This essay undertakes a phenomenological inquiry into the ‘experiential structure of hip-hop’ – a structure that hip-hop artist Jay-Z (Shawn Carter) gestures towards in his text Decoded. In this book, Jay-Z argues that hip-hop has a particular power to act as the vehicle for the communication of a specific type of experience, i.e. contradictory experiences, or those which do not seem possible under the principle of non-contradiction. For instance, Tupac Shakur says of his mom that “…even as a crack fiend, (...) mama / You always was a Black Queen, mama.” The way in which hip-hop is a powerful vehicle for this communication lies, according to Jay-Z, in its very structure, which he describes using two sets of terms: rhythm/flow and music/rhyme. Using Jay-Z’s general outline, this essay attempts to complete a phenomenological analysis of hip-hop, in the effort to (1) isolate the experiential structure of hip-hop and (2) isolate, within this structure, the way in which hip-hop is able to communicate contradictory experiences. In the final analysis, the author isolates the experiential structure of hip-hop and shows how its multiple layers work to draw listeners in and induce them to experience-with the artist. (shrink)

A retrospective essay, written for the 125th anniversary of Ethics.

According to Frankfurt’s analysis, bullshitting and lying necessarily differ in intention. I argue contra Frankfurt that (i) bullshitting can be lying, and that (ii) bullshitting need involve neither misrepresentation nor intention to deceive. My discussion suggests that bullshit is not capturable by a simple formula and that, although illuminating, Frankfurt’s analysis is limited to one paradigm.

In his article, “Equality as a Moral Ideal”, Harry Frankfurt argues against economic egalitarianism and presents what he calls the “doctrine of sufficiency.” According to the doctrine of sufficiency, what is morally important is not relative economic equality, but rather, whether somebody has enough, where “having enough” is a non-comparative standard of reasonable contentment that may differ from person to person given his/her aims and circumstances. The purpose of this paper is to show that Frankfurt’s original arguments in support (...) for his doctrine of sufficiency have critical problems that Frankfurt himself does not properly recognize. In the end, I will argue that in order to solve these problems the doctrine of sufficiency cannot help but to incorporate certain prioritarian commitments – commitments which many would view as implying economic egalitarianism. This is embarrassing for a doctrine whose raison d’être was mainly to defeat economic egalitarianism. (shrink)

Ethical objectivists hold that there is one and only one correct system of moral beliefs. From such a standpoint it follows that conflicting basic moral principles cannot both be true and that the only moral principles which are binding on rational human agents are those described by the single true morality. However sincerely they may be held, all other moral principles are incorrect. Objectivism is an influential tradition, covering most of the rationalist and naturalist standpoints which have dominated nineteenth and (...) twentieth century moral philosophy: there is widespread agreement amongst relativists themselves that objectivism is firmly rooted in common sense. (shrink)

In his writings on school choice and educational justice, Harry Brighouse presents normative evaluations of various choice systems. This paper responds to Brighouse's claim that it is inadequate to criticise these evaluations with reference to empirical data concerning the effects of school choice.

How about a different take on the rich and famous? First the obvious—these novels are primitive superstition that encourages children to believe in fantasy rather than take responsibility for the world-- the norm of course. JKR is just as clueless about herself and the world as all the other monkeys, but about 200 times as destructive as the average American and about 800 times more than the average Chinese. She has been responsible for the destruction of maybe 30,000 hectares of (...) forest to produce these trash novels and all the erosion ensuing (not trivial as its ca. 12 tons/year soil into the ocean for everyone on earth or maybe 100 tons per American, and so about 5000 tons/year for Rowling’s books and movies and her destructive brood of 3 children). Then there is the huge amount of fuel burned and waste made to make and distribute the books and films, plastic dolls etc. She shows her lack of social responsibility by producing children rather than using her millions to encourage family planning or buy up the rain forest. Of course she's not that different from most people--just more destructive. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). (shrink)

The authors definitely become the voice of countless parents. This book forces us to focus on the family, so neglected today, and emphasises its role in shaping values of future generations.

In this paper I will defend the idea of the success of post-truth as one of the main features of hypermodernity. In order to understand such a claim, I will start by defining “post-truth” and showing the key differences that separate it from simple manipulation or lies. I will explain how post-truth characterizes a whole new way of understanding the difference between truth and falsity: a new attitude of indifference to the sharp distinction that moderns and ancients had placed between (...) these two notions. I will contend that this new attitude had been announced by the work of at least three recent philosophers: Harry Frankfurt, Gianni Vattimo and Mario Perniola. They give different names to “post-truth”, though, and attribute it to different causes (from anti-intellectualism to the new media and to sheer carelessness). After that, I will explore how two key aspects of hypermodernity (according to Gilles Lipovetsky), i.e. hyperindividualism and hyperconsumption, cohere with this spread of post-truth. Finally, I will summarily refer to some political and geopolitical events that corroborate the relevance of post-truth in our hypermodern world. (shrink)

