Results for 'Mind-Brain Identity'

1000+ found
Order:
  1. Mindbrain identity and evidential insulation.Jakob Hohwy - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (3):377-395.
    Is it rational to believe that the mind is identical to the brain? Identity theorists say it is (or looks like it will be, once all the neuroscientific evidence is in), and they base this claim on a general epistemic route to belief in identity. I re-develop this general route and defend it against some objections. Then I discuss how rational belief in mindbrain identity, obtained via this route, can be threatened by an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. The Mind/Brain Identity Theory: A Critical Appraisal.Leslie Allan - manuscript
    The materialist version of the mind/brain identity theory has met with considerable challenges from philosophers of mind. The author first dispenses with a popular objection to the theory based on the law of indiscernibility of identicals. By means of discussing the vexatious problem of phenomenal qualities, he explores how the debate may be advanced by seeing each dualist and monist ontology through the lens of an evolutionary epistemology. The author suggests that by regarding each ontology as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. An Evidence-Based Critical Review of the Mind-Brain Identity Theory.Marco Masi - 2023 - Hypothesis and Theory, Front. Psychol. - Consciousness Research 14.
    In the philosophy of mind, neuroscience, and psychology, the causal relationship between phenomenal consciousness, mentation, and brain states has always been a matter of debate. On the one hand, material monism posits consciousness and mind as pure brain epiphenomena. One of its most stringent lines of reasoning relies on a ‘loss-of-function lesion premise,’ according to which, since brain lesions and neurochemical modifications lead to cognitive impairment and/or altered states of consciousness, there is no reason to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Defining Mind-Brain Token Identity.Terence Rajivan Edward - manuscript
    This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Coalescing minds: Brain uploading-related group mind scenarios.Kaj Sotala & Harri Valpola - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (01):293-312.
    We present a hypothetical process of mind coalescence, where arti cial connections are created between two or more brains. This might simply allow for an improved form of communication. At the other extreme, it might merge the minds into one in a process that can be thought of as a reverse split-brain operation. We propose that one way mind coalescence might happen is via an exocortex, a prosthetic extension of the biological brain which integrates with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. How To Make Mind-Brain Relations Clear.Mostyn W. Jones - 2010 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):135-160.
    The mind-body problem arises because all theories about mind-brain connections are too deeply obscure to gain general acceptance. This essay suggests a clear, simple, mind-brain solution that avoids all these perennial obscurities. (1) It does so, first of all, by reworking Strawson and Stoljar’s views. They argue that while minds differ from observable brains, minds can still be what brains are physically like behind the appearances created by our outer senses. This could avoid many obscurities. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7. Self‐awareness and the mindbrain problem.Gilberto Gomes - 1995 - Philosophical Psychology 8 (2):155-65.
    The prima facie heterogeneity between psychical and physical phenomena seems to be a serious objection to psychoneural identity thesis, according to many authors, from Leibniz to Popper. It is argued that this objection can be superseded by a different conception of consciousness. Consciousness, while being conscious of something, is always unconscious of itself . Consciousness of being conscious is not immediate, it involves another, second-order, conscious state. The appearance of mental states to second-order consciousness does not reveal their true (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Some puzzles concerning relations between minds, brains, and bodies.Rick Grush - 2016
    In this article I explore a number of questions that have not been adequately investigated in philosophy of mind circles: are minds located in the same place as the brains (or other computing machinery) supporting them? Must they exist at the same location as the body? Must they exist at the same time? Could a single mind be implemented in multiple brains, or multiple minds in a single brain? Under what conditions might a single mind persist (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Theoretical Identities as Explanantia and Explananda.Kevin Morris - 2011 - American Philosophical Quarterly 48 (4):373-385.
