Schopenhauer repeatedly claims that all pleasure is negative, and this view seems to play key roles throughout his work. Nonetheless, many scholars have argued that Schopenhauer actually acknowledges certain positive pleasures. Two major arguments have been offered for this reading, one focused on the link between Schopenhauer's view of pleasure and Plato's, and one focused on Schopenhauer's distinction between two components of aesthetic pleasure. I argue that neither way of motivating the positive pleasure reading succeeds. (...) Both overlook a key aspect of Schopenhauer's account: namely, his suggestion that there are two distinct kinds of negative pleasure, pleasures of satisfaction and pleasures of distraction. When Schopenhauer claims that all pleasure is negative, he means it. (shrink)

Compare your pain when immersing your hand in freezing water and your pleasure when you taste your favourite wine. The relationship seems obvious. Your pain experience is unpleasant, aversive, negative, and bad. Your experience of the wine is pleasant, attractive, positive, and good. Pain and pleasure are straightforwardly opposites. Or that, at any rate, can seem beyond doubt, and to leave little more to be said. But, in fact, it is not beyond doubt. And, true or false, (...) it leaves a good deal more to be said: about the nature of sensory affect; its relations to perception, motivation, and rationality; its value; and the mechanisms underlying it. Much is said about these matters in the contributions that follow. Here, in this introductory essay, we map the dialectical landscape and locate our contributors’ papers within it. (shrink)

The goal of this essay is a twofold one. My first task is mainly negative: I want to show that the heated debate over whether pleasure is a sensation misallocates the central task in understanding pleasure and has been based on an unexamined conception of sensation, despite the long philosophical tradition and topical opinions that hold the opposite . My second task is to bring out attention to a relatively uncharted territory in our investigation of pleasure. (...) I shall argue, Gilbert Ryle's Aristotelian insight on the pleasure in intelligent activities, when properly understood, should have led us, and Ryle himself, to investigate pleasure in connection with intentional action and practical rationality. (shrink)

Bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions share the striking property of being valenced, i.e. they are positive or negative. What is valence? How do bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions relate to one another? This chapter assesses the prospects of two popular theses regarding the relation between bodily (dis)pleasures and emotions in light of what we can reasonably think about valence. According to the first thesis, the valence of bodily (dis)pleasures is explanatory prior vis-à-vis the valence of emotions. According to the second, emotions (...) contain bodily (dis)pleasures. I argue that bodily (dis)pleasures are intentional states whose valence is to be understood in terms of evaluative experience, and bring to light the similarities and dissimilarities between their intentional structure and that of emotions. On this backdrop, I offer reasons to conclude that we should adopt neither of the two theses. (shrink)

(DRAFT: I'll update when the book is published.) This started as a book about desire. I was hoping to complement what I had said about belief in my (2022). To believe something, I argued, is to be positioned to do, think and feel things in light of a possibility whose obtaining would make one right. I argued that believing is not representational, that belief states are not causes or causal powers, and that the objects of belief are ways the world (...) might be and not representations of things. Believing is not so much a response to the world as a way of being positioned in it, a way of having an environment, as Frege put it. (Frege 1956, 306) I was trying to put the believer as a rational agent positioned in a world at the heart of my account. I hoped an account of desire could round out this picture of a rational agent’s psychology. But as I thought about desire, I came to see that two ideas about the nature of goodness, one negative and one positive, were really at the heart of my thinking. The negative idea is that there is no such thing as what philosophers have variously called intrinsic goodness or simple goodness or absolute value. I guess I am a nihilist about that. The positive idea is that our world is rich in what I will call sortal quality, what others have called goodness-of-a-kind or attributive goodness. I came to think that sortal quality is at the heart not just of desire but also of pleasure and moral worth. A picture of moral psychology had come into view. And so I re-organised the book. I still say a lot about the nature of desire, or ‘wanting’ as I prefer to call it, and I think my view does complement my externalist view of belief. Wanting, I will argue, is a matter of falling short relative to a standard one falls under, failing to be as good as one could be. If believing is about having an environment to respond to, then desire is about fitting into it well. And so my book offers a comprehensive picture of a moral agent in a world where nothing is simply or absolutely good but where many kinds of things, including people, can be very good and even splendid. (shrink)

Aristotle of Stagira (384–322 BCE) originates the study of zoology and political science. But whereas his zoology identifies a continuum between human and non-human animals, in his political and ethical works he appears to view human and non-human animals as different in kind in order to illustrate the superiority of the former and justify the instrumental use of the latter. For instance, Aristotle’s account of the virtue of moderation (namely that which concerns how humans experience pleasure) depicts non-human animals (...) as predators who only view other animals as a meal and immoderate human animals as beast-like and disgraceful because they act, “not insofar as they are human beings but insofar as they are animals” (EN 3.10.1118b2–3). Nonetheless, Aristotle wrote another ethical treatise, the Eudemian Ethics, that offers discussions that parallel those in the Nicomachean Ethics but that eschew negative characterizations of non-human animals—as if Aristotle had excised all such negative depictions of non-human animals from the Eudemian text on rhetorical grounds. I argue that the reason that Aristotle treats pleasure so differently is the result of his contrast between ethics as a function of political science (as found in the Nicomachean Ethics) and a “non-political” ethical reflection (as found in the Eudemian Ethics) that is more in line with Aristotle the zoologist. (shrink)

My aim is to discuss the impact of higher-order evidence on aesthetic appreciation. I suggest that this impact is different with respect to aesthetic beliefs and to aesthetic affective attitudes (such as enjoyment). More specifically, I defend the view that higher-order evidence questioning the reliability of one’s aesthetic beliefs can make it reasonable for one to revise those beliefs. Conversely, in line with a plausible account of emotions, aesthetic affective attitudes are not directly sensitive to this type of higher-order evidence; (...) they are sensitive only to those features of objects that make such attitudes (un)fitting. Thus, I argue, there are cases of non-defective recalcitrant aesthetic attitudes where the subject has both a non-defective, fitting aesthetic affective attitude and a reasonable belief questioning the fittingness of this attitude. I further discuss whether, in this type of case, the subject has decisive reasons to try to change her recalcitrant attitudes—say by trying to modify her aesthetic affective dispositions. My answer is negative. Even granting that subjects always have aesthetic reasons to try to avoid aesthetically unfitting attitudes, these can be outweighed by further reasons not to do so—perhaps including aesthetic reasons related to the construction of valuable aesthetic identities or to the value of aesthetic engagement. (shrink)

Future-biased individuals systematically prefer pleasures to be in the future and pains to be in the past. Empirical research shows that negative future-bias is robust: people prefer more past pain to less future pain. Is positive future-bias robust or fragile? Do people only prefer pleasures to be located in the future, compared to the past, when those pleasures are of equal value, or do they continue to prefer that pleasures be located in the future even when past pleasures outweigh (...) future ones? Some arguments against the rationality of future-bias require positive future-bias to be robust, while others require it to be fragile. We empirically investigate and show that positive future-bias is robust. (shrink)

The paper explores Burke’s twofold solution to the paradox of negative emotions. His Philosophical Enquiry (1757/59) employs two models that stand on different anthropological principles: the Exercise Argument borrowed from authors like the Abbé Du Bos, guided by the principle of self-preservation, and the Sympathy Argument, propageted by notable men of lettres such as Lord Kames, ruled by the principle of sociability. Burke interlocks these two arguments through a teleologically-ordered physiology, in which the natural laws of the human body (...) and mind, secretly working in the depth of the nerve fibres, ensure both self-preservation and sociability. Utilizing both efficient and final causes throughout his Enquiry, Burke argues that the experiences of pain and terror – under certain conditions – are made agreeable (delight) by providence,so that the physiological mechanisms underlying these experiences could ensure the health and strenuousness of the nerve fibres amidst the corrupting pleasures of commercial society (Exercise Argument). Furthermore, due to the ambiguous character of this delight annexed to such experiences, they also function as exercises for our social passions (Sympathy Argument). Te 'egoistic' anthropological drive to remove the visceral uneasiness that dominates these experiences facilitates moral action when it is needed the most: when others in pain need our help. In accordance with the anthropocentric providentialism of the moderate Enlightenment, it is the design of the human frame that ensures the activities essential to our health (self-preservation) and moral conduct (sociability), a design that not only guarantees that pleasure, if exclusive and excessive, is 'inconvenient', and pain, if mitigated and harmless, is aesthetically agreeable, but also that our 'egoistic' drive to self-preservation ultimately improves sociability. (shrink)