Both Martin Heidegger and Harry Frankfurt have argued that the fundamental feature of human identity is care. Both contend that caring is bound up with the fact that we are finite beings related to our own impending death, and both argue that caring has a distinctive, circular and non-instantaneous, temporal structure. In this paper, I explore the way Heidegger and Frankfurt each understand the relations among care, death, and time, and I argue for the superiority of Heideggerian version of (...) this nest of claims. Frankfurt claims that we should conceive of the most basic commitments which practically orient a person in the world and define his identity (“volitional necessities”) as naturalistic facts, foundational for and located completely without the normative space of reasons. In support of this he appeals to the supposedly foundational role played in human life by the instinct for self-preservation, what Frankfurt calls the “love of living.” The claim is that in questions of practical identity there is a definite priority of the factual over the normative. Frankfurt’s naturalistic model of volitional necessity is motivated by a misunderstanding of the temporal structure of care, a misunderstanding that helps lead him to an implausible conception of the basic structures of human identity. Heidegger advances an anti-naturalistic conception of caring, one bound up with his way of understanding how human beings relate to their own future. I argue that the existential, temporal, and normative significance that Frankfurt attributes to the naturalized “love of living” is better captured by the Heideggerian claim that human identity is defined by being “for-the-sake-of” certain projects and commitments, a way of being lived out in the way Heidegger calls “being-towards-death.”. (shrink)

In his paper, "Free Choice, Incommensurable Goods and the Self-Refutation of Determinism,"' Joseph Boyle seeks to show how the argument for the self-refutation of determinism - first articulated over twenty-five years ago - is an argument whose force depends on (first) a proper understanding of just what free choice is, and (secondly) a proper understanding of how free choice is a principle of moral responsibility. According to Boyle, a person can make a genuinely free choice only if he is presented (...) with alternative options that are incommensurable in their goodness or desirability. If the goodness or desirability of alternative options could be commensurated, or compared in accordance with some common standard, then it would be possible in principle for a person to determine which of the two options offered more, and which offered less, of the same sort of good represented by the two options. But if this sort of commensuration or comparison were possible, according to Boyle, then there would really be no need to choose. Rather, the only task that would have to be performed in order to determine the person's selection among alternative options would be the task clarifying or calculating which of the alternative options offered most fully what it is that makes both options desirable in the first place. Once the clarification or calculation is done, there would be no need-and in fact, no possibility--of really choosing: the calculation alone would settle which option is the best option, and thus which option is to be selected. Now if genuinely free choice requires that the choosing person be presented with options that are incommensurable in goodness or desirability, then it also seems to be the case that genuine choice-and the moral responsibility that goes along with it-requires that the person be presented with alternative possibilities from which to choose. And yet some compatibilist thinkers have held that moral responsibility does not really require the presence of alternative possibilities. In particular, Harry G. Frankfurt has sought to show (by means of counter-example) that a person can be a moral agent and morally responsible, even if the person did not, in fact, have any alternative possibilities available to him (that is, even if the person could not have done otherwise). Frankfurt's counter-example offers a direct challenge to the sort of incompatibilism that Boyle seeks to defend; and so Boyle is quite right to address Frankfurt head-on. For if Frankfurt is right, then it is erroneous to hold "the principle of alternative possibilities" (the principle that a person can be morally responsible for what he has done, only if he had alternative possibilities, or only if he could have done otherwise). But if it is erroneous to hold the principle of alternative possibilities, then it also seems erroneous to hold the more robust position that Boyle wishes to defend: namely, the position that moral responsibility requires not only alternative possibilities, but also alternative possibilities representing options that are incommensurable in their goodness. (shrink)

This article begins by tracing two issues to be kept in mind in discussing the theme of love as far back as Aristotle: on the one hand the polysemy of the term philia in Aristotle, and on the other hand the fact that there is a focal or core meaning of philia that provides order to that polysemy. Secondly, it is briefly suggested that the same issues are, mutatis mutandis, central for understanding the discussion of love or Liebe by Hegel, (...) the central classic reference in debates on recognition. Thirdly, by pointing out a certain ambiguity in Harry Frankfurt’s recent work on love, the article focuses more closely on the thought that love in the simple sense which Aristotle had pinpointed as the focal meaning of philia, which is arguably at the core of Hegel’s discussion of Liebe, and which still forms at least one of the core senses of the term, is a ‘personifying’ attitude of recognition. Finally, drawing on the above points the article addresses the question whether love as a form of recognition is restricted to intimate relations such as those between family-members, ‘lovers’, close friends and so on, or whether it has applications in interhuman relations more broadly. The answer to this question, it is suggested, is essential for the viability of ethically substantial notions of solidarity beyond circles of close acquaintances, whether within the civil society, across nations, or towards future generations. (shrink)

This paper argues that ability to do otherwise (in the compatibilist sense) at the moment of initiation of action is a necessary condition of being able to act at all. If the argument is correct, it shows that Harry Frankfurt never provided a genuine counterexample to the 'principles of alternative possibilities' in his 1969 paper ‘Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility’. The paper was written without knowledge of Frankfurt's paper.

