Divine intention is an important problem for both philosophy and Kalam. This problem has two aspects as the subject and action of the intention. The intention of the subject occurs for the motion or the action itself. The intention of the action is to reach the motion or the action itself. According to this, when a person travels to Mecca to visit Kaaba, the visit is the intention of the subject and the journey is the intention of the action. (...) In this context, does Allah have an intention? And what are the intentions of the actions aris-ing from him? In the Islamic philosophy, the first question is handled as "intention of the sub-ject/divine intention” and the second question as "the intention of the actions/divine inten-tion of the actions". In order to answer the first question, we must examine all types of inten-tions. Each subject takes action to benefit them, to benefit others and to act for the sake of the goodness and kindness. Allah would be dependent being if he acted to benefit him and to make up for a flaw for the first of these intentions. In the second intention type, if Allah acted for someone else, this sit-uation would be on the degree of cause for the subject and he would be passive. For the third intention type which is to act to reach for perfection, it would deem Allah as a dependent being. The above-mentioned intentions are flawed. On the contrary, Allah is perfect and does not need any of these intentions to create. Thus, he is not subject to any of these possible inten-tions. These intentions are only used by imperfect subjects. Of course, it does not mean that Allah does not have intentions. According to Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, intention of Allah is the love towards his essence which is free from any flaw. According to this, all beings are entailed to the divine essence and they exist due to the love of essence of Allah. Allah has a direct intention as well as an indirect one. As mentioned before, Allah is in love with his essence. Allah loves the works and actions of his essence as well, according to the principal that one, who loves the essence, loves the works and actions of that essence as well. In this context, the love of essence of the Allah is a direct intention, while the love of his es-sence's works and actions is an indirect intention. After the divine intention is explained, we must also explain the intention of the divine ac-tions. According to both Mulla Sadra and Avicenna, since possible beings are flawed, their intention is to reach to certain perfections which are compatible with themselves. Mulla Sadra states that Allah bestows motivation to possible beings to advance towards the perfection and he claims that these beings make use of that motivation to be perfect. Therefore, possible beings try to make up their flaws and reach to perfection. Since Allah is the absolute perfect being, the final intention of the possible beings is Allah. In other words, all beings that seek for perfection, take example of him. The other intentions act as a primary tool to reach the final intention. How can flawed beings by essence reach to perfections compatible with them? Avicenna and Mulla Sadra stated different opinions on the search of perfection of the flawed beings in the Islam philosophy. According to Avicenna, beings change with extinction and creation. This change happens by accident and the substance stays constant. In accordance with this approach, this change and development is only possible with accidental motion. It occurs with the replacement between forms. But the theory of the Avicenna has some flaws. Because forms are not the intentions of each other and first hyle is not strong enough to have an intention. Thus, no form is superior to the other. It is also not possible to have substance development because the substance and es-sence of the material are constant. It only goes through changes in appearance with the acci-dental motion. It is clear that the changes in the appearance and the shape are not standards for perfection. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra's development theory, which is based on the fundamentality of existence, existential gradation and substantial motion, suggests that the material world is moving towards the perfection. The motion in the substance of material beings is reason of substantial and accidental developments. All beings try to promote themselves to a higher position by reaching perfection in accordance with their intentions. Thus, the theory of Avicenna focuses on the accidental and formal changes in the search of perfection of the material beings, while Mulla Sadra’s theory explains accidental changes as well as the essential ones. Mulla Sadra does not limit the explanation of which Allah is the intention of possible beings to ontological dimension. According to him, Allah is an intention of possible beings as well. He points out the Hadith Qudsi "I was a hidden treasure, I desired to be recognized so I created the creature" and states that "This (Hadith Qudsi) indicates that he is the subject and the in-tention of the universe in an ontological manner as well as the intention of the universe in an epistemological manner." Thus, according to Mulla Sadra, possible beings have two inten-tions, to reach to and understand Allah. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra's view of the perception of the other is the product of a profound study and serious criticism of the ideas of Peripatetics and Illuminationists, particularly those of Ibn Sina and Suhrawardi. In fact, an accurate perception of his view requires great attention to these criticisms. The importance of Mulla Sadra's criticisms lies in the fact that they are not limited only to the outward and external layers of a philosophy but continue until penetrating its inward and (...) internal layers and main principles and, in case they are defective, lead to developing new fundamental principles.According to Suhrawardi, the perception of the other is a relation. Mulla Sadra rejects this idea because of its being based on some principles which are completely unacceptable to him. Some of them include the principiality of quiddity, its gradation, and the negation of the union of the knower and the known. Mulla Sadra demonstrates the opposite of these principles and, unlike Suhrawardi, based his interpretation of the perception of the other on believing in the principiality of existence, its gradation, and the union of the knower and the known. Accordingly, he views the perception of thing not as a relation but as the presence of its form before the perceiver. Here, the form has no identity in separation from the perceiver so that we could say there is a non-relational perception between the perceiver and the perceived.The writer believes that Mulla Sadra's arguments on rejecting the argument of relation lack sufficient firmness, and a final judgment of the truth of either of these theories on perception depends on the truth of their basic principles. The acceptance of Mulla Sadra's theory depends on the strength of his arguments on denying the plurality of existents. This is because without this denial one cannot reject the ideas of relation and demonstrate the idea of the union of the knower and the known. (shrink)

