In this paper, I examine whether John Stuart Mill’s account of free speech can survive three main challenges posed by social media. First, I consider the problem of social media failing to distinguish between emotive and factual language. Second, I look at the problem of algorithms creating moralism. I then turn to a potential objection to my first two challenges. The objection elucidates the benefits of social media’s emotional and algorithmic character, amplifying arguments and increasing public engagement. However, I take (...) issue with this objection on consequentialist terms. I finally return to the third challenge, where I focus on how anonymity removes the consequences to our words; I contend that this final failure is the ultimate reason why Mill’s account cannot persist in the modern age. In conclusion, I argue that Mill’s account cannot withstand the problems posed by social media. (shrink)

The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathers of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, Gibbard, Harper, Lewis, Skyrms, Sobel, (...) and Joyce) all endorse counterfactual decision theories. I additionally discuss why these theories came to be called ‘causal’, rather than ‘counterfactual’. And I argue that, properly understood, causal decision theory escapes Hedden's objections. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. 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SOCIOLOGIA: TRANSFORMAÇÕES SOCIAIS E POLÍTICAS -/- SOCIOLOGY: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE - [email protected] e [email protected] e WhatsApp:(82)98143-8399 -/- -/- 1. PREMISSA -/- Muitas foram as transformações sociais e políticas vividas em nossa sociedade. Algumas foram violentas e transformaram radicalmente as sociedades. Outras levaram à independência do jugo colonial ou neocolonial. Há também aquelas que brotaram de acordos entre classes dominantes ou que se constituíram movimentos liderados pela burguesia ascendente. -/- (...) Merecem destaque aquelas que eclodiram no século XX, consideradas populares por terem registrado significativa participação do povo nos países onde ocorreram. -/- 2. TRANSFORMAÇÕES LENTAS E GRADUAIS -/- As transformações em algumas sociedades foram lentas e graduais, permeadas por acordos, conciliações, reformas. Em alguns momentos houve até atos violentos, coordenados por quem estava no poder e sempre em acordo com as novas classes dominantes e os grupos mais poderosos dos momentos históricos precedentes. -/- São exemplos desse tipo de mudança social o que aconteceu na Inglaterra, no Japão e na Alemanha. -/- A Revolução Inglesa foi um movimento em que uma parcela dos senhores de terras e comerciantes se insurgiu contra o poder absoluto do rei e de seus associados (principalmente a nobreza e o clero, que nada produziam). Iniciada em 1642, tinha como objetivo limitar e condicionar esse poder a determinadas funções, impedindo o controle do comércio e da indústria e a criação de impostos pelo rei sem autorização do Parlamento. Após prolongado conflito civil, as forças políticas que lutavam contra o absolutismo derrubaram a monarquia, em 1649, e proclamaram a república. Esse movimento tornou possível a eliminação dos últimos laços que prendiam os ingleses a uma sociedade feudal. -/- A monarquia foi restaurada em 1660, mas o rei e os nobres perderam os poderes anteriores. O Parlamento havia adquirido força política e dividia o poder com a monarquia. Era o grande passo para que o mercantilismo se expandisse e, como consequência, o processo de industrialização se desenvolvesse a partir do século seguinte. O fundamental nesse processo foi a implantação de uma série de direitos que hoje são considerados universais. Mas foi um movimento em um único país e alterou substancialmente a situação apenas em uma sociedade. Só posteriormente teve repercussão maior. -/- A Inglaterra pode ser considerada o paradigma das transformações lentas e graduais mesmo tendo passado por algumas revoltas e irrupções políticas, uma vez que conseguiu manter a monarquia e também um sistema político e jurídico estável por muito tempo. -/- Pode-se dizer que a Revolução Inglesa é resultado de um acordo entre as várias classes dominantes existentes. Constituiu-se, assim, uma integração cultural em torno da ideia de nacionalidade. -/- Na Alemanha e no Japão também aconteceram mudanças políticas decorrentes de um pacto social entre as classes dominantes: os grandes proprietários de terras e a burguesia industrial e comercial emergente. Mesmo com as características próprias de cada país, o que houve foram alterações políticas e econômicas necessárias para o desenvolvimento de sociedades industriais modernas. Apesar de mudanças significativas nos processos e nas relações de produção, houve poucas alterações na estrutura do Estado e os detentores do poder político continuaram os mesmos. Assim, os proprietários da terra não perderam sua fonte de poder e continuaram conduzindo de forma compartilhada com a nova burguesia os destinos do Estado nacional. -/- No Japão, o período entre o início do século XVII até a segunda metade do século XIX (1600-1868) foi marcado por um governo autoritário assentado sobre a grande propriedade rural feudal. Esse período ficou conhecido como Era Xogunato Tokugawa, família que tinha apoio dos famosos guerreiros samurais. A chamada Revolução ou Restauração Meiji refere-se ao período de renovações políticas, religiosas e sociais profundas que ocorreram no Japão entre 1868 e 1900. É também chamado de “Renovação”, já que transformou o Império japonês num estado-nação moderno, o que levou o país a entrar na corrida imperialista do século XIX, principalmente na Ásia, tendo como fundamento o domínio econômico e o expansionismo militar. Essa reforma propriamente dita, apesar de ter assistido a revoltas e batalhas, não resultou na abolição das relações de produção no campo nem na derrubada da monarquia absoluta. Nesse contexto é que os antigos samurais e a pequena nobreza, composta de classes instruídas e já comandantes da burocracia estatal e de parte do exército, passam a ser uma força significativa no Estado japonês. Pode-se dizer, portanto, que houve uma “revolução conservadora” ou apenas uma conciliação de interesses e objetivos que visava manter os mesmos grupos e classes no comando das ações do Estado. Somente depois do fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial (1939-1945) é que se iniciou no Japão a reforma agrária, o que alterou profundamente a estrutura de propriedade da terra. -/- Na Alemanha, as mudanças passaram pelo processo de unificação de muitas unidades políticas, territoriais e culturais. A Alemanha de hoje é fruto de vários movimentos militares, políticos e culturais. Entre 1860 e 1871, foram incorporados novos territórios, demonstrando a força dos exércitos da Prússia – antigo Estado que fazia parte da então Alemanha pré-unificação –, concomitante à ideia de um inimigo externo e comum a todos que desejavam a unificação. Como consequência dessas necessidades, perpetrou-se guerra contra a Dinamarca, depois contra a Áustria e, finalmente, contra a França, em 1870, o que concorreu para o aumento do território. -/- Com a vitória na Guerra Franco-Prussiana, em 1870, a Prússia conseguiu unificar a Alemanha. O rei Guilherme I foi coroado kaiser (imperador) da Alemanha e considerado o líder máximo do país. Mas, mesmo quando o Império alemão se constituiu como tal, ainda existiam 22 estruturas políticas e territoriais diferenciadas, como principados, ducados, grão -ducados, grandes reinos (como os da Baviera e da Prússia) e até cidades livres (como Bremen e Hamburgo). -/- Apenas depois de 1870 foram possíveis a unificação nacional e a transformação da Alemanha em um país industrializado e desenvolvido, uma vez que, além das questões militares, houve outras ações urgentes para que a união se efetivasse. Otto von Bismarck – chefe de governo que estava à frente do processo de unificação alemã e uma das figuras mais proeminentes da política europeia do século XIX – desenvolveu um intenso projeto educacional que incluía um programa curricular unificado, no qual a língua alemã era obrigatória. Além disso, passaram a ser produzidas histórias da nação germânica atreladas a uma formação religiosa protestante única, cujo objetivo era unir a língua, a história e a religião e identificá-las com o povo alemão, rejeitando a diversidade e postulando a falsa ideia de uma unidade alemã indissolúvel e harmônica. -/- Assim, o pacto político orquestrado no interior dos Estados nacionais alemão e japonês aprofundou os laços políticos entre os grandes proprietários de terras e a burguesia, excluindo os operários e os camponeses do direito pleno à democracia e à cidadania, bem como ao acesso à terra. A burguesia não tinha poder para fazer a transformação, e os grandes proprietários não tinham como manter as coisas como estavam. Esse processo de modernização conservadora conduziu esses países à formação de uma sociedade industrial modernizada, mas cuja estrutura política se manteve conservadora. -/- 3. REVOLUÇÕES E MOVIMENTOS ANTICOLONIAIS -/- O rompimento com os laços coloniais também configura um conjunto de movimentos em prol de mudanças sociais. Mais do que isso: como resultado de profundas conscientizações políticas por parte de populações