This paper reviews the hole argument as an argument against spacetime substantivalism. After a careful presentation of the argument itself, I critically review possible responses.

In this paper I offer an argument against one important version of panentheism, that is, mereological panentheism. Although panentheism has proven difficult to define, I provide a working definition of the view, and proceed to argue that given this way of thinking about the doctrine, mereological accounts of panentheism have serious theological drawbacks. I then explore some of these theological drawbacks. In a concluding section I give some reasons for thinking that the classical theistic alternative to panentheism is preferable, all (...) things considered. (shrink)

Empirical philosophers of science aim to base their philosophical theories on observations of scientific practice. But since there is far too much science to observe it all, how can we form and test hypotheses about science that are sufficiently rigorous and broad in scope, while avoiding the pitfalls of bias and subjectivity in our methods? Part of the answer, we claim, lies in the computational tools of the digital humanities, which allow us to analyze large volumes of scientific literature. Here (...) we advocate for the use of these methods by addressing a number of large-scale, justificatory concerns—specifically, about the epistemic value of journal articles as evidence for what happens elsewhere in science, and about the ability of DH tools to extract this evidence. Far from ignoring the gap between scientific literature and the rest of scientific practice, effective use of DH tools requires critical reflection about these relationships. (shrink)

This paper uses a schema for infinite regress arguments to provide a solution to the problem of the infinite regress of justification. The solution turns on the falsity of two claims: that a belief is justified only if some belief is a reason for it, and that the reason relation is transitive.

Binding specificity is a centrally important concept in molecular biology, yet it has received little philosophical attention. Here I aim to remedy this by analyzing binding specificity as a causal property. I focus on the concept’s role in drug design, where it is highly prized and hence directly studied. From a causal perspective, understanding why binding specificity is a valuable property of drugs contributes to an understanding of causal selection—of how and why scientists distinguish between causes, not just causes from (...) noncauses. In particular, the specificity of drugs is precisely what underwrites their value as experimental interventions on biological processes. (shrink)

We make some remarks on the mathematics and metaphysics of the hole argument, in response to a recent article in this journal by Weatherall ([2018]). Broadly speaking, we defend the mainstream philosophical literature from the claim that correct usage of the mathematics of general relativity `blocks' the argument.

In this paper, I argue for a novel reading of Spinoza’s position in his exchangewith Boyle about Boyle’s experiment with nitre. Boyle claimed to have shownthrough experiments that nitre ceased to be nitre after heating. Spinozadisagreed and proposed the alternative hypothesis that nitre has changed itsstate and not its nature. Spinoza’s position was construed in the literature asrational scepticism denying that experiments can yield knowledge ofessences because all sensory experience is underdetermined and open tomultiple interpretations. I argue for an alternative (...) reading of Spinoza’sposition which focuses on Bacon’s notion of crucial instance. According tothis reading, Spinoza did not deny the possibility of knowing byexperimentation whether nitre has changed its nature, he asked for a crucialinstance, i.e. an experiment that would refute the hypothesis that nitre haschanged merely its state. Spinoza’s argumentative strategy shows that,contrary to the mainstream reading, the representational content of sensoryideas can be determined even if it does not represent the essence of theobject: we can know with absolute, rather than merely moral, certaintywhether nitre ceased to be nitre without knowing what nitre is. (shrink)

We present a new model for the human psyche in this paper. We support the thinkers from Philosophy of Science that believe that we should keep the theory that best explains our phenomena, and, therefore, we believe that we should keep the theory we here present for the human psyche. We present evidences as to why our theory explains the human psyche better than the Freudian and the Jungian theories. We include all concepts created by Jung and Freud in our (...) theory apart from the collective unconscious. We introduce the elements extended id and extended ego in terms of human personality and the elements judgmental, non-judgmental, shared, and non-shared in terms of human mind. Our methodology consists in performing a logical analysis of the theories of Freud and Jung and then put them against the known reality to come up with solutions that address the gaps that both exhibit. (shrink)

