The method of reflective equilibrium (MRE) is a method of justification popularized by John Rawls and further developed by Norman Daniels, Michael DePaul, Folke Tersman, and Catherine Z. Elgin, among others. The basic idea is that epistemic agents have justified beliefs if they have succeeded in forming their beliefs into a harmonious system of beliefs which they reflectively judge to be the most plausible. Despite the common reference to MRE as a method, its mechanisms or rules are typically expressed (...) in a metaphorical or simplified manner and are therefore criticized as too vague. Recent efforts to counter this criticism have been directed towards the attempt to provide formal explications of MRE. This paper aims to supplement these efforts by providing an informal working definition of MRE. This approach challenges the view that MRE can adequately be characterized only in the negative as a set of anti-essentialisms. I argue that epistemic agents follow MRE iff they follow four interconnected rules, which are concerned with a minimalistic form of foundationalism, a minimalistic form of fallibilism, a moderate form of holism, and a minimalistic form of rationality. In the critical spirit of MRE, the corresponding working definition is, of course, provisional and revisable. In general, the aim is to contribute to a reflective equilibrium (RE) concerning MRE. If it is successful, this working definition provides a better grasp of the most basic elements of the method and thereby enhances our understanding of it. (shrink)

Deliberate contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA) is a reader’s ability to figure out a (not the) meaning for an unknown word from its “context”, without external sources of help such as dictionaries or people. The appropriate context for such CVA is the “belief-revised integration” of the reader’s prior knowledge with the reader’s “internalization” of the text. We discuss unwarranted assumptions behind some classic objections to CVA, and present and defend a computational theory of CVA that we have adapted to a new (...) classroom curriculum designed to help students use CVA to improve their reading comprehension. (shrink)

Theodicy and Toleration Seem at first glance to be an unlikely pair of topics to treat in a single paper. Toleration usually means putting up with beliefs or actions with which one disagrees, and it is practiced because the beliefs or actions in question are not disagreeable enough to justify interference. It is usually taken to be a topic for moral and political philosophy. Theodicy, on the other hand, is the attempt to solve the problem of evil; that is, to (...) explain the origin of suffering and sin in a way that does not make God a moral cause of those evils.1 While theodicy concerns the notions of good and evil, and could therefore be considered a moral topic, historical and contemporary discussions of it have .. (shrink)

While evil has always fascinated philosophers, it is only in modern times that the existence of evil has been seen as a serious challenge to belief in the existence of a powerful and benevolent God. In order to demonstrate this, the following chapter traces the historical emergence of what philosophers today call “the problem of evil” through an analysis of the writings of Plato, Epicurus, Sextus Empiricus, Augustine, Aquinas, Calvin, Descartes, Bayle, and Hume.

It is generally assumed that if it is possible to believe that p without believing that q, then there is some difference between the object of the thought that p and the object of the thought that q. This assumption is challenged in the present paper, opening the way to an account of epistemic opacity that improves on existing accounts, not least because it casts doubt on various arguments that attempt to derive startling ontological conclusions from seemingly innocent epistemic premises.

In this paper I uncover and critically analyze a methodological assumption in the literature on conscientious refusals in health care. The assumption is what I call the “Priority of Conscience Principle,” which says the following: to determine the moral status of any act of conscientious refusal, it is first necessary to determine the nature and value of conscience. I argue that it is not always necessary to discuss conscience in the debate on conscientious refusals, and that discussing conscience is even (...) problematic, since it can lead authors to beg the question. (shrink)

A survey of the skepticism of Simon Foucher, with particular attention to his objections to Descartes' philosophy.

A survey of Bayle's skeptical arguments regarding Descartes' criterion of truth, which Bayle refers to as "evidence." Bayle's arguments for degrees of evidence, as well as for the necessity and sufficiency of possessing a high degree of evidence in order to form virtuous beliefs, are surveyed as well.

Mark Coeckelbergh starts his book with a very powerful picture based on a real incident: On the 9th of January 2020, Robert Williams was wrongfully arrested by Detroit police officers in front of his two young daughters, wife and neighbors. For 18 hours the police would not disclose the grounds for his arrest (American Civil Liberties Union 2020; Hill 2020). The decision to arrest him was primarily based on a facial detection algorithm which matched Mr. Williams’ driving license photo with (...) the picture of a man who was suspected of watch theft two years earlier. Not only did the computer ‘get it wrong’ as one of the detectives said, when Mr. Williams made them aware that the picture of the suspect obviously wasn’t resembling him, the probably unreliable algorithm very likely contributed to racial discrimination (Hill 2020). It is well documented that many available facial detection algorithms at this time had significant problems (e.g. a comparably high false positive rate) with respect to black persons, like Mr. Williams (NIST 2019). Multiple causes may exist, such as unbalanced training datasets and insufficient optimization. Coeckelbergh compares the disturbing case of Mr. Williams with a political interpretation of Franz Kafka’s The Trial, where the protagonist, Josef K., is accused of an unspecified crime by an opaque, oppressive and absurd bureaucracy: “In the 21st-century United States, Josef K. is black and is falsely accused by an algorithm, without explanation” (p. 2). (shrink)

