Results for 'Not-Being-One'

999 found
Order:
  1. On (not) being in two places at the same time: an argument against endurantism.Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (3):239 - 248.
    Is there an entity such that it can be in two places at the same time ? According to one traditional view, properties can, since they are immanent universals. But what about objects such as a person or a table ? Common sense seems to say that, unlike properties, objects are not multiply locatable. In this paper, I will argue first of all that endurantism entails a consequence that is quite bizarre, namely, that objects are universals, while properties are particulars. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  2. Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.
    We argue that the main results of scientific papers may appropriately be published even if they are false, unjustified, and not believed to be true or justified by their author. To defend this claim we draw upon the literature studying the norms of assertion, and consider how they would apply if one attempted to hold claims made in scientific papers to their strictures, as assertions and discovery claims in scientific papers seem naturally analogous. We first use a case study of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. COVID-19 vaccination status should not be used in triage tie-breaking.Olivia Schuman, Joelle Robertson-Preidler & Trevor M. Bibler - 2022 - Journal of Medical Ethics 48 (10):1-3.
    This article discusses the triage response to the COVID-19 delta variant surge of 2021. One issue that distinguishes the delta wave from earlier surges is that by the time it became the predominant strain in the USA in July 2021, safe and effective vaccines against COVID-19 had been available for all US adults for several months. We consider whether healthcare professionals and triage committees would have been justified in prioritising patients with COVID-19 who are vaccinated above those who are unvaccinated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  4. Even if it might not be true, evidence cannot be false.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):801-827.
    Wordly internalists claim that while internal duplicates always share the same evidence, our evidence includes non-trivial propositions about our environment. It follows that some evidence is false. Worldly internalism is thought to provide a more satisfying answer to scepticism than classical internalist views that deny that these propositions about our environment might belong to our evidence and to provide a generally more attractive account of rationality and reasons for belief. We argue that worldly internalism faces serious difficulties and that its (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  5. Untying the Gorgianic ‘Not’: Argumentative Structure in On Not-Being.Evan Rodriguez - 2019 - Classical Quarterly 69 (1):87-106.
    Gorgias’ On Not-Being survives only in two divergent summaries. Diels–Kranz's classic edition prints the better-preserved version that appears in Sextus’ Aduersus Mathematicos. Yet, in recent years there has been rising interest in a second summary that survives as part of the anonymous De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. The text of MXG is more difficult; it contains substantial lacunae that often make it much harder to make grammatical let alone philosophical sense of. As Alexander Mourelatos reports, one manuscript has a scribal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Theoretical identities may not be necessary.Alik Pelman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (3):412-422.
    Following insights from the New Theory of Reference, it has become widely accepted that theoretical identities like ‘water = H2O' are necessary. However, some have challenged this claim. I propose yet another challenge in the form of a sceptical argument. The argument is based on the contention that the necessity of theoretical identities is dependent upon criteria of identity. Thus, a theoretical identity is necessary given one criterion of identity but contingent given another. Since we do not know which criteria (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Subjective Probabilities Need Not be Sharp.Jake Chandler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  8.  91
    God's definition may not be as accurate as we most know.Abbot Kamalkhani - manuscript
    Just a silly thought of where we might have come from. Furthermore, who created us? No one knows for sure, but some claim it was God. However, no one has seen God or the actual creators to the best of our knowledge. Moreover, those that claim to have seen God show us no proof. -/- One may wonder, why does God only appear to those who believe in him? What is the point of that if they already believe in God? (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  88
    Losing the Forest for the Tree: Why All Thomists Should (Not) Be River Forest Thomists.Philip-Neri Reese, O. P. - 2024 - Religions 15 (5):1-11.
    One of the most influential and controversial schools of 20th century Thomism—especially in North America—is the “River Forest School” or “River Forest Thomism”. And one of the most influential and controversial theses associated with that school is the thesis that metaphysics cannot be established as a distinct and autonomous science unless one has already proven the existence of a positively immaterial being. The purpose of this paper is to show that River Forest Thomism cannot and should not be reduced (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. What temptation could not be : a lesson from the criminal law.Gabriel S. Mendlow - 2014 - In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Law and the Philosophy of Action. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Brill | Rodopi.