Jacques Monod (1971) argued that certain molecular processes rely critically on the property of chemical arbitrariness, which he claimed allows those processes to “transcend the laws of chemistry”. It seems natural, as some philosophers have done, to interpret this in modal terms: a biological relationship is chemically arbitrary if it is possible, within the constraints of chemical “law”, for that relationship to have been otherwise than it is. But while modality is certainly important for understanding chemical arbitrariness, understanding its biological (...) role also requires an account of the concrete causal-functional features that distinguish arbitrary from non-arbitrary phenomena. In this paper I elaborate on this under-emphasised aspect by offering a general account of these features: arbitrary relations are instantiated by mechanisms that involve molecular adapters, which causally couple two properties or processes which would otherwise be uncorrelated. Additionally, adapters work by acting as intermediate rather than cooperating causes. (shrink)

Lack of consent is valorized within popular culture to the point that sexual assault has become a spectator sport and creepshot entertainment on social media. Indeed, the valorization of nonconsensual sex has reached the extreme where sex with unconscious girls, especially accompanied by photographs as trophies, has become a goal of some boys and men.

Ontologies, as the term is used in informatics, are structured vocabularies comprised of human- and computer-interpretable terms and relations that represent entities and relationships. Within informatics fields, ontologies play an important role in knowledge and data standardization, representation, integra- tion, sharing and analysis. They have also become a foundation of artificial intelligence (AI) research. In what follows, we outline the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO), which covers multiple areas in the domain of coronavirus diseases, including etiology, transmission, epidemiology, pathogenesis, diagnosis, (...) prevention, and treatment. We emphasize CIDO development relevant to COVID-19. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss three translation techniques: literal, cultural, and artistic. Literal translation is a well-known technique, which means that it is quite easy to find sources on the topic. Cultural and artistic translation may be new terms. Whilst cultural translation focuses on matching contexts, artistic translation focuses on matching reactions. Because literal translation matches only words, it is not hard to find situations in which we should not use this technique. Because artistic translation focuses on reactions, judging the (...) quality of an artistic translation work is one of the most difficult things one can do. We end up having a score of complexity and humanity for each one of the mentioned techniques: Literal translation would be the closest thing we have to the machines world and artistic translation would be the closest thing we have to the purely human world. By creating these classifications and studying the subtleties of each one of them, we are adding degrees of quality to our courses and to translation as a professional field. The main contribution of this paper is then the formalization of such a piece of knowledge. We, however, also lay the foundations for studies of this type. (shrink)

Our investigative question is what part of the human psyche is active when we are sleeping. We use the single-counter-example method, extracted from Classical Logic, to prove that it could not be the case that one of our existing models for the human psyche could explain the human sleep. The models of the human psyche that we consider are the Freudian, the Jungian, and our own. By proving that no known part could be active whilst we sleep, and we prove (...) all by presenting known facts, we reach the conclusion that we need a new model of psyche to account for the entire complexity of our beings. We associate sleep with dreams. Upon discussing the human dreams in more details, we end up applying the principles of the inference to the best explanation to explain the human dreams by means of references to the spiritual world. That makes us think about how the spiritists would describe our psyche, and we then present a new model. The new model is obviously a fruit of speculation. This time, the model involves all Freudian elements, our extensional elements, body, and soul. We use the synthetic method to construct our new model. Since our sleep time is so important, to the point of obliging us to build a new model for the human psyche, we worry about protecting it. We then use studies on the impact of noise on humans to talk about how bad the consequences of having a person speaking to us during sleep are. This trivially extends to people that are in hypnotic state. We try to make a case against hypnosis and interference with the sleep of human beings by referring to health, spiritual, and world consequences. Our main result is then a new model for the human psyche, and this time a model that has to do with what is beyond what has already been formally acknowledged by us. A secondary result is that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or to speak to them as they sleep. Our conclusions are that there is definitely something beyond our rationality that happens during our sleep time and this something has not been identified by Freud, Jung or us this far. Besides, that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or speak to them as they sleep. (shrink)