I argue against the claim that it is trivial to state that Sidgwick used the method of wide reflective equilibrium. This claim is based on what could be called the Triviality Charge, which is pressed against the method of wide reflective equilibrium by Peter Singer. According to this charge, there is no alternative to using the method if it is interpreted as involving all relevant philosophical background arguments. The main argument against the Triviality Charge is that although the method of (...) wide reflective equilibrium is compatible with coherentism (understood as a form of weak foundationalism) as well as moderate foundationalism, it is not compatible with strong foundationalism. Hence, the claim that a philosopher uses the method of wide reflective equilibrium is informative. In particular, this is true with regard to Sidgwick. (shrink)

Mit einer virtuellen Welt kann sehr Verschiedenes und Mannigfaltiges assoziiert werden, unter anderem ein weiterer schillernder Begriff: Die Utopie. Sind nun virtuelle Welten allesamt Utopien? Oder müsste man vielmehr umgekehrt die Utopie als eine besondere virtuelle Welt hervorheben? Dass es überhaupt einen engen Zusammenhang zwischen den beiden Begriffen gibt, scheint nicht einmal selbstverständlich: Es gibt ihn sicherlich nicht, wenn man unter einer virtuellen Welt lediglich ein mit Hilfe von Computertechnik generiertes Szenario und unter einer Utopie schlicht und einfach eine der (...) Wirklichkeit unangemessene Wunschvorstellung versteht oder aber die Utopie als die literarische Konzeption einer für ideal befundenen Gesellschaftsform begreift und ideengeschichtlich demgemäß mit Platons „Staat“ beginnen lässt. Damit das begriffliche Verhältnis zwischen den heute durchaus auch im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch verwurzelten Ausdrücken „Utopie“ und „Virtualität“ untersucht werden kann, soll der Versuch unternommen werden, anschaulich zu machen, wie sie verwendet werden könnten. (shrink)

Pierre Bayle is perhaps most well-known for arguing in his Dictionary (1697) that the problem of evil cannot be solved by reason alone. This skepticism about theodicy is usually credited to a religious crisis suffered by Bayle in 1685 following the unjust imprisonment and death of his brother, the death of his father, and the revocation of the Edict of Nantes. But in this paper I argue that Bayle was skeptical about theodicy a decade earlier than these events, from at (...) least the time of his Sedan philosophy course (1675–77). I then argue that both the Various Thoughts on the Comet (1683) and Philosophical Commentary on Luke 4:23 (1686–88), which are usually read as treatments of superstition and toleration respectively, are works that also closely engage the problem of evil and demonstratethe skepticism of Bayle toward theodicy. (shrink)

In Anarchie, Staat, Utopia aus dem Jahre 1974 legte Robert Nozick eine libertäre Staatstheorie dar, die er auch als Utopie verstanden wissen will. Ist nun diese Selbst-Etikettierung berechtigt? Hierzu möchte ich sowohl Nozicks Auffassung von einer Utopie betrachten, als auch nach einem sinnvollen Utopie-Begriff suchen, dem ein als utopisch bezeichneter Text zu genügen hat. Dabei werde ich hauptsächlich den Blick auf Thomas Morus’ genre-prototypischen Text über die Insel Utopia richten. Neben der Frage, ob Nozicks Staatstheorie als Utopie bezeichnet werden sollte, (...) möchte ich zum Schluß versuchen, eine Antwort auf die Frage zu finden, warum sich Nozick eines Begriffs bedient, der im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch durchaus nicht immer positiv verstanden wird. (shrink)

In the Dedicatory Letter of the Meditations, René Descartes claims that he will offer a proof of the soul’s immortality, to be accomplished by reason alone. This proof is also promised by the title page of the first edition of the Meditations, which includes the words “in which the existence of God and the immortality of the soul are demonstrated.” But in the Synopsis, and later in his replies to objections, Descartes gives a more nuanced account of the possibility of (...) proving immortality and whether an attempt is even to be found in the Meditations. To confuse matters further, the title page of the second edition no longer mentions a demonstration of immortality but promises only to prove the distinction between body and soul. The question arises, therefore, whether the Meditations contains a purely philosophical demonstration of the immortality of the soul. (shrink)

In this paper I uncover the identities of the interlocutors of Pierre Bayle's Entretiens de Maxime et de Themiste, and I show the significance of these identities for a proper understanding of the Entretiens and of Bayle's thought more generally. Maxime and Themiste represent the philosophers of late antiquity, Maximus of Tyre and Themistius. Bayle brought these philosophers into dialogue in order to suggest that the problem of evil, though insoluble by means of speculative reason, could be dissolved and thus (...) avoided through mutual toleration. I conclude by comparing Bayle's "theodicy of toleration" with Kant's notion of authentic theodicy. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that solutions to normative challenges associated with autonomous driving, such as real-world trolley cases or distributions of risk in mundane driving situations, face the problem of reasonable pluralism: Reasonable pluralism refers to the fact that there exists a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive moral doctrines within liberal democracies. The corresponding problem is that a politically acceptable solution cannot refer to only one of these comprehensive doctrines. Yet a politically adequate solution to the normative challenges (...) of autonomous driving need not come at the expense of an ethical solution, if it is based on moral beliefs that are (1) shared in an overlapping consensus and (2) systematized through public reason. Therefore, we argue that a Rawlsian justificatory framework is able to adequately address the normative challenges of autonomous driving and elaborate on how such a framework might be employed for this purpose. (shrink)

