This dissertation examines the relationship of skepticism and philosophy in the work of G.W.F. Hegel. Whereas other commentators have come to recognize the epistemological significance of Hegel's encounter with skepticism, emphasizing the strength of his system against skeptical challenges to the possibility of knowledge, I argue that Hegel develops his metaphysics in part through his ongoing engagement with the skeptical tradition. As such, I argue that Hegel's interest is not in refuting skepticism, but in defining its legitimate role within the (...) project of philosophical science. Hegel finds that historical forms of skepticism have misunderstood their own activity and thus have drawn the wrong conclusions from the epistemological challenges that they raise. For Hegel, these challenges lead not to the suspension of judgment, as many skeptics have assumed, but to an insight into the fundamental nature of reality itself. For this reason, I argue that it is important to distinguish between historical forms of skepticism (e.g., Pyrrhonism) and the "self-completing skepticism" that Hegel describes in the Phenomenology of Spirit. It is the latter sense of skepticism, I argue, that one finds at work in Hegel's own philosophical project at nearly every stage of his career. (shrink)

Michael Morris' Knowledge and Ideology is an original and valuable contribution to the philosophical debate concerning the meaning and validity of the concept of ideology critique. While the concept of ideology has occupied a pivotal role within the tradition of critical social theory, as Terry Eagleton had already pointed out in his 1994 study, the term nevertheless has "a whole range of useful meanings, not all of which are compatible with one another." Morris takes Eagleton's analysis as his point of (...) departure, distinguishing between "epistemic" and "functional" varieties of ideology critique. Unlike Eagleton's earlier study, however, which focused on the historical development of these two dominant ways of conceiving ideology, Morris' work attempts to show how the cognitive and non-cognitive dimensions of belief can be productively reconciled in a "Neo-Hegelian variation of epistemic ideology critique." Morris' work makes a compelling case that critical social theory can be sensitive to the social dimensions of belief without abandoning the legitimate goals of the traditional epistemological project. I have some questions, however, regarding how he proposes to reconcile these two competing visions of ideology critique. (shrink)

Large-scale Social Limitation (hereinafter referred to as PSBB) is one form of concern. The government and local governments are Pendemic throughout Indonesia and the world, namely Pandemic Corona Virus Disease (Covid-19). Bogor Regency, which is one of the buffer cities of the Republic of Indonesia, is an area that is quite vulnerable in spreading the Corona virus. Why? because many DKI Jakarta employees / laborers live in Bogor Regency, whose mobility is very high. With the birth of Regent Regulation No. (...) 16 of 2020 concerning Implementation of Large- Scale Social Restrictions in Handling COVID-19 in order to conserve the use of Covid 19. The purpose of this study is to analyze the Implementation of Large Scale Social Limitation Policies in the Government of Bogor Regency. This research method uses Qualitative Methods with Literature Study research methods. (Huberman, Miles, 1994). The technique of inviting data is by searching Scientific Journals, Online Mass Media, Legislation and Books. The technique to determine Online Media by Pusposive, while for data analysis using Nvivo 12 Plus. Test the validity of the data by testing the data source. The results of the study show that the implementation of the Large-Scale Social Limitation Policy in the Bogor District Government has not yet proceeded, starting from the clash of authority between the Central Government and the Regional Government so that it cannot make improvements, and many more are in accordance with the provisions of Covid-19 and its distribution. Social assistance to the community. (shrink)