Many commentators have remarked upon the striking points of correspondence that can be found in the works of Freud and Nietzsche. However, this essay argues that on the subject of desire their work presents us with a radical choice: Freud or Nietzsche. I first argue that Freud’s theory of desire is grounded in the principle of inertia, a principle that is incompatible with his later theory of Eros and the life drive. Furthermore, the principle of inertia is not essentially distinct (...) from his later theory of the death drive. Consequently, Freud’s theory of desire can only be interpreted consistently as a monism of the death drive. I then analyze Nietzsche’s attempt to ground his theory of desire in the concept of the will to power. I argue that Nietzsche’s view of desire is fundamentally opposed to the key elements of Freud’s theory of desire: the principle of constancy, the Freudian definition of the drive, and the pleasure principle. Next, I explicate the stakes of this opposition by analyzing the social consequences of each view for morality and justice. I argue that the Freudian subject seeks to dominate the social other, and that there is an insurmountable conflict between the satisfaction of desire and the demands of social life. Consequently, Freud’s view allows only for a negative conception of the social good in which morality is defined as the intrinsically impossible task of eliminating evil, and justice can be achieved only through the equal distribution of instinctual frustration. Finally, I argue that in Nietzsche’s theory of desire there is no essential conflict between individual desire and social life. The Nietzschean subject desires to manifest power in the form of activity that is independent of external agents, not to dominate the other. Consequently, Nietzsche’s view allows for the possibility of a positively defined concept of the social good in which morality is the affirmation and enhancement of every subject’s happiness, and justice can be achieved through the promotion and protection of an equality of power among subjects. (shrink)

The sublime (das Erhabene) in Kant is a feeling that elevates (erhebt)! the soul and results in an aesthetic judgment. While aesthetic judgments of beauty involve a feeling of pure pleasure (Lust), aesthetic judgments of the sublime rest on a feeling of pleasure and displeasure (Lust und Unlust) at the same moment. Kant describes the sublime at one point rather paradoxically as involving a" negative pleasure"(Critique 0/Judgment, Ak. V: 245). 2 The feeling of the sublime is (...) brought about by experiences where one has a sense of the infinity (Unendlichkeit) of nature. This sense of infinity can be brought about by the sheer size (Grofle) of an object. Kant would call this a feeling of the mathematically sublime. A mountain so large that one cannot take it in at a single glance causes a feeling of the mathematically sublime. One gets a different sense of the infinity of 'Kant's deliberate connection of the noun for the sublime. (shrink)

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment, Immanuel Kant characterizes the sublime as a negative pleasure derived from the encounter with something absolutely great. Some scholars have claimed that Kant’s notion of the sublime only applies to objects in nature (Abaci 2008, 239). Others contend that the object that provokes the sublime experience is not confined to objects of nature since the sublime is an experience in the mind (Clewis 2010, 169). This paper argues that Kant’s Critique (...) and the Grateful Dead’s song “The Other One” provide a framework for understanding the artistic mathematical sublime in music, wherein the pleasure and displeasure experienced when engaging with music can be identified as instances of the sublime. Beginning with an elucidation of Kant’s concepts of judgments of taste and the sublime, the paper explores their similarities and differences. Notably, his theory of the sublime is less developed than his theory of the beautiful. This provides an opportunity to interrogate arguments surrounding which objects can elicit the sublime and how artworks represent or present it to their viewers. After demonstrating a textual disparity of the role of music in Kant’s Critique, I show how music without words, also known as jams, can fit the definition of free beauty and can be classified as art. The discussion further delineates the process of experiencing the mathematical sublime and describes indicators in music theory for discerning the sublime in musical compositions. I use the Grateful Dead’s performance of “The Other One” on April 7, 1972, to illustrate how particular works of art manifest the mathematical sublime. The paper concludes by reflecting on how the qualitative description of the piece highlights why “The Other One” should be seen as both artistic (because, while the piece is coherent, there is no discernible concept that seems to unify it) and sublime (because it is mind-blowingly complex). How we engage with music like the Grateful Dead can allow us to discuss why particular works of art are meaningful to us. (shrink)

Aristotle lists six different hexeis (stable states of the soul) in Nicomachean Ethics Book VII. The three to be avoided are akrasia (lack of self-control), vice, and beastliness. Their mirrors, the three to be praised, are enkrateia (self-control), virtue, and superhuman virtue. While the beastial and superhumanly virtuous fall out of discussion, the other four remain a focus for most of Book VII. Aristotle thinks that he has described four reliable ways in which people act always or hōs epi to (...) polu (for the most part). However, I argue that he has only given us enough information to delineate three hexeis. On my interpretation, the akratēs (person lacking self-control) and the enkratēs (self-controlled person) are the same kind of person, they differ only in degree. They exist on a spectrum, while the other two hexeis are distinct kinds of people. While this is hardly the received view, I am convinced that it is consistent with the text. By his own lights, Aristotle does not have a description of the akratēs as differing from the enkratēs making a mistake. Therefore, I want to group them together, rather than draw a bright line between them. First, the mistake of the akratēs is very narrow. She does not know, or knows only in the way the drunk person knows, the conclusion to the good practical syllogism. Second, akrasia is only about an excess of the bodily pleasures associated with food and sex. Aristotle lists eleven other areas where her behavior is undetermined. Third, the akratēs and enkratēs lack the psychological unity that I argue the virtuous and vicious each possess. Therefore, I conclude that the akratēs and enkratēs are the same kind of person. The upshot of my view is that, because it focuses on the positives rather than the negatives, it exhorts us to be better people. (shrink)

Some physicalists (Balog 2012, Howell 2013), and most dualists, endorse the acquaintance response to the Knowledge Argument. This is the claim that Mary gains substantial new knowledge, upon leaving the room, because phenomenal knowledge requires direct acquaintance with phenomenal properties. The acquaintance response is an especially promising way to make sense of the Mary case. I argue that it casts doubt on two claims often made on behalf of physicalism, regarding parsimony and mental causation. I show that those who endorse (...) the acquaintance response face special obstacles to invoking parsimony in an argument for physicalism. And I show how acknowledging the phenomenon of acquaintance can ease the dualist’s problems with mental causation, by dispelling three key objections to epiphenomenalism. The most challenging of these objections is that epiphenomenalism blocks an evolutionary explanation of the so-called “hedonic/utility match”. I propose that pleasures and pains, while themselves epiphenomenal, can nonetheless explain positive and negative associations with stimuli, associations that can contribute to fitness. (shrink)

The essay gives a brief account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong's reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and subsequently receives an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, fantasy representation, relation and complexion, I show how both the theory of production of representations and that of higher-order objects develop under the impulse of Ehrenfels's concept of Gestalt quality; both these theories (...) may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the objective and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extraobjective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject's mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong as regards both the role of objectives, which he views as mere intermediaries of beauty, and the conception of imaginary and aesthetic feelings. In the last part, I present the reactions to Witasek's aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself, and I sketch Ehrenfels's and Veber's aesthetic views. (shrink)

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic (...) future-bias. This paper experimentally tests these descriptive hypotheses. While as predicted we found first-person hedonic future-bias, we did not find that participants were time-neutral in all other conditions. Hence, the presumed asymmetry of hedonic/non-hedonic and first/third-person preferences cannot be used to argue for the irrationality of future-bias, since no such asymmetries exist. Instead, we develop a more fine-grained approach, according to which three factors—positive/negative valence, first/third-person, and hedonic/non-hedonic—each independently influence, but do not determine, whether an event is treated in a future-biased or time-neutral way. We discuss the upshots of these results for the debate over the rationality of future-bias. (shrink)

‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their (...) sentience. In a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research. (shrink)

This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily (...) location, and that their intentional object vanishes, they truly fuse with each other, giving rise to sentimental mixtures in which the initial pleasures and unpleasures are no longer discernible. (shrink)

Effective stakeholder engagement and inclusive governance are essential for effective and equitable ocean management. However, few cross-national studies have been conducted to examine how stakeholders’ economic and cultural benefit perceptions influence their support level for policies focused on ocean preservation. The current study aims to fill this gap by employing the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF) analytics on a dataset of 709 stakeholders from 42 countries, a part of the MaCoBioS project funded by the European Commission H2020. We found that economic (...) and cultural benefit perceptions are generally negatively associated with the policy support level. Regarding economic aspects, stakeholders considering transportation and shipping, renewable energy generation, and oil and gas provision as the most crucial benefits their countries’ oceans provide tend to obtain less support for policies focusing on ocean preservation. Meanwhile, for cultural aspects, perceiving recreation and tourism, aesthetic pleasure, mental health and well-being support, and sense of identity provision as the most important benefits provided by the country’s ocean are negatively associated with the policy support level. The perceived economic, cultural, and environmental tradeoffs when supporting policies focused on ocean preservation were discussed. Recommendations for improving the effective management of multi-use marine space are also provided to reduce the perceived competing interests among stakeholders. (shrink)

