This paper looks at an argument strategy for assessing the epistemic closure principle. This is the principle that says knowledge is closed under known entailment; or (roughly) if S knows p and S knows that p entails q, then S knows that q. The strategy in question looks to the individual conditions on knowledge to see if they are closed. According to one conjecture, if all the individual conditions are closed, then so too is knowledge. I give a deductive argument (...) for this conjecture. According to a second conjecture, if one (or more) condition is not closed, then neither is knowledge. I give an inductive argument for this conjecture. In sum, I defend the strategy by defending the claim that knowledge is closed if, and only if, all the conditions on knowledge are closed. After making my case, I look at what this means for the debate over whether knowledge is closed. (shrink)

The present text contains a critical edition of Peter of Palude’s question of divine concurrence, found in his Sentences commentary, book II, d. 1, q. 4. The question concerns whether God is immediately active in every action of a creature, and if yes, how we should understand this divine concurrence. Peter, just as elsewhere in his commentary, considers at length the opinions of other thinkers — especially those of Giles of Rome, Durand of St.-Pourçain, and Thomas Aquinas — (...) and develops his own answer as a response to theirs. Thus, while Giles maintained that God acts uniformly in every instance of natural causation just as the sun acts uniformly by giving the same light to everything, Peter (following Durand) argues that this is incompatible with the divine creation of multiple things. Second, while Durand maintained that God is only mediately active in the actions of creatures, Peter rejects this opinion because it cannot account for miracles contra naturam (such as the three young men in Nebuchadnezzar’s fire), and because he thinks that God’s immediate action follows from his immediate conservation of creatures. Third, Peter presents Aquinas’s position in detail, and defends it against Durand’s objections; according to this position, God immediately conserves and concurs with every creature, with an action that is numerically distinct from that of the secondary agent. Although as a result of his extensive borrowing, Peter’s text might not be regarded as immensely original, it provides an interesting case study of the Dominican reaction against Durand in the early 1300’s. (shrink)

The strong law of large numbers and considerations concerning additional information strongly suggest that Beauty upon awakening has probability 1/3 to be in a heads-awakening but should still believe the probability that the coin landed heads in the Sunday toss to be 1/2. The problem is that she is in a heads-awakening if and only if the coin landed heads. So, how can she rationally assign different probabilities or credences to propositions she knows imply each other? This is the problem (...) I address in this article. I suggest that ‘p whenever q and vice versa’ may be consistent with p and q having different probabilities if one of them refers to a sample space containing ordinary possible worlds and the other to a sample space containing centred possible worlds, because such spaces may fail to combine into one composite probability space and, as a consequence, ‘whenever’ may not be well defined; such is the main contribution of this article. 1The Sleeping Beauty Game2Groisman’s and Peter Lewis’s Approaches3Discussing Beauty’s Credences4The Principle of Equivalence's Failure5Making Sense of the Principle of Equivalence's Failure6Elga’s and Lewis’s Approaches7ConclusionAppendix. (shrink)

Thomas Aquinas wrote a text later known as Quaestio de attributis and ordered it inserted in a precise location of his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard more than a decade after composing this work. Aquinas assigned exceptional importance to this text, in which he confronts the debate on the issue of the divine attributes that swept the most important centres of learning in 13th Century Europe and examines the answers given to the problem by the representatives of (...) the four mainstream schools of his time: the Greek mystic Dionysius Areopagita, the Latin Saint Anselm of Canterbury, the Jewish rabbi Moses Maimonides and the Muslim philosopher Ibn Sina. This in-depth study of Thomas Aquinas’ Quaestio de attributis (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3) binds together the findings of previous research on the unique history of this text by reconstructing the historical circumstances surrounding its composition, shows that the Quaestio contains Aquinas’ final answer to the dispute on the divine attributes, and thoroughly examines his interpretation of Maimonides’ position on the issue of the knowledge of God by analysing this and other texts related to it chronologically and doctrinally. The examination of the Quaestio reveals the background of Thomas Aquinas’ renewed interest in Maimonides’ position on the issue and brings to light elements of Aquinas’ interpretation that are absent from his earlier references to Maimonides. Moreover, the chronological and doctrinal connection of the Quaestio de attributis to other Thomistic works with explicit references to Maimonides enables a reconstruction of his comprehensive approach to Maimonides’ teaching on the possibility and extent of the knowledge of God in the Guide of the Perplexed and highlights the place of Maimonides’ philosophical teachings in Thomas’ own thought in issues like "Being" as the proper name of God, the multiplicity of the divine names, the beatific vision in the afterlife, the causes that prevent the instruction of the multitude in divine matters and the role of faith and prophecy in the acquisition of the true knowledge of God in this life. The last chapter examines the reasons behind Aquinas’ silencing of Maimonides’ name when introducing his Five Ways for the knowledge of the existence of God, in spite of the evident relation between these and Maimonides’ Four Speculations. The study is completed with an extensive appendix that includes the text of the Quaestio de attributis with an English translation and the critical edition of several chapters of the 13th Century Latin translation of the Guide of the Perplexed known as Dux neutrorum. (shrink)

1. Introduction: a look back at the reasons vs. causes debate. 2. The interventionist account of causation. 3. Four objections to interventionism. 4. The counterfactual analysis of event causation. 5. The role of free agency. 6. Causality in the human sciences. -- The reasons vs. causes debate reached its peak about 40 years ago. Hempel and Dray had debated the nature of historical explanation and the broader issue of whether explanations that cite an agent’s reasons are causal or not. Melden, (...) Peters, Winch, Kenny and Anscombe had contributed their anticausal conceptions. The neo-Wittgensteinians seemed to be winning the day when in 1963 Donald Davidson published his seminal paper “Actions, Reasons, and Causes”. Davidson’s paper devastated the Wittgensteinian camp. It contained, among other things, a powerful attack on the logical connection argument. Davidson argued that the existence of a logical or conceptual connection between descriptions can never eliminate a causal relation, which holds between events simpliciter, not between events under certain descriptions. Davidson maintained that in a way, reasons can be causes. When somebody acts for a certain reason, his intentional attitudes, or rather changes in his attitudes, cause his bodily movements. Davidson also argued that rationalization is a species of causal explanation. For the definition of action, he argued that intentional actions are bodily movements caused in the right way by beliefs and desires that rationalize them. Davidson’s paper paved the way for causal theories of action, which superseded neo-Wittgensteinian analyses in the following decades. The causal theory was rapidly adopted by Alvin Goldman, David Armstrong, Paul Churchland, Myles Brand and many others, entering the mainstream and dominating the philosophy of action to this very day. In 1971 Georg Henrik von Wright published his book "Explanation and Understanding". The second chapter did not deal with agency, but with causation. It developed a new account of causation, the interventionist or experimentalist account. Focusing on causation, von Wright remedied a major shortcoming of the reasons vs. causes debate. The concept of causality, and the nature of the causal relation, received little attention in this debate, a fact that holds true for both camps. Mostly it was simply taken for granted that, as Hempel had declared, “causal explanation is a special type of deductive-nomological explanation”. One camp then aligned intentional explanations with D-N explanations, while the other camp insisted on their disparity. So strictly speaking, the label “reasons/causes debate” was a misnomer. The controversy dealt primarily with the question as to whether intentional explanations can take the form of D-N explanations, while the notion of causation, and the metaphysics of the causal relation, were left obscured. With von Wright’s new approach, the situation changed. Von Wright was primarily concerned with causation, but his approach contained an implicit attack on the causal theory of action as well. His core idea was that the notion of causality is intimately linked with, or even derived from, the notion of intentionally making something happen. Other philosophers, even Hume, had considered such a connection before, but often just to reject this view, regarding it as a kind of myth belonging to the infancy of the human mind. Von Wright took the idea seriously. He submitted the analysis that p is the cause of q if and only if by doing p we could bring about q. The causal theory of action was also concerned with the relation between causation and agency, to which its name bears witness. The causal theory of action holds that actions are bodily movements with a certain causal history. This is why von Wright’s account constituted a momentous challenge to the causal theory: it reversed the direction of conceptual dependency between both notions. Davidson and his followers tried to define what an intentional action is by using the notion of causation. The causal condition which the causal theory sets is part of the definition of “doing something intentionally”. Von Wright claimed that the conceptual dependency is the other way round. He used the notions of doing, and bringing about, to explain what causal relations are. So, instead of a causal theory of action, he advocated an agency theory of causation, as it may be dubbed. It is remarkable how seldom this clash of opinions about conceptual primacy is reflected in the literature. There are few exceptions: Fred Stoutland noticed the conflict, and he published a number of papers in which he compared Davidson’s and von Wright’s views. Von Wright’s book "Explanation and Understanding" was widely read and discussed in the seventies, especially in Europe. But it strikes me that especially in North America, where the causal theory of action became the orthodoxy of the day, von Wright’s challenge went largely unnoticed. Even Davidson did not seem to take it seriously. He nowhere takes notice of the interventionist theory of causation, while he does discuss von Wright’s earlier book "Norm and Action". As is well-known, Davidson favoured an alternative account of causation, based on “the principle of the nomological character of causality”, as he somewhat clumsily called it, or, later and less clumsily, “the cause-law thesis”. Davidson’s firm adherence to a nomological theory of causality may explain why he did not take much interest in alternative accounts. [...] -/- . (shrink)