Mümkün varlıkları aracı kılmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlama çabalarının bir sonucu olan sıddıkîn burhanı ilk defa Müslüman filozoflar tarafından dillendirildi. İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) da Fârâbî’nin etkisiyle yeni bir burhan açıkladı ve buna sıddıkîn adını verdi. Molla Sadrâ (ö. 1050/1641) varlığın asaleti ilkesini mutasavvıflardan, teşkîk ilkesini de Sühreverdî’den iktibas ederek yeni bir sıddıkîn burhanı dillendirdi. Bu burhanın, varlığın asaleti, basîtliği/yalınlığı, teşkîkî ve ma’lûlün illete ihtiyacı olmak üzere bazı öncülleri vardır. O, bu öncülleri açıkladıktan sonra teselsüle ihtiyaç duymadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlar. Onun (...) burhanı diğer sıddıkîn burhanlarına nispetle bazı üstün özelliklere sahiptir. Öncelikle bu burhan varlığın asaleti ilkesi üzerine bina edildiğinden dayanağı varlık kavramı değil, varlığın nesnel hakikatidir. İkincisi bu burhan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un zâtını ispatlamakla birlikte Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un birliğini ve kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatlar. Üçüncüsü bu burhana göre mümkün varlıklar hiçbir aracı olmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’a bağımlı olduklarından burhanın açıklanmasında teselsül ve kısır döngüden yararlanma ihtiyacı yoktur. Molla Sadrâ’nın teselsül ve kısır döngüden de yararlanarak Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatladığı burhanlar da vardır. Molla Sadrâ bu burhanıyla hem Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ve hem de onun kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatladığını iddia eder. Bu çalışmada bu iddia incelecek ve ispat-ı vacip meselesinde Molla Sadrâ’nın ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği ele alınacaktır. ABSTRACT A result of the attempts to prove the existence of The Necessary Existence without the mediation of possible beings, proof of the truthful was first expressed by Muslim philosophers called it sıddıkin. Mullā Ṣadrā’s “proof” that he explains has certain premises such as the fundamental of existence, indivisibility of the existence, existential gradation, effect’s need for cause. After explanining these premises, Mullā Ṣadrā then proves the Necessary Existence without needing succession. Mullā Ṣadrā’s proof of the truthful has certain superior features tan the proofs of truthful expressed before him. First of all, as this proof is built upon the principle of the fundamental of existence, its foundation is the external truth of existence, not the concept of existence itself. Secondly, this proof proves the unity and perfection attributes of The Necessary Existence as well as proving the existence of the Necessary Existence. Thirdly, according to this proof, as all possible existences are dependent on The Necessary Existence without any mediation, there is no need to benefit from succession and vicious circle in explaining the proof. However, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the Necessary Existence by benefitting from succession and vicious circle in other proofs. Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that this proof demonstrates the presence of The Necessary Existence and its perfection attributions. This study examines this assertion and addresses what kind of innovations was brought by Mullā Ṣadrā in terms of proving The Necessary Existence. (shrink)

I seek to explicate the ways in which the soul is deemed immaterial in two main strands of Islamic philosophy, and then consider some arguments for the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I first overview Avicenna’s theory of the spiritual incipience (al-ḥudūth al-rūḥānī) of the soul and his version of substance dualism. I will then discuss Mullā Ṣadrā’s view of the physical incipience (al-ḥudūth al-jismānī) of the soul and how the soul emerges and develops towards immateriality on (...) his account. I then overview and discuss five of the most important arguments presented by these two great Muslim philosophers in favor of the immateriality of the soul. To do so, I will also point out some of the main contemporary physicalistic views of the nature of mind and mental states. I will then argue that arguments for the immateriality of the soul – dealt with here – do not indeed target or challenge any significant versions of contemporary physicalism. Moreover, these arguments involve conflations of epistemological or ontological issues. (shrink)

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi (ca. 1571–1636), known as Mulla Sadra, is one of the three important philosophers (with Avicenna, and Suhrawardi) in Islamic philosophy, after the period of the first prominent Islamic philosophers i.e., Averroes and al-Farabi.

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi (ca. 1571–1636), known as Mulla Sadra, is one of the three important philosophers (with Avicenna, and Suhrawardi) in Islamic philosophy, after the period of the first prominent Islamic philosophers i.e., Averroes and al-Farabi.

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi (ca. 1571–1636), known as Mulla Sadra, is one of the three important philosophers (with Avicenna, and Suhrawardi) in Islamic philosophy, after the period of the first prominent Islamic philosophers i.e., Averroes and al-Farabi.

Sadr al-Din Muhammad b. Ibrahim b. Yahya Qawami Shirazi (ca. 1571–1636), known as Mulla Sadra, is one of the three important philosophers (with Avicenna, and Suhrawardi) in Islamic philosophy, after the period of the first prominent Islamic philosophers i.e., Averroes and al-Farabi.

The purpose of the present project is to study the Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā as expounders of mystical philosophy dealing with the question of the nature of Ultimate Reality and its concomitant issues. To be more specific, this study is an examination focused on the metaphysical theories propounded by them. The mystical and philosophical systems constructed by Upaniṣads and Mullā Sadrā are often viewed as being representative of absolutism found within their respective traditions. The striking differences generally perceived between aspects (...) of Hinduism and Islām have, however, somewhat prevented scholars to develop interest in the comparison of philosophies rooted in these two philosophical traditions. This study will be exploring the systems of these influential traditions to ascertain if this approach is true. (shrink)

The paper analyzes the concept of a first cause, both for event causation and for agent causation. It turns out that one is rather ready to believe in the existence of first causes that are events, but not in the existence of first causes that are agents. The paper, however, develops and defends a complex argument to the conclusion that there is a first agent-cause. one version of that argument proves -- not necessarily the existence of God -- but still (...) the existence of a godlike agent. Finally, the notion of a first agent-cause is employed for an analysis of freely willed human action. (shrink)

There is an argument for God’ s existence from consciousness. The argument was initially formulated by Swinburne in contemporary Western philosophy. He claims that no one has preceded him in formulating the argument, except John Locke who had a vague reference to it. The argument considers the existence of mental phenomena, such as feelings, emotions, intentions, and thoughts— which are scientifically unexplainable and merely admit of subjective explanations— as evidence for God’ s existence. Swinburne provides an inductive versions of the (...) argument, which confirms and reinforces the probability of God’ s existence. A survey of arguments for God’ s existence in Islamic philosophical tradition reveals that Mullā Ṣ adra was the first philosopher who argued for God’ s existence from rational consciousness. His argument is syllogistic and certainty-conferring. This paper deploys a descriptive-analytic method to consider the two versions of the argument from consciousness for God’ s existence in Western and Islamic philosophical traditions, comparing their agreements, distinctions, weaknesses, and strengths. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: Mullā Ṣadrā’s (c 1571-1640) commentary on Uṣūl al- Kāfī is one of the more famous commentaries on this significant Shi‘i hadith collection. For his philosophical and Sui background, Ṣadrā’s approach to the hadith is slightly different and in some ways contrary to the earlier commentators such as`Allāma Majlisī in Shi'a and Ibn Taymīyya in Sunni Islam. This paper aims to shed light on the way, Ṣadrā interprets al-Kāfī and particularly to determine his understanding of the ʿaql (intellect) at the (...) cosmic (as first created being) and human levels as presented in the Kitāb al-ʿAql wa al-Jahl (The Book of Intellect and Ignorance). Ṣadrā, already well-versed in the philosophical discourses on ontology and cosmology find al-Kāfī as a fertile ground to develop and extend his vision of cosmos and existence. This paper, furthermore, investigates and reviews some later and contemporary scholars’ critiques of Ṣadrā’s view on hadith and intellect. (shrink)

