or Moorean reasoning are insensitive, but some closely related beliefs in even stronger propositions are sensitive. These heterogeneous results regarding sensitivity do not fit with our intuitions about bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning. Thus, neither Nozick's sensitivity account of knowledge nor any of its modified versions can provide the basis for an argument that bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning are flawed or for an explanation why they seem to be flawed. (shrink)

Keith DeRose’s solution to the skeptical problem is based on his indirect sensitivity account. Sensitivity is not a necessary condition for any kind of knowledge, as direct sensitivity accounts claim, but the insensitivity of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false explains why we tend to judge that we do not know them. The orthodox objection line against any kind of sensitivity account of knowledge is to present instances of insensitive beliefs that we still judge to constitute knowledge. This (...) objection line offers counter-examples against the claim of direct sensitivity accounts that sensitivity is necessary for any kind of knowledge. These examples raise an easy problem for indirect sensitivity accounts that claim that there is only a tendency to judge that insensitive beliefs do not constitute knowledge, which still applies to our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false. However, a careful analysis reveals that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are sensitive; nevertheless, we still judge that we do not know them. Therefore, the fact that some of our beliefs that the skeptical hypotheses are false are insensitive cannot explain why we tend to judge that we do not know them. Hence, indirect sensitivity accounts cannot fulfill their purpose of explaining our intuitions about skepticism. This is the hard problem for indirect sensitivity accounts. (shrink)

Este artículo examina el concepto del concepto en Kant y en Hegel. El modo de relación entre el principio de la apercepción y el concepto puro permite pensar a la filosofía de la forma transcendental como una metafísica crítica. La conexión sistemática entre las doctrinas del concepto, el juicio y el silogismo posibilita, en cambio, concebir la filosofía de la forma absoluta como una metafísica especulativa. En ambas lógicas el objeto corresponde, en último término, a la totalidad de las determinaciones (...) de aquella unidad suprema que Kant denominó apercepción y Hegel el concepto. (shrink)

Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, therefore, qualifies as (...) knowledge. Miščević shares Pritchard’s take on epistemic luck and acknowledges the resulting problem. In his intriguing article “Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck” Miščević suggests solving the problem by supplementing safety with a virtue theoretic condition-“agent stability”-which he also spells out in modal terms. I will argue that Miščević is on the right track when he suggests adding a virtue-theoretic component to the safety condition. However, it should not be specified modally but rather in terms of performances that manifest competences. (shrink)

Epistemologists understand radical skepticism as arising from two principles: Closure and Underdetermination. Both possess intuitive prima facie support for their endorsement. Understanding how they engender skepticism is crucial for any reasonable anti-skeptical attempt. The contemporary discussion has focused on elucidating the relationship between them to ascertain whether they establish distinct skeptical questions and which of the two constitutes the ultimately fundamental threat. Major contributions to this debate are due to Brueckner, Cohen, and Pritchard. This contribution aims at defending Brueckner’s contention (...) that underdetermination expresses the fundamental skeptical threat and that the closure-based argument can ultimately be reduced to it, at least concerning skeptical contexts. This will be achieved by undermining Cohen’s objections to Brueckner on both counts. Cohen’s argument endorses a picture of evidential underdetermination, which, while apt for non-skeptical contexts, cannot be applied to radical skepticism. A comparison with a case of scientific underdetermination is developed to argue for this idea. Our argument is then applied to the principle equivalence issue and to objections against it. It is then shown how this analysis possesses a distinctive effect on our understanding of the skeptical threat and the assessment of successful anti-skeptical strategies. (shrink)

El presente escrito presenta la tesis del yo y el mundo como partes de la apariencia ilusoria transcendental en Kant. En el capítulo de los paralogismos se exhibe la dimensión subjetiva de la apariencia bajo el modo de la subrepción del yo, mientras que el capítulo de las antinomias expone la determinación objetiva de la apariencia a partir de la dinámica de los conflictos eidéticos del mundo. Desde la perspectiva más amplia, ambas doctrinas ejercen la crítica de la apariencia del (...) yo y el mundo en el pensamiento de Kant. (shrink)