Estados Unidos y el mundo están en proceso de colapso por el crecimiento excesivo de la población, la mayor parte del siglo pasado y ahora todo debido a la tercera gente del mundo. El consumo de recursos y la adición de uno o dos mil millones más alrededor de 2100 colapsarán la civilización industrial y provocarán hambre, enfermedades, violencia y guerra a una escala asombrosa. Miles de millones morirán y la guerra nuclear es muy segura. En Estados Unidos esto (...) está siendo enormemente acelerado por la inmigración masiva y la reproducción de inmigrantes, combinado con los abusos que hacen posible la democracia. La depravada naturaleza humana convierte inexorablemente el sueño de la democracia y la diversidad en una pesadilla del crimen y la pobreza. La causa fundamental del colapso es la incapacidad de nuestra psicología innata para adaptarse al mundo moderno, lo que lleva a las personas a tratar a personas no relacionadas como si tuvieran intereses comunes. Esto, además de la ignorancia de la biología básica y la psicología, conduce a los delirios de ingeniería social de los parcialmente educados que controlan las sociedades democráticas. Pocos entienden que si ayudas a una persona, dañas a otra persona, no hay almuerzo gratis y cada artículo que alguien consume destruye la tierra más allá de la reparación. En consecuencia, las políticas sociales en todas partes son insostenibles y una a una todas las sociedades sin estrictos controles sobre el egoísmo se derrumbarán en anarquía o dictadura. Sin cambios dramáticos e inmediatos, no hay esperanza de impedir el colapso de Estados Unidos, ni de ningún país que siga un sistema democrático. De ahí mi ensayo "Suicidio por Democracia". También está claro ahora que los siete sociópatas que gobiernan China están ganando la Tercera Guerra Mundial, por lo que mi ensayo final sobre ellos. La única amenaza mayor es la Inteligencia Artificial, que comento brevemente. La clave de todo lo que nos pasa es la biología, y es el olvido lo que lleva a millones de personas educadas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton, el Partido Demócrata y el Papa a defender ideales utópicos suicidas que inexorablemente conducen directamente al Infierno en la Tierra. Como W señaló, es lo que siempre está ante nuestros ojos lo que es más difícil de ver. Vivimos en el mundo del sistema linguístico deliberativo consciente 2, pero es inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 lo que gobierna. Esta es la fuente de la ceguera universal descrita por La ilusión fenomenológica (TPI) de Searle, la pizarra en blanco de Pinker y Tooby y el modelo de ciencia social estándar de Cosmides. El primer grupo de artículos intenta dar una idea de cómo nos comportamos que está razonablemente libre de delirios teóricos. En los siguientes tres grupos comento tres de los principales delirios que impiden un mundo sostenible: la tecnología, la religión y la política (grupos cooperativos). La gente cree que la sociedad puede ser salvada por ellos, por lo que proporciono algunas sugerencias en el resto del libro sobre por qué esto es poco probable a través de artículos cortos y reseñas de libros recientes de escritores conocidos. Otra sección describe el delirio religioso – que hay algún superpoder que nos salvará. En la siguiente sección se describen los delirios digitales, que confunden los juegos de idiomas del Sistema 2 con los automatismos del Sistema Uno, y por lo tanto no pueden distinguir las máquinas biológicas (es decir, las personas) de otros tipos de máquinas (es decir, computadoras). Otros delirios digitales son que seremos salvados del mal puro (egoísmo) del Sistema 1 por computadoras/AI/robotics/nanotech/ingeniería genética creada por System 2. El director De No Free Lunch nos dice que habrá consecuencias graves y posiblemente fatales. La última sección describe The One Big Happy Family Delusion, es decir, que somos seleccionados para la cooperación con todos, y que los eufóricos ideales de Democracia, Diversidad e Igualdad nos llevarán a la utopía, si sólo manejamos las cosas correctamente (la posibilidad de la política). Una vez más, el Principio De No Almuerzo Libre debe advertirnos que no puede ser verdad, y vemos a lo largo de la historia y en todo el mundo contemporáneo, que sin estrictos controles, egoísmo y estupidez ganar ventaja y pronto destruir cualquier nación que abraza estos delirios. Además, la mente del mono descuenta el futuro, por lo que cooperamos en la venta de la herencia de nuestros descendientes para las comodidades temporales, exacerbando en gran medida los problemas. (shrink)

Conditionalists say that the value something has as an end—its final value—may be conditional on its extrinsic features. They support this claim by appealing to examples: Kagan points to Abraham Lincoln’s pen, Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen to Lady Diana’s dress, and Korsgaard to a mink coat. They contend that these things may have final value in virtue of their historical or societal roles. These three examples have become familiar: many now merely mention them to establish the conditionalist position. But the widespread (...) faith in such cases is, I believe, unjustified. This is because, surprisingly, the pen, the dress, and the coat cannot have final value. I argue that the problem is internal: these cases are ruled out by every conditionalist account of final value. Further, the problem with these well-known cases applies to most other supposed examples of extrinsic, final goods. Thus nearly all cases given to support the conditionalist view cannot succeed. I suggest a kind of diagnosis: I claim that these examples are best seen as instances of sentimental value, rather than final value. I close by providing a brief account of sentimental value and explain how it relates to instrumental, intrinsic, and final goodness. (shrink)

After briefly outlining the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I explain how it relies crucially on the claim that it is not improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe. Against this premise stands the divine psychology objection: the contention that the probability that God would design a fine-tuned universe is inscrutable. I explore three strategies for meeting this objection: (i) denying that the FTA requires any claims about divine psychology in the first place, (ii) defining the motivation and intention to design (...) a fine-tuned universe into the theistic hypothesis, and (iii) providing arguments that the relevant probability is not terribly low. While I reject the first two, I conclude, in line with the third, that considerations about life's objective value establish that it is not absurdly improbable that God would design a fine-tuned universe, whether one regards the FTA as an inference merely to a cosmic designer, or to theism proper. Accordingly, the divine psychology objection fails. (shrink)

