Ausgehend von der immer wieder bemühten Metapher des Black CNN wird versucht, das Potenzial der musikalischen Ausdrucksform des HipHop als Kommunikationsstruktur der Schwarzen Minderheit in den USA zu analysieren. Nach einer historisch-kulturellen Erläuterung, die sich mit der Tradition der Reflektion sozialer und politischer Aspekte in den unterschiedlichen musikalischen Äußerungen der Schwarzen Volksgruppe in den USA beschäftigt und schon ansatzweise die Bedeutung dieser Ausdrucksmöglichkeit im Kontext eines internal colonialsm vor Augen führt, werden jene soziodemographischen Entwicklungen nachvollziehbar gemacht, die sich als zentraler (...) Kritikpunkt in den verbalen Artikulationen des HipHop widerspiegeln. Vor dem theoretischem Hintergrund von cultural citizenship - ein Konzept zur Bestimmung kultureller Teilhabe in der Mediengesellschaft -, werden 25 Textbeispiele, die sich auf HipHop- Veröffentlichungen von 1982 bis 2004 finden, auf ihre Übereinstimmung mit Indikatoren untersucht, die sich aus, den Medien zugeschriebenen, politischen und sozialen Funktionen ableiten lassen. Overseen by Scott La Rock... (shrink)

Die Erkenntnistheorie zählt zu den wichtigsten Teildisziplinen der theoretischen Philosophie. Seit 2000 hat sich die Disziplin sehr stark entwickelt. In diesem Zeitraum wurden in der Forschungsliteratur viele neue Antworten auf klassische erkenntnistheoretischen Fragen hervorgebracht und auch gänzlich neue Fragen und Probleme behandelt. Das Handbuch liefert einen Überblick über die aktuelle Entwicklung der Disziplin.

Im institutionalisierten Bereich interkultureller Beziehungen kommt es permanent zu Bemühungen, über gemeinsame musikalische Projekte Brücken zum Austausch von Lebensrealitäten und Erfahrungen zu erzielen. In vielen Fällen besteht jedoch nicht die Gelegenheit des gegenseitigen Austausches, weil die beteiligten Akteure entweder nebeneinander agieren, ohne aufeinander einzugehen und die Impulse ihres Gegenübers in den eigenen Beiträgen zu reflektieren, oder aber eine der beiden Bestandteile den anderen dominiert, und keine entsprechende Gelegenheit zur gleichberechtigten Artikulation einräumt. Der Grund dafür liegt häufig in der Starrheit der (...) musikalischen Systeme, die bei solchen Gelegenheiten aufeinander treffen und deren Unfähigkeit, auf Impulse außerhalb des jeweiligen Bezugsrahmens einzugehen. Die Improvisation bietet in diesem Zusammenhang einen tatsächlichen Spielplatz für unterschiedliche Zugänge und Entwürfe, der dazu einlädt, sich spielerisch einander anzunähern. Während im idiomatisch eingeschränkten Ausdrucksspektrum auch hier noch einige Barrieren existieren dürften, stellt sich im Kontext der harmonisch und rhythmisch freien Variante eine scheinbar ideale Basis zum gegenseitigen Erfahrungsaustausch dar. Diese wird nicht zuletzt aufgrund einer stark individualisierten Klangästhetik und Ausdruckspalette erzielt, deren Repräsentationsanteil an deutlich zuzuordnenden Elementen einer jeweiligen kulturellen Entität jedoch oft nicht exakt zu bestimmen ist. So widmet sich ein zentraler Aspekt der Arbeit der Frage nach der Zuweisungsebene der in diesem Zusammenhang getätigten Ausdrucksweisen, die sich im Bereich zwischen eindeutig einer bestimmten kulturellen Entität zuzuordnenden Elemente – häufig in Form von traditionellen Instrumenten als kulturelle Artefakte einer spezifischen regionalen Zugehörigkeit – und der rein technischen Herangehensweise an die musikalische Praxis der Kollektiv-Improvisation als Bestandteil einer global präsenten Subkultur der freien Improvisationsszene bewegt. Regelmäßig initiierte Projekte, die sich mit dieser Thematik auseinandersetzen werden im methodischen Teil der Arbeit zur Diskussion gestellt und als Ausgangspunkt für Erkenntnisse zur Optimierung von Projekten mit ähnlich ausgerichteten Zielsetzungen herangezogen. (shrink)

Im Rahmen der folgenden Seiten sollen die Kommunikationsbedingungen im Kontext der Kollektiv-Improvisation genauer analysiert und einem Vergleich mit den Voraussetzungen der idealen Sprechsituation von Habermas unterzogen werden. Hinleitend dazu erfolgt zum Einstieg eine Darstellung jener Ausgangsbedingungen, welche die Methode der kollektiven Improvisation von herkömmlichen musikalischen Verfahren unterscheidet. Zu diesem Zweck werden neben einer kurzen Erläuterung der bereits im vorangegangenen Kapitel ausführlich diskutierten Ausgangsbedingungen u.a. Ansätze aus der Musiktherapie herangezogen, die sowohl soziale als auch politische Faktoren mit einbeziehen. Im Anschluss daran (...) sollen mittels einer systemtheoretisch orientierten Annäherung, wie sie von Borgo und Goguen vorgenommen wurde, jene Aspekte genauer beleuchtet werden, die Aufschluss über die tatsächlichen Kommunikationsstrukturen und geben. (shrink)