El presente escrito traza el camino del logos en tres figuras centrales de la filosofía clásica alemana. Luego de recorrer el problema de los antecedentes, es planteada la querella ante la cual quedó puesto el logos moderno. Se trata, en primer lugar, de poner de manifiesto la función del logos en la respuesta kantiana a la cuestión del fundamento del saber, tematizada principalmente en los Paralogismos de la segunda edición de la Crítica de la razón pura. En segundo lugar, será (...) reconstruida la respuesta de Fichte a dicha pregunta, desarrollada de manera específica en la Primera y Segunda Introducción a la Doctrina de la Ciencia. En tercer lugar, será tematizado el sentido del logos expuesto en la Introducción y la División General de la Ciencia de la lógica de Hegel. A lo largo de este derrotero, será formalizada de tres modos la energía fundante de toda objetividad. (shrink)

Die Beschreibung des Verhältnisses zwischen Hegel und Lateinamerika ist bis heute eine noch ungelöste Aufgabe. Die unterschiedlichen Zugänge zur spekulativen Logik des deutschen Philosophen, die innerhalb der lateinamerikanischen Region aufzufinden sind, beschreiben die unterschiedlichsten Denkmotive, Perspektiven und theoretischen Dispositionen. Dabei übersteigt Hegels Präsenz in Lateinamerika die Grenzen der Philosophie. Denn heute kommen wesentliche Forschungsbeiträge insbesondere aus dem Bereich der Sozial- und Geisteswissenschaften, wobei diese zumeist einen bestimmten Begriff der Hegelschen Philosophie hervorheben, um diesen dann in Beziehung zu ihrer singulären Disziplin (...) zu setzen. Auch wenn das Projekt einer Darstellung der Wirkungsgeschichte der Philosophie Hegels innerhalb lateinamerikanischer Wissensformen spannend sein mag, besteht das Hauptinteresse dieses Essays vornehmlich in der Diskussion zweier Rezeptionsarten der Philosophie Hegels in Lateinamerika, die als die Tradition „mit Hegel“ und die Tradition „trotz Hegel“ bezeichnet werden können. Das allgemeine Ziel der Tradition „trotz Hegel“ besteht in der Befreiung von einem europäischen philosophischen Erbe und diese Denkrichtung kann somit eher als die skeptisch-kritische Rezeptionsart gelten. Auf der anderen Seite entwickelt sich die Tradition „mit Hegel“ vor allem durch das Projekt eines deutsch-lateinamerikanischen Netzwerkes, das sich die Fortführung der Philosophie Hegels unter Berücksichtigung eines auch kontinentalen Austausches zum Ziel setzt. Diese Bewegung zeichnet sich eher durch eine immanente Rezeptionsart aus. Ihr Ansatz besteht in einem inneren – und keineswegs äußerlich-fragmentarischen – Gebrauch der Begriffe der Philosophie Hegels. Aus der Perspektive des Ganzen gesehen betont diese Strömung grundsätzlich die aktuellen Aspekte des spekulativen Denkens. Der folgende Beitrag teilt sich somit in zwei Abschnitte auf. Im ersten Abschnitt werden die dominierenden Bilder der spekulativen Philosophie dargestellt, die in den wichtigsten Entwicklungen der Tradition „trotz Hegel“ zu finden sind. Im zweiten Abschnitt werden die Spuren der Tradition „mit Hegel“ anhand des deutsch-lateinamerikanischen Philosophienetzwerkes thematisiert. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts of knowledge against an objection that has been recently proposed by Wallbridge in Philosophia. I argue in, 479–496, 2015) that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face a heterogeneity problem when it comes to higher-level knowledge about the truth of one’s own beliefs. Beliefs in weaker higher-level propositions are insensitive, but beliefs in stronger higher-level propositions are sensitive. The resulting picture that we can know the stronger propositions without being in a (...) position to know the weaker propositions is too heterogeneous to be plausible. Wallbridge objects that there is no heterogeneity problem because beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are also sensitive. I argue against Wallbridge that the heterogeneity problem is not solved but only displaced. Only some beliefs in the weaker higher-level propositions are sensitive. I conclude that the heterogeneity problem is one of a family of instability problems that sensitivity accounts of knowledge face and that Wallbridge’s account raises a further problem of this kind. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyse and develop how scepticism becomes an intelligible question starting from requirements that epistemologists themselves aim to endorse. We argue for and defend the idea that the root of scepticism is the underdetermination principle by articulating its specificitya respectable epistemic principle and by defending it against objections in current literature. This engagement offers a novel understanding of underdetermination-based scepticism. While most anti-sceptical approaches challenge scepticism by understanding it as postulating uneliminated scenarios of mass (...) deception, or as endorsing unnatural epistemic requirements, we argue here that both contentions are mistaken. Underdetermination-based scepticism targets our beliefs by issuing a genuine question about the rational support they enjoy. If we cannot establish that the sources of our beliefs provide them the required epistemic merit and authority, they lack non-arbitrary grounds. This has a sizable impact on what constitutes a satisfactory anti-sceptical strategy. Strategies that merely focus on the scenario-based aspect of scepticism, or on the truth-functional evaluation of our beliefs, are shown to miss the mark of the sceptical threat. The proposed analysis ultimately provides a shift in perspective concerning the character and reach of philosophical doubt. (shrink)