REPRODUÇÃO ANIMAL: TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES EM ANIMAIS, E A INDÚSTRIA DE EMBRIÕES NO BRASIL -/- ANIMAL BREEDING: EMBRYO TRANSFER IN ANIMALS, AND THE EMBRYO INDUSTRY IN BRAZIL Apoio: Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE E-mail: [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- 1. INTRODUÇÃO A técnica da inseminação artificial tornou possível aumentar o impacto na descendência de touros geneticamente superiores em termos de produção láctea das filhas. Com a transferência de embriões é possível aumentar o impacto da fêmea sobre (...) a população das filhas. A transferência de embriões data de 1890, ano em que Heape obteve o nascimento de coelhos transferindo ovócitos fecundados de uma fêmea para outra. A partir de 1930, é repetida uma série de experiências para desenvolver a técnica e aplicá-la em ovinos, caprinos (1934) e bovinos (1951) como espécies mais idôneas para a reprodução. A Inglaterra e os Estados Unidos estabeleceram as bases para o comércio de embriões durante os anos sessenta e setenta. De forma resumida, a transferência de embriões implica na estimulação da produção de ovócitos mediante a aplicação de hormônios: cerca de 6-8 dias após a cobrição dessas fêmeas ou da sua inseminação artificial, os óvulos fertilizados são extraídos dos órgãos genitais da fêmea doadora por perfusão ou lavagem com soluções biológicas controladas e testadas, originando-se uma deposição dos gametas fecundados nas fêmeas receptoras que serão encarregadas de levar adiante a gestação e o parto sem influência sobre as produções do novo indivíduo. 2. MANEJO DAS FÊMEAS DOADORAS É relativamente fácil obter um embrião, uma vez que pode origina-se a partir do cio natural das vacas cíclicas. No entanto, a fim de otimizar a técnica, o normal é «superovular» a fêmea doadora e obter um número superior de gametas fecundadas após cada lavagem ou perfusão das genitais. A maioria das fêmeas doadoras são tratadas com gonadotrofinas (PMSG) ou com hormônios estimuladores da foliculogênese (FSH). Estes hormônios invertem a atresia normal de folículos permitindo uma maturação, que em condições normais não se realizaria. O mecanismo exato do funcionamento destas hormonas não é totalmente claro. A superovulação multiplica por um fator de 10 o número de ovócitos recuperados no caso das vacas, ovelhas e cabras, mas apenas por um fator 2 ou 3 no caso das porcas. Existe um acordo geral sobre a utilização das gonadotrofinas; a PMSG deve ser aplicada durante a transição da fase luteica para a folicular, ou seja, no 16º dia do ciclo. As doses de gonadotrofinas variam entre 1500 e 3000 UI em bovinos, aumentando a resposta e a variabilidade individual com o aumento da dose. A resposta ao tratamento varia de acordo em função de diversos fatores. Neste contexto, merecem especial atenção a espécie, a raça, a época e a conformação corporal do animal, bem como o lote de fabricação da preparação hormonal (quadro 7.1). Estudos demonstram que, nos bovinos, as raças de corte respondem melhor ao tratamento do que as raças leiteiras. Tabela 1: Doses de gonadotrofinas em UI -/- Espécie Dia do ciclo Crescimento folicular_ ___ PMSG FSH Ovulação _____ PMSG FSH Bovinos 8 – 10 1500 – 3000 20 – 50 1500 – 2000 75 – 200 Caprinos 16 – 17 1000 – 1500 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Ovinos 12 – 14 1000 – 2000 12 – 20 1000 – 1500 50 – 75 Suínos 15 – 17 750 – 1500 10 – 20 500 – 1000 25 – 50 Coelhos — 25 – 75 2 – 3 25 – 75 2 – 3 Fonte: HAFEZ, 2004. O FSH também é utilizado para superovulação em várias espécies. Nos ovinos, injetam-se 2 mg desta hormona 12 horas antes da retirada das esponjas, aplicando-se mais três injeções, com um intervalo de 12 horas, até 24 horas após a retirada das esponjas, o que corresponde a um total de 8 mg de FSH injetados por tratamento e animal. Às vezes, e dependendo do país, existem dificuldades para a obtenção desse hormônio em condições de pureza adequada para que o tratamento proporcione o resultado esperado. Nas vacas dadoras devem ter passado mais de 50 dias após o último parto: também ser animais cíclicos, encontrar-se num nível nutricional elevado e em aumento, sem deficiências especificas alimentares. Existe uma indicação de suplementação das fêmeas doadoras com minerais essenciais antes do tratamento. 3. OBTENÇÃO DE EMBRIÕES Uma vez as fêmeas doadoras inseminadas, entre o sexto e o oitavo dia, procede-se a coleta dos embriões. Para isso, atualmente se utilizam cateteres de obtenção transcervical (tipo Foley, Rusch. etc.) munidos de uma bola insuflável na sua extremidade que permite criar um compartimento estanque na parte distal do córneo uterino e proceder ao arrasto dos embriões ali localizados. Para obter esta «lavagem» utiliza-se uma solução aquosa tamponada: o meio mais frequentemente utilizado é o tampão fosfato salino (PBS: pH = 7; PO = 280 - 290 mOsm/kg) suplementado com antibióticos e proteínas. Depois de recuperado o meio de lavagem, os embriões devem ser isolados do volume total, avaliados segundo critérios do Manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões de acordo com seu estado de desenvolvimento. Código numérico para determinar o grau de desenvolvimento embrionário: N° 1: ovócito não fertilizado ou embrião de uma célula (1 dia). N° 2: Identifica embriões com 2 a 16 células (2-4 dias). N° 3: Identifica mórulas adiantadas (5-6 dias). N° 4: Identifica mórulas compactas de 6 dias de idade. N° 5: blastocisto adiantado (7 dias). N° 6: blastocisto (7-8 dias). N° 7: blastocisto expandido (8-9 dias). N° 8: blastocisto eclodido (9 dias) a partir do nono ou décimo dia o blastocisto já está fora da zona pelúcida. Além da classificação por estado de desenvolvimento, a referida Sociedade Internacional estabeleceu uma categorização dos embriões com base na qualidade dos mesmos. Assim os denomina: 1: excelente; 2: bom; 3: regular; 4: degenerado. Segundo as investigações de diversos autores especialistas no tema não devem ser transferidos embriões que não tenham sido classificados como excelentes ou bons. A obtenção dos embriões pode ser realizada em uma clínica, em unidades móveis especializadas, ou na própria fazenda. Em todo o caso, a doadora não deve apresentar quaisquer sintomas clínicos de doença, sendo esta responsabilidade direta do veterinário. O rebanho de onde provém a doadora deve estar livre de medidas cautelares sanitárias. Os técnicos devem estar adequadamente limpos e preparados para esta atuação, em um lugar tranquilo e que permita a colocação de equipamentos e material em condições limpas e seguras. 4. TÉCNICAS DE TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES Recomenda-se que os embriões sejam transferidos o mais rápido possível depois da recuperação. A fêmea receptora deve apresentar um ambiente uterino o mais semelhante possível ao da fêmea doadora. Isto quer dizer que a receptora também será mantida num sistema de sincronização para que coincida o mais possível o estágio de desenvolvimento embrionário com seu correspondente estado uterino. A margem de assincronia para evitar efeitos indesejáveis é de ± 24 horas. Os métodos hormonais de sincronização são análogos aos das doadoras. As técnicas para a deposição dos embriões no seu novo habitat podem ser igualmente cirúrgicas e não cirúrgicas, mas devido aos problemas do uso de anestésicos em técnicas cirúrgicas, as transferências foram direcionadas para modelos não-cirúrgicos ou transcervicais. Este método é baseado na utilização do colo uterino de forma análoga como é realizada na inseminação artificial. Devido às relações entre o embrião e o ovário, as porcentagens de fertilidade são aumentadas ao serem depositadas no corno ipsilateral no ovário que se encontra ativo. A utilização desta técnica implica na obtenção de mais fêmeas gestantes. O uso de novilhas como fêmeas receptoras aumenta também a taxa de gestações a partir de uma maior facilidade de manejo, uniformidade na resposta hormonal e um custo mais baixo. O fator humano ou habilidade do técnico que realiza esta técnica também constitui um fator que influencia decisivamente no êxito da transferência, encontrando-se variações de 20 a 60% devidas a este fator. 5. CONTROLES SANITÁRIOS Com a utilização da inseminação artificial, verificou-se que, embora as tecnologias reprodutivas colaborativas fossem mais avançadas em termos de técnicas destinadas a aumentar a produtividade individual, da mesma forma, podem constituir um perigo de contaminação e de dispersão de doenças estrangeiras para o grupo ou rebanho para onde são transferidos os novos genes. Neste contexto, a transferência embrionária (TE) deve realizar-se tendo em conta os riscos que pode implicar uma manipulação inadequada. Uma vez mais, a Sociedade Internacional (IETS) na Reunião Regional da OIE (Oficina Internacional de Epizootias) estabeleceu as normas em 1985 para que a TE pudesse ser utilizada como meio para controle de doenças na pecuária. Para que a utilização da TE se realize sem risco para a saúde, é necessário ter em conta um certo número de regras e condições específicas que evitem os riscos de contaminação. O embrião está separado do meio externo por três barreiras de proteção: o corpo da mãe, o útero por si só e a terceira, e mais importante, pela zona pelúcida, a qual nos animais domésticos tem demonstrado ser totalmente impermeável a qualquer elemento patogênico, desde que fique intacta. Portanto, o risco de contaminação dos embriões pode vir por duas vias diferentes: a) Fatores extrínsecos - por invasão dos agentes patogênicos na cavidade uterina principalmente. Isto está relacionado com o estado sanitário médio do país, região ou rebanho de origem. b) Fatores intrínsecos - Segundo Thibier podemos considerar diferentes fontes potenciais de contaminação, que segundo o risco sanitário se classificam nas seguintes ordens: 1° Zigoto. 2° Penetração. 3° Absorção. 4° Armazenamento. 5° Exame. 6° Transferência. Os esforços para que os embriões se tornem livres de contaminação devem ser semelhantes aos que são efetuados com os animais vivos e com as doses seminais. O momento mais perigoso encontra-se entre a coleta das células fecundadas e a sua deposição, após seu exame, no trato reprodutivo da receptora. As condições em que o referido processo deve ser realizado encontram-se detalhadas no manual da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS). 