This article is intended to provide insight into aspects of Ibn Sīnā’s natural philosophy. It will summarize his interpretation of the Aristotelian four causes, explicate his theory of efficient and necessary causal linkage, and analyze his arguments for causal efficacy. Finally, it will discuss Ibn Sīnā’s views on chance happenings in nature.

In this paper, we introduce the Hinduism religion and philosophy. We start with introducing the holy books in Hinduism including Vedas and Upanishads. Then, we explain the simplistic Hinduism, Brahman, gods and their incarnations, stories of apocalypse, karma, reincarnation, heavens and hells, vegetarianism, and sanctity of cows. Then, we switch to the profound Hinduism which is the main core of Hinduism and is monotheistic. In profound Hinduism, we focus on the non-dualism or Advaita Vedanta approach in Hinduism. We discuss consciousness, (...) causality, Brahman, psychology based on Hinduism, supportive scientific facts for Hinduism, the four levels of truth, and Maya. The four paths of knowledge, love, karma, and meditation are explained as well as the cosmic mind, the subtle body, and Aum. The risks for every path are also explained. Then, we introduce the orthodox and heterodox Indian schools including Yoga, Nyaya, Advaita Vedanta, Vishishtadvaita, and Dvaita. Connections to some other religions including Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Islamic mysticism, and Zoroastrianism are analyzed. Finally, we explain the connection of Hindu philosophy with the Greek, western, and Islamic philosophies which include the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Plotinus, Spinoza, Descartes, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Avicenna, Suhrawardi, and Mulla Sadra. (shrink)

After Al-Tusi and his effective work- which is called Nasirian Ethics- Islamic Philosophical Ethics emerges a fixed perspective that tips the balance (scale) in favor of otherworldly Eudemonia and considers worldly Eudemonia as rental land which can be abandoned. Ibn Khaldun tries to present a communicative theory; but his work has limited under the main discourse of Islamic Ethics which is fixed in the space and effect of the mentioned balance. As a consequence, after Mulla Sadra and (...) in Esfahan school, the Nasirian though is developed. then the main challenge is that the social development is slowed diminished in favor of individual Eudemonia. But it seems that Tabatabai in his theory (Constructional Perceptions) shows or reconstructs an almost unanimous consensus which tries to find a compromise between temporal (worldly) and eschatological (otherworldly) Eudemonia. In this paper and according to its descriptive- analytic prospect- with memorizing a historical transformation- Tabatabai 's theory is supposed as an alternative for reconstituting of Islamic Philosophical Ethics, which is based on the popular goodness and civil development. (shrink)

This paper first explores in detail a regenerated theory in philosophy of mind, known among contemporary philosophers as ‘emergentism’. By distinguishing strong and weak versions of the theory, I explain two important explanatory challenges presented by physicalists against this theory. In the following, I provide a brief overview of Sadr al-Muta’allihin’s theory of the incipience and degrees of the soul, examining similarities and differences between this theory and strong emergentism. Then, underlining the main aspects of similarity between the two theories, (...) I consider the challenges presented by physicalists against emergentism as reconstructible against Sadra’s theory. Surveying some explanations by Sadraean philosophers of the soul-body relationship, I ultimately argue that Sadra’s theory is inadequate in face of the objections and doubts raised by contemporary physicalists. My assessment is that Sadra’s philosophy is in need of further development to meet those explanatory challenges. (shrink)

Personal identity is one of the important and complex issues in the field of the philosophy of the soul. It is also related to the philosophy of ethics and metaphysics in different respects and has given rise to some problems in these two areas. The justification of ethical responsibility and man's eternity in the posthumous state have attracted psychologist-philosophers' attention to the significance and necessity of explaining personal identity. This paper examines the issue from the view point of Mulla (...) Sadra. Here, the writer initially refers to some of the most important contemporary theories about personal identity which can generally be divided into two reductionist and non-reductionist branches. Reductionists intend to reduce the human identity to elements such as memory, biological specifications, or continuous psychological states, while non-reductionists are against this. Mulla Sadra's theory in this regard is not in conformity with any of the above theories; however, it is more consistent with the non-reductionist approach from certain aspects. Though relying on the fundamental ontological and psychological principles of his own philosophy, Mulla Sadra tries to present a picture of human identity that, while depending on human nature, reveals personal identity, too. This is an identity in whose process of formation the three elements of habits, intentions, and acts play major roles. The extent of the consistency of these three elements with rationality is the reason behind having people with different identities. It should also be added that no human being enjoys a single and fixed identity; rather, identity is a continuous reality that, while being one, is a plural truth. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas and Mulla Sadra both criticized the previous theories on the soul-body problem, which held that the body is a mere instrument in the employ of the soul. Instead, they, following Aristotle, regard the connection between the soul and the body as form and matter since, they thought of it as an essential connection not accidental. Despite this initial similarity there are differences between Aquinas and Sadra on this problem which in the end lead them to two distinctive (...) results. (shrink)

