İdrak ve niteliği felsefenin en önemli problemlerinden biridir. İbn Sînâ hissî, hayalî, vehmî ve aklî olmak üzere dört farklı idrak mertebesi dillendirir. Buna göre insan nefsi nesnelerin suretlerini duyu yetileriyle algılar. Daha sonra bu suretleri hayal yetisine teslim eder. Akabinde akıl bu sureti barındırdığı maddî eklentilerden arındırarak aklî suretlerin oluşumu için gerekli zeminleri hazırlar. Daha sonra faal akıl insan nefsine aklî suretleri verir. İnsan zihninde duyularla algılanan bu kavramlardan başka kavramlar da vardır. Bu küllî kavramların yeri nesnel âlem değil öznel (...) âlemdir. İslam felsefesi geleneğinde Fârâbî ilk defa bu ayırımı yapar ve ma‘kūlleri birinci ve ikinci ma‘kūller diye iki kısma ayırır. İbn Sînâ da bu sınıflandırmayı benimser ve konu hakkında yeni açıklamalar getirir. İbn Sînâ, ikinci ma‘kūllerin sonraki dönemlerde yapılan felsefî ve mantıkî ayırımını her ne kadar dillendirmese de eserlerinden bu iki ma‘kūl türünün farklılığına teveccüh eder. Bu çalışmada İbn Sînâ felsefesinde idrak olgusunun gerçekleşme niteliği ele alınacak ve daha sonraki dönemlerde dillendirilen ikinci felsefî ma‘kūl anlamların İbn Sînâ felsefesindeki yeri açıklanacaktır. (shrink)

Öz: İslam dünyasında Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlayan birçok burhan zikredilmiştir. Bu burhanlardan biri pek bilinmeyen nefs burhanıdır. Bu burhanın tam olarak gelişmemiş formları Meşşâî filozoflar tarafından dile getirilmiş olsa da tam ve kâmil olarak ifadesini Sühreverdî’de bulmaktayız. Sühreverdî’den sonra ve onun etkisiyle Mîr Dâmâd başka bir nefs burhanı açıklar. İslam düşünce geleneğinde nefs vesilesiyle Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlayan bir diğer filozof da Molla Sadrâ’dır. O, bu iki filozofun nefs burhanlarını benimsememiş ve Hikmet-i Müte’âliye ekolünün ilkeleri çerçevesinde yeni burhanlar dile getirmiştir. İlk burhanında (...) nefsin kuvveden fiile yani heyûlânî akıldan bilfiil akla doğru hareket etmesini ikinci burhanında ise nefsin hudûsunu orta terim kılar. Mefatihü’l-Gayb adlı eserinde de bu iki burhanı birleştirir ve tek bir burhan olarak ifade eder. Molla Sadrâ, Allah’ın varlığını ispatlayan burhanları üç gruba ayırır ve nefs burhanının sıddıkîn burhanından sonra en önemli ve en üstün burhan olduğunu söyler. Molla Sadrâ’nın dillendirdiği nefs burhanlarının en önemli özelliği Allah’ın varlığını ispatlamakla beraber sıfatlarını ve fiillerini de ispatlamasıdır. Bu çalışmada Molla Sadrâ’nın nefs burhanı ile diğer nefs burhanlarının farkı ele alınacak ve Molla Sadrâ’nın bu burhan vesilesiyle Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’u ve sıfatlarını nasıl ispatladığı ve konu hakkında ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği açıklanacaktır. (shrink)