historicamente exploradas e segregadas, esses movimentos anticoloniais estabelecem de modo bastante peculiar um novo patamar para o conceito de revolução. -/- 3.1 Revoluções no continente americano pela independência -/- A Revolução Americana, ocorrida em 1776, caracterizou-se como uma luta contra o colonialismo inglês. O movimento teve grande repercussão, principalmente nos países da América Latina, pois provocou o rompimento dos laços coloniais. Teve influência significativa também por pregar a liberdade individual como um dos pilares da sociedade que se formara na América do Norte. -/- O Boston Tea Party foi um protesto de colonos ingleses considerado fundamental para a deflagração da Revolução Americana, o movimento de independência dos Estados Unidos. -/- Na América do Sul, Simón Bolívar foi sumamente decisivo para a conquista da independência da Venezuela, proclamada em 1811, mas só consumada com a tomada de Caracas e outras regiões de importância estratégica que permaneciam até 1821 sob domínio da coroa espanhola. -/- A maioria dos países da América Latina e do Caribe, seguindo o exemplo do que havia acontecido nos Estados Unidos e sob influência da Revolução Francesa, iniciou as lutas pela independência no início do século XIX, cujos desdobramentos se estenderam até 1820, aproximadamente. Foram necessárias muitas batalhas para que a Espanha aceitasse os termos de independência desses países. Após a emancipação, os países se organizaram politicamente na forma de repúblicas, abolindo a escravidão e o trabalho servil. -/- O Brasil, antiga colônia portuguesa, foi o único país que manteve a monarquia e a escravidão. Com o fim dos laços coloniais, os países que obtiveram a liberdade política assumiram uma nova forma de dependência econômica, agora em relação à Inglaterra, posto que o interesse do capitalismo britânico era conseguir manter o fornecimento de matérias-primas e ampliar o consumo de seus produtos manufaturados em território latino-americano. -/- 3.2 Independência das colônias no século XX -/- A segunda fase do processo de descolonização desenvolveu-se no contexto do neocolonialismo, após a Segunda Guerra Mundial e até a última parte do século XX. Os palcos principais foram a África e a Ásia. -/- O continente africano, no final do século XIX, tinha sido loteado pelos países europeus (com exceção de Portugal, que possuía colônias desde o século XVI), que buscavam matérias-primas para o desenvolvimento de suas indústrias e ampliação do mercado consumidor para os seus produtos manufaturados. Assim, a maior parte das estruturas políticas tribais foi sendo gradativamente destruída, bem como as formas de vida e de produção existentes. -/- Após o fim da Segunda Guerra Mundial, em 1945, muitos povos africanos se organizaram e passaram a lutar por sua independência, criando, assim, uma série de novos países. -/- A independência, no entanto, não significou autonomia, uma vez que os novos países surgidos após a descolonização enfrentaram problemas para promover o desenvolvimento econômico e social. As heranças deixadas pelos colonizadores, representadas tanto por uma economia sempre dependente do exterior, exportadora de matéria-prima e importadora de gêneros de primeira necessidade quanto pelo baixo nível educacional e técnico da população, impediram os projetos de desenvolvimento e provocaram a continuidade da dependência através do endividamento, mantendo esses países subordinados aos interesses das antigas metrópoles. -/- Na Ásia, alguns países obtiveram sua independência mediante lutas ou acordos com as potências colonizadoras. Aqueles que foram invadidos durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial pelo Japão aproveitaram, depois da derrota nipônica em 1945, para iniciar ou retomar os vários movimentos pela independência. Do mesmo modo, o Vietnã, o Laos e o Camboja se tornaram independentes da França, e a Indonésia, da Holanda. Em alguns casos, houve acordo, como a Malásia e Cingapura, que conseguiram a independência da Inglaterra nos anos de 1957 e 1965, respectivamente. -/- O caso da Índia – emblemático – reúne movimentos por independência e acordos com o país colonizador. A presença dos ingleses na Índia data do século XVII e foi se ampliando com o tempo. A dominação foi facilitada pela inexistência de um governo centralizado e também pela diversidade religiosa e de castas, o que não contribuía para uma visão de unidade nacional. -/- Em 1920, logo após o término da Primeira Guerra Mundial (1914-1918), surgiram movimentos pela independência, os quais, ao final da Segunda Guerra, quando o declínio do poder econômico e militar da Inglaterra ficou evidente, foram muito bem -sucedidos em suas lutas. Assim, a dominação na Índia não pôde ser mantida e em 1947 os ingleses reconheceram a independência indiana, que, em função das rivalidades religiosas, deu origem à União Indiana, com maioria hinduísta, e à Liga Muçulmana, com maioria islâmica, que veio a constituir o Paquistão (Ocidental e Oriental). O Ceilão, de maioria budista, tornava-se também independente, passando a ilha a se denominar Sri-Lanka. Posteriormente, o Paquistão Oriental se tornou o atual Bangladesh. -/- 4. REVOLUÇÕES RADICAIS E POPULARES -/- Muitas foram as revoluções radicais e populares. Aqui será abordada apenas a Revolução Francesa. -/- 4.1 Revolução Francesa -/- A Revolução Francesa eclodiu em 1789 como um movimento contrário ao poder monárquico e aos resquícios do feudalismo na França. Foi exemplo para a luta em várias nações do mundo ocidental contra os regimes absolutistas e pela eliminação da monarquia, uma vez que essas formas e sistemas de governo significavam opressão à maioria da população. -/- Além disso, com a revolução foi alterada profundamente a estrutura da propriedade rural, eliminando entraves para o desenvolvimento de uma nova sociedade. Entretanto, o fato mais importante foi que os revolucionários lutaram em nome das pessoas (apesar de não incluir as mulheres), e não só dos franceses, o que transformou o movimento em paradigma das revoluções posteriores. -/- 5. REVOLUÇÕES POLÍTICAS NO SÉCULO XX -/- No século XX ocorreram várias experiências revolucionárias. Entretanto, foram poucas as que envolveram os mais explorados e, portanto, a maioria da sociedade. Duas delas serão aqui tratadas. -/- 5.1 Revolução Mexicana -/- A Revolução Mexicana começou em 1910 e foi uma resposta dos explorados no campo e nas cidades a uma situação insustentável de desigualdade e de exploração. Havia no México uma grande desigualdade social: 1% da população possuía 97% das terras, o que gerava uma situação de exploração e miséria muito grande. -/- Três grandes grupos, representando classes sociais diferentes, participaram do movimento: o dos camponeses, que eram a maioria (seus líderes mais conhecidos foram Pancho Villa no norte e Emiliano Zapata no sul); o dos trabalhadores urbanos organizados em torno da Casa del Obrero Mundial (COM), de orientação inicialmente anarquista; e o da burguesia urbana e rural, liderada por Francisco Madero. Os camponeses exigiam o fim da concentração e a redistribuição das terras. A burguesia dissidente exigia que fossem definidas regras claras sobre as eleições para que se implantasse uma democracia de tipo liberal. Os trabalhadores urbanos, por sua vez, que não tinham nenhum direito nem liberdade de expressão e reunião, exigiam direitos garantidos pela Constituição. -/- O movimento estendeu-se até 1917, quando foi promulgada uma nova Constituição para o México. Várias reivindicações dos camponeses foram atendidas, mas todas sob o controle do Estado. Grandes propriedades, principalmente as da Igreja, foram expropriadas e repartidas. Possibilitou-se a manutenção das terras comunais na forma de cooperativas, mas a reforma agrária (divisão dos latifúndios) propriamente dita não foi realizada e a restituição das terras usurpadas não se efetivou. Assim, os camponeses pouco tiveram a comemorar. -/- Aos trabalhadores urbanos garantiu-se uma série de novos direitos, como jornada máxima de oito horas e a regulamentação do trabalho das mulheres e de menores, do trabalho noturno, do repouso semanal, das férias e das horas extras. Além disso, foram regulamentados a liberdade de organização sindical e o direito à greve, entre outros direitos. -/- A burguesia industrial, os banqueiros, os grandes comerciantes e proprietários de terras, em nome da “revolução mexicana”, constituíram o Partido Revolucionário Institucional (PRI), que se manteve no poder de 1929 até 2000. -/- 5.2 Revolução Russa -/- Enquanto os mexicanos conquistavam sua Constituição, na Rússia a sociedade fervilhava. A maior parte dos russos, tanto no campo como na cidade, vivia em condições precárias e, desde 1905, lutava pela construção de uma nova ordem social. -/- A Revolução Russa de 1917 começou com a derrubada do czar, em fevereiro, e culminou com a tomada do poder pelos bolcheviques, liderados por Vladimir Ilitch Ulianov, o Lênin, e por Leon Trotsky, em outubro. O movimento teve como base os trabalhadores urbanos e os soldados. -/- Os revolucionários organizavam-se em conselhos populares que expressavam a proposta de uma sociedade que se orientasse pela vontade da maioria. Esses conselhos populares eram chamados de sovietes e constituíram o fato mais inovador da revolução. -/- Após a tomada do poder, com a constituição de uma