Throughout his lectures and published writings on anthropology, Kant describes a form of unintentional, unstructured, obscure, and pleasurable imaginative mental activity, which he calls fantasy (Phantasie), where we ‘take pleasure in letting our mind wander about in obscurity.’ In the context of his pragmatic anthropology, Kant was concerned not only to describe this form of mental activity as a fact of human psychology, but more importantly, to criticize and discourage it. But must we share Kant’s negative evaluation? Could (...) fantasy play a positive role in some kinds of experience? In this paper I first reconstruct Kant’s conception of fantasy, and then consider what role fantasy might play in aesthetic experience. Precisely because of his anxieties about fantasy, Kant is careful to distinguish between the lawless freedom of the imagination in fantasy and the ‘free lawfulness’ of the imagination in aesthetic judgment. Departing from Kant, and with help from Susan Sontag, I argue that certain aesthetic objects, especially certain works of modernist art, positively invite fantasy, making fantasy part of proper aesthetic appreciation. I conclude by suggesting that while fantasy can indeed play a positive role in aesthetic appreciation, there is still reason to regard fantasy as ‘normatively ambiguous.’. (shrink)

We sometimes experience pleasures and displeasures simultaneously: whenever we eat sfogliatelle while having a headache, whenever we feel pain fading away, whenever we feel guilty pleasure while enjoying listening to Barbara Streisand, whenever we are savouring a particularly hot curry, whenever we enjoy physical endurance in sport, whenever we are touched upon receiving a hideous gift, whenever we are proud of withstanding acute pain, etc. These are examples of what we call " mixed feelings ". Mixed feelings are cases (...) in which one and the same person experiences pleasure and displeasure at the same time. Mixed feelings raise two questions: (1) If pleasure and displeasure are contraries, how can mixed feelings be possible? (2) Does the excess of pleasure (or displeasure) that we feel when experiencing mixed feelings itself constitute a new feeling, that results from the co-occurrence of the first two? I will argue (1) that mixed feelings are possible and that their existence does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and displeasure, and (2) that there are no resultant feelings: having a lot of pleasure and a little displeasure does not result in having additional mild pleasure. Finally, I will suggest (3) that although both false, scepticism towards the existence of mixed feelings, as well as the idea according to which resultant feelings exist, are inspired from a single and correct idea: that pleasure and displeasure do fuse in some cases. (shrink)

Using friendship studies from the perspectives of philosophy, psychology, history, classics, political science, sociology, ethology, neuroscience, semiotics and other disciplines, the volume uses the encyclopedic format to construct both a positive ontology (based on empirical evidence) of friendship, as well as discussing friendship's "negative ontology" (i.e., its uncertainties, ambivalences, unknowns, and ineffable aspects), to outline a multidisciplinary comparative approach to different philosophical models of friendship (e.g., ancient Greek, Indian, Roman, modern), and to explore the inner connection between friendship and (...) philosophy (as a way of life and a friendship with wisdom). Among the emergent categories are 1. Issues (e.g., money, mutuality, satisfaction). 2. Models (e.g., the ancient Greek, the Indian, the modern model of friendship). 3. Kinds or types of friendship (e.g., bad friends, noblest friendship, typologies). 4. Incoherence of theoretical typologies (e.g., complexity, ineffability, thisness). 5. Technical terms (e.g., bestowal, friend-shield effect, homophily). 6. Theories, accounts (e.g. Silver’s thesis, Dunbar’s number, mirror account of friendship). 7. Cases of friendships (e.g., Achilles and Patroclus, Murdoch’s friends, famous friends). 8. Philosophers on friendship (e.g., Aristotle, Kant, Weil). 9. Motifs and themes (e.g., gift, pleasure, social media). 10. Concepts (e.g., eros, presentism, tacit knowledge). 11. Proverbs (e.g., Faroese, Jamaican, Swahili proverbs). 12. Friendship studies (e.g., anthropology, history, semiotics of friendship). (shrink)

Statements such as “X is beautiful but I don’t like how it looks” or “I like how X looks but it is not beautiful” sound contradictory. How contradictory they sound might however depend on the object X and on the aesthetic adjective being used (“beautiful”, “elegant”, “dynamic”, etc.). In our study, the first sentence was estimated to be more contradictory than the latter: If we describe something as beautiful, we often intend to evaluate its appearance, whereas it is less counterintuitive (...) to appreciate an appearance without finding it beautiful. Furthermore, statements including “beautiful” appeared more contradictory than those including “elegant” and “dynamic”, pointing to its greater evaluative component. When related to artworks, sentences could appear less contradictory due to readers’ consideration of the divergence between conventional beauty and art-related sensory pleasures that can even include negative valence. Such ambivalence might be more frequent in art-objects than in other artefacts. Indeed, in our study, sentences referring to artworks were estimated to be less contradictory compared to sentences referring to other artefacts. Meanwhile, an additional small group of graphic design students showed a less clear difference between art-related and non-art-related sentences. We discuss the potential influence of art experience and interest as well as theoretical and methodological challenges like the conceptualization of beauty. (shrink)

There is an ethics of blaming the person who deserves blame. The Christian scriptures imply the following no-vengeance condition: a person should not vengefully overtly blame a wrongdoer even if she gives the wrongdoer the exact negative treatment that he deserves. I explicate and defend this novel condition and argue that it demands a revolution in our blaming practices. First, I explain the no-vengeance condition. Second, I argue that the no-vengeance condition is often violated. The most common species of (...) blame involves anger; anger conceptually includes a desire for vengeance; and there are many pleasures in payback. Third, I clarify that it is possible to blame non-vengefully in anger and highlight three good uses for anger in non-vengeful blame. Fourth, I offer two reasons that justify the divine command prohibiting vengeance, and I note that the Christian God is merely sufficient to make non-vengeance morally obligatory. Fifth, I defend the no-vengeance condition against four biblical objections. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the ‘real hard problem’ of phenomenal perception (Chalmers), i.e. of the qualitative kind of perception presenting the subject with forms, colors, smell, pleasurable or negative feelings etc.; the problem of Human consciousness, however, will explicitly not be treated. The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine) complained by the philosophy of mind, that is to say the failure of all attempts to supply a neuronal explanation of experiences, is emergence-theoretically treated: Systems own properties and laws different from (...) their components; so the emergence concept shows promise also for the explanatory potential with respect to neuronal systems. Here the phenomenal character of perception is explained from the systemic co-action of perception and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. Qualitative feelings, as is further shown, are not to be understood as needless ‘epiphenomena’, but as a necessary completion of per-ception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

Some sensory experiences are pleasant, some unpleasant. This is a truism. But understanding what makes these experiences pleasant and unpleasant is not an easy job. Various difficulties and puzzles arise as soon as we start theorizing. There are various philosophical theories on offer that seem to give different accounts for the positive or negative affective valences of sensory experiences. In this paper, we will look at the current state of art in the philosophy of mind, present the main contenders, (...) critically compare and contrast them. In particular, we want to examine how they handle the reason-giving power of affective states. We will look into two representationalist proposals (Evaluativism and Imperativism) and a functionalist proposal, and argue that, contrary to their own advertisements, the representationalist proposals don’t have good accounts of why and how sensory affect can motivate, rationalize, and justify subsequent behavior and intentional mental activity. We will show that our own functionalist proposal does a much better job in this regard, and that when the representationalist proposals are modified to do a better job, they fare better not because of their representationalist credentials but due to their functionalist ones. (shrink)

This paper examines the concept of liberty at the heart of Sarah Chapone’s 1735 work, The Hardships of the English Laws in Relation to Wives. In this work, Chapone (1699-1764) advocates an ideal of freedom from domination that closely resembles the republican ideal in seventeenth and eighteenth- century England. This is the idea that an agent is free provided that no-one else has the power to dispose of that agent’s property—her “life, liberty, and limb” and her material possessions—according to his (...) arbitrary will and pleasure, without being accountable to the law. This paper shows how Chapone uses this ideal to ground her arguments against those laws that put married women in a worse condition than slavery, and to call for the establishment of reasonable and just safeguards for a woman’s personal property and property in her children. More than this, it is argued, in this text Chapone articulates a feminist ideal that is both negative freedom from domination and positive freedom to be one’s own master or arbiter. Her work thus occupies a unique—and hitherto unrecognized—place in the history of feminist philosophy. (shrink)

