Anh chàng Anhinga, còn gọi là chim cổ rắn, xuất trong hai bức tranh tiêu đề “Nóng” ngày 20/11/2023. Một năm sau, lại tìm được ngôi nhà mát mẻ hơn cho anh chàng. Chốn đó là xứ sở kỳ quặc, lắm chuyện kỳ khôi, nơi cư trú của ông Bói Cá, gọi là Xóm Chim. Chứ ở mãi trong Gallery mãi cũng chán.

Příspěvek se snaží ukázat, jaký dopad mělo poznávání přírody Nového světa na utváření specific- kých podob raně novověké vědecké kooperace a vědy obecně. Záměrem textu je prezentovat originální metody a formy vědění, které v souvislosti s kooperativním poznáváním Nového světa především ve Španělsku vznikaly a jež v soudobé Evropě neměly obdobu. Studie tak chce poukázat na význam, který mělo poznávání Nového světa Španěly v procesu tzv. vědecké revoluce, resp. proměny vědecké praxe i teoretických episte- mologických schémat.

Abstract. Gettier’s famous examples intended to show that knowledge cannot always be equated with justified true belief. The Gettier problem can also be considered as a problem for topological epistemic logic: If knowledge and justified belief are conceived as topological operators K and B on topological spaces (to be considered as universes of possible worlds), one may ask whether it happens that there is a proposition A such that KA ≠ A & BA or not. If this is the case, (...) the epistemological logic defined by the topological operators K and B may be said to be non-traditional since there is for them a “Gettier proposition” where knowledge does not coincide with justified true belief. As far as we know, for the first time, this topological Gettier problem is discussed in Steinvold’s PhD dissertation (Steinsvold 2012). In Baltag, Bezhanishvili, Özgün, and Smets (2013), Steinvold’s co-derived set account is criticized since it can be easily “Gettierized”. Baltag et alii claim (without proof) that their topological account of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief does not have this flaw. In the following we will give some topological conditions that determine whether a topological KB model does or does not cope with the Gettier challenge. First, it will be shown that every KB model defines a (topologically slightly simplified) model that is rather similar to it but a is a model of traditional JTB (knowledge = justified true belief) logic of knowledge and belief. The existence of such doppelgangers of all KB models may be read as a qualified and partial topological rehabilitation of traditional JTB epistemology. Second, we consider the Gettier problem for a special class of models of Stalnaker’s combined logic of knowledge and belief KB, namely, for T0 Alexandroff spaces. We prove that, that almost all Alexandroff spaces do not face Gettier counterexamples. Third, we prove that the Stone spaces of Boolean algebras of regular closed subsets of Hausdorff (or T2) spaces X do not face Gettier counterexamples if the X are not pseu–docompact, and these Stone spaces do face Gettier counterexamples for compact spaces X. Succinctly formulated, Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief can avoid Gettier problems for some models, while it falls back to traditional pre-Gettier JTB epistemology for other models. In contrast, co-derived set semantics is doomed to fail always in the sense that its models always fall prey to Gettier counterexamples. (shrink)

Bacteria do many things as organized populations. We have recently learned much about the molecular basis of intercellular communication among prokaryotes. Colonies display bacterial capacities for multicellular coordination which can be useful in nature where bacteria predominantly grow as films, chains, mats and colonies. E. coli colonies are organized into differentiated non-clonal populations and undergo complex morphogenesis. Multicellularity regulates many aspects of bacterial physiology, including DNA rearrangement systems. In some bacterial species, colony development involves swarming (active migration of cell (...) groups). Swarm colony development displays precise geometrical controls and periodic phenomena. Motile E. coli cells in semi-solid media form organized patterns due to chemotactic autoaggregation. On poor media, B. subtilis forms branched colonies using group motility and long-range chemical signalling. The significances of bacterial colony patterns thus reside in a deeper understanding of prokaryotic biology and evolution and in experimental systems for studying self-organization and morphogenesis. (shrink)

Lĩnh vực bất động sản (BĐS) là một trong những ngành kinh tế mũi nhọn của Việt Nam với đóng góp quan trọng vào GDP quốc gia. Tuy nhiên, thực tiễn cho thấy, thị trường BĐS Việt Nam đang phải đối mặt với nhiều khó khăn và thách thức. Để duy trì vị thế cạnh tranh và đáp ứng kịp thời những đòi hỏi của thị trường, các doanh nghiệp BĐS buộc phải liên tục đổi mới. Bài viết làm rõ (...) những yếu tố tác động đến sự phát triển của lĩnh vực BĐS tại Việt Nam nhằm cung cấp cơ sở khoa học và thực tiễn cho việc hoạch định và hoàn thiện chính sách quản lý nhà nước, đồng thời đưa ra 1 số hàm ý góp phần tạo tiền đề cho sự phát triển bền vững của doanh nghiệp BĐS trong tương lai. (shrink)