In the debate about Heidegger’s commitment to National Socialism is often referred to his membership in the „Committee for the Philosophy of Right“ of the „Academy for German Law“ that was founded by then „Reichsminister“ Hans Frank in 1934. Since the protocols of the Committee were destroyed and there is no relevant information in other writings, nothing can be said about the frequency and content of the meetings. It is only documented that the committee was dissolved in 1938. However, in (...) the past year the philosopher Sidonie Kellerer and the semiotician François Rastier referred to a document that, they say, proves that Heidegger was in the committee until 1941/42 and that the latter participated „in practice“ (Rastier) in the Holocaust. The said document was depicted for the first time in the above mentioned FAZ publication and will be analysed in the present essay. It is exluded in it that the document proves the continuity of the „Committee for the Philosophy of Right“ until 1941/42 or even the participation mentioned. It is rather possible to conclude in the frame of high probability that in the document were listed only the names and addresses of possible experts for the conversion of the Civil Code into a „Volksgesetzbuch“. The allegation of the committee’s participation in the Holocaust is rejected as being untenable. The publication of the article in the FAZ triggered the „Debate about Heidegger and Fake News“. In der Debatte um das Engagement des Philosophen Martin Heidegger für den Nationalsozialismus wird oft auf seine Mitgliedschaft in dem vom damaligen Reichsminister Hans Frank gegründeten „Ausschuss für Rechtsphilosophie“ innerhalb der „Akademie für Deutsches Recht“ verwiesen, der 1934 gegründet wurde. Da die Protokolle des Ausschusses zerstört wurden und auch in anderen Schriften keine diesbezüglichen Angaben zu finden sind, lässt sich nichts über die Häufigkeit und den Inhalt der Tagungen sagen. Es ist nur belegt, dass der Ausschuss 1938 offiziell aufgelöst wurde. Im vergangenen Jahr, im September 2017, referierten die Philosophin Sidonie Kellerer und der Linguist François Rastier jedoch auf ein Schriftstück, das belege, dass Heidegger bis 1941/42 in dem Ausschuss war und dieser auch „in der Praxis“ (Rastier) am Holocaust teilgenommen habe. Das Schriftstück wurde in der obigen Publikation der FAZ erstmals abgebildet und wird hier im Detail analysiert. Dabei kann begründetermaßen ausgeschlossen werden, dass das besagte Dokument den Fortbestand des „Ausschusses für Rechtsphilosophie“ oder die genannte Teilhabe belege. Nach hinreichender Analyse muss vielmehr in dem Rahmen hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit geschlossen werden, dass dort nur Namen und Adressen von potentiellen Gutachtern für die Umwandlung des BGB in ein „Volksgesetzbuch“ aufgelistet wurden. Der Vorhalt einer Teilhabe des Ausschusses am Holocaust wird als ganz unhaltbar zurückgewiesen. Die Publikation des Artikels in der FAZ löste die „Debatte über Heidegger und Fake News“ aus. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger as Interrogator: The Final Paradigm By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Copyright©2024 Daniel Fidel Ferrer. All rights reserved. Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs CC BY-NC-ND. Imprint 1.0. 2024. All Rights are reserved. Intended copies of this work can be used for research and teaching. No change in the content and must include my full name, Daniel Fidel Ferrer. Enjoying reading and disagreeing. Publisher: Kuhn von Verden Verlag. Language: English and German. Includes bibliographical references and an index. Pages 1-316. Index total pages is 524. (...) Ontology. 2. Metaphysics. 3. Philosophy, German. 4. Thought and thinking. 5. Kant, Immanuel, 1724-1804. 6. Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von, 1775-1854. 7. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. 10. Philosophy, Modern -- 20th century. 11. Philosophy, Modern -- 19th century. 12. Practice (Philosophy). 13. Philosophy and civilization. 14. Postmodernism. 15. Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 1844-1900. 16. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. 17. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel. Table of Contents Mottos Division I. Discussion of the title pages 2-6 Prologue pages 7-14 Heidegger, what do we know about him? page 15-22 Early Heidegger pages 23-41 What are the periods in Heidegger’s thought? pages 42-51 Preface and Setting the Stage pages 52-65 Introduction pages 66-82 Heidegger on Questioning pages 83-94 The Crisis or Krisis in philosophy? pages 95-106 Does Heidegger have a philosophy? pages 107-127 Heidegger about the Nature of Teaching pages 128-132 Heidegger against philosophy as a worldview or the standpoint of standpointlessness pages 133-137 Heidegger’s world-famous book Being and Time (Sein und Zeit, SuZ, 1927) pages 138-153 Heidegger’s second attempt Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938) pages 154-162 Heidegger on the image of the Bridge pages 163-170 Conclusion pages 171-188 -/- Division II. Engagement with Heidegger on history of philosophy (metaphysics). Reinigung as cleaning, purifying pages 189-191 What is Heidegger’s Metahistory of philosophy? pages 192-243 Appendix A. Reconstruction of a partial letter from Martin Heidegger to Dieter Sinn. Dated. 24 August 1964. pages 244-248 Appendix B. Martin Heidegger's Dialogue and Critical Debate with Hegel. pages 249-253 Appendix C. Heidegger on Pain (Schmerz) pages 254-257 Appendix D. Update: 2023 Oct 24. Daniel Fidel Ferrer replies to Professor Thomas Sheehan (Sein question) pages 258-269 Appendix E. Five Habilitations done with Martin Heidegger. Habilitationsschrift pages 270-272 Heidegger Bibliography Individual Lectures Vortrag or Vorträge. Detailed pages 273-294 Heidegger‘s Gesamtausgabe (HGA or GA). Note GA 72 has yet to be published (2024). pages 295-299 Letters. Briefe. Briefwechsel. Not complete pages 300-303 Heidegger Studies / Heidegger Studien / Etudes Heideggeriennes (list of Heidegger texts) pages 304-305 Jahresgaben der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft (from the internet) (list of Heidegger texts) pages 306-308 Additional References (bibliographies) pages 309-310 Heidegger Index Projects by Daniel Fidel Ferrer page 311 -/- Martin Heidegger Audio Recordings pages 312-313 -/- Additional acknowledgements pages 314-315 -/- Letter from Hermann Heidegger to Daniel Ferrer den 5.2.2002. In German. Hermann Heidegger’s response to the Barbara Fiand collection being in the USA. -/- One of the thesis: there is no Heidegger philosophy. Read more… -/- “What always counts in the lecture-courses is the manner of proceeding - the sequence of steps - not a claim to final truths. The lecture-courses never wrap up in a completeness and in seemingly "finishing off" the works interpreted, but rather in the inner fullness of the hidden dynamics of questioning.” GA 66. Besinnung (1938/39). GA 66: 421. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger Esoteric Writings: An Index. 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Philosophy, German – Greek influences. 7). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. -/- First step: 10 whole volumes from Martin Heidegger’s collect writings (Gesamtausgabe) were combined into one file and then indexed. The 10 volumes were selected for their emphasis on (...) Heidegger’s later esoteric writings. It seems that Zum Ereignis-Denken GA 73 may start around 1935. But the new philosophical language gets underway, GA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis. -/- What is so special about this group of Heidegger’s writings? Why are these writings called: esoteric? -/- How do use this index? Because of sorting problems it is best to use the FIND FUNCTION. Nota Bene: use umlauts because the letters sort different as well!! So, again use the FIND FUNCTION to look for words or names (Dignum memoria). Please note the German words that start with umlauts are at the end of the index because of machine sorting of the words. Starting with the German word “ßA” on page 958 page of this book (see in Main Index). -/- This is a machine created index for 10 volumes of Martin Heidegger’s collected writing (Gesamtausgabe, “Wege – nicht Werke”). -/- Gesamtausgabe (GA) indexed. This group of 10 GA volumes were combined into one file and indexed. -/- GA 65. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938). GA 66. Besinnung (1938/39). GA 70. Über den Anfang (1941). GA 71. Das Ereignis (1941/42). GA 73.1-GA 73.2 Zum Ereignis-Denken, ed. P. Trawny, 2013, 1496p. GA 94. Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 536p. GA 95. Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 456p. GA 96. Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 286p. GA 97. Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948), ed, P.Trawny 2015, 528p. -/- Total pages of these 10 volumes is 4967 in the single file; the .pdf e-format of combining these 10 books. (shrink)