The skeptic argues that we cannot have any external world knowledge because we cannot know that we are not brains in a vat. The intuitive appeal of this skeptical argument is essentially based on the comprehensibility of the process of skeptical doubting, where we focus our attention on our experiences and experience-based beliefs and raise questions about the sources of these experiences. I propose that skeptical doubting is an instance of a mental attitude that contemporary psychology characterizes as mindfulness. I (...) suggest that mindful self-reflection is not a single phenomenon but rather a cluster of related phenomena that are characterized by an epistemic gap of one kind or the other. I conclude that the persuasiveness of the skeptical argument is based on undergoing the mental process of mindful self-reflection. The undesired skeptical results are gained by overemphasizing the epistemic force of this mental attitude. (shrink)

Vogel argues that sensitivity accounts of knowledge are implausible because they entail that we cannot have any higher-level knowledge that our beliefs are true, not false. Becker and Salerno object that Vogel is mistaken because he does not formalize higher-level beliefs adequately. They claim that if formalized correctly, higher-level beliefs are sensitive, and can therefore constitute knowledge. However, these accounts do not consider the belief-forming method as sensitivity accounts require. If we take bootstrapping as the belief-forming method, as the discussed (...) cases suggest, then we face a generality problem. Our higher-level beliefs as formalized by Becker and Salerno turn out to be sensitive according to a wide reading of bootstrapping, but insensitive according to a narrow reading. This particular generality problem does not arise for the alternative accounts of process reliabilism and basis-relative safety. Hence, sensitivity accounts not only deliver opposite results given different formalizations of higher-level beliefs, but also for the same formalization, depending on how we interpret bootstrapping. Therefore, sensitivity accounts do not fail because they make higher-level knowledge impossible, as Vogel argues, and they do not succeed in allowing higher-level knowledge, as Becker and Salerno suggest. Rather, their problem is that they deliver far too heterogeneous results. (shrink)

In epistemology, the concept of knowledge is of distinctive interest. This fact is also reflected in the discussion of epistemic value, which focuses to a large extend on the value problem of knowledge. This discussion suggests that knowledge has an outstanding value among epistemic standings because its value exceeds the value of its constitutive parts. I will argue that the value of knowledge is not outstanding by presenting epistemic standings of checking, transferring knowledge, and proving in court, whose values exceed (...) the value of knowledge in certain contexts. Moreover, the values of these other epistemic standings do not always rely on the value of knowledge. In terms of value, knowledge is not an outstanding epistemic concept. Hence, in terms of value we cannot find support for the privileged position that knowledge enjoys in epistemology. (shrink)

