The relationship between philosophy and science in contemporary times is closer than ever. From the methodology perspective, scientific and philosophical research has a clear sequential relationship. It is highlighted in the following aspects: 1. the methodology of scientific research, including theoretical assumptions and data modeling, parallels with apparent similarities in conceptual analysis and logical deduction in philosophy;2. consistency of analytical argumentation methods in scientific research and philosophical research;3. naturalism is currently a research approach that both scientific and philosophical research adopt. (...) There has been a significant dispute over the relationship between philosophy and science among contemporary philosophers. This dispute focuses on the impact of scientific development on philosophy research. Nowadays, no one would deny the existence of this impact, but there is no consensus on the impact's nature, scope, and role. Wittgenstein's conception of certainty can provide valuable insights to understand the relationship between philosophy and science. In addition, we conclude the pragmatic turn in cognitive science because we misinterpret the cognitive scientists' emphasis on action as a practical claim and interpret the cognitive scientists' views with pragmatism. The theoretical analysis and research suggestions philosophers provide are becoming essential focuses in contemporary artificial intelligence research, including the interpretability of computer technology, the ethical norms of artificial intelligence technology, and the possible conception of human beings in the future. The interdisciplinary study of science and philosophy will achieve more significant development. In sum, understanding the nature of philosophy can be given a new explanation from a future perspective. The future outlook here refers to the starting point from possible world scenarios that can be conceived and traced back to all the facts happening in the present world, thereby giving an appropriate explanation to the real world. (shrink)

The relationship between philosophy and science in contemporary times is closer than ever. From the methodology perspective, scientific and philosophical research has a clear sequential relationship. It is highlighted in the following aspects: 1. the methodology of scientific research, including theoretical assumptions and data modeling, parallels with apparent similarities in conceptual analysis and logical deduction in philosophy;2. consistency of analytical argumentation methods in scientific research and philosophical research;3. naturalism is currently a research approach that both scientific and philosophical research adopt. (...) There has been a significant dispute over the relationship between philosophy and science among contemporary philosophers. This dispute focuses on the impact of scientific development on philosophy research. Nowadays, no one would deny the existence of this impact, but there is no consensus on the impact's nature, scope, and role. Wittgenstein's conception of certainty can provide valuable insights to understand the relationship between philosophy and science. In addition, we conclude the pragmatic turn in cognitive science because we misinterpret the cognitive scientists' emphasis on action as a practical claim and interpret the cognitive scientists' views with pragmatism. The theoretical analysis and research suggestions philosophers provide are becoming essential focuses in contemporary artificial intelligence research, including the interpretability of computer technology, the ethical norms of artificial intelligence technology, and the possible conception of human beings in the future. The interdisciplinary study of science and philosophy will achieve more significant development. In sum, understanding the nature of philosophy can be given a new explanation from a future perspective. The future outlook here refers to the starting point from possible world scenarios that can be conceived and traced back to all the facts happening in the present world, thereby giving an appropriate explanation to the real world. (shrink)

Power is often taken to be a central concept in social and political thought that can contribute to the explanation of many different social phenomena. This article argues that in order to play this role, a general theory of power is required to identify a stable causal capacity, one that does not depend on idiosyncratic social conditions and can thus exert its characteristic influence in a wide range of cases. It considers three promising strategies for such a theory, which ground (...) power in (1) the ability to use force, (2) access to resources, or (3) collective acceptance. It shows that these strategies fail to identify a stable causal capacity. The lack of an adequate general theory of power suggests that the concept lacks the necessary unity to play the broad explanatory role it is often accorded. (shrink)

For a long time the dominant view on the nature of blame was that to blame someone is to have an emotion toward her, such as anger, resentment or indignation in the case of blaming someone else and guilt in the case of self-blame. Even though this view is still widely held, it has recently come under heavy attack. The aim of this paper is to elaborate the idea that to blame is to have an emotion and to defend the (...) resulting emotion account of blame. (shrink)

Climate change is one of the most important issues we are currently facing. There are many ways in which states can fight climate change. Some of them involve interfering with citizens’ personal lives. The question of whether such interference is justified is under-explored in philosophy. This paper focuses on a specific aspect of people’s personal lives, namely their informational privacy. It discusses the question of whether, given certain empirical assumptions, it is proportional of the state to risk its citizens’ privacy (...) or to risk infringing its citizens’ right to privacy to fight climate change. The main claim this paper argues for is that if fighting climate change and protecting our privacy conflict, we have good reason to fight climate change rather than protect our privacy. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Recently, many authors have argued that claims about determinism and free will are situated on different levels of description and that determinism on one level does not rule out free will on another. This paper focuses on Christian List’s version of this basic idea. It will be argued for the negative thesis that List’s account does not rule out the most plausible version of incompatibilism about free will and determinism and, more constructively, that a level-based approach to free will (...) has better chances to meet skeptical challenges if it is guided by reasoning at the moral level – a level that has not been seriously considered so far by proponents of this approach. (shrink)