El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke de (...) una manera lo más neutral que podemos. En la segunda, presentaremos las características más notables trabajo de Kusch. En la tercera parte rebasamos los límites más estrictos de un comentario crítico para proponer una hipótesis propia acerca de la manera en la que la interpretación de Kusch permite comprender el vínculo de la propuesta de Kripke con la discusión clásica acerca del lenguaje privado como así también la discusión clásica permite realizar algunas observaciones críticas acerca de la propuesta de Kusch. (shrink)

Der Begriff der Toleranz in der Moderne wurde erdacht mit dem Ziel, Gesellschaften zu organisieren, die sich im Umbruch befanden auf Grund des plötzlichen Eindringens von Glaubensunterschieden in die politische Raumordnung. Die Definition der Toleranz als Tugend, die auf der Nachgiebigkeit gegenüber dem Andersartigen basiert, ist ein Pseudobegriff. Die hermeneutische Veranlagung, die mit der Philosophie einhergeht, zeigt, dass die Toleranz keine schlichte moralische Tugend sein kann, sondern vielmehr eine der Beschaffenheiten der Möglichkeit rationaler Handlungen (die Arten des Seins und des (...) Sagens fallen in der Vielfältigkeit ihrer Formen zusammen). Die Geschichte der Hermeneutik zeigt seit ihren Anfängen – die exegetische Arbeit war hierbei grundlegend – die Zwickmühlen der Existenzformen der Rationalität und lässt nur ein Denken an der Grenze zu, welche ihre Grundlage ist: Es gibt keine Tatsachen, sondern Interpretationen. (shrink)

In der sozialphilosophischen Debatte um Freiheit bei Foucault wird das ‚Freiheitsproblem‘ verhandelt: Wie können Freiheit und Widerstand innerhalb von Foucaults Theorie der Macht und Subjektivierung konzipiert werden? Die Arbeit unterscheidet systematisch vier verschiedene Interpretationsstrategien von Foucaults Werk, die es als kohärente sozialphilosophische Theorie konstruieren und dabei das Freiheitsproblem lösen sollen; sie rekonstruiert die Arbeiten von exemplarischen Vertreter_innen dieser Strategien: 1. Foucault ist kohärent (Paul Patton), 2. Foucault korrigiert sich (Thomas Lemke), 3. Foucault kritisiert kohärent (Martin Saar), 4. Foucault ist (...) nicht genug (Amy Allen). Das erste Ziel der Arbeit ist, die Debatte und die in ihr verhandelten Probleme und Begriffe durch die systematische Rekonstruktion zu differenzieren und klarer zu fassen. Dafür werden einige neue systematische Unterscheidungen entwickelt: u.a. das Freiheitsproblem der Machtdetermination im Gegensatz zum Freiheitproblem der Subjektivierung, Freiheit als Anders-handeln-Können im Gegensatz zu Freiheit als Kritik, verschiedene Modalitäten dieser Freiheitsbegriffe und eine Foucault-Lesart der Regierungstranszendenz im Gegensatz zu einer Lesart der radikalen Immanenz. Das zweite Ziel der Arbeit ist die Entwicklung einer neuen These zur Freiheit im Rahmen einer Subjektivierungstheorie durch die interne Kritik der vier Interpretationsstrategien auf Grundlage der dort entwickelten Differenzierungen. Freiheit als die Fähigkeit zur reflexiven Kritik der eigenen Subjektivierung ‒ kurz: Freiheit als Kritik ‒ kann verstanden werden als das Resultat von freiheitlicher Subjektivierung, deren gesellschaftlicher Ort politische Institutionen sind, die im Rahmen einer postfundamentalen, pluralen und liberalen politischen Theorie bestimmt werden können. Drittens verfolgt die Arbeit das Ziel, durch den Begriff der Freiheit als Kritik die allgemeine sozialphilosophische Debatte um Freiheitsbegriffe zu erweitern und ihn als einen Kandidaten neben der negativen, reflexiven und sozialen Freiheit zu präsentieren, der einerseits plausible Einsichten dieser drei Ansätze aufnimmt und andererseits ihre blinden Flecken korrigiert. (shrink)

The main assumption and conclusion of this book is summarized by Nietzsche’s thought and his single sentence (Motto): "The tragic era for Europe: due to the struggle with nihilism. (Das tragische Zeitalter für Europa: bedingt durch den Kampf mit dem Nihilismus). " eKGWB/NF-1886, 7 [31]. I have translated the entire group of notes that start with a note giving Nietzsche’s location “Lenzer Heide” (Graubünden, Switzerland) dated June 10, 1887 (Lenzer Heide den 10. Juni 1887). From the first note, eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 (...) [71] and then subsection ending at the final note: eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 [110]. Also in this publication, Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden (KSA). Volume information, KSA 12. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, (1967). Section or notebook, five. 5 = NVÜ3. Sommer 1886—Herbst 1887. The Lenzer Heide subsection is from 5 [71] and goes to section 5 [110]. Pages for this subsection are p. 211-229 (KSA 12). The editor sometimes use letter spacing as way to emphasis what Nietzsche wrote, for example, “N i h i l i s m u s”; for the word ‘Nihilismus’. Over 190+ Nietzsche’s notes are translated in this text. Additional materials from his published writing are also included in the topics discussed. The general background is the context of Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretations. Principle conclusion: all of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought can be seen as his response to the urgent crisis of Nihilism. Countermovement to Nihilism. Additional topics and many more translations covering: the eternal return of the same, Will to Power, B. Spinoza (1632-1677), concept of meaninglessness, Nihilism and Nietzsche Thought, Stages or the outline of Nihilism, Chronological Nietzsche’s Thoughts on Nihilism, and Nietzsche on the Nihilist. Other topics covered are: Nietzsche Contra Metaphysics: Rejection of ontology and Being Rejection of God Rejection of metaphysicians Rejection of the idea of eternal Rejection of supersensuous Rejection of Platonism Rejection of the dignity of humanity (metaphysicians) Rejection of eternal values Rejection of immorality Possible Metaphysical Claims for the idea of Will-to-Power, Connection of Will to Power and Amor Fati, Anti-metaphysical and perspectivism, Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy, and Bibliographic sources. (shrink)