    Prominent theories of the criminal law borrow heavily from the two leading theories of temptation—the evaluative conception of temptation, which conceives emotion and desire as essentially involving a kind of evaluation, and the mechanistic conception of temptation, which conceives emotion and desire as essentially involving felt motivation. As I explain, both conceptions of temptation are inconsistent with the possibility of akratic action, that is, action contrary to a person’s conscious better judgment. Both are inconsistent with the possibility of akratic action (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Anticipating the ultimate innovation, volitional evolution: can it not be promoted or attempted responsibly?Lantz Fleming Miller - 2015 - Journal of Responsible Innovation 2 (3):280-300.
    The aspiration for volitional evolution, or human evolution directed by humans themselves,has increased in philosophical, scientific, technical, and commercial literature. The prospect of shaping the very being who is the consumer of all other innovations offers great commercial potential, one to which all other innovations would in effect be subservient. Actually an amalgam of projected technical/commercial developments, this prospective innovation has practical and ethical ramifications. However, because it is often discussed in a scientific way (specifically that of evolutionary theory), (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. Not So Blue to be Sad: Affective Affordances and Expressive Properties in Affective Regulation.Marta Caravà & Marta Benenti - 2024 - Topoi:1-12.
    In our everyday interaction with the environment, we often perceive objects and spaces as opportunities to feel, maintain, enhance, and change our affective states and processes. The concept of affective affordance was coined to accommodate this aspect of ordinary perception and the many ways in which we rely on the material environment to regulate our emo- tions. One natural way to think of affective affordances in emotion regulation is to interpret them as tools for regulating felt affective states. We argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Debunking a mereological myth: If composition as identity is true, universalism need not be.Nikk Effingham - manuscript
    It is a common view that if composition as identity is true, then so is mereological universalism (the thesis that all objects have a mereological fusion). Various arguments have been advanced in favour of this: (i) there has been a recent argument by Merricks, (ii) some claim that Universalism is entailed by the ontological innocence of the identity relation, (or that ontological innocence undermines objections to universalism) and (iii) it is entailed by the law of selfidentity. After a preliminary introduction (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Nadine Elzein & Tuomas K. Pernu - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):13-32.
    A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will. More precisely: if an agent A is to be justified in asserting a proposition P (e.g. "there is no free will"), then A must also be able to assert not-P. Thus, if A is unable to assert not-P, due to determinism, then A is not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15. One Thing After Another: Why the Passage of Time Is Not an Illusion.Natalja Deng - 2019 - In Adrian Bardon, Valtteri Arstila, Sean Power & Argiro Vatakis (eds.), The Illusions of Time: Philosophical and Psychological Essays on Timing and Time Perception. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Does time seem to pass, even though it doesn’t, really? Many philosophers think the answer is ‘Yes’—at least when ‘time’s passing’ is understood in a particular way. They take time’s passing to be a process by which each time in turn acquires a special status, such as the status of being the only time that exists, or being the only time that is present. This chapter suggests that, on the contrary, all we perceive is temporal succession, one thing (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  16. Cognitive Regeneration and the Noetic Effects of Sin: Why Theology and Cognitive Science May not be Compatible.Lari Launonen - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (3).
    Justin Barrett and Kelly James Clark have suggested that cognitive science of religion supports the existence of a god-faculty akin to sensus divinitatis. They propose that God may have given rise to the god-faculty via guided evolution. This suggestion raises two theological worries. First, our natural cognition seems to favor false god-beliefs over true ones. Second, it also makes us prone to tribalism. If God hates idolatry and moral evil, why would he give rise to mind with such biases? A (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Being Self-Deceived about One’s Own Mental State.Kevin Lynch - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):652-672.
    A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception—being self-deceived about one's own intentional mental state—is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it's puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick.Jussi Backman - 2023 - In Steven Delay (ed.), Life Above the Clouds: Philosophy in the Films of Terrence Malick. State University of New York Press. pp. 127-146.