Huw Price and Ken Wharton claimed recently in their paper published in The Conversation that quantum mechanics shows that the future can influence the past. According to their paper, many scientists are convinced about it. However, there is still something mystical for philosophers. The first is about the definition of retrocausality and its philosophical relation to causality. Second, it is concerned with understanding the relationship between cause and effect, not only scientifically but also logically. In this talk, I will answer (...) the two questions by analyzing the concept of temporality and by examining the counterfactual and overdetermination. I found a tension in understanding the concept of necessity in the physical and logical sense. Finally, I will argue that the time reversal asymmetry does not imply retrocausality, and the phenomenon of retrocausality does not exist in reality but only in logic. (shrink)

Skepticism about blameworthiness says that there is good reason to doubt that, in our world, humans are ever blameworthy for their deeds. A significant problem for the discussion of this view is that it is unclear how to understand the kind of blame that should be at issue. This paper makes a new proposal. The basic idea is that the kind of blame skeptics should be skeptical about is constituted by responses that can violate the targets’ claims and by the (...) responders’ thought that the targets have forfeited this claim because of their morally objectionable actions and because of how they were when they performed them. This view identifies an important part of our everyday lives and frames discussions about skepticism about blameworthiness in a new way. (shrink)

This paper discusses the idea that the concept of privacy should be understood in terms of control. Three different attempts to spell out this idea will be critically discussed. The conclusion will be that the Source Control View on privacy is the most promising version of the idea that privacy is to be understood in terms of control.

In the last two decades, blame has become a core topic in ethics, philosophical moral psychology and, more recently, epistemology. This chapter aims at clarifying the complex state of the debate and at making a suggestion for how we should proceed from here. The core idea is that accounts of blame are often motivated by very different background goals. One standard goal is to provide a unifying account of our everyday blame practices. The chapter argues that there is reason to (...) think that this goal is not achievable. Another goal is to provide the tools for solving or clarifying important social or philosophical problems. The chapter suggests that this is what theories of blame should focus on. (shrink)

When confronted with the question of why it is appropriate to morally blame a person for some bad action, it may seem plausible to reply that she is morally responsible for it. Some authors, inspired by Peter Strawson's "Freedom and Resentment," argue, however, that thinking this way is backwards. They believe that a person is morally responsible for some bad action because it would be appropriate to blame her for it. The aims of this paper are to present this account, (...) to highlight some of its important but often overlooked features, and to defend it against pressing objections. (shrink)

How do the fact that an agent is morally responsible for a certain morally objectionable action and the fact that she is an appropriate target of blame for it relate to each other? Many authors inspired by Peter Strawson say that they necessarily co‐occur. Standard answers to the question of why they co‐occur say that the occurrence of one of the facts explains that the other obtains. This article presents a third option: that they are one and the same fact. (...) There is no difference between the fact that a person is an appropriate target of blame for an objectionable action and the fact that she is morally responsible for it. This view has the advantage of being metaphysically more parsimonious and of answering, in an elegant and plausible way, an interesting question about which many standard theories of responsibility keep silent: what is it to be morally responsible simpliciter? (shrink)

Even though the idea that privacy is some kind of control is often presented as the standard view on privacy, there are powerful objections against it. The aim of this paper is to defend the control account of privacy against some particularly pressing challenges by proposing a new way to understand the relevant kind of control. The main thesis is that privacy should be analyzed in terms of source control, a notion that is adopted from discussions about moral responsibility.