6. REGRAS DA IETS A transferência de embriões é a via mais segura para a troca de genes. No entanto, os técnicos devem esforçar-se por manter todas as regras e normas sanitárias para que a coleta e a manipulação dos embriões se realizem sob condições de absoluta garantia higiênica e sanitária. A transferência embrionária implica, pela primeira vez na história da medicina veterinária, que a vigilância sanitária não se aplica estritamente ao animal, uma vez que, na sua fase "in vitro", está inteiramente sob o controle do técnico. Por conseguinte, não haverá futuro para este tipo de biotecnologia se, paralelamente, não houver um elevado nível de garantia de que não «servirá» para não disseminar ou difundir doenças. As conclusões da Sociedade Internacional de Transferência de Embriões (IETS) na sua reunião anual de 14 de Janeiro de 1992 estabelecem, tendo em conta a revisão efetuada em 1991 pela Subdireção de Investigação e pelo Comitê de Importação e Exportação, uma classificação das doenças. Esta classificação corresponde às seguintes categorias: Categoria 1 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas suficientes para afirmar que o risco de transmissão é negligenciável, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência: a) Leucose bovina enzoótica. b) Febre aftosa (bovinos). c) Língua azul (bovinos). d) Brucelose bovina. e) Rintraqueíte infecciosa bovina. f) Doença de Aujeszky. Categoria 2 - Doenças para as quais foram recolhidas provas substanciais que indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para as quais é necessário verificar os dados existentes através de novas transferências: a) Peste suína clássica. Categoria 3 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças para as quais os resultados preliminares indicam que o risco de transmissão é insignificante, desde que os embriões sejam corretamente manipulados, entre a coleta e a transferência, mas para os quais essas verificações preliminares devem ser corroboradas por dados experimentais complementares "in vitro" e "in vivo": a) Peste bovina. b) Diarreia viral bovina. c) Língua azul (ovinos). d) Febre aftosa (suínos, ovelhas e cabras). e) Campylobacter fetus (ovinos). f) Doença vesicular do porco. g) Peste suína africana. h) Prurido lombar (ovinos). i) Haemophilus somnus. Categoria 4 - Doenças ou agentes de doenças que foram ou são objeto de trabalhos preliminares: a) Vírus Akabane (bovino). b) Estomatite vesicular (bovinos e suínos). c) Chlamydia psittaci (bovinos e suínos). d) Ureaplasma/micoplasmose (bovinos e caprinos). e) Maedi-visna (ovino). f) Adenomatosa pulmonar (ovino). g) Prurido lombar (caprinos). h) Língua azul (caprinos). i) Artrite e encefalite caprina. j) Parvovírus (suíno). k) Enterovírus (bovinos e suínos). I) Leptospirose (suíno). m) Herpesvírus 4 dos bovinos. n) Mycobacterium paratuberculose (bovinos). o) brucelose ovina. p) Doença de Border (ovinos). q) Vírus parainfluenza 3 (bovinos). r) Agente da encefalopatia espongiforme bovina. É interessante salientar que apenas seis doenças estão incluídas na categoria 1 (a mais segura). Isso não significa que as outras doenças tenham um risco maior, apenas indica que o risco de transmissão das doenças da categoria 1 é irrelevante, estatisticamente falando. É importante assinalar que as doenças mais importantes dos bovinos se situam na categoria 1. Isto significa que a incidência do embrião patogênico nos bovinos parece ser perfeitamente controlável, desde que sejam adotadas metodologias adequadas. Isto serve também como linha de defesa adicional para que o técnico centre sua atenção e cuidados entre a fase de obtenção e a de transferência. 7. SITUAÇÃO ATUAL DA TRANSFERÊNCIA DE EMBRIÕES ANIMAIS NO BRASIL O Brasil é um dos grandes responsáveis mundiais pela implantação da tecnologia na reprodução animal, sendo assim, o país conseguiu inserir-se no mercado internacional como um dos maiores produtores de embriões in vivo e in vitro. Nas últimas duas décadas, especialmente entre os anos de 1997 e 2017 o país passou por importantes transformações nesse segmento, dentre essas transformações vale destacar a posição relativa do Brasil no contexto mundial. O Brasil passou de referência regional, nos anos 1990, para se tornar o maior produtor mundial de embriões entre os anos 2012 e 2013, sendo líder no uso e na produção de embriões in vitro. Os primeiros registros da TE produzidos in vivo no Brasil datam da década de 1980, e uma década depois o país já tornara-se referência e detinha um mercado consolidado de produção e TE na espécie bovina. Não obstante, no ano de 1997 o país ainda era referência apenas no contexto regional, detendo 68,3% dos embriões transferidos na América Latina, esse percentual corresponde a 24.085 embriões de um total de 35.254 produzidos na América Latina. Esse percentual regional representa apenas 6,6% de toda a produção mundial de embriões in vivo, que produziu, em 1997, 360.656 embriões in vivo. Nos últimos anos, o mercado de embriões, principalmente o bovino, teve retração moderada de -2,5% ao ano entre 2003 e 2018, porém essa retração contrasta com o ligeiro crescimento observado a partir dos anos 2000 conforme figura 1: Figura 1: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil no período 1996-2018, total e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo[IVD] ou in vitro [IVP]). Em 2018, o mercado de embriões bovinos manteve-se inalterado se compararmos com os três anos anteriores, houve reduções nós segmentos de corte, leite e no total comparado ao ano de 2017. Em 2014, a produção de embriões para melhoramento do gado leiteiro teve seu ápice, porém de lá para cá esse mercado manteve-se estagnado como demonstra a tabela 2. Tabela 2: Produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil em 2018, estratificada por segmento e por tecnologia adotada (in vivo ou in vitro). 7.1 Crise, economia e mercado de embriões A indústria de embriões reflete, em maior ou menor grau, o momento da economia brasileira. Apesar do segmento agropecuário ser um setor em constante crescimento no país, ao qual, sem dúvidas, em meio a inúmeras crises mantém-se em constante crescimento. Porém vale ressaltar que esse mercado é emergente e está refletido em paralelo com os bens produzidos pelo país, como demonstra a figura 2. Figura 2: Produção de embriões bovinos e variação no produto interno bruto (PIB) no Brasil, no período 1996-2018. Cada vez mais o setor agropecuário do Brasil investe em novas tecnologias que maximizem o mercado e que melhore a produção dos animais seja no segmento corte ou leite. Segundo a OCDE, 1997, essa indústria da produção de embriões é um conjunto de novas técnicas e processos, frutos do desenvolvimento técnico-científico, que chega ao mercado e - o mais importante - o transforma. Logo, todas essas técnicas e biotecnologias visam, além da alta produção e do lucro, o melhoramento e a suplementação alimentícia da população mundial que está em crescente avanço. A evolução da tecnologia embrionária no país, seja para o melhoramento dos equinos para os esportes como as vaquejadas, hipismo, corridas, etc., onde são investidos tempo, dedicação e dinheiro para formar um novo animal que apresente força, conformação, conversão alimentar e que custa milhões, em muitos casos, não só dos equinos, mas também dos caprinos, ovinos, suínos e até mesmo os bovinos onde o mercado da TE é mais presente e aquecida, venceu os estigmas do “modismo” e o chamado “elitismo”, porém deve enfrentar novos desafios, em especial num contexto de forte concentração do mercado de genética e de concorrência globalizada. Mesmo com todos esses avanços e retrocessos, essa relativização dos números demonstra que um percentual bastante reduzido das fêmeas bovinas que estão em idade reprodutiva é utilizado para a técnica da transferência de embriões, e que o mercado brasileiro ainda tem um grande potencial de crescimento no setor de produção in vivo e in vitro. 8. RESUMO E PRIMEIRAS CONCLUSÕES Ao longo deste trabalho pretendi realizar uma revisão sumária sobre um tema de grande importância presente, e sobretudo futura; referir-me à transferência embrionária. Atualmente, esta técnica atingiu um grau notável de penetração, a nível prático, no gado leiteiro. No entanto, num futuro mais ou menos longínquo, não temos dúvidas quanto a esta técnica, pelas vantagens indubitáveis que apresenta a nível de avanço genético, que será aplicada em outras espécies úteis ao homem. Na minha exposição, tentei dar especial ênfase a dois aspectos: as técnicas de transferência, incluindo as normas IETS e os controles sanitários a serem efetuados. Por fim, a indústria brasileira de embriões mostrou-se em retrocessos e avanços, porém o mercado ainda têm grandes desafios a serem enfrentados ao longo dos anos, mas que serão sanados mediante as técnicas desenvolvidas pelos inúmeros centros de pesquisa embrionárias e seus especialistas. -/- Realização -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – Departamento de Zootecnia da UFRPE. Recife, 2020. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- BALL, Peter JH; PETERS, Andy R. Reproduction in cattle. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2008. BARUSELLI, Pietro Sampaio et al. Sêmen sexado: inseminação artificial e transferência de embriões. Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 31, n. 3, p. 374-381, 2007. BRACKELL, B. G.; JR SEIDEL, G. E.; SEIDEL, S. Avances en zootecnia nuevas técnicas de reproducción animal. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1988. COLE, H. H.; CUPPS, P. T. Reproduction in domestic animals. 1ª ed. Londres: Academic Press, 1977. CURTIS, John L. et al. Cattle embryo transfer procedure. An instruction manual for the rancher, dairyman, artificial insemination technician, animal scientist, and veterinarian. Londres: Academic Press, Inc., 1991. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Ovulação, Controle e Sincronização do Cio. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia da Reprodução Animal: Fecundação e Gestação. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Março de 2020. DE LA FUENTE, J. Manipulación de embriones en ganado vacuno. Bovis, n. 58, p. 51-61, 1994. GIBBONS, A.; CUETO, M. Manual de transferencia de embriones ovinos y caprinos. Bariloche: Inta, 2013. GONÇALVES, Paulo Bayard Dias; DE FIGUEIREDO, José Ricardo; DE FIGUEIRÊDO FREITAS, Vicente José. Biotécnicas aplicadas à reprodução animal. São Paulo: Editora Roca, 2008. GONÇALVES, Rômany Louise Ribeiro; VIANA, João Henrique Moreira. Situação atual da produção de embriões bovinos no Brasil e no mundo. In: Embrapa Recursos Genéticos e Biotecnologia-Artigo em anais de congresso (ALICE). Revista Brasileira de Reprodução Animal, v. 43, n. 2, p. 156-159, abr./jun. 2019., 2019. HAFEZ, E. S. E.; HAFEZ, B. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HOPPER, Richard M. (Ed.). Bovine reproduction. Nova Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, 2014. PÉREZ PÉREZ, F.; PÉREZ GUTIÉRREZ, F. Reproducción animal, inseminación animal y transplante de embriones. Barcelona: Cientifico-medica, 1985. MANSOUR, R. T.; ABOULGHAR, M. A. Optimizing the embryo transfer technique. Human reproduction, v. 17, n. 5, p. 1149-1153, 2002. MARTINS, Carlos Frederico. O impacto da transferência de embriões e da fecundação in vitro na produção de bovinos no Brasil. Embrapa Cerrados-Artigo de divulgação na mídia (INFOTECA-E), 2010. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS MCKINNON, A. O.; SQUIRES, E. L. Equine embryo transfer. Veterinary Clinics of North America: Equine Practice, v. 4, n. 2, p. 305-333, 1988. PALMA, G. A.; BREM, G. Transferencia de los embriones. GA Palma & G. Brem. Transferencia de embriones y biotecnología de la reproducción en la especie bovina. Ed. Hemisferio Sur. Buenos Aires, Argentina, p. 143-161, 1993. SCHOOLCRAFT, William B.; SURREY, Eric S.; GARDNER, David K. Embryo transfer: techniques and variables affecting success. Fertility and sterility, v. 76, n. 5, p. 863-870, 2001. SEIDEL, George E. Superovulation and embryo transfer in cattle. Science, v. 211, n. 4480, p. 351-358, 1981. STRINGFELLOW, D. A.; SEIDEL, S. M. Manual of IETS. Savoy IL: IETS, p. 103-130, 1998. STRINGFELLOW, D. A. Manual da sociedade internacional de transferência de embriões. Brasília: Sociedade Brasileira de Transferência de Embriões (SBTE), 1999. THIBIER, M.; NIBART, M. Disease control and embryo importations. Theriogenology, v. 27, n. 1, p. 37-47, 1987. VIANA, J. H. M. Produção e transferência de embriões bovinos em 2018. In: Jornal o embrião. Edição 64, ano 33. Brasília: SBTE, 2019. -/- . (shrink)