Luthers »Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen« bietet einen Einblick in sein Menschenbild. Die philosophisch-ethische Perspektive ist für den Einsatz in der Oberstufe konzipiert, wo sie auch einen Hintergrund für das Zentralabiturthema im Fach Religion bietet.

Luthers »Von der Freiheit eines Christenmenschen« bietet einen Einblick in sein Menschenbild. Die philosophisch-ethische Perspektive ist für den Einsatz in der Oberstufe konzipiert, wo sie auch einen Hintergrund für das Zentralabiturthema im Fach Religion bietet.

The main assumption and conclusion of this book is summarized by Nietzsche’s thought and his single sentence (Motto): "The tragic era for Europe: due to the struggle with nihilism. (Das tragische Zeitalter für Europa: bedingt durch den Kampf mit dem Nihilismus). " eKGWB/NF-1886, 7 [31]. I have translated the entire group of notes that start with a note giving Nietzsche’s location “Lenzer Heide” (Graubünden, Switzerland) dated June 10, 1887 (Lenzer Heide den 10. Juni 1887). From the first note, eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 (...) [71] and then subsection ending at the final note: eKGWB/NF-1886. 5 [110]. Also in this publication, Friedrich Nietzsche. Sämtliche Werke Kritische Studienausgabe in 15 Bänden (KSA). Volume information, KSA 12. Nachgelassene Fragmente 1885-1887, (1967). Section or notebook, five. 5 = NVÜ3. Sommer 1886—Herbst 1887. The Lenzer Heide subsection is from 5 [71] and goes to section 5 [110]. Pages for this subsection are p. 211-229 (KSA 12). The editor sometimes use letter spacing as way to emphasis what Nietzsche wrote, for example, “N i h i l i s m u s”; for the word ‘Nihilismus’. Over 190+ Nietzsche’s notes are translated in this text. Additional materials from his published writing are also included in the topics discussed. The general background is the context of Martin Heidegger’s Nietzsche interpretations. Principle conclusion: all of Nietzsche’s philosophical thought can be seen as his response to the urgent crisis of Nihilism. Countermovement to Nihilism. Additional topics and many more translations covering: the eternal return of the same, Will to Power, B. Spinoza (1632-1677), concept of meaninglessness, Nihilism and Nietzsche Thought, Stages or the outline of Nihilism, Chronological Nietzsche’s Thoughts on Nihilism, and Nietzsche on the Nihilist. Other topics covered are: Nietzsche Contra Metaphysics: Rejection of ontology and Being Rejection of God Rejection of metaphysicians Rejection of the idea of eternal Rejection of supersensuous Rejection of Platonism Rejection of the dignity of humanity (metaphysicians) Rejection of eternal values Rejection of immorality Possible Metaphysical Claims for the idea of Will-to-Power, Connection of Will to Power and Amor Fati, Anti-metaphysical and perspectivism, Nietzsche's Metahistory of philosophy, and Bibliographic sources. (shrink)