This paper sheds light on the views of Mulla Sadra about virtue and action. The main question is how he explains the relationship, if any, between virtue and action. Mulla Sadra defines moral virtue as a settled inner disposition by which one acts morally, without need for any reflection or deliberation. This study seeks to explain how, according to Mulla Sadra, a virtue motivates the agent and leads him to do the right action easily. Is virtue the (...) reason for or cause of action? Is there a semantic link between action and virtue? Can we regard an action as right if it is not motivated by a virtue? Another question is about the role of action in the development of moral character. Is virtue acquired through the practice of corresponding actions? If we divide virtues into moral and intellectual, we should ask about the relationship between an epistemic action and intellectual virtues as well. In addition, since Mulla Sadra is a Muslim religious thinker, explaining the role of faith and religious rituals in forming moral character and also the relationship between faith and moral action is important. This paper will show that Mulla Sadra accepts the semantic, metaphysical, and psychological relationships between virtue and action. (shrink)

Abstract The present paper examines the role of epistemic virtues in the formation of intellectual identity and its impact on improving our truth-seeking behaviors. A epistemic virtue is a special faculty or trait of a person whose operation makes that person a thinker, believer, learner, scholar, knower, cognizer, perceiver, etc., or causes his intellectual development and perfection, and improves his truth-seeking and knowledge-acquiring behaviours and places him on the path to attain understanding, perception and wisdom. Virtue epistemology is a set (...) of approaches in contemporary epistemology that regards knowledge as "a true belief arising from humans epistemic virtues." Virtue responsibilism and Virtue reliabilism are two important approaches to virtue epistemology that differ together in their attitude to the nature of epistemic virtue. Responsibilisms regards epistemic virtues as an acquired character traits that must be attained through practice and training with plenty of effort from the agent who possesses the will. In contrast, virtue reliabilisms considers epistemic virtues as reliable and innate cognitive faculties, and believes that this natural faculties has been placed in the human being from the very beginning and, if used in the appropriate condition and in a proper environment, is reliably truth-conducive. So virtue epistemology, which is distinguished from belief-based analytical epistemology by focusing on the cognitive character of the agent rather than the belief, regards epistemic virtues as the constructive factor of the epistemic agent and the condition of reaching the truth. From the two approaches of virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, this paper focuses on the second approach and with using of the nine-fold virtues, that Jason Baehr posed, shows how to make epistemically good and thinker human by utilizing these virtues and avoiding the corresponding vices and through this, gained the truth in various epistemic areas. After explaining these virtues and their role in the two mentioned domains based on the virtue epistemology, the significance of this relationship in the view of Mulla Sadra as an example of Islamic philosophy is examined, For the reason that he sees knowledge as the produce of some factors that epistemic virtues is considered part of them. In the view of Sadra, epistemic virtues is the specific attributes and traits of reason faculty that their function causes man to be a very good and strong perciever, and their actual possesion or their gradual acquisition leads to the perfection of the soul and the dignity of human existence. In a new theory of soul-  Ph.D. Student of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran (Responsible author) [email protected]  Associate Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran. [email protected]  Professor of Islamic Philosophy and Theology, Qom University, Qom, Iran. [email protected] 2/ Comparative Theology, Vol: 9, No: 19, Spring & Summer 2018 knowledge, he considers the journey of the soul from the outset as evolutionary journey, and, on the other hand, he considers all human activities directly as an activity of the soul (epistemic agent), which he performs through his own faculties. As a result, the soul is a increasing and evolving being, while at the same time acquiring knowledge is also from its own activities, and therefore the factors that make up the soul are also influential in its products. Now, as knowledge comes from soul exposure to the outside world, the more this soul is refined from pollutions and adorned to virtues, the better reflection from reality will be. Undoubtedly, the desire to engage in the process of truth-seeking and the responsible use of cognitive virtues and skills lead man to a desirable goal (recognition of truth) and forms his true intellectual identity. In the end, the paper suggests that because of the importance of epistemic virtues in the improvement of truth-seeking behaviors, educating and cultivating of these types of virtues should be part of the spoken and written course content of universities and schools, and must be proper critical thinking is institutionalized and strengthened in the spirit of community members. Educational resources contain a wide range of information that can deeply influence our epistemic behaviors and actions. Hence, it is necessary to include praised cognitive skills and epistemic virtues training in them. Teachers play an important role in educating and developing epistemic virtues as part of the formal curriculum content of educational centers, perhaps as part of critical thinking and logic courses. The formal education of epistemic virtues and the creation of opportunities for practicing and exercising them will be a good starting point for institutionalizing and developing admired cognitive skills among members of the community. In a society where individuals in their epistemic processes use their own cognitive virtues and organize their beliefs on their basis, the community itself and the social relations will also be virtuous, because the necessity of such an virtues is that individuals interact with their peers and In these interactions, rule virtue. Observing fairness towards others, intellectual humility, intellectual generosity, courage against miscreant and one who has weak arguments, observance of neutrality and other epistemic virtues, if it is to be found in societies as a habit and praised skill, then that society will be virtuous and its relations will be healthier and with the cultivating of those virtues, Intellectual and moral development will also become easier and more common. Intellectual virtues (or praised cognitive skills) should be taught to the community members, so that they display such characteristics when engaging in social activities, whean expressing opinions, when doing research, and so on. It is important to change our education policies, because the decay of praised cognitive skills leads to devastating consequences for intellectual identity and the truth-seeking and knowledgeacquiring behavior of the community members. (shrink)

Affirming that divine knowledge of occurrent changes among particulars is incompatible with the doctrine of divine immutability, this article seeks to resolve this tension by denying the latter. Reviewing this long-running debate, I first formalize the exchange between al-Ghazālı̄and Avicenna on this topic, and then set out the ways in which contemporary Sadrāean philosophers have tried to resolve the incompatibility. I argue that none of the cited Sadrāean attempts to resolve the incompatibility between divine omniscience and immutability (...) is successful. Then, by reference to certain principles drawn from Shia theology, I indicate how one might seek to reject the dogma of divine immutability. I conclude that by emancipating ourselves from that dogma, new horizons could be opened for Islamic philosophy, free from traditional Hellenistic constraints. (shrink)

