Results for 'Prisoner's Dilemma'

36 found
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  1. Prisoner's Dilemma Doesn't Explain Much.Robert Northcott & Anna Alexandrova - 2015 - In Martin Peterson (ed.), The Prisoner’s Dilemma. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 64-84.
    We make the case that the Prisoner’s Dilemma, notwithstanding its fame and the quantity of intellectual resources devoted to it, has largely failed to explain any phenomena of social scientific or biological interest. In the heart of the paper we examine in detail a famous purported example of Prisoner’s Dilemma empirical success, namely Axelrod’s analysis of WWI trench warfare, and argue that this success is greatly overstated. Further, we explain why this negative verdict is likely true generally and (...)
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  2.  9
    Fool Me Once, Shame on You, Fool Me Twice, Shame on Me: The Alleged Prisoner’s Dilemma in Hobbes’s Social Contract.Necip Fikri Alican - 2019 - Dialogue and Universalism 29 (1):183-204.
    Hobbes postulates a social contract to formalize our collective transition from the state of nature to civil society. The prisoner’s dilemma challenges both the mechanics and the outcome of that thought experiment. The incentives for reneging are supposedly strong enough to keep rational persons from cooperating. This paper argues that the prisoner’s dilemma undermines a position Hobbes does not hold. The context and parameters of the social contract steer it safely between the horns of the dilemma. Specifically, (...)
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  3. Oyun: A New, Free Program for Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournaments in the Classroom.Charles H. Pence & Lara Buchak - 2012 - Evolution Education and Outreach 5 (3):467-476.
    Evolutionary applications of game theory present one of the most pedagogically accessible varieties of genuine, contemporary theoretical biology. We present here Oyun (OY-oon, http://charlespence.net/oyun), a program designed to run iterated prisoner’s dilemma tournaments, competitions between prisoner’s dilemma strategies developed by the students themselves. Using this software, students are able to readily design and tweak their own strategies, and to see how they fare both in round-robin tournaments and in “evolutionary” tournaments, where the scores in a given “generation” directly (...)
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  4.  54
    Does the Prisoner's Dilemma Refute the Coase Theorem?Enrique Guerra-Pujol & Orlando I. Martinez-Garcia - 2015 - The John Marshall Law School Law Review (Chicago) 47 (4):1289-1318.
    Two of the most important ideas in the philosophy of law are the “Coase Theorem” and the “Prisoner’s Dilemma.” In this paper, the authors explore the relation between these two influential models through a creative thought-experiment. Specifically, the paper presents a pure Coasean version of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, one in which property rights are well-defined and transactions costs are zero (i.e. the prisoners are allowed to openly communicate and bargain with each other), in order to test the truth (...)
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  5. Accounting for the 'Tragedy' in the Prisoner's Dilemma.John J. Tilley - 1994 - Synthese 99 (2):251–76.
    The Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) exhibits a tragedy in this sense: if the players are fully informed and rational, they are condemned to a jointly dispreferred outcome. In this essay I address the following question: What feature of the PD's payoff structure is necessary and sufficient to produce the tragedy? In answering it I use the notion of a trembling-hand equilibrium. In the final section I discuss an implication of my argument, an implication which bears on the persistence of (...)
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  6. The Referee's Dilemma. The Ethics of Scientific Communities and Game Theory.Tomislav Bracanovic - 2002 - Prolegomena 1 (1):55-74.
    This article argues that various deviations from the basic principles of the scientific ethos – primarily the appearance of pseudoscience in scientific communities – can be formulated and explained using specific models of game theory, such as the prisoner’s dilemma and the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. The article indirectly tackles the deontology of scientific work as well, in which it is assumed that there is no room for moral skepticism, let alone moral anti-realism, in the ethics of scientific communities. (...)
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  7. McClennen’s Early Cooperative Solution to the Prisoner’s Dilemma.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):341-358.
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  8.  58
    A (Moral) Prisoner's Dilemma: Character Ethics and Plea Bargaining.Andrew Ingram - 2013 - Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 11 (1):161-177.