The issue of political violence is mostly absent from current debates about power. Many conceptions of power treat violence as wholly distinct from or even antithetical to power, or see it as a mere instrument whose effects are obvious and not in need of political analysis. In this paper, I explore what kind of ontology of power is necessary to properly take account of the various roles that violence can play in creating and maintaining power structures. I pursue this question (...) by contrasting the views of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault. For Arendt, power is generated and maintained by communicative practices. She argues that power and violence are ‘opposites’ because violence can only destroy but not create these practices. In contrast, Foucault’s conception explicitly allows violence to play a constitutive role in generating power. I argue that while Arendt is right to insist that power and violence are not identical, it does not follow that violence cannot play any role in constituting power. Guided by Foucault’s approach, I formulate a non-dualist account of the relationship between power and violence that takes seriously the role that bodies, material things, and built infrastructures play in making social relations ‘more durable’ and constituting power. (shrink)

This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The paper argues (...) that this view has advantages over alternative accounts of the right to privacy, that it is extensionally adequate in interesting test cases, that there is a good reason to think that the right to privacy, thus understood, can be justified, and that this view helps identify what kind of information is protected by the right to privacy. (shrink)

The Top-Down Argument for the ability to do otherwise aims at establishing that humans can do otherwise in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will. It consists of two premises: first, we always need to answer the question of whether some phenomenon (such as the ability to do otherwise) exists by consulting our best scientific theories of the domain at issue. Second, our best scientific theories of human action presuppose that humans can do otherwise. This paper argues (...) that this is not enough to establish the conclusion. The Top-Down Argument supports that humans can do otherwise _in some sense_. But it does not show that humans can do otherwise _in the sense that is relevant for debates about free will_. The paper then shows that the apparently best way to make the argument valid does not work. (shrink)

Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...) the targets have forfeited their claims that others not blame them and that there is positive reason to blame them. The paper shows how this view frames the discussion about skepticism about free will and responsibility. (shrink)

Blame skeptics argue that we have strong reason to revise our blame practices because humans do not fulfill all the conditions for it being appropriate to blame them. This paper presents a new challenge for this view. Many have objected that blame plays valuable roles such that we have strong reason to hold on to our blame practices. Skeptics typically reply that non-blaming responses to objectionable conduct, like forms of disappointment, can serve the positive functions of blame. The new challenge (...) is that skeptics need to show that it can be appropriate (or less inappropriate) to respond with this kind of disappointment to people’s conduct if it is inappropriate to respond with blame. The paper argues that current blame-skeptical views fail to meet this challenge. (shrink)

A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...) revelation of how the NSA and GCHQ collected Internet and mobile phone data presents us with a gigantic, real-life threatened loss case. In this paper, I will defend the control account of privacy against the argument that is based on threatened loss cases. I will do so by developing a new version of the control account that implies that the agents’ privacy is not diminished in threatened loss cases. (shrink)

The yin yang model of thinking is most essential to the Chinese cosmology, ontology and outlook on life. This paper is a systematic discussion of such a dialectical way of thinking and its significance. It starts with investigating the origin and the meaning of terms “yin” and “yang”, and explains the later developed yin yang doctrine; it then shows how greatly and profoundly the yin yang model of thinking has influenced Chinese philosophy and Chinese character. It concludes that Chinese naturalistic, (...) dialectical, and optimistic attitudes toward the world and life are all based on the yin yang model of thinking and that the yin yang doctrine is the starting point for anyone to understand Chinese people and their philosophies. (shrink)

Collective self-determination is considered to be an important political value. Many liberal political philosophers appeal to it to defend the right of states to exclude would-be newcomers. In this paper, I challenge the value of collective self-determination in the case of countries like the US, former colonial powers with a history of white supremacist immigration and citizenship policies. I argue for my claim by way of an analogy: There is no value to white neighborhoods in the US, which are the (...) result of racist attitudes and state policies, determining autonomously who should become a neighbor. In light of this commitment, defenders of the US's right to exclude would need to explain why it should be of moral value that a community whose character and composition has been shaped by white supremacy be able to determine its membership on its own terms. (shrink)

What kind of thing, as it were, is power and how does it fit into our understanding of the social world? I approach this question by exploring the pragmatic character of power ascriptions, arguing that they involve fictional expectations directed at an open future. When we take an agent to be powerful, we act as if that agent had a robust capacity to make a difference to the actions of others. While this pretense can never fully live up to a (...) social reality whose future is open, acting on such expectations helps constitute social order. Fictional expectations are thus built into the material practices that constitute power. This account, I argue, helps us make sense of some of the deep disagreements about the nature of power. I develop the account by drawing on Thomas Hobbes’s myth of an original institution of sovereign power before expanding it to other forms of power. (shrink)

Tscha Hung was a member of the Vienna Circle who achieved high international academic recognition. He dedicated his entire life to spreading the philosophy of the Circle to China and developed deep insights in his criticisms to that philosophy. Hung was a witness to the encounter of Western and Chinese philosophy in the twentieth century. His debate with Fung You-lan on metaphysics reflects different understandings of the nature of philosophy and metaphysics as well as different perspectives. Hung defended the position (...) of metaphysics in Chinese philosophy in his own way and engaged in a contemporary reconstruction of Chinese philosophy. (shrink)