Áp lựс lên сơ sở tài nguyên thiên nhiên ngày сàng giа tăng. Nguồn nướс bình quân đầu người liên tụс giảm và сhất lượng nướс suy giảm đаng trở thành những vấn đề сấp báсh hơn bао giờ hết. Nhu сầu về gỗ, сhăn thả giа súс và đất nông nghiệp đаng gây áp lựс lên rừng. Những tháсh thứс này сàng trở nên trầm trọng hơn dо sự mất аn tоàn về quyền sử dụng và sự thiếu rõ (...) ràng trоng quyền sử dụng, сả hаi đều không khuyến khíсh việс bảо tồn tài nguyên và đầu tư để bảо vệ năng suất сủа сơ sở tài nguyên thiên nhiên. (shrink)

En teoría del valor y en teoría normativa, es común considerar que lo positivo y lo negativo tienen la misma importancia. Algunas rechazan esta idea y consideran que lo negativo tiene mayor importancia. Aquí se presentarán algunos de los argumentos en favor de la asimetría. Tras esto, daré cuenta de los diferentes tipos de posiciones asimétricas defendibles. Explicaré cuáles son las características de cada teoría y qué puntos a favor y en contra de estas posiciones se pueden postular. Por último, (...) consideraré que no hay razones para creer que haya una posición asimétrica claramente superior a las demás. (shrink)

A path model of organizational creativity was presented; it conceptualized the influences of information sharing, learning culture, motivation, and networking on creative climate. A structural equation model was fitted to data from the pharmaceutical industry to test the proposed model. The model accounted for 86% of the variance in the creative climate dependent variable. Information sharing had a positive effect on learning culture, which in turn had a positive effect on creative climate, while there were negative direct effects of information (...) sharing on creative climate and on intrinsic motivation. This study suggests that information sharing and intrinsic motivation are important drivers for organizational creativity in a complex R&D environment in the pharmaceutical industry. Implications of the model are discussed. (shrink)

Based on Steven Wall's work I take perfectionism in political philosophy to include two components: the objective good and the non-neutral state. Some perfectionist theories aim to be liberal. But given the objective good component perfectionism seems to be unable to accommodate the commitment to value pluralism found in liberalism, this is what I call the challenge of pluralism. The perfectionist reply is to claim that their objective good can also be plural and thus there is no conflict. My aim (...) in this paper is to show that this reply does not work. I do this by looking at three different ways we could conceive of perfectionist theories as plural and show how each is unsatisfactory. (shrink)

This thesis presents an interpretation of David Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. The most distinguishing feature of this interpretation is the emphasis placed on the significance of Hume’s general philosophical position in a faithful reading of this philosophical classic. The success of this interpretation will show that Hume’s essay should be read as an integral part of his system of philosophy. There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key aspects of (...) Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A faithful reading of his works should take his general philosophical framework seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of the next two parts. The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically, it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the reader form a more specific conceptual framework for understanding Hume’s essay. The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few sections are devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last section of this part discusses four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions establish the strength of this interpretation, or at least, the fruitful prospect of an interpretative project that integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system. (shrink)

In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that Quine has (...) at best proven the claim that the use of general principles essentially fails the task of radical reductionism. However, in order to establish the conclusion that the Aufbau fails in principle, Quine needs to further vindicate two other claims. They are: first, a switch from operating rules to general principles is necessary; second, the set of general principles Carnap adopts is the best alternative. By disambiguating the notion of “explicit definition” and examining the concept of definability in the Aufbau, I explore the possibility of justifying these two claims that Quine overlooks in his objection. The result suggests that Quine’s objection stands in tension with his radical reductionist reading of the Aufbau. (shrink)

This paper examines how different forms of performance evaluation relate to aspects of the creative climate in a major pharmaceutical company. The study was based on a large employee-attitude survey that was distributed to all company employees. The study analyses survey results from 5,333 employees at five R&D sites. The results indicate that management’s evaluation of employees (either dialogue-based or control-based) relates to the type of motivation (intrinsic or extrinsic) that drives employees, to their style of thinking (value-focused thinking) and (...) on their attitudes to organizational creativity. The paper then discusses implications of these findings for HRM. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to briefl y examine one of the fundamental assumptions made in contemporary liberal political philosophy, namely that persons are free and equal. Within the contemporary liberal political thought it would be considered very uncontroversial and even trivial to claim something of the following form: “persons are free and equal” or “people think of themselves as free and equal”. The widespread nature of this assumption raises the question what justifies this assumption, are there good reasons (...) for holding it? After establishing some methodological remarks, including a distinction between having freedom-equality and being free-equal and restricting the domain of discussion to include only a subset of all moral questions, namely the questions of political morality, the paper deals with some conceptual issues concerning this assumption of persons as free and equal, such as how do free-and-equal-making properties relate to person-making properties. It then moves on to examine three broad ways the free-and-equal-mak-ing properties could be established. First, necessary property approaches, which take some necessary feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g. possessing an immortal soul). Second, contingent property approaches, which take some contingent feature of persons to be what makes them free and equal (e.g heir practise of reasoning). Third, agreement based approaches, which take some agreement or contract among persons to be the basis for their being free and equal (e.g. evolutionary emergence of our treatment of others). Strengths and weaknesses of all approaches will be examined. (shrink)