This article studies common aspects and differences between Heidegger, contemporary German philosopher, with Persian philosopher, Mulla Sadra 17th century equivalent to 11th Islamic century. The origin point for Mulla Sadra and Heidegger is "existence". However, Mulla Sadra believe in "existence unity" whereas Heidegger tries to understand the concept of "existence" by special being, i.e. human being. Both of them believe in supposing the concept of human without world is wrong, they believe in dichotomy of mind, being (...) is wrong, and there is a unity between objective and sane. Both reached from thing to being, but Heidegger by "Phenomenology", and Mulla Sadra by "metaphysics." Both believe in priority of existence before nature, or virtual validity of nature. Although Heidegger considers existence just for threshold, and Mulla Sadra believes origin of existence is the same and it includes for all beings versus of null. Briefly, for Heidegger same as Hegel, being as being has no value, whereas for Mulla Sadra this type of being is highest grade of existence. Heidegger returns into illumination, while his illumination is different from Mulla Sadra's illumination, his illumination is same as Buddhism "human for human" not from higher world for human. According to Heidegger, existence changes have cultural and historical meaning. Whereas according to Mulla Sadra the concept of existence is common, meaning and it is understood with illumination . (shrink)

One of the challenges faced by philosophers throughout history of philosophical thoughts, has always been and is to find an adequate answer to the question of quiddity and existence of time and space. Thus, the present study aims to elaborate on the question of space and time in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy and its relationship with outcomes of modern physics. The study also intends to conduct an analytical comparison between these two views and clarify newer aspects of this complicated and (...) vague question. According to principles of his thought system in his ontology and particularly his theory of substantial motion, Mulla Sadra’s view toward time has a closer concordance with findings of modern physicists like Albert Einstein. One of the most noticeable achievements of the present paper, considering ontological view of Mulla Sadra toward time, is to reach a comprehensive and vast view of the question of space and time covering space-time approach of theory of relativity and having the common issue of time in mind, develops an image of unity and connectivity of the world of nature with the four dimensions. The present study uses a documentary analysis research and uses library resources. The prominent works of Mulla Sadra and Einstein’ works on the Theory of Relativity were the main sources for this study. It is hoped that this view not only reveals further philosophical aspects of the issue of time but also help uncover newer approaches for physicists. (shrink)

According to Mulla Sadra, the will is an existential phenomenon that is free from the essence. Therefore, there is no essential and correlational definition which contains its truth completely. As a matter of fact, the definition made by Mulla Sadra is a nominal definition. Mulla Sadra, unlike the former philosophers and the theologians, expressed that the will is homogeneous with existence for the first time. Moreover, he claims that characteristics of the will and the existence is the (...) same. According to this approach, the first feature of the will is that it has a shared meaning like existence. In other words, concept of the will involves the same signification when it is used about God and the creatures. The second feature of the will, like existence too, indicates varied existential grades. That is to say, the will is a single truth, but it has different existential grades and is manifested in a different way in every aspects of the being. Therefore, it has its own domination and is obligatory in some grades while it is only propable in others. In this way, Mulla Sadra solved the problems that would arise when the divine will has both essential and intellectual qualities. In addition, he explained that the will is eternal for God, temporal for the human beings. (shrink)

In this chapter, we examine a few potential problems when inquiring into the ethics of medieval Christian and Islamic mystical traditions: First, there are terminological and methodological worries about defining mysticism and doing comparative philosophy in general. Second, assuming that the Divine represents the highest Good in such traditions, and given the apophaticism on the part of many mystics in both religions, there is a question of whether or not such traditions can provide a coherent theory of value. (...) Finally, the antinomian tendencies and emphasis on passivity of some mystics might lead one to wonder whether their prescriptive exhortations can constitute a coherent theory of right action. We tackle each of these concerns in turn and discuss how they might be addressed, in an attempt to show how medieval mysticism, as a fundamentally practical enterprise, deserves more attention from practical and moral philosophy than it has thus far received. (shrink)

This paper compares epistemic virtue from the viewpoints of Zagzebski and Mulla Sadra, aiming to determine the extent to which their viewpoints on epistemic virtue are similar. Zagzebski, the contemporary philosopher, considers epistemic virtue as the basis on which knowledge is interpreted. She sees epistemic virtue as a requirement for achieving knowledge. Mulla Sadra, the founder of Transcendent Philosophy, considers knowledge as an outcome of intellectual virtues without which there would be no knowledge. The role these two philosophers (...) ascribe to moral and intellectual virtues and vices in forming the identity makes it possible to compare their interpretation of epistemic virtues. As a virtue responsibilist, Zagzebski sees epistemic virtue as a character trait and explains its nature by its different components. Sadra as well, sees epistemic virtue as a character trait. Evidence shows that Sadra’s definition of intellectual virtues is similar to that given by Zagzebski in many respects. Examining Zagzebski’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue, this paper will discuss Sadra’s viewpoint on epistemic virtue as well as its contribution to knowledge. In conclusion the similarities of the two viewpoints will be delineated. (shrink)

In this chapter, I elaborate an idealized type of Islamic philosophy of education and epistemology. Next, I examine the crisis that Islamic schools face in Western societies. This will occur on two fronts: (1) an analysis of the relationship (if any) between the philosophy of education, the aspirations of school administration, and the actual character and practice of Islamic schools; and (2) an analysis concerning the meaning of an Islamic curriculum. To the first issue, I argue (...) that there exists a disjuncture between Islamic educational ideals (as expressed by Muslim philosophers of education), the aspirations of school administrators, and the manner in which Islamic schools operate in practice. Concerning the second item, I argue that Islamic schools, notwithstanding their own insistent claims, must struggle to define what an Islamic education entails that is uniquely distinctive to Islamic schools. Finally, I argue that Islamic educators need to encourage open-minded discussions concerning issues on which there is no settled opinion. I illumine this discussion by drawing upon minority Muslim voices that encourage further dialogue and debate. Above all else, this chapter is an attempt to highlight the challenges that Muslim educators in the West face as they aim to reconcile an idealized caricature of Islamic philosophy of education with the on-the-ground needs of Muslim children socialized in a non-Islamic society. (shrink)