The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. -/- Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible (...) with moral responsibility. I will argue, however, that it is not merely the inability to do otherwise by itself but rather the inability to do otherwise in combination with the absence of a counterfactual intervener that is incompatible with moral responsibility. If I cannot do otherwise and it is not because of a counterfactual intervener, then it must be the case that I am being forced to choose and therefore act as I do, in which case I cannot be morally responsible for this action. -/- Because the Blockage Argument fails, and because it was really the only way to establish that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, it follows that moral responsibility does indeed require at least one alternative possibility in any given situation. But it turns out that this conclusion does not tip the balance in favor of incompatibilism over compatibilism. It would have if blockage and determinism were equivalent. But they are not. Unlike blockage, determinism is compatible with certain counterfactuals that compatibilists traditionally believed the ability to do otherwise reduces to. So even though moral responsibility is incompatible with blockage, it does not necessarily follow that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. (shrink)

Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. Using (...) Harry Frankfurt’s emphasis on love as a final end, I argue that disintegration as motivation is not a more acceptable motivation than impartiality and so does not adequately address Williams’ criticism. I also argue that the idea of a divided self either leads to an infinite regress or to an implausible description of how our commitments evolve and change. To make this last claim, I discuss a case from John Updike’s novel 'In the Beauty of the Lilies.'. (shrink)

Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. Using (...) Harry Frankfurt’s emphasis on love as a final end, I argue that disintegration as motivation is not a more acceptable motivation than impartiality and so does not adequately address Williams’ criticism. I also argue that the idea of a divided self either leads to an infinite regress or to an implausible description of how our commitments evolve and change. To make this last claim, I discuss a case from John Updike’s novel 'In the Beauty of the Lilies.'. (shrink)

Harry S. Broudy has studied the utility of general education through the development and testing of his Newspaper Test of the Uses of Schooling (NPT). The results of research with a new version of the NPT are reported in this essay and some options for future research are presented. The results of the study indicate that continued development and testing of the NPT will prove important. Promising new versions of the test are suggested for future research to pursue, including (...) a Hypertest version. Additional instruments and research strategies are also suggested that could be used to broaden the "search for evidence" of the uses of schooling. (shrink)

Harry G. Frankfurt’s work on agency and reflexivity represents one of the most important attempts in the current philosophical literature to elaborate the structure of agency. Frankfurt wishes to provide an account of what I call the “deep structures” of agency—those features of agency, such as care and love, in virtue of which the surface features, such as desire, are to be explained and understood. These deep structures are important because of their power to explain unified diachronic patterns in (...) our lives rather than just individual actions. In doing so, Frankfurt seeks to be a Humean in Aristotelian clothing: he desires the richness of a broadly Aristotelian moral psychology–specifically, an Augustinian variant of this—built out of the resources of a Humean human nature in which the “passions,” or here, those objects we care about, are fundamental. -/- Thus Frankfurt develops concepts such as second-order desire, identification and dissociation, wholeheartedness, and love without incurring significant metaphysical costs. Through these concepts Frankfurt provides an account with extraordinary richness. However, I argue that Frankfurt’s minimalism conflicts with his attempts to provide so rich an account of our moral lives. In particular, his attempt to make caring foundational for practical reason undermines his conception of identification and dissociation. Frankfurt’s Humeanism commits him to a tragic moral universe in which the dissociation of desire is little more than an exercise in self-deception rather than a means of guaranteeing psychic unity. -/- I then argue that a superior account of moral life and the moral self can be constructed through greater reliance upon Augustinian ideas concerning the nature of love that is rooted in two concepts: affinity and peace. The concept of affinity provides a basis for evaluating what is worth loving and the concept of peace, central to Augustine’s moral psychology, is used to analyze the structure of love itself in its many manifestations. This account is less minimalist than Frankfurt’s but is more faithful to our moral experience and provides a more powerful and nuanced analysis of moral life and the self. (shrink)

I argue against two of the most influential contemporary theories of moral responsibility: those of Harry Frankfurt and John Martin Fischer. Both propose conditions which are supposed to be sufficient for direct moral responsibility for actions. (By the term direct moral responsibility, I mean moral responsibility which is not traced from an earlier action.) Frankfurt proposes a condition of 'identification'; Fischer, writing with Mark Ravizza, proposes conditions for 'guidance control'. I argue, using counterexamples, that neither is sufficient for direct (...) moral responsibility. -/- My counterexample cases are based on recent research in psychology which reveals many surprising causes of our actions. Some of this research comes from the field of situationist social psychology; some from experiments which reveal the influence of automatic processes in our actions. Broadly, I call such causes 'subverting' when the agent would not identify with her action, if she knew all the causes of the action. When an action has subverting causes, the agent is not directly morally responsible for it, even though she may meet the conditions specified by Frankfurt and Fischer. -/- I also criticise the theories of Eddy Nahmias and John Doris, who have both engaged specifically with the threats posed to moral responsibility by situationist research. Against Doris and Nahmias, I argue that their conditions are neither necessary nor sufficient for direct moral responsibility. -/- My final objective is to argue that there are many everyday actions for which we mistakenly hold agents morally responsible. I review evidence that there are many everyday actions which have subverting causes. Many of those are actions for which we currently hold agents morally responsible. But I argue that, in many of those same actions, the agents are not in fact morally responsible – they bear neither direct nor traced moral responsibility. (shrink)