nova estrutura estatal, os sovietes perderam pouco a pouco sua força. O termo, no entanto, ficou gravado no nome da unidade política e nacional formada em consequência da revolução: República Soviética. -/- A situação na Rússia, que era terrível por causa da Primeira Guerra Mundial, tornou-se ainda pior no período de afirmação da revolução. Mesmo assim, a propriedade privada foi extinta e procurou-se alterar a estrutura estatal e de serviços, como a educação, a saúde, o transporte ferroviário e o sistema bancário. A grande dificuldade foi mudar a estrutura da propriedade rural, que ainda era medieval, e a condição dos camponeses, precária em todos os sentidos. Assim, foi necessário primeiro privatizar a terra para depois torná-la coletiva. Isso foi possível com a concentração do poder pelo Partido Comunista e pelo Estado. -/- Em 1922 foi criada a União das Repúblicas Socialistas Soviéticas (URSS), formada por 12 repúblicas, todas sob o comando político e militar da República Soviética Russa. Depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial, mais três repúblicas foram incorporadas à URSS. -/- Em 1924, com a morte de Lênin, Josef Stálin assumiu o comando da URSS e aprofundou a concentração do poder no Partido Comunista e no Estado, eliminando a oposição. A partir de então, uma revolução que nascera com o propósito de transformar o sistema anterior e garantir a liberdade para todos gerou uma sociedade que teve parte dos problemas econômicos resolvidos, mas à custa da submissão a um Estado autoritário que oprimiu a maioria da população. -/- A União Soviética desmoronou na década de 1980, tendo seu fim assinalado pela queda do Muro de Berlim, em 1989. Deixou oficialmente de existir em dezembro de 1991. -/- Além da experiência russa, outras revoluções populares de orientação socialista ocorreram no século XX. Podemos citar alguns exemplos: na China, em 1949, a revolução liderada por Mao Tsé-Tung; em Cuba, em 1959, o movimento revolucionário encabeçado por Fidel Castro e Che Guevara; no Vietnã, de 1945 a 1954, o movimento liderado por Ho Chi Minh. -/- 5.3 Um breve balanço -/- Como se pode perceber, uma coisa é o início de uma revolução, com seus propósitos transformadores; outra é a situação pós-revolucionária ou a institucionalização da revolução, em que o momento inicial de tomada do poder e alteração das estruturas políticas, econômicas e sociais precisa ser deixado para trás. É necessário, então, criar novas instituições ou reformular as antigas para que a revolução possa se desenvolver. -/- Com o passar dos anos, a liderança muda, e as situações interna e externa se modificam; aparecem interesses novos e são necessárias novas ações, que podem gerar maior emancipação ou não. -/- Algumas revoluções, como a do México, são populares, mas depois do momento inicial as demandas da maioria do povo são deixadas de lado e, em nome delas, há uma reorganização das classes dominantes para continuar no poder. -/- Os exemplos analisados aqui são de sociedades que alteraram sua estrutura e seu modo de vida, mas avançaram pouco no processo de liberdade e emancipação. Pode-se afirmar, então, que não são parâmetros para futuras mudanças, embora devam ser vistos como repletos de lições da história, da vida e dos rumos sempre otimistas e de esperança num mundo melhor. -/- 6. E O QUE VEM PELA FRENTE? -/- A transformação radical de uma sociedade – revolução – está sempre ligada à superação de um sistema por outro, havendo um movimento popular ou uma classe social oprimida organizada para ir à frente e derrubar o antigo regime. -/- Na sociedade capitalista, segundo Marx, a classe social oprimida é o proletariado. Depois das muitas revoluções que ocorreram no mundo, há a possibilidade de a classe proletária, ou trabalhadora, organizar-se para derrubar o sistema capitalista? Há condições objetivas (crise do sistema, organização, poder, armas) e subjetivas (consciência social, aliança entre os diversos segmentos dos explorados) para que isso ocorra? Não se pode negar a existência de algumas dessas condições, principalmente nos países periféricos do sistema capitalista, mas, com as sociedades submetidas a forte esquema de massificação, torna-se cada dia mais difícil acontecer um movimento revolucionário nos moldes da Revolução Russa. -/- Hoje, em todos os meios de comunicação, ouvimos declarações de que estamos vivendo em uma “nova” sociedade, em uma “era pós-moderna”, em uma “sociedade pós-burguesa”, em uma “sociedade pós-industrial” etc. Com isso, afirma-se que está se estruturando uma nova organização social, completamente diferente da anterior. -/- Ora, na sociedade atual estão sendo levadas ao limite as potencialidades da modernidade estabelecida pela Revolução Industrial dos séculos XVIII e XIX, sem mudanças nas estruturas de poder e na economia; mas há indícios de que uma transformação esteja ocorrendo. Em que direção? As respostas a essa questão são divergentes. -/- É possível perceber que a ideia de uma revolução violenta, com a tomada do poder do Estado para desenvolver uma nova sociedade, está cada dia mais distante da realidade. Parece remota, também, a ideia de uma mudança significativa mediante ações lentas e graduais por parte das instituições políticas, pois estas estão muito amarradas às estruturas de poder existentes. Diante de uma possibilidade de mudança, a força da reação normalmente é muito grande e pode aniquilar qualquer tentativa de resistência. Além disso, devido à crise na democracia representativa, as pessoas já não acreditam que seus representantes possam tomar medidas que alterem profundamente a sociedade. -/- Então não há alternativa? Parece difícil, porque a capacidade de cooptação por parte dos poderes vigentes é muito grande. Mas a consciência da desigualdade e do sofrimento que isso acarreta não é apagada ou silenciada e se expressa em manifestações populares e revoltas pontuais em várias partes do mundo. -/- 6.1 Mobilizações e mudanças no século XXI -/- Para pensar um pouco mais sobre as possibilidades de mudança social, é urgente atentar para o que está acontecendo no mundo. Se é verdade que a simples ideia de mudanças lentas e constantes, em termos políticos, não avança para uma grande transformação da vida em sociedade, é também verdadeiro que os sintomas da inquietude que se alastram pelo mundo contemporâneo permitem observar a gestação de novas realidades no curso do processo histórico. -/- O filósofo italiano Antônio Negri (1933-) e o filósofo estadunidense Michael Hardt (1960-) destacaram ao menos três características que podem multiplicar os sintomas da inquietude social: -/- • o nascimento de um grupo composto de novos e jovens sujeitos políticos, conectados com o mundo e inconformados com os limites e a mediocridade de sua vida cotidiana nas periferias das metrópoles, que já não aceitam a condição de subordinação e, para abandoná-la, estão dispostos a sacudir o status quo; -/- • o cultivo de um projeto emancipador por esses jovens sujeitos políticos: eles querem organizar a produção e a distribuição de riquezas horizontalmente e em rede – sem os limites das hierarquias e da mercantilização atuais; -/- • a prática de uma nova democracia, ainda em construção, numa época em que a representação tradicional está se tornando cada vez mais obsoleta e desprestigiada. -/- Exemplos de inquietude social foram as Jornadas de Junho de 2013, quando as ruas do Brasil foram tomadas por insubmissas e plurais personagens. O mesmo aconteceu durante a ocupação, pelos estudantes, das escolas públicas paulistas, em 2015 e 2016, contrários às políticas do governo estadual. -/- Conforme o sociólogo espanhol Manuel Castells (1942-), em termos tecnológicos, econômicos e culturais já há um longo caminho percorrido e muitas transformações efetivadas. De acordo com ele, o período atual é um tempo de eclosão de uma nova era em termos políticos e institucionais. -/- É crucial que se estabeleça um alerta para as possíveis reações contrárias às mudanças sociais e políticas, posto que as forças conservadoras são robustas e poderosas e não desejam mudanças que possam ameaçar seus privilégios. É do confronto entre as correntes progressistas e conservadoras, no entanto, que poderá emergir uma nova era que seja constituída de saltos qualitativos na vida coletiva ou, então, que faça prevalecer o ritmo obscuro e perigoso do retrocesso histórico, rumo a um tempo que não garanta a existência de direitos, em que gritos não são ouvidos e em que as utopias não se alimentam. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- ALMOND, M.; BATISTA, G. O livro de ouro das revoluções. 2ª ed. Nova Iorque: Harper Collins, 2018. -/- ARRUDA, J. J. de A. A Revolução Inglesa. Vol. 82. 1ª ed. São Paulo: brasiliense, 1984. Col. Tudo é História. -/- COTRIM, G. História global. Vol. Único. 11ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016. -/- FUKASAWA, M.; ISI, M.; IRIMAJIRI, Y. Cultura japonesa 7: a era Meiji. Vol. 7. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Nikkey Shimbun, 2018. -/- SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. Vol. Único. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- VÁRIOS AUTORES. O livro da Sociologia. Trad. Rafael Longo. 1ª ed. São Paulo: Globo, 2015. -/- -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- EICdaS, Belo Jardim, Pernambuco, 2019. (shrink)

