Results for 'Katharine Jenkins'

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Katharine Jenkins
Nottingham University
  1.  71
    Disability, Impairment, and Marginalised Functioning.Katharine Jenkins & Aness Webster - forthcoming - Tandf: Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    One challenge in providing an adequate definition of physical disability is unifying the heterogeneous bodily conditions that count as disabilities. We examine recent proposals by Elizabeth Barnes (2016), and Dana Howard and Sean Aas (2018), and show how this debate has reached an impasse. Barnes’ account struggles to deliver principled unification of the category of disability, whilst Howard and Aas’ account risks inappropriately sidelining the body. We argue that this impasse can be broken using a novel concept: marginalised functioning. Marginalised (...)
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  2. Gender Identity and Exclusion: A Reply to Jenkins.Matthew Salett Andler - 2017 - Ethics 127 (4):883-895.
    A theory of gender ought to be compatible with trans-inclusive definitions of gender identity terms, such as ‘woman’ and ‘man’. Appealing to this principle of trans-inclusion, Katharine Jenkins argues that we ought to endorse a dual social position and identity theory of gender. Here, I argue that Jenkins’s dual theory of gender fails to be trans-inclusive for the following reasons: it cannot generate a definition of ‘woman’ that extends to include all trans women, and it understands transgender (...)
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  3. Some Internal Problems with Revisionary Gender Concepts.Tomas Bogardus - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (1):55-75.
    Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: (...)
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  4. A Feminist Voice in the Enlightenment Salon: Madame de Lambert on Taste, Sensibility, and the Feminine Mind*: Katharine J. Hamerton.Katharine J. Hamerton - 2010 - Modern Intellectual History 7 (2):209-238.
    This essay demonstrates how the early Enlightenment salonnière madame de Lambert advanced a novel feminist intellectual synthesis favoring women's taste and cognition, which hybridized Cartesian and honnête thought. Disputing recent interpretations of Enlightenment salonnières that emphasize the constraints of honnêteté on their thought, and those that see Lambert's feminism as misguided in emphasizing gendered sensibility, I analyze Lambert's approach as best serving her needs as an aristocratic woman within elite salon society, and show through contextualized analysis how she deployed honnêteté (...)
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  5. The Role of Judgment in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2018 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 7 (1):12-19.
    We take it that we can exercise doxastic agency by reasoning and by making judgments. We take it, that is, that we can actively make up our minds by reasoning and judging. On what I call the ‘Standard View’ this is so because judgment can yield belief. It is typical to take it that judgments yield beliefs by causing them. But on the resultant understanding of the Standard View, I argue, it is unclear how judgment could play its role in (...)
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  6. Luminosity in the Stream of Consciousness.David Jenkins - forthcoming - Synthese:1-14.
    Williamson’s “anti-luminosity” argument aims to establish that there are no significant luminous conditions. “Far from forming a cognitive home”, luminous conditions are mere “curiosities”. Even supposing Williamson’s argument succeeds in showing that there are no significant luminous states his conclusion has not thereby been established. When it comes to determining what is luminous, mental events and processes are among the best candidates. It is events and processes, after all, which constitute the stream of consciousness. Judgment, for instance, is plausibly self-conscious. (...)
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  7. Malebranche, Taste, and Sensibility: The Origins of Sensitive Taste and a Reconsideration of Cartesianism’s Feminist Potential.Katharine J. Hamerton - 2008 - Journal of the History of Ideas 69 (4):533-558.
    This essay argues that Malebranche originated the model of sensitive taste in French thought, several decades before Du Bos. It examines the highly gendered, negative physiological model of taste and of the female mind which Malebranche developed within the Cartesian framework and as a witness to Parisian salon society in which women’s taste had great cultural influence, and strongly questions the common assumption that Cartesian substance dualism necessarily contained feminist potential. The essay argues for Malebranche’s great influence in this regard, (...)