En este artículo se explica en qué consisten las éticas centradas en el sufrimiento, presenta algunas de las principales razones a su favor y expone cuáles son sus implicaciones con respecto a la consideración moral de los animales. Se argumenta que conforme a estas éticas los usos como recursos de los animales lesivos para estos deberán ser rechazados. A continuación, se examinan las posiciones que aceptan el uso de los animales siempre que este tenga lugar reduciendo los daños infligidos a (...) estos. Se presentarán una serie de razones por las que tales posiciones resultan cuestionables y por las que van a entrar en conflicto con las implicaciones de las éticas centradas en el sufrimiento. (shrink)

Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that vision is an (...) outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth from the eyes to the object. The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. [...]. (shrink)

A subject of a conversation is the social context for the emergence of a doxology as a project of the naturalised theory of knowledge. The Swedish philosopher Mats Rosengren developed the doxology. From his point of view, human knowledge has never been and will never be epistemic (in the Platonic sense). It is always cultural and historical determined, situational and changeable. During the conversation, Rosengren discusses the specifics of the doxological understanding of the constructive nature of scientific knowledge. He (...) speaks about the importance of reception of the French philosophy of the 20th century for the emergence of a doxology. Mats Rosengren gave an interview on June 14, 2018, in Stockholm in the House of the Union of the Swedish writers. Mikael Nydahl did the simultaneous translation from Swedish. Further, Dmitry Vorobev made the transcript and editing of the conversation written text. The paper allows better to understand what the doxology is – as a modern version of the Protagorean theory of knowledge – and what is not. Предметом беседы стал социальный контекст возникновения доксологии – натурализованной теории познания, предложенной шведским философом Матсом Розенгреном. С его точки зрения человеческое знание никогда не было и не будет эпистемическим (в платоновском смысле). Оно всегда культурно-исторически обусловлено, ситуативно, изменчиво. В ходе беседы Розенгрен говорит о специфике доксологического понимания конструктивного характера научного познания, о значении рецепции французской философии XX века для возникновения доксологии. Профессор Розенгрен дал интервью 14 июня 2018 года в Стокгольме в доме Союза шведских писателей. Синхронный перевод с шведского сделал Микаэль Нюдаль. В дальнейшем на базе аудиозаписи беседы Дмитрием Воробьевым был создан и отредактирован текст интервью. Новизна данной работы заключается в том, что она позволяет лучше понять, чем является и чем не является доксология, заявленная ее автором как современный вариант протагорейской теории познания. (shrink)

Longtermism should not be wrongly defined as the view that we should act so that the future is as good as possible for human beings and their descendants; rather, longtermists should be concerned with what the long-term future may be like for all sentient beings. This includes nonhuman animals, as different risks of future suffering may afflict them. Indifference toward their interests could lead to the worsening of their use as resources, quantitatively and qualitatively. It could also help expand wild (...) animal suffering, a process that may have already begun. (shrink)

El siguiente artı́culo intenta defender la tesis de que la distinción aristotélica entre enérgeia y kı́nesis debe ser comprendida de modo intensional (en contraposición a una lectura extensional), tomando como punto de partida su célebre aparición en Met IX 6. Sobre la base de la identificación del problema acerca del cual trata dicho pasaje, se toma en consideración otras apariciones de la distinción en Met IX 8, en la EE, en la EN y en otros textos, en orden a documentar, (...) en primer lugar, la vinculación de la distinción con la noción de érgon y, en segundo lugar, de qué modo dicha vinculación permite una lectura intensional de la distinción. Por último, se ofrece un argumento adicional para dicha lectura considerando la estructura teleológica de la acciones presentada por Aristóteles en EN I 1. (shrink)

Представляя доксологию как постфеноменологический способ решения эпистемических и перцептивных проблем, автор обращается к истории открытия в конце XIX в. палеолитической наскальной живописи и к данным современных когнитивных наук. Восприятие и познание не являются отражением объективной реальности, это – особая творческая деятельность людей, обусловленная как биологическими, так и социокультурными факторами. Используя принципы Э. Кассирера, Л. Флека, П. Бурдье и Ж. Деррида, автор дает очерк сложного переплетения биологических и социальных факторов в процессе восприятия, анализируя первые попытки осмысления так называемого «пещерного искусства», и (...) пытается дать ответ на вопрос, как мы, люди, создаем новое знание, которое необходимо нам для жизни в мире (см. также [Розенгрен 2012, 63–72]). Человеческое знание никогда не было и не будет эпистемическим (в платоновском смысле), так как у людей нет привилегированного доступа к реальности самой по себе. Защищая эту идею, автор дает доксологическую трактовку тезиса Протагора о человекомерности (см. также: [Розенгрен 2014, 171–178]) и, по сути, говорит о необходимости отказаться от принципов метафизической теории познания. Он предлагает исходить из наблюдаемой ситуативности и изменчивости нашего знания. (shrink)

In this introduction, we cover some ways in which the topic of noise is discussed today, and then point to some important open questions about noise and its experience. We then provide a synopsis of the papers collected in the volume.