¿Qué tal una toma diferente de los ricos y famosos? Primero lo obvio — las novelas de Harry Potter son supersticiones primitivas que animan a los niños a creer en la fantasía en lugar de asumir la responsabilidad del mundo-la norma por supuesto. JKR es tan despistada sobre sí misma y el mundo como la mayoría de las personas, pero unas 200 veces más destructivas que el estadounidense promedio y unas 800 veces más que el chino promedio. Ella ha (...) sido responsable de la destrucción de tal vez 30.000 hectáreas de bosque para producir estas novelas de basura y toda la erosión subsiguiente (no trivial como es al menos 6 y tal vez 12 toneladas/año de tierra en el océano para todos en la tierra o tal vez 100 toneladas por American, y así alrededor de 5000 toneladas/año para los libros y películas de Rowling y su 3 niños). La tierra pierde al menos el 1% de su tierra vegetal cada año, por lo que se acerca a 2100, la mayor parte de su capacidad de cultivo de alimentos desaparecerá. Luego está la enorme cantidad de combustible quemado y los desechos hechos para hacer y distribuir los libros y películas, muñecas de plástico, etc. Ella muestra su falta de responsabilidad social produciendo niños en lugar de usar sus millones para alentar la planificación familiar o comprar la selva tropical, y promoviendo la estupidez liberal convencional de la 3ª supremacía mundial que está destruyendo Gran Bretaña, Estados Unidos, el mundo y el futuro de su descendiente. Por supuesto, ella no es tan diferente de las otras 7.8 mil millones de - sólo más ruidosas y destructivas. Es el no libre problema de almuerzo escrito grande. La multitud simplemente no puede ver que no hay tal cosa como ayudar a una persona sin dañar a los demás. Los derechos o privilegios dados a los nuevos participantes en un mundo superpoblado sólo pueden disminuir los de los demás. A pesar de los desastres ecológicos masivos que ocurren delante de ellos en todas partes todos los días, no pueden anclar a la maternidad desenfrenada de "lo diverso", que representa la mayor parte del aumento de la población del siglo pasado y todo eso en este. Carecen de una combinación de inteligencia, educación, experiencia y cordura necesaria para extrapolar los asaltos diarios a los recursos y el funcionamiento de la sociedad para el eventual colapso de la civilización industrial. Cada comida, cada viaje en coche o autobús, cada par de zapatos es otro clavo en el ataúd de la tierra. Probablemente nunca ha cruzado su mente que un asiento en un avión de Londres a San Francisco produce alrededor de una tonelada de carbono que derrite unos 3 metros cuadrados de hielo marino y como uno de los privilegiados que probablemente ha volado cientos de tales vuelos. No sólo los ricos y famosos, pero casi cualquier figura pública en absoluto, incluyendo prácticamente todos los profesores, se ven presionados a ser políticamente correcto, que en el las democracias occidentales, ahora significa socialdemócrata (Neomarxista — i. e., comunista diluido), supremacistas del tercer mundo que trabajan por la destrucción de sus propias sociedades y sus propios descendientes. Entonces, aquellos cuya falta of educación, experiencia, inteligencia (y el sentido común básico), que debería prohibirles hacer declaraciones públicas en absoluto, dominar totalmente a todos los medios de comunicación, creando la impresión de que los inteligentes y civilizados deben favorecer la democracia, la diversidad y la igualdad, mientras que la verdad es que estos son los problemas y no las soluciones, y que ellos mismos son los principales enemigos de la civilización. Ver mi suicidio por la democracia 2Nd Ed (2019) y otras obras. (shrink)

Much of the literature on impairment to self-governance focuses on cases in which a person either lacks the ability to protect herself from errant urges or cases in which a person lacks the capacity to initiate self-reflective agential processes. This has led to frameworks for thinking about self-governance designed with only the possibility of these sorts of impairments in mind. I challenge this orthodoxy using the case of melancholic depression to show that there is a third way that self-governance can (...) be undermined: an agent may fail to form the desire she most wants to act on. (shrink)

There are many psychic mechanisms by which people engage with their selves. We argue that an important yet hitherto neglected one is self-appraisal via meta-emotions. We discuss the intentional structure of meta-emotions and explore the phenomenology of a variety of examples. We then present a pilot study providing preliminary evidence that some facial displays may indicate the presence of meta-emotions. We conclude by arguing that meta-emotions have an important role to play in higher-order theories of psychic harmony.

I begin by sketching the Epicurean position on death - that it cannot be bad for the one who dies because she no longer exists - which has struck many people as specious. However, alternative views must specify who is wronged by death (the dead person?), what is the harm (suffering?), and when does the harm take place (before death, when you’re not dead yet, or after death, when you’re not around any more?). In the second section I outline the (...) most sophisticated anti-Epicurean view, the deprivation account, according to which someone who dies is harmed to the extent that the death has deprived her of goods she would otherwise have had. In the third section I argue that deprivation accounts that use the philosophical tool of possible worlds have the counterintuitive implication that we are harmed in the actual world because counterfactual versions of us lead fantastic lives in other possible worlds. In the final section I outline a neo-Epicurean position that explains how one can be wronged by being killed without being harmed by death and how it is possible to defend intuitions about injustice without problematic appeal to possible worlds. (shrink)