    Plea bargains are the stock-in-trade of the modern American prosecutor’s office. The basic scenario, wherein a defendant agrees to plea guilty in exchange for a reduced sentence, is familiar to viewers of police procedurals. In an equally famous variation on the theme, the prosecutor requests something more than an admission of guilt: leniency will only be forthcoming if the defendant is willing to cooperate with the prosecutor in securing the conviction of another suspect. In some of these cases, the defendant (...)
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  9.  43
    Love in the Time of Antibiotic Resistance: How Altruism Might Be Our Best Hope.Dien Ho - 2017 - In Philosophical Issues in Pharmaceutics: Development, Dispensing, and Use. Springer.
    Antibiotic-resistant bacteria pose a serious threat to our health. Our ability to destroy deadly bacteria by using antibiotics have not only improved our lives by curing infections, it also allows us to undertake otherwise dangerous treatments from chemotherapies to invasive surgeries. The emergence of antibiotic resistance, I argue, is a consequence of various iterations of prisoner’s dilemmas. To wit, each participant (from patients to nations) has rational self-interest to pursue a course of action that is suboptimal for all of us. (...)
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  10.  60
    Where Did Mill Go Wrong? Why the Capital-Managed Rather Than the Labor-Managed Enterprise is the Predominant.Schwartz Justin - 2012 - Ohio State Law Journal 73:220-85.
    In this Article, I propose a novel law and economics explanation of a deeply puzzling aspect of business organization in market economies. Why are virtually all firms organized as capital-managed and -owned (capitalist) enterprises rather than as labor-managed and -owned cooperatives? Over 150 years ago, J.S. Mill predicted that efficiency and other advantages would eventually make worker cooperatives predominant over capitalist firms. Mill was right about the advantages but wrong about the results. The standard explanation is that capitalist enterprise is (...)
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  11.  32
    Umweltmanagement und Rationalität. Der Schatten von VW: Betrieblicher Umweltschutz auf dem Prüfstand.Kay Herrmann - 2017 - WiSt 4 (2017):47-49.
    Economic pressures, mounting environmental, security and health requirements, are all critical factors that shape economic action. With regard to environmental protection, an economic entity acting as homo oeconomicus finds himself in a situation resembling a prisoner’s dilemma. Signposts for a possible resolution of this dilemma include an environmental management system, a system of environmental law based on the principles of environmental ethics, and a new conception of human nature.
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  12. Assuring, Threatening, a Fully Maximizing Theory of Practical Rationality, and the Practical Duties of Agents.Duncan MacIntosh - 2013 - Ethics 123 (4):625-656.
    Theories of practical rationality say when it is rational to form and fulfill intentions to do actions. David Gauthier says the correct theory would be the one our obeying would best advance the aim of rationality, something Humeans take to be the satisfaction of one’s desires. I use this test to evaluate the received theory and Gauthier’s 1984 and 1994 theories. I find problems with the theories and then offer a theory superior by Gauthier’s test and immune to the problems. (...)
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  13.  19
    Book Note: Danielson, P. Artificial Morality: Virtuous Robots for Virtual Games.Luc Bovens - 1993 - Political Studies 41:719.
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  14. Team Reasoning, Framing and Self-Control: An Aristotelian Account.Natalie Gold - 2013 - In Neil Levy (ed.), Addiction and SelfControl.
    Decision theory explains weakness of will as the result of a conflict of incentives between different transient agents. In this framework, self-control can only be achieved by the I-now altering the incentives or choice-sets of future selves. There is no role for an extended agency over time. However, it is possible to extend game theory to allow multiple levels of agency. At the inter-personal level, theories of team reasoning allow teams to be agents, as well as individuals. I apply team (...)
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  15. An Introduction to the Theory of Social Dilemmas.Leon Felkins - 1994 - The Ethical Spectacle.