Not only the direct physical experiences of deployment can severely harm soldiers’ mental health. Witnessing violations of their moral principles by the enemy, or by their fellow soldiers and superiors, can also have a devastating impact. It can cause soldiers’ moral disorientation, increasing feelings of shame, guilt, or hate, and the need for general answers on questions of right and wrong. Various attempts have been made to keep soldiers mentally sane. One is to provide convincing causes for their deployment, which (...) risks an “end justifies the means” way of thinking. The good cause can provide a moral justification for horrible atrocities. Another method, introduced in the USA, Canada, and Australia, aims to strengthen military personnel’s resistance by promoting and maintaining a happy, optimistic state of mind through the use of positive psychology. Alongside making soldiers “morally fit” for all kinds of situations, the focus could also be on moral recovery and forgiveness. Such a care-based military ethics approach, aimed at mutual understanding and interdependence, could help soldiers handle the emotional impact of moral conflicts. This demands that military units reflect on their organizational culture and rethink oaths and codes of conduct that focus mainly on efficiency and readiness, as well as the soldierly self-image with its seemingly still deeply rooted warrior ethos. Today, resilience and positive psychology in the military is apparently mainly geared to assuring its soldiers’ readiness. An appropriate set of virtues and understanding of virtue ethics that are less centered on self-perfection and autonomy could point to a different form of character-building and lead to a better understanding of others. (shrink)