A philosopher argues that state-sponsored cyberattacks against central military or civilian targets are always acts of war. What is this philosopher doing? According to conceptual analysts, the philosopher is making a claim about our concept of war. According to philosophical realists, the philosopher is making a claim about war per se. In a quickly developing literature, a third option is being explored: the philosopher is engineering the concept of war. On this view, the philosopher is making a proposal about which (...) concept we should have – even if it deviates from the extant concept, and even if it does not capture ‘what war really is’. The activity or method of proposing such revisionary definitions, as well as the metaphilosophical reflection on it, has become known as conceptual engineering. (shrink)

In questo contributo del 2008 si dimostra, attraverso un confronto con le posizioni di Max Scheler, che Alsberg con il disimpegno corporeo (Körperausschaltung) non mira a esonerare l’organismo (nel senso della Entlastung di Gehlen). Per Alsberg l’evoluzione sociale avviene attraverso utensili, ma l’utensile non si limita a essere un’appendice del corpo, bensì rappresenta una logica estranea a quella del corpo. La Körperausschaltung è il killer del corpo. L’errore di Spencer è quello di non comprendere che un’evoluzione basata su utensili non (...) è semplicemente “sovra-organica”, ma piuttosto “extraorganica”. Extra-organico per Alsberg significa che l’utensile è al di fuori della logica del corpo. Ed è proprio l’autonomia dell’utensile dalla biologia a permettere di risolvere il paradosso della duplicità costitutiva dell’uomo: l’essere il motore di un’evoluzione extra-organica che produce contemporaneamente involuzione organica. Il “disimpegno organico” che libera l’uomo dal bisogno è possibile solo perché il problema dell’adattamento e dell’evoluzione viene spostato sul piano extra-organico: tale spostamento è ciò che contraddistingue l’uomo da tutti gli altri esseri viventi, quindi il principio costitutivo dell’esser umano. L' Ausschaltung, come disattivazione del corpo (dal verbo tedesco auschalten, nel senso di spegnere, ad es. una macchina, la luce ecc.) diventa pertanto il principio ultimo per comprendere l'umano nella sua interezza e non solo l'uomo della modernità (l'homo faber). L'eccezionale testo di Alsberg rimarrà praticamente sconosciuto, tuttavia con eccezioni di rilievo: già negli anni '20 ha un impatto decisivo su Max Scheler e sul progetto di fondazione dell'antropologia filosofica. Successivamente, ma con esiti opposti, su Gehlen. Il concetto di Körperausschaltung viene ripreso anche da Dieter Claessens, da Hans Blumenberg e infine da Sloterdijk. (shrink)

This article aims to provide a structural analysis of the problems related to the easy knowledge problem. The easy knowledge problem is well known. If we accept that we can have basic knowledge via a source without having any prior knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source, then we can acquire knowledge about the reliability or accuracy of this source too easily via information delivered by the source. Rejecting any kind of basic knowledge, however, leads into an infinite (...) regress and, plausibly, to skepticism. The article argues that the third alternative, accepting basic knowledge but rejecting easy knowledge, entails closure failure. This is obviously the case for deductive bootstrapping, but, notably, the problem also arises for inductive bootstrapping. Hence, the set of problems related to the easy knowledge problem has the structure of a trilemma. We are forced to accept easy knowledge, closure failure, or skepticism. (shrink)

Title: «Messages for the seven churches in the Vulgate's Revelation Book: a functional Greek-Latin translation analysis». Abstract: This paper analyses and describes the potential translation and revision of the three first chapters of the Revelation Book by Saint Jerome, which are part of the Vulgate. The present analysis has been carried out as per the functionalist theory with a focus on the skopos by Nord (1991) through the review of intratextual and extratextual factors of such theory. Additionally, it considers the (...) translation problems and techniques typologies defined and classified by Hurtado (2001). In the light of these postulates, it is considered to carry out a commented translation with a centre on Greek and Latin languages of Late Antiquity with the purpose of following and understanding the translation process developed in a natural way by the Saint. (shrink)

This paper replies to the comments made in Acta Analytica by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Wes Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster on my Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Routledge 2019), hereinafter abbreviated as KC. These papers resulted from a workshop organized by the department of philosophy of the University of Maribor. I am very thankful to the organizers of the workshop and to the authors for their comments.