The seventeenth century Muslim philosopher Muhammad Sadr al-Din Shirazi, known as Mulla Sadra, introduced the idea of substantial motion in Islamic philosophy. This view is characterized by a continuity criterion for diachronic identity, a four-dimensional view of individual substances, the notion that possibilities change, and the continual creation of all creatures. Modern philosophical logic provides means to model a variety of claims about individuals, substances, modality and time. In this paper, the semantics of formal systems discussed by Carnap, (...) Bressan and Gupta are reviewed with regard to the issue of substance and identity. Next a model introduced by Storrs McCall is described that is able to build upon and yet resolve some of the issues about substance and identity as characterized by Bressan and others. McCall’s model is also shown to be able to provide an illustration of Mulla Sadra’s doctrine of substantial motion. (shrink)

Truth is a locus of guilt for the Christian, according to Jacques Lacan. The religious person, he argues, punitively defers truth eschatologically. Yet Lacan’s own view dissolves eschatological deferral to the world, as the “Real”. The metaphysics of Erich Przywara SJ helps highlight that this mirrors Lacan’s view of the religious person. Przywara’s Christian metaphysics and Lacanian psychoanalysis converge on the immanence of truth to history. But Przywaran analogy corrects Lacan’s position on the religious person, which by implication calls for (...) an adjustment to Lacan’s worldview. In the final analysis, Lacan’s dialectical nihilism should yield to a Christian’s hopeful relation to the truth. (shrink)

Modern philosophy is, for what appear to be good reasons, uniformly hostile to sui generis final causes. And motivated to develop philosophically and scientifically plausible interpretations, scholars have increasingly offered reductivist and eliminitivist accounts of Aristotle's teleological commitment. This trend in contemporary scholarship is misguided. We have strong grounds to believe Aristotle accepted unreduced sui generis teleology, and reductivist and eliminitivist accounts face insurmountable textual and philosophical difficulties. We offer Aristotelians cold comfort by replacing his apparent view with failed (...) accounts. And so we ought to admit Aristotle’s prima facie commitments and deal with — if not accept — the consequences. (shrink)

The concept of Substantial motion (حركت جوهرى) is fundamentally flawed and severely muddled. Aristotle and Mulla Sadra’s conception of motion, substance (جوهر) and substantial form صورت نوعيه)) were all based on a severe misunderstanding of nature as later was established by the scientists and philosophers that came after them. Here, by recalling the established facts of modern science, particularly the universally accepted scientific fact that, properties of objects are reducible to the motion of their electrons and there’s no such (...) thing as ‘substantial form’ much less substance, the author puts an end to a 400-year-old glorious error called ‘substantial motion’. Naturally any attempt to reconcile the paradigms of modern physics with Aristotle/Sadra paradigms of form/matter and substance/accidents, and to try to draw parallel between the two and revive their philosophy would be an exercise in futility. (shrink)

This article focuses on one aspect of the late mediaeval debate over divine power, as it was discussed by Oxford philosophers Walter Chatton (d. 1343) and William Ockham (d. 1347). Chatton and Ockham would have agreed, for example, that God is ultimately responsible for the existence of the works of Pablo Picasso, but they would not agree over wheher it violates God's omnipotence to say that he cannot make something that Picasso made, for example, the painting Guernica, without using (...) Picasso himself as an intermediate cause. The context of their dispute was a larger debate regarding the ontological status of relations. This article (1) explains how these two issues, omnipotence and relations, became so interestingly tangled together, (2) tries to see which of the two men mentioned above got the better of their exchange, and finally (3) draws out some important consequences for fourteenth-century discussions of causality, occasionalism, and omnipotence. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that Edward Said’s central thesis in Orientalism has a direct explanatory role to play in our understanding of the work produced in at least one area of scholarship about the Arab and Islamic worlds, namely Arab-Islamic philosophy from the classical or medieval period. Moreover, I claim that it continues to play this role not only for scholarship produced in the West by Western scholars but also within the Arab world itself. After recalling some (...) traditional varieties of Orientalism in the study of Islamic philosophy, I go on to isolate some neo-Orientalist theses and positions. Then I identify what I call “Oriental Orientalism” in the study of Islamic philosophy, which originates in the Arab world itself. In conclusion, I speculate as to why Orientalism persists in scholarship about the Islamic world, more than a quarter of a century after Said first unmasked it. Finally, I distinguish two accounts of Said's interpretive stance and attempt to justify a particular reading of his philosophical framework. (shrink)

Many assume that Plato's Form of the Good is a final cause. This might be true if one assumes an Aristotelian definition of final cause; however, I argue that if one adopts Plato's conception of final causation as evidenced in the Phaedo and Timaeus, the claim that the Form of the Good is a final cause for Plato is untenable.

In this article, we develop the intersection of Shīʿī Islamic philosophy and extraterrestrial life. We explain the view of Ḥukamā (Islamic Philosophers) and what implications it holds for asserting a plurality of worlds and life forms. In addition to this, we bring Shīʿī hadīth sources which also suggest the existence of other life forms outside the earth. Combining the philosophical and textual evidence, we argue that the Shīʿī school not only suggests the existence of extraterrestrial life but also (...) provides a potential framework for possible human-extraterrestrial interactions. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to discuss Safavid period Islamic philosopher Sadraddin Shirazi’s philosophical methodology and the sources of the school founded by him. The article relies on research conducted on Shirazi philosophy. It shows that Shirazi through synthesizing the methods of the earlier schools that existed in Islam to acquire knowledge devised a new mechanism for acquiring knowledge. Before coming to Shirazi, intellectual movements formed during Islam’s classical period, such as peripateticism, illuminationism, theology and Gnosticism, were of (...) different views regarding the best way to reach the truth. For example, for peripatetics reason, for theologians revelation, for gnostics/mystics intuition or personal experience were important, but ishraqi school was somewhere between peripatetic and Gnostic schools. Sadraddin Shirazi, though, considered all these agents necessary, for they complement each other, and said they should be utilized altogether to obtain ultimate reality. Similarly, considering his philosophical sources, we see that he is influenced almost by all philosophical schools as well as religious sources. However, Ibn Sina and Ibn Arabi’s influence on him was more profound compared to other philosophers. (shrink)