I argue that relaxed moral realists are not ontologically committed to moral properties. Regardless of whether we tie ontological commitment to quantification, entailment, or truthmaking, if moral properties are not explanatory (as relaxed realists claim), then moral truths do not require moral properties. This permits a nominalist form of relaxed realism that is both simpler and more ecumenical than extant formulations. The possibility of such a position places pressure on the ontology of competing views—and helps focus attention on the critical (...) and underexplored explanatory element of the relaxed realist’s program. (shrink)

I maintain that intrinsic value is the fundamental concept of axiology. Many contemporary philosophers disagree; they say the proper object of value theory is final value. I examine three accounts of the nature of final value: the first claims that final value is non‐instrumental value; the second claims that final value is the value a thing has as an end; the third claims that final value is ultimate or non‐derivative value. In each case, I argue that the concept of final (...) value described is either identical with the classical notion of intrinsic value or is not a plausible candidate for the primary concept of axiology. (shrink)

Mooreans claim that intrinsic goodness is a conceptual primitive. Fitting-attitude theorists object: they say that goodness should be defined in terms of what it is fitting for us to value. The Moorean view is often considered a relic; the fitting-attitude view is increasingly popular. I think this unfortunate. Though the fitting-attitude analysis is powerful, the Moorean view is still attractive. I dedicate myself to the influential arguments marshaled against Moore’s program, including those advanced by Scanlon, Stratton-Lake and Hooker, and Jacobson; (...) I argue that they do not succeed. (shrink)

Abstractionists claim that the only bearers of intrinsic value are abstract, necessarily existing states of affairs. I argue that abstractionism cannot succeed. Though we can model concrete goods such as lives, projects, and outcomes with abstract states, conflating models of goods with the goods themselves has surprising and unattractive consequences. I suggest that concrete states of affairs or facts are the only bearers of intrinsic value. I show how this proposal can overcome the concerns lodged against abstractionism and, in the (...) process, reconnect us with the good. (shrink)

British writers of the eighteenth century such as Shaftesbury and Hutcheson are widely thought to have used the notion of disinterestedness to distinguish an aesthetic mode of perception from all other kinds. This historical view originates in the work of Jerome Stolnitz. Through a re-examination of the texts cited by Stolnitz, I argue that none of the writers in question possessed the notion of disinterestedness that has been used in later aesthetic theory, but only the ordinary, non-technical concept, and that (...) they did not use this notion to define a specifically aesthetic mode of perception or a specifically aesthetic mode of anything else. The nearest thing that they had to the Stolnitzian conception of “the aesthetic” was their conception of taste, which differs from the former in some essential respects. (shrink)

I argue that there are two distinct views called ‘value pluralism’ in contemporary axiology, but that these positions have not been properly distinguished. The first kind of pluralism, weak pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they say that there are many things that are valuable. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Moore, Brentano and Chisholm were interested in. The second kind of pluralism, strong pluralism, is the view philosophers have in mind when they (...) say there are many values, or many kinds of value. It is also the kind of pluralism that philosophers like Stocker, Kekes and Nussbaum have advanced. I separate and elucidate these views, and show how the distinction between them affects the contemporary debate about value pluralism. (shrink)

After outlining sceptical theism (ST) and the fine-tuning argument (FTA), I demonstrate how arguments for the former undercut the latter. I then consider and reject three recent proposals for ameliorating the conflict: positive ST, considerations about normative superiors, and appeal to theistic metaethics. I contend, however, that Kirk Durston’s complexity argument for ST does not undercut the FTA but in fact supports it. In defending that thesis, I respond to Climenhaga’s contention that ST undermines all warrant for theistic belief, the (...) FTA included. (shrink)

Against interpretations of Kant that would assimilate the universality claim in judgments of taste either to moral demands or to theoretical assertions, I argue that it is for Kant a normative requirement shared with ordinary empirical judgments. This raises the question of why the universal agreement required by a judgment of taste should consist in the sharing of a feeling, rather than simply in the sharing of a thought. Kant’s answer is that in a judgment of taste, a feeling assumes (...) the role of predicate. Such a solution presents a problem as serious as the one it purports to solve. (shrink)