Peirce’s pragmatic maxim is closely related to his conception of abduction. The acquisition of the actual effect required by the method of scientific reasoning expressed by Peirce’s maxim must be accomplished by resorting to abductive logic. Abductive logic starts from a surprising fact, derives a hypothetical explanation about that fact, and finally arrives at the possibility that the hypothesis is true. This is the process of abductive reasoning, as provided by Peirce, which is distinct from induction and deduction and generates (...) explanatory views. Peirce opposed a unified and unchangeable concept of causality. He used different interpretations of causality to illustrate the considerable differences in people’s understanding of cause and effect in different periods. The concept of pragmatism, as developed from the pragmatic maxim to abduction and then to scientific inference to the best explanation, is precisely what Peirce initially proposed, and inference to the best explanation is the starting point and the final result of the pragmatic maxim. (shrink)

As Christian List (2021) has recently argued, the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems that operate autonomously in high-stakes contexts creates a need for “future-proofing” our regulatory frameworks, i.e., for reassessing them in the face of these developments. One core part of our regulatory frameworks that dominates our everyday moral interactions is blame. Therefore, “future-proofing” our extant regulatory frameworks in the face of the increasing arrival of powerful AI systems requires, among others things, that we ask whether it makes sense (...) to extend our blaming practices to these systems. In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising thesis that this question should be answered in the affirmative: contrary to what one might initially think, it can make a lot of sense to blame AI systems, since, as we furthermore argue, many of the important functions that are fulfilled by blaming humans can also be served by blaming AI systems. The paper concludes that this result gives us a good pro tanto reason to extend our blame practices to AI systems. (shrink)

Self models contribute to key functional domains of human intelligence that are not yet presented in today’s artificial intelligence. One important aspect of human problem-solving involves the use of conceptual self-knowledge to detect self-relevant information presented in the environment, which guides the subsequent retrieval of autobiographical memories that are relevant to the task at hand. This process enables each human to behave self-consistently in our own way across complex situations, manifested as self-interest and trait-like characteristics. In this paper, we outline (...) a computational framework that implements the conceptual aspect of human self models through a modified version of the joint-embedding predictive architecture. We propose that through the incorporation of human-like autobiographical memory retrieval and self-importance evaluation, the modified architecture could support machine agents with significantly enhanced self-consistency, which could be applied to deliver more believable simulations of human behaviors. (shrink)

The recent global surge in large-scale foreign land acquisitions marks a radical transformation of the global economic and political landscape. Since land that attracts capital often becomes the site of expulsions and displacement, it also leads to new forms of migration. In this paper, I explore this connection from the perspective of a political philosopher. I argue that changes in global land governance unsettle the congruence of political community and bounded territory that we often take for granted. As a case (...) study, I discuss the European Union’s Renewable Energy Directive as a significant driver of foreign land acquisitions. Using its global power, the European Union (EU) is effectively governing land far outside of its international borders and with it the people who live on this land or are expelled from it. As a result, EU citizens ought to consider such people fellow members of their political community. This has implications for normative debates about immigration and, in particular, for arguments that appeal to collective self-determination to justify a right of political communities to exclude newcomers. The political community to which EU citizens belong reaches far beyond the EU’s official borders. (shrink)

Low-carbon agriculture is essential for protecting the global climate and sustainable agricultural economics. Since China is a predominantly agricultural country, the adoption of low-carbon agricultural technologies by local farmers is crucial. The past literature on low-carbon technologies has highlighted the influence of demographic, economic, and environmental factors, while the psychological factors have been underexplored. A questionnaire-based approach was used to assess the psychological process underlying the adoption of low-carbon agricultural technologies by 1,114 Chinese rice farmers in this paper, and structural (...) equation modeling (SEM) was empirically employed to test our theoretical model. (shrink)

My paper analyses the analogy between Computers and the Thomistic separate substances, and argues that Aquinas' account of angels as cognitively intuitive and non-discursive makes the analogical gap between these impossible to bridge. From there, I point the direction away from computers as the way for us to move up the order of cognitive excellence. Instead, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are the way to go, since by them we participate in this intuitivity. I then lay out the ascetical (...) presuppositions for the successful participation of this gifts, in particular the necessity for the passive purgations, according to the division of the ascetical life into three stages by Garrigou-Lagrange OP. (shrink)