Abstract in English, German, French and Croatian -/- In the paper “The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, which was published in 2013 in the Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor and Sabine Selchow attempted to reveal the specific qualities of the uprisings which emerged after the year 2010 in some European countries, such as Germany, Spain, Italy, England etc. According to the authors, the mode of organization which forms the main body of these emancipatory movements obtains its basic (...) logic from the world of the Internet. The use of the Internet requires a re-evaluation of negative philosophical commentary regarding technology. In the context of twentieth-century philosophy, Martin Heidegger and Herbert Marcuse are the most influential philosophers who studied the negative aspects of technology. Heidegger portrayed the destructive effects of scientific reasoning and technology on the Western culture through the criticism of the traditional Western metaphysics on a phenomenological-ontological level. Marcuse, belonging to the tradition of Western Marxism, formed his critique of technology in the context of the concept of instrumental rationality and the critique of advanced industrial society and capitalism. Although the starting points of their perspectives on technology and the underlying purposes of their critiques of technology were different, it may be asserted that both have a rather negative and almost entirely pessimistic disposition towards technology. Heidegger’s and Marcuse’s criticisms of technology will be discussed in this context and the differences and similarities between these criticisms will be shown. Finally, the paper will emphasise the question of the possibility of a positive role of technology. Technology can serve as an alternative to negative uses by shedding light on the relation between the current uprisings and the Internet. Keywords technology, rationality, freedom, enframing, criticism, revolt movements, Internet, politics //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Ist die Emanzipation des Menschen durch Technologie möglich? Zusammenfassung In dem Artikel „The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe”, veröffentlicht im Jahre 2013 im Journal of Civil Society, versuchten Mary Kaldor und Sabine Selchow die spezifischen Qualitäten der Aufstände zum Ausdruck zu bringen, die nach 2010 in den europäischen Ländern ausbrachen – Deutschland, Spanien, Italien, England usw. Nach Ansicht der Autoren erhält der Modus der Organisation, der den Hauptkörper dieser emanzipatorischen Bewegungen bildet, seine grundlegende Logik aus der Welt des Internets. Die Analogie mit dem Internet erfor- dert eine Neubewertung der negativen Kommentare über die Technologie aus philosophischer Perspektive. Martin Heidegger und Herbert Marcuse sind die einflussreichsten Philosophen, die sich mit den negativen Aspekten der Technologie in der Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts befasst haben. Heidegger schilderte die zerstörerischen Auswirkungen der wissenschaftlichen Vernunft und Technologie auf die westliche Kultur durch die Kritik an der traditionellen abend- ländischen Metaphysik auf der phänomenologisch-ontologischen Ebene, während Marcuse, ein Mitglied des westlichen Marxismus, seine Kritik an der Technologie im Rahmen des Konzepts der instrumentellen Rationalität und der Kritik der fortgeschrittenen Industriegesellschaft und Kapitalismus geformt hat. Obgleich die Ansatzpunkte ihrer Perspektiven über die Technologie und die zugrunde liegenden Zwecke ihrer Kritik an der Technologie unterschiedlich waren, kann behauptet werden, dass beide eine eher negative und fast völlig pessimistische Einstellung zur Technologie hatten. In diesem Zusammenhang werden Heideggers und Marcuses Kritiken an der Technologie diskutiert sowie Unterschiede und Ähnlichkeiten zwischen den beiden Kri- tiken aufgezeigt. Abschließend unterstreicht das Paper die Frage nach der Möglichkeit einer positiven Rolle für die Technologie, die als Alternative zur negativen Perspektive dienen kann, indem sie Licht in das Verhältnis zwischen aktuellen Aufständen und Internet bringt. Schlüsselwörter Technologie, Rationalität, Freiheit, Gestell, Kritik, Revoltebewegungen, Internet, Politik //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// L’émancipation humaine est-elle possible à travers la technologie ? Résumé Dans l’article « The “Bubbling Up” of Suberranean Politics in Europe » publié en 2013 dans Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor et Sabine Selchow tentent de mettre en lumière les caractéristiques spécifiques des révoltes qui ont fait jour après 2010 dans certains pays européens – Allemagne, Espagne, Italie, Angleterre, etc. Selon nos auteures, le mode d’organisation qui a formé le corps essentiel de ces mouvements émancipatoires tire sa logique de base du monde de l’internet. Cette analogie avec l’internet requiert une réévaluation, à partir d’un point de vue philosophique, des commentaires négatifs sur la technologie. Martin Heidegger et Herbert Marcuse sont les philosophes les plus influents ayant travaillé sur les aspects négatifs de la technologie au sein de la philosophie du XXe siècle. Heidegger a dépeint les effets destructeurs de la raison scientifique et de la technologie de notre culture occidentale à travers son criticisme de la métaphysique traditionnelle occidentale à un niveau phénoménologico-ontologique, tandis que Marcuse, membre du « communisme occidentale », a formé une critique de la technologie au sein du concept de rationalité instrumentale et une critique de la société industrielle avancée et du capitalisme. Bien que le point de départ de leur perspective sur la technologie et que le but sous-jacent de leur critique diffèrent, il est possible d’affirmer que leur point commun est d’avoir posé un regard négatif et presque entièrement pessimiste sur la technologie. À cet égard, le criticisme d’Heidegger et de Marcuse vont être abordés afin d’en soulever les différences et les similarités. Enfin, cet article mettra l’accent sur la possibilité d’un rôle positif de la technologie qui pourrait servir d’alternative aux perspectives négatives en faisant la lumière sur le lien entre les révoltes actuelles et l’internet. Mots-clés technologie, rationalité, liberté, mettre en forme, criticisme, mouvements de révolte, internet, politique //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// /////// Je li moguća ljudska emancipacija kroz tehniku? Sažetak U članku »The ‘Bubbling Up’ of Subterranean Politics in Europe«, objavljenom 2013. u časopisu Journal of Civil Society, Mary Kaldor i Sabine Selchow pokušale su otkriti specifične značajke pobuna koje su se javila nakon 2010. godine u europskim zemljama poput Njemačke, Španjolske, Italije, Engleske itd. Prema autoricama, način organiziranja koji čini glavno tijelo ovih emancipatornih pokreta preuzima svoju osnovnu logiku iz svijeta Interneta. Analogija s Internetom zahtijeva ponovnu evaluaciju negativnih komentara o tehnici iz filozofske perspektive. Martin Heidegger i Herbert Marcuse najutjecajniji su filozofi 20. stoljeća koji su se bavili negativnim aspektima tehnike. Heidegger je prikazao destruktivne učinke znanstvene racionalnosti i tehnike na zapadnu kulturu kroz kritiku tradicionalne zapadne metafizike na fenomenološko-ontološkoj razini, dok je Marcuse, kao predstavnik zapadnoga marksizma, oblikovao svoju kritiku tehnike u kontekstu pojma instrumentalne racionalnosti te kritike razvijenog industrijskog društva i kapitalizma. Iako su polazišne točke njihovih pogleda na tehniku, kao i osnovne svrhe kritike tehnike, različite, može se reći da obojica imaju poprilično negativno i gotovo u potpunosti pesimističko shvaćanje tehnologije. U tom će se kontekstu razmotriti Heideggerova i Marcuseova kritika tehnike kao i razlike i sličnosti između tih dvaju pristupa. Zaključno će rad naglasiti mogućnost pozitivne uloge tehnike, koja može služiti kao alternativa negativnoj perspektivi osvjetljavajući odnos između nedavnih pobuna i interneta. Ključne riječi tehnologija, racionalnost, sloboda, postav, kritika, pobunjenički pokreti, Internet, politika. (shrink)

Langeweile wird in dieser Anthologie als Signatur der Moderne lesbar: Sie durchdringt die gegenwärtige Kultur, wird aber nach wie vor weggeschoben, ja tabuisiert. Der Band bietet eine Textauswahl von klassischen Denkern sowie von Autorinnen und Autoren des modernen Diskurses bis heute und stellt den Zusammenhang mit verwandten Phänomenen der Sinnleere und Erschöpfung her. Als zunehmendes Massenphänomen in saturierten Gesellschaften entwickelt die Langeweile eine pathologische Dynamik, wenn ihr nicht ein eigener Raum gelassen wird. Ein Plädoyer für die Anerkennung dieses unvermeidlichen Gefühls. (...) Mit Texten von Blaise Pascal, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer, Søren Kierkegaard, Charles Baudelaire, Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Simmel, Walter Benjamin, Bertrand Russell, Iwan Gontscharow, Siegfried Kracauer, Emil Cioran, Giacomo Leopardi, Wolf Lepenies, Elizabeth S. Goodstein, Peter Toohey, Martin Doehlemann, Françoise Wemelsfelder und anderen. (shrink)