I advance a novel argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge, according to which we know all and only those propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this theory lets us reconcile major extant theories of knowledge, in the following sense: for any of these theories, if we require that its central condition (evidential support, reliability, safety, etc.) obtains to a maximal degree, we get a theory of knowledge extensionally equivalent to infallibilism. As such, the infallibilist can affirm (...) that, when their conditions are suitably interpreted, most post-Gettier theories of knowledge offer necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. The infallibilist can thus reconcile major theories of knowledge, and is in a better position to explain the intuitive appeal of these theories than the fallibilist who only accepts one of them, and rejects the rest. (shrink)

A common argument for atheism runs as follows: God would not create a world worse than other worlds he could have created instead. However, if God exists, he could have created a better world than this one. Therefore, God does not exist. In this paper I challenge the second premise of this argument. I argue that if God exists, our world will continue without end, with God continuing to create value-bearers, and sustaining and perfecting the value-bearers he has already created. (...) Given this, if God exists, our world—considered on the whole—is infinitely valuable. I further contend that this theistic picture makes our world's value unsurpassable. In support of this contention, I consider proposals for how infinitely valuable worlds might be improved upon, focusing on two main ways—adding value-bearers and increasing the value in present value-bearers. I argue that neither of these can improve our world. Depending on how each method is understood, either it would not improve our world, or our world is unsurpassable with respect to it. I conclude by considering the implications of my argument for the problem of evil more generally conceived. (shrink)