-/- The Best Natural Stimuli for Beneficial Brain Chemistry -/- The human brain relies on a delicate balance of neurotransmitters to regulate mood, motivation, and overall well-being. While artificial stimulants such as caffeine, nicotine, and drugs can temporarily boost brain chemicals like dopamine and serotonin, they often lead to long-term negative effects, including addiction and imbalances. Fortunately, there are numerous natural ways to stimulate the brain’s reward system without harmful consequences. By engaging in physical activity, social interaction, mental engagement, (...) deep faith, and spiritual practices, individuals can optimize their brain chemistry for long-term health and happiness. -/- Exercise: A Natural Mood Booster -/- One of the most effective ways to enhance brain function is through regular physical activity. Exercise has been shown to increase dopamine, which plays a key role in motivation and pleasure, while also releasing endorphins, the body’s natural painkillers. Activities such as running, swimming, dancing, and strength training improve both physical and mental well-being by reducing stress and enhancing cognitive function. Engaging in exercise for at least 30–60 minutes daily provides lasting benefits, including improved focus, resilience to stress, and an overall sense of happiness. -/- Sunlight and Nature: Elevating Mood and Energy -/- Sunlight exposure is another crucial factor in maintaining healthy brain chemistry. Natural sunlight stimulates serotonin production, which is essential for mood regulation and sleep quality. Additionally, spending time in nature, whether through walking, hiking, or gardening, can enhance dopamine release and reduce stress. Just 15–30 minutes of daily sunlight exposure, preferably in the morning, helps regulate the body’s internal clock and promotes a sense of well-being. -/- The Role of Nutrition In Brain Health -/- The brain relies on proper nutrition to produce essential neurotransmitters. A balanced diet rich in protein, healthy fats, and probiotics supports optimal brain function. Foods high in tyrosine, such as eggs, fish, and nuts, help increase dopamine levels. Meanwhile, fermented foods like yogurt and kimchi boost serotonin production through the gut-brain connection. Dark chocolate, especially varieties with 85% cocoa or higher, can also naturally enhance dopamine without the negative effects of processed sugar. By consuming nutrient-dense foods, individuals can maintain stable energy levels and mental clarity. -/- The Power of Deep Faith, Prayer, and Spiritual Practices -/- In addition to physical and social activities, deep faith in God, prayer, and genuine spirituality play a significant role in maintaining a balanced and healthy brain. Faith provides a sense of purpose, hope, and emotional stability, which has been linked to increased serotonin and dopamine levels. Prayer and meditation on spiritual beliefs reduce anxiety, strengthen resilience, and promote inner peace. Studies show that individuals who engage in regular prayer or spiritual reflection experience lower stress levels, enhanced emotional regulation, and a greater sense of gratitude. -/- Attending Mass, Prayers in Mosques or Temples, and Spiritual Gatherings -/- Participating in religious ceremonies, such as attending Mass in a church, praying in a mosque, or meditating in a temple, further enhances mental well-being. Being in a place of worship fosters a sense of belonging, increases oxytocin levels, and reinforces social and spiritual bonds. Engaging in community prayers or religious gatherings provides emotional support, peace of mind, and spiritual fulfillment. -/- Additionally, other spiritual practices, such as reading sacred texts, chanting, lighting candles, or practicing mindfulness rituals, can have profound effects on brain chemistry. These practices help align the mind with positive thoughts, reducing stress and increasing happiness. Spiritual music, hymns, or reciting mantras can also boost dopamine and serotonin, creating a calming and uplifting effect. -/- A person who practices faith, gratitude, and meditation on divine wisdom cultivates a more balanced mind, making them less susceptible to depression and anxiety. Just as physical exercise strengthens the body, spiritual devotion strengthens the mind and soul, leading to a more fulfilling and meaningful life. -/- The Power of Social Connection and Kindness -/- Humans are inherently social beings, and positive interactions play a crucial role in brain chemistry. Spending time with loved ones, engaging in deep conversations, and acts of kindness all trigger the release of oxytocin, the “bonding hormone.” Simple actions such as giving compliments, hugging, or helping others contribute to increased dopamine and serotonin levels. Developing strong social relationships and practicing kindness regularly can create a lasting sense of fulfillment and emotional balance. -/- Meditation and Mindfulness: Rewiring the Brain for Positivity -/- Another powerful way to naturally stimulate beneficial brain chemicals is through meditation and mindfulness practices. Studies have shown that regular meditation enhances dopamine and serotonin levels, reducing stress and increasing focus. Simple techniques such as deep breathing, gratitude journaling, and positive affirmations help rewire the brain to adopt a more positive outlook on life. Practicing just 10–20 minutes of meditation daily can lead to long-term improvements in emotional stability and cognitive performance. -/- Music and Creativity: Fueling the Brain’s Reward System -/- Music has a profound effect on brain chemistry. Listening to uplifting music or playing an instrument increases dopamine production, creating a sense of pleasure and motivation. Similarly, engaging in creative activities such as painting, writing, or crafting provides a natural dopamine boost, enhancing problem-solving skills and reducing anxiety. Incorporating creative pursuits into daily life fosters mental agility and a deeper sense of satisfaction. -/- The Importance of Sleep and Relaxation -/- Sleep plays a vital role in restoring brain function and maintaining healthy neurotransmitter levels. During deep sleep, the brain replenishes dopamine and serotonin, regulating emotions and cognitive abilities. Poor sleep patterns, especially those disrupted by screen exposure before bedtime, can negatively impact mood and concentration. A consistent sleep schedule of 7–9 hours per night, combined with relaxing bedtime rituals, ensures optimal brain health and emotional resilience. -/- Laughter and Play: A Natural Antidepressant -/- Laughter is often called “the best medicine” for a reason—it triggers the release of dopamine, endorphins, and oxytocin, creating a powerful sense of happiness and connection. Watching comedies, sharing jokes with friends, or engaging in playful activities such as games and sports can significantly boost mental well-being. Cultivating a sense of humor and embracing playfulness in daily life is a simple yet effective way to maintain emotional balance. -/- Conclusion -/- By incorporating exercise, sunlight, proper nutrition, deep faith in God, prayers, attending religious gatherings, social interaction, mindfulness, music, sleep, and laughter into daily routines, individuals can optimize their brain chemistry without the risks associated with artificial stimulants. These natural dopamine, serotonin, oxytocin, and endorphin boosters not only improve mental health but also contribute to long-term cognitive function and life satisfaction. -/- In a world increasingly dominated by quick fixes and instant gratification, returning to natural, sustainable habits is the key to a healthier and happier mind. Faith in God, prayer, and attending spiritual gatherings provide deeper emotional resilience, purpose, and inner peace, making them essential elements of a well-balanced life. By embracing both the physical and spiritual aspects of well-being, individuals can experience true harmony of the mind, body, and soul. -/- . (shrink)