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  8. Contextualising Knowledge: Epistemology and Semantics.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The book develops and synthesises two main ideas: contextualism about knowledge ascriptions and a knowledge-first approach to epistemology. The theme of the book is that these two ideas fit together much better than it's widely thought they do. Not only are they not competitors: they each have something important to offer the other.
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  9. Robot Ethics 2.0: From Autonomous Cars to Artificial Intelligence.Patrick Lin, Keith Abney & Ryan Jenkins (eds.) - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    As robots slip into more domains of human life-from the operating room to the bedroom-they take on our morally important tasks and decisions, as well as create new risks from psychological to physical. This book answers the urgent call to study their ethical, legal, and policy impacts.
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  10. Internalism, Factivity, and Sufficient Reason.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. Cambridge University Press.
    How radical is the idea that reasons are factive? Some philosophers consider it a dramatic departure from orthodoxy, with surprising implications about the bearing of the external world on what credences it’s reasonable to have, what beliefs are epistemically appropriate, and what actions are rational. I deny these implications. In the cases where external matters imply differences in factive states, there will inevitably be important weaker factive states in common. For example, someone who knows it is raining has many factive (...)
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  11. Intuition in Contemporary Philosophy.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - In Lisa M. Osbeck & Barbara S. Held (eds.), Rational Intuition. Cambridge university Press. pp. 192-210.
    This chapter will consider three themes relating to the significance of intuitions in contemporary philosophy. In §1, I’ll review and explore the relationship between philosophical use of words like ‘intuitively’ and any kinds of mental states that might be called ‘intuitions’. In §2, I’ll consider the widely-discussed analogy between intuitive experience and perceptual experience, drawing out some interesting similarities and differences. Finally, in §3, I’ll introduce the recent movement of ‘experimental philosophy’, and consider to what extent its projects are tied (...)
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  12. Rape Culture and Epistemology.Bianca Crewe & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - forthcoming - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology.
    We consider the complex interactions between rape culture and epistemology. A central case study is the consideration of a deferential attitude about the epistemology of sexual assault testimony. According to the deferential attitude, individuals and institutions should decline to act on allegations of sexual assault unless and until they are proven in a formal setting, i.e., a criminal court. We attack this deference from several angles, including the pervasiveness of rape culture in the criminal justice system, the epistemology of testimony (...)
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  13. Herman Cappelen, Philosophy Without Intuitions[REVIEW]Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (1):111 - 116.
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  14. Introduction—What is Epistemic Contextualism?Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - In Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. London: Taylor & Francis.
    Introduces contextualism about knowledge ascriptions, and provides a brief summary of the contributions to the Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism.
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  15.  50
    Motions in the Body, Sensations in the Mind: Malebranche's Mechanics of Sensory Perception and Taste.Katharine Julia Hamerton - forthcoming - Arts Et Savoirs.
    This article, which seeks to connect philosophy, polite culture, and the Enlightenment, shows how Malebranche’s Cartesian science presented a full-frontal attack on the worldly notion of a good taste aligned with reason. It did this by arguing that the aesthetic tastes that people experience were the result of mechanically-transmitted sensations that, like all physical sensations, were inaccurate, erroneous and relativistic. The mechanics of this process is explored in detail to show how Malebranche was challenging honnête thinking. The article suggests that (...)
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  16. On Putting Knowledge 'First'.Jonathan Ichikawa & C. S. I. Jenkins - 2017 - In Joseph Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press.
    There is a New Idea in epistemology. It goes by the name of ‘knowledge first,’ and it is particularly associated with Timothy Williamson’s book Knowledge and Its Limits. In slogan form, to put knowledge first is to treat knowledge as basic or fundamental, and to explain other states—belief, justification, maybe even content itself—in terms of knowledge, instead of vice versa. The idea has proven enormously interesting, and equally controversial. But deep foundational questions about its actual content remain relatively unexplored. We (...)
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  17. Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.