When is it (epistemically) rational to suspend judgment on a proposition? Before addressing this question, one has to clarify what suspension of judgment (in short: suspension) is and establish rationality standards for the attitudes that constitute suspension. Ideally, suspending can be reduced to attitudes for which one already has established rationality standards. This paper distinguishes two kinds of suspension, weak and strong, and offers a reductionist account of suspension based on credence. However, it does not reduce suspension to credence alone (...) but takes a higher-order perspective on credence into account. Other doxastic attitudes such as belief and doubtful belief are also reexamined and defined in the light of this higher-order perspective. (shrink)

Kingfisher was upset. He cared little for the village but cared a lot for the wellbeing of himself.

Throughout her philosophical writing, Margaret Cavendish is clear in stating that colours are real; they are not mere mind-dependent qualities that exist only in the mind of perceivers. This puts her at odds with other seventeenthcentury thinkers such as Galileo and Descartes who endorsed what would come to be known as the ‘primary-secondary quality distinction’. Cavendish’s argument for this view is premised on two claims. First, that colourless objects are inconceivable. Second, that if an object is inconceivable then it could (...) not possibly exist in nature. My aim in this paper is to explain why Cavendish accepts both premises of this argument. However, the repercussions of this paper go much further than just explaining why she thinks colourless objects cannot exist in nature and the upshots are twofold. First, it provides new insights into the fundamental role that perception plays in Cavendish’s metaphysics. While Cavendish’s view that all of nature perceives is well-established, I show that Cavendish is also committed to the view that all of nature is perceivable. Second, it provides the first in-depth discussion of Cavendish’s modal epistemology and her reasons for thinking that inconceivability entails impossibility (in nature). (shrink)

If you want to understand McDowell's spatial metaphors when he talks about perceptual knowledge, place him side-by-side with Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Though McDowell shows no evidence of reading Dretske's writings on knowledge from the late 1960s onwards (McDowell mentions "Epistemic Operators" once in passing), McDowell gives the same four arguments as Dretske for the conclusion that knowledge requires "conclusive" reasons that rule of the possibility of mistake. Despite various differences, we think it is best to read McDowell as re-discovering (...) Dretske on perceptual knowledge. Since Dretske is easy to understand, all of McDowell's metaphors become easy to understand. But what about McDowell's disjunctivism? Turns out McDowell is not an ontological disjunctivist, and his epistemological disjunctivism is really just the banal point that some perceptual experiences provide conclusive reasons for perceptual belief and some do not. Perceptual experiences are either conclusive or inconclusive. Dretske would agree. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

All contributions included in the present issue were originally prepared for an “Author Meets Critics” session organized by Carl Sachs for the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association in Savannah, Georgia, on 5th January, 2018.

When do two sentences say the same thing, that is, express the same content? We defend two-component (2C) semantics: the view that propositional contents comprise (at least) two irreducibly distinct constituents: (1) truth-conditions and (2) subject-matter. We contrast 2C with one-component (1C) semantics, focusing on the view that subject-matter is reducible to truth-conditions. We identify exponents of this view and argue in favor of 2C. An appendix proposes a general formal template for propositional 2C semantics.