Attaining Nirvana Using the Universal Formula: Eliminating Imbalances in the Body, Emotions, Mind, and Spirituality -/- By Angelito Malicse -/- Introduction -/- Nirvana, the state of ultimate peace and liberation, can only be attained by eliminating all imbalances in the body, emotions, mind, and spirituality. My universal formula, which follows the law of balance in nature, the law of karma as a systemic principle, and feedback mechanisms, provides an exact path to achieving this state. -/- Imbalances in human life arise (...) due to physical illnesses, negative emotions, irrational thinking, and spiritual confusion. These imbalances cause suffering, preventing people from achieving inner peace. By applying my universal formula, one can correct these defects and align with the natural laws that govern life, leading to a harmonious existence and the attainment of Nirvana. -/- This essay will provide real-world examples of how imbalances arise in each aspect of human existence and how applying my universal formula eliminates them. It will also highlight the importance of medicine, positive emotions, deep faith in God or Divine Essence, and how they contribute to balance and enlightenment. -/- 1. The Role of the Body in Creating Imbalance and the Solution -/- Example of Physical Imbalance: Chronic Illness Due to an Unhealthy Lifestyle -/- Scenario: A person consumes excessive processed foods, avoids exercise, and does not get enough sleep. Over time, they develop obesity, diabetes, and heart disease. These physical imbalances create suffering by limiting mobility, causing chronic pain, and shortening lifespan. -/- Solution Using the Universal Formula: -/- Follow the Universal Law of Balance in Nature: The body requires proper nutrition, movement, and rest to function optimally. A balanced diet, regular exercise, and sufficient sleep restore equilibrium. -/- Apply the Law of Karma as a Systemic Principle: The body operates as a biological system, and like any system, it must be free of defects to function correctly. Eliminating unhealthy habits and seeking medical care corrects these defects, restoring proper function. -/- Use Feedback Mechanisms for Self-Correction: Pain, fatigue, and illness are signals from the body indicating an imbalance. Instead of ignoring these warnings, one should adjust lifestyle choices, preventing further suffering. -/- Example of Physical Imbalance: Addiction (Alcoholism, Drug Use, Smoking) -/- Scenario: A person suffers from alcohol addiction, which damages their liver, distorts their judgment, and causes conflict in relationships. -/- Solution Using the Universal Formula: -/- Follow the Universal Law of Balance in Nature: The human body cannot function well when it is poisoned by harmful substances. Eliminating alcohol and drugs and replacing them with healthy habits restores physical and mental balance. -/- Apply the Law of Karma as a Systemic Principle: Addiction is a defect in the nervous system—it alters brain chemistry, leading to dependency. Medical treatment, rehabilitation, and psychological support correct this defect, helping the person regain control. -/- Use Feedback Mechanisms for Self-Correction: Withdrawal symptoms, declining health, and damaged relationships are signals of imbalance. Recognizing these signs motivates change, leading to recovery. -/- The Importance of Medicine -/- Medicine plays a crucial role in restoring physical balance. When the body suffers from illness, medical intervention corrects internal imbalances. However, medicine must be combined with lifestyle changes and emotional stability for long-term health. -/- 2. The Role of Emotions in Creating Imbalance and the Solution -/- Example of Emotional Imbalance: Uncontrolled Anger and Hatred -/- Scenario: A man is always angry at his coworkers, leading to stress, conflicts, and isolation. -/- Solution Using the Universal Formula: -/- Follow the Universal Law of Balance in Nature: Anger disrupts inner peace and must be regulated through emotional awareness and self-discipline. -/- Apply the Law of Karma as a Systemic Principle: Uncontrolled anger is a defect in the emotional system. Practicing patience, forgiveness, and communication corrects this defect, leading to healthier interactions. -/- Use Feedback Mechanisms for Self-Correction: Frequent stress, tension, and failed relationships indicate emotional imbalance. Recognizing these effects motivates change toward emotional stability. -/- The Importance of Positive Emotions in Human Relationships -/- Positive emotions such as love, compassion, and gratitude create harmony in relationships. Expressing kindness and understanding balances social interactions, reducing conflicts and strengthening bonds. This balance is necessary for personal peace and the path to Nirvana. -/- 3. The Role of Spirituality in Creating Imbalance and the Solution -/- Causes of Spiritual Imbalance -/- Spiritual imbalances occur when a person lacks connection, purpose, or faith. The main causes include: -/- 1. Materialism and Excessive Focus on the Physical World – Prioritizing wealth, power, or pleasure over inner peace and wisdom leads to dissatisfaction. -/- 2. Religious Dogma and Fear-Based Beliefs – When spirituality is based on fear, guilt, or rigid doctrines, it creates psychological distress rather than enlightenment. -/- 3. Loss of Faith or Meaning in Life – When people lose trust in God, Divine Essence, or Higher Purpose, they experience emptiness and existential suffering. -/- 4. Isolation and Lack of Spiritual Practice – A lack of meditation, prayer, or reflection disconnects people from inner wisdom. -/- Example of Spiritual Imbalance: Loss of Faith and Meaning -/- Scenario: A person feels lost, purposeless, and disconnected from life. -/- Solution Using the Universal Formula: -/- Follow the Universal Law of Balance in Nature: The soul craves connection to something greater. Engaging in spiritual practices like prayer, meditation, or service restores spiritual balance. -/- Apply the Law of Karma as a Systemic Principle: A loss of faith is a defect in the spiritual system. Deepening one’s connection to God, Divine Essence, or Higher Guidance corrects this defect, bringing fulfillment. -/- Use Feedback Mechanisms for Self-Correction: Depression and existential dread indicate spiritual emptiness. Seeking meaning through faith and selfless service restores harmony. -/- The Importance of Deep Faith in God or Divine Essence -/- Faith provides inner stability, helping people endure suffering and maintain hope and resilience. A deep connection with the Divine or Universal Truth aligns human existence with higher wisdom, guiding one toward Nirvana. -/- Conclusion -/- Attaining Nirvana requires eliminating imbalances in the body, emotions, mind, and spirituality. My universal formula provides the exact method to restore balance by aligning with natural laws, correcting systemic defects, and using feedback mechanisms for self-correction. -/- By embracing health, positive emotions, wisdom, and spiritual faith, one can transcend suffering and achieve ultimate peace. This is the path to Nirvana—the state of complete harmony with the universe. -/- . (shrink)

The State of Nirvana Explained Through the Universal Formula -/- Nirvana, a concept often associated with Buddhism, represents a state of ultimate peace, liberation, and detachment from suffering. Traditionally, it is understood as the cessation of desires and the end of the cycle of birth and rebirth. However, using my universal formula, Nirvana can be understood more precisely as a state of perfect balance, where the system of human consciousness operates free from defects and external disturbances. By examining Nirvana through (...) the universal law of balance in nature, the law of karma as a system principle, and the feedback mechanism of conscious minds, we can explain it as the highest achievable state of homeostasis in human decision-making and awareness. -/- Nirvana as Perfect Balance in Nature -/- According to the universal law of balance in nature, all systems—whether they are physical, biological, or cognitive—must maintain equilibrium to function optimally. Any deviation from balance results in dysfunction, suffering, or destruction. In this context, the state of Nirvana is the ultimate form of equilibrium in the human mind, where all forms of psychological and emotional turbulence have been neutralized. -/- Human suffering often arises from internal imbalances caused by uncontrolled desires, false beliefs, and external influences. When a person reaches Nirvana, their mind no longer fluctuates between extremes such as attachment and aversion, pleasure and pain, or hope and fear. Instead, they attain a stable and self-regulating mental state that is in perfect harmony with the natural laws governing reality. -/- Karma and the System of Consciousness -/- The law of karma, as understood in my universal formula, does not merely refer to the traditional idea of moral cause and effect but extends to the principle of systems functioning without defects. Any system, whether mechanical, biological, or cognitive, must be free of errors to operate effectively. If an engine has faulty components, it will not run efficiently; if the human body accumulates toxins, it will suffer disease. Similarly, if the mind is filled with ignorance, false assumptions, or emotional disturbances, it will create suffering. -/- Nirvana, in this sense, is the final correction of the system of consciousness. It is a state where all mental defects—such as irrational fears, harmful attachments, and misperceptions—have been eliminated. The individual no longer reacts to external influences in a way that creates further imbalance or suffering. They achieve a fully optimized and self-sustaining mental state, free from unnecessary disturbances. -/- Is Nirvana a Permanent or Dynamic State? -/- From the perspective of the universal law of balance in nature, Nirvana is a dynamic state rather than a fixed or permanent one. No system in nature remains absolutely static; instead, it continuously adjusts to maintain balance in response to external and internal influences. Even though Nirvana is often described as the cessation of suffering, it does not mean the individual mind ceases to function or engage with reality. Rather, it reaches a level of self-correction and adaptability, where it can maintain balance despite changing conditions. -/- A person in Nirvana does not freeze in a single state but dynamically interacts with reality while ensuring that no imbalance disturbs their equilibrium. Just as homeostasis in the human body requires constant regulation to maintain stability, the state of Nirvana involves continuous awareness and adjustment to preserve its balance. Therefore, rather than being a fixed endpoint, Nirvana can be understood as a sustained and dynamic process of perfect self-regulation. -/- The Feedback Mechanism of Conscious Minds -/- Beyond the individual, all conscious beings exist in a collective feedback system, where their decisions and emotions continuously influence one another. Human society operates as an interconnected web of minds, shaping each other’s beliefs, actions, and responses. Most people remain trapped in this cycle, where external influences trigger internal disturbances, leading to suffering and further imbalance. -/- However, a person who has reached Nirvana no longer contributes to this cycle of mental disturbances. Instead, they exist as a neutral force within the feedback loop, unaffected by external pressures and incapable of generating suffering for themselves or others. Their dynamic state of equilibrium allows them to respond to the world without being influenced by negative forces, ensuring that they do not create further disturbances in the system of human consciousness. -/- How to Achieve and Regulate the State of Nirvana -/- Since Nirvana is a dynamic state, it is not achieved in a single moment but rather through a continuous process of self-regulation. Based on the universal law of balance in nature and the law of karma, an individual must take specific steps to eliminate mental defects and maintain an optimized state of consciousness. -/- 1. Understanding the Nature of Imbalance – The first step is recognizing how ignorance, false beliefs, and uncontrolled desires create internal imbalances. This requires deep introspection and an awareness that suffering is the result of flawed decision-making processes. -/- 2. Eliminating False Systems of Thought – Mental defects arise from incorrect assumptions about reality. An individual must adopt rational thinking based on natural laws, ensuring that their thoughts align with objective truth rather than societal conditioning, superstitions, or emotional biases. -/- 3. Regulating Desires and Attachments – Desires create imbalance when they control the individual, leading to continuous dissatisfaction. To maintain Nirvana, one must learn to regulate desires, keeping them within a balanced framework where they do not dominate decision-making. -/- 4. Practicing Continuous Feedback Adjustment – Since all minds exist within a collective feedback system, an individual must remain conscious of how external influences affect their state of balance. This means developing a high level of self-awareness to prevent unnecessary emotional reactions to external events. -/- 5. Achieving Self-Correcting Homeostasis – Just as a healthy body automatically corrects imbalances (such as regulating temperature and pH levels), the mind in Nirvana must develop a self-correcting mechanism. This means consistently checking whether one’s thoughts, emotions, and actions remain in harmony with the natural law of balance. -/- 6. Avoiding Sources of Mental Disturbance – External influences such as misinformation, emotional manipulation, and toxic environments can disrupt mental balance. A person striving for Nirvana must carefully filter external inputs to ensure that their internal equilibrium remains undisturbed. -/- 7. Integrating Nirvana into Daily Life – Achieving Nirvana is not about retreating from reality but about engaging with it in a state of complete balance. This means making decisions based on reason, clarity, and natural law, ensuring that every action contributes to a stable and harmonious existence. -/- The Balance Between Social Interaction and Privacy -/- While privacy plays an important role in maintaining Nirvana, it is also essential to strike a balance between privacy and social interaction. A person striving for Nirvana must recognize that while solitude and self-reflection are necessary for maintaining mental equilibrium, human beings are inherently social creatures. Healthy social interaction can be a source of joy, support, and growth, and should not be completely avoided in the pursuit of Nirvana. -/- The key to maintaining Nirvana in social settings lies in setting boundaries and choosing relationships that foster peace and balance. Too much social interaction, especially in environments filled with conflict, negativity, or manipulation, can lead to disturbances in mental stability. On the other hand, complete isolation can lead to a lack of social harmony and neglect of collective well-being. -/- Therefore, an individual in Nirvana must be able to navigate between these two aspects of life—engaging in meaningful social interactions while protecting their personal space when needed. This balance is vital in maintaining the mental clarity and emotional stability required to preserve Nirvana in an ever-changing world. By carefully choosing social environments and establishing healthy boundaries, an individual can prevent external disturbances from disturbing their equilibrium. -/- The Importance of Privacy in Maintaining the State of Nirvana -/- In the pursuit of Nirvana, privacy plays a crucial role in preserving mental balance and maintaining the integrity of the individual’s self-regulation process. In a world filled with external pressures, distractions, and unsolicited influences, privacy serves as a protective barrier that allows an individual to maintain personal space and autonomy. -/- Without privacy, the individual is subject to constant interference from external sources—be it through social media, public scrutiny, or external judgments. These external influences can create mental disturbances that disrupt the equilibrium necessary for Nirvana. Privacy allows individuals to maintain their mental clarity, free from the noise of others’ expectations, and to reflect deeply on their own thoughts and feelings without being swayed by outside opinions. -/- By protecting their privacy, an individual can control the flow of information they are exposed to, ensuring that their mental state is not disturbed by harmful or irrelevant stimuli. Privacy enables one to determine their own internal environment, cultivating a space where personal growth and introspection can occur without interference. -/- Furthermore, privacy is integral to emotional regulation. It allows individuals to process their emotions and experiences in a safe environment, enabling them to reach the state of Nirvana without the pressure of external forces. This protection helps avoid unnecessary emotional reactions and preserve mental peace, ensuring that one remains in a state of dynamic balance amidst the complexities of daily life. -/- Nirvana as the Ultimate State of Homeostasis -/- In conclusion, Nirvana, when analyzed through my universal formula, can be understood as the highest state of homeostasis in human consciousness. It is the point at which a person has fully optimized their decision-making process, eliminated all mental defects, and achieved perfect balance with their internal and external reality. However, rather than being a permanent, unchanging state, Nirvana is a dynamic equilibrium, requiring continuous self-regulation to maintain balance. -/- The role of privacy in achieving and maintaining Nirvana cannot be overstated. In a world filled with external distractions and emotional disturbances, privacy is a key factor in preserving mental equilibrium and allowing the individual to maintain the dynamic self-regulation needed to stay in Nirvana. -/- By understanding the steps to achieve and regulate Nirvana, individuals can cultivate mental stability, rational decision-making, and emotional resilience. This explanation provides a scientific and systematic approach to Nirvana, making it not only a spiritual ideal but a practical model for individual and societal well-being. The path to Nirvana is not just a personal journey but a necessary step toward achieving universal equilibrium in human civilization. -/- . (shrink)