Die bisherige Beschäftigung mit der Anaximanderauslegung Heideggers beschränkt sich auf Zeitschriften- und Buchbeiträge in Sammelwerken. Der nun vorliegende monographische Band schließt dahingehend zum einen diese Lücke in der Heideggerforschung, indem er vor allem der „Holzwege“-Abhandlung „Der Spruch des Anaximander“ als einem Zeugnis der genannten Auseinandersetzung systematisch wie kommentierend nachdenkt. Dabei wird das Verständnis Heideggers nicht als ein sekundäres historisches beleuchtet, sondern sein Gedankengang ebenso wie derjenige des Spruchs selbst als primärer geschichtlicher des abendländischen Denkens bedacht. Gerade in diesem Ansatz und (...) Vorgehen stellt der Band zum anderen – über die zusammenfassende historische Überlieferungs- und Rezeptionsgeschichte des Anaximanderfragments im Ersten Teil hinaus – einen Beitrag zur Klassischen Philologie dar. Er entwickelt einen in dieser systematisch-methodischen Form bisher unbeachtet gebliebenen Zugang zum Hören und Übersetzen der Griechischen Sprache. Ferner wird insbesondere durch den ausführlichen Sachindex sowohl der seinsgeschichtlichen Erforschung Heideggerischer wie Anaximandrischer Grundworte ein philologisches Hilfsmittel an die Hand gegeben, als auch umgekehrt dem Klassischen Philologen ein möglicher Einstieg eröffnet in die Erschließung der eigentümlichen Begrifflichkeit anfänglicher, frühester wie spätester abendländischer Aufmerksamkeit für das, was ist. (shrink)

By observing processes of art perception two contradicting phenomena come to the fore: a feeling of closeness and distance at the same time. The phenomenologists Martin Heidegger and Bernhard Waldenfels describe this connection as a matter of being ("Seinsweise") of images, that allows new views of the world whereas the two cultural anthropologists Ernst Cassirer and Hartmut Böhme note that the connection between both can be seen as the basis of experience ("Erlebnisweise") of images and therefore serves for communication. (...) Here one can see, knowledge-oriented notions the former promote do not exclude semiotic notions the latter imply. (shrink)

This book explores a question central to philosophy--namely, what does it take for a belief to be justified or rational? According to a widespread view, whether one has justification for believing a proposition is determined by how probable that proposition is, given one's evidence. In this book this view is rejected and replaced with another: in order for one to have justification for believing a proposition, one's evidence must normically support it--roughly, one's evidence must make the falsity of that proposition (...) abnormal in the sense of calling for special, independent explanation. This conception of justification bears upon a range of topics in epistemology and beyond. Ultimately, this way of looking at justification guides us to a new, unfamiliar picture of how we should respond to our evidence and manage our own fallibility. This picture is developed here. (shrink)

This paper seeks to widen the dialogue between the “epistemology of peer disagreement” and the epistemology informed by Wittgenstein’s last notebooks, later edited as On Certainty. The paper defends the following theses: not all certainties are groundless; many of them are beliefs; and they do not have a common essence. An epistemic peer need not share all of my certainties. Which response to a disagreement over a certainty is called for, depends on the type of certainty in question. Sometimes a (...) form of relativism is the right response. Reasonable, mutually recognized peer disagreement over a certainty is possible.—The paper thus addresses both interpretative and systematic issues. It uses Wittgenstein as a resource for thinking about peer disagreement over certainties. (shrink)

Spinoza's philosophy of mind is thought to lack a serious account of consciousness. In this essay I argue that Spinoza's doctrine of ideas of ideas has been wrongly construed, and that once righted it provides the foundation for an account. I then draw out the finer details of Spinoza's account of consciousness, doing my best to defend its plausibility along the way. My view is in response to a proposal by Edwin Curley and the serious objection leveled against it by (...) Margaret Wilson and Jonathan Bennett. (shrink)

There is something puzzling about statistical evidence. One place this manifests is in the law, where courts are reluctant to base affirmative verdicts on evidence that is purely statistical, in spite of the fact that it is perfectly capable of meeting the standards of proof enshrined in legal doctrine. After surveying some proposed explanations for this, I shall outline a new approach – one that makes use of a notion of normalcy that is distinct from the idea of statistical frequency. (...) The puzzle is not, however, merely a legal one. Our unwillingness to base beliefs on statistical evidence is by no means limited to the courtroom, and is at odds with almost every general principle that epistemologists have proposed as to how we ought to manage our beliefs. (shrink)

According to a captivating picture, epistemic justification is essentially a matter of epistemic or evidential likelihood. While certain problems for this view are well known, it is motivated by a very natural thought—if justification can fall short of epistemic certainty, then what else could it possibly be? In this paper I shall develop an alternative way of thinking about epistemic justification. On this conception, the difference between justification and likelihood turns out to be akin to the more widely recognised difference (...) between ceteris paribus laws and brute statistical generalisations. I go on to discuss, in light of this suggestion, issues such as classical and lottery-driven scepticism as well as the lottery and preface paradoxes. (shrink)

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in metaphysical explanation, and philosophers have fixed on the notion of ground as the conceptual tool with which such explanation should be investigated. I will argue that this focus on ground is myopic and that some metaphysical explanations that involve the essences of things cannot be understood in terms of ground. Such ‘essentialist’ explanation is of interest, not only for its ubiquity in philosophy, but for its being in a sense an ultimate (...) form of explanation. I give an account of the sense in which such explanation is ultimate and support it by defending what I call the inessentiality of essence. I close by suggesting that this principle is the key to understanding why essentialist explanations can seem so satisfying. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer reasons for thinking that two prominent sceptical arguments in the literature – the underdetermination-based sceptical argument and the closure-based sceptical argument – are less philosophically interesting than is commonly supposed. The underdetermination-based argument begs the question against a non-sceptic and can be dismissed with little fanfare. The closure-based argument, though perhaps not question-begging per se, does rest upon contentious assumptions that a non-sceptic is under no pressure to accept.

According to the principle of Conjunction Closure, if one has justification for believing each of a set of propositions, one has justification for believing their conjunction. The lottery and preface paradoxes can both be seen as posing challenges for Closure, but leave open familiar strategies for preserving the principle. While this is all relatively well-trodden ground, a new Closure-challenging paradox has recently emerged, in two somewhat different forms, due to Backes :3773–3787, 2019a) and Praolini :715–726, 2019). This paradox synthesises elements (...) of the lottery and the preface and is designed to close off the familiar Closure-preserving strategies. By appealing to a normic theory of justification, I will defend Closure in the face of this new paradox. Along the way I will draw more general conclusions about justification, normalcy and defeat, which bear upon what Backes :2877–2895, 2019b) has dubbed the ‘easy defeat’ problem for the normic theory. (shrink)

Reinholds Kritik an Kants Ausführungen über Willkürfreiheit aus der Einleitung zur "Metaphysik der Sitten". Zur Aktualität dieser Kritik.