    The mind-brain identity theory, the thesis that sensations are identical with properties or processes of the brain, was introduced into contemporary discussion by U.T. Place, Herbert Feigl, and J.J.C Smart in the 1950s. Despite its widespread rejection in the following decades, the identity theory has received several carefully articulated defenses in recent years. Aside from developing novel responses to well-known arguments against the identity theory, contemporary identity theorists have argued that the epistemological resources (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  10. Transfer of Personality to Synthetic Human ("mind uploading") and the Social Construction of Identity.John Danaher & Sim Bamford - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 24 (11-12):6-30.
    Humans have long wondered whether they can survive the death of their physical bodies. Some people now look to technology as a means by which this might occur, using terms such 'whole brain emulation', 'mind uploading', and 'substrate independent minds' to describe a set of hypothetical procedures for transferring or emulating the functioning of a human mind on a synthetic substrate. There has been much debate about the philosophical implications of such procedures for personal survival. Most participants (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  11. The problem of Identity in the Identity Theory of Mind.Shanjendu Nath - 2012 - Pratidhwani the Echo (I):115-121.
    The identity theory of mind is advocated and developed by different philosophers beginning with Place, Feigl and Smart. The main thesis of this theory is – states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain. Although this theory is better than dualism and Behaviourism, still it has its own problems. This theory leaves many things unexplained with regard to the relation between mind and body, which have been questioned by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Conscious Experience and Quantum Consciousness Theory: Theories, Causation, and Identity.Mika Suojanen - 2019 - E-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 26 (2):14-34.
    Generally speaking, the existence of experience is accepted, but more challenging has been to say what experience is and how it occurs. Moreover, philosophers and scholars have been talking about mind and mental activity in connection with experience as opposed to physical processes. Yet, the fact is that quantum physics has replaced classical Newtonian physics in natural sciences, but the scholars in humanities and social sciences still operate under the obsolete Newtonian model. There is already a little research in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Psychophysical identity and free energy.Alex Kiefer - 2020 - Journal of the Royal Society Interface 17.
    An approach to implementing variational Bayesian inference in biological systems is considered, under which the thermodynamic free energy of a system directly encodes its variational free energy. In the case of the brain, this assumption places constraints on the neuronal encoding of generative and recognition densities, in particular requiring a stochastic population code. The resulting relationship between thermodynamic and variational free energies is prefigured in mindbrain identity theses in philosophy and in the Gestalt hypothesis of psychophysical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. The microstructure view of the brain-consciousness relation.Michael Schmitz - 2008 - In Sven Walter & Helene Bohse (eds.), Selected Contributions to GAP. 6, Sixth International Conference of the Society for Analytical Philosophy.
    How can consciousness, how can the mind be causally efficacious in a world which seems—in some sense—to be thoroughly governed by physical causality? Mental causation has been a nagging problem in philosophy since the beginning of the modern age, when, inspired by the rise of physics, a metaphysical picture became dominant according to which the manifest macrophysical world of rocks, trees, colors, sounds etc. could be eliminated in favor of, or identified with, the microconstituents of these entities and their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Species-specific properties and more narrow reductive strategies.Ronald P. Endicott - 1993 - Erkenntnis 38 (3):303-21.
    In light of the phenomenon of multiple realizability, many philosophers wanted to preserve the mind-brain identity theory by resorting to a “narrow reductive strategy” whereby one (a) finds mental properties which are (b) sufficiently narrow to avoid the phenomenon of multiple realization, while being (c) explanatorily adequate to the demands of psychological theorizing. That is, one replaces the conception of a mental property as more general feature of cognitive systems with many less general properties, for example, replacing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  16.  77
    Neurocentrist identity theory and neuro-phenomenal typing: A commentary on Manzotti's, “The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit”.Marvan Tomas - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:1 - 4.
    Manzotti (2021) surveys recent variants of identity theories, defending his own preferred version, mind-object identity theory (MOI). According to this view, experiences are identical with the external objects, and the mind is thus literally “spread” in the world. Manzotti supports this view with considerations about indiscernibility of properties and other theoretical considerations. He claims that brain-mind accounts of identity commit the “fallacy of the center,” locating conscious mind inside the skull. Amongst other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Distributed selves: Personal identity and extended memory systems.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):3135–3151.