The Psychology of Gossip Obsession -/- Gossip is a universal human behavior, deeply ingrained in social interactions. While it can serve useful purposes—such as reinforcing social norms and strengthening group bonds—an obsession with gossip can lead to negative consequences, including invasion of privacy, misinformation, and social toxicity. Understanding the psychology behind gossip obsession helps explain why people are so drawn to it and how it can be managed. -/- Why Do People Gossip? -/- 1. Evolutionary Psychology: Survival and Social (...) Bonding -/- In early human societies, gossip helped individuals navigate social hierarchies and avoid potential threats. -/- Sharing information about others’ behaviors allowed groups to regulate social norms and enforce cooperation. -/- People who stayed informed about their peers had an advantage in forming alliances and avoiding deception. -/- 2. Dopamine and the Pleasure of Gossiping -/- Gossip activates the brain’s reward system, releasing dopamine, the same neurotransmitter involved in pleasure and addiction. -/- People feel a sense of excitement or satisfaction when sharing or hearing juicy information, reinforcing the habit. -/- 3. Social Status and Power -/- Gossiping about others can create a sense of social superiority. -/- Those who spread insider knowledge may feel more influential within their social circles. -/- Negative gossip can sometimes be used to diminish the status of others and elevate one’s own standing. -/- 4. Emotional Regulation and Catharsis -/- Talking about others can serve as an emotional outlet, helping people vent frustrations. -/- Sharing experiences of betrayal, unfairness, or scandal can provide a sense of validation and solidarity. -/- 5. Curiosity and the Desire for Novelty -/- Humans are naturally curious, and gossip often involves unpredictable or surprising information. -/- The brain is wired to pay attention to unusual or dramatic events, making gossip irresistible. -/- 6. Fear of Exclusion and the Need for Belonging -/- Staying informed about social dynamics helps people feel included and avoid being left out. -/- Gossiping together strengthens social bonds by creating shared knowledge and experiences. -/- 7. Projection and Psychological Defense Mechanisms -/- Some people gossip to project their insecurities onto others. -/- By focusing on someone else’s flaws, they distract themselves from their own weaknesses. -/- Why Some People Become Obsessed with Gossip -/- 1. Low Self-Esteem and Insecurity -/- Those who lack self-confidence may gossip to shift attention away from themselves. -/- Engaging in gossip can provide a temporary boost in self-worth by making others look worse. -/- 2. Addiction to Drama and Sensationalism -/- Some individuals develop a dependency on the emotional high of gossip. -/- This can be linked to a need for excitement, distraction from boredom, or avoidance of personal issues. -/- 3. Lack of Personal Fulfillment -/- People who are not satisfied with their own lives may focus excessively on the lives of others. -/- Celebrity gossip and social media drama can serve as an escape from their own problems. -/- 4. Peer Pressure and Social Conformity -/- In environments where gossip is a norm, individuals may feel compelled to participate to fit in. -/- Workplace gossip, school cliques, and online communities often encourage this behavior. -/- 5. Media Influence and the Digital Age -/- The internet has made gossip more accessible, encouraging an endless cycle of speculation and commentary. -/- Social media algorithms prioritize sensational and controversial content, reinforcing gossip obsession. -/- Consequences of Gossip Obsession -/- 1. Psychological and Emotional Impact -/- Increased anxiety and paranoia about how one is perceived by others. -/- Reduced trust and deeper insecurities due to constant comparison. -/- 2. Relationship Damage -/- Gossip can ruin friendships, workplace dynamics, and reputations. -/- People who gossip excessively may lose credibility and respect. -/- 3. Ethical and Moral Consequences -/- Spreading false or harmful information can contribute to bullying, defamation, and social division. -/- Unethical gossip can destroy lives and create unnecessary conflict. -/- How to Manage Gossip Obsession -/- 1. Develop Self-Awareness -/- Recognize when gossip is becoming a habit and ask yourself why you are engaging in it. -/- Reflect on whether it serves a meaningful purpose or just fuels negativity. -/- 2. Build Self-Confidence -/- Strengthen your self-worth so you don’t need to elevate yourself by putting others down. -/- Focus on personal growth and meaningful achievements. -/- 3. Seek Positive Social Interactions -/- Surround yourself with people who engage in constructive conversations rather than gossip. -/- Build relationships based on mutual respect and support. -/- 4. Limit Exposure to Toxic Media -/- Avoid celebrity gossip websites, clickbait news, and negative social media feeds. -/- Follow content that promotes personal development, knowledge, and meaningful discussions. -/- 5. Shift the Conversation -/- If a conversation turns into gossip, redirect it to a more positive or neutral topic. -/- Encourage discussions about ideas, experiences, and shared goals instead of personal rumors. -/- 6. Practice Empathy and Compassion -/- Before spreading gossip, consider how it would feel if someone gossiped about you. -/- Recognize that everyone has struggles and flaws, and kindness is more valuable than judgment. -/- 7. Cultivate a Growth Mindset -/- Invest your energy in self-improvement, learning new skills, and pursuing hobbies. -/- The more fulfilled you feel in your own life, the less interest you will have in gossiping about others. -/- Conclusion -/- Gossip obsession is rooted in human psychology, from evolutionary survival instincts to modern social pressures. While gossip can serve as a social tool, excessive engagement in it can be harmful to both individuals and society. By developing self-awareness, practicing empathy, and shifting focus toward meaningful interactions, people can break free from gossip obsession and cultivate a healthier, more positive mindset. -/- . (shrink)