Scientists may sometimes generalize from their samples to broader populations when they have not yet sufficiently supported this generalization. Do such hasty generalizations also occur in experimental philosophy? To check, we analyzed 171 experimental philosophy studies published between 2017 and 2023. We found that most studies tested only Western populations but generalized beyond them without justification. There was also no evidence that studies with broader conclusions had larger, more diverse samples, but they nonetheless had higher citation impact. Our analyses reveal (...) important methodological limitations of many experimental philosophy studies and suggest that philosophical training may not protect against hasty generalizations. (shrink)

We present a formal semantics for epistemic logic, capturing the notion of knowability relative to information (KRI). Like Dretske, we move from the platitude that what an agent can know depends on her (empirical) information. We treat operators of the form K_AB (‘B is knowable on the basis of information A’) as variably strict quantifiers over worlds with a topic- or aboutness- preservation constraint. Variable strictness models the non-monotonicity of knowledge acquisition while allowing knowledge to be intrinsically stable. Aboutness-preservation models (...) the topic-sensitivity of information, allowing us to invalidate controversial forms of epistemic closure while validating less controversial ones. Thus, unlike the standard modal framework for epistemic logic, KRI accommodates plausible approaches to the Kripke-Harman dogmatism paradox, which bear on non-monotonicity, or on topic-sensitivity. KRI also strikes a better balance between agent idealization and a non-trivial logic of knowledge ascriptions. (shrink)

Confirmation bias is one of the most widely discussed epistemically problematic cognitions, challenging reliable belief formation and the correction of inaccurate views. Given its problematic nature, it remains unclear why the bias evolved and is still with us today. To offer an explanation, several philosophers and scientists have argued that the bias is in fact adaptive. I critically discuss three recent proposals of this kind before developing a novel alternative, what I call the ‘reality-matching account’. According to the account, confirmation (...) bias evolved because it helps us influence people and social structures so that they come to match our beliefs about them. This can result in significant developmental and epistemic benefits for us and other people, ensuring that over time we don’t become epistemically disconnected from social reality but can navigate it more easily. While that might not be the only evolved function of confirmation bias, it is an important one that has so far been neglected in the theorizing on the bias. (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next (...) twenty or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

We explore some possibilities for developing epistemic logic using truthmaker semantics. We identify three possible targets of analysis for the epistemic logician. We then list some candidate epistemic principles and review the arguments that render some controversial. We then present the classic Hintikkan approach to epistemic logic and note—as per the ‘problem of logical omniscience’—that it validates all of the aforementioned principles, controversial or otherwise. We then lay out a truthmaker framework in the style of Kit Fine and present six (...) different ways of extending this semantics with a conditional knowledge operator, drawing on notions of implication and content that are prominent in Fine’s work. We demonstrate that different logics are thereby generated, bearing on the aforementioned epistemic principles. Finally, we offer preliminary observations about the prospects for each logic. (shrink)

You don't say much about who you are teaching, or what subject you teach, but you do seem to see a need to justify what you are doing. Perhaps you're teaching underprivileged children, opening their minds to possibilities that might otherwise never have occurred to them. Or maybe you're teaching the children of affluent families and opening their eyes to the big moral issues they will face in life — like global poverty, and climate change. If you're doing something like (...) this, then stick with it. Giving money isn't the only way to make a difference. (shrink)

Peter Ludlow shows how word meanings are much more dynamic than we might have supposed, and explores how they are modulated even during everyday conversation. The resulting view is radical, and has far-reaching consequences for our political and legal discourse, and for enduring puzzles in the foundations of semantics, epistemology, and logic.

When scientists or science reporters communicate research results to the public, this often involves ethical and epistemic risks. One such risk arises when scientific claims cause cognitive or behavioural changes in the audience that contribute to the self-fulfilment of these claims. I argue that the ethical and epistemic problems that such self-fulfilment effects may pose are much broader and more common than hitherto appreciated. Moreover, these problems are often due to a specific psychological phenomenon that has been neglected in the (...) research on science communication: many people tend to conform to ‘descriptive norms’, that is, norms capturing (perceptions of) what others commonly do, think, or feel. Because of this tendency, science communication may frequently produce significant social harm. I contend that scientists have a responsibility to assess the risk of this potential harm and consider adopting strategies to mitigate it. I introduce one such strategy and argue that its implementation is independently well motivated by the fact that it helps improve scientific accuracy. (shrink)

We propose a solution to the problem of logical omniscience in what we take to be its fundamental version: as concerning arbitrary agents and the knowledge attitude per se. Our logic of knowledge is a spin-off from a general theory of thick content, whereby the content of a sentence has two components: an intension, taking care of truth conditions; and a topic, taking care of subject matter. We present a list of plausible logical validities and invalidities for the logic of (...) knowledge per se for arbitrary agents, and isolate three explanatory factors for them: the topic-sensitivity of content; the fragmentation of knowledge states; the defeasibility of knowledge acquisition. We then present a novel dynamic epistemic logic that yields precisely the desired validities and invalidities, for which we provide expressivity and completeness results. We contrast this with related systems and address possible objections. (shrink)

Some artificial intelligence systems can display algorithmic bias, i.e. they may produce outputs that unfairly discriminate against people based on their social identity. Much research on this topic focuses on algorithmic bias that disadvantages people based on their gender or racial identity. The related ethical problems are significant and well known. Algorithmic bias against other aspects of people’s social identity, for instance, their political orientation, remains largely unexplored. This paper argues that algorithmic bias against people’s political orientation can arise in (...) some of the same ways in which algorithmic gender and racial biases emerge. However, it differs importantly from them because there are strong social norms against gender and racial biases. This does not hold to the same extent for political biases. Political biases can thus more powerfully influence people, which increases the chances that these biases become embedded in algorithms and makes algorithmic political biases harder to detect and eradicate than gender and racial biases even though they all can produce similar harm. Since some algorithms can now also easily identify people’s political orientations against their will, these problems are exacerbated. Algorithmic political bias thus raises substantial and distinctive risks that the AI community should be aware of and examine. (shrink)

What rights and duties do adults have with respect to raising children? Who, for example, has the right to decide how and where a particular child will live, be educated, receive health care, and spend recreational time? I argue that neither biological (gene-provider) nor..

Bayesianism can be characterized as the following twofold position: (i) rational credences obey the probability calculus; (ii) rational learning, i.e., the updating of credences, is regulated by some form of conditionalization. While the formal aspect of various forms of conditionalization has been explored in detail, the philosophical application to learning from experience is still deeply problematic. Some philosophers have proposed to revise the epistemology of perception; others have provided new formal accounts of conditionalization that are more in line with how (...) we learn from perceptual experience. The current investigation argues that Bayesian epistemology is still incomplete; the epistemology of perception and the epistemology of rational reasoning have not been reconciled. (shrink)

Our folk epistemology says that if someone knows that P and tells you that P, then, given the absence of defeaters, if you believe what they tell you, you will come to know that P as well. A speaker's knowledge that P is then, for the most part, enough for a hearer to come to know that P. But there are counterexamples to this principle: testimonial knowledge does not always transfer from the speaker to the hearer. Why should that be (...) so? Because testimonial knowledge arises through the flow of information--from conclusive grounds--from the speaker through the speaker's assertion to the hearer's state of comprehension as of the speaker's assertion. A speaker's belief can be based on conclusive grounds, but the speaker's assertion may fail to provide conclusive grounds to the hearer. Then the hearer won't acquire knowledge, even from a knowledgeable speaker. Knowledge from testimony then works more like knowledge through perception. But wait, you say, that can't be so because testimony involves free will but perception does not. The essay ends with a broadly Hume inspired reply to this objection. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.