Mümkün varlıkları aracı kılmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlama çabalarının bir sonucu olan sıddıkîn burhanı ilk defa Müslüman filozoflar tarafından dillendirildi. İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) da Fârâbî’nin etkisiyle yeni bir burhan açıkladı ve buna sıddıkîn adını verdi. Molla Sadrâ (ö. 1050/1641) varlığın asaleti ilkesini mutasavvıflardan, teşkîk ilkesini de Sühreverdî’den iktibas ederek yeni bir sıddıkîn burhanı dillendirdi. Bu burhanın, varlığın asaleti, basîtliği/yalınlığı, teşkîkî ve ma’lûlün illete ihtiyacı olmak üzere bazı öncülleri vardır. O, bu öncülleri açıkladıktan sonra teselsüle ihtiyaç duymadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatlar. Onun (...) burhanı diğer sıddıkîn burhanlarına nispetle bazı üstün özelliklere sahiptir. Öncelikle bu burhan varlığın asaleti ilkesi üzerine bina edildiğinden dayanağı varlık kavramı değil, varlığın nesnel hakikatidir. İkincisi bu burhan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un zâtını ispatlamakla birlikte Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un birliğini ve kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatlar. Üçüncüsü bu burhana göre mümkün varlıklar hiçbir aracı olmadan Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’a bağımlı olduklarından burhanın açıklanmasında teselsül ve kısır döngüden yararlanma ihtiyacı yoktur. Molla Sadrâ’nın teselsül ve kısır döngüden de yararlanarak Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ispatladığı burhanlar da vardır. Molla Sadrâ bu burhanıyla hem Vâcibü’l-Vücûd’un varlığını ve hem de onun kemâlî sıfatlarını ispatladığını iddia eder. Bu çalışmada bu iddia incelecek ve ispat-ı vacip meselesinde Molla Sadrâ’nın ne gibi yenilikler getirdiği ele alınacaktır. ABSTRACT A result of the attempts to prove the existence of The Necessary Existence without the mediation of possible beings, proof of the truthful was first expressed by Muslim philosophers called it sıddıkin. Mullā Ṣadrā’s “proof” that he explains has certain premises such as the fundamental of existence, indivisibility of the existence, existential gradation, effect’s need for cause. After explanining these premises, Mullā Ṣadrā then proves the Necessary Existence without needing succession. Mullā Ṣadrā’s proof of the truthful has certain superior features tan the proofs of truthful expressed before him. First of all, as this proof is built upon the principle of the fundamental of existence, its foundation is the external truth of existence, not the concept of existence itself. Secondly, this proof proves the unity and perfection attributes of The Necessary Existence as well as proving the existence of the Necessary Existence. Thirdly, according to this proof, as all possible existences are dependent on The Necessary Existence without any mediation, there is no need to benefit from succession and vicious circle in explaining the proof. However, Mullā Ṣadrā proves the Necessary Existence by benefitting from succession and vicious circle in other proofs. Mullā Ṣadrā asserts that this proof demonstrates the presence of The Necessary Existence and its perfection attributions. This study examines this assertion and addresses what kind of innovations was brought by Mullā Ṣadrā in terms of proving The Necessary Existence. (shrink)

Mulla Sadra mentions two definitions about evil, one of them is that something lacking of essence or lacking of its a perfection and the other one is that all possible living creatures may have deficiencies. In order not to fall into the paradox of some existence are evils, he describes evils in terms of two ways that are by itself evil and relative evil. By itself evil is absolute non-existence so that it doesn’t need perpetrator. Mulla Sadra describes the evil (...) as four categories that metaphysical, natural, moral and perceptual. He utilizes Aristotle's finest universe theory to solve the problem of relation between evilness and spiritual creation. Mulla Sadra he explains five universes with the example of absolute goodness, much goodness then less evil, goodness and evil are equal, less goodness much evil, and certain evil. He proves the most beautiful universe as much goodness then les evilness. Then he solves the problem of evil in terms of recognition divine decree and destiny. (shrink)