Medieval Theories of Perception and the Activity of Senses in the Franciscan Context (in Czech). A book-length study (175.000 words) on Roger Bacon's, Peter Olivi's, and Peter Auriol's philosophy of perception.

A carne bovina é uma das proteínas mais consumidas no mundo, favorecendo o comércio exterior. O Brasil é um dos grandes exportadores desse produto, o que leva à importância de buscar meios para se obter maior eficiência reprodutiva e produtiva. Dentre esses métodos, o uso de Inseminação Artificial em Tempo Fixo (IATF) vem aumentando e com isso vem a busca por estratégias para alcançar melhores taxas de prenhez. Uma estratégia é avaliar a nutrição do animal em conjunto com a condição (...) corporal. Assim a proposta desse trabalho é verificar a influência do Escore de Condição Corporal (ECC) na taxa de prenhez em vacas Nelore submetidas à IATF. O estudo foi realizado em propriedade particular no município de Cacoal, Rondônia, com 150 vacas da raça Nelore, multíparas, com idade média de 5 anos, submetidas ao manejo de pastejo semi-intensivo. Foram separados dois grupos sendo, grupo A: 75 vacas com escore ≥ 3,0 e grupo B: 75 matrizes com escore ≤2,5. Ambos passaram pelo mesmo protocolo farmacológico, dividido em três etapas (D0, D8 e D10). A inseminação artificial foi realizada no D10 e após 30 dias as vacas dos dois grupos passaram pelo diagnóstico de gestação, por ultrassonografia. Os resultados demonstraram que a taxa de prenhez do grupo A (68%) foi maior que a do grupo B (40%), sendo relevante a preocupação com o ECC de vacas Nelore em protocolos de IATF. (shrink)

В этой статье мы утверждаем, что философия символических форм Эрнста Кассирера является незаменимым философско-антропологическим партнером риторики. Мы предполагаем, что освоение риторикой теории символических форм Кассирера позволит вывести риторику за пределы её доминирующей трактовки как теории, ориентированной на языковое выражение, и позволит ей полностью соответствовать широкому пониманию риторики как учения о том, каким образом создаётся, утверждается и изменяется социальное значение. Чтобы сделать наше расширенное понимание риторико-философско-антропологического подхода более ясным, мы построили наше рассуждение частично на критике недавней попытки Томаса А. Дишенны (Discenna, (...) Rhetorica 32/3, 2014) включить Кассирера в риторическую традицию в ходе анализа давосских дебатов между Кассирером и М. Хайдеггером 1929 года; и частично на разъяснении тех аспектов мысли Кассирера, которые мы считаем наиболее важными для развития риторико-философской антропологии социального значения. Основным выводом проведенного исследования является тезис о том, что философия символических форм Кассирера создает теоретические основы современной риторической философской антропологии как учения о формировании социального значения. (shrink)

The paper presents doxological interpretation of homo-measure set. Traditionally this thesis is seen as an expression of the impermanent human doxa as the only possible truth. Using the approach of analytic philosophy to the interpretation of the famous speech, the author refuses treatment of man as an individual in favor of a generic understanding of the man. Generic feature of human in ancient world-view is the logos, which is coming to be seen as a measure of all things, including man (...) himself. -/- . (shrink)

This paper explores the notion of the self as one of the main obstacles in advancing neuroscience. Some folks argue for strict naturalism in order to study the brain objectively. However, in this process of naturalization, we run the risk of losing key components that make up our experience as human beings, namely emotions, ideas, and values. Therefore, I argue for moderate naturalism in an attempt to reconcile with the self. I reference Immanuel Kant’s moral law theory in order to (...) discuss the ethical implications of following a moderate naturalist view of the self in advancing neuroscience. (shrink)

M. Rosengren developed doxology as an 'other' take on epistemology, as teaching about how we actually do create the knowledge that we need. He has chosen to call his epistemic stance doxological in order to emphasise that all knowledge is doxic knowledge, thus turning the seminal Platonic distinction between doxa (beliefs, opinions) and episteme (objective, eternal knowledge) upside down.

Đáp án không phải Blanche-Neige. Thực tế, ở nước ta cũng không có tuyết. Đúng ra là quá hiếm. Giữa núi rừng miền Bắc rét mướt ngày mùa đông, ruộng ngô trổ cờ xung quanh hoa hậu ruộng.

The APA has recently taken steps to address concerns related to teaching and supporting philosophers and students who come from less privileged backgrounds. I want to add to this project by fleshing out some concrete ways that philosophy professors contribute to the challenges faced by first-generation and financially disadvantaged philosophers and students. I hope that in making these behaviors explicit, it may be easier for faculty to acknowledge and overcome them.