    "If the previous chapters by Cabrera, Reid and Craig, and Cerbone all accentuate the paradox of existence, that our being-in-the-world is simultaneously beautiful and ugly, good and evil, joyous and painful, Jussi Backman's "Not One Power, But Two: Dark Grounds and Twilit Paradises in Malick" investigates this fundamental ambivalence in terms of Schelling's doctrine of evil, a view that assigns evil (and hence melancholy) a fundamental place as a basic principle of reality. Backman's suggestion at once deepens and complexifies (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19. To remember, or not to remember? Potential impact of memory modification on narrative identity, personal agency, mental health, and well-being.Przemysław Zawadzki - 2021 - Bioethics 35 (9):891-899.
    Memory modification technologies (MMTs)—interventions within the memory affecting its functions and contents in specific ways—raise great therapeutic hopes but also great fears. Ethicists have expressed concerns that developing and using MMTs may endanger the very fabric of who we are—our personal identity. This threat has been mainly considered in relation to two interrelated concerns: truthfulness and narrative self‐constitution. In this article, we propose that although this perspective brings up important matters concerning the potential aftermaths of MMT utilization, it fails to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  20. Be Careful what you Wish for: Acceptance of Laplacean Determinism Commits One to Belief in Precognition.Stan Klein - 2024 - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 11 (1):19–29.
    Laplacean Determinism (his so-called demon argument) is the thesis that every event that transpires in a closed universe is a physical event caused (i.e., determined) in full by some earlier event in accord with laws that govern their behavior. On this view, it is possible, in principle, to make perfect predictions of the state of the universe at any time Tn on the basis of complete knowledge of the state of the universe at time T1. Thus, if identity theory, epiphenomenalism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. To Be or Not to Be – A Research Subject.Eric M. Meslin & Peter H. Schwartz - 2010 - In Thomasine Kushner (ed.), Surviving Health Care: A Manual for Patients and Their Families. Cambridge University Press. pp. 146-162.
    Most people do not know there are different kinds of medical studies; some are conducted on people who already have a disease or medical condition, and others are performed on healthy volunteers who want to help science find answers. No matter what sort of research you are invited to participate in, or whether you are a patient when you are asked, it’s entirely up to you whether or not to do it. This decision is important and may have many implications (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Hamlet: to be or not to be who one is.Eva Cybulska-Corsack & Eva Cybulska - 2016 - Existenz 11:22-30.
    Abstract: This essay examines the thoughts and actions of the eponymous hero Hamlet of Shakespeare's tragedy from the perspective of existential philosophy. The death of his father, the prompt remarriage of his mother and Ophelia's rejection of his love are interpreted as Jaspersian boundary situations. Burdened with the responsibility to avenge his father's murder, Hamlet faces an existential dilemma of either being a dutiful son or being true to himself. As he loses faith in the goodness of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Why the One Cannot Have Parts: Plotinus on Divine Simplicity, Ontological Independence, and Perfect Being Theology.Caleb M. Cohoe - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):751-771.
    I use Plotinus to present absolute divine simplicity as the consequence of principles about metaphysical and explanatory priority to which most theists are already committed. I employ Phil Corkum’s account of ontological independence as independent status to present a new interpretation of Plotinus on the dependence of everything on the One. On this reading, if something else (whether an internal part or something external) makes you what you are, then you are ontologically dependent on it. I show that this account (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24. Can One Be A Quasi-Realist About The Aesthetic?Christopher Dowling - 2006 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 3 (3):100-109.
    For ordinary judgements it is often the case that it may be justifiable to change one's mind given that others agree in holding an opposing view. In the case of judgements of beauty this is never the case; these are autonomous. Robert Hopkins has discussed the following (familiar) explanation: Judgements of beauty are not genuine assertions at all; rather they are expressions of some response or experience. Since to acknowledge the disagreement of others is not to respond to objects as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Not One, Not Two: Toward an Ontology of Pregnancy.Maja Sidzinska - 2017 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 3 (4):1-23.