In this paper I argue, based on a comparison of Spinoza's and Descartes‟s discussion of error, that beliefs are affirmations of the content of imagination that is not false in itself, only in relation to the object. This interpretation is an improvement both on the winning ideas reading and on the interpretation reading of beliefs. Contrary to the winning ideas reading it is able to explain belief revision concerning the same representation. Also, it does not need the assumption that I (...) misinterpret my otherwise correct ideas as the interpretation reading would have it. In the first section I will provide a brief overview of the notion of inherence and its role in Spinoza‟s discussion of the status of finite minds. Then by examining the relation between Spinoza‟s and Descartes‟ distinction of representations and attitudes, I show that affirmation can be identified with beliefs in Spinoza. Next, I will take a closer look at the identification of intellect and will and argue that Spinoza's identification of the two is based on the fact that Spinoza sees both as the active aspect of the mind. After that, I analyze Spinoza‟s comments on the different scopes of will and intellect, and argue that beliefs are affirmations of the imaginative content of the idea. Finally, through Spinoza‟s example of the utterance of mathematical error, I present my solution to the problem of inherence of false beliefs. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to provide a theory that explains human behavior, and thinking in their totality. We missed the corporeal part when writing the theory about our new model for the human psyche: It was missing explaining that some things are physical, such as memories, involuntary organic movements, disease, etc. If we had developed a philosophical model for the soma, we would also miss the essence of the individual, what we have decided to call psyche. In order to (...) explain how our hand could not stand the pressure and ended up releasing the link that then got lose and killed somebody, we need the philosophical explanation involving the soma. In order to explain why a person had a shared-ego moment, we need the philosophical explanation involving the psyche. In this way, it is missing creating a theory that unifies all in order to produce a set that can explain any situation that involves human behavior and thinking. We are then calling the entity that collects all in one, which is needed for our better understanding, Human Persona. Persona because that reminds us of individuality, unique characteristics that tell us that the individual we call John Smith, of id 143, is someone special. Human because we do talk about personality of animals, and we would like to make sure we create an impression of difference and superiority when referring to humans. The tools we here use are logical analysis, deductive reasoning, selection and collection of real-life evidence, etc. (shrink)

I argue, through appeal to the distinction between analysis and decomposition described by Dummett, that Wittgenstein employs both of those notions in the Tractatus. I then bring this interpretation to bear upon the issue of propositional unity, where I formulate an objection to the views of both Leonard Linksy and José Zalabardo. I show that both Linsky and Zalabardo fail to acknowledge the distinction between analysis and decomposition present in the Tractatus, and that they consequently mischaracterise Wittgenstein’s position with respect (...) to propositional unity. (shrink)

In this paper, we take the approach of the lexicon makers: We contemplate human language instead of trying to resist its forces. Basically, some sigmatoids seem to have been created to be free of boundaries: We fence them as we please when we apply them to our assertions, but they are quite vague in the lexicon. We here identify at least two types of such sigmatoids: The synthetisers and the specifiers. The former would originate from our capacity of isolating common (...) features of objects that, in principle, have no possible intersection. The latter would originate from our attempt of describing the 3D World by means of 2D entities. We conclude that the intrinsic vagueness of these sigmatoids is something not only acceptable, but either pleasant or necessary. (shrink)

Entailment is an interesting sigmatoid: It should mean one thing, but it means another, just for starters. When used in Mathematics, it is usually with the sense of saying that something is definitely true. That would be the use in Classical Logic then. When used in Logic, it became something else. Now it was about how the logical system, which can be any nonclassical one, could be making a proposition become true or false. The major issue we found in 2000, (...) when learning from the own nonclassicists what they do, was that they talk about Nonclassical Logic, therefore a way of thinking that is not Cartesian, yet they stick to the notion of entailment we use in Mathematics, and therefore to the Classical Logic ways. We here discuss exactly this. (shrink)

The Unexpected Hanging Problem is also known as the Surprise Examination Problem. We here solve it by isolating what is logical reasoning from the rest of the human psyche. In a not-so-orthodox analysis, following our tradition (The Liar, Dichotomy, The Sorites and Russell’s Paradox), we talk about the problem from a perspective that is more distant than all the known perspectives. From an observational point that is in much farther than all the observational points used until now, the reader can (...) finally see why the problem has been perpetuated as a problem and can also see that the problem was never an actual problem: Once more, we have an allurement. The allurement this time makes us start paying attention to all the complexity of the human psyche when studying problems that involve human feelings. The main finding could be told to be that we have to understand and study more the human psyche, in all its intricacies, also when dealing with problems that seem to belong with exclusivity to Mathematics or Logic. (shrink)

I argue that notions of relative fundamentality need to be invoked if there is to be something substantive at stake in the debate between proponents of Harvey Brown's dynamical approach to relativity and defenders of a more traditional interpretation of spacetime. I will review some problems that stand in the way of the advocate of the dynamical approach making good on their claim that dynamical symmetries are more fundamental than spacetime symmetries.