    An infuential twenty-first century philosophical project posits a central role for knowledge: knowledge is more fundamental than epistemic states like belief and justification. So-called “knowledge first” theorists find support for this thought in identifying central theoretical roles for knowledge. I argue that a similar methodology supports a privileged role for more specific category of basic knowledge. Some of the roles that knowledge first theorists have posited for knowledge generally are better suited for basic knowledge.
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  18. Review of C. S. Jenkins, Grounding Concepts: An Empirical Basis for Arithmetical Knowledge[REVIEW]Neil Tennant - 2010 - Philosophia Mathematica 18 (3):360-367.
    This book is written so as to be ‘accessible to philosophers without a mathematical background’. The reviewer can assure the reader that this aim is achieved, even if only by focusing throughout on just one example of an arithmetical truth, namely ‘7+5=12’. This example’s familiarity will be reassuring; but its loneliness in this regard will not. Quantified propositions — even propositions of Goldbach type — are below the author’s radar.The author offers ‘a new kind of arithmetical epistemology’, one which ‘respects (...)
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  19. Intuitive Evidence and Experimental Philosophy.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - In Jennifer Nado (ed.), Advances in Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Methodology. Bloomsbury. pp. 155–73.
    In recent years, some defenders of traditional philosophical methodology have argued that certain critiques of armchair methods are mistaken in assuming that intuitions play central evidential roles in traditional philosophical methods. According to this kind of response, experimental philosophers attack a straw man; it doesn’t matter whether intuitions are reliable, because philosophers don’t use intuitions in the way assumed. Deutsch (2010), Williamson (2007), and Cappelen (2012) all defend traditional methods in something like this way. I also endorsed something like this (...)
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  20. Experimental Philosophy and Apriority.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - In Al Casullo & Josh Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 45-66.
    One of the more visible recent developments in philosophical methodology is the experimental philosophy movement. On its surface, the experimentalist challenge looks like a dramatic threat to the apriority of philosophy; ‘experimentalist’ is nearly antonymic with ‘aprioristic’. This appearance, I suggest, is misleading; the experimentalist critique is entirely unrelated to questions about the apriority of philosophical investigation. There are many reasons to resist the skeptical conclusions of negative experimental philosophers; but even if they are granted—even if the experimentalists are right (...)
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  21.  86
    Review of Lorraine Daston & Katharine Park, Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150-1750. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 1999 - Times Literary Supplement 5001.
    Curious about the nature of light, Robert Boyle spent a series of late nights taking detailed observations of shining veal shanks, stinking fish, pieces of rotten wood which glowed in the dark, and a ‘noctiluca’ distilled from human urine. Once, report Lorraine Daston and Katharine Park, with "only a foot-boy" to assist him, Boyle put a luminous diamond to the nocturnal test, "plunging it into oil and acid, spitting on it, and ‘taking it into bed with me, and holding (...)
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  22. Linguistic Interventions and Transformative Communicative Disruption.Rachel Katharine Sterken - 2020 - In Herman Cappelen, David Plunkett & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 417-434.
    What words we use, and what meanings they have, is important. We shouldn't use slurs; we should use 'rape' to include spousal rape (for centuries we didn’t); we should have a word which picks out the sexual harassment suffered by people in the workplace and elsewhere (for centuries we didn’t). Sometimes we need to change the word-meaning pairs in circulation, either by getting rid of the pair completely (slurs), changing the meaning (as we did with 'rape'), or adding brand new (...)
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  23.  64
    How Inference Isn’T Blind: Self-Conscious Inference and its Role in Doxastic Agency.David Jenkins - 2019 - Dissertation, King’s College London
    This thesis brings together two concerns. The first is the nature of inference—what it is to infer—where inference is understood as a distinctive kind of conscious and self-conscious occurrence. The second concern is the possibility of doxastic agency. To be capable of doxastic agency is to be such that one is capable of directly exercising agency over one’s beliefs. It is to be capable of exercising agency over one’s beliefs in a way which does not amount to mere self-manipulation. Subjects (...)