In this essay I consider whether the political perspective of third wave science studies – ‘elective modernism’ – offers a suitable framework for understanding the policy-making contributions that (bio)ethical experts might make. The question arises as a consequence of the fact that I have taken inspiration from the third wave in order to develop an account of (bio)ethical expertise. I offer a précis of this work and a brief summary of elective modernism before considering their relation. The view I set (...) out suggests that elective modernism is a political philosophy and that although its use in relation to the use of scientific expertise in political and policy-making process has implications for the role of (bio)ethical expertise it does not, in the final analysis, provide an account that is appropriate for this latter form of specialist expertise. Nevertheless, it is an informative perspective, and one that can help us make sense of the political uses of (bio)ethical expertise. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine a new line of response to Frankfurt’s challenge to the traditional association of moral responsibility with the ability to do otherwise. According to this response, Frankfurt’s counterexample strategy fails, not in light of the conditions for moral responsibility per se, but in view of the conditions for action. Specifically, it is claimed, a piece of behavior counts as an action only if it is within the agent’s power to avoid performing it. In so far as (...) Frankfurt’s challenge presupposes that actions can be unavoidable, this view of action seems to bring his challenge up short. Helen Steward and Maria Alvarez have independently proposed versions of this response. Here I argue that this response is unavailable to Frankfurt’s incompatibilist opponents. This becomes evident when we put this question to its proponents: “Are actions that originate deterministically ipso facto unavoidable?” If they answer “yes,” they encounter one horn of a dilemma. If they answer “no,” they encounter the other horn. Since no one has a clearer stake in meeting Frankfurt’s challenge than these theorists do, it is significant that the Steward-Alvarez response is unavailable to them. (shrink)

Scholarly critiques of the just war tradition have grown in number and sophistication in recent years to the point that available publications now provide the basis for a more philosophically challenging Peace Studies course. Focusing on just a few works published in the past several years, this review explores how professional philosophers are reclaiming the terrain long dominated by the approach of political scientist Michael Walzer. On center stage are British philosopher David Rodin’s critique of the self-defensejustification for war and (...) American philosopher Andrew Fiala’s skeptical assessment of the just war tradition in its entirety. Also considered is a collection of more narrowly focused critiques by philosophers and some highly relevant extra-philosophical studies regarding the social interconnections between authority and violence. (shrink)

It seems better to love virtue than vice, pleasure than pain, good than evil. Perhaps it's also better to love virtuous people than vicious people. But at the same time, it's repugnant to suggest that a mother should love her smarter, more athletic, better looking son than his dim, clumsy, ordinary brother. My task is to help sort out the conflicting intuitions about what we should love. In particular, I want to address a problem for the no-reasons view, the theory (...) that love cannot be rationally justified. Since it seems better to love good people rather than evil villains, it appears that there are indeed reasons for (or, at least, against) love. Is it coherent to talk this way and deny that love can be justified? I think so and will explain how. (shrink)

어떻게 부자와 유명한에 다른 걸릴에 대한? 먼저 해리 포터 소설은 아이들이 세상에 대한 책임을 지기보다는 환상을 믿도록 장려하는 원시적인 미신입니다. JKR은 자신과 세계에 대한 단서가 거의없지만, 평균 미국인보다 약 200배, 평균 중국인보다 약 800배 더 파괴적입니다. 그녀는 이 쓰레기 소설과 모든 침식을 생산하기 위해 30,000 헥타르의 숲을 파괴한 책임이있습니다 (지구상의 모든 사람을 위해 바다에 적어도6 톤과 12 톤 / 년 토양이 아니며 미국인 100 톤, 그리고 Rowling의 책과 이스와그녀의 3 명의 아이들에 대해 연간 약 5000 톤). 지구는 매년 표토의 적어도 (...) 1 %를 잃고, 그래서 그것은 2100 에 가까워지면, 그것의 음식 성장 능력의 대부분은 사라질 것입니다. 그런 다음 책과 영화, 플라스틱 인형 등을 만들고 배포하기 위해 만든 연료와 폐기물의 엄청난 양이있다. 그녀는 수백만 명의 아이들을 가족 계획을 장려하거나 열대 우림을 사들이기보다는 아이들을 생산함으로써 사회적 책임이 부족하다는 것을 보여주고, 영국, 미국, 세계 및 그녀의 후손의 미래를 파괴하는 제 3 세계 패권의 전통적인 자유주의 어리석음을 장려함으로써 그녀의 사회적 책임이 부족하다는 것을 보여줍니다. 물론, 그녀는 다른 7과 다르지 않습니다. 80 억 단서 - 그냥 시끄고 더 파괴적. 무료 런치 문제 영장 큰 입니다. 폭도들은 다른 사람을 해치지 않고 한 사람을 돕는 것과 같은 것이 없다는 것을 알 수 없습니다. 혼잡한 세상에 새로운 참가자에게 주어지는 권리 나 특권은 다른 사람들의 사람들을 희미하게 만들 수있습니다. 매일 어디서나 일어나는 거대한 생태 재해에도 불구하고, 그들은 지난 세기의 인구 증가의 대부분과이 모든 것을 차지하는 "다양한"의 억제되지 않은 모성에 고정 할 수 없습니다. 그들은 산업 문명의 궁극적 인 붕괴에 자원과 기능 사회의 매일 공격을 추정하는 데 필요한 지능, 교육, 경험과 정신의 조합이 부족합니다. 각 식사, 자동차 또는 버스로 각 여행, 신발의 각 쌍은 지구의 관에 또 다른 손톱입니다. 런던에서 샌프란시스코로 가는 비행기의 한 좌석이 약 3 평방 미터의 해빙을 녹이는 약 1 톤의 탄소를 생산한다는 것은 결코 그녀의 마음을 건드리지 않았을 것이며, 그녀가 수백 개의 항공편을 비행했을 가능성이 큽니까. 부유하고 유명한 사람뿐만 아니라 거의 모든 공적 인물, 거의 모든 교사를 포함하여, 정치적으로 올바른 압력을 받고, 이는 서구 민주주의에서, 지금 사회 민주주의를 의미(신마르크스주의자 - 즉, 희석 공산주의자) 자신의 사회와 자신의 후손의 파괴를 위해 일하는 제 3 세계 우월주의자. 그래서,그 부족 of 교육, 경험, 정보 (그리고 기본적인 상식), 전혀 공개 발언을 금지해야, 완전히 모든 미디어를 지배, 지적이고 문명화 된 민주주의, 다양성과 평등을 선호해야한다는 인상을 만드는, 진실은 이들이 문제가 아닌 솔루션이며, 그들 자신은 문명의 주요 원수입니다. 민주주의 2nd 에드 (2019) 및 다른 사람에 의해 내 자살을 참조하십시오. (shrink)