We discuss a research project that develops and applies algorithms for computational contextual vocabulary acquisition (CVA): learning the meaning of unknown words from context. We try to unify a disparate literature on the topic of CVA from psychology, first- and secondlanguage acquisition, and reading science, in order to help develop these algorithms: We use the knowledge gained from the computational CVA system to build an educational curriculum for enhancing students’ abilities to use CVA strategies in their reading of science texts (...) at the middle-school and college undergraduate levels. The knowledge gained from case studies of students using our CVA techniques feeds back into further development of our computational theory. Keywords: artificial intelligence, knowledge representation, reading, reasoning, science education, vocabulary acquisition. (shrink)

An English translation of Pierre Bayle's posthumous last book, Entretiens de Maxime et de Themiste (1707), in which Bayle defends his skeptical position on the problem of the evil. This book is often cited and attacked by G.W. Leibniz in his Theodicy (1710). Over one hundred pages of original philosophical and historical material introduce the translation, providing it with context and establishing the work's importance.

In this paper, we focus on one controversial element of the method of reflective equilibrium, namely Rawls’s idea that the commitments that enter the justificatory procedure should be pre-selected or filtered: According to him, only considered judgements should be taken into account in moral philosophy. There are two camps of critics of this filtering process: 1) Critics of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too weak and seek a more reliable one, which would actually constitute a distinct (...) epistemic method. 2) Proponents of reflective equilibrium: They reject the Rawlsian filtering process as too exclusionary. We defend RE against its critics, arguing that the method can secure reasonable commitments without depending on a strong external filtering process. However, we side with the critical proponents of reflective equilibrium and argue that without the Rawlsian weak filtering process, RE is more plausible both as a general method as well as in the context of moral philosophy. (shrink)

The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics offers the most authoritative and compelling guide to this diverse and fertile field of philosophy. Twenty-four of the world's most distinguished specialists provide brand-new essays about 'what there is': what kinds of things there are, and what relations hold among entities falling under various categories. They give the latest word on such topics as identity, modality, time, causation, persons and minds, freedom, and vagueness. The Handbook's unrivaled breadth and depth make it the definitive reference work (...) for students and academics across the philosophical spectrum. (shrink)

For many years there has been a debate about the role of the parietal lobe in the generation of behavior. Does it generate movement plans (intention) or choose objects in the environment for further processing? To answer this, we focus on the lateral intraparietal area (LIP), an area that has been shown to play independent roles in target selection for saccades and the generation of visual attention. Based on results from a variety of tasks, we propose that LIP acts as (...) a priority map in which objects are represented by activity proportional to their behavioral priority. We present evidence to show that the priority map combines bottom-up inputs like a rapid visual response with an array of top-down signals like a saccade plan. The spatial location representing the peak of the map is used by the oculomotor system to target saccades and by the visual system to guide visual attention. (shrink)

Our approach is based on a tri-partite method of integrating psychodynamic hypotheses, cognitive subliminal processes, and psychophysiological alpha power measures. We present ten social phobic subjects with three individually selected groups of words representing unconscious conflict, conscious symptom experience, and Osgood Semantic negative valence words used as a control word group. The unconscious conflict and conscious symptom words, presented subliminally and supraliminally, act as primes preceding the conscious symptom and control words presented as supraliminal targets. With alpha power as a (...) marker of inhibitory brain activity, we show that unconscious conflict primes, only when presented subliminally, have a unique inhibitory effect on conscious symptom targets. This effect is absent when the unconscious conflict primes are presented supraliminally, or when the target is the control words. Unconscious conflict prime effects were found to correlate with a measure of repressiveness in a similar previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). Conscious symptom primes have no inhibitory effect when presented subliminally. Inhibitory effects with conscious symptom primes are present, but only when the primes are supraliminal, and they did not correlate with repressiveness in a previous study (Shevrin et al., 1992, 1996). We conclude that while the inhibition following supraliminal conscious symptom primes is due to conscious threat bias, the inhibition following subliminal unconscious conflict primes provides a neurological blueprint for dynamic repression: it is only activated subliminally by an individual's unconscious conflict and has an inhibitory effect specific only to the conscious symptom. These novel findings constitute neuroscientific evidence for the psychoanalytic concepts of unconscious conflict and repression, while extending neuroscience theory and methods into the realm of personal, psychological meaning. (shrink)

In this paper we critically evaluate an argument put forward by William Lane Craig for the existence of God based on the assumption that if there were no God, there could be no objective morality. Contrary to Craig, we show that there are some necessary moral truths and objective moral reasoning that holds up whether there is a God or not. We go on to argue that religious faith, when taken alone and without reason or evidence, actually risks undermining morality (...) and is an unreliable source of moral truths. We recommend a viewpoint on morality that is based on reason and public consensus, that is compatible with science, and that cuts across the range of religious and non-religious positions. (shrink)