The guiding premise of this chapter is that we, as teachers in higher education, must consider how the content and form of our teaching can foster inclusivity through a responsiveness to neurodiverse learning styles. A narrow pedagogical focus on lectures, textual engagement, and essay-writing threatens to exclude neurodivergent students whose ways of learning and making sense of the world may not be best supported through these traditional forms of pedagogy. As we discuss in this chapter, we, as engineering ethics educators, (...) designed and implemented a new engineering ethics exercise with which we aimed to promote inclusivity at the levels of form and content. At the content level, students were invited to critically engage with inclusivity-undermining ableist assumptions in technology development. This took shape, at the form level, through a hands-on ‘material tinkering’ workshop in which students collaboratively and creatively altered (or ‘hacked’) artifacts used in contexts of disability and healthcare, so as to operationalize values of inclusivity and accessibility. Our hunch was that this hands-on tinkering workshop would simultaneously encourage a meaningful way of engagement with these ethical issues and values, while also enacting a more inclusive learning environment by enriching the range of pedagogical activities and learning formats available to our students.As we aim to show in this chapter, we believe this hunch largely panned out – though there are clear areas for future improvement pertaining to the pilot exercise itself and the research we conducted on the exercise. We begin by offering a description of our tinkering exercise. We discuss the exercise’s source of inspiration (Sect. 16.2.1) and its implementation (Sect. 16.2.2), which is visually captured via photographic documentation. We then discuss (Sect. 16.3) how we utilized a triangulated research method to assess the pedagogical value of the exercise. After we discuss our findings, we conclude by identifying areas for future improvement (Sect. 16.4). (shrink)

An ontology of geographic kinds is designed to yield a better understanding of the structure of the geographic world, and to support the development of geographic information systems that are conceptually sound. This paper first demonstrates that geographical objects and kinds are not just larger versions of the everyday objects and kinds previously studied in cognitive science. Geographic objects are not merely located in space, as are the manipulable objects of table-top space. Rather, they are tied intrinsically to space, and (...) this means that their spatial boundaries are in many cases the most salient features for categorization. The ontology presented here will accordingly be based on topology (the theory of boundary, contact and separation) and on mereology (the theory of extended wholes and parts). Geographic reality comprehends mesoscopic entities, many of which are best viewed as shadows cast onto the spatial plane by human reasoning and language. Because of this, geographic categories are much more likely to show cultural differences in category definitions than are the manipulable objects of table-top space. (shrink)

According to Heidegger's Being and Time, social relations are constitutive of the core features of human agency. On this view, which I call a ‘strong conception’ of sociality, the core features of human agency cannot obtain in an individual subject independently of social relations to others. I explain the strong conception of sociality captured by Heidegger's underdeveloped notion of ‘being-with’ by reconstructing Heidegger's critique of the ‘weak conception’ of sociality characteristic of Kant's theory of agency. According to a weak conception, (...) sociality is a mere aggregation of individual subjects and the core features of human agency are built into each individual mind. The weak conception of sociality remains today widely taken for granted. I show that Christine Korsgaard, one of the most creative contemporary appropriators of Kant, operates with a weak conception of sociality and that this produces a problematic explanatory deficiency in her view: she is unable to explain the peculiar motivational efficacy of shared social norms. Heidegger's view is tailor made to explain this phenomenon. I end by sketching how Heidegger provides a social explanation of a major systematic concern animating Korsgaard, the concern with the importance of individual autonomy and answerability in human life. (shrink)

The acquisition of a new skill usually proceeds through five stages, from novice to expert, with a sixth stage of mastery available for highly motivated performers. In this chapter, we re-state the six stages of the Dreyfus Skill Model, paying new attention to the transitions and interrelations between them. While discussing the fifth stage, expertise, we unpack the claim that, “when things are proceeding normally, experts don’t solve problems and don’t make decisions; they do what normally works” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, (...) 1988, pp. 30 – 31). This leads us to offer an account of the “perspectival deliberation” that arises for experts and masters and that is distinct from the calculative deliberation characteristic of the lower stages of skillfulness. (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation of the existential conception of selfhood that follows from Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception. On this view, people relate to themselves not by “looking within” in acts of introspection but, first, by “looking without” at the field of solicitations in which they are immersed and, eventually, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, by “making explicit” the “melodic unity” or “immanent sense” of their behavior. To make sense of this, I draw out a distinction latent in Merleau-Ponty’s view between a (...) pre-reflective sense of self and a reflective self-interpretation. The former is a suite of abilities and dispositions in light of which a person is aware of and drawn to act in a situation. This sense of self undergoes transitions over time, is constitutively susceptible to moments of disorientation, and tends toward but never achieves full coherence. Reflective self-interpretation is an activity whereby someone—provisionally and defeasibly—clarifies, articulates, and gets a better “grip” on how they are prereflectively drawn to act. I ground this interpretation in a detailed reading of Merleau-Ponty’s treatment of romantic love and I corroborate it by examining his account of the emergence of class-consciousness in the self-interpretation of a worker. (shrink)

My interest lies in offering a phenomenological perspective on how noise is experienced, with particular attention to what may be common to different sorts of noise phenomena. As a counterpoint to the notion that noise is an empty or constructed notion, I argue for two desiderata of a phenomenological account of noise; accommodating a plurality of noise experiences, on the one hand, and clarifying their specific phenomenal character, on the other. I then pursue these desiderata by turning to an examination (...) of some contemporary views of perception that have implications for how the phenomenal character of perceptual noise in particular is to be understood; an epistemic misfire view and a sensory misfire view. After clarifying each and its appeal, I convey concerns about the one and the other. I propose a third alternative for further exploration - a perceptual disjoint view - and point to how it ought to explored. On the premise that there is something like a unity of consciousness or experience, I lay out the idea that there may then be many forms of 'disunities' of experience. From an analysis of the latter, I suggest, one may account for many different types of experiences of noise, though with a common ‘phenomenal’ thread running through them. (shrink)