    This paper explores the implications of extended and distributed cognition theory for our notions of personal identity. On an extended and distributed approach to cognition, external information is under certain conditions constitutive of memory. On a narrative approach to personal identity, autobiographical memory is constitutive of our diachronic self. In this paper, I bring these two approaches together and argue that external information can be constitutive of one’s autobiographical memory and thus also of one’s diachronic self. To develop (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  18. Materialised Identities: Cultural Identity, Collective Memory, and Artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    This essay outlines one way to conceptualise the relation between cultural identity, collective memory, and artifacts. It starts by characterising the notion of cultural identity as our membership to cultural groups and briefly explores the relation between cultural and narrative identity (section 2). Next, it presents how human memory is conceptualised on an individual and collective level (section 3) and then distinguishes between small-scale and large-scale collective memory (section 4). Having described cultural identity and collective memory, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. Extended mind and cognitive enhancement: Moral aspects of cognitive artifacts.Richard Heersmink - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):17-32.
    This article connects philosophical debates about cognitive enhancement and situated cognition. It does so by focusing on moral aspects of enhancing our cognitive abilities with the aid of external artifacts. Such artifacts have important moral dimensions that are addressed neither by the cognitive enhancement debate nor situated cognition theory. In order to fill this gap in the literature, three moral aspects of cognitive artifacts are singled out: their consequences for brains, cognition, and culture; their moral status; and their relation to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  20. Materialism and ‘the soft substance of the brain’: Diderot and plasticity.Charles T. Wolfe - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (5):963-982.
    ABSTRACTMaterialism is the view that everything that is real is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot was one of the first to notice that any (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. Preserving narrative identity for dementia patients: Embodiment, active environments, and distributed memory.Richard Heersmink - 2022 - Neuroethics 15 (8):1-16.
    One goal of this paper is to argue that autobiographical memories are extended and distributed across embodied brains and environmental resources. This is important because such distributed memories play a constitutive role in our narrative identity. So, some of the building blocks of our narrative identity are not brain-bound but extended and distributed. Recognising the distributed nature of memory and narrative identity, invites us to find treatments and strategies focusing on the environment in which dementia patients (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity.Don Merrell - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):593 - 602.
    Thomas Polger has argued in favor of the mind-brain type-identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type-identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type-materialist must respond to Kripke's modal anti-materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke's argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non-identical when one knows the identity conditions for both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Body, mind and order: local memory and the control of mental representations in medieval and renaissance sciences of self.John Sutton - 2000 - In Guy Freeland & Antony Corones (eds.), 1543 And All That: word and image in the proto- scientific revolution. pp. 117-150.
    This paper is a tentative step towards a historical cognitive science, in the domain of memory and personal identity. I treat theoretical models of memory in history as specimens of the way cultural norms and artifacts can permeate ('proto')scientific views of inner processes. I apply this analysis to the topic of psychological control over one's own body, brain, and mind. Some metaphors and models for memory and mental representation signal the projection inside of external aids. Overtly at (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. What is a brain state?Richard Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (6):729-742.
    Philosophers have been talking about brain states for almost 50 years and as of yet no one has articulated a theoretical account of what one is. In fact this issue has received almost no attention and cognitive scientists still use meaningless phrases like 'C-fiber firing' and 'neuronal activity' when theorizing about the relation of the mind to the brain. To date when theorists do discuss brain states they usually do so in the context of making some (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  25. "Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation" by Jaegwon Kim.Tim Crane - 2000 - The Times Literary Supplement 1.