This essay discusses the Vietnam War from the perspective of the strategist, and with focus on men-power,which is part of the concept of `order of the battle’. The interest is progressing toward determining best methodsfor the calculation of estimates of this type to decrease mistake in wars that involve various nations. Uponstudying the debate involving the estimates for the Vietnam War, period ranging from 1965 to 1968, theconclusion is that there were gross mistakes from the part of the military, and (...) methods of producing the order ofthe battle have to be much better examined. Systems of decision, and management deserve revision, so that whathas happened during the Vietnam War does not repeat: important is saving human lives, not the prestige ofindividual institutions or even the amount of negative criticism that is made publicly available about them.National forces must mean also Academia, and there is a chance that Academia can improve those systems bymuch if governmental authorities acknowledge its existence in all sectors of the national life. The best strategyis still including the dissident group or person, not facing them as an enemy, when it comes to those who areregarded by the general public as part of the national forces. (shrink)

Incarceration is a hurdle for The State, the perpetrator‘s family, society in general, the victim, and the perpetrator themselves. Laws, regulations, and rules are as relative, and fragile as their associated human group intended them to be, and it is frequently the case that they change so completely from one location to another that one can be regarded as a hero in one place, and most unacceptable perpetrator in another for practicing the same acts. It is time for a change: (...) community justice centers are a good start - especially if one considers their court intervention programs –because they align with the concept of restorative justice, and form a natural step toward incarceration zero, which has to be human kind‘s goal. (shrink)

In the following article I intend to examine the problem of the unity of the proposition in Russell, Frege, and Wittgenstein. My chief aim will be to draw attention to the distinction between Russell’s conception of propositional constituents, on the one hand, with Frege and Wittgenstein’s on the other. My focus will be on Russell’s view of terms as independent, propositions being built up out of these building blocks, compared with Frege and Wittgenstein’s ‘top down’ approach. Furthermore, I will argue (...) that, contra certain other commentators, Frege’s metaphor of saturation and unsaturation does not serve as a solution to the problem of unity, and that the extension of this metaphorical language to Wittgenstein is, therefore, inappropriate. (shrink)

We talk about how to best protect Australia against cyberterrorist attacks of the type in which the offenders use a computer to attack or in which the offenders attack computers. Our concern is phenomena like Stuxnet and Ransomware, but also any attack that has not yet happened, as for our official records, so say hacking of satellite and use of its allowances to burn people alive to death. We talk about the basics, which could be the advice of FireEye, and (...) we talk about the sophisticated, which could be what is not yet printed. We worry about actions that could be considered part of the intelligence system, so things that demand detailed study of the past and systemic plus organised collection of data in the present. We do not talk about how to deal with Acts of War: Only about how to protect our systems to best so that we do not get those happening via computer or from a computer. (shrink)

A discussion on this so debatable and debated concept, Higher Order Vagueness. After going through the issues that make Higher Order Vagueness an object of scientific attention, we conclude that vagueness is undesirable in logical systems but desirable in language, and the Semiotics Universe splits into three other universes inside of the universe of the Computer Science Systems. We create a new way of addressing problems with sigmatoids, and define vagueness in an almost mathematical fashion.

We here propose a solution to the problem we have raised. Basically, the mathematical notion of entailment seems to be connected to the inferential rules from Classical Logic, so that if we have P: x belongs to the reals, and Q: x+2=5 => x=3, P |= Q. Notwithstanding, we would also have that if P: x belongs to the interval (7,10), and Q: x+2=5 => x=3, P |= Q. The second instance of entailment does not seem to be justifiable if (...) our intuition is consulted: Even though we could say that absurdity implies anything in Classical Logic, entailment should be a concept that belongs to the metalogic, not to the logic of the system, so that we should not be inside of the Classical Logic World by the time we assess things in what regards entailment. As another point, our discussions in Entailment led us to choose the sense has as a consequence for entailment, so that it is not really acceptable that we have, as a consequence, using normal language, of x being inside of the real interval (7,10) that if x+2=5, then x=3. If x is in that interval, x+2 should not be 5, unless we are talking about moduli of vectors. However, when we transfer to Classical Logic, in having the antecedent false, and the consequent false as well, we have that the implication, which some call material, is true. We here discuss this sort of matter in detail, and hope to get to the bottom of the issue, and perhaps to a universal solution. (shrink)