Moore's moral programme is increasingly unpopular. Judith Jarvis Thomson's attack has been especially influential; she says the Moorean project fails because ‘there is no such thing as goodness’. I argue that her objection does not succeed: while Thomson is correct that the kind of generic goodness she targets is incoherent, it is not, I believe, the kind of goodness central to the Principia. Still, Moore's critics will resist. Some reply that we cannot understand Moorean goodness without generic goodness. Others claim (...) that even if Moore does not need Thomson's concept, he still requires the objectionable notion of absolute goodness. I undermine both these replies. I first show that we may dispense with generic goodness without losing Moorean intrinsic goodness. Then, I argue that though intrinsic goodness is indeed a kind of absolute goodness, the objections marshalled against the concept are unsound. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that the topic of skepticism is central to Hegel’s philosophical work. However, I contend that in returning to the subject of skepticism throughout his career, Hegel does not treat skepticism simply as an epistemological challenge to be overcome on the way to truth, as some commentators suggest, but as part of the very truth which it is philosophy’s task to explain. I make this case by considering three texts through which Hegel develops the connection between (...) skepticism and the ‘negative’ or ‘dialectical’ dimension of reality: “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy” (1802), the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807), and the Encyclopedia Logic (1817). In this, I also demonstrate how the topic of skepticism informs the development of Hegel’s speculative metaphysics throughout his career and, thus, present a problematic that sheds light on the important continuity between these different phases of Hegel’s project. (shrink)

In this article, I offer a critical interpretation of Hegel’s claims regarding the presuppositionless status of the Logic. Commentators have been divided as to whether the Logic actually achieves the status of presuppositionless science, disagreeing as to whether the Logic succeeds in making an unmediated beginning. I argue, however, that this understanding of presuppositionless science is misguided, as it reflects a spurious conception of immediacy that Hegel criticizes as false. Contextualizing Hegel’s remarks in light of his broader approach to the (...) problem of beginning, I contend that Hegel’s Logic is presuppositionless not in the sense that it satisfies a formal epistemological demand to begin free from all mediation, but in that its self-mediating structure facilitates an immanent deduction of the categories. (shrink)

In his 1802 article for the Critical Journal, “Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy,” Hegel attempts to articulate a form of skepticism that is “at one with every true philosophy.” Focusing on the priority that Hegel gives to ancient skepticism over its modern counterpart, Michael Forster and other commentators suggest that it is Pyrrhonism that Hegel views as one with philosophy. Since Hegel calls attention to the persistence of dogmatism even in the work of Sextus Empiricus, however, I argue that it (...) is only a sublated form of Pyrrhonism, what in the Phenomenology of Spirit he calls “self-completing skepticism,” that Hegel takes to be part of genuine philosophical cognition. In this way, I hope to show that the insight that motivates Hegel’s engagement with skepticism in the 1802 essay comes to inform the philosophical itinerary of the Phenomenology of Spirit. (shrink)

Peter Geach’s distinction between logically predicative and logically attributive adjectives has gained a certain currency in philosophy. For all that, no satisfactory explanation of what an attributive adjective is has yet been provided. We argue that Geach’s discussion suggests two different ways of understanding the notion. According to one, an adjective is attributive just in case predications of it in combination with a noun fail to behave in inferences like a logical conjunction of two separate predications. According to the other, (...) an adjective is attributive just in case it cannot be applied in a truth-value-yielding fashion unless combined with a noun. The latter way of understanding the notion has been largely neglected by Geach’s critics, but we argue that taking account of it shows the misguided nature of some of their objections, and also yields a more satisfactory explanation of attributivity than does the other. (shrink)

Kant’s argument in § 38 of the *Critique of Judgment* is subject to a dilemma: if the subjective condition of cognition is the sufficient condition of the pleasure of taste, then every object of experience must produce that pleasure; if not, then the universal communicability of cognition does not entail the universal communicability of the pleasure. Kant’s use of an additional premise in § 21 may get him out of this difficulty, but the premises themselves hang in the air and (...) have no independent plausibility. What Kant offers as a proof of our right to make judgments of taste is more charitably construed as an indirect argument for the adequacy of a speculative explanation of a *presumed* right to make judgments of taste. (shrink)

I develop and defend a maximizing theory of moral motivation: I claim that consequentialists should recommend only those desires, emotions, and dispositions that will make the outcome best. I advance a conservative account of the motives that are possible for us; I say that a motive is an alternative if and only if it is in our psychological control. The resulting theory is less demanding than its competitors. It also permits us to maintain many of the motivations that we value (...) most, including our love for those most important to us. I conclude that we are closer to meeting morality’s demands on our character than has been appreciated. (shrink)