对富人和名人有不同的看法怎么样？首先显而易见的——哈利·波特小说是原始的迷信,鼓励孩子们相信幻想,而不是对世界负责——当然,这是常态。JKR和大多数人一样对自己和世界一无所知,但破坏力是普通美国人的2 00倍,比一般中国人高出800倍。她一直负责破坏大约3万公顷的森林,以产生这些垃圾小说和所有的侵蚀(不是微不足道的,因为它至少是6,也许12吨/年的土壤进入海洋,地球上的每个人或100吨每个美国人,所 以约5000吨/年罗琳的书和莫夫和她的3个孩子)。地球每年至少损失1%的表土,因此,当它接近2100年时,大部分粮食的生长能力将消失。然后是大量的燃料燃烧和废物,使书籍和电影,塑料娃娃等。她通过生孩子 ,而不是用她数百万的人来鼓励计划生育或购买雨林,以及通过宣扬正在毁灭英国、美国、破坏英国、美国、、世界和她的后代的未来。当然,她和其他7个也没有什么不同。8十亿无头 - 只是嘈杂和更破坏性的. 这是没有免费的午餐问题写大。暴徒们就是看不上没有伤害别人就能帮助一个人。给予新进入拥挤世界的人的权利或特权只能使其他人的权利或特权黯然失色。尽管每天都在他们面前发生大规模的生态灾难,但他们无法把它们与 "多样化"的无拘无束的母性相统一,因为"多样化"占上个世纪人口增长的大部分时间。一个。他们缺乏智力、教育、经验和理智,因此需要将每天对社会资源和运作的攻击推断为 工业文明的最终崩溃。每顿饭,每次坐汽车或公共汽车旅行,每双鞋都是地球棺材里的另一颗钉子。她可能从未想过,从伦敦飞往旧金山的飞机上的一个座位会产生大约一吨的碳,融化了大约3平方米的海冰,而作为特权阶层之 一,她可能飞过数百次这样的航班。 不仅富人和名人,而且几乎任何公众人物,包括几乎所有的教师,都被迫在政治上正确,这在西方民主政体中,现在意味着社会民主(新马克思主义者——即被稀释的共产主义者)第三位。世界至高无上主义者为毁灭自己的社会 和自己的后代而工作。因此,那些缺乏教育、经验、智力(和基本常识)的人,应该禁止他们发表任何公开声明,完全主宰着所有媒体,给人留下一种印象,即聪明和文明必须有利于民主、多样性和平等,而事实是,这些是问题 而不是解决办法,它们本身就是文明的主要敌人。看到我的自杀民主2nd(2019).

Как насчет другого взять на богатых и знаменитых? Во-первых, очевидное - романы о Гарри Поттере - это примитивные суеверия, которые побуждают детей верить в фантазию, а не брать на себя ответственность за мир - норма, конечно. JKR как раз как clueless о себе и мире как большинств люди,но около 200 времен как разрушительно как средний американец и около 800 времен больше чем средний китаец. Она несет ответственность за уничтожение, может быть, 30000 гектаров леса для производства этих романов мусора и все (...) эрозии последующем (не тривиально, как этопо крайней мере 6 и, возможно, 12 тонн / год почвы в океан для всех на земле или, может быть, 100 тонн на американских, и так около 5000 тонн / год для книг Роулинг и movies иее 3 детей). Земля теряет по крайней мере 1% своего верхнего слоя почвы каждый год, так как она приближается к 2100, большая часть его потенциала выращивания продуктов питания исчезнет. Тогда есть огромное количество горючего сжигается и отходов, чтобы сделать и распространять книги и фильмы, пластиковые куклы и т.д. Она показывает ее отсутствие социальной ответственности, производя детей, а не использовать ее миллионы для поощрения планирования семьи или скупить тропический лес, а также путем поощрения обычных либеральной глупости 3-го мирового превосходства, что разрушает Великобритании, Америки, мира и будущего ее потомка. Конечно, она не сильно отличается от остальных 7. 8 миллиардов невежественных - просто шумнее и более разрушительным. Это - не бесплатная проблема обеда, большая. Толпа просто не может видеть, что нет такого понятия, как помогать одному человеку, не причиняя вреда другим. Права или привилегии, предоставленные новым абитуриентам в переполненном мире, могут лишь приглушить правадругих. Несмотря на массовые экологические катастрофы, происходящие перед ними повсюду каждый день, они не могут приколоть их к безудержной материнства "разнообразных", что составляет большую часть прироста населения в прошлом веке, и все это в этом. Им не хватает определенного сочетания интеллекта, образования, опыта и здравомыслия, необходимых для экстраполирования ежедневных посягательств на ресурсы и функционирование общества на возможный крах индустриальной цивилизации. Каждая еда, каждая поездка на машине или автобусе, каждая пара обуви является еще одним гвоздем в гроб земли. Он, вероятно, никогда не приходило ей в голову, что одно место на самолете из Лондона в Сан-Франциско производит около одной тонны углерода, который тает около 3 квадратных метров морского льда и в качестве одного из перепривилегированных она, вероятно, пролетел сотни таких рейсов. Не только богатые и известные, но почти любой общественный деятель на всех, в том числе практически все учителя, давление, чтобы быть политически корректным, что в западных демократиях, в настоящее время означает социал-демократической(неомарксистской т.е. разбавленный коммунист) третьего мира превосходства, работающих на уничтожение своих собственных обществ и их собственных потомков. Таким образом, те, у кого не хватаетобразования, опыта, интеллекта (и основного здравого смысла), которые должны запрещать им делать какие-либо публичные заявления вообще, полностью доминируют во всех средствах массовой информации, создавая впечатление, что умные и цивилизованные должны способствовать демократии, разнообразию и равенству, в то время как истина заключается в том, что это проблемы, а не решения, и что они сами являются главными врагами цивилизации. Смотрите мой Самоубийство демократии 2nd ed (2019) и другие. (shrink)