Two extremely detailed accounts of temporal experience can be found in the work of C. D. Broad. These accounts have been subject to considerable criticism. I argue that, when we look more carefully at Broad’s work, we find that much of this criticism fails to find its target. I show that the objection that ultimately proves troubling for Broad stems from his commitment to two principles: i) the Thin-PSA, and ii) the ‘Overlap’ claim. I use this result to demonstrate that (...) we can learn two extremely important lessons from Broad’s work on temporal experience. -/- The first lesson is that there is a structural problem facing any account that commits to these two principles. This is significant given that a number of recent accounts of temporal experience are so committed. The second lesson is that the problem facing these accounts stems only from commitment to the Thin-PSA and ‘Overlap’, rather than to commitment to a particular conception of how experiences are to be individuated. This, I argue, gives us reason to reject Tye’s recent claim that the problems facing accounts of temporal experience can be dissolved simply by making stipulations about how experiences are to be individuated. (shrink)

The following four theses all have some intuitive appeal: (I) There are valid norms. (II) A norm is valid only if justified by a valid norm. (III) Justification, on the class of norms, has an irreflexive proper ancestral. (IV) There is no infinite sequence of valid norms each of which is justified by its successor. However, at least one must be false, for (I)--(III) together entail the denial of (IV). There is thus a conflict between intuition and logical possibility. This (...) paper, after distinguishing various conceptions of a norm, of validity and of justification, argues for the following position. (I) is true. (II) is false for legislative justification and true for epistemic justification. (III) is true for legislative and false for epistemic justification. (IV) is true for legislative justification; for epistemic justification (IV) is true or false depending on the conception taken of a norm. Our intuition in favour of (II) must therefore be abandoned where justification is conceived legislatively. Our intuition in favour of (III) must be abandoned, and our intuition in favour of (IV) qualified, where justification is conceived epistemically. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against Michael Morris’ claim, that the Tractatus view involves holding that the possibility of truth-functional combination is prior to the possibility for sentential constituents to combine with one another. I provide an alternative interpretation in which I deny the presence of any distinction in the Tractatus between these two possibilities. I then turn to Adrian Moore’s ‘disjunctivist’ account of sentencehood, itself inspired by the Tractatus view. I argue that Moore’s account need not involve a commitment (...) to the kind of priority Morris describes, and that it need not involve a commitment to transcendental idealism. (shrink)

In this paper, through a close reading of Spinoza's use of common notions I argue for the role of experiential and experimental knowledge in Spinoza's epistemology.

In higher education, interdisciplinarity involves the design of subjects that offer the opportunity to experience ‘different ways of knowing’ from students’ core or preferred disciplines. Such an education is increasingly important in a global knowledge economy. Many universities have begun to introduce interdisciplinary studies or subjects to meet this perceived need. This chapter explores some of the issues inherent in moves towards interdisciplinary higher education. Definitional issues associated with the term ‘academic discipline’, as well as other terms, including ‘multidisciplinary’, ‘cross-disciplinary’, (...) ‘pluridisciplinarity’, ‘transdisciplinarity’ and ‘interdisciplinary’ are examined. A new nomenclature is introduced to assist in clarifying the subtle distinctions between the various positions. The chapter also outlines some of the pedagogical and epistemological considerations which are involved in any move from a conventional form of educational delivery to an interdisciplinary higher education, and recommends caution in any implementation of an interdisciplinary curriculum. (shrink)

The immediate occasion for this special issue was Christia Mercer’s influential paper “The Contextualist Revolution in Early Modern Philosophy”. In her paper, Mercer clearly demarcates two methodologies of the history of early modern philosophy. She argues that there has been a silent contextualist revolution in the past decades, and the reconstructivist methodology has been abandoned. One can easily get the impression that ‘reconstructivist’ has become a pejorative label that everyone outright rejects. Mercer’s examples of reconstructivist historians of philosophy are deceased (...) (P. F. Strawson, Margaret J. Osler, Richard Watson, and Bernard Williams), anonymous (the fans of philosopher* mentioned by Lisa Downing), or authors whose more recent work followed a contextualist methodology (Jonathan Bennett). The reconstructivist camp seems to have turned into a shadowy group, largely extinct by now, not unlike the Death Eaters in the fictional universe of Harry Potter. There are some figures who previously belonged to this group, but they have since reformed their ways – or so it seems. Sometimes it is rumoured that certain people may still have secret allegiance to it, but no one dares to fly its banner openly. We decided to create this special issue because we believe that reconstructivist methodology does not deserve this shadowy existence. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate whether Spinoza theory of intellect can be considered as an Averroistic, Themistian or Alexandrian theory of intellect. I identify key doctrines of these theories that are argumentatively and theoretically independent from Aristotelian hylomorphism and thus can be accepted by someone rejecting hylomorphism. Next, I argue that the textual evidence is inconclusive: depending on the reading of Spinoza's philosophy accepted, Spinoza's theory of intellect can or cannot be considered as an Averroistic theory.