This chapter aims to illuminate ways in which hope was significant in the philosophy of classical Greece. Although ancient Greek philosophies contain few dedicated and systematic expositions on the nature of hope, they nevertheless include important remarks relating hope to the good life, to reason and deliberation, and to psychological phenomena such as memory, imagination, fear, motivation, and pleasure. After an introductory discussion of Hesiod and Heraclitus, the chapter focuses on Plato and Aristotle. Consideration is given both to Plato’s (...) direct comments on hope and to the narrative contexts of his dialogues, with analysis of Plato’s positive and negative representations of hope, hope’s relationship to reason, and Plato’s more psychological approach in the Philebus, where hope finds a place among memory, recollection, pleasure, and pain. The chapter then reviews Aristotle’s discussions of confidence, hope, and courage, observing that although Aristotle does not mention hope as a virtue, he does note its importance to human agency and deliberation and as a foundation for the further development of virtue. The chapter concludes that discussions surrounding hope in ancient Greek philosophy are rich and challenging and can serve as a lively stimulus to further exploration of the concept of hope. (shrink)

The combination of sex and horror may be disquieting to many, but the two are natural (if perhaps gruesome) bedfellows. In fact, sex and horror coincide with such regularity in contemporary horror fiction that the two concepts appear to be at least partially intertwined. The sex–horror relationship is sometimes connotative rather than overt; examples of this relationship range from the seduction overtones of 'Nosferatu' and the juxtaposition of nudity and horror promised by European exploitation filmmakers to the sadomasochistic iconography of (...) 'Hellraiser'. In other cases, sex and horror are balanced in a manner that thoroughly blurs the distinction between porn and horror. The sustained presence of sex-horror in film suggests that these two elements fit together and the combination is a source of pleasure (entertainment, fascination, intellectual stimulation and so forth) for many. Yet sex-horror is broadly perceived to be disturbing and these negative reactions indicate that sex-horror is a source of trepidation, moral disdain or disgust for some. Thus, it appears that sex-horror inspires directly competing responses. One might conclude that sex-horror itself is paradoxical; that it holds two directly oppositional meanings simultaneously. However, as I will illustrate in this chapter, these dual responses are not as contradictory as they might first appear to be. (shrink)

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

The topical theme of this paper explores the ethical principles of Mahayana Buddhism, based on Bodhicaryavatara(BC) of Santideva(7thcentury A.D.). According to him, only generation of enlightened mind (bodhicitta-intellect) and virtuous actions are not sufficient to attain the main objective i.e. Buddha-hood, the state of perfect enlightenment. But, for the fulfillment of this goal one must have to gain perfection to engage in the performance of six actions, termed as –Sadparmitas. It is necessary to stop present and future sufferings, and to (...) bring eternal pleasure, for all sentient beings. For this self-attitude and behavior in everyday affairs towards other beings is necessary. Thus, the ethics in Buddhism is directly associated with theory of Karman (action). Here, ethics means not only pure observance of virtuous actions but also good performance of one’s own duty and good actions in all affairs. It means while we work and act must be abstain from negative thinking doing harm for other beings. Therefore, Santideva emphasizes on applied form of teachings of the ethical theory. According to him, who has proper vision and understanding can act, of the work of compassionate, beyond the ethical code of conduct prescribed by the scriptures as warranted by circumstances and conditions for the sake of others. Thus, the ethical theory is based on good or bad intention of mind of an individual. This is so as what is virtuous and non-virtuous actions are not so easy to understand because it depends on purity of mind. In fact, nothing is good and nothing is bad, circumstances and intentions make it so. (shrink)

This article examines the plausibility of regarding altruism in terms of universal friendship. Section 1 frames the question around Aristotle’s ground-breaking philosophy of friendship. For Aristotle, most friendships exist for selfish reasons, motivated by a desire either for pleasure(playmates) or profit (workmates); relatively few friendships are genuine, being motivated by a desire for shared virtue (soulmates). In contrast to this negative answer to the main question, Section 2 examines a possible religious basis for affirming altruism, arising out of (...) the so-called “love command” – the biblical maxim that we ought to love others as we love ourselves. Many theologians have cited this maxim to justify altruism, with some (such as Aelred of Rievaulx) explicitly portraying it as a form of friendship. Section 3 examines Kant’s view of friendship, arguing that, although at first his position seems disappointingly limited, it actually captures the essence of the only possible form of friendship that could be regarded as a universal ideal without imposing unrealistic expectations onto friends. The article concludes in section 4 by offering a new, Kant-inspired interpretation of Jesus’ parable of the GoodSamaritan: Jesus’ appeal to the love command does enjoin friendship, but not as altruism; rather, love requires a selective form of friendship that is closer to Kant’s position. (shrink)

Fitouchi et al. claim that seemingly victimless pleasures and nonproductive activities are moralized because they alter self-control. Their account predicts that: (1) victimless excesses are negatively moralized because they diminish self-control, and (2) restrained behaviors are positively moralized because they enhance self-control. Several examples run contrary to these predictions and call into question the general relationship between self-control and cooperation.

Aristotle tells us that in order to develop virtue, one needs to come to love and hate the right sorts of things. However, his description of the virtuous person clearly privileges love to hate. It is love rather than hate that is the main driving force of a good life. It is because of her love of knowledge, truth and beauty that the virtuous person organizes her life in a certain way and pursues these rather than other things (such as (...) pleasure). When hate comes into the picture, it is merely an unavoidable consequence of loving those noble and beautiful things. The virtuous person hates things that are contrary to her values, but does not concentrate on them, much less constructs her life in the pursuit of their destruction. But why privilege love over hate in this way? Why could not a good (happy) and virtuous life be a life driven primarily by hate (in particular, one aimed at eradicating what one (correctly) considers shameful and evil)? Without appealing to any consequences or harmful effects that hate might have on other People, the paper gives two answers to this question. First, allowing hate (rather than love) to dominate one’s life would undermine the right relationship between the two parts of the soul (the rational and the non-rational one) that Aristotle recognizes. Virtue involves establishing the right kind of internal ordering of one’s soul and this cannot be done if one’s soul is dominated by hate. Second, hate has negative cognitive effects insofar as it renders one insensitive to the beauty of human nature and behavior and actively precludes one from acquiring knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, if a good life is a life that involves virtue and knowledge, a life fueled by hate cannot but fall short of that ideal. (shrink)

The essay gives an account of the aesthetics of the Graz school, focusing on the standpoint of the object as well as on that of emotions. Meinong’s reflection on aesthetics stems from a psychological background and comes subsequently to an ontological grounding. After examining the notions of imagination, phantasy-representation, relation and complexion, I show how the theory of production of representations, as well as that of higher-order objects, develops under the impulse of Ehrenfels’ concept of Gestalt qualities; both these theories (...) may be applied to aesthetics in the explanation of artistic creation and of aesthetic objects. Meinong identifies the specific object of aesthetics with the “objective” and distinguishes aesthetic feelings, which are true feelings, from imaginary ones. Witasek develops a psychological aesthetics built on the conceptual framework of Meinongian philosophy: aesthetic properties are ideal and extra-objective, they connect the aesthetic object to the subject’s mental attitude; an aesthetic object is an object endowed with aesthetic properties, such as beauty, which depends on the degree of pleasure or displeasure the object may induce in the subject. Witasek, though, parts from Meinong on both the conception of aesthetic objects and of imaginary feelings. In the last sections, I review the reactions to Witasek’s aesthetics, both positive and negative, within the Graz school itself (in particular Schwarz’ and Saxinger’s ideas on phantasy-feelings, and Ameseder’s on value beauty), and I sketch Ehrenfels’ and Veber’s aesthetic views. (shrink)