Precision medicine and molecular systems medicine (MSM) are highly utilized and successful approaches to improve understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of many diseases from bench-to-bedside. Especially in the COVID-19 pandemic, molecular techniques and biotechnological innovation have proven to be of utmost importance for rapid developments in disease diagnostics and treatment, including DNA and RNA sequencing technology, treatment with drugs and natural products and vaccine development. The COVID-19 crisis, however, has also demonstrated the need for systemic thinking and transdisciplinarity and the limits (...) of MSM: the neglect of the bio-psycho-social systemic nature of humans and their context as the object of individual therapeutic and population-oriented interventions. COVID-19 illustrates how a medical problem requires a transdisciplinary approach in epidemiology, pathology, internal medicine, public health, environmental medicine, and socio-economic modeling. Regarding the need for conceptual integration of these different kinds of knowledge we suggest the application of general system theory (GST). This approach endorses an organism-centered view on health and disease, which according to Ludwig von Bertalanffy who was the founder of GST, we call Organismal Systems Medicine (OSM). We argue that systems science offers wider applications in the field of pathology and can contribute to an integrative systems medicine by (i) integration of evidence across functional and structural differentially scaled subsystems, (ii) conceptualization of complex multilevel systems, and (iii) suggesting mechanisms and non-linear relationships underlying the observed phenomena. We underline these points with a proposal on multi-level systems pathology including neurophysiology, endocrinology, immune system, genetics, and general metabolism. An integration of these areas is necessary to understand excess mortality rates and polypharmacological treatments. In the pandemic era this multi-level systems pathology is most important to assess potential vaccines, their effectiveness, short-, and long-time adverse effects. We further argue that these conceptual frameworks are not only valid in the COVID-19 era but also important to be integrated in a medicinal curriculum. (shrink)

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

Freud proposes that in unconscious processing, logical connections are also (heavily) based upon phonological similarities. Repressed concerns, for example, would also be expressed by way of phonologic ambiguity. In order to investigate a possible unconscious influence of phonological similarity, 31 participants were submitted to a tachistoscopic subliminal priming experiment, with prime and target presented at 1ms. In the experimental condition, the prime and one of the 2 targets were phonological reversed forms of each other, though graphemically dissimilar (e.g., “nice” and (...) “sign”); in the control condition the targets were pseudo-randomly attributed to primes to which they don’t belong. The experimental task was to “blindly” pick the choice most similar to the prime. ERPs were measured with a focus on the N320, which is known to react selectively to phonological mismatch in supraliminal visual word presentations. The N320 amplitude-effects at the electrodes on the midline and at the left of the brain significantly predicted the participants’ net behavioral choices more than half a second later, while their subjective experience is one of arbitrariness. Moreover, the social desirability score (SDS) significantly correlates with both the behavioral and the N320 brain responses of the participants. It is proposed that in participants with low SDS the phonological target induces an expected reduction of N320 and this increases their probability to pick this target. In contrast, high defensive participants have a perplexed brain reaction upon the phonological target, with a negatively peaking N320 as compared to control and this leads them to avoid this target more often. Social desirability, which is understood as reflecting defensiveness, might also manifest itself as a defense against the (energy-consuming) ambiguity of language. The specificity of this study is that all of this is happening totally out of awareness and at the level of very elementary linguistic distinctions. (shrink)

The thought of G. W. F. Hegel (1770 -1831) has had a deep and lasting influence on a wide range of philosophical, political, religious, aesthetic, cultural and scientific movements. But, despite the far-reaching importance of Hegel's thought, there is often a great deal of confusion about what he actually said or believed. G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts provides an accessible introduction to both Hegel's thought and Hegel-inspired philosophy in general, demonstrating how his concepts were understood, adopted and critically transformed (...) by later thinkers. The first section of the book covers the principal philosophical themes in Hegel's system: epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, ethical theory, political philosophy, philosophy of nature, philosophy of art, philosophy of religion, philosophy of history and theory of the history of philosophy. The second section covers the main post-Hegelian movements in philosophy: Marxism, existentialism, pragmatism, analytic philosophy, hermeneutics and French poststructuralism. The breadth and depth of G. W. F. Hegel: Key Concepts makes it an invaluable introduction for philosophical beginners and a useful reference source for more advanced scholars and researchers. (shrink)