In her last known piece of work Lady Mary Shepherd’s Metaphysics (1832), Mary Shepherd writes that “mind, may inhere in definite portions of matter […] or of infinite space” (LMSM 699). Shepherd thus suggests that a mind – a “capacity for sensation in general” (e.g., EPEU 16) – may have a spatial location. This is prima facie surprising given that she is committed to the view that the mind is unextended. In this paper, we argue that Shepherd can consistently honor (...) both of these commitments. We argue, first, that even though finite minds, due to their unextendedness cannot, to use Shepherd’s term, ‘occupy’ space as material bodies do, such minds can nonetheless be said to have a spatial location in virtue of what we call their presence, or what Shepherd calls ‘inherence’, in a material body. Second, we argue that, in a similar way, the divine mind is present throughout the whole of space and is thus omnipresent. We then argue that, in contrast to finite minds, the divine mind does not require a body to be present in space. Rather, we contend, God’s omnipresence might be best understood in a ‘holenmerist’ sense, where the divine mind is wholly present in every part of creation. (shrink)

Robert Audi’s Seeing, Knowing, and Doing argues that knowledge does not entail justification, given a broadly externalist conception of knowledge and an access internalist conception of justification, where justification requires the ability to cite one’s grounds or reasons. On this view, animals and small children can have knowledge while lacking justification. About cases like these and others, Audi concludes that knowledge does not entail justification. But the access internalist sense of “justification” is but one of at least two ordinary senses (...) of the term. On a broader or looser sense, “justification” means “being in the right” where that involves meeting a standard or norm. I argue that the beliefs of animals and small children can then meet standards or norms associated with truth and knowledge such that their beliefs may count as justified in this broader or looser sense. I then question whether knowledge fails to entail justification on this broader sense. (shrink)

We argue that recent empirical findings and theoretical models shed new light on the nature of attention. According to the resulting amplification view, attentional phenomena can be unified at the neural level as the consequence of the amplification of certain input signals of attention-independent perceptual computations. This way of identifying the core realizer of attention evades standard criticisms often raised against sub-personal accounts of attention. Moreover, this approach also reframes our thinking about the function of attention by shifting the focus (...) from the function of selection to the function of amplification. (shrink)

Our topic is the theory of topics. My goal is to clarify and evaluate three competing traditions: what I call the way-based approach, the atom-based approach, and the subject-predicate approach. I develop criteria for adequacy using robust linguistic intuitions that feature prominently in the literature. Then I evaluate the extent to which various existing theories satisfy these constraints. I conclude that recent theories due to Parry, Perry, Lewis, and Yablo do not meet the constraints in total. I then introduce the (...) issue-based theory—a novel and natural entry in the atom-based tradition that meets our constraints. In a coda, I categorize a recent theory from Fine as atom-based, and contrast it to the issue-based theory, concluding that they are evenly matched, relative to our main criteria of adequacy. I offer tentative reasons to nevertheless favour the issue-based theory. (shrink)

Many scientists routinely generalize from study samples to larger populations. It is commonly assumed that this cognitive process of scientific induction is a voluntary inference in which researchers assess the generalizability of their data and then draw conclusions accordingly. We challenge this view and argue for a novel account. The account describes scientific induction as involving by default a generalization bias that operates automatically and frequently leads researchers to unintentionally generalize their findings without sufficient evidence. The result is unwarranted, overgeneralized (...) conclusions. We support this account of scientific induction by integrating a range of disparate findings from across the cognitive sciences that have until now not been connected to research on the nature of scientific induction. The view that scientific induction involves by default a generalization bias calls for a revision of the current thinking about scientific induction and highlights an overlooked cause of the replication crisis in the sciences. Commonly proposed interventions to tackle scientific overgeneralizations that may feed into this crisis need to be supplemented with cognitive debiasing strategies against generalization bias to most effectively improve science. (shrink)

Many artificial intelligence (AI) systems currently used for decision-making are opaque, i.e., the internal factors that determine their decisions are not fully known to people due to the systems’ computational complexity. In response to this problem, several researchers have argued that human decision-making is equally opaque and since simplifying, reason-giving explanations (rather than exhaustive causal accounts) of a decision are typically viewed as sufficient in the human case, the same should hold for algorithmic decision-making. Here, I contend that this argument (...) overlooks that human decision-making is sometimes significantly more transparent and trustworthy than algorithmic decision-making. This is because when people explain their decisions by giving reasons for them, this frequently prompts those giving the reasons to govern or regulate themselves so as to think and act in ways that confirm their reason reports. AI explanation systems lack this self-regulative feature. Overlooking it when comparing algorithmic and human decision-making can result in underestimations of the transparency of human decision-making and in the development of explainable AI that may mislead people by activating generally warranted beliefs about the regulative dimension of reason-giving. (shrink)

We often speak as if there are merely possible people—for example, when we make such claims as that most possible people are never going to be born. Yet most metaphysicians deny that anything is both possibly a person and never born. Since our unreflective talk of merely possible people serves to draw non-trivial distinctions, these metaphysicians owe us some paraphrase by which we can draw those distinctions without committing ourselves to there being merely possible people. We show that such paraphrases (...) are unavailable if we limit ourselves to the expressive resources of even highly infinitary first-order modal languages. We then argue that such paraphrases are available in higher-order modal languages only given certain strong assumptions concerning the metaphysics of properties. We then consider alternative paraphrase strategies, and argue that none of them are tenable. If talk of merely possible people cannot be paraphrased, then it must be taken at face value, in which case it is necessary what individuals there are. Therefore, if it is contingent what individuals there are, then the demands of paraphrase place tight constraints on the metaphysics of properties: either (i) it is necessary what properties there are, or (ii) necessarily equivalent properties are identical, and having properties does not entail even possibly being anything at all. (shrink)

This chapter states the contrast between presumptivism about testimonial warrant (often called anti-reductionism) and strict reductionism (associated with Hume) about testimonial warrant. Presumptivism sees an analogy with modest foundationalism about perceptual warrant. Strict reductionism denies this analogy. Two theoretical frameworks for these positions are introduced to better formulate the most popular version of persumptivism, a competence reliabilist account. Seven arguments against presumptivism are then stated and critiqued: (1) The argument from reliability; (2) The argument from reasons; (3) the argument from (...) positive reasons; (4) the argument from negative reasons; (5) the argument from agency; (6) the argument from psychological force; and (7) the argument from gullibility. If presumptivm is false, it is not for any of these arguments. (shrink)

I defend the following version of the ought-implies-can principle: (OIC) by virtue of conceptual necessity, an agent at a given time has an (objective, pro tanto) obligation to do only what the agent at that time has the ability and opportunity to do. In short, obligations correspond to ability plus opportunity. My argument has three premises: (1) obligations correspond to reasons for action; (2) reasons for action correspond to potential actions; (3) potential actions correspond to ability plus opportunity. In the (...) bulk of the paper I address six objections to OIC: three objections based on putative counterexamples, and three objections based on arguments to the effect that OIC conflicts with the is/ought thesis, the possibility of hard determinism, and the denial of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities. (shrink)

According to the structured theory of propositions, if two sentences express the same proposition, then they have the same syntactic structure, with corresponding syntactic constituents expressing the same entities. A number of philosophers have recently focused attention on a powerful argument against this theory, based on a result by Bertrand Russell, which shows that the theory of structured propositions is inconsistent in higher order-logic. This paper explores a response to this argument, which involves restricting the scope of the claim that (...) propositions are structured, so that it does not hold for all propositions whatsoever, but only for those which are expressible using closed sentences of a given formal language. We call this restricted principle Closed Structure, and show that it is consistent in classical higher-order logic. As a schematic principle, the strength of Closed Structure is dependent on the chosen language. For its consistency to be philosophically significant, it also needs to be consistent in every extension of the language which the theorist of structured propositions is apt to accept. But, we go on to show, Closed Structure is in fact inconsistent in a very natural extension of the standard language of higher-order logic, which adds resources for plural talk of propositions. We conclude that this particular strategy of restricting the scope of the claim that propositions are structured is not a compelling response to the argument based on Russell’s result, though we note that for some applications, for instance to propositional attitudes, a restricted thesis in the vicinity may hold some promise. (shrink)