    As Jaegwon Kim points out in his excellent new book, “reductionism” has become something of a pejorative term in philosophy and related disciplines. But originally (eg, as expressed in Ernest Nagel’s 1961 The Structure of Science) reduction was supposed to be a form of explanation, and one may wonder whether it is reasonable to reject in principle the advances in knowledge which such explanations may offer. Nagel’s own view, illustrated famously by the reduction of thermodynamics to statistical mechanics, was that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Counting Minds and Mental States.Jonathan Vogel - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 393-400.
    Important conceptual and metaphysical issues arise when we try to understand the mental lives of “split-brain” subjects. How many distinct streams of consciousness do they have? According to Elizabeth Schechter’s partial unity model, the answer is one. A related question is whether co-consciouness, in general, is transitive. That is, if α and β are co-conscious experiences, and β and γ are co-conscious experiences, must α and γ be co-conscious? According to Schechter, the answer is no. The partial unity model (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Consciousness and the End of Materialism: Seeking identity and harmony in a dark era.Spyridon Kakos - 2018 - International Journal of Theology, Philosophy and Science 2 (2):17-33.
    “I am me”, but what does this mean? For centuries humans identified themselves as conscious beings with free will, beings that are important in the cosmos they live in. However, modern science has been trying to reduce us into unimportant pawns in a cold universe and diminish our sense of consciousness into a mere illusion generated by lifeless matter. Our identity in the cosmos is nothing more than a deception and all the scientific evidence seem to support this idea. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Narrative niche construction: Memory ecologies and distributed narrative identities.Richard Heersmink - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (5):1-23.
    Memories of our personal past are the building blocks of our narrative identity. So, when we depend on objects and other people to remember and construct our personal past, our narrative identity is distributed across our embodied brains and an ecology of environmental resources. This paper uses a cognitive niche construction approach to conceptualise how we engineer our memory ecology and construct our distributed narrative identities. It does so by identifying three types of niche construction processes that govern (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  29. The grateful Un-dead? Philosophical and Social Implications of Mind-Uploading.Ivan William Kelly - manuscript
    The popular belief that our mind either depends on or (in stronger terms) is identical with brain functions and processes, along with the belief that advances in technology in virtual reality and computability will continue, has contributed to the contention that one-day (perhaps this century) it may be possible to transfer one’s mind (or a simulated copy) into another body (physical or virtual). This is called mind-uploading or whole brain emulation. This paper serves as an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Libet and Freedom in a Mind-Haunted World.David Gordon Limbaugh & Robert Kelly - 2018 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (1):42-44.
    Saigle, Dubljevic, and Racine (2018) claim that Libet-style experiments are insufficient to challenge that agents have free will. They support this with evidence from experimen- tal psychology that the folk concept of freedom is consis- tent with monism, that our minds are identical to our brains. However, recent literature suggests that evidence from experimental psychology is less than determinate in this regard, and that folk intuitions are too unrefined as to provide guidance on metaphysical issues like monism. In light of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  95
    Critical Neuroscience and Philosophy. A Scientific Re-Examination of the Mind-Body Problem.David Låg Tomasi (ed.) - 2020 - London, England, UK: Palgrave MacMillan Springer.
    This book presents an analysis of the correlation between the mind and the body, a complex topic of study and discussion by scientists and philosophers. Drawing largely on neuroscience and philosophy, the author utilizes the scientific method and incorporates lessons learned from a vast array of sources. Based on the most recent cutting-edge scientific discoveries on the Mind-Body problem, Tomasi presents a full examination of multiple fields related to neuroscience. The volume offers a scientist-based and student-friendly journey into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Process Thought and the Spaciness of Mind.Rem B. Edwards - 1990 - Process Studies 19 (3):156-166.
    The process claim that matter is mentally infused and that mind or consciousness is spatially and temporally extended is explored. The views of Peirce, Whitehead, Hartshorne, Cobb, Ford and Griffin on the following questions are examined: If spacy, where are the occasions of human consciousness, how are they related to the brain, how large are they, and can they be externally perceived directly or with instruments? It is proposed that what is internally experienced as human consciousness is objectively (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. The problem of the many minds.Bradley Monton & Sanford Goldberg - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (4):463-470.