    It is said that society is in a moral crisis. And, what is worse, it seems to be deteriorating at an ever increasing rate. We all agree that something needs to be done. Our politicians and preachers say we need to help each other more, we need to have "family values", we need to contribute to society and we need to have high moral standards. But there is a fundamental logical reason why none of this is going to happen. This (...)
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  16. Economic Rationality and the Optimization Trap.Nikil Mukerji & Julian Nida-Rümelin - 2015 - St. Gallen Business Review 2015 (1):12-17.
    The theme of this issue of the St. Gallen Business Review is "Harmony". For this reason, we would like to discuss whether two aspects of our life- world are in harmony, namely economic optimization and morality. What is the relation between them? According to a widely shared view, which is one aspect of the doctrine of "mainstream economics", the functioning of an economic system does not require moral behaviour on the part of the individual economic agent. In what follows, we (...)
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  17.  63
    The Dark Side of the Force: When Computer Simulations Lead Us Astray and ``Model Think'' Narrows Our Imagination.Eckhart Arnold - manuscript
    This paper is intended as a critical examination of the question of when the use of computer simulations is beneficial to scientific explanations. This objective is pursued in two steps: First, I try to establish clear criteria that simulations must meet in order to be explanatory. Basically, a simulation has explanatory power only if it includes all causally relevant factors of a given empirical configuration and if the simulation delivers stable results within the measurement inaccuracies of the input parameters. If (...)
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  18.  22
    The Social Dilemmas.Leon Felkins - manuscript
    "For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be (...)
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  19. Preference's Progress: Rational Self-Alteration and the Rationality of Morality.Duncan MacIntosh - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):3-32.
    I argue that Gauthier's constrained-maximizer rationality is problematic. But standard Maximizing Rationality means one's preferences are only rational if it would not maximize on them to adopt new ones. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, it maximizes to adopt conditionally cooperative preferences. (These are detailed, with a view to avoiding problems of circularity of definition.) Morality then maximizes. I distinguish the roles played in rational choices and their bases by preferences, dispositions, moral and rational principles, the aim of rational action, (...)
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  20. Libertarian Agency and Rational Morality: Action-Theoretic Objections to Gauthier's Dispositional Soution of the Compliance Problem.Duncan MacIntosh - 1988 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):499-525.
    David Gauthier thinks agents facing a prisoner's dilemma ('pd') should find it rational to dispose themselves to co-operate with those inclined to reciprocate (i.e., to acquire a constrained maximizer--'cm'--disposition), and to co-operate with other 'cmers'. Richmond Campbell argues that since dominance reasoning shows it remains to the agent's advantage to defect, his co-operation is only rational if cm "determines" him to co-operate, forcing him not to cheat. I argue that if cm "forces" the agent to co-operate, he is (...)
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  21. What’s Wrong with Social Simulations?Eckhart Arnold - 2014 - The Monist 97 (3):359-377.
    This paper tries to answer the question why the epistemic value of so many social simulations is questionable. I consider the epistemic value of a social simulation as questionable if it contributes neither directly nor indirectly to the understanding of empirical reality. To examine this question, two classical social simulations are analyzed with respect to their possible epistemic justification: Schelling’s neighborhood segregation model and Axelrod’s reiterated Prisoner’s Dilemma simulations of the evolution of cooperation. It is argued that Schelling’s simulation (...)
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  22.  51
    In Defense of Moderate Envy.Bernd Lahno - 2000 - Analyse & Kritik 22 (1):98-113.
    In contrast to Axelrod's advice 'don't be envious' it is argued that the emotion of envy may enhance cooperation. TIT FOR TAT does exhibit a certain degree of envy. But, it does so in inconsistent ways. Two variants of TIT FOR TAT are introduced and their strategic properties are analyzed. Both generate the very same actual play as TIT FOR TAT in a computer tournament without noise. However, if noise is introduced they display some greater degree of stability. This is (...)
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  23. A Bargaining Game Analysis of International Climate Negotiations.John Basl, Ronald Sandler, Rory Smead & Patrick Forber - 2014 - Nature Climate Change 4:442-445.
    Climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have so far failed to achieve a robust international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Game theory has been used to investigate possible climate negotiation solutions and strategies for accomplishing them. Negotiations have been primarily modelled as public goods games such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma, though coordination games or games of conflict have also been used. Many of these models have solutions, in the form of equilibria, corresponding to (...)
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  24. Rationality in Collective Action.Margaret P. Gilbert - 2006 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (1):3-17.
    Collective action is interpreted as a matter of people doing something together, and it is assumed that this involves their having a collective intention to do that thing together. The account of collective intention for which the author has argued elsewhere is presented. In terms that are explained, the parties are jointly committed to intend as a body that such-and-such. Collective action problems in the sense of rational choice theory—problems such as the various forms of coordination problem and the prisoner’s (...)
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  25. The Ethics of Killing, an Amoral Enquiry.Cheng-Chih Tsai - 2015 - Applied Ethics Review 59:25-49.
    In ‘What Makes Killing Wrong?’ Sinnott-Armstrong and Miller make the bold claim that killing in itself is not wrong, what is wrong is totally-disabling. In ‘After-Birth Abortion: Why Should the Baby Live?’ Giubilini and Minerva argue for allowing infanticide. Both papers challenge the stigma commonly associated with killing, and emphasize that killing is not wrong at some margins of life. In this paper, we first generalize the above claims to the thesis that there is nothing morally wrong with killing per (...)
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  26. Persons and the Satisfaction of Preferences: Problems in the Rational Kinematics of Values.Duncan Macintosh - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):163-180.
    If one can get the targets of one's current wants only by acquiring new wants (as in the Prisoner's Dilemma), is it rational to do so? Arguably not. For this could justify adopting unsatisfiable wants, violating the rational duty to maximize one's utility. Further, why cause a want's target if one will not then want it? And people "are" their wants. So if these change, people will not survive to enjoy their wants' targets. I reply that one rationally (...)
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  27. Political realism and anarchy in international relations.Tvrtko Jolić - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):113-130.
    In this paper I critically examine an influential argument in favor of political realism. The argument claims that international relations, by analogy with Hobbes’s state of nature at the individual level, are governed by anarchy which makes it irrational for states to observe the principles of morality and justice since there are no guarantees that they will be observed by other states. However, this analogy is unsustainable due to the differences that exist between agents on the international and individual levels. (...)
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  28.  43
    How Models Fail.Eckhart Arnold - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma (in the following: RPD-models) are since 30 years considered as one of the standard tools to study the evolution of cooperation (Rangoni 2013; Hoffmann 2000). A considerable number of such simulation models has been produced by scientists. Unfortunately, though, none of these models has empirically been verified and there exists no example of empirical research where any of the RPD-models has successfully been employed to a particular instance of cooperation. Surprisingly, this (...)
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  29.  15
    How Models Fail. A Critical Look at the History of Computer Simulations of the Evolution of Cooperation.Catrin Misselhorn (ed.) - 2015 - Springer.
    Simulation models of the Reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma have been popular for studying the evolution of cooperation since more than 30 years now. However, there have been practically no successful instances of empirical application of any of these models. At the same time this lack of empirical testing and confirmation has almost entirely been ignored by the modelers community. In this paper, I examine some of the typical narratives and standard arguments with which these models are justified by their (...)
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  30. Logical Model of Personality and Cognition with Possible Applications.Miro Brada - 2016 - In Woosuk Park (ed.), KAIST/KSBS International Workshop. Daejeon: KAIST. pp. 89-100.
    Although the cognition is significant in strategic reasoning, its role has been weakly analyzed, because only the average intelligence is usually considered. For example, prisoner's dilemma in game theory, would have different outcomes for persons with different intelligence. I show how various levels of intelligence influence the quality of reasoning, decision, or the probability of psychosis. I explain my original methodology developed for my MA thesis in clinical psychology in 1998, and grant research in 1999, demonstrating the bias (...)