Divine intention is an important problem for both philosophy and Kalam. This problem has two aspects as the subject and action of the intention. The intention of the subject occurs for the motion or the action itself. The intention of the action is to reach the motion or the action itself. According to this, when a person travels to Mecca to visit Kaaba, the visit is the intention of the subject and the journey is the intention of the action. In (...) this context, does Allah have an intention? And what are the intentions of the actions aris-ing from him? In the Islamic philosophy, the first question is handled as "intention of the sub-ject/divine intention” and the second question as "the intention of the actions/divine inten-tion of the actions". In order to answer the first question, we must examine all types of inten-tions. Each subject takes action to benefit them, to benefit others and to act for the sake of the goodness and kindness. Allah would be dependent being if he acted to benefit him and to make up for a flaw for the first of these intentions. In the second intention type, if Allah acted for someone else, this sit-uation would be on the degree of cause for the subject and he would be passive. For the third intention type which is to act to reach for perfection, it would deem Allah as a dependent being. The above-mentioned intentions are flawed. On the contrary, Allah is perfect and does not need any of these intentions to create. Thus, he is not subject to any of these possible inten-tions. These intentions are only used by imperfect subjects. Of course, it does not mean that Allah does not have intentions. According to Avicenna and Mulla Sadra, intention of Allah is the love towards his essence which is free from any flaw. According to this, all beings are entailed to the divine essence and they exist due to the love of essence of Allah. Allah has a direct intention as well as an indirect one. As mentioned before, Allah is in love with his essence. Allah loves the works and actions of his essence as well, according to the principal that one, who loves the essence, loves the works and actions of that essence as well. In this context, the love of essence of the Allah is a direct intention, while the love of his es-sence's works and actions is an indirect intention. After the divine intention is explained, we must also explain the intention of the divine ac-tions. According to both Mulla Sadra and Avicenna, since possible beings are flawed, their intention is to reach to certain perfections which are compatible with themselves. Mulla Sadra states that Allah bestows motivation to possible beings to advance towards the perfection and he claims that these beings make use of that motivation to be perfect. Therefore, possible beings try to make up their flaws and reach to perfection. Since Allah is the absolute perfect being, the final intention of the possible beings is Allah. In other words, all beings that seek for perfection, take example of him. The other intentions act as a primary tool to reach the final intention. How can flawed beings by essence reach to perfections compatible with them? Avicenna and Mulla Sadra stated different opinions on the search of perfection of the flawed beings in the Islam philosophy. According to Avicenna, beings change with extinction and creation. This change happens by accident and the substance stays constant. In accordance with this approach, this change and development is only possible with accidental motion. It occurs with the replacement between forms. But the theory of the Avicenna has some flaws. Because forms are not the intentions of each other and first hyle is not strong enough to have an intention. Thus, no form is superior to the other. It is also not possible to have substance development because the substance and es-sence of the material are constant. It only goes through changes in appearance with the acci-dental motion. It is clear that the changes in the appearance and the shape are not standards for perfection. On the other hand, Mulla Sadra's development theory, which is based on the fundamentality of existence, existential gradation and substantial motion, suggests that the material world is moving towards the perfection. The motion in the substance of material beings is reason of substantial and accidental developments. All beings try to promote themselves to a higher position by reaching perfection in accordance with their intentions. Thus, the theory of Avicenna focuses on the accidental and formal changes in the search of perfection of the material beings, while Mulla Sadra’s theory explains accidental changes as well as the essential ones. Mulla Sadra does not limit the explanation of which Allah is the intention of possible beings to ontological dimension. According to him, Allah is an intention of possible beings as well. He points out the Hadith Qudsi "I was a hidden treasure, I desired to be recognized so I created the creature" and states that "This (Hadith Qudsi) indicates that he is the subject and the in-tention of the universe in an ontological manner as well as the intention of the universe in an epistemological manner." Thus, according to Mulla Sadra, possible beings have two inten-tions, to reach to and understand Allah. (shrink)

Muslim philosophers separated the material cause and formal cause as essential, and the efficient cause and intention cause as existential, which are the four causes stated by Aristoteles. Mulla Sadra addresses the efficient cause in two parts which are natural and emanative (creative) causes. Natural perpetrator is preparatory perpetrator and the creative perpetrator is the perpetrator bestowing entity. According to a almohad, Allah is the perpetrator of everything. However, there are disputes concerning what kind of perpetrator Allah is. Muslim philosophers (...) dealt with all types of perpetrator to put forth the attributes of emanative perpetration. Agents by Intentional, Agreement, Providence, Manifestation are perpetrators who have knowledge and will. Agents by intentional perform their actions by the virtue of a purpose. Their knowledge is detailed in their actions. The knowledge of agent by agreement is collective before creation and detailed after creation. The knowledge of agents by providence on their entity is presential and their knowledge on their actions is conceptual and detailed. On the other hand, agents by manifestation have a detailed presential knowledge on their actions. This study addresses all the perpetrator types which may be attributed to Allah and identifies the perpetrator type which can possibly be attributed to Allah. (shrink)