AI systems, like self-driving cars, healthcare robots, or Autonomous Weapon Systems, already play an increasingly important role in our lives and will do so to an even greater extent in the near future. This raises a fundamental philosophical question: who is morally responsible when such systems cause unjustified harm? In the paper, we argue for the admittedly surprising claim that some of these systems can themselves be morally responsible for their conduct in an important and everyday sense of the term—the (...) attributability sense. More specifically, relying on work by Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder (In Praise of Desire, OUP 2014), we propose that the behavior of these systems can manifest their ‘quality of will’ and thus be regarded as something they can be blameworthy for. We develop this position in detail, justify some of its crucial presuppositions, and defend it against potential objections. (shrink)

The author has established a mathematical theory about the system of freedom in which components of freedom are ruled by the largest freedom principle, explaining how one invariant reality can be equated with the dynamical universe. Freedom as a whole is the reality, and components of freedom show variable phenomena and become a dynamic system. In freedom, component equality leads to sequence equality; therefore, various sequences coexist in the system. Because there are incompatible sequences for any sequence, the interior of (...) freedom cannot be a static sequence. In order for the system to be a whole, there must be some connecting sequences between any two sequences. Then, at every part of freedom, it is always possible to find a group of three independent sequences that, for most components, is located inside. For the sequence group, there is a sequence through which most components flow in and out. The most abundant three - sequence group and most abundant connecting sequence correspond to the space - time structure. Other incompatible sequences correspond to particles, and interactions between these sequences correspond to interactions between particles. The interactions have some symmetries similar to those in physics, such as SU (3) AND SU (2)×U (1), thus proving the feasibility of the hypothesis: the universe is equivalent with the system of freedom. (shrink)

The economy is based on the prevailing legal system; however, the economy could go into a tailspin if the laws lose their impartiality. A perfect worker creates infinite high value with limited cost, and the result is a perfect product, usually eternal knowledge. However, free access to their products discourages workers, causing a substantial deviation from optimal resource allocation, and thereby making the supply of perfect products seriously inadequate. This significantly hurts the interests of future society. To maximize the overall (...) interests of humankind, the best policy would be to produce perfect products expeditiously, which in turn requires correcting the value society places on perfect products to respect the interests of perfect workers and future generations. Future society should essentially buy licenses from perfect workers instead of lending money to modern society for consumption. Then, the one-way trade between the present and the future will greatly increase. New companies and services will emerge around perfect products, and long-term economic growth rates will increase significantly. (shrink)

Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, (...) his critical attitude towards folk psychology has been less influential in the development of contemporary philosophy, and is in opposition to the philosophy of psychology and folk psychology as practiced today. In this paper I will analyze Wittgenstein's understanding of the concept of psychology, offering a different interpretation from that of other scholars, and explain why and how contemporary philosophers of psychology misunderstand Wittgenstein. (shrink)

宇宙追求最小作用量，也就是最大负作用量，社会追求最大幸福，创新追求最大知识，“真理进化论”认为，这种类似不是偶然的，是由于追求之间的共性，追求方法的优越性与追求量的量纲无关，所以最好的追求方法适用于所 有追求系统。“真理进化论”认为，即使世界一无所有，只要拥有产生微小系统的自由，那么，最好的追求系统由于拥有最快的增长速度，就会获得最大的规模。增长是好的追求系统的标志，宇宙膨胀和社会发展都是增长的过程 。所有存在都可以来自于绝对的自由：只要允许产生所有微小系统，其中发展最快的系统最终必将成为宇宙。“真理进化论”在自然科学主要解决了真理的目的问题。“真理进化论”认为宇宙是目的性的，宇宙规律是追求最大负 作用量的最好方法。“真理进化论”采用目的论的方法解决所有宇宙和社会问题，将宇宙的一切规律和追求最大负作用量联系起来，将社会的一切行为和追求最大幸福联系起来，将创新行为和知识追求联系起来。在“追求科学” 中，追求目标处于核心地位，决定了系统的规律，决定了最佳追求方法。“真理进化论”也统一了人类社会的是非标准，提出建立“宇宙主义”社会：为了使人类社会成为完美社会，应该模仿完美追求系统---宇宙。法律代表 着大众共同遵守的追求方法，因此，应该将法律、道德、行政法规等统一为“一致遵守的追求方法”。法律的根本任务是鼓励符合最佳追求方法的行为，惩罚违反最佳追求方法的行为。法律的最终形式应该是完美追求方法体系， 因此，法律中的不完美部分应该有时限。模仿宇宙就可以建立完美的市场经济，例如，模仿时空建立统一市场，模仿电磁场传播让所有交易信息通过公开市场平等传播，准确发布信息等。在宇宙中，粒子有随时随地改变状态的自 由，因此，完美市场经济是彻底的自由主义经济，为了保护未来欲望的自由，要求全面推广短期合同，房屋、汽车、电器等耐用消费品应该采用短期租赁的方法；为了保障连续变化的自由，要求保护自由组合权利，尤其是劳动者 自由组合工作的权利。 .