In this paper I draw attention to a peculiar epistemic feature exhibited by certain deductively valid inferences. Certain deductively valid inferences are unable to enhance the reliability of one's belief that the conclusion is true—in a sense that will be fully explained. As I shall show, this feature is demonstrably present in certain philosophically significant inferences—such as GE Moore's notorious 'proof' of the existence of the external world. I suggest that this peculiar epistemic feature might be correlated with the much (...) discussed phenomenon that Crispin Wright and Martin Davies have called 'transmission failure'—the apparent failure, on the part of some deductively valid inferences to transmit one's justification for believing the premises. (shrink)

Theories of epistemic justification are commonly assessed by exploring their predictions about particular hypothetical cases – predictions as to whether justification is present or absent in this or that case. With a few exceptions, it is much less common for theories of epistemic justification to be assessed by exploring their predictions about logical principles. The exceptions are a handful of ‘closure’ principles, which have received a lot of attention, and which certain theories of justification are well known to invalidate. But (...) these closure principles are only a small sample of the logical principles that we might consider. In this paper, I will outline four further logical principles that plausibly hold for justification and two which plausibly do not. While my primary aim is just to put these principles forward, I will use them to evaluate some different approaches to justification and (tentatively) conclude that a ‘normic’ theory of justification best captures its logic. (shrink)

Is it right to convict a person of a crime on the basis of purely statistical evidence? Many who have considered this question agree that it is not, posing a direct challenge to legal probabilism – the claim that the criminal standard of proof should be understood in terms of a high probability threshold. Some defenders of legal probabilism have, however, held their ground: Schoeman (1987) argues that there are no clear epistemic or moral problems with convictions based on purely (...) statistical evidence, and speculates that our aversion to such convictions may be nothing more than an irrational bias. More recently, Hedden and Colyvan (2019, section VI) describe our reluctance to convict on the basis of purely statistical evidence as an ‘intuition’, but suggest that there may be no ‘in principle’ problem with such convictions (see also Papineau, forthcoming, section 6). In this paper, I argue that there is, in some cases, an in principle problem with a conviction based upon statistical evidence alone – namely, it commits us to a precedent which, if consistently followed through, could lead to the deliberate conviction of an innocent person. I conclude with some reflections on the idea that the criminal justice system should strive to maximise the accuracy of its verdicts – and the related idea that we should each strive to maximise the accuracy of our beliefs. (shrink)

A de minimis risk is defined as a risk that is so small that it may be legitimately ignored when making a decision. While ignoring small risks is common in our day-to-day decision making, attempts to introduce the notion of a de minimis risk into the framework of decision theory have run up against a series of well-known difficulties. In this paper, I will develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of overcoming two major obstacles to the modelling (...) of de minimis risk. The key move is to introduce, into decision theory, a non-probabilistic conception of risk known as normic risk. (shrink)

This paper offers some brief reflections on pragmatist themes in Georg Simmel’s philosophy. §1 presents a number of assessments – by Simmel’s contemporaries, by later interpreters, and by Simmel himself – concerning his proximity to pragmatism. §2 offers a reconstruction of Simmel’s 1885-paper “The Relationship between the Theory of Selection and Epistemology,” focusing in particular on what the argument owed to von Helmholtz. It was this paper first and foremost that suggested to many that Simmel was close to pragmatism. §§3-5 (...) follow the development of the core idea of the 1885-paper in Simmel’s subsequent writings. §§6-8 compare and contrasts Simmel’s views on evolution and truth with the positions of Peirce, James, and Dewey. §9 returns to the overall question whether Simmel was a pragmatist and offers an irenic answer. (shrink)

There are a number of debates that are relevant to questions concerning objectivity in science. One of the eldest, and still one of the most intensely fought, is the debate over epistemic relativism. —All forms of epistemic relativism commit themselves to the view that it is impossible to show in a neutral, non-question-begging, way that one “epistemic system”, that is, one interconnected set of epistemic standards, is epistemically superior to others. I shall call this view “No-metajustification”. No-metajustification is commonly taken (...) to deny the objectivity of standards. In this paper I shall discuss two currently popular attempts to attack “No-metajustification”. The first attempt attacks no-metajustification by challenging a particular strategy of arguing in its defence: this strategy involves the ancient Pyrrhonian “Problem of the Criterion”. The second attempt to refute No-metajustification targets its metaphysical underpinning: to wit, the claim that there are, or could be, several fundamentally different and irreconcilable epistemic systems. I shall call this assumption “Pluralism”. I shall address three questions with respect to these attempts to refute epistemic relativism by attacking no-metajustification: Can the epistemic relativist rely on the Problem of the Criterion in support of No-metajustification? Is a combination of Chisholmian “particularism” and epistemic naturalism an effective weapon against No-metajustification? And is Pluralism a defensible assumption? (shrink)

Ernst Mayr argued that the emergence of biology as a special science in the early nineteenth century was possible due to the demise of the mathematical model of science and its insistence on demonstrative knowledge. More recently, John Zammito has claimed that the rise of biology as a special science was due to a distinctive experimental, anti-metaphysical, anti-mathematical, and anti-rationalist strand of thought coming from outside of Germany. In this paper we argue that this narrative neglects the important role played (...) by the mathematical and axiomatic model of science in the emergence of biology as a special science. We show that several major actors involved in the emergence of biology as a science in Germany were working with an axiomatic conception of science that goes back at least to Aristotle and was popular in mid-eighteenth-century German academic circles due to its endorsement by Christian Wolff. More specifically, we show that at least two major contributors to the emergence of biology in Germany—Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Gottfried Reinhold Treviranus—sought to provide a conception of the new science of life that satisfies the criteria of a traditional axiomatic ideal of science. Both C.F. Wolff and Treviranus took over strong commitments to the axiomatic model of science from major philosophers of their time, Christian Wolff and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, respectively. The ideal of biology as an axiomatic science with specific biological fundamental concepts and principles thus played a role in the emergence of biology as a special science. (shrink)

A ‘lottery belief’ is a belief that a particular ticket has lost a large, fair lottery, based on nothing more than the odds against it winning. The lottery paradox brings out a tension between the idea that lottery beliefs are justified and the idea that that one can always justifiably believe the deductive consequences of things that one justifiably believes – what is sometimes called the principle of closure. Many philosophers have treated the lottery paradox as an argument against the (...) second idea – but I make a case here that it is the first idea that should be given up. As I shall show, there are a number of independent arguments for denying that lottery beliefs are justified. (shrink)

In this paper I respond to Marcello Di Bello’s criticisms of the ‘normic account’ of the criminal standard of proof. In so doing, I further elaborate on what the normic account predicts about certain significant legal categories of evidence, including DNA and fingerprint evidence and eyewitness identifications.