Molinists hold that there are contingently true counterfactuals about what agents would do if put in specific circumstances, that God knows these prior to creation, and that God uses this knowledge in choosing how to create. In this essay we critique Molinism, arguing that if these theses were true, agents would not be free. Consider Eve’s sinning upon being tempted by a serpent. We argue that if Molinism is true, then there is some set of facts that fully explains both (...) Eve’s action and everything else Eve does that influences that action; and that if this is the case, Eve does not act freely. The first premise of this argument follows from the explanatory relations the Molinist is committed to, and the second premise follows from libertarian intuitions about free will. (shrink)

The epistemic probability of A given B is the degree to which B evidentially supports A, or makes A plausible. This paper is a first step in answering the question of what determines the values of epistemic probabilities. I break this question into two parts: the structural question and the substantive question. Just as an object’s weight is determined by its mass and gravitational acceleration, some probabilities are determined by other, more basic ones. The structural question asks what probabilities are (...) not determined in this way—these are the basic probabilities which determine values for all other probabilities. The substantive question asks how the values of these basic probabilities are determined. I defend an answer to the structural question on which basic probabilities are the probabilities of atomic propositions conditional on potential direct explanations. I defend this against the view, implicit in orthodox mathematical treatments of probability, that basic probabilities are the unconditional probabilities of complete worlds. I then apply my answer to the structural question to clear up common confusions in expositions of Bayesianism and shed light on the “problem of the priors.”. (shrink)

This chapter presents a typology of the different kinds of inductive inferences we can draw from our evidence, based on the explanatory relationship between evidence and conclusion. Drawing on the literature on graphical models of explanation, I divide inductive inferences into (a) downwards inferences, which proceed from cause to effect, (b) upwards inferences, which proceed from effect to cause, and (c) sideways inferences, which proceed first from effect to cause and then from that cause to an additional effect. I further (...) distinguish between direct and indirect forms of downwards and upwards inferences. I then show how we can subsume canonical forms of inductive inference mentioned in the literature, such as inference to the best explanation, enumerative induction, and analogical inference, under this typology. Along the way, I explore connections with probability and confirmation, epistemic defeat, the relation between abduction and enumerative induction, the compatibility of IBE and Bayesianism, and theories of epistemic justification. (shrink)

Defenders of Inference to the Best Explanation claim that explanatory factors should play an important role in empirical inference. They disagree, however, about how exactly to formulate this role. In particular, they disagree about whether to formulate IBE as an inference rule for full beliefs or for degrees of belief, as well as how a rule for degrees of belief should relate to Bayesianism. In this essay I advance a new argument against non-Bayesian versions of IBE. My argument focuses on (...) cases in which we are concerned with multiple levels of explanation of some phenomenon. I show that in many such cases, following IBE as an inference rule for full beliefs leads to deductively inconsistent beliefs, and following IBE as a non-Bayesian updating rule for degrees of belief leads to probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. (shrink)

Where E is the proposition that [If H and O were true, H would explain O], William Roche and Elliot Sober have argued that P(H|O&E) = P(H|O). In this paper I argue that not only is this equality not generally true, it is false in the very kinds of cases that Roche and Sober focus on, involving frequency data. In fact, in such cases O raises the probability of H only given that there is an explanatory connection between them.

I present a cumulative case for the thesis that we only know propositions that are certain for us. I argue that this thesis can easily explain the truth of eight plausible claims about knowledge: -/- (1) There is a qualitative difference between knowledge and non-knowledge. (2) Knowledge is valuable in a way that non-knowledge is not. (3) Subjects in Gettier cases do not have knowledge. (4) If S knows that P, P is part of S’s evidence. (5) If S knows (...) that P, ~P is epistemically impossible for S. (6) If S knows that P, S can rationally act as if P. (7) If S knows that P, S can rationally stop inquiring whether P. (8) If S knows each of {P1, P2, … Pn}, and competently deduces Q from these propositions, S knows that Q. -/- I then argue that the skeptical costs of this thesis are outweighed by its explanatory power. (shrink)

Robust Virtue Epistemology maintains that knowledge is achieved just when an agent gets to the truth through, or because of, the manifestation of intellectual virtue or ability. A notorious objection to the view is that the satisfaction of the virtue condition will be insufficient to ensure the safety of the target belief; that is, RVE is no anti-luck epistemology. Some of the most promising recent attempts to get around this problem are considered and shown to ultimately fail. Finally, a new (...) proposal for defending RVE as a kind of anti-luck epistemology is defended. The view developed here turns importantly on the idea that knowledge depends on ability and luck in a way that is gradient, not rigid, and that we know just when our cognitive success depends on ability not rather, but more so, than luck. (shrink)

I argue that when we use ‘probability’ language in epistemic contexts—e.g., when we ask how probable some hypothesis is, given the evidence available to us—we are talking about degrees of support, rather than degrees of belief. The epistemic probability of A given B is the mind-independent degree to which B supports A, not the degree to which someone with B as their evidence believes A, or the degree to which someone would or should believe A if they had B as (...) their evidence. My central argument is that the degree-of-support interpretation lets us better model good reasoning in certain cases involving old evidence. Degree-of-belief interpretations make the wrong predictions not only about whether old evidence confirms new hypotheses, but about the values of the probabilities that enter into Bayes’ Theorem when we calculate the probability of hypotheses conditional on old evidence and new background information. (shrink)

"Correlation is not causation" is one of the mantras of the sciences—a cautionary warning especially to fields like epidemiology and pharmacology where the seduction of compelling correlations naturally leads to causal hypotheses. The standard view from the epistemology of causation is that to tell whether one correlated variable is causing the other, one needs to intervene on the system—the best sort of intervention being a trial that is both randomized and controlled. In this paper, we argue that some purely correlational (...) data contains information that allows us to draw causal inferences: statistical noise. Methods for extracting causal knowledge from noise provide us with an alternative to randomized controlled trials that allows us to reach causal conclusions from purely correlational data. (shrink)

According to a simple Bayesian argument from evil, the evil we observe is less likely given theism than given atheism, and therefore lowers the probability of theism. I consider the most common skeptical theist response to this argument, according to which our cognitive limitations make the probability of evil given theism inscrutable. I argue that if skeptical theists are right about this, then the probability of theism given evil is itself largely inscrutable, and that if this is so, we ought (...) to be agnostic about whether God exists. (shrink)

A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that draws (...) from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or are otherwise ‘trivial’. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