According to Kant, the singular judgement ‘This rose is beautiful’ is, or may be, aesthetic, while the general judgement ‘Roses in general are beautiful’ is not. What, then, is the logical relation between the two judgements? I argue that there is none, and that one cannot allow there to be any if one agrees with Kant that the judgement ‘This rose is beautiful’ cannot be made on the basis of testimony. The appearance of a logical relation between the two judgements (...) can, however, be explained in terms of what one does in making a judgement of taste. Finally, I describe an analogy between Kant's treatment of judgements of taste and J. L. Austin's treatment of explicit performative utterances, which I attribute to a deeper affinity between their respective projects. (shrink)

This paper analyzes the case of public anti-vaccine campaigns and examines whether there may be a normative case for placing limitations on public speech of this type on harm principle grounds. It suggests that there is such a case; outlines a framework for when this case applies; and considers seven objections to the case for limitation. While not definitive, the case that some limitation should be placed on empirically false and harmful speech is stronger than it at first appears.

In this article, we apply the literature on the ethics of choice-architecture (nudges) to the realm of virtual reality (VR) to point out ethical problems with using VR for empathy-based nudging. Specifically, we argue that VR simulations aiming to enhance empathic understanding of others via perspective-taking will almost always be unethical to develop or deploy. We argue that VR-based empathy enhancement not only faces traditional ethical concerns about nudge (autonomy, welfare, transparency), but also a variant of the semantic variance problem (...) that arises for intersectional perspective-taking. VR empathy simulations deceive and manipulate their users about their experiences. Despite their often laudable goals, such simulations confront significant ethical challenges. In light of these goals and challenges, we conclude by proposing that VR designers shift from designing simulations aimed at producing empathic perspective-taking to designing simulations aimed at generating sympathy. These simulations, we claim, can avoid the most serious ethical issues associated with VR nudges, semantic variance, and intersectionality. (shrink)

Este trabalho tem por objetivo a compreensão da ação em Aristóteles. Para este fim será utilizado o livro III da Ética a Nicômaco, passando antes por uma breve definição da virtude, tal como aparece no livro II, a qual, pode-se dizer ser o bem para a ação, na medida em que é aquilo que se deve alcançar com ela. No campo específico da ação será visto como ela pode ser distinguida entre voluntária, involuntária e não-voluntária. Neste espectro insere-se igualmente a (...) discussão sobre o que significa agir por e na ignorância. Além disso, se abordará também a questão relacionada à deliberação e à escolha.: This study aims to understand the action in Aristotle. For this purpose, we will use the book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, after doing a brief definition of virtue, as it appears in the Book II, which can be said to be the good for the action, as that is what should be reached by her. In the specific field of action, it will be seen how she can be distinguished between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary. This spectrum is also part of the discussion about what it means to act by and in the ignorance. In addition, the study will also address the issue related to deliberation and choice. Keywords: Deliberation, Choice, Action, Nicomachean Ethics. (shrink)

In 1772, Kant outlined the new problem of his critical period in terms of four possible “ways” of understanding the agreement of knowledge with its object. This study expands Kant’s terse descriptions of these ways, examining why he rejected them. Apart from clarifying the historical context in which Kant saw his own achievement (the Fifth Way), the chief benefits of exploring the historical background of Way Two, in particular, are that it (1) explains the puzzling intuitus originarius/intellectus archetypus dichotomy, and (...) (2) casts doubt on the received idea that Kant broke with the traditional theocentric model of cognition. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument is committed to a problematic implication that is weakened by research in cognitive psychology on affective forecasting. Schellenberg’s notion of a nonresistant nonbeliever logically implies that for any such person, it is true that she would form the proper belief in God if provided with what he calls “probabilifying” evidence for God’s existence. In light of Schellenberg’s commitment to the importance of both affective and propositional belief components for (...) entering into the proper relationship with God, this implication of his argument becomes an affective prediction or forecast. However, research in cognitive psychology has shown that in multiple and varied circumstances humans often make inaccurate predictions of their future affective states or reactions. Thus, this research provides strong empirical reasons to doubt that the implication is warranted. (shrink)

O conceito de self-ownership é frequentemente utilizado nos campos da Ética e da Filosofia Política para justificar ou negar a justeza de determinadas situações, atos ou práticas. As críticas a tal conceito são predominantemente focadas em seus corolários. No presente artigo a análise se concentra sobra as condições de possibilidade da existência de uma relação de propriedade de si mesmo – auto-propriedade – procurando-se demonstrar a impossibilidade de tal relação pela ausência de multiplicidade de elementos que possam constituir um proprietário (...) e uma propriedade. A propriedade de si mesmo é fundada em um dualismo ontológico, cuja ilusão procura se respaldar na percepção de si como um outro na constituição da identidade e na confusão da relação genitiva com uma relação de propriedade. (shrink)