Przed skomentowaniem książki, oferuję uwagi na temat Wittgenstein i Searle i logicznej struktury racjonalności. Eseje tutaj są w większości już opublikowane w ciągu ostatniej dekady (choć niektóre zostały zaktualizowane), wraz z jednym niepublikowanym elementem, i nic tutaj nie będzie zaskoczeniem dla tych, którzy nadążyli za jego pracą. Podobnie jak W, jest uważany za najlepszego filozofa standupu swoich czasów, a jego twórczość pisemna jest solidna jak skała i przełomowa w całym. Jednak jego brak podjęcia później W wystarczająco poważnie prowadzi do pewnych (...) błędów i zamieszania. Tylko kilka przykładów: na p7 dwukrotnie zauważa, że nasza pewność co do podstawowych faktów wynika z przytłaczającej wagi rozumu na poparcie naszych roszczeń, ale W pokazał definitywnie w "Na pewności", że nie ma możliwości wątpliwości co do prawdziwej tylko aksjomatycznej struktury naszego systemu 1 postrzegania, wspomnień i myśli, ponieważ sam w sobie jest podstawą do osądu i nie może być osądzony. W pierwszym zdaniu na p8 mówi nam, że pewność jest re prostu, ale tego rodzaju "pewność", którą moglibyśmy nazwać Certainty2, jest wynikiem rozszerzenia naszej aksjomatycznej i niepodróżnej pewności (Pewność1) poprzez doświadczenie i jest zupełnie inna, ponieważ jest propositional (prawda lub fałsz). Jest to oczywiście klasyczny przykład "walki z urzekaniem naszej inteligencji przez język", którą W wielokrotnie demonstrował. Jedno słowo- dwa (lub wiele) różnych zastosowań. Jego ostatni rozdział "Jedność propozycji" (wcześniej niepublikowane) również skorzystają znacznie z czytania W "Na pewność" lub dwóch książek DMS na OC (patrz moje recenzje), ponieważ jasno różnica między prawdziwymi tylko zdania opisujące S1 i prawdziwe lub fałszywe propozycje opisujące S2. To uderza mnie jako znacznie lepsze podejście do S biorąc S1 postrzegania jako propositional ponieważ tylko się T lub F po raz zaczyna myśleć o nich w S2. Jednak jego punkt, że propozycje pozwalają na oświadczenia rzeczywistej lub potencjalnej prawdy i fałszu, przeszłości i przyszłości i fantazji, a tym samym stanowić ogromny postęp w stosunku do społeczeństwa pre lub protolinguistic, jest przekonujący. Jak mówi: "Propozycja jest w ogóle czymś, co może określić warunek satysfakcji... i warunek satysfakcji... jest to, że tak i tak jest." Lub, trzeba dodać, że może być lub może być lub może być wyobrażane, że tak jest. -/- Ogólnie rzecz biorąc, PNC jest dobrym podsumowaniem wielu znaczących postępów w Wittgenstein wynikających z pół wieku pracy S, ale moim zdaniem, W nadal jest niezrównany, gdy uchwycić, co mówi. Idealnie, powinny być czytane razem: Searle dla jasnej prozy spójne i uogólnienia, zilustrowane perspicacious przykłady W i genialny aforyzmów. Gdybym był dużo młodszy, napisałbym książkę, która właśnie to robi. -/- Ci, którzy chcą kompleksowych, aktualnych ram dla ludzkich zachowań z nowoczesnego widoku dwóch systems, mogą zapoznać sięz moją książką "Logiczna struktura filozofii, psychologii, mind ijęzyka w Ludwig wittgenstein i John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Osoby zainteresowane bardziej moimi pismami mogą zobaczyć "Talking Monkeys - Filozofia, Psychologia, Nauka, Religia i Polityka na Skazanej Planecie - Artykuły i recenzje 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) i Suicidal Utopian Urojenia w 21wieku 4th th ed (2019) i inne. (shrink)

Po pół wieku w zapomnieniu, natura świadomości jest teraz najgorętszym tematem w naukach behawioralnych i filozofii. Począwszy od pionierskiej pracy Ludwiga Wittgensteina w latach 30-tych (Blue and Brown Books) i od lat 50-tych do chwili obecnej przez jego logicznego następcę Johna Searle'a, stworzyłem poniższą tabelę jako heurystykę do dalszego tego badania. Wiersze pokazują różne aspekty lub sposoby studiowania, a kolumny pokazują mimowolne procesy i dobrowolne zachowania obejmujące dwa systemy (podwójne procesy) logicznej struktury świadomości (LSC), które można również uznać za logiczną (...) strukturę racjonalności (LSR-Searle), zachowania (LSB), osobowości (LSP), rzeczywistości (LSOR), celowości (LSI) -filozoficznego klasycznego terminu, opisowa psychologia świadomości (DPC) , Psychologia Opisowa Myśli (DPT) - lub lepiej, Język Psychologii Opisowej Myśli (LDPT), terminy wprowadzone tutaj i w moich innych bardzo ostatnich pism. Ci, którzy chcą kompleksowych, aktualnych ram dla ludzkich zachowań z nowoczesnego widoku dwóch systems, mogą zapoznać sięz moją książką "Logiczna struktura filozofii, psychologii, mind ijęzyka w Ludwig wittgenstein i John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Osoby zainteresowane bardziej moimi pismami mogą zobaczyć "Talking Monkeys - Filozofia, Psychologia, Nauka, Religia i Polityka na Skazanej Planecie - Artykuły i recenzje 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) i Suicidal Utopian Urojenia w 21wieku 4th th ed (2019) i inne. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the under-researched figure A.W. Rehberg in his exchange with Kant over the relationship between theory and practice in the philosophy of right. I argue that Rehberg raises, what I call, two problems of political matter which attempt to show that Kant's overly formal approach to political theory cannot justifiably determine political practice. The first problem is the problem of positive determinations of right, rather than merely negative prohibitions. Rehberg takes this to mean that Kant cannot determine (...) us to a specific form of constitution. I argue that Kant's innovation of intelligible property functions as a response to this critique in that it provides the possibility of synthetic propositions of right a priori. Second, Rehberg insists that an a priori system of right cannot relate to already formed historical communities. Here Kant's response comes close to agreeing with Rehberg as Kant takes prudential or historical reasoning to harmonize with the demands of a priori right in order to applied to the sensible world. Kant, in this instance, comes closer to Rehberg by denying centralized enlightened monarchy and the reliance on natural and historical development for the application of right. (shrink)