Harry Frankfurt has argued that Descartes’s madness doubt in the First Meditation is importantly different from his dreaming doubt. The madness doubt does not provide a reason for doubting the senses since were the meditator to suppose he was mad his ability to successfully complete the philosophical investigation he sets for himself in the first few pages of the Meditations would be undermined. I argue that Frankfurt’s interpretation of Descartes’s madness doubt is mistaken and that it should be understood (...) as playing the same role as his more famous dreaming doubt. I focus my discussion around four questions: (Q1) What does the meditator have in mind when speaking of madness?, (Q2) Why does the meditator so quickly dismiss the madness doubt but take seriously the dreaming doubt?, (Q3) Does the madness doubt have the same scope as the dreaming doubt?, and (Q4) Why does the meditator bring up the madness doubt at all? (shrink)

Goffman’s (1959) dramaturgical identity theory requires modification when theorising about presentations of self on social media. This chapter contributes to these efforts, refining a conception of digital identities by differentiating them from ‘corporatised identities’. Armed with this new distinction, I ultimately argue that social media platforms’ production of corporatised identities undermines their users’ autonomy and digital well-being. This follows from the disentanglement of several commonly conflated concepts. Firstly, I distinguish two kinds of presentation of self that I collectively refer to (...) as ‘expressions of digital identity’. These digital performances (boyd 2007) and digital artefacts (Hogan 2010) are distinct, but often confused. Secondly, I contend this confusion results in the subsequent conflation of corporatised identities – poor approximations of actual digital identities, inferred and extrapolated by algorithms from individuals’ expressions of digital identity – with digital identities proper. Finally, and to demonstrate the normative implications of these clarifications, I utilise MacKenzie’s (2014, 2019) interpretation of relational autonomy to propose that designing social media sites around the production of corporatised identities, at the expense of encouraging genuine performances of digital identities, has undermined multiple dimensions of this vital liberal value. In particular, the pluralistic range of authentic preferences that should structure flourishing human lives are being flattened and replaced by commercial, consumerist preferences. For these reasons, amongst others, I contend that digital identities should once again come to drive individuals’ actions on social media sites. Only upon doing so can individuals’ autonomy, and control over their digital identities, be rendered compatible with social media. (shrink)

It is technically possible to clone a human being. The result of the procedure would be a human being in its own right. Given the current level of cloning technology concerning other animals there is every reason to believe that early human clones will have shorter-than-average life-spans, and will be unusually prone to disease. In addition, they would be unusually at risk of genetic defects, though they would still, probably, have lives worth living. But with experimentation and experience, seriously unequal (...) prospects between cloned and noncloned people should erode. We shall ignore arguments about cloning that focus on the potential for harm to the fetus or resultant human being, where harm is understood solely in terms of physical and mental health. Unless the resultant people would generally have lives worth living there is no positive case for cloning, or any other form of reproduction, for that matter. If the resultant beings will generally have lives worth living there is a prima facie case for allowing cloning. We imagine the case in which the resultant beings will have lives well worth living. (shrink)

Artificial Intelligence is at a turning point, with a substantial increase in projects aiming to implement sophisticated forms of human intelligence in machines. This research attempts to model specific forms of intelligence through brute-force search heuristics and also reproduce features of human perception and cognition, including emotions. Such goals have implications for artificial consciousness, with some arguing that it will be achievable once we overcome short-term engineering challenges. We believe, however, that phenomenal consciousness cannot be implemented in machines. This becomes (...) clear when considering emotions and examining the dissociation between consciousness and attention in humans. While we may be able to program ethical behavior based on rules and machine learning, we will never be able to reproduce emotions or empathy by programming such control systems—these will be merely simulations. Arguments in favor of this claim include considerations about evolution, the neuropsychological aspects of emotions, and the dissociation between attention and consciousness found in humans. Ultimately, we are far from achieving artificial consciousness. (shrink)

Some of the barriers to the realisation of equality reflect the value of respecting prerogatives people have to favour themselves. Even G.A. Cohen, whose egalitarianism is especially pervasive and demanding, says that.