Spinoza’s account of memory has not received enough attention, even though it is relevant for his theory of consciousness. Recent literature has studied the “pancreas problem.” This paper argues that there is an analogous problem for memories: if memories are in the mind, why is the mind not conscious of them? I argue that Spinoza’s account of memory can be better reconstructed in the context of Descartes’s account to show that Spinoza responded to these views. Descartes accounted for the preservation (...) of memories by holding that they are brain states without corresponding mental states, and that the mind is able to interpret perception either as new experience or as memory. Spinoza has none of these conceptual resources because of his substance monism. Spinoza accounts for memories as the mind’s ability to generate ideas according to the order of images. This ability consists in the connection of ideas, which is not an actual property, but only a dispositional one and thus not conscious. It is, however, grounded in the actual property of parts of the body, of which ideas are conscious. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the question whether Spinoza can account for the necessity of death. I argue that he cannot because within his ethical intellectualist system the subject cannot understand the cause of her death, since by understanding it renders it harmless. Then, I argue that Spinoza could not solve this difficulties because of deeper commitments of his system. At the end I draw a historical parallel to the problem from medieval philosophy.

Addressing classicists, philosophers, students, and general readers alike, this volume emphasizes the unity of Seneca's work and his originality as a translator of Stoic ideas in the literary forms of imperial Rome. It features a vitalizing diversity of contributors from different generations, disciplines, and research cultures. Several prominent Seneca scholars publishing in other languages are for the first time made accessible to anglophone readers. (See also the attached file with ToC and Introduction).

On 25 December 1991 Alaa Hamed must for his literary work to the "Emergency Court for National Security" in Cairo. The judge read out the verdict: 2,300 egyptian pounds fine and eight years in prison for violating of state security and social peace. - A shock not only for egyptian intellectuals! The Arabic Department of BBC London placed the sentence in second place in the news, immediately after the notification of the resignation of Michail Gorbachev. Even in Germany the message (...) arrived in the media (FAZ, 30 December 1991). The egyptian journalist Jusif El Kaid spoke of the "most dangerous convicted of the 20 century" (Almussawar. No. 3508, 3 January 1992). The human rights organization of Egypt criticized the verdict as a violation of the right to freedom of expression and artistic innovation. It was the first time in modern history (after the 1952 revolution), that an author should because of his literary work in prison. (shrink)

Methodological critique of the sociological theory "spontaneous cooperation" to explain the revolution in Germany in 1989. This approach represented the german sociologists Dieter Opp and Detlef Pollack. The author reconstructs the two statements. Opp's approach is logically inconsistent. This approach is also unfit for scientific prediction, but Opp says the possibility of prediction is a necessary criterion for a scientific theory. Pollack's systemtheoretical approach ignores the really existing organized resistance of the subversive groups in Leipzig, for example the "Working group (...) for human rights" or the "Working group for Justice". Miracle or surprise chance are scientifically anacceptable models to explain a revolution. Both economically and politically offered the capitalist welfare state more for the workers than the socialism. So people noticed socialism as a system with more work for less prosperity and without civil rights, as a system of "exploitation by inefficiency" (Elsenhans). The author describes the revolution as a result of very effective collaboration between people, who willing to take risks and wanted to emigrate from the GDR to West, and the subversive groups, that could organize the revolutionary resistance. - This is a possible interpretation of the revolution from the interaction of transition-theory and voice-and-exit-theory (Hirschman). (shrink)

1. Kulturkomparatistik / 2. Physis als Gewissheit / 3. Kultur und Wertungskriterium / 4. Genealogie als Methode der Entbindung aus Tradition / 5. Genealogie der Ahnenkultur am Beispiel der Inuit / 6. Zwei Errungenschaften Europas: Liberaler Universalismus und individualistische Vernunftkritik / 7. Theorie der Notgemeinschaft und die Psychologie des Ressentiments zur Lösung von Isaiah Berlins "Paradoxon kollektiver Selbstbestimmung" / 8. Konflikt-Transformationen nach Albert O. Hirschman / 9. Der Wille zur Anthropodiversität übersteigt die Toleranz.