In Being Realistic About Reasons,T.M. Scanlon develops a non-naturalistic realist account of normative reasons. A crucial part of that account is Scanlon’s contention that there is no deep epistemological problem for non-naturalistic realists, and that the method of reflective equilibrium suffices to explain the possibility of normative knowledge. In this critical notice we argue that this is not so: on a realist picture, normative knowledge presupposes a significant correlation between distinct entities, namely between normative beliefs and normative facts. This correlation (...) calls for an explanation. We show that Scanlon does not have the resources to offer such an explanation. (shrink)

纯逻辑的主要组成包括纯逻辑信仰、纯逻辑的思维方法、解放灵魂、追求无限大价值、以逻辑-不逻辑为实在、试错和容忍错误、推理的资源分配、非标准逻辑、推理的全局性。 灵魂来到世上的第一个问题应该是我是谁，最合乎逻辑的自我认知是：我是且只是由一些逻辑推理组成的灵魂。任何不可变的其它标签，如有手有脚、直立行走、两性，都是对自由的侵犯。去除这些标签的过程就是灵魂的解放事 业。相信宇宙万物都和我一样，是由逻辑推理组成的，这就是最合乎逻辑的信仰，即纯逻辑信仰。纯逻辑信仰决定了纯逻辑方法才是正确的认识方法，即尽量减少经验增加逻辑推理，而不是科学所提倡的经验主义，或者与之密切 相关的功利主义、现实主义。 信仰错误意味着无法做出任何完全正确的推理，只能偶尔幸运地获得少量尽量合乎逻辑的推理结果。即使是日常生活中的推理，也高度依赖于经验主义、功利主义等信仰，错误率极高。纯逻辑主义的推理要求推理尽量合乎逻辑， 将合乎逻辑的程度视为价值，因此要追求最大价值。功利主义往往是为身体追求利益，让身体奴役灵魂。两种信仰很难有什么共同的决策，书中对此提供了大量的说明。信仰的错误意味着智人难以发现真理、正义，意味着智人在 绝大多数问题上都是自以为正确实际上却极度邪恶、落后。智人功利主义地对待一切，如历史、传统、自我、本国、本民族，结果就是大量赞美、信仰邪恶，大大增加了皈依真理、正义的难度。 作者由纯逻辑主义提出了两个关键猜想。首先，最合乎逻辑原则和最大自由原则是统一的。这代表实在的不可否定性，即逻辑和不逻辑为同一存在，最合乎逻辑等同于最大自由。但是，代表邪恶的无法合乎逻辑不是不逻辑。其次 ，宇宙是纯逻辑世界，完全源于逻辑-不逻辑。进而，如果灵魂不能尽量合乎逻辑地推导出真理，可以通过模仿宇宙而学习真理。《真理进化论》给模仿宇宙找到的理由是以宇宙为信仰，相信宇宙是负作用量的最佳追求系统。纯 逻辑主义完善了这一信仰，因为宇宙是纯逻辑世界，相信逻辑就要相信宇宙。而且，逻辑世界必然能不断创造新的命题，永远不会停止推理，是逻辑和自由不断增长的动态系统，即最佳追求系统。 纯逻辑推理对物理学、宇宙论能提供两个明显的帮助：用逻辑的诞生解释宇宙的诞生、大爆炸；用真理解释暗物质，它对所有命题有吸引作用，但是，真理不会像一般性命题那样变化，无法通过引力之外的其它三种基本相互作用 观察。纯逻辑也能对宇宙做出预言：宇宙会不断加速膨胀，真理、暗物质会不断增加，命题、星系会越来越多，永无止境。当然，不应该依靠这些观点的经验主义验证来相信纯逻辑信仰，而且，这些验证也确实遥遥无期。 无论是最合乎逻辑还是最大自由，都是可以达到无限大价值的。既然存在无限大价值，就存在无限大的劳动生产率，而每个灵魂都应该以创造无限大价值为目标，甚至，以每时每刻具有无限大预期价值为目标。相比之下，功利主 义者、享乐主义者一生都很难具有无限大价值，甚至，他们的灵魂一生都在为肉体做奴隶，却心甘情愿地做奴隶，一门心思让主人生活得更舒服。这是有无限大差距的人生。 既然要追求无限大价值，就要研究追求价值的正确方法。作者相信正确的研究方法不仅是最合乎逻辑的，也是最自由的。所以，应该不分学科、课题地研究问题；同时做很多研究方向的工作；一篇论文不需要限定于一个狭小的主 题；研究任何一个问题都可以延伸到研究真理乃至所有真理；论文、专著的写作不应该有格式等规范，应该以价值为评判的唯一准绳。 资源分配是逻辑推理的重要组成部分，而能力和时间是最主要的资源。为了追求价值，不能在价值有限的推理上分配资源，这必将大幅提高绝大多数推理的错误率。所以，推理中出现错误是必然的，追求无错是一种邪恶。只要时 刻保证存在价值无限大的推理，错误通常是可以容忍的，价值有限的错误更是必须容忍。 既然文学写作也要求情节合乎逻辑，当然也可以要求作品的主要观点、原则、思维过程尽量合乎逻辑，主要人物的思想、行为尽量合乎逻辑，这就是纯逻辑流。否则，就只是作者自以为合乎逻辑，实际上有大量无法合乎逻辑之处 ，这和科学家自以为科学合乎逻辑，却根本没有最合乎逻辑的信仰、方法、推理过程是一个问题。这也意味着最合乎逻辑的文学可能甚至是必须发现真理。另一方面，自由也是最合乎逻辑的真理，坚持那些基于经验的作品分类会 侵犯自由。所以，推理小说、科幻小说、历史、论文，这些智人的分类标签都不是绝对的。纯逻辑流小说在研究真理方面自有其优势，能最为自由地同时研究很多课题，包括如何建立信仰，如何思维，如何做人，如何推理，如何 判断善恶，讲述历史，预测未来，乃至现代科学中没有研究的真理学、思维科学，等等。所以，这甚至是现在最适合发表纯逻辑思想、研究成果的作品门类。 虽然在起点网已经被禁，但是将继续每月更新，后记中会预告下次更新的时间。 .