In this Précis, I provide an overview of my Monograph Knowing and Checking: An Epistemological Investigation (Melchior 2019), which is subject to a book symposium organized by the University of Maribor. This volume in Acta Analytica contains contributions by Peter Baumann, Kelly Becker, Marian David, Nenad Miščević, Robert Weston Siscoe, and Danilo Šuster along with my replies.

Ensayo ganador del Concurso de Ensayo “Hegel y América Latina”, convocado por FILORED con ocasión del III Congreso Germano-Latinoamericano sobre la Filosofía de Hegel, Lima-Cusco, Perú 2022.

The feeling of shame discussed by Socrates differs from the one considered in the classic distinction between shame culture and guilt culture [Dodds 1951; Williams 1993]. Dodds refers to 9th-century Homeric society and focuses on αἴδομαι understood as fear towards public opinion. What Socrates talks about, instead, is aischýne (αἰσχύνη), such as the feeling of shame Alcibiades only has towards Socrates, for which not public opinion but one’s own conscience matters (Smp. 216 b-c). Socrates’ standpoint does not coincide at all (...) with the dominant dòxa, nor does it intend to undermine Alcibiades’ moral autonomy by inducing his sense of shame. On the contrary, it performs a cathartic function that is essential for the care of the soul, which is an indispensable premise for Alcibiades to learn to govern himself. (shrink)

Author: Norbert Waszek. Translated by Pedro Sepúlveda Zambrano.

Questions surrounding deep disagreement have gained significant attention in recent years. One of the central debates is metaphysical, focusing on the features that make a disagreement deep. Proposals for what makes disagreements deep include theories about hinge propositions and first epistemic principles. In this paper, I criticize this metaphysical discussion by arguing that it is methodologically flawed. Deep disagreement is a technical or semi-technical term, but the metaphysical discussion mistakenly treats it as a common-sense concept to be analyzed and captured (...) by our pre-theoretical intuitions. Since the literature on deep disagreement is subject to this fundamental confusion and deep disagreement is not a helpful umbrella term either, I propose eliminating the notion of deep disagreement from the philosophical discourse. Instead of analyzing the nature of deep disagreement, we should develop theories about different forms of disagreement, including disagreement about hinge propositions and disagreement about epistemic principles, and, in particular, a theory of rationally irresolvable disagreement. (shrink)

Given the explanatory stalemate between ‘embedded’ (EMB) and ‘extended’ (EXT) cognition, various authors have proposed normative and moral arguments in favour of EXT. According to what we call the “extended cognition moral narrative” (EXT-MN) (Cassinadri, 2022), we should embrace EXT and dismiss EMB, because the former leads to morally preferable consequences with respect to the latter. In this article we argue that two arguments following the EXT moral narrative are flawed. In Sect. 2.1 and 2.2, we present respectively King (2016) (...) and Vold’s (2018) ‘argument from assessment of capacities’ (AAC) and Clowes (2013), Farina and Lavazza’s (2022a) ‘cognitive diminishment argument’ (CDA). The AAC states that we should embrace EXT over EMB since the former is better at attributing cognitive credit to individuals with learning disabilities who use assistive tools to complete their learning tasks, thus avoiding their marginalisation. The CDA states that EMB implies a morally undesirable picture of the agent in terms of cognitive diminishment. In Sect. 3, we clarify and criticise the underlying assumptions of the AAC and CDA: the “cognitive credit assumption”, the “marginalisation assumption” and, more generally, an ableist conception of disabled agency. In Sect. 3.1, we discuss the role of moto-perceptual skills and metacognitive credit involved in complex cases of tool-use, to demonstrate that the EXT-MN is uninformative in addressing these cases. To conclude, in Sect. 4 we argue that AAC and CDA fail to present EXT as descriptively and normatively superior to EMB. (shrink)