    Basic understandings of subjectivity are derived from the principles of masculine embodiment such as temporal stability and singularity. But pregnancy challenges such understandings because it represents a sort of splitting of the body. In the pregnant situation, a subject may experience herself as both herself and an other, as well as neither herself nor an other. This is logically untenable—an impossibility. If our discourse depends on singular, fixed referents, then what paradigms of identity are available to the pregnant subject? What (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. This Universalism which is not One: Ernesto Laclau's Emancipations.Linda M. G. Zerilli - 1998 - Diacritics 28 (2):3-20.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:This Universalism Which Is Not OneLinda M. G. Zerilli (bio)Ernesto Laclau. Emancipation(s). London: Verso, 1996.Judging from the recent spate of publications devoted to the question of the universal, it appears that, in the view of some critics, we are witnessing a reevaluation of its dismantling in twentieth-century thought. One of the many oddities about this “return of the universal” 1 is the idea that contemporary engagements with it are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  27. A Being On Facebook but not Of Facebook: Using New Social Media Technologies to Promote the Virtues of Jacques Ellul.Brian Lightbody - 2014 - Ellul Forum 55:1-6.
    In this paper, I wish to show how new technologies come to alter one’s initial enjoyment and comportment towards a hobby. What I show is that new technologies serve to transform leisurely activities into a technique, in the Ellulian sense of the term. I begin from the outside in, as it were, by first articulating what I take a hobby to be. Secondly, I then examine the time-honoured pastime of fishing to show that new technologies, if utilized, either cause the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Why Images Cannot be Arguments, But Moving Ones Might.Marc Champagne & Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen - 2020 - Argumentation 34 (2):207-236.
    Some have suggested that images can be arguments. Images can certainly bolster the acceptability of individual premises. We worry, though, that the static nature of images prevents them from ever playing a genuinely argumentative role. To show this, we call attention to a dilemma. The conclusion of a visual argument will either be explicit or implicit. If a visual argument includes its conclusion, then that conclusion must be demarcated from the premise or otherwise the argument will beg the question. If (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29. Not One of Those Girls: An Existential-Phenomenological Exploration of My Relationship with Eyeliner.Scarlett de Courcier - 2022 - Existential Analysis 1 (33):98-111.
    This is a phenomenological exploration of my relationship with eyeliner. I draw parallels between the loss of possibilities in Heidegger’s being-towards-death and the cutting off of the possibility of wearing eyeliner through illness. I discuss Sartrean and Kierkegaardian views of the self and how, through illness, self can become Other.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Immersing oneself into one’s past: subjective presence can be part of the experience of episodic remembering.Denis Perrin & Michael Barkasi - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.
    A common view about the phenomenology of episodic remembering has it that when we remember a perceptual experience, we can relive or re-experience many of its features, but not its characteristic presence. In this paper, we challenge this common view. We first say that presence in perception divides into temporal and locative presence, with locative having two sides, an objective and a subjective one. While we agree with the common view that temporal and objective locative presence cannot be relived in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Happiness is not Well-being.Jason R. Raibley - 2012 - Journal of Happiness Studies 13 (6):1105-1129.
    This paper attempts to explain the conceptual connections between happiness and well-being. It first distinguishes episodic happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants, so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the idea that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  32. Better to be than not to be?Gustaf Arrhenius & Wlodek Rabinowitz - 2010 - In Hans Joas (ed.), The benefit of broad horizons: intellectual and institutional preconditions for a global social science: festschrift for Bjorn Wittrock on the occasion of his 65th birthday. Leiden [etc.]: Brill. pp. 65 - 85.
    Can it be better or worse for a person to be than not to be, that is, can it be better or worse to exist than not to exist at all? This old 'existential question' has been raised anew in contemporary moral philosophy. There are roughly two reasons for this renewed interest. Firstly, traditional so-called “impersonal” ethical theories, such as utilitarianism, have counter-intuitive implications in regard to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future, not yet existing people. Secondly, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. How not to be a normative irrealist.Mark Kalderon - manuscript
    Jimmy expresses sympathy for Scanlon’s contractualism but wonders whether it might be better developed in the context of a Humean expressivism. Jimmy presses this point, in part, by observing that much of what Scanlon wants to say about moral and normative discourse, such as their logical discipline and apparent truth-aptitude, can be accommodated by the expressivist. If all that Scanlon wants to say about moral and normative discourse can be accommodated by the expressivist then what content can be given to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Between the Void and Emptiness: Ontological Paradox and Spectres of Nihilism in Alain Badiou’s Being and Event_ and Graham Priest’s _One.Georgie Newson - 2023 - Open Philosophy 6 (1).