According to reductive intellectualists about knowledge-how :147–190, 2008; Philos Phenomenol Res 78:439–467, 2009) knowledge-how is a kind of knowledge-that. To the extent that this is right, then insofar as we might conceive of ways knowledge could be extended with reference to active externalist :7–19, 1998; Clark in Supersizing the mind: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension: embodiment, action, and cognitive extension. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008) approaches in the philosophy of mind, we should expect no interesting difference between the two. However, (...) insofar as anti-intellectualist approaches to knowledge-how are a viable option, there is an overlooked issue of how knowledge-how might be extended, via active externalism, in ways very differently from knowledge-that. This paper explores this overlooked space, and in doing so, illustrates how a novel form of extended knowledge-how emerges from a pairing of active externalism in the philosophy of mind with anti-intellectualism in the theory of knowledge. Crucial to our argument will be a new way of thinking about the extended mind thesis, as it pertains to the kinds of state one is in when one knows how to do something, and how this state connects with non-accidentally successful performance. (shrink)

Buildings energy consumption is growing gradually and put away around 40% of total energy use. Predicting heating and cooling loads of a building in the initial phase of the design to find out optimal solutions amongst different designs is very important, as ell as in the operating phase after the building has been finished for efficient energy. In this study, an artificial neural network model was designed and developed for predicting heating and cooling loads of a building based on a (...) dataset for building energy performance. The main factors for input variables are: relative compactness, roof area, overall height, surface area, glazing are a, wall area, glazing area distribution of a building, orientation, and the output variables: heating and cooling loads of the building. The dataset used for training are the data published in the literature for various 768 residential buildings. The model was trained and validated, most important factors affecting heating load and cooling load are identified, and the accuracy for the validation was 99.60%. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to challenge what is often called the “Uniqueness” thesis. According to this thesis, given one’s total evidence, there is a unique rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition. It is sensible for defenders of Uniqueness to commit to an accompanying principle that: when some agent A has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, the unique epistemically rational doxastic attitude for A to adopt with (...) respect to whether p is the suspension of judgment. In this paper, I offer a case wherein the agent has equal epistemic reason both to believe that p and to believe that not p, but the agent is not epistemically required to suspend judgment about whether p. Furthermore, the case is such that there seems to be no uniquely rational attitude for the agent to adopt. (shrink)

In Chapter 3 of Judgment and Agency, Ernest Sosa (2015) explicates the concept of a fully apt performance. In the course of doing so, he draws from illustrative examples of practical performances and applies lessons drawn to the case of cognitive performances, and in particular, to the cog- nitive performance of judging. Sosa's examples in the practical sphere are rich and instructive. But there is, I will argue, an interesting disanalogy between the practical and cognitive examples he relies on. Ultimately, (...) I think the source of the disanalogy is a problematic picture of the cogni- tive performance of guessing and its connection to knowledge and defeat. Once this critical line of argument is advanced, an alternative picture of guessing, qua cognitive performance, is articulated, one which avoids the problems discussed, and yet remains compatible with Sosa's broader framework. (shrink)

Among Bayesian confirmation theorists, several quantitative measures of the degree to which an evidential proposition E confirms a hypothesis H have been proposed. According to one popular recent measure, s, the degree to which E confirms H is a function of the equation P(H|E) − P(H|~E). A consequence of s is that when we have two evidential propositions, E1 and E2, such that P(H|E1) = P(H|E2), and P(H|~E1) ≠ P(H|~E2), the confirmation afforded to H by E1 does not equal the (...) confirmation afforded to H by E2. I present several examples that demonstrate the unacceptability of this result, and conclude that we should reject s (and other measures that share this feature) as a measure of confirmation. (shrink)

This collection of essays explores the metaphysical thesis that the living world is not made up of substantial particles or things, as has often been assumed, but is rather constituted by processes. The biological domain is organised as an interdependent hierarchy of processes, which are stabilised and actively maintained at different timescales. Even entities that intuitively appear to be paradigms of things, such as organisms, are actually better understood as processes. Unlike previous attempts to articulate processual views of biology, which (...) have tended to use Alfred North Whitehead’s panpsychist metaphysics as a foundation, this book takes a naturalistic approach to metaphysics. It submits that the main motivations for replacing an ontology of substances with one of processes are to be found in the empirical findings of science. Biology provides compelling reasons for thinking that the living realm is fundamentally dynamic, and that the existence of things is always conditional on the existence of processes. The phenomenon of life cries out for theories that prioritise processes over things, and it suggests that the central explanandum of biology is not change but rather stability, or more precisely, stability attained through constant change. This edited volume brings together philosophers of science and metaphysicians interested in exploring the consequences of a processual philosophy of biology. The contributors draw on an extremely wide range of biological case studies, and employ a process perspective to cast new light on a number of traditional philosophical problems, such as identity, persistence, and individuality. (shrink)

What does being money consist in? We argue that something is money if, and only if, it is typically acquired in order to realise the reduction in transaction costs that accrues in virtue of agents coordinating on acquiring the same thing when deciding what thing to acquire in order to exchange. What kinds of things can be money? We argue against the common view that a variety of things (notes, coins, gold, cigarettes, etc.) can be money. All monetary systems are (...) best interpreted as implementing the same basic protocol. Money, i.e. the thing that we coordinate on acquiring in order to lower our transaction costs, is, in all cases, a set of positions on an abstract mathematical object, namely a relative ratio scale. The things that we ordinarily call ‘money’ are merely records of positions on such a scale. (shrink)

Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren’t expecting it, we suddenly see a connection that previously eluded us—a kind of ‘Aha!’ experience. People with a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What’s not clear, however, is just what it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical work on (...) the psychology of problem solving and creativity to make some inroads in accounting for insightfulness as an intellectual virtue. Important to the view advanced is that virtuously insightful individuals manifest certain skills which both cultivate insight experiences (even if not by directly bringing them about) and enable such individuals to move in an epistemically responsible way from insight experience to epistemic endorsement. (shrink)

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that our first-person preferences regarding pleasurable and painful experiences exhibit a bias toward the future (positive and negative hedonic future-bias), and that our preferences regarding non-hedonic events (both positive and negative) exhibit no such bias (non-hedonic time-neutrality). Further, it has been assumed that our third-person preferences are always time-neutral. Some have attempted to use these (presumed) differential patterns of future-bias—different across kinds of events and perspectives—to argue for the irrationality of hedonic future-bias. This (...) paper experimentally tests these descriptive hypotheses. While as predicted we found first-person hedonic future-bias, we did not find that participants were time-neutral in all other conditions. Hence, the presumed asymmetry of hedonic/non-hedonic and first/third-person preferences cannot be used to argue for the irrationality of future-bias, since no such asymmetries exist. Instead, we develop a more fine-grained approach, according to which three factors—positive/negative valence, first/third-person, and hedonic/non-hedonic—each independently influence, but do not determine, whether an event is treated in a future-biased or time-neutral way. We discuss the upshots of these results for the debate over the rationality of future-bias. (shrink)

We investigated, experimentally, the contention that the folk view, or naïve theory, of time, amongst the population we investigated is dynamical. We found that amongst that population, ~ 70% have an extant theory of time that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory, and ~ 70% of those who deploy a naïve theory of time deploy a naïve theory that is more similar to a dynamical than a non-dynamical theory. Interestingly, while we found stable results across our (...) two experiments regarding the percentage of participants that have a dynamical or non-dynamical extant theory of time, we did not find such stability regarding which particular dynamical or non-dynamical theory of time they take to be most similar to our world. This suggests that there might be two extant theories in the population—a broadly dynamical one and a broadly non-dynamical one—but that those theories are sufficiently incomplete that participants do not stably choose the same dynamical theory as being most similar to our world. This suggests that while appeals to the ordinary view of time may do some work in the context of adjudicating disputes between dynamists and non-dynamists, they likely cannot do any such work adjudicating disputes between particular brands of dynamism. (shrink)

Williams, Elster and Pears hold that an effort to induce in oneself a belief in the truth of some proposition that one believes to be false can succeed only if one manages, somewhere along the way, to forget that one is engaged in such an effort. Although this view has strong intuitive appeal, it is false, and in this paper it is shown to be false by example.