ابن‌سینا در آثار مختلف خود به کتاب الحکمة المشرقیة اشاره کرده است. برخی متفکران اسلامی نیز به این کتاب استشهاد کرده¬اند. وی در این کتاب دیدگاه¬های خاص خود را با صراحت بیان کرده است. بنا بر روشی که ابن‌سینا داشت، و برخی آثار خود را در آثار دیگر خلاصه می‌کرد، این کتاب نیز خلاصه‌ای از کتاب شفاء است. درباره معنا و مفهوم «مشرقی» در اندیشه¬های ابن‌سینا نیز دیدگاه‌های مختلفی بیان شده است، ولی نگارنده معتقد است «مشرقی» به معنای «اسلامی» است. (...) در بخش ماهیت حکمت مشرقی هم باید گفت که ابن‌سینا، چنان‌که یک فیلسوف مشایی به معنای ارسطویی نیست، همان‌طور که هانری کربن و پیروان او معتقدند یک فیلسوف خسروانی هم نیست. لذا منظور ابن‌سینا از حکمت مشرقی همان حکمت اسلامی بودن آن است. (shrink)

“The issue of obligation and free determination had been subject to polemics due to religious concerns. One group defended carbriyya on the basis of the absolute sovereignty of God. While others argued the idea of indetermination in terms of divine justice. After explaining and critizing these thoughts, Molla Sadra gave explanation to the opinions of the Ash’arites on the subject. And then he formed the basis of a new theory called “theory of ahl-i yakin” while getting inspired by the words (...) of Ali b. Ebu Talib who says “there is neither determination nor tawfiz, indeed it is between these” So to speak, human acts are related to both human beings and God.”. (shrink)

According to Mulla Sadra, the will is an existential phenomenon that is free from the essence. Therefore, there is no essential and correlational definition which contains its truth completely. As a matter of fact, the definition made by Mulla Sadra is a nominal definition. Mulla Sadra, unlike the former philosophers and the theologians, expressed that the will is homogeneous with existence for the first time. Moreover, he claims that characteristics of the will and the existence is the same. According to (...) this approach, the first feature of the will is that it has a shared meaning like existence. In other words, concept of the will involves the same signification when it is used about God and the creatures. The second feature of the will, like existence too, indicates varied existential grades. That is to say, the will is a single truth, but it has different existential grades and is manifested in a different way in every aspects of the being. Therefore, it has its own domination and is obligatory in some grades while it is only propable in others. In this way, Mulla Sadra solved the problems that would arise when the divine will has both essential and intellectual qualities. In addition, he explained that the will is eternal for God, temporal for the human beings. (shrink)

A central debate in philosophy and neuroscience pertains to whether PFC activity plays an essential role in the neural basis of consciousness. Neuroimaging and electrophysiology studies have revealed that the contents of conscious perceptual experience can be successfully decoded from PFC activity, but these findings might be confounded by post- perceptual cognitive processes, such as thinking, reasoning, and decision-making, that are not necessary for con- sciousness. To clarify the involvement of the PFC in consciousness, we present a synthesis of research (...) that has used intracranial electrical stimulation (iES) for the causal modulation of neural activity in the human PFC. This research provides compelling evidence that iES of only certain prefrontal regions (i.e., orbitofrontal cortex and anterior cingu- late cortex) reliably perturbs conscious experience. Conversely, stimulation of anterolateral prefrontal sites, often con- sidered crucial in higher-order and global workspace theories of consciousness, seldom elicits any reportable alterations in consciousness. Furthermore, the wide variety of iES-elicited effects in the PFC (e.g., emotions, thoughts, and olfactory and visual hallucinations) exhibits no clear relation to the immediate environment. Therefore, there is no evidence for the kinds of alterations in ongoing perceptual experience that would be predicted by higher-order or global workspace theories. Nevertheless, effects in the orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices suggest a specific role for these PFC subregions in supporting emotional aspects of conscious experience. Overall, this evidence presents a challenge for higher-order and global workspace theories, which commonly point to the PFC as the basis for con- scious perception based on correlative and possibly confounded information. (shrink)

This study aims to find out the factors that hinder students in learning Integrated Art Education. A descriptive research design was utilized in the conduct of the study. The researcher prepared a questionnaire with 15 closed-ended- questions that could be answered objectively. The study discovered that the students would learn more when they feel that they belong to a certain group. Interests in a subject also matter, the more you are interested in a particular subject, the more you will learn (...) the material. Parent support marks an impact on the student's interest in learning Arts. Therefore, personal interest in a subject must be given attention and managed properly. Parent's support also plays a vital role in reinforcing the students on what to pursue in order to maintain their motivation. (shrink)