This paper provides an answer to the question why birth parents have a moral right to keep and raise their biological babies. I start with a critical discussion of the parent-centred model of justifying parents’ rights, recently proposed by Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift. Their account successfully defends a fundamental moral right to parent in general but, because it does not provide an account of how individuals acquire the right to parent a particular baby, it is insufficient for addressing (...) the question whether and why there is a right to parent one’s biological child. Such a right is important because, in its absence, fairness towards adequate prospective parents who are involuntarily childless would demand a ‘babies redistribution’; moreover, in societies with entrenched histories of injustice there may be reasons of fairness for shuffling babies amongst all recent parents. I supplement the Brighouse-Swift account of fundamental parental rights by an account of how adequate parents acquire the right to parent their biological babies. I advance two arguments to this conclusion: by the time of birth, the birth parents will have already shouldered various burdens in order to bring children into existence, and are likely to have formed an intimate relationship with the future baby. Denying birth parents who would make at least adequate parents the right to keep their baby would be unfair to them and would destroy already formed parent-baby relationships which, I assume, are intrinsically valuable. (shrink)

Some theorists argue that rather than advocating a principle of educational equality as a component of a theory of justice in education, egalitarians should adopt a principle of educational adequacy. This paper looks at two recent attempts to show that adequacy, not equality, constitutes justice in education. It responds to the criticisms of equality by claiming that they are either unsuccessful or merely show that other values are also important, not that equality is not important. It also argues that a (...) principle of educational adequacy cannot be all there is to justice in education. (shrink)

The publication of Harry Frankfurt’s 1986 essay “On Bullshit,” and especially its republication as a book in 2005, have sparked a great deal of interest in the philosophical analysis of the concept of bullshit. The present essay seeks to contribute to the ever-widening discussion of the concept by applying it to the realm of advertising. First, it is argued that Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit is too narrow, and an alternative definition is defended that accommodates both Frankfurt’s truth-indifferent bullshit and (...) what is here termed “culpably confused bullshit.” Second, it is explained why a great deal of advertising constitutes bullshit so defined.The essay concludes by making the case that bullshitting in general is clearly unethical on both Utilitarian and Kantian grounds. (shrink)

In 1969 Harry Frankfurt published his hugely influential paper 'Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility' in which he claimed to present a counterexample to the so-called 'Principle of Alternate Possibilities' ('a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise'). The success of Frankfurt-style cases as counterexamples to the Principle has been much debated since. I present an objection to these cases that, in questioning their conceptual cogency, undercuts many of those debates. Such (...) cases all require a counterfactual mechanism that could cause an agent to perform an action that he cannot avoid performing. I argue that, given our concept of what it is for someone to act, this requirement is inconsistent. Frankfurt-style alleged counterexamples are cases where an agent is morally responsible for an action he performs even though, the claim goes, he could not have avoided performing that action. However, it has recently been argued, e.g. by John Fischer, that a counterexample to the Principle could be a 'Fischer-style case', i.e. a case where the agent can either perform the action or do nothing else. I argue that, although Fischer-style cases do not share the conceptual flaw common to all Frankfurt-style cases, they also fail as counterexamples to the Principle. The paper finishes with a brief discussion of the significance of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

This paper aims to clarify the relationship between consciousness and attention through theoretical considerations about evolution. Specifically, we will argue that the empirical findings on attention and the basic considerations concerning the evolution of the different forms of attention demonstrate that consciousness and attention must be dissociated regardless of which definition of these terms one uses. To the best of our knowledge, no extant view on the relationship between consciousness and attention has this advantage. Because of this characteristic, this paper (...) presents a principled and neutral way to settle debates concerning the relationship between consciousness and attention, without falling into disputes about the meaning of these terms. A decisive conclusion of this approach is that extreme views on the relationship between consciousness and attention must be rejected, including identity and full dissociation views. There is an overlap between the two within conscious attention, but developing a full understanding of this mechanism requires further empirical investigations. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is an important anomaly to the causalist/compatibilist paradigm in the philosophy of action and free will. This anomaly, which to my knowledge has gone unnoticed so far, can be found in the philosophy of Harry Frankfurt. Two of his most important contributions to the field – his influential counterexample to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities and his ‘guidance’ view of action – are incompatible. The importance of this inconsistency goes far beyond the (...) issue of coherence within Frankfurt’s philosophy. I shall argue that this inconsistency represents an important anomaly within the causalist/compatibilist framework; so that we should start to seriously consider having to move on from the established paradigm. (shrink)

The main thesis of this paper is that two prevailing theories about cognitive penetration are too extreme, namely, the view that cognitive penetration is pervasive and the view that there is a sharp and fundamental distinction between cognition and perception, which precludes any type of cognitive penetration. These opposite views have clear merits and empirical support. To eliminate this puzzling situation, we present an alternative theoretical approach that incorporates the merits of these views into a broader and more nuanced explanatory (...) framework. A key argument we present in favor of this framework concerns the evolution of intentionality and perceptual capacities. An implication of this argument is that cases of cognitive penetration must have evolved more recently and that this is compatible with the cognitive impenetrability of early perceptual stages of processing information. A theoretical approach that explains why this should be the case is the consciousness and attention dissociation framework. The paper discusses why concepts, particularly issues concerning concept acquisition, play an important role in the interaction between perception and cognition. (shrink)