This paper empirically investigates one aspect of the folk concept of time by testing how the presence or absence of directedness impacts judgements about whether there is time in a world. Experiment 1 found that dynamists, showed significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in dynamically directed worlds than in non-dynamical non-directed worlds. Comparing our results to those we describe in Latham et al., we report that while ~ 70% of dynamists say there is time in B-theory worlds, (...) only ~ 45% say there is time in C-theory worlds. Thus, while the presence of directedness makes dynamists more inclined to say there is time in a world, a substantial subpopulation of dynamists judge that there is time in non-directed worlds. By contrast, a majority of non-dynamists judged that there was time in both growing block worlds and C-theory worlds, with no significant differences between the means. Experiment 2 found that when participants are only presented with non-dynamical worlds—namely, a directed world and a non-directed world—they report significantly higher levels of agreement that there is time in B-theory worlds. However, the majority of participants still judge that there is time in C-theory worlds. We conclude that while the presence of directedness bolsters judgements that there is time, most people do not judge it to be necessary for time. (shrink)

This paper examines the debate between permissive and impermissive forms of Bayesianism. It briefly discusses some considerations that might be offered by both sides of the debate, and then replies to some new arguments in favor of impermissivism offered by Roger White. First, it argues that White’s (Oxford studies in epistemology, vol 3. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 161–186, 2010) defense of Indifference Principles is unsuccessful. Second, it contends that White’s (Philos Perspect 19:445–459, 2005) arguments against permissive views do not (...) succeed. (shrink)

It has become customary to conceptualize the living cell as an intricate piece of machinery, different to a man-made machine only in terms of its superior complexity. This familiar understanding grounds the conviction that a cell's organization can be explained reductionistically, as well as the idea that its molecular pathways can be construed as deterministic circuits. The machine conception of the cell owes a great deal of its success to the methods traditionally used in molecular biology. However, the recent introduction (...) of novel experimental techniques capable of tracking individual molecules within cells in real time is leading to the rapid accumulation of data that are inconsistent with an engineering view of the cell. This paper examines four major domains of current research in which the challenges to the machine conception of the cell are particularly pronounced: cellular architecture, protein complexes, intracellular transport, and cellular behaviour. It argues that a new theoretical understanding of the cell is emerging from the study of these phenomena which emphasizes the dynamic, self-organizing nature of its constitution, the fluidity and plasticity of its components, and the stochasticity and non-linearity of its underlying processes. (shrink)

While the contemporary philosophical literature is replete with discussion of the control or freedom required for moral responsibility, only more recently has substantial attention been devoted to the knowledge or awareness required, otherwise called the epistemic condition. This area of inquiry is rapidly expanding, as are the various positions within it. This chapter introduces two major positions: the reasonable expectation view and the quality of will view. The chapter then explores two dimensions of the epistemic condition that serve as fault (...) lines along which these two views diverge. The first dimension concerns different kinds of ignorance. The second concerns what agents can be directly blameworthy for. The chapter closes by sketching a novel approach that incorporates advantages of opposing positions on this topic. (shrink)

Recent work has explored the extent to which intercollegiate athletics even belong at the university or meet the university’s mission. Just as play seems evident in athletics, it is also present in music, art, and theater. While these programs are popular targets when discussing possible cuts, few question their legitimacy at the university. In this article I argue that the justification for retaining the extracurricular status of intercollegiate sports should be based on their being especially playful. Indeed, on the basis (...) of this argument, I suggest that universities offer even greater and wider access to sport through club and intramural sports. However, while athletics might appear to be more playful, I hold that there is substantially more play present in university music, art, and theater programs than there is in intercollegiate sports. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, we proposed two novel puzzles associated with the precautionary principle. Both are puzzles that materialise, we argue, once we investigate the principle through an epistemological lens, and each constitutes a philosophical hurdle for any proponent of a plausible version of the precautionary principle. Steglich-Petersen claims, also in this journal, that he has resolved our puzzles. In this short note, we explain why we remain skeptical.

This chapter draws on insights from non-equilibrium thermodynamics to demonstrate the ontological inadequacy of the machine conception of the organism. The thermodynamic character of living systems underlies the importance of metabolism and calls for the adoption of a processual view, exemplified by the Heraclitean metaphor of the stream of life. This alternative conception is explored in its various historical formulations and the extent to which it captures the nature of living systems is examined. Following this, the chapter considers the metaphysical (...) implications of reconceptualizing the organism from complex machine to flowing stream. What do we learn when we reject the mechanical and embrace the processual? Three key lessons for biological ontology are identified. The first is that activity is a necessary condition for existence. The second is that persistence is grounded in the continuous self-maintenance of form. And the third is that order does not entail design. (shrink)

Feminist socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy make the presence of idealized social conditions necessary for autonomy. I argue that such conceptions cannot, when applied under nonideal conditions, play two key feminist theoretical roles for autonomy: the roles of anti-oppressive character ideal and paternalism-limiting concept. Instead, they prescribe action that reinforces oppression. Treated as character ideals, socially constitutive conceptions of autonomy ask agents living under nonideal ones to engage in self-harm or self-subordination. Moreover, conceptions of autonomy that make idealized social conditions (...) a requirement of autonomy yield the conclusion that oppressed agents are appropriate objects of paternalism. (shrink)

Trope theory is a leading metaphysical theory in analytic ontology. One of its classic statements is found in the work of Donald C. Williams who argued that tropes qua abstract particulars are the very alphabet of being. The concept of an abstract particular has been repeatedly attacked in the literature. Opponents and proponents of trope theory alike have levelled their criticisms at the abstractness of tropes and the associated act of abstraction. In this paper I defend the concept of a (...) trope qua abstract particular by rejecting arguments that purport to show that tropes should not be understood as abstract and by arguing that the abstractness of tropes plays an indispensable role in one of our more promising trope-theoretic analyses of universals and of concrete objects. (shrink)