Swear words are highly colloquial expressions that have the capacity to signal the speaker's affective states, i.e., to display the speaker's feelings with respect to a certain stimulus. For this reason, swear words are often called 'expressives'. Which linguistic mechanisms allow swear words display affective states, and, more importantly, how can such 'affective content' be characterized in a theory of meaning? Even though research on expressive meaning has produced models that integrate the affective aspects of swear words in a compositional (...) framework, there is extensive evidence that swear words cannot be assigned a single or stable affective interpretation across contexts. For example, even though expletive adjectives (e.g., 'damn'), particularistic insults (e.g., 'bastard') and slurs (e.g., 'wop') typically express (and elicit) negatively valenced affective states, they can also be interpreted positively in some contexts. Thus, inspired in recent developments in formal sociolinguistics, I propose an 'indexical' approach to affective meaning. Under this approach, an affective expression is associated with a set of affective qualities, anyone of which may emerge at a given context depending on the interpreter's prior assumptions about the speaker's affective states and/or relation with the target of the swear word. To define this set, also called 'indexical field', I will use the dimensions pleasure, arousal and dominance, standardly employed in cognitive psychology to characterize and measure affective episodes. In this dissertation, thus, the affective meaning of an expression is given by the set of affective states it typically conveys within a linguistic community, but its interpretation at a given context is established by taking into account the interpreter's prior assumptions about the speaker's affective states and/or attitudes with respect to the target of the affective expression. (shrink)

The paper aims at clarifying the distinctions and relations between pain and suffering. Three negative theses are defended: 1. Pain and suffering are not identical. 2. Pain is not a species of suffering, nor is suffering a species of pain, nor are pain and suffering of a common (proximate) genus. 3. Suffering cannot be defined as the perception of a pain’s badness, nor can pain be defined as a suffered bodily sensation. Three positive theses are endorsed: 4. Pain and (...) suffering are categorically distinct: pain is a localised bodily episode, suffering is a non-localised affective attitude. 5. Suffering can be expressed, pains cannot. As a consequence, we can have compassion for the suffering of others, not for their pains. 6. The relation between pain and suffering is akin to the relation between danger and fear, injustice and indignation, wrongdoing and guilt: suffering is the correct reaction to pain. One upshot is that both the influential view that the experience of pain is incorrigible and the influential view that the ordinary conception of pain is paradoxical are false. (shrink)

According to Schopenhauer’s compensation argument for pessimism, the non-existence of the world is preferable to its existence because no goods can ever compensate for the mere existence of evil. Standard interpretations take this argument to be based on Schopenhauer’s thesis that all goods are merely the negation of evils, from which they assume it follows that the apparent goods in life are in fact empty and without value. This article develops a non-standard variant of the standard interpretation, which accepts the (...) relevance of the negativity thesis but rejects that the argument assumes that life’s goods are all empty and valueless. Instead, it argues that whatever value negative goods might possess, they do not have the kind of value to compensate for positive evils. This involves additional development of the negativity thesis and a defence of it against objections from Byron Simmons (2021). (shrink)

Despite its pertinence to every field of study, no systematic theory exists for the exploration of the unknown world of new knowledge. In order to construct such a theory, this paper draws on the unique and highly refined principles of military strategy, in the process demonstrating the universal applicability of such principles and developing an effective analogy for the process of research. Such principles include diverging advance, converging attack, and selecting the superior and eliminating the inferior. In seeking further discoveries, (...) one should search for more possibilities, attack more aims, and confound the front line. The theory presented in this paper is also a means to further the unification of science. For no matter what the individuals look like, (soldiers, particles, cells, consumers, producers, stockholders, or concepts), what they pursue, (victory, negative action, viability, pleasure, profit, investment return, or knowledge), or what relationship exists between opponents, (hostile, mysterious, adaptive, reciprocal, cooperative, or explanatory), the result is always an unknown world in which individuals are exploring. It is reasonable to suppose that the exploration of the unknown world is a common property among individuals. (shrink)

This paper deals with a classical issue that remains at the core of the contemporary philosophical debate: the fact that the meaning of life is interlaced—in both negative and positive ways, with respect to morality—with happiness. On some historical conceptions, individual happiness must be sacrificed for the moral (universal, objective) good of a life, where the good fundamentally coincides with the meaning of life. On other approaches, happiness and flourishing (where flourishing is understood in terms of life’s meaningfulness) consist (...) in good action and a good life. On still other views, happiness, while equated with the meaning of life, is reduced to mere pleasure, to a sensorial state that can be influenced by outside forces. In the current literature, the prevailing interpretations of this question are largely deontological, eudaimonic or hedonic in character. Moving from the Schelerian theory of the stratification of the emotional life, and emphasizing the affective side of this broadly ethical question, this paper intends to examine this issue through the lens of phenomenology. From this perspective, the connection between happiness and the meaning not only of life but also of existence can be understood in light of what appears to underlie both phenomena: the entire existence of the individual, which is revealed most clearly in an act of personal love. Since this paper considers the condition humaine in all its complexity, that is to say, even in its fragility and vulnerability, within this framework I will also consider possible abnormal manifestations of happiness. Following Rümke’s clinical observations of pathological frameworks in which the feeling of happiness manifests itself, this paper shows how the deepest feeling of happiness, understood as a Schelerian personality feeling, can remain untouched by pathology. In his classic (but largely unappreciated) enquiry into the happiness syndrome, Rümke engages in a fruitful dialogue with Scheler, whose theory of the stratification of emotional life plays a crucial role in the former’s study of the phenomenology and the clinical aspects of happiness. Not only is Rümke’s Zur Phänomenologie und Klinik des Glücksgefühls an excellent example of applied phenomenology, but it also confirms the results of Scheler’s research on affective life. (shrink)

This article gives a short presentation of reflexive imperativism, the intentionalist theory of valence I developed with Max Khan Hayward. The theory says that mental states have valence in virtue of having reflexive imperative content. More precisely, mental states have positive valence (i.e., feel good) in virtue of issuing the command "More of me!", and they have negative valence (i.e., feel bad) in virtue of issuing the command "Less of me!" The article summarises the main arguments in favour of (...) reflexive imperativism and against other intentionalist treatments of valence. (shrink)

Carolyn Korsmeyer’s Savoring Disgust is a book that, in spite of its seemingly unsavoury subject matter, deserves to be widely read. Written in an accessible yet richly suggestive prose, it is the first systematic investigation in English-speaking contemporary philosophy of the aesthetic and artistic significance of the emotion of disgust. Korsmeyer’s book discusses a wealth of issues that is difficult to match and presents a comprehensive and organic approach to a previously underexplored topic. The intelligence of its analysis and the (...) elegance of its prose prove that one can indeed be pleasurably absorbed in matters disgusting. (shrink)

This paper responds to a new objection, due to Ben Bramble, against attitudinal theories of sensory pleasure and pain: the objection from unconscious pleasures and pains. According to the objection, attitudinal theories are unable to accommodate the fact that sometimes we experience pleasures and pains of which we are, at the time, unaware. In response, I distinguish two kinds of unawareness and argue that the subjects in the examples that support the objection are unaware of their sensations in only (...) a weak sense, and this weak sort of unawareness of a sensation does not preclude its being an object of one’s attitudes. (shrink)

This paper presents a new account of aesthetic pleasure, according to which it is a distinct psychological structure marked by a characteristic self-reinforcing motivation. Pleasure figures in the appreciation of an object in two ways: In the short run, when we are in contact with particular artefacts on particular occasions, aesthetic pleasure motivates engagement and keeps it running smoothly—it may do this despite the fact that the object we engagement is aversive in some ways. Over longer periods, (...) it plays a critical role in shaping how we engage with objects to get this kind of pleasure from them. This account is yoked to a broadly functional understanding of art: it is not the nature of the object that makes it art, but the nature of the response that it is designed to elicit. The view does not, however, rest on individual psychology alone, as some other functional accounts do. Crucially, it is argued that shared cultural context is a key determinant of the pleasure we derive from aesthetic artefacts. The pleasure of art is always communal and communicative. (shrink)

Globally, there are calls to increase physical activity levels in relatively sedentary populations, including via physical activity programmes, often targeted at those body-selves deemed at risk of ‘sedentariness’. Despite the salience of sensory pleasures and displeasures in engagement with (and abandonment of) these programmes, the sensory, embodied experiences of participation remain under-researched. Here, we draw on findings from a two-year ethnographic study of a national programme in Wales, which used the aesthetic attractions of ‘natural’ outdoor environments to encourage and sustain (...) physical activity. Employing insights from phenomenological sociology, we explore the programme participants’ (n=146) lived experiences, analysed via a phenomenological lens, cohering around a panoply of sensory pleasures and displeasures, and somatic learning that is shaped and reshaped by weather encounters. (shrink)