    In this study, I reconstruct and compare Alain Badiou’sBeing and Event(2005) and Graham Priest’sOne(2014), arguing that the ontologies pursued within the two texts are intriguingly analogous in a number of ways. Both Badiou and Priest are committed to thinking through classically ontological problems without denying the validity of the paradoxes they raise; both regard Plato’sParmenidesas an early and formative account of these paradoxes; both establish conclusions to the effect that unity – or “oneness” – is indeed a contradictory phenomenon; and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.
    I defend the widely-held view that morally worthy action need not be motivated by a desire to promote rightness as such. Some have recently come to reject this view, arguing that desires for rightness as such are necessary for avoiding a certain kind of luck thought incompatible with morally worthy action. I show that those who defend desires for rightness as such on the basis of this argument misunderstand the relationship between moral worth and the kind of luck that their (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  36. One's Modus Ponens: Modality, Coherence and Logic.Una Stojnić - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):167-214.
    Recently, there has been a shift away from traditional truth-conditional accounts of meaning towards non-truth-conditional ones, e.g., expressivism, relativism and certain forms of dynamic semantics. Fueling this trend is some puzzling behavior of modal discourse. One particularly surprising manifestation of such behavior is the alleged failure of some of the most entrenched classical rules of inference; viz., modus ponens and modus tollens. These revisionary, non-truth-conditional accounts tout these failures, and the alleged tension between the behavior of modal vocabulary and classical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  37. Not Those Who "all speak with pictures": Kant on Linguistic Abilities and Human Progress.Huaping Lu-Adler - forthcoming - In Luigi Filieri & Konstantin Pollok (eds.), Kant on Language. Cambridge University Press.
    Kant ascribes two radically different kinds of language—symbolic or pictorial (qua intuitive) and discursive languages—to the “Oriental” and “Occidental” peoples respectively. By his analysis, having a merely symbolic language suggests that the “Orientals” lack understanding—and hence the ability to form concepts and think in abstracto—as well as genius and spirit. Meanwhile, he establishes discursive language as a sine qua non of the continued progress of humanity, primarily because only by means of words—as opposed to symbols—can one think (not just intuit), (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
    Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  39. Thinking and being sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):634-654.
    How is what we believe related to how we act? That depends on what we mean by ‘believe’. On the one hand, there is what we're sure of: what our names are, where we were born, whether we are sitting in front of a screen. Surety, in this sense, is not uncommon — it does not imply Cartesian absolute certainty, from which no possible course of experience could dislodge us. But there are many things that we think that we are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  40.  78
    The puzzle of make-believe about pictures: can one imagine a perception to be different?Sonia Sedivy - 2021 - In Art, Representation, and Make-Believe: Essays on the Philosophy of Kendall L. Walton. New York: Routledge. pp. 147-163.
    Kendall Walton explains pictures in terms of games of perceptual make-believe. Pictures or depictions are props that draw us to participate in games of make-believe where we imagine seeing what a picture depicts. Walton proposes that one imagines of one’s perceptual experience of the coloured canvas that it is a different perceptual experience. The issue is whether perception and imagination can combine the way Walton suggests. Can one imagine a perception to be different? To get a clearer understanding of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Herder’s Concept of Being and the Influence of Kant’s Pre-Critical Consideration of the Ontological Argument.Alexander J. B. Hampton - 2015 - Filozofia 10 (70):842-52.
    Herder’s earliest philosophical writing, the essay fragment Versuch über das Sein, explores the concept of Being (Sein) in dialogue with Kant’s pre-critical Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes. In this often critically omitted work, Herder arrives at a number of insights that would be determinative for the development of his later thought. This examination details Herder’s concept of Being as the transcendent ground of predication, his contention that Being can never be experienced directly, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. The «One over Many» Argument for Propositions.Esteban Withrington - 2023 - Contrastes: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 28 (1):61-79.