    It is argued that, given certain reasonable premises, an infinite number of qualitatively identical but numerically distinct minds exist per functioning brain. The three main premises are (1) mental properties supervene on brain properties; (2) the universe is composed of particles with nonzero extension; and (3) each particle is composed of continuum-many point-sized bits of particle-stuff, and these points of particle-stuff persist through time.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Construct Stabilization and the Unity of the Mind-Brain Sciences.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):662-673.
    This paper offers a critique of an account of explanatory integration that claims that explanations of cognitive capacities by functional analyses and mechanistic explanations can be seamlessly integrated. It is shown that achieving such explanatory integration requires that the terms designating cognitive capacities in the two forms of explanation are stable but that experimental practice in the mind-brain sciences currently is not directed at achieving such stability. A positive proposal for changing experimental practice so as to promote such (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  35. Does Belief in Dualism Protect against Maladaptive Psycho-Social Responses to Deep Brain Stimulation? An Empirical Exploration.Jason Shepard & Joshua May - 2014 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 5 (4):40–42.
    We provide empirical evidence that people who believe in dualism are more likely to be uncomfortable with Deep Brain Stimulation (DBS) and to view it as threatening to their identity, humanity, or self. It is (neurocentric) materialists—who think the mind just is the brain—that are less inclined to fear DBS or to see it as threatening. We suggest various possible reasons for this connection. The inspiration for this brief report is a target article that addresses this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  36. Sensory Systems as Cybernetic Systems that Require Awareness of Alternatives to Interact with the World: Analysis of the Brain-Receptor Loop in Norwich's Entropy Theory of Perception.Lance Nizami - 2009 - Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics. San Antonio, TX.
    Introduction & Objectives: Norwich’s Entropy Theory of Perception (1975 [1] -present) stands alone. It explains many firing-rate behaviors and psychophysical laws from bare theory. To do so, it demands a unique sort of interaction between receptor and brain, one that Norwich never substantiated. Can it now be confirmed, given the accumulation of empirical sensory neuroscience? Background: Norwich conjoined sensation and a mathematical model of communication, Shannon’s Information Theory, as follows: “In the entropic view of sensation, magnitude of sensation is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Mind-Brain Dichotomy, Mental Disorder, and Theory of Mind.Wesley Buckwalter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):511-526.
    The tendency to draw mind-brain dichotomies and evaluate mental disorders dualistically arises in both laypeople and mental health professionals, leads to biased judgments, and contributes to mental health stigmatization. This paper offers a theory identifying an underlying source of these evaluations in social practice. According to this theory, dualistic evaluations are rooted in two mechanisms by which we represent and evaluate the beliefs of others in folk psychology and theory of mind: the doxastic conception of mental disorders (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Mind-body identity and irreducible properties.Neil Lubow - 1978 - Philosophy Research Archives 4:196-246.
    The identity theory, advocated as a solution to the mind-body problem by materialists such as Feigl and Smart, has been criticized for implying the existence of irreducible properties. After summarizing the relevant theses of materialism, I consider several versions of the irreducible properties objection, and argue that they are all unsuccessful.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Mind-brain reduction: New light from philosophy of science.Patricia S. Churchland - 1982 - Neuroscience 7:1041-7.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40. Revisiting the mind-brain reductionisms: Contra dualism and eliminativism.Nythamar de Oliveira - 2016 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 61 (2):363-385.
    In this paper, I should like to argue against both eliminative materialism and substance/property dualism, aiming more specifically at the reductionist arguments offered by the Churchlands’ and Swinburne’s versions thereof, insofar as they undermine moral beliefs qua first-personish accounts dismissed as folk psychology by the former, as the latter regards them as supervening on natural events extendedly, that is, necessarily both ways of the biconditional linking mental and physical substances (for every A-substance x there is a B-substance y, such that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Are perceptual fields quantum fields?Brian Flanagan - 2003 - Neuroquantology 3:334-364.