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  31. The Evolutionary Path of the Law. [REVIEW]Enrique Guerra-Pujol - 2014 - Indonesian Journal of International and Comparative Law 1 (3):878-890.
    What lessons can legal scholars learn from the life and work of W. D. "Bill" Hamilton, a lifelong student of nature? From my small corner of the legal Academia, three aspects of Bill Hamilton’s work in evolutionary biology stand out in particular: (i) Hamilton’s simple and beautiful model of social behavior in terms of costs and benefits; (ii) his fruitful collaboration with the political theorist Robert Axelrod and their unexpected yet elegant solution of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, an important game (...)
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  32.  15
    Productive Versus Destructive Cooperation.Sheldon Wein & Radu Neculau - 2012 - In Frank Zenker (ed.), Argument Cultures: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference of the Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, Zenker, F. (ed.) (Windsor: OSSA 2012). Windsor, ON, Canada:
    Many of the problems we face can usefully be modeled as prisoners’ dilemmas. All the standard game-theoretic solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas lead, in the real world, to assurance games. But too often some aspects of our social interaction are as much obscured by, as illuminated by, game theory. Removing some of the epistemic constraints often accepted by game theorists will enable us to distinguish between productive and destructive prisoners’ dilemmas. Doing so is an important step in understanding the nature of (...)
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  33.  76
    A Critical Commentary on Block 2011: "David Friedman and Libertarianism: A Critique" and a Comparison with Lester [2000] 2012's Responses to Friedman.J. C. Lester - 2014 - In Explaining Libertarianism: Some Philosophical Arguments. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 106-143.
    David Friedman posed a number of libertarian philosophical problems (Friedman 1989). This essay criticizes Walter Block’s Rothbardian responses (Block 2011) and compares them with J C Lester’s critical-rationalist, libertarian-theory responses (Lester [2000] 2012). The main issues are as follows. 1. Critical rationalism and how it applies to libertarianism. 2.1. How libertarianism is not inherently about law and is inherently about morals. 2.2. How liberty relates to property and can be maximized: carbon dioxide and radio waves. 2.3. Applying the theory to (...)
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  34.  6
    Where Nothing Happened: The Experience of War Captivity and Levinas’s Concept of the ‘There Is’.Johanna Jacques - 2017 - Social and Legal Studies 26 (2):230-248.
    This article takes as its subject matter the juridico-political space of the prisoner of war (POW) camp. It sets out to determine the nature of this space by looking at the experience of war captivity by Jewish members of the Western forces in World War II, focusing on the experience of Emmanuel Levinas, who spent 5 years in German war captivity. On the basis of a historical analysis of the conditions in which Levinas spent his time in captivity, it argues (...)
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  35. Remembering as Public Practice: Wittgenstein, Memory, and Distributed Cognitive Ecologies.John Sutton - 2014 - In V. A. Munz, D. Moyal-Sharrock & A. Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language, and Action: proceedings of the 36th Wittgenstein symposium. De Gruyter. pp. 409-444.
    A woman is listening to Sinatra before work. As she later describes it, ‘suddenly from nowhere I could hear my mother singing along to it … I was there again home again, hearing my mother … God knows why I should choose to remember that … then, to actually hear her and I had this image in my head … of being at home … with her singing away … like being transported back you know I got one of those (...)
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  36. Autobiographical Forgetting, Social Forgetting and Situated Forgetting.Celia B. Harris, John Sutton & Amanda Barnier - 2010 - In Sergio Della Sala (ed.), Forgetting. Psychology Press. pp. 253-284.
    We have a striking ability to alter our psychological access to past experiences. Consider the following case. Andrew “Nicky” Barr, OBE, MC, DFC, (1915 – 2006) was one of Australia’s most decorated World War II fighter pilots. He was the top ace of the Western Desert’s 3 Squadron, the pre-eminent fighter squadron in the Middle East, flying P-40 Kittyhawks over Africa. From October 1941, when Nicky Barr’s war began, he flew 22 missions and shot down eight enemy planes in his (...)
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