Während in griechisch-römischer Antike Arbeit und Freiheit einander ausschlossen, gilt heute den Nicht-Wohlhabenden der Ausschluss aus der Erwerbsarbeit als Verlust von Selbstbestimmung. Funktion und Wert von Arbeit sind abhängig von der Machtstreuung vs. -konzentration der jeweiligen Gesellschaften. Nicht-kapitalistische Machtstrukturen erzwingen Arbeit durch materielle Not bzw. außerökonomisch zum Zwecke der Sozialdisziplinierung. Kapitalismus ist zum Siege gelangt, wo Arbeit knapp und daher teuer – für die Armen zum Modus der Teilhabe am Wohlstand – werden konnte. Zuerst erkannten Nietzsche und Lafargue, dass die (...) aus Not zur Tugend gelogene „Arbeitsmoral“ die Arbeitenden in ihrem Kampfe um die Preissteigerung für Arbeit nie mehr als hindern kann. -/- Seit Keynes ist die Funktionsweise des Kapitalismus bekannt: Vollbeschäftigung ist Bedingung der Möglichkeit, damit Arbeit im Konflikt mit dem Kapital zu Verhandlungsmacht gelangen kann. Die von Marxisten ersehnten Krisen des Kapitalismus sind durch staatliche Maßnahmen und wohlfahrtsstaatliche Umverteilung prinzipiell politisch regulierbar. Aber wer öffentlich der politökonomischen Aufklärung dient, befähigt auch deren Widersacher dazu, sich an ihr zu bilden, die Konter-Strategie entlang ihrer Erkenntnisse gegenläufig auszurichten. -/- Neoliberalismus lässt sich als politischer Anti-Liberalismus verstehen, offensiv gegen den Sozialstaat wie den gesamten Kulturbereich gerichtet, der mehr als nur boulevardeske Unterhaltung ist. Ob Schrumpfung des öffentlichen Dienstes, Privatisierung kollektiver Güter oder Steuersenkungen für Vermögende, letztlich geht es um die Steigerung ungleicher Verteilung finanzieller Verfügungsrechte. Dem korrespondiert die Zersetzung demokratischer Steuerung durch Entpolitisierung: Wenn es gelingt vermeintliche Sachzwänge politisch glaubwürdig zu inszenieren, erscheint gleichgültig, welche Regierung angeblich nichts mehr zu entscheiden hat, weil sie den Haushalt konsolidieren müsse etc. etc. Hohe Arbeitslosigkeit ist für den Erfolg neoliberaler Strategie entscheidend. Sie spaltet die abhängig Beschäftigten in realiter machtlose Arbeitslose (sie können nicht einmal streiken) und angesichts der Arbeitslosigkeit verängstigte Arbeitende (die sich aller Forderungen enthalten). Arbeit und Lohn bleiben Verteilungsprobleme. Die Zukunft bietet die Alternativen, hinter den bewussten kapitalistischen Fortschritt zurückzufallen oder auf dessen Grundlage das Otium der Edlen für alle zu erkämpfen. (shrink)