    The meanings of utterances and thoughts are commonly regarded in philosophical semantics as abstract objects, called «propositions», which account for how different utterances and thoughts can be synonymous and which constitute the primary truth-bearers. I argue that meanings are instead natural properties that play causal roles in the world, that the kind of «One over Many» thinking underlying the characterization of shared meanings as abstract objects is misguided and that utterances and thoughts having truth-values in virtue of their meanings does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. "... in God only one infinite act can be thought...": The Ambiguity of Divine Agency and the Diversity of Evil.Ingolf U. Dalferth - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (3):167-186.
    The paper argues that God does not act but is creative activity, which helps to overcome evil by the possibilities of the good that it opens up for creatures in the face of evil.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Not So Human, After All?Brendan Shea - 2016 - In Courtland Lewis & Kevin McCain (eds.), Red Rising and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 15-25.
    If asked to explain why the Golds’ treatment of other colors in Red Rising is wrong, it is tempting to say something like “they are all human beings, and it is wrong to treat humans in this way!” In this essay, I’ll argue that this simple answer is considerably complicated by the fact that the different colors might not be members of the same biological species, and it is in fact unclear whether any of them are the same species as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Well-Being and the Priority of Values.Jason Raibley - 2010 - Social Theory and Practice 36 (4):593-620.
    Leading versions of hedonism generate implausible results about the welfare value of very intense or unwanted pleasures, while recent versions of desire satisfactionism overvalue the fulfillment of desires associated with compulsions and addictions. Consequently, both these theories fail to satisfy a plausible condition of adequacy for theories of well-being proposed by L.W. Sumner: they do not make one’s well-being depend on one’s own cares or concerns. But Sumner’s own life-satisfaction theory cannot easily be extended to explain welfare over (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   31 citations  
  46. Mother Nature and the Mother of All Virtues.Karen Bardsley - 2013 - Environmental Ethics 35 (1):27-40.
    Feelings of gratitude toward the natural environment are problematic because gratitude seems to be an appropriate response to someone’s intentional decision to benefit us, and ecosystems that sustain human life do not choose to do so. In accordance with one defense of the rationality and appropriateness of gratitude toward nature, intentional action can be regarded as not being a necessary condition for feelings of gratitude. Instead, gratitude toward an entity can be considered both rational and appropriate when (1) that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. Should the teleosemanticist be afraid of semantic indeterminacy?Karl Bergman - 2021 - Mind and Language (N/A).
    The teleosemantic indeterminacy problem has generated much discussion but no consensus. One possible solution is to accept indeterminacy as a real feature of some representations. I call this view “indeterminacy realism.” In this paper, I argue that indeterminacy realism should be treated as a serious option. By drawing an analogy with vagueness, I try to show that accepting the reality of indeterminacy would not be catastrophic for teleosemantics. I further argue that there are positive reasons to endorse indeterminacy realism. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  48. The Being of History, the Play of Différance and the Problem of Misunderstanding.Adrian Costache - 2013 - Studia Universitatis Babes-Bolyai, Philosophia 58 (3):179-190.
    Beginning with the second decade of the last century, after a fierce critique of W. Dilthey and the Historical School’s epistemological approach, philosophical hermeneutics has assumed the position of “official” philosophy of history of our times. However, in our previous work we have shown that philosophical hermeneutics is not actually able to give a better answer to “What is history?” than that already offered by the Historical School. Now we would like to show that its answer to the other fundamental (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  56
    Quantum ontology de-naturalized: What we can't learn from quantum mechanics.Raoni Arroyo & Jonas R. B. Arenhart - forthcoming - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science.
    Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Why Truthmakers?Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 17-31.
    Consider a certain red rose. The proposition that the rose is red is true because the rose is red. One might say as well that the proposition that the rose is red is made true by the rose’s being red. This, it has been thought, does not commit one to a truthmaker of the proposition that the rose is red. For there is no entity that makes the proposition true. What makes it true is how the rose is, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   141 citations  
1 — 50 / 999