If knowledge requires safety, then one might think that when the epistemic source of knowledge is testimony, that testimony must itself be safe. Otherwise, will not the lack of safety transfer from testimony to hearer, such that hearer will lack knowledge? Resisting this natural line of reasoning, Goldberg (2005; 2007) argues that testimonial knowledge through unsafe testimony is possible on the basis of two cases. Lackey (2008) and Pelling (2013) criticize Goldberg’s examples. But Pelling goes on to provide his own (...) example that attempts to show that Goldberg’s thesis is true: one can gain safe testimonial belief from unsafe testimony. If any of these counterexamples were correct, they would undermine the main reason to think that knowledge based on unsafe testimony is impossible. My aim in this paper is to critically assess these arguments, and to consider the possibility of knowledge through unsafe testimony. Drawing a general moral from the analysis of these cases, I shall contend that it is impossible to acquire safe belief solely on the basis of unsafe testimony. If so, then testimonial knowledge based solely on unsafe testimony is impossible. (shrink)

The New Evil Demon problem has been hotly debated since the case was introduced in the early 1980’s (e.g. Lehrer and Cohen 1983; Cohen 1984), and there seems to be recent increased interest in the topic. In a forthcoming collection of papers on the New Evil Demon problem (Dutant and Dorsch, forthcoming), at least two of the papers, both by prominent epistemologists, attempt to resist the problem by appealing to the distinction between justification and excuses. My primary aim here is (...) to critically evaluate this new excuse maneuver as a response to the New Evil Demon problem. -/- Their response attempts to give us reason to reject the idea that victims of the New Evil Demon have justification for believing as they do. I shall argue that this approach is ultimately unsuccessful, however much of value can be learned from these attempts. In particular, progress in the debate can be made by following those who advance the excuse maneuver and make explicit the connection between epistemic justification and epistemic norms. By doing so, the questions being debated are clarified, as is the methodology being used to attempt to answer them. (shrink)

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

In the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) [Kritik der reinen Vernunft], Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) associates freedom with infinity. According to the definition given in this book, only an infinite being not subject to causality can be defined as free. However, the fact that a finite being, such as a human, is always subject to the laws of nature implies that they are perpetually bound by causality, which hinders their freedom. Freedom devoid of causality cannot be theoretically (...) justified. Another reason for this is Kant’s assertion in the Second Analogy of Critique of Pure Reason, where he states that everything in the phenomenal world is subject to causality. Accordingly, freedom can be conceived not in the phenomenal world but only in the noumenal world. In the First Critique, freedom, defined as a cause without a cause, a cause without being the result of another cause, later be characterized as negative freedom in the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten]. Such conceptualization of freedom cannot be determined by any other cause than itself. While there may be a theoretical foundation for accepting such a cause as uncaused, we have moral reasons to believe in it. This moral foundation in question guides us toward the notion of positive freedom. Here, unlike negative freedom, we are subject to moral laws, and as long as we comply with these, we can experience freedom as a finite being. This is because adhering to the laws we set for ourselves enables us to be morally the cause of our own actions. Thus, Kant renders freedom through positive freedom. Following this line of argument, negative freedom appears meaningful to us only within the framework of positive freedom. Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-2021) finds a problematic Kantian account of freedom as an uncaused cause in his book The Experience of Freedom (1988) [L’expérience de la liberté]. Because, according to this perspective, humans are not only subject to the laws of nature but also to moral cause-and-effect relationships with others, they exist at the ix limit of freedom. By this means, considering freedom as a duty imposed on the subject leads to ambiguous analyses such as negative/positive freedom in Kantian philosophyーIn post-Kantian philosophy, the ambiguity persists until Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)1 , who finds the solution by negating freedom. Therefore, according to Nancy, freedom should be considered not as a Kantian Idea but through its relationship with human finitude and experience. Thus, through the criticism directed at Kant in Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik], Nancy attempts to resolve the confusion created by the concept of freedom, which despite being associated with infinity in Kant, is made possible in the practical world through respect for the moral law. In this direction, Nancy finds the solution in the freedom that becomes conceptually elusive, transforming it into an act that goes beyond being a mere duty and which permeates all our experiences. In this book, Nancy introduces the initial stages of “community” and “singularity” concepts, which he would later develop further. For this, he begins the book's introductory section by emphasizing Martin Heidegger’s statement in §9 of Being and Time (1927) [Sein und Zeit], where “freedom” is mentioned as another name for existence. As a justification, he refers to the concept of Da-sein [being-there] and states that every being [être] is a being-in-common [être-en-commun], and freedom should be thought of through this. Namely, the problem of freedom is approached not as a political or ethical issue but as an ontological matter. Within the framework of beingin-common, this situation transforms into an ontological “generosity [générosité ontologique].” -/- 1 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom [Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände], Schelling, approaches freedom not through infinity but rather through finitude. While Heidegger and Nancy pursue different paths, they both adhere to the idea of finitude freedom in Schelling. x Despite primarily emphasizing Heidegger’s thought in writing this text as his aggrégation thesis, Jean-Luc Nancy desires to transcend it and maintain a certain distance. This transcendence and distancing include authors from the French Phenomenological tradition, such as Georges Bataille (1897-1962), Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), and Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), and also incorporate the emphasis from Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) that death cannot be thought of independently of life. Referencing many philosophers from the continental philosophy tradition and developing a thematic reading through freedom, this bookーlike Nancy’s other worksーseeks ways to experience philosophy and thought freely in this own writing experience. So much so that this book, unlike Nancy’s other works like The Inoperative Community (1986) [La communauté désoeuvrée] ve Being Singular Plural (1996) [Être Singulier Pluriel], which is not widely discussed in secondary sources, is challenging to follow. Therefore, in examining this book as my Master’s research thesis and addressing the idea of freedom in Nancy, I found it appropriate to adopt a close reading method. Certainly, this research should not be considered independent of works such as The Discourse of Syncope (1976) [Le discours de la syncope], The Categorical Imperative (1983) [L’impératif catégorique], as they serve as examples of while engaging in philosophy, how Nancy refers and relates to the works within the philosophical tradition. (shrink)