Resumo Este trabalho retoma o tema dos preconceitos sociais de grupo na filosofia, esclarecendo seu modo de funcionamento a partir das identificações sociais e destacando que os discursos de preconceito – xenophobia, racismo, homofobia etc. – seguem o mesmo paradigma, independentemente de seu conteúdo. Primeiramente procederemos a um breve delineamento histórico do conceito de preconceito na filosofia, a fim de delimitar o escopo do trabalho no preconceito social de grupo. Em seguida, a discussão se dará sobre a constituição da identidade (...) de grupo e a exclusão do outro dela decorrente. Por fim, chegaremos à conclusão de que os diversos tipos de preconceito não só possuem uma estrutura similar como seguem a mesma lógica e funcionam conjuntamente para a hierarquização complexa da sociedade por meio da interseccionalidade. Abstract This paper takes up the issue of social prejudice in philosophy, clarifying its way of functioning by the means of social identifications as well as highlighting that the discourses of prejudice – xenophobia, racism, homophobia etc. – follow the same paradigm, regardless of their content. First, we will briefly delineate the concept of prejudice throughout the history of philosophy, in order to delimit the scope of this work in the group-related social prejudice. Then, the discussion will follow to the constitution of the group identity and the exclusion of the others from it. Finally, we will conclude that the different types of prejudice not only have a similar structure but follow the same logic and work together for the complex hierarchization of society through intersectionality. (shrink)

Many persons believe that benefiting from injustice can be morally wrong. Philosophers have developed several compelling theories to justify this intuition. These theories, however, may have a difficult time explaining a particular set of benefit-from-injustice cases: cases in which the beneficiary subjectively opposes the injustice from which she objectively benefits. This paper suggests that our moral duties to disgorge the benefits of injustice may vary in proportion to our subjective intent in acquiring and using those benefits. In doing so, it (...) reasons by analogy to other areas of moral and legal theory, including principles of compensation for unjust harms. (shrink)

RésuméLa critique kantienne de la psychologie rationnelle est une expérience de pensée visant ni un individu ni une école, mais une tendance de la raison humaine à « hypostasier » la condition intellectuelle suprême d'une connaissance quelconque (le « Je pense ») en connaissance du « moi ». Cette tendance implique une circularité qui est également la cible des critiques transcendantales bien plus familières qui visent Locke et Hume. De même qu'un nouveau type de cercle (dit « de niveau »), (...) cet article propose une conception des arguments transcendantaux différente de celle présupposée dans la plupart des débats contemporains sur l'empirisme, le naturalisme et le fondationnalisme cartésien. (shrink)

Neste artigo é defendido que 'os iluministas' não poderiam ser capazes de eliminar os preconceitos, como pretendiam, haja vista que atacavam o fenômeno do preconceito onde ele não estava, sendo o entrave no acesso à verdade apenas um efeito colateral do preconceito e não seu elemento central. Independente da possibilidade ou não de se eliminar os preconceitos, a estratégia adotada pelos filósofos desse período estava condenada ao fracasso. Para sustentar esta hipótese, primeiro será extraída uma noção geral do preconceito a (...) partir de autores do período do iluminismo. Em seguida serão estudados seus aspectos a fim de compreender a relação dos preconceitos com a realidade. Por fim se demonstra que o caráter dessa relação é acidental, não podendo o preconceito ser abolido por uma argumentação acerca da verdade das coisas. Este artigo não discute se é possível eliminar os preconceitos, apontando apenas o erro do método dos autores modernos. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to highlight the clientelistic strategies and informal practices that the ruling political parties in Albania use during the elections to ensure an unfair advantage in their favour over the opposition challengers. One of the main characteristics of the political developments of the transition period in Albania since 1991 has been the flourishing of informal practices and clientelist networks of political parties within state structures, which has produced an extreme politicization of these institutions. These strategies (...) that in general terms we label as “clientelistic” and that have been used to a large extent by the incumbent political parties have had a direct negative impact on the conduct of free and fair elections in Albania by distorting their main goal: to reflect the will of the people. This is because such clientelist strategies, together with the informal practices/mechanisms that accompany them, have influenced the creation of an unlevelled playing field, and have produced a hyperincumbency advantage in the electoral contests between political parties in Albania. The case of the recent elections held in Albania on 25 April 2021 will be the empirical case of this study, in which are evidenced the electoral containment strategies and practices that the ruling political party used to provide an unfair advantage in its favour and to secure its grip on power. (shrink)

O presente artigo analisa a propriedade privada a partir da teoria de John Locke no que se refere à aquisição originária. São discutidos o princípio da apropriação pelo trabalho, os limites à propriedade privada pelo deixar em comum para apropriação pelos demais 'o suficiente e de mesma qualidade' - o que Nozick nomeia como 'cláusula lockeana' –, bem como a possibilidade de acumulação. Para isso serão analisados os argumentos apresentados por Locke, acompanhado das críticas elaboradas por Robert Nozick.