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  24.  75
    Reasoning's Relation to Bodily Action.David Jenkins - 2020 - Ratio 33 (2):87-96.
    Recent philosophical work on the relation between reasoning and bodily action is dominated by two views. It is orthodox to have it that bodily actions can be at most causally involved in reasoning. Others have it that reasoning can constitutively involve bodily actions, where this is understood as a matter of non‐mental bodily events featuring as constituents of practical reasoning. Reflection on cases of reasoning out‐loud suggests a neglected alternative on which both practical and theoretical reasoning can have bodily actions (...)
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  25. Cartesian Epistemology Without Cartesian Dreams? Commentary on Jennifer Windt's Dreaming.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 25 (5-6):30-43.
    Jennifer Windt’s Dreaming is an enormously rich and thorough book, developing illuminating connections between dreaming, the methodology of psychology, and various philosophical subfields. I’ll focus on two epistemological threads that run through the book. The first has to do with the status of certain assumptions about dreams. Windt argues that the assumptions that dreams involve experiences, and that dream reports are reliable — are methodologically necessary default assumptions, akin to Wittgensteinian hinge propositions. I’ll suggest that Windt is quietly pre-supposing some (...)
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  26. Contextual Injustice.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30.
    Contextualist treatments of clashes of intuitions can allow that two claims, apparently in conflict, can both be true. But making true utterances is far from the only thing that matters — there are often substantive normative questions about what contextual parameters are appropriate to a given conversational situation. This paper foregrounds the importance of the social power to set contextual standards, and how it relates to injustice and oppression, introducing a phenomenon I call "contextual injustice," which has to do with (...)
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  27. Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism[REVIEW]Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (1):138-142.
    Review of Duncan Pritchard's Epistemological Disjunctivism.
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  28. Presupposition and Consent.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 6 (4):forthcoming.
    I argue that ‘consent’ language presupposes that the contemplated action is or would be at someone else’s behest. When one does something for another reason — for example, when one elects independently to do something, or when one accepts an invitation to do something — it is linguistically inappropriate to describe the actor as ‘consenting’ to it; but it is also inappropriate to describe them as ‘not consenting’ to it. A consequence of this idea is that ‘consent’ is poorly suited (...)
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  29. Rape and Resistance. [REVIEW]Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2018 - The Philosophers' Magazine 83:117-118.
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  30. Virtue, Intuition, and Philosophical Methodology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2013 - In John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: Essays on the Philosophy of Ernest Sosa. Springer. pp. 1-20.
    This chapter considers Ernest Sosa’s contributions to philosophical methodology. In Section 1, Sosa’s approach to the role of intuitions in the epistemology of philosophy is considered and related to his broader virtue-theoretic epistemological framework. Of particular focus is the question whether false or unjustified intuitions may justify. Section 2 considers Sosa’s response to sceptical challenges about intuitions, especially those deriving from experimental philosophy. I argue that Sosa’s attempt to attribute apparent disagreement in survey data to difference in meaning fails, but (...)
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  31.  74
    Eric L. Jenkins, Free to Say No? Augustine's Evolving Doctrines of Grace and Elections. [REVIEW]Seamus O'Neill - 2014 - Analecta Hermeneutica 6.
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  32. Forall X (UBC Edition).P. D. Magnus & Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2020 - Creative Commons: Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0.
    This is an open-access introductory logic textbook, prepared by Jonathan Ichikawa, based on P.D. Magnus's forallx. This (v2.0, July 2020) is intended as a stable, ready-for-teaching edition.
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  33. Articulating the A Priori-A Posteriori Distinction.Albert Casullo - 2012 - In Essays on A Priori Knowledge and Justification. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 289-327.
    The distinction between a priori knowledge and a posteriori knowledge has come under attack in the recent literature by Philip Kitcher, John Hawthorne, C. S. Jenkins, and Timothy Williamson. Evaluating the attacks requires answering two questions. First, have they hit their target? Second, are they compelling? My goal is to argue that the attacks fail because they miss their target. Since the attacks are directed at a particular concept or distinction, they must accurately locate the target concept or distinction. (...)