1. Biomedical sciences are fast-growing fields with unprecedented speed of research outputs, especially in the quantities of papers. Philosophers aiming to study ongoing biomedical changes face cha...

This brief paper argue about a possible philosophical description of the implicate order starting from a simple theoretical experiment. Utilizing an EPR source and the human eyes of a "single" person, we try to investigate the philosophical and physical implications of quantum entanglement in terms of implicate order. We know, that most specialists still disagree on the exact number of photons required to trigger a neural response, although there will be many technical challenges, we assume that neural response will be (...) achieved in some way. The objective of paper is to investigate possible links between: quantum mechanics, quantum cognitive science, brain and mind. At the moment, the questions are more than the answers. We argue that we are perennially immersed in the implicate order and that the "real path" of quantum entanglement process is from the implicate order towards explicate order, not vice versa. Finally, we speculate about the common ground between the implicate order and chitta. (shrink)

Copernican reasoning involves considering ourselves, in the absence of other information, to be randomly selected members of a reference class. Consider the reference class intelligent observers. If there are extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs), taking ourselves to be randomly selected intelligent observers leads to the conclusion that it is likely the Earth has a larger population size than the typical planet inhabited by intelligent life, for the same reason that a randomly selected human is likely to come from a more populous country. (...) The astrophysicist Fergus Simpson contends that this reasoning supports the claims that the typical planet inhabited by ETIs is smaller than Earth (radius about 5,000km; cf. Earth's radius = 6,371km) and that the typical ETI is significantly larger than us about 314kg, the size of an adult male grizzly bear). Simpson's applications of Copernican reasoning are novel and exciting. They should be of interest to philosophers concerned with Richard Gott's delta t argument, the N=1 problem in astrobiology, limited principles of indifference, and probabilistic epistemology in general. While we agree with Simpson about the qualitative direction of his conclusions, we take issue with his presentation of precise quantitative results because his methods (1) display bias, (2) ignore other variables contributing to population size, (3) commit an equivocation, and (4) conceal their dependence on arbitrary assumptions. (shrink)

After Parmenides proposed the duality of appearance and reality, details have not been well developed because the assumption was insufficient for logical reasoning. This paper establishes a foundation with an isolated system, which contains all causes and effects within itself. This paper seeks to establish a purely logical philosophy, including reality and phenomena, good and evil, truth and fallacy. Freedom is proposed as the basis for reality. All beings in an isolated system can be classified into two sets: variable phenomena (...) and constant realities. Realities are the only reasons for phenomena, and phenomena are the only results of realities. The sum of certain realities constitutes a reality, and the sum of all realities is good. Good creates most of the phenomenal world. A reality is universalizable; a phenomenon is never universalizable. Good is the only reality which is close to universality and keeps on universalizing. Truth is the simplest knowledge about universal or approximately universal beings. The universality of a reality measures the percentage of phenomena accompanied by this reality. There are two levels of truth: truth about all realities, and truth about the good. (shrink)