Recent studies indicate that indicative conditionals like "If people wear masks, the spread of Covid-19 will be diminished" require a probabilistic dependency between their antecedents and consequents to be acceptable (Skovgaard-Olsen et al., 2016). But it is easy to make the slip from this claim to the thesis that indicative conditionals are acceptable only if this probabilistic dependency results from a causal relation between antecedent and consequent. According to Pearl (2009), understanding a causal relation involves multiple, hierarchically organized conceptual dimensions: (...) prediction, intervention, and counterfactual dependence. In a series of experiments, we test the hypothesis that these conceptual dimensions are differentially encoded in indicative and counterfactual conditionals. If this hypothesis holds, then there are limits as to how much of a causal relation is captured by indicative conditionals alone. Our results show that the acceptance of indicative and counterfactual conditionals can become dissociated. Furthermore, it is found that the acceptance of both is needed for accepting a causal relation between two co-occurring events. The implications that these findings have for the hypothesis above, and for recent debates at the intersection of the psychology of reasoning and causal judgment, are critically discussed. Our findings are consistent with viewing indicative conditionals as answering predictive queries requiring evidential relevance (even in the absence of direct causal relations). Counterfactual conditionals in contrast target causal relevance, specifically. Finally, we discuss the implications our results have for the yet unsolved question of how reasoners succeed in constructing causal models from verbal descriptions. (shrink)

Traditionally, being a realist about something means believing in the independent existence of that something. In this line of thought, a scientific realist is someone who believes in the objective existence of the entities postulated by our best scientific theories. In metaphysical terms, what does that mean? In ontological terms, i.e., in terms of what exists, scientific realism can be understood as involving the adoption of a scientifically informed ontology. But according to some philosophers, a realistic attitude must go beyond (...) ontology. The way in which this requirement has been understood involves providing a metaphysics for the entities postulated by science, that is, answering questions about the nature of what ontology admits to exist. We discuss how two fashionable approaches face the challenge of providing a metaphysics for science: a form of naturalism and the Viking/Toolbox approach. Finally, we present a third way, which adopts the best of both approaches: the meta-Popperian method, which focuses on discarding the wrong alternatives, or better saying, the metaphysical profiles incompatible with certain theories. We present the meta-Popperian method, a metametaphysical method capable of objectively assessing which metaphysical profiles are incompatible with certain scientific theories. For this, we will use quantum mechanics as a case study, presenting some previously obtained results. As our focus is on methodological questions about the relationship between metaphysics and science; with this method, we can see how science can be used to avoid error in metaphysical issues. In our opinion, this would be a way to develop a productive relationship between science and metaphysics. (shrink)

In recent years, language has been shown to play a number of important cognitive roles over and above the communication of thoughts. One hypothesis gaining support is that language facilitates thought about abstract categories, such as democracy or prediction. To test this proposal, a novel set of semantic memory task trials, designed for assessing abstract thought non-linguistically, were normed for levels of abstractness. The trials were rated as more or less abstract to the degree that answering them required the participant (...) to abstract away from both perceptual features and common setting associations corresponding to the target image. The normed materials were then used with a population of people with aphasia to assess the relationship of abstract thought to language. While the language-impaired group with aphasia showed lower overall accuracy and longer response times than controls in general, of special note is that their response times were significantly longer as a function of a trial’s degree of abstractness. Further, the aphasia group’s response times in reporting their degree of confidence (a separate, metacognitive measure) were negatively correlated with their language production abilities, with lower language scores predicting longer metacognitive response times. These results provide some support for the hypothesis that language is an important aid to abstract thought and to metacognition about abstract thought. (shrink)

A longish (12 page) discussion of Richard Sorabji's excellent book, with a further discussion of what it means for a theory of emotions to be a cognitive theory.

Hermann von Helmholtz’s work on perceptual science had a fundamental impact on Neo-Kantian movements in the late nineteenth century, and his influence continues to be felt in psychology and analytic philosophy of perception. As is widely acknowledged, Helmholtz denied that we can perceive mind-independent properties of external objects, a view I label Ignorance. Given his commitment to Ignorance, Helmholtz might seem to be committed to a subjectivism according to which we only perceive properties of our own representations. Against this, I (...) argue that for Helmholtz, the properties we perceive are not monadic properties of either the subject or the object. Rather, Helmholtz endorsed a relationalism about the properties we perceive: the properties of objects we perceive are all relational properties. I then suggest that once we take into account oft-neglected terminological distinctions in Helmholtz’s corpus, we are better able to make sense of his commitment to relationalism. (shrink)