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  34. Justified Concepts and the Limits of the Conceptual Approach to the A Priori.Darren Bradley - 2011 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):267-274.
    Carrie Jenkins (2005, 2008) has developed a theory of the a priori that she claims solves the problem of how justification regarding our concepts can give us justification regarding the world. She claims that concepts themselves can be justified, and that beliefs formed by examining such concepts can be justified a priori. I object that we can have a priori justified beliefs with unjustified concepts if those beliefs have no existential import. I then argue that only beliefs without existential (...)
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  35. Free Thinking for Expressivists.Neil Sinclair - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (2):263-287.
    This paper elaborates and defends an expressivist account of the claims of mind-independence embedded in ordinary moral thought. In response to objections from Zangwill and Jenkins it is argued that the expressivist 'internal reading' of such claims is compatible with their conceptual status and that the only 'external reading' available doesn't commit expressivisists to any sort of subjectivism. In the process a 'commitment-theoretic' account of the semantics of conditionals and negations is defended.
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  36. Ignorance, Presuppositions, and the Simple View.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Mind 124 (496):1221-1230.
    Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa has presented a series of examples that are meant to spell trouble for Presuppositional Epistemic Contextualism. In this short article I aim to establish two things. First, I argue that even if Ichikawa’s examples were viable counterexamples to PEC, they would not threaten the key ideas underlying the account in my 2009 article ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’. The philosophically interesting work that is done in that article remains unaffected by Ichikawa’s alleged counterexamples. In the second part of (...)
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  37. Selves on Selves: The Philosophical Significance of Autobiography. Gibson - 2012 - Journal of Aesthetic Education 46 (4):109-119.
    Philosophers of literature do not take much of an interest in autobiography.1 In one sense this is not surprising. As a certain prejudice has it, autobiography is, along with biography, the preferred reading of people who do not really like to read. The very words can conjure up images of what one finds on bookshelves in Florida retirement communities and in underfunded public libraries, books with titles like Under the Rainbow: The Real Liza Minnelli or Me: Stories of My Life (...)
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  38. Boghossian's Implicit Definition Template.Ben Baker - 2012 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Philosophical and Formal Approaches to Linguistic Analysis. Ontos-Verlag. pp. 15.
    In Boghossian's 1997 paper, 'Analyticity' he presented an account of a prioriknowledge of basic logical principles as available by inference from knowledge of their role in determining the meaning of the logical constants by implicit definitiontogether with knowledge of the meanings so-determined that we possess through ourprivileged access to meaning. Some commentators (e.g. BonJour (1998), Glüer (2003),Jenkins (2008)) have objected that if the thesis of implicit definition on which he relieswere true, knowledge of the meaning of the constants would (...)
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  39. Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. Second, that (...)
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  40. Boghossian's Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - 2018 - Al Mukhatabat 26:71-90.
    Within his overarching program aiming to defend an epistemic conception of analyticity, Boghossian (1996 and 1997) has offered a clear-cut explanation of how we can acquire a priori knowledge of logical truths and logical rules through implicit definition. The explanation is based on a special template or general form of argument. Ebert (2005) has argued that an enhanced version of this template is flawed because a segment of it is unable to transmit warrant from its premises to the conclusion. This (...)
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  41. Ebert on Boghossian’s Template and Transmission Failure.Alessia Marabini & Luca Moretti - manuscript
    Boghossian (1996) has put forward an interesting explanation of how we can acquire logical knowledge via implicit definitions that makes use of a special template. Ebert (2005) has argued that the template is unserviceable, as it doesn't transmit warrant. In this paper, we defend the template. We first suggest that Jenkins (2008)’s response to Ebert fails because it focuses on doxastic rather than propositional warrant. We then reject Ebert’s objection by showing that it depends on an implausible and incoherent (...)
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