Modern scientific cosmology pushes the boundaries of knowledge and the knowable. This is prompting questions on the nature of scientific knowledge. A central issue is what defines a 'good' model. When addressing global properties of the Universe or its initial state this becomes a particularly pressing issue. How to assess the probability of the Universe as a whole is empirically ambiguous, since we can examine only part of a single realisation of the system under investigation: at some point, data will (...) run out. We review the basics of applying Bayesian statistical explanation to the Universe as a whole. We argue that a conventional Bayesian approach to model inference generally fails in such circumstances, and cannot resolve, e.g., the so-called 'measure problem' in inflationary cosmology. Implicit and non-empirical valuations inevitably enter model assessment in these cases. This undermines the possibility to perform Bayesian model comparison. One must therefore either stay silent, or pursue a more general form of systematic and rational model assessment. We outline a generalised axiological Bayesian model inference framework, based on mathematical lattices. This extends inference based on empirical data (evidence) to additionally consider the properties of model structure (elegance) and model possibility space (beneficence). We propose this as a natural and theoretically well-motivated framework for introducing an explicit, rational approach to theoretical model prejudice and inference beyond data. (shrink)

One of the most intriguing claims in Sven Rosenkranz’s Justification as Ignorance is that Timothy Williamson’s celebrated anti-luminosity argument can be resisted when it comes to the condition ~K~KP—the condition that one is in no position to know that one is in no position to know P. In this paper, I critically assess this claim.

Kant’s views on animals have received much attention in recent years. According to some, Kant attributed the capacity for objective perceptual awareness to non-human animals, even though he denied that they have concepts. This position is difficult to square with a conceptualist reading of Kant, according to which objective perceptual awareness requires concepts. Others take Kant’s views on animals to imply that the mental life of animals is a blooming, buzzing confusion. In this article I provide a historical reconstruction of (...) Kant’s views on animals, relating them to eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. I reconstruct the views of Buffon and Reimarus and show that (i) both Buffon and Reimarus adopted a conceptualist position, according to which concepts structure the cognitive experience of adult humans, and (ii) that both described the mental life of animals as a blooming, buzzing confusion. Kant’s position, I argue, is virtually identical to that of Reimarus. Hence Kant’s views on animals support a conceptualist reading of Kant. The article further articulates the historical antecedents of the Kantian idea that concepts structure human cognitive experience and provides a novel account of how the ideas of similarity and difference were conceptualized in eighteenth-century debates on animal cognition. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal Duncan Pritchard responds to an objection to the modal account of risk pressed by Ebert, Smith and Durbach ( 2020 ). In this paper, I expand upon the objection and argue that it still stands. I go on to consider a more general question raised by this exchange – whether risk is ‘objective’, or whether it is something that varies from one perspective to another.

This article explains Kant’s claim that sciences must take, at least as their ideal, the form of a ‘system’. I argue that Kant’s notion of systematicity can be understood against the background of de Jong & Betti’s Classical Model of Science (2010) and the writings of Georg Friedrich Meier and Johann Heinrich Lambert. According to my interpretation, Meier, Lambert, and Kant accepted an axiomatic idea of science, articulated by the Classical Model, which elucidates their conceptions of systematicity. I show that (...) Kant’s critique of the mathematical method is compatible with his adherence to this axiomatic conception of science. I further show that systematicity furthers traditionally accepted logical ideals of scientific knowledge, which explains why Meier and Kant think that sciences must be ‘systematic’. (shrink)

A moral requirement R1 is said to be lexically prior to a moral requirement R2 just in case we are morally obliged to uphold R1 at the expense of R2 – no matter how many times R2 must be violated thereby. While lexical priority is a feature of many ethical theories, and arguably a part of common sense morality, attempts to model it within the framework of decision theory have led to a series of problems – a fact which is (...) sometimes spun as a ‘decision theoretic critique’ of lexical priority. In this paper, I develop an enriched decision theoretic framework that is capable of modelling lexical priority while avoiding all extant problems. This will involve introducing several new ingredients into the standard decision theoretic framework, including multidimensional utilities, de minimis risks, and the means to represent two different conceptions of risk. (shrink)

Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species (...) of variably strict conditional I hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 6, Issue 2-3, pp 120 - 142 This paper aims to contribute to the debate over epistemic versus non-epistemic readings of the ‘hinges’ in Wittgenstein’s _On Certainty_. I follow Marie McGinn’s and Daniele Moyal-Sharrock’s lead in developing an analogy between mathematical sentences and certainties, and using the former as a model for the latter. However, I disagree with McGinn’s and Moyal-Sharrock’s interpretations concerning Wittgenstein’s views of both relata. I argue that mathematical sentences as well as certainties are (...) true and are propositions; that some of them can be epistemically justified; that in some senses they are not prior to empirical knowledge; that they are not ineffable; and that their primary function is epistemic as much as it is semantic. (shrink)

In ‘The normative role of knowledge’ (2012), Declan Smithies defends a ‘JK-rule’ for belief: One has justification to believe that P iff one has justification to believe that one is in a position to know that P. Similar claims have been defended by others (Huemer, 2007, Reynolds, forthcoming). In this paper, I shall argue that the JK-rule is false. The standard and familiar way of arguing against putative rules for belief or assertion is, of course, to describe putative counterexamples. My (...) argument, though, won’t be like this – indeed I doubt that there are any intuitively compelling counterexamples to the JK-rule. Nevertheless, the claim that there are counterexamples to the JK-rule can, I think, be given something approaching a formal proof. My primary aim here is to sketch this proof. I will briefly consider some broader implications for how we ought to think about the epistemic standards governing belief and assertion. (shrink)