This paper provides a thorough analysis of two often informally stated claims. First, successful argumentation in the sense of persuasive argumentation requires agreement between the interlocutors about the rationality of arguments. Second, a general agreement about rationality of arguments cannot itself be established via argumentation, since such an attempt leads to an infinite meta‐regress. Hence, agreement about the rationality of arguments is a precondition for successful argumentation. As the paper argues, these plausible claims hold under the assumption that interlocutors are (...) subjectively rational and follow their own standards of rationality when engaging in argumentation. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta el modo de relación de la totalidad de lo condicionado y lo incondicionado en la lógica transcendental de Kant. Para ello el argumento reconstruye los elementos que abren el tratamiento de la dialéctica transcendental en la "Crítica de la razón pura", es decir, la apariencia ilusoria y las Ideas de la razón. Este modo de leer la doctrina de las síntesis transcendentales de lo condicionado y lo incondicionado exhibe la tesis de la complementariedad diferenciada entre ambas regiones, (...) dando a cada una su derecho, lugar y misión. (shrink)

The proof paradox results from conflicting intuitions concerning different types of fallible evidence in a court of law. We accept fallible individual evidence but reject fallible statistical evidence even when the conditional probability that the defendant is guilty given the evidence is the same, a seeming inconsistency. This paper defends a solution to the proof paradox, building on a sensitivity account of checking and settling a question. The proposed sensitivity account of legal proof not only requires sensitivity simpliciter but sensitivity (...) of each relevant step of the proof procedure and/or sensitivity concerning all relevant alternatives. This account avoids problems that have been identified for other sensitivity views of legal proof. Moreover, it is argued that sensitivity, rather than safety, is the crucial modal condition for legal proof. It is, finally, shown that the provided account can fruitfully support very different existing views on the relationship between knowledge and legal proof. (shrink)

Author: Thomas Sören Hoffmann. Translated by Pedro Sepúlveda Zambrano.

This book explores how we can find meaning in life through "care of desire" and "emotional sharing" that provide the basis for relationships of care. It argues that this meaning is not automatically given to us at birth, as we come into the world without having finished being born.

That bootstrapping and Moorean reasoning fail to instantiate persuasive argumentation is an often informally presented but not systematically developed view. In this paper, I will argue that this unpersuasiveness is not determined by principles of justification transmission but by two straightforward principles of rationality, understood as a concept of internal coherence. First, it is rational for S to believe the conclusion of an argument because of the argument, only if S believes sufficiently many premises of the argument. Second, if S (...) doubts that a source _O_ is reliable and believes that information _i_ is delivered by _O_, then S rationally suspends judgment about the truth of _i_. This paper aims to accomplish two tasks. First, it provides a thorough analysis of why bootstrapping argumentation is not an instance of rational persuasion. Second, it contains a more general theory about preconditions and limits of persuasive argumentation. (shrink)

I will compare Lehrer’s anti-skeptical strategy from a coherentist point of view with the anti-skeptical strategy of the Mooreans. I will argue that there are strong similarities between them: neither can present a persuasive argument to the skeptic and both face the problem of easy knowledge in one way or another. However, both can offer a complete and self-explanatory explanation of knowledge although Mooreanism can offer the more natural one. Hence, one has good reasons to prefer Mooreanism to Lehrer’s anti-skeptical (...) approach, if one does not prefer coherentism to foundationalism for other reasons. (shrink)

The following contribution aims at presenting a reading of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy as a kind of idealism within the Kantian and post-Kantian traditions. The goal is to argue that Wittgenstein’s position shares substantial theoretical and methodological grounds with Hegel’s idealism. The main concepts pertaining to the later Wittgenstein’s position are analyzed and understood as a form of idealism. After defending the reading against anti-idealist interpretations we argue that the kind of idealism presented clashes with central tenets of the Kantian position. (...) These points of departure are then shown to cover in a substantial manner the same kind of criticism Hegel raised against Kant. In the last section, an interpretation of central concepts of the Hegelian position is offered in order to dissolve any fundamental incompatibility with Wittgenstein’s idealism. (shrink)