Scientific hedges are communicative devices used to qualify and weaken scientific claims. Gregor Betz has argued—unconvincingly, we think—that hedging can rescue the value-free ideal for science. Nevertheless, Betz is onto something when he suggests there are political principles that recommend scientists hedge public-facing claims. In this article, we recast this suggestion using the notion of public justification. We formulate and reject a Rawlsian argument that locates the justification for hedging in its ability to forge consensus. On our alternative proposal, hedging (...) is often justified because it renders scientific claims as publicly accessible reasons. (shrink)

In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does (...) have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief. (shrink)

Bu çalışmanın amacı, okuma kültürünün geliştirilmesine yönelik aile farkındalık programının (OKGYAFP) çocukta okuma kültürü oluşturmaya yönelik aile yeterliliğine etkisini belirlemek ve ailelerin OKGYAFP deneyimlerinin okuma kültürü oluşturmaya yönelik yeterliliklerini nasıl değiştirdiğini keşfetmektir. Bu nedenle çalışmada karma yöntem araştırma desenlerinden açımlayıcı sıralı karma desen kullanılmıştır. Araştırmanın nicel aşamasında öntest-sontest kontrol gruplu yarı deneysel desen tercih edilmiştir. Nitel aşamasında ise odak grup görüşmeleri yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın nicel boyutunun katılımcılarını Aydın ili Köşk ilçesinde bulunan bir devlet okulunun iki 2. sınıf şubesinin gönüllü velileri (n=30) (...) oluşturmuştur. Nitel boyutunun çalışma grubunu ise araştırmanın deney grubunda yer alan velilerden gönüllü 10 kişi oluşturmuştur. Araştırmada veri toplama aracı olarak Okuma Kültürü Oluşturmada Aile Yeterliliği Ölçeği ve görüşme formu kullanılmıştır. Bu araştırmanın nicel verilerinin analizi için betimsel istatistiklerin yanı sıra tek yönlü kovaryans analizinden (ANCOVA) yararlanılmıştır. Nitel veriler ise içerik analizi yöntemiyle çözümlenmiştir. Araştırmanın bulgularına göre deney grubu velilerinin okuma kültürü oluşumunda aile yeterliliği son test puanlarının anlamlı düzeyde farklılaştığı görülmüştür. Ayrıca OKGYAFP’nin deney grubunu oluşturan veliler üzerinde okuma kültürü ediniminde aile yeterliliği noktasında yüksek etkiye sahip olduğu bulgusuna da ulaşılmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda aileler programın okuma kültürü bağlamında farkındalık oluşturduğunu ifade etmiştir. Katılımcı ailelerin programın sonunda okuma kültürü oluşturmada aile yeterliliği düzeyleri ile programa ilişkin görüşlerinin tam olarak örtüştüğü de görülmüştür. (shrink)

Advocates of dynamic systems have suggested that higher mental processes are based on continuous representations. In order to evaluate this claim, we first define the concept of representation, and rigorously distinguish between discrete representations and continuous representations. We also explore two important bases of representational content. Then, we present seven arguments that discrete representations are necessary for any system that must discriminate between two or more states. It follows that higher mental processes require discrete representations. We also argue that discrete (...) representations are more influenced by conceptual role than continuous representations. We end by arguing that the presence of discrete representations in cognitive systems entails that computationalism (i.e., the view that the mind is a computational device) is true, and that cognitive science should embrace representational pluralism. (shrink)