Discerning the decisionmaking of Kim Jong-Un and the North Korean regime on issues of peaceful engagement and warlike actions endures as a mighty challenge for U.S. intelligence analysts and policymakers. In this report, we seek to inform analysis of Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) leadership decisionmaking. To do so, we use three discussion papers that were written to facilitate discussion of an interagency working group. The three papers are assembled here in a single report. The first discussion paper describes (...) decisionmaking among different authoritarian regimes, including North Korea, and the opening up of those economies to outside engagement. The second paper outlines two different scenarios that might occur when conventional deterrence on the Korean Peninsula breaks down and the resulting decisions that North Korea’s leadership could face. The third paper assesses DPRK decisionmaking about nuclear weapon use. The report concludes with some observations, drawn from the issues covered in these three discussion papers, about DPRK decisionmaking and stability on the Korean Peninsula. (shrink)

The book presents the first comprehensive survey of limits of the intentional control of action from an interdisciplinary perspective. It brings together leading scholars from philosophy, psychology, and the law to elucidate this theoretically and practically important topic from a variety of theoretical and disciplinary approaches. It provides reflections on conceptual foundations as well as a wealth of empirical data and will be a valuable resource for students and researchers alike. Among the authors: Clancy Blair, Todd S. Braver, Michael (...) W. Cole, Anika Fäsche, Maayan Davidov, Peter Gollwitzer, Kai Robin Grzyb, Tobias Heikamp, Gabriele Oettingen, Rachel McKinnon, Nachschon Meiran, Hans Christian Röhl, Michael Schmitz, John R. Searle, Gottfried Seebaß, Gisela Trommsdorff, Felix Thiede, J. Lukas Thürmer, Frank Wieber. (shrink)

Wittgenstein (W) is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior and this is his last work and crowning achievement. It belongs to his third and final period, yet it is not only his most basic work (since it shows that all behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination is but icing on unconscious machinations), but as Daniele Moyal-Sharrock has recently noted, is a radical new epistemology and the foundation for all description (...) of animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all brains share a common ancestry and common genes, and so there is only one basic way they work, that this necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on inclusive fitness, and in humans this is extended into a personality based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be regarded as trivial). This book, and arguably all of W's work and all useful discussion of behavior is a development of or variation on these ideas. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Horwichはウィトゲンシュタイン(W)の細かい分析を行い、Wの第一人者ですが、私の見解では、このレビューや他の多くの人が長々と説明しているように、それらはすべて完全な感謝に満ち不足しています。W( そして好ましくはサールも)を理解していないならば、私は哲学と高次思考、したがってすべての複雑な行動(心理学、社会学、人類学、歴史、文学、社会)の表面的な理解以上のものを持つことができる方法を見ません。 一言で言えば、Wは、あなたが興味のある文脈で文がどのように使用されているかを示したとき、これ以上言うことは何もあることを実証しました。私はいくつかの注目すべき引用から始め、その後、私はウィトゲンシュタ イン、哲学と人間の行動を理解するために必要な最小限の考慮事項であると思うものを与えます。 まず、単語の前に「meta」を置くことは疑わしいはずです。Wは、例えば、メタ数学は他の数学と同様に、言った。哲学の外に出ることができるという考え(すなわち、高次思考の記述心理学)は、それ自体が深い混乱 です。ここでのもう一つのいらだちは、「彼女」と「彼女」と「彼女」や「彼女/彼女」などの絶え間ない逆言語的性差別です。同様に、英語の「レパートリー」がうまくいくフランス語の「レパートリー」の使用もうまく いくでしょう。大きな欠陥は、私が上記で概説したHOTとサールのフレームワークの非常に強力で直感的な2つのシステムビューとして私が見ているものを採用する完全な失敗(非常に一般的ですが)です。これは、特に 意味p111 et seq.(特に脚注2-7)に関する章では、自動化された真のS1、命題の処分S2、COSなどの枠組みなしで非常に泥だらけの水の中で泳ぎます。ジョンストンやバッド(私のレビューを参照)などを読むことで、内 側と外側のより良いビューを得ることもできます。しかし、ホーウィッチは多くの切迫したコメントをします。私は特にp65に対するWの反理論的スタンスの輸入の彼の要約が好きでした。彼は最近、ダニエレ・モヤル・ シャーロック、コリバなどによる多くの努力の主題である「確実性について」にもっと重点を置く必要があり、私の最近の記事で要約されています。 ホーウィッチは一流であり、彼の仕事は努力の価値があります。彼(そして誰もが)サールといくつかの現代心理学だけでなく、ハット、リード、ハッチンソン、スターン、モヤアル・シャーロック、ストロール、ハッカー 、ベイカーなどを研究し、幅広い現代的な行動観を達成することを望んでいます。彼らの論文のほとんどはacademia dot eduとphilpapers dot orgにありますが、PMSハッカーにとってはhttp: slash slash info dot sjc dot ox dot ac dot uk slash scr slash hacker slash DownloadPapers dot htmlを参照してください。 彼はウィトゲンシュタインの理解が私が今まで見た私たちを残す場所の最も美しい要約の一つを与えます。 「フレージの論理への算術の削減のように、言語的/概念的な活動(PI 126)を説明する試みがあってはならない。それを認識論的基盤(PI 124)に与える試みはありません。.意味論理のように理想化された形式(PI 130)を特徴付けようとする試みはありません。マッキーの誤り理論やダメットの直感のように、それを改革する試み(PI 124、132)はありません。クインの存在のアカウントのようにそれを合理化する試みはありません (PI 133)。嘘つきのパラドックスに対するタルスキーの反応のように、それをより一貫させる試み(PI 132)を作る試みはありません。奇妙な仮説的な「テレポーテーション」シナリオのための個人的なアイデンティティの質問の解決のように、それをより完全に(PI 133)にしようとする試みはありません。 最後に、私がここで奨励した視点で、Wは現代哲学と心理学の中心にあり、あいまいで困難でも無関係でもありませんが、シンチレーション、深遠でクリスタルクリアであり、彼を見逃すのは可能な限り最大の知的冒険の1 つを逃すということです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