    I argue that our sensory fields are photon fields. The philosophical foundation here is informed by mind/brain identity theory, such as we find in Russell, Feigl, Lockwood and Chalmers. In brief, given Dyson's observation that all material things consist of quantum fields, and given an identity of mind and brain, our sensory fields are then most plausibly photon fields.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Extended Mind and Identity.Robert A. Wilson & Bartlomiej A. Lenart - 2014 - In Jens Clausen & Neil Levy (eds.), Handbook of Neuroethics. Springer. pp. 423-439.
    Dominant views of personal identity in philosophy take some kind of psychological continuity or connectedness over time to be criterial for the identity of a person over time. Such views assign psychological states, particularly those necessary for narrative memory of some kind, special importance in thinking about the nature of persons. The extended mind thesis, which has generated much recent discussion in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, holds that a person’s psychological states can physically (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  43. Mind, Brain, and Chaos.Nicholas Georgalis - 2000 - In The Caldron of Consciousness: Motivation, affect and self-organization. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: pp. 179-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44. Critical Review of Minds, Brains and Science.William J. Rapaport - 1988 - Noûs 22 (4):585-609.
    Critical Review of Searle's Minds, Brains and Science.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  45. Personal Identity and Brain Identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2017 - In L. Syd M. Johnson & Karen Rommelfanger (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Neuroethics. Routledge. pp. 335-351.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Are Mental States Reducible to Brain States? Or The Quale is Dead: Long Live the Quale!Richard Loosemore - manuscript
    Each of the various philosophical positions on the mind-body problem has grown out of the perceived shortcomings of one or more of its predecessors. One fertile source of aggravation to many of the -isms has been the problem of qualia: the ostensibly irreducible, qualitative character of many of our mental states. An argument is presented here that solves the qualia problem within the context of a otherwise functionalist theory of mind. The proposed solution is unusual in that it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Contribution à la Théorie de la Conscience, Conçue comme Activite du Cerveau.Gilberto Gomes - 1998 - Dissertation, Université Paris 7
    This thesis explores the possibility of theoretically conceiving consciousness as an activity of the brain. Objections, based on the concept of qualia, to the identification of consciousness with a brain activity are refuted. Phenomenal consciousness is identified with access-consciousness. Consciousness is conceived as a higher order processing of informational states of the brain. The state of consciousness represents an integration of prior nonconscious states. Libet’s research on the timing of conscious experience is reviewed and analyzed. His hypothesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburg
    It is a common idea, and an element in many legal systems, that people can deserve punishment when they commit criminal (or immoral) actions. A standard philosophical objection to this retributivist idea about punishment is that if human choices and actions are determined by previous events and the laws of nature, then we are not free in the sense required to be morally responsible for our actions, and therefore cannot deserve blame or punishment. It has recently been suggested that this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. Multiple Realizability and Mind-Body Identity.Simone Gozzano - 2010 - In Mauricio Suarez, Mauro Dorato & Miklos Redei (eds.), Epsa. Epistemology and Methodology of Science. Springer. pp. 119-127.
    In this paper it is argued that the multiple realizability argument and Kripke's argument are based on schemas of identifications rather than identification. In fact, "heat = molecular motion" includes a term "molecular motion" that does not capture a natural kind, nor has a unique referent. If properly framed, this schema suits also for the type identity theory of mind. Some consequences of this point are evaluated.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  50. A Unified Theory of Mind-Brain Relationship: Is It Possible?Belbase Shashidhar - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):443.
    The mind-body relationship has vexed philosophers of mind for quite a long time. Different theories of mind have offered different points of view about the interaction between the two, but none of them seem free of ambiguities and questions. This paper attempts to use a mathematical model for mind-body relationship. The model may generate some questions to think about this relationship from the viewpoint of operator theory.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 1000