What is it to be a woman? What is it to be a man? We start by laying out desiderata for an analysis of 'woman' and 'man': descriptively, it should link these gender categories to sex biology without reducing them to sex biology, and politically, it should help us explain and combat traditional sexism while also allowing us to make sense of the activist view that gendering should be consensual. Using a Putnam-style 'Twin Earth' example, we argue that none of (...) the existing analyses in the feminist literature succeeds in meeting all of our desiderata. Finally, we propose a positive account that we believe can satisfy all the desiderata outlined. According to our theory, the genders 'woman' and 'man' are individuated not by their contemporary connections to sex biology, but by their historical continuity with classes that were originally closely connected to sex biology. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that self-awareness is intertwined with one's awareness of possibilities for action. I show this by critically examining Dan Zahavi's multidimensional account of the self. I argue that the distinction Zahavi makes among 'pre-reflective minimal', 'interpersonal', and 'normative' dimensions of selfhood needs to be refined in order to accommodate what I call 'pre-reflective self-understanding'. The latter is a normative dimension of selfhood manifest not in reflection and deliberation, but in the habits and style of a person’s (...) pre-reflective absorption in the world. After reviewing Zahavi's multidimensional account and revealing this gap in his explanatory taxonomy, I draw upon Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Frankfurt in order to sketch an account of pre-reflective self-understanding. I end by raising an objection to Zahavi’s claim for the primitive and foundational status of pre-reflective self-awareness. To carve off self-awareness from the self’s practical immersion in a situation where things and possibilities already matter and draw one to act is to distort the phenomena. A more careful phenomenology of pre-reflective action shows that pre-reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-understanding are co-constitutive, both mutually for each other and jointly for everyday experience. (shrink)

The global water crisis is being exacerbated by climate change, even in the United States. Recycled water is a feasible alternative to alleviate the water shortage, but it is constrained by humans’ perceptions. The current study examines how residents’ water scarcity awareness and climate change belief influence their willingness to use recycled water directly and indirectly. Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics was employed on a dataset of 1831 residents in Albuquerque, New Mexico, an arid inland region in the US. We (...) discovered that residents’ willingness to use direct recycled potable water is positively affected by their awareness of water scarcity, but only if they believe in the impacts of climate change on the water cycle. Meanwhile, the willingness to use indirect recycled potable water is influenced by water scarcity awareness, and the belief in climate change further enhances this effect. These findings implicate that fighting climate change denialism and informing the public of the water scarcity situation in the region can contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of long-term water conservation and climate change alleviation efforts. (shrink)

In the wake of the advent of genome editing technology CRISPR-Cas9 (clustered regularly interspaced palindromic repeat (CRISPR)-associated protein 9), there has been a global debate around the implications of manipulating the human genome. While CRISPR-based germline gene editing is new, the debate about the ethics of gene editing is not – for several decades now, scholars have debated the ethics of making heritable changes to the human genome. The arguments that have been raised both for and against the use of (...) genetic technologies in human reproduction reiterate much of the arguments made in the pre-CRISPR debate. As such, it is instructive for South Africa to reflect on these arguments now, in considering our position on the regulation of the use of this novel biotechnology. There are two dominant schools of thought in this area, bioliberalism and bioconservatism. Bioconservatives raise concerns about the risks of genetic manipulation, and argue that it ought to be limited or prohibited to avert these risks to human health and human nature. Bioliberal scholars are more open to the prospect of genetic manipulation, because of its potential utility. In this article, I conclude that in liberal democracies such as our own, bioliberal arguments ought to be seriously considered when formulating policy on human genome editing because of the extent to which they resonate with our Constitutional values and human rights. I further suggest that there is a need for an enquiry into the relevance of African perspectives on the ethical questions that arise concerning germline genome editing. (shrink)

In general, epistemic internalists hold that an individual’s justification for a belief is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons for thinking that the contents of her beliefs are true. Applying this to the epistemology of testimony, a hearer’s justification for beliefs acquired through testimony is exhausted by her reflectively accessible reasons to think that the contents of the speaker’s testimony is true. A consequence of internalism is that subjects that are alike with respect to their reflectively accessible reasons are alike (...) with respect to what they have justification to believe. Testimony should be thought no different: hearers that are alike with respect to reflectively accessible reasons to think that a speaker’s testimony is true are alike with respect to their justification for beliefs based upon that testimony. But it has been recently argued that this view faces powerful counterexamples. So the central question is this: assuming that a hearer can acquire justification to believe a proposition through the testimony of a speaker, can epistemic internalism provide the resources to explain how such justification is possible? My aim in this paper is to address these counterexamples, and in so doing, defend epistemic internalist accounts of testimony. (shrink)

Does the recent success of Podemos and Syriza herald a new era of inclusive, egalitarian left populism? Because leaders of both parties are former students of Ernesto Laclau and cite his account of populism as guiding their political practice, this essay considers whether his theory supports hope for a new kind of populism. For Laclau, the essence of populism is an “empty signifier” that provides a means by which anyone can identify with the people as a whole. However, the concept (...) of the empty signifier is not as neutral as he assumes. As I show by analyzing the role of race in his theory, some subjects are constituted in a way that prevents their unmediated identification with the people. Consequently, Laclau’s view should be read as symptomatic of the problems with populist logic if its adherents are to avoid reproducing its exclusions and practice a more inclusive politics. (shrink)