In this article I argue that Hutcheson has a theory of obligation that is different in important ways from the views of his predecessors and that his theory may not be as problematic as critics have claimed. In section (I) I sketch a brief picture of the rich conceptual landscape surrounding the concept of obligation in the Early Modern period. I focus on the five figures Hutcheson explicitly references: Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, their French translator and commentator Jean Barbeyrac, as (...) well as G. W. Leibniz and Richard Cumberland. In section (II) I offer an account of Hutcheson’s theory of obligation and illustrate that not only does Hutcheson have a view on what previous figures called the source, end, and object of obligation, he also focuses on the epistemological question of the origin of our idea of obligation as opposed to the metaphysical question of the efficient cause of obligation. Furthermore, although Hutcheson shares with his predecessors the idea that obligation implies a certain kind of necessity, he conceives of this necessity in a unique way, namely in terms of the necessity of a perception. In section (III) I defend Hutcheson’s theory of obligation against three objections: 1. that it makes a sham of obligation by locating its source within the human being, 2. that it is reducible to divine command theory, and 3. that, in the end, Hutcheson has no real or meaningful theory of obligation. My hope is that, at the very least, appraising these objections helps further clarify the theory of obligation that Hutcheson presents in his works. (shrink)

Este livro é inestimável como uma sinopse de algumas das obras de um dos maiores filósofos dos últimos tempos. Há muito valor em analisar suas respostas às confusões básicas da filosofia, e em tentativas geralmente excelentes de conectar o pensamento clássico chinês com a filosofia moderna. Eu tenho uma visão moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocá-lo em perspectiva. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus (...) livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicídio pela Democracia 4a ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019), Entendendo as Conexões Entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia (2019), Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no século XXI (2019), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Alealeitividade, Computabilidade, Informática, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Doria, da Costa , Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. Este livro é uma tentativa única de correlacionar a filosofia clássica chinesa com a de Searle (S), a quem considero ser o melhor desde Wittgenstein (W) e seu herdeiro intelectual. A qualidade dos itens é extraordinariamente alta para tal coleção, que deve ser devido à cuidadosa seleção de papéis de Mou. Os leitores acharão instrutivo comparar isso com outro volume recente de artigos sobre a filosofia de S, "Thinking About the Real World", outro livro no qual escrevi a única revisão. Como em W, tudo o que S escreve é um tesouro, mas infelizmente essa tomada tem atraído tão pouca atenção que esta parece ser a única revisão, mesmo que tenha aparecido há 6 anos. Sua única deficiência real é a falta de impressão da resposta de S a Allinson, pois corrigiria seus inúmeros erros substanciais. Como observado em minhas outras críticas, tais erros são de interesse, pois são os padrões universais de nossa psicologia devido ao fato de que nossa linguagem carece de perspicaz, como W apontou pela primeira vez no BBB (Blue and Brown Books) 3/4 de um século atrás. Quando a conferência foi gravada, tentei obter o vídeo ou uma transcrição da resposta de Mou, S, Allinson e 3 pessoas no HKUST, mas ninguém ajudou. A questão da espiritualidade inevitavelmente se mistura com as questões da linguagem da filosofia em alguns dos artigos aqui. As muitas sutilezas ao longo do caminho para dissipar a ilusão de ego e a realização da iluminação são outra questão inteira, embora como em todas as outras arenas, as confusões filosóficas inevitavelmente surgem quando falam de religião, em vez de praticá-la. Ou seja, a filosofia no sentido geral, pois reflete sobre ética, religião, moralidade, como devemos viver ou sentir sobre nossa vida e o mundo não é o sentido mais estreito em que W e S estão praticando isso , embora inevitavelmente e quase universalmente o sentido amplo é misturado com i sobre como a linguagem funciona (a mente como W nos mostrou). (shrink)