The encounter of the medieval Muslims with Greek philosophy undeniably shaped the course of their philosophical and theological thought. This encounter led to the complex and contentious issue of ‘philosophy versus theology’. Medieval Muslim thinkers needed to develop a response to the issue of philosophy versus theology. The present article will first highlight the response of the Islamic theologians to their encounter with Greek philosophy in the form of three major trends in medieval Islamic theology: (1) strong opposition (...) to the application of reason and rationalist approach to Islamic doctrines, and strict adherence to the actual text of the Qur’an and the Hadith, (2) the adoption of Greek philosophy, and the application of reason and rationalist approach to explain and defend Islamic religion and (3) acknowledging the significance of reason in exploring the matters related to the natural world but, at the same time, stressing the subordination of reason to revelation. This article will discuss Atharism, Muʿtazilism and Ashʿarism as the representatives of the first, second and third trends, respectively. The response of the medieval Islamic theologians to the issue of philosophy versus theology serves as a context in which medieval Muslim philosophers carried out their philosophy–theology debate. The article will proceed to show that some medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Abu Bakr Al-Razi, subordinated religion or revelation to philosophy or reason. Other medieval Muslim philosophers, such as Al-Ghazali, subordinated philosophy to theology. The third group of medieval Islamic philosophers represented by Alfarabi argued for the reconciliation and harmonious co-existence of philosophy and religion. Contribution: This article highlights the response of medieval Islamic theologians and philosophers to the issue of philosophy versus theology that was caused by their encounter with Greek philosophy. (shrink)

Seeking for Happiness in Islamic Philosophy and its goal, it can be seen a literal and unanimous answer in philosopher words which reflects combination of worldly(secular) and otherworldly(sacred) happiness that it can prepare temporal and eschatological happiness. But in a deeper investigation we can ask: what is the main purpose? mortal or final dimension of happiness? As a result of the text, it seems that from Al- Kendi to Al- Rāzī the otherworldly happiness is considered as a result (...) of worldly happiness. After Al- Farabi to Al- Tusi the flow of thinking tends to combine worldly and otherworldly happiness. After Al- Tusi and under the influence of him in Nasirian Ethics (Akhlaq-i Nasiri), the changed version of philosophical Islamic Ethics supports eschatological happiness and supposes the worldly happiness as a primary and elementary level which must be considered as healing of mortal life. Matching with this view, it seems that worldly happiness is Abolished, because it changes the balance between and worldly and otherworldly happiness, and also it week the social development instead of increasing individual happiness. (shrink)

In this paper I focus on the work of Sayyid Qutb and in particular his book Milestones, which is often regarded as the Communist Manifesto of Islamic fundamentalism. This paper has four main sections. First I outline Qutb’s political position and in particular examine his advocacy of offensive jihad. In section two I argue that there are a number of tendencies that make his position potentially more liberal that it is often taken to be. I here argue that there (...) are at least six reasons why Qutb’s position is not intrinsically as anti-liberal as it might at first appear. First, many western liberals, influenced by the social contract tradition, regard the legitimacy of their societies as based on popular sovereignty. Qutb, however, regards a society based on popular sovereignty, where law emerges from the will of man rather than the will of God, as a form of tyranny, so it would seem that he is in principle opposed to Western liberal societies. It is not clear, however, that we, or Islamic fundamentalist, need to regard Western liberal societies as based on popular sovereignty, for it is always possible to interpret Western political institutions through the lens of natural law theory, which was one of the main sources of the liberal tradition. In this section I will compare Qutb’s political philosophy with that of Aquinas to illustrate this point and suggest the possibility of secularists and puritan Islamists being able to form an overlapping consensus on the legitimacy of liberal Western societies. Secondly, there is an analogue to the social contract in Qutb’s own position as he believes that legitimate authority requires the free submission of the governed. Thirdly, Qutb is in principle a fallibilist about human reason; this fallibilism extends even to our capacity to interpret divine revelation. Fourthly, Islamic universalism requires that Muslims regard enemies they might be fighting as potential converts. Fifthly, Qutb, like most Sunni fundamentalists, is an implacable enemy of theocracy. And finally, Qutb is a gradualist. In the third section I argue that the real danger for liberal societies from believers in a position like Qutb’s is sociological rather than intrinsic to the ideology – specifically, that there is a danger that such groups may develop in a ‘Leninist’ direction. In the final section I argue that one of the main reasons for this danger is the lack of a consensus in the Islamic world about what it is to be a good, or even a true, Muslim, and that the slow emergence of some sort of consensus will require a vigorous public debate amongst Muslims. Western liberals should welcome such debate rather than fearing such, and should do all they can to ensure that civil society, both in Western societies and in predominantly Islamic societies, is open to such debate. (shrink)