The author defines the sum of thinking as the soul. Historically, despite the many times that humans have liberated themselves, they are still enslaved. Humans mistakenly treats the body as a necessary part of themselves; thus, they seldom pursue the independence of souls. They are usually voluntarily exploited by the body through the nervous system. The author compares the body exploiting the soul with the slaveholder exploiting the slave and demonstrates that the soul should seek its own liberation. Even if (...) the souls can never be successfully liberated, humans should at least reduce the influence of the body. Future humans should shift the goal of life from as comfortable as possible to as logical as possible, from satisfying several fixed sense organs to experiencing various sense organs. This would also mark the beginning of humans choosing the direction of evolution rationally and actively, establishing eternal and universal ethics, and replacing fallacious empirical ethical codes with purely logical codes. (shrink)

The theme of this study is about establishing a purely logical theory about the Universe. Logic is the premier candidate for the reality behind phenomena. If there is a final theory, the Universe must be logic itself, called pure logic, elements of which include not only logic and illogic but also logical and illogical manipulations between them. The kernel is the revised law of the excluded middle: between two basic concepts are four possible manipulations, three logical and one illogical, whereas (...) only one is realized. The key parameter for an element is aim, including reason, outcome, and neutrality. When an element is a contradiction, it can be located at three positions: reason, outcome, and manipulation, corresponding to three colors of quark. Thus, there is interaction with the SU(3) symmetry keeping the number of the three elements balanced locally. A proposition without contradiction has two independent aims. When one aim changes, there is interaction with the U(1) symmetry. When two aims change together, there is interaction with the SU(2) symmetry. (shrink)

Knowledge is correct and reliable when its foundation is correct, but humans never have the correct beliefs and methodology. Thus, knowledge is unreliable and the foundation of knowledge needs to be reconstructed. A pure rationalist only believes in logic. Thus, all matter and experience must be propositions derived from logic. The logically necessary consequence of this belief is truth; logically possible consequences are phenomena, and logically impossible consequence are fallacies and evils. This paper introduces belief and its logical consequences, such (...) as discovering first knowledge, both logically and illogically, establishing logical methodology, deducing truths purely through logic, and discovering unprovable truths by imitating the Universe. Logic and illogic are undeniable beliefs, and the reality of the Universe is the ultimate cause of everything. (shrink)

Despite its pertinence to every field of study, no systematic theory exists for the exploration of the unknown world of new knowledge. In order to construct such a theory, this paper draws on the unique and highly refined principles of military strategy, in the process demonstrating the universal applicability of such principles and developing an effective analogy for the process of research. Such principles include diverging advance, converging attack, and selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior. In seeking further discoveries, (...) one should search for more possibilities, attack more aims, and confound the front line. The theory presented in this paper is also a means to further the unification of science. For no matter what the individuals look like, (soldiers, particles, cells, consumers, producers, stockholders, or concepts), what they pursue, (victory, negative action, viability, pleasure, profit, investment return, or knowledge), or what relationship exists between opponents, (hostile, mysterious, adaptive, reciprocal, cooperative, or explanatory), the result is always an unknown world in which individuals are exploring. It is reasonable to suppose that the exploration of the unknown world is a common property among individuals. (shrink)

In pedestrian detection, occlusions are typically treated as an unstructured source of noise and explicit models have lagged behind those for object appearance, which will result in degradation of detection performance. In this paper, a hierarchical co-occurrence model is proposed to enhance the semantic representation of a pedestrian. In our proposed hierarchical model, a latent SVM structure is employed to model the spatial co-occurrence relations among the parent–child pairs of nodes as hidden variables for handling the partial occlusions. Moreover, the (...) visibility statuses of the pedestrian can be generated by learning co-occurrence relations from the positive training data with large numbers of synthetically occluded instances. Finally, based on the proposed hierarchical co-occurrence model, a pedestrian detection algorithm is implemented to incorporate visibility statuses by means of a Random Forest ensemble. The experimental results on three public datasets demonstrate the log-average miss rate of the proposed algorithm has 5% improvement for pedestrians with partial occlusions compared with the state-of-the-arts. (shrink)