Proper functionalism explicates epistemic warrant in terms of the function and normal functioning of the belief-forming process. There are two standard substantive views of the sources of functions in the literature in epistemology: God (intelligent design) or Mother Nature (evolution by natural selection). Both appear to confront the Swampman objection: couldn’t there be a mind with warranted beliefs neither designed by God nor the product of evolution by natural selection? Is there another substantive view that avoids the Swampman objection? There (...) are two. The first is the generalized selected-effects theory of functions. The second is the organizational theory of functions. Both, however, require some history to assign functions, for both are etiological theories of functions: past effects help explain current function. Swampman can then acquire functions, perhaps soon after creation, though he has none at the moment of inception. (shrink)

This book explores the idea that all of logic can be reduced to two very simple rules that are sensitive to logical polarity. The authors show that this idea has profound consequences for our understanding of the nature of human inferential capacities, and for some of the key issues in contemporary linguistics.

Members of the field of philosophy have, just as other people, political convictions or, as psychologists call them, ideologies. How are different ideologies distributed and perceived in the field? Using the familiar distinction between the political left and right, we surveyed an international sample of 794 subjects in philosophy. We found that survey participants clearly leaned left (75%), while right-leaning individuals (14%) and moderates (11%) were underrepresented. Moreover, and strikingly, across the political spectrum, from very left-leaning individuals and moderates to (...) very right-leaning individuals, participants reported experiencing ideological hostility in the field, occasionally even from those from their own side of the political spectrum. Finally, while about half of the subjects believed that discrimination against left- or right-leaning individuals in the field is not justified, a significant minority displayed an explicit willingness to discriminate against colleagues with the opposite ideology. Our findings are both surprising and important, because a commitment to tolerance and equality is widespread in philosophy, and there is reason to think that ideological similarity, hostility, and discrimination undermine reliable belief formation in many areas of the discipline. (shrink)

The domain of phenomenological investigation delineated by the Husserlian term authentic empathy presents us with an immediate tension. On the one hand, authentic empathy is supposed to grant the subject access (in some sense that remains to be fully specified) to the Other’s experience. On the other hand, foundational phenomenological considerations pertaining to the apprehension of a foreign subjectivity determine that it is precisely a disjunction in subjective processes that is constitutive of the Other being other. In my approach to (...) this problem, I seek, within the context of a reading of Edith Stein’s work On the Problem of Empathy, to clarify the place of ascription in authentic empathy, and to render more explicit a certain notion of “contiguity” that I take to be informing Stein’s understanding of the co-givenness of the Other’s mental life. I go on to argue that a resolution to the problem of empathy lies in the idea that the respective lived experiences of self and Other are, as a matter of descriptive fact, phenomenally connected by a relation of resemblance, and that, consonantly, the essential structure of authentic empathy is characterised in its mature phases by an homological relation to picture consciousness. (shrink)

The English language now dominates scientific communications. Yet, many scientists have English as their second language. Their English proficiency may therefore often be more limited than that of a ‘native speaker’, and their scientific contributions (e.g. manuscripts) in English may frequently contain linguistic features that disrupt the fluency of a reader’s, or listener’s information processing even when the contributions are understandable. Scientific gatekeepers (e.g. journal reviewers) sometimes cite these features to justify negative decisions on manuscripts. Such justifications may rest on (...) the prima facie plausible assumption that linguistic characteristics that hinder fast and easy understandability of scientific contributions are epistemically undesirable in science. I shall raise some doubts about this assumption by drawing on empirical research on processing fluency and its biasing effects. I also argue that directing scientists with English as a foreign language toward approaching ‘native-level’ English can have the negative consequence of reducing their potential to make scientific belief formation more reliable. These points suggest that one seemingly compelling justification for linguistically discriminating against scientific contributions in ‘non-native’ English is questionable and that the common insistence by scientific gatekeepers on ‘native-like’ English may be epistemically harmful to science. (shrink)

"Modern History" versions of the etiological theory claim that in order for a trait X to have the proper function F, individuals with X must have been recently favored by natural selection for doing F (Godfrey-Smith 1994; Griffiths 1992, 1993). For many traits with prototypical proper functions, however, such recent selection may not have occurred: traits may have been maintained due to lack of variation or due to selection for other effects. I examine this flaw in Modern History accounts and (...) offer an alternative etiological theory, the Continuing Usefulness account, which appears to avoid such problems. (shrink)

Children from various countries have been acknowledged and studied for their ability to philosophize, while, unfortunately, Filipino children have not received similar recognition. In this paper, I make a rather unpopular claim that Filipino children can and already are doing philosophy in their efforts to make sense of their existential conditions. “Doing philosophy” here refers to the act of being perplexed by one's own or other people's experiences and making an effort to comprehend them. Filipino children, are a vast and (...) diverse group, coming from various backgrounds, speaking different or even multiple languages, and representing rich cultures and unique circumstances. This diversity adds richness to the wide array of experiences from which existential questions can emerge. However, to truly comprehend the philosophical thinking of Filipino children, they need opportunities and guidance to explore their existential questions and solutions, regardless of how tentative or rudimentary these may seem to adults. Without such opportunities, it remains unclear to what extent their thinking engages with philosophical themes and issues. This not only offers Filipino adults a view of children’s inner worlds but also brings fresh perspectives to commonly held assumptions. (shrink)

In the philosophy of science, it is a common proposal that values are illegitimate in science and should be counteracted whenever they drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions. Drawing on recent cognitive scientific research on human reasoning and confirmation bias, I argue that this view should be rejected. Advocates of it have overlooked that values that drive inquiry to the confirmation of predetermined conclusions can contribute to the reliability of scientific inquiry at the group level even when they (...) negatively affect an individual’s cognition. This casts doubt on the proposal that such values should always be illegitimate in science. It also suggests that advocates of that proposal assume a narrow, individualistic account of science that threatens to undermine their own project of ensuring reliable belief formation in science. (shrink)

Expressivists about epistemic modals deny that ‘Jane might be late’ canonically serves to express the speaker’s acceptance of a certain propositional content. Instead, they hold that it expresses a lack of acceptance. Prominent expressivists embrace pragmatic expressivism: the doxastic property expressed by a declarative is not helpfully identified with that sentence’s compositional semantic value. Against this, we defend semantic expressivism about epistemic modals: the semantic value of a declarative from this domain is the property of doxastic attitudes it canonically serves (...) to express. In support, we synthesize data from the critical literature on expressivism—largely reflecting interactions between modals and disjunctions—and present a semantic expressivism that readily predicts the data. This contrasts with salient competitors, including: pragmatic expressivism based on domain semantics or dynamic semantics; semantic expressivism à la Moss [2015]; and the bounded relational semantics of Mandelkern [2019]. (shrink)

Big decisions in a person’s life often affect the preferences and standards of a good life which that person’s future self will develop after implementing her decision. This paper argues that in such cases the person might lack any reasons to choose one way rather than the other. Neither preference-based views nor happiness-based views of justified choice offer sufficient help here. The available options are not comparable in the relevant sense and there is no rational choice to make. Thus, ironically, (...) in many of a person’s most important decisions the idea of that person’s good seems to have no application. (shrink)