The commentary on Plato's Republic by Proclus (d. 485 CE), which takes the form of a series of essays, is the only sustained treatment of the dialogue to survive from antiquity. This three-volume edition presents the first complete English translation of Proclus' text, together with a general introduction that argues for the unity of Proclus' Commentary and orients the reader to the use which the Neoplatonists made of Plato's Republic in their educational program. Each volume is completed by a Greek (...) word index and an English-Greek glossary that will help non-specialists to track the occurrence of key terms throughout the translated text. The second volume of the edition presents Proclus' essays on the tripartite soul and the virtues, female philosopher rulers, and the metaphysics and epistemology of the central books of the Republic. The longest of the essays in Volume II interprets the nature and significance of the 'marriage number' whose miscalculation leads to the degeneration of the ideal city-state. (shrink)

Covers Essays 1 to 6 in Proclus' Commentary and includes a general introduction to the work as a whole.

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar se não seria o caso que o trato diferenciado dedicado a cidadãos nacionais e imigrantes seria discriminatório. A questão dos imigrantes internacionais aflora atualmente nos mais distintos campos da sociedade. Entretanto, o foco da discussão aqui não é somente o ato de cruzar as fronteiras – ponto central de grande parte das publicações filosóficas sobre imigração. O cerne é a diferença entre direitos e obrigações de imigrantes internacionais e cidadãos nacionais. Não se trata de (...) cidadãos de um ou outro país, mas da categoria ‘cidadão nacional’ frente à categoria ‘estrangeiro’, independentemente do país. Será discutido o conceito de discriminação, a fim de que, sobre o pano de fundo deste conceito, sejam debatidas as restrições aos direitos dos estrangeiros. Com isso, pretende-se demonstrar que este tratamento diferenciado caracterizaria uma discriminação, pois os argumentos que sustentariam a diferenciação são insuficientes para justificá-la. -/- This paper aims to analyze whether the differential treatment dedicated to national citizens and immigrants would be discriminatory. The issue of international migrants arises today in very different fields of society. However, the core of the discussion here is not only the act of crossing borders – focus of much of the philosophical publications about immigration. The focus of the analysis is the difference of rights and obligations between international migrants and national citizens. It is not about one country or another, but the discussion concern the category ‘national citizen’ in relation to the ‘foreign’, regardless of the country. We will discuss the concept of discrimination, in order to debate the restrictions over the rights of the strangers on the background of this conceptualization. Our goal is to show that this differential treatment would characterize as discrimination, because the arguments that support this differentiation are insufficient for justifying it. (shrink)

O problema do eterno retorno, conforme este é construído no aforismo 341 da Gaia Ciência, é analisado em sua possibilidade de se construir uma perspectiva ética. Além disso, são abordadas as relações que se estabelecem entre essas expressões 'cuidado de si' e 'eterno retorno', respectivamente em Foucault e Nietzsche, de forma a compreender como as noções que residem nelas se aproximam, afastam ou complementam-se.

O culto à lei e à “ordem” e a defesa da punição – mais dura possível - aos desvios estão cada vez mais presentes na sociedade brasileira, especialmente em razão dos recentes acontecimentos que demonstram a corrupção existente nos governos e nas grandes empresas. Porém, este tipo de discurso esconde atrás de si outras consequências quando defende, em outras palavras, a obediência. Em que medida a liberdade é afetado pelo agir obediente à lei é o ponto central deste trabalho. Por (...) fim cabe pensar a que serve a obediência e quem lucra com a ordem, tanto a que é estabelecida, quanto a que é dada. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo analisar o significado do termo 'utopia'. Para isso, é fundamental tratar da obra de Morus – origem do termo. O estudo aborda a formação do termo e a atribuição de significado negativo de fantasia e impossibilidade, o qual é rechaçado como incompreensão do movimento completo que caracteriza a utopia. Tal impressão de ilusão repousaria sobre o focar-se apenas no exercício imaginativo eutópico. A utopia é compreendida aqui como processo dialético fundado na análise de uma sociedade (...) distópica e proposição de uma antítese eutópica, cuja síntese é a ação prática transformadora no processo histórico. (shrink)