Over 40 years ago I read a small grey book with metaphysics in the title which began with the words “Metaphysics is dead. Wittgenstein has killed it.” I am one of many who agree but sadly the rest of the world has not gotten the message. Shoemaker’s work is nonsense on stilts but is unusual only in that it never deviates into sense from the first paragraph to the last. At least with Dennett, Carruthers, Churchland etc. one gets a breath (...) of fresh air when they discuss cognitive science (imagining they are still doing philosophy). As W showed so beautifully, the confusions that lead to metaphysics are universal and nearly inescapable aspects of our psychology. They occur not only in all thinking on behavior but throughout science as well. It’s easy to find examples in Hawking, Weinberg, Penrose, Green, who of course have no idea they have left science and entered metaphysics, that the statement they just made is not a matter of fact at all but a matter of conceptual (linguistic) confusion. “Law, event, space, time, force, matter, proof, connection, cause, follows, physical”, etc., all have clear uses in certain technical contexts, but these blend insensibly into quite different uses that have little in common but the spelling. Since it is pointless to waste time deconstructing Shoemaker line by line, showing the same errors over and over, I will describe some facts about how our psychology (language) works and with this outline and the references I give it is quite straightforward to give a meaningful description of the world in place of the metaphysical fantasies. If I were to debate Shoemaker we would never get beyond the title. Horwich gives one of the most beautiful summaries of where an understanding of Wittgenstein leaves us that I have ever seen. “There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Overall Stern does a fine analysis of Wittgenstein (W) and is one of the top W scholars, but in my view they all fall short of a full appreciation, as I explain at length in this review and many others. If one does not understand W (and preferably Searle also) then I don't see how one could have more than a superficial understanding of philosophy and of higher order thought and thus of all complex behavior(psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, literature, society). (...) In a nutshell, W demonstrated that when you have shown how a sentence is used in the context of interest, there is nothing more to say. I will start with a few notable quotes and then give what I think are the minimum considerations necessary to understand Wittgenstein, philosophy and human behavior. -/- As Stern is aware, throughout W’s works, understanding is bedeviled by possible alternative and consequently often infelicitous translations from often unedited and handwritten German notes, with “Satz” being frequently incorrectly rendered as “proposition”(which is a testable or falsifiable statement) when referring to our nonfalsifiable psychological axioms, as opposed to the correct “sentence”, which CAN be applied to our axiomatic true-only statements such as “these are my hands” or “Tyrannosaurs were large carnivorous dinosaurs that lived about 50 million years ago”. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with the perspective I have encouraged here, W is at the center of contemporary philosophy and psychology and is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant, but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN # B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd period writings (though Hutto (...) seems only intermittently aware of this). -/- The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online papers ). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my reviews of Wittgenstein (who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (who called it The Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century which I have also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I won’t dwell on it here. -/- This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2. -/- This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of “information” and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science and philosophy of mind.” Yes and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize that W laid it all out with great (and unmatched) clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago. -/- I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t see how one can lay the burden of explaining how the mind works at Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled contentful activities” etc helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of S3 culture? Beginning and end of story. -/- Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible, is an even better filter for folly. In sum an excellent book with various faults which I try to correct. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

In recent decades, perspectivism has developed into an independent epistemological research program. Perspectivism is based on the idea of perspective as an attempt to elucidate an object from a multitude of factors. Perspectivists are concerned with reconstructing and explaining these factors, identifying the conditioning of epistemic acts, using concepts such as “position”/“point of view,” “gaze,” “angle of view,” “horizon,” “focus,” “picture,” “relativity,” and “context”. Although these concepts are part of the perspectivist's toolkit, their content and interrelationship have not yet been (...) critically and comprehensively analyzed. The purpose of this article is to clarify the conceptual basis of perspectivism as an epistemological program, which began in the works of F. Kaulbach (1990) and W. Stegmaier (2008). For this purpose, a systematic conceptual analysis will be carried out, a detailed presentation of the logical content of perspectivist notions and their reduction into a single coherent model, which can become the conceptual basis of perspectivism. Perspectivist concepts constitute a “population” or matrix of the concept “epistemic situation”. Being consistently expounded and correlated in a conceptual model, they can be used as a tool for a detailed analysis of epistemic situations and their results (theories, positions, views, etc.). The final part of the article will formulate a number of significant implications of the new programmatic understanding of perspectivism: the status of perspectivist concepts, the distinction of perspectivism from similar epistemological programs, and the challenges for its further development. (shrink)

Although now over 25 years old, many of the essays are quite contemporary. As expected, none of the authors grasp the full relevance of W for the description of behavior, missing most of the points made in my comments above, his many examples of how S1becomes S2, his role as a pioneer in EP, and his attempts to separate nature from nurture. Brose has many good points and is aware of the foundational nature of On Certainty, but is too scattered (...) and does not clearly describe W’s analysis of how our innate automatic unconscious S1 is the axiomatic basis for all behavior (but with a few exceptions nobody else to this day has either). Russell’s article is excellent, especially the first part dealing with Kripke’s famously distorted view of W. For a more recent and superb deconstruction of Kripke’s W that is of very general application, see “Kripke’s conjuring Trick” by Read and Sharrock, available on the net. I also found Coulter’s article quite good and like Margolis and Harre, he has continued his work to the present day and published widely. Margolis is very bright and well read but his precious prose and attempt to include as many references as possible results in a lack of clarity and focus. Rosch makes the best effort to apply W to real research but also lacks the broad understanding of him that could transform the view of higher order thought. Harre has since become a major W scholar but has little to say here, so those interested should see my review of his “Wittgenstein and Psychology”. Overall, considering that this book was written over 25 years ago and most of the authors were not philosophers they did a good job and the volume is still worth reading. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)