Einer der traditionell gegen den Utilitarismus erhobenen Vorwürfe besagt, Utilitarismus sei mit der Konzeption unveräußerlicher Individualrechte unvereinbar, er könne die Menschenrechte entweder nicht begründen oder schlösse deren Gebotensein schlicht aus. Der Berechtigung dieser Behauptung wird zuerst bei den klassischen Utilitaristen Jeremy Bentham und John Stuart Mill nachgegangen. Der Einwand von Bernhard Williams gegen den Utilitarismus, er würdige den Wert von Integrität der Persönlichkeit nicht, wird anhand seines von ihm selbst gebotenen Beispiels erwogen. Unter den nicht-klassischen Utilitarismen wird die Theorie von (...) Rainer W. Trapp auf ihre Vereinbarkeit mit unveräußerlichen Rechten geprüft. Das Resümee ist uneindeutig: Nicht alle Utilitarismen schließen die Rechtsinhalte unveräußerlicher Individualrechte aus. Nicht alle der uns heute bekannten und als unveräußerlich postulierten Individualrechte lassen sich inhaltlich utilitaristisch begründen. Im Paralipomenon wird das Verhältnis der utilitaristischen Methode zu moralischen Intuitionen überdacht und ein weiterer Einwand Bernard Williams gegen den Utilitarismus geprüft: Ist der Utilitarismus konformistisch? Ein Plädoyer für einen freiheitlichen Utilitarismus in der Tradition Mills bildet den Abschluss. -/- 1. Klassischer Utilitarismus und unveräußerliche Individualrechte / 1.1. Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832): Utilitarismus im Sicherheitsinteresse der Gemeinschaft / 1.2. John Stuart Mill (1806–1873): Utilitarismus der Freiheit als Lebenskunst der Individuen / 2. Zu Bernard Williams` Utilitarismus-Kritik: Integrität oder „Hier steh` ich und ich kann nicht anders!“ / 2.1. Das Jim-Pedro-Beispiel / 2.2. Negative Verantwortlichkeit: „Verhindere das größere Übel!“ / 3. Nicht-klassischer Utilitarismus und unveräusserliche Individualrechte / 3.1. Rainer W. Trapp: Gerechtigkeitsutilitarismus / 3.2. Utilitaristen und deontologische Rigoristen / 4. Resümee: Utilitarismus und unveräusserliche Individualrechte - 5. Paralipomenon: Plädoyer für Utilitarismus als Lebenskunst / 5.1. Ist der Utilitarismus konformistisch? / 5.2. Utilitarismus im Sinne John Stuart Mills als freiheitliche Lebenskunst, als „Art of Life“. (shrink)

In a theoretical reflection, the aim of this paper is primarily to discuss alterity in journalism. We believe that journalism plays a fundamental role in the construction of knowledge on similarities and differences between human beings, stressing social diversity as one of its purposes. We associate the concept of otherness, understood as a singular mode of existence of the “other”, with the purpose of journalism and with actions of empathy, sympathy and compassion. Based on a phenomenological perspective, we discuss the (...) importance of the meeting between the "self" and the "other", as well as the ability of journalists to perceive and narrate on the aspects that shape the identities of human beings. Moreover, we discuss otherness in journalistic narratives, approaching the relation between the lifeworld and the world of text... (shrink)

The way we answer the question, .what ought I to do?. goes to show what we believe about our life and the way to live that life. However we answer the question .what ought I to do?., we are prescribing a mode of -/- action and this action has a direct bearing on other people and our society at large. So the moral question has a direct connection with what society becomes. If we answer rightly then the impact on our (...) society will be salutary but if wrongly, the impact too will be fatal. So, what we do influences society for good or bad. -/- In this book, the meaning of morality and, ethics and how these can help in personal and national development will be examined. (shrink)

On January 27, 2022, the Constitutional Court of Ecuador (the Court) granted judgment in the case 253-20-JH, called “Rights of Nature and Animals as Subjects of Rights, Estrellita Monkey Case,” popularly known as the Estrellita case. 1 The case generated high expectations because the Court selected it for the development of binding jurisprudence. Since its release, the case has received broad public attention due to its ruling and media outlets having announced that Ecuador is the frst country where animals have (...) legal rights. Given the importance of the Estrellita case, an analysis from an animal rights perspective is necessary. First, I will summarize the Rights of Nature under the Ecuadorian Constitution and the history of the Estrellita case. Secondly, I will explain the ruling of the Estrellita case, how the Court recognized individual animals as legal subjects, what rights of wild animals were recognized, the interspecies principle, and the ecological interpretation principle. Thirdly, I will argue why Rights of Nature is not the correct framework for the achievement of rights for animals, mainly because the ecological interpretation principle has the effect of undermining the full realization of those rights. Finally, I will present positive outcomes for animals in Ecuador that derive from the Estrellita case, as the Rights of Nature framework has a symbolic and instrumental value that one can use for the beneft of animals. (shrink)

Scalability, efficiency, and security had been a persistent problem over the years in data mining, several techniques had been proposed and implemented but none had been able to solve the problem of scalability, efficiency and security from cloud computing. In this research, we solve the problem scalability, efficiency and security in data mining over cloud computing by using a restful web services and combination of different technologies and tools, our model was trained by using different machine learning algorithm, and finally (...) using different validation and cross-validation methods to compare and validate our results. We build, train, test and deploy our model by restful API services which can be called through an endpoint, and with very high accuracy and huge success. (shrink)