Neste artigo são brevemente discutidas as origens e o significado da propriedade a partir dos conceitos de bem e Mal em Nietzsche e do Temer e da Angústia em Heidegger. No tocante à origem da Propriedade, foca-se não em seu significado posterior, mas em seu anterior, ou seja, naquilo que pode subjazer ao desejo de apropriar-se, o qual parece relacionar-se com a liberdade, ao mesmo tempo desejada e temida: desejada para si e temida para o outro. Por fim então se (...) abordam propostas do que significa para a sociedade atual a propriedade em termos de sua organização social, com base nas conclusões da análise realizada neste artigo. (shrink)

We argue that many recent philosophical discussions about the reference of everyday concepts of intentional states have implicitly been predicated on descriptive theories of reference. To rectify this, we attempt to demonstrate how a causal theory can be applied to intentional concepts. Specifically, we argue that some phenomena in early social de- velopment ðe.g., mimicry, gaze following, and emotional contagionÞ can serve as refer- ence fixers that enable children to track others’ intentional states and, thus, to refer to those states. (...) This allows intentional concepts to be anchored to their referents, even if folk psy- chological descriptions turn out to be false. (shrink)

This essay defends a reading of Hegel as a metametaphysical antirealist. Metametaphysical antirealism is a denial that metaphysics has as its subject matter answers to theoretical questions about the mind-independent world. Hence, on this view, metaphysical questions are not, in principle, knowledge transcendent. I hold that Hegel presents a version of metametaphysical antirealism in the Science of Logic because he pursues his project by suspending reference to all supposed objects of metaphysical theory as practiced before him. Hegel introduces reference in (...) his theory only by the self-reference of thought to itself in the Doctrine of the Concept. I motivate the relevance of Hegel’s approach to metaphysics by comparing it to Kit Fine’s (2017) concept of “naïve metaphysics.” I argue that Hegel’s theory results from a comprehensively naïve metaphysics. (shrink)

Ausgangspunkt ist die Frage, was Masse ist, wodurch sie insbesondere befähigt ist, Dauer zu konstituieren und deshalb - im Sinn des kinematischen Relativitätsprinzips - ebenso als bewegt wie als ruhend betrachtet werden kann. In einem Gedankenexperiment wird diese Frage, in Umkehrung der Perspektive, hier nicht von der Masse selbst, sondern von einer stehenden Lichtwelle her angegangen. In diesem Modell lassen sich masse-analoge Strukturen rekonstruieren, die in relativer Bewegung sein können. Die (empirisch bekannte) Unabhängigkeit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit vom Bezugssystem ist dabei nicht (...) vorausgesetzt. Doch kann gezeigt werden, dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit Grenzgeschwindigkeit solcher relativer Bewegungen ist, dass dies für alle durch masse-analoge Strukturen konstituierte, relativ zueinander gleichförmig bewegten Bezugssysteme gilt und dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit selbst in allen diesen Systemen gleich ist. Die Absolutheit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit und die Relativität der Massebewegungen erweisen sich so als zwar differente, aber intrinsisch zusammengehörende Momente des kinematischen Relativitätsprinzips: ein Beitrag zu einer Philosophie der Relativitätstheorie. - Die mathematischen Zusammenhänge werden im Anhang ausführlicher dargelegt. (shrink)

Sustainability science seeks to extend scientific investigation into domains characterized by a distinct problem-solving agenda, physical and social complexity, and complex moral and ethical landscapes. In this endeavor it arguably pushes scientific investigation beyond its usual comfort zones, raising fundamental issues about how best to structure such investigation. Philosophers of science have long scrutinized the structure of science and scientific practices, and the conditions under which they operate effectively. We propose a critical engagement between sustainability scientists and philosophers of science (...) with respect to how to engage in scientific activity in these complex domains. We identify specific issues philosophers of science raise concerning current sustainability science and the contributions philosophers can make to resolving them. In conclusion we reflect on the steps philosophers of science could take to advance sustainability science. (shrink)

In the world of philosophy of science, the dominant theory of confirmation is Bayesian. In the wider philosophical world, the idea of inference to the best explanation exerts a considerable influence. Here we place the two worlds in collision, using Bayesian confirmation theory to argue that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant.

Things and Their Place in Theories Our talk of external things, our very notion of things, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps us to foresee and ...