It has widely been assumed, by philosophers, that most people unambiguously have a phenomenology as of time passing, and that this is a datum that philosophical theories must accommodate. Moreover, it has been assumed that the greater the extent to which people have said phenomenology, the more likely they are to endorse a dynamical theory of time. This paper is the first to empirically test these assumptions. Surprisingly, our results do not support either assumption. One experiment instead found the reverse (...) correlation: people were more likely to report having passage phenomenology if they endorsed a non-dynamical theory of time. Given that people do not have an unambiguous phenomenology as of time passing, we conclude that this is suggestive evidence in favor of veridical non-dynamism—the view that our phenomenology is veridical, and that it does not unambiguously represent that time passes. Instead, our phenomenology veridically has some quite different content. (shrink)

It has often been suggested that people’s ordinary folk understanding of morality involves a rejection of moral relativism and a belief in objective moral truths. The results of six studies call this claim into question. Participants did offer apparently objectivist intuitions when confronted with questions about individuals from their own culture, but they offered increasingly relativist intuitions as they were confronted with questions about individuals from increasingly different cultures or ways of life. In light of these data, the authors hypothesize (...) that people do not have a fixed commitment to moral objectivism but instead tend to adopt different views depending on the degree to which they consider radically different perspectives on moral questions. [NOTE: This is a reprint of Sarkissian et al 2011]. (shrink)

How should we undertand the role of norms—especially epistemic norms—governing assertive speech acts? Mitchell Green (2009) has argued that these norms play the role of handicaps in the technical sense from the animal signals literature. As handicaps, they then play a large role in explaining the reliability—and so the stability (the continued prevalence)—of assertive speech acts. But though norms of assertion conceived of as social norms do indeed play this stabilizing role, these norms are best understood as deterrents and not (...) as handicaps. This paper explains the stability problem for the maintenance of animal signals, and so human communication, for we are animals too, after all; the mechanics of the handicap principle; the role of deterrents and punishments as an alternative mechanism; and the role of social norms governing assertion for the case of human communication. (shrink)

We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection ; we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. (...) This demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core logical constants. (shrink)

Future-bias is the preference, all else being equal, for positive states of affairs to be located in the future not the past, and for negative states of affairs to be located in the past not the future. Three explanations for future-bias have been posited: the temporal metaphysics explanation, the practical irrelevance explanation, and the three mechanisms explanation. Understanding what explains future-bias is important not only for better understanding the phenomenon itself, but also because many philosophers think that which explanation is (...) the correct one has implications for our evaluation of the normative status of future-bias. In this paper we focus on the connection between future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry. The latter refers to the fact that people tend to assign more value to a state of affairs when it is located in the future, as opposed to being equidistant in the past. All three candidate explanations offered for future-bias proceed by explaining the temporal value asymmetry, and then supposing that future-bias is simply a manifestation of that asymmetry. Recently, however, it has been argued that the conditions under which people display the temporal value asymmetry and future-bias are different, and that this is reason to doubt that the latter is a manifestation of the former. In this paper we empirically test one response to this argument against the manifestation thesis—the simulation response—according to which once we control for the degree to which people can simulate the object of their preference, we find that people display future-bias and the temporal value asymmetry in the same conditions. We find no evidence in favour of the simulation response. Moreover, our results support some previous research that suggests that the temporal value asymmetry is less robust than previously thought, and this in itself casts doubt on the idea that future bias is just a manifestation of this asymmetry. (shrink)

Recent research (Latham, Miller and Norton, forthcoming) reveals that a majority of people represent actual time as dynamical. But do they, as suggested by McTaggart and Gödel, represent time as essentially dynamical? This paper distinguishes three interrelated questions. We ask (a) whether the folk representation of time is sensitive or insensitive: i.e., does what satisfies the folk representation of time in counterfactual worlds depend on what satisfies it actually—sensitive—or does is not depend on what satisfies it actually—insensitive, and (b) do (...) those who represent actual time as dynamical, represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical—what we call insensitive dynamism—or do they represent time in all possible worlds as dynamical only conditional on the actual world in fact being dynamical—what we call sensitive dynamism and (c) do dynamists and non-dynamists deploy two different representations of time, or deploy the same representation, but disagree about what actually satisfies that representation? We found no evidence that the folk representation of time is sensitive, or that the folk representation of time is essentially dynamical in either sense, though we did find evidence of a shared representation, on which dynamical features are sufficient, but not necessary, for time. (shrink)

The standard view says that epistemic normativity is normativity of belief. If you’re an evidentialist, for example, you’ll think that all epistemic reasons are reasons to believe what your evidence supports. Here we present a line of argument that pushes back against this standard view. If the argument is right, there are epistemic reasons for things other than belief. The argument starts with evidentialist commitments and proceeds by a series of cases, each containing a reason. As the cases progress, the (...) reasons change from counting in favor of things like having a belief to things like performing ordinary actions. We argue that each of those reasons is epistemic. If the argument succeeds, we should think there are epistemic reasons to consider hypotheses, conduct thought and physical experiments, extend one’s evidence, and perform mundane tasks like eating a sandwich, just as there are epistemic reasons to believe what one’s evidence supports. (shrink)

This paper reads Republic 583b-608b as a single, continuous line of argument. First, Socrates distinguishes real from apparent pleasure and argues that justice is more pleasant than injustice. Next, he describes how pleasures nourish the soul. This line of argument continues into the second discussion of poetry: tragic pleasures are mixed pleasures in the soul that seem greater than they are; indulging them nourishes appetite and corrupts the soul. The paper argues that Plato has a novel account of the ‘paradox (...) of tragedy’, and that the Republic and Philebus contain complementary discussions of tragic and comic pleasure. (shrink)

Epistemic defeat is standardly understood in either evidentialist or responsibilist terms. The seminal treatment of defeat is an evidentialist one, due to John Pollock, who famously distinguishes between undercutting and rebutting defeaters. More recently, an orthogonal distinction due to Jennifer Lackey has become widely endorsed, between so-called doxastic (or psychological) and normative defeaters. We think that neither doxastic nor normative defeaters, as Lackey understands them, exist. Both of Lackey’s categories of defeat derive from implausible assumptions about epistemic responsibility. Although Pollock’s (...) evidentialist view is superior, the evidentialism per se can be purged from it, leaving a general structure of defeat that can be incorporated in a reliabilist theory that is neither evidentialist nor responsibilist in any way. (shrink)

An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are “iconic” or “sentential,” “analog” or “digital,” and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...) of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties—namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co‐occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities. (shrink)

Prior research has demonstrated that antisocial behavior, substance-use disorders, and personality dimensions of aggression and impulsivity are indicators of a highly heritable underlying dimension of risk, labeled externalizing. Other work has shown that individual trait constructs within this psychopathology spectrum are associated with reduced self-monitoring, as reflected by amplitude of the error-related negativity (ERN) brain response. In this study of undergraduate subjects, reduced ERN amplitude was associated with higher scores on a self-report measure of the broad externalizing construct that links (...) these various indicators. In addition, the ERN was associated with a response-locked increase in anterior theta (4–7 Hz) oscillation; like the ERN, this theta response to errors was reduced among high-externalizing individuals. These findings suggest that neurobiologically based deficits in endogenous action monitoring may underlie generalized risk for an array of impulse-control problems. (shrink)