This chapter (5) focuses on the concept of the forgiving God in Islamic religion and theology and claims that Islamic thinking about divine forgiveness accommodates two different views that emphasize two different attributes of God: justice and mercy. The first view is associated with a rationalist school of theology known as Mu'tazilism, while the second is associated with a fideistic school known as Ash'arism. The author argues that the first view, which is based on a strict calculus (...) of desert, leaves little or no room for mercy, and that the second view is more true to our ordinary notion of forgiveness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.3 (2003) 417-418 [Access article in PDF] Heidi M. Ravven and Lenn E. Goodman, editors. Jewish Themes in Spinoza's Philosophy. Albany: The State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. ix + 290. Cloth, $78.50. Paper, $26.95.The current anthology presents an important contribution to the study of Spinoza's relation to Jewish philosophy as well as to contemporary scholarship of Spinoza's metaphysics and political (...) theory.In the opening essay, Lenn Goodman takes upon himself the ambitious task of evaluating Spinoza's positions as to several central disputes throughout the history of philosophy. In this rich and extensive essay Goodman argues that Spinoza's radical rationalism makes him pursue syntheses between traditionally opposed poles. Lee Rice's article, "Love of God in Spinoza," carefully analyzes Spinoza's concept of love and suggests the existence of three kinds of love parallel to the three kinds of knowledge. Warren Montag addresses the unresolved issue of Spinoza's relation to the Kabbalah. Montag sides with Deleuze against the association of Spinozism with the Neo-Platonic theory of emanation, arguing that unlike the Neo-Platonists and Kabbalists, Spinoza's view of God rules out any hierarchy, and does not assume a descent from primal simplicity into complexity. Edwin Curley contributes a beautiful reading of the story of Job and of Maimonides' interpretation of the story. Curley follows Maimonides' discussion of the various positions regarding the question of divine providence and his attempt to identify the speeches of the characters of the book of Job with each of these positions. Following a sensitive consideration of various attempts to [End Page 417] recover Maimonides' own rather concealed view about providence, Curley concludes that "[W]hatever you think Maimonides' final word on Job is, our examination of him certainly supports [Spinoza's] claim that [Maimonides] reads Scripture in terms of Platonic or Aristotelian speculations" (170).Warren Zev Harvey's essay addresses Spinoza's most neglected work, the Compendium of the Grammar of the Hebrew Language. Apart from providing an outline of Spinoza's work as a Hebrew grammarian ("a noun-intoxicated grammarian") and pointing out some of Spinoza's more eccentric views about the nature of the Hebrew language, Harvey makes a compelling case for the importance of the book for the study of Spinoza's metaphysics. He points out a fascinating analogy which Spinoza draws between the parts of speech: (proper) noun, adjectives, and participles, and Spinoza's key metaphysical terms: substance, attributes, and modes. (Think about the weighty implications of this analogy for Curley's interpretation of the substance-mode relation.) According to Harvey, Spinoza's claim that all Hebrew words are derived from nouns is a linguistic parallel to Spinoza's pivotal metaphysical doctrine which makes all things be in the substance (or God). Kenneth Seeskin's article discusses the views of Maimonides and Spinoza on the question of creation and God's relation to the world. Seeskin reconstructs an interesting critical dialogue between these two philosophers. According to Seeskin, both philosophers held that an effect must be similar to its cause. Maimonides' commitment to Negative Theology and to the denial of any common measure between God and finite things forced him to deny causal or explanatory relation between God and the world. What Maimonides can suggest instead is rather to prove that the emergence of the world ex nihilo and according to the divine will, is possible, and even likely given certain astronomical facts of medieval science. Thus, Maimonides would hold that "although we have grounds for believing that creation occurred, we will never be in a position to say how" (120). For Spinoza, such a view constitutes nothing but a "sanctuary of ignorance." Thus, according to Seeskin, Spinoza affirms a clear causal relation between God and the world of finite things insofar as God is said to explain the world. While I tend to agree with most aspects of this analysis, it is important to note that Spinoza also claims that "between the finite and infinite there is no relation" (Letter 54). This... (shrink)

Among critical concepts in Mulla Sadra's thought, which, of course, cannot be discussed separately between the parts. This is because the basic rules in philosophical discourse are universal traits that make it approached from various directions as a unified form of reality. One of Sadra's famous thoughts is the concept of the soul, which is related to the roots of his philosophical doctrine of being. The significance of the discussion of the soul by Mulla Sadra becomes increasingly crucial (...) given the discourse about the soul, especially in the debate of modern European philosophy in such a way that are absurd forms in Islamic religious doctrine. Therefore, seeing the relationship between the two models of approach to the soul is not only the only way to understand the universal message of the Islamic treatise about the soul but also creates a model of dialogue volume two of Ibn Rusyd-Ghazali becoming Mulla Sadra versus Modern Europe. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra mentions two definitions about evil, one of them is that something lacking of essence or lacking of its a perfection and the other one is that all possible living creatures may have deficiencies. In order not to fall into the paradox of some existence are evils, he describes evils in terms of two ways that are by itself evil and relative evil. By itself evil is absolute non-existence so that it doesn’t need perpetrator. Mulla Sadra describes (...) the evil as four categories that metaphysical, natural, moral and perceptual. He utilizes Aristotle's finest universe theory to solve the problem of relation between evilness and spiritual creation. Mulla Sadra he explains five universes with the example of absolute goodness, much goodness then less evil, goodness and evil are equal, less goodness much evil, and certain evil. He proves the most beautiful universe as much goodness then les evilness. Then he solves the problem of evil in terms of recognition divine decree and destiny. (shrink)

We provide two programmatic frameworks for integrating philosophical research on understanding with complementary work in computer science, psychology, and neuroscience. First, philosophical theories of understanding have consequences about how agents should reason if they are to understand that can then be evaluated empirically by their concordance with findings in scientific studies of reasoning. Second, these studies use a multitude of explanations, and a philosophical theory of understanding is well suited to integrating these explanations in illuminating ways.

This article reviews the political thought of one of the most important figures during the Islamic resurgence in the 20th century, Abul A’la Maududi. The thought of Maududi is often read superficially by either those desiring to portray him as politically ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ as well as ‘backwards’ and ‘conservative’. The core of debates surrounding Maududi’s support for liberal democratic principles such as equality, freedom, democratic elections, and the like are pinpointed and reviewed individually, according to two main primary (...) texts, Islamic Way of Life, and Islamic Law and Constitution. The themes that are covered by the article concern (a) the meaning of his term ‘theodemocracy’; (b) Maududi’s understanding of the ‘shurah council’ (advisory council to the Caliph) and its meaning in terms of popular sovereignty; and (c) the people’s role in maintaining rule of law and the office of the Caliph. It is argued that after a review of these concepts within their respective contexts, the argument attempting to show Maududi as an ‘innovator’ or ‘progressive’ in terms of his application of Islamic law in his modern-day ideal for an Islamic state collapses. Rather, it is shown that Maududi clearly envisioned the ideal Caliphate as one established by the prophet Muhammad and his companions (the ‘Rashidūn Caliphate’) and affirmed Divine sovereignty over the general concept of ‘popular sovereignty’ as conceived by western political thought. (shrink)

ASP.net is one of the most widely used languages in web developing of its many advantages, so there are many lessons that explain its basics, so it should be an intelligent tutoring system that offers lessons and exercises for this language.why tutoring system? Simply because it is one-one teacher, adapts with all the individual differences of students, begins gradually with students from easier to harder level, save time for teacher and student, the student is not ashamed to make mistakes, and (...) more. Therefore, in this paper, we describe the design of an Intelligent Tutoring System for teaching ASP.net to help students learn ASP.net easily and smoothly. Tutor provides beginner level in ASP.net. Finally, we evaluated our tutor and the results were excellent by students and teacher. (shrink)