At the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, frontline medical professionals at intensive care units around the world faced gruesome decisions about how to ration life-saving medical resources. These events provided a unique lens through which to understand how the public reasons about real-world dilemmas involving trade-offs between human lives. In three studies (total N = 2298), we examined people’s moral attitudes toward triage of acute coronavirus patients, and found elevated support for utilitarian triage policies. These utilitarian tendencies did not stem (...) from period change in moral attitudes relative to pre-pandemic levels--but rather, from the heightened realism of triage dilemmas. Participants favored utilitarian resolutions of critical care dilemmas when compared to structurally analogous, non-medical dilemmas—and such support was rooted in prosocial dispositions, including empathy and impartial beneficence. Finally, despite abundant evidence of political polarization surrounding Covid-19, moral views about critical care triage differed modestly, if at all, between liberals and conservatives. Taken together, our findings highlight people’s robust support for utilitarian measures in the face of a global public health threat, and illustrate how hypothetical scenarios in moral psychology (e.g. trolley cases) should strive for more experiential and psychological realism, otherwise their results might not generalize to real-world moral dilemmas. (shrink)

Entrepreneurship education is among the key drivers of the country’s economy, and teachers are primarily responsible for its integration into teaching and finding the best and most useful method. The purpose of this research is to determine the level of entrepreneurial competence and teaching methods among entrepreneurship education teachers. Focusing on the concept of entrepreneurial competencies combining conceptual, human relations, strategic, commitment, opportunity, organizational and strategic competencies. Using quantitative – descriptive survey, the study tested its significant difference and relationship when (...) grouped with the profile variables. The findings indicate a significant correlation between the variables particularly, with the technical competence which has the strongest correlation. The paper sheds some light concerning the status of the current entrepreneurial competence of the teachers in the division and recommends training curriculum to develop their competencies in handling the subject. (shrink)

In our paper we investigate a difficulty arising when one tries to reconsiliateessentialis t’s thinking with classification practice in the biological sciences. The article outlinessome varieties of essentialism with particular attention to the version defended by Brian Ellis. Weunderline the basic difference: Ellis thinks that essentialism is not a viable position in biology dueto its incompatibility with biological typology and other essentialists think that these two elementscan be reconciled. However, both parties have in common metaphysical starting point and theylack explicit (...) track of methodological procedures. Methodological inquiry involves less demandingassumptions than metaphysical, and therefore it is justified to analyse abovementioned discrepancy between Ellis and other essentialist in this context. We do it by bottom-up investigation whichfocuses on the practice of taxonomists in the particular field of biology. A case study helps us todiscover four characteristics of biological typology practice: impossibility of algorithmization,relativity, subjectivity and conventionality. These features prove non-realistic and therefore anti-essentialistic character of biological classification. We conclude by saying that any essentialismrelated to the notion of biological kind cannot be regarded as justified by scientific enterprise of creating typologies. (shrink)

This is part 1 of 6 of the dossier What Do We Talk about when We Talk about Queer Death?, edited by M. Petricola. The contributions collected in this article sit at the crossroads between thanatology and queer theory and tackle questions such as: how can we define queer death studies as a research field? How can queer death studies problematize and rethink the life-death binary? Which notions and hermeneutic tools could be borrowed from other disciplines in order to better (...) define queer death studies? The present article includes the following contributions: – MacCormack P., What does queer death studies mean?; – Radomska M., On queering death studies; – Lykke N., Death as vibrancy; – Hillerup Hansen I., What concreteness will do to resolve the uncertain; – Olson P., Queer objectivity as a response to denials of death; – Manganas N., The queer lack of a chthonic instinct. (shrink)

A hard choice is a situation in which an agent is unable to make a justifiable choice from a given menu of alternatives. Our objective is to present a systematic treatment of the axiomatic structure of such situations. To do so, we draw on and contribute to the study of choice functions that can be indecisive, i.e., that may fail to select a non-empty set for some menus. In this more general framework, we present new characterizations of two well-known choice (...) rules, the maximally dominant choice rule and the top-cycle choice rule. Together with existing results, this yields an understanding of the circumstances in which hard choices arise. (shrink)

Coronary arteries were studied on 110 postmortem human hearts during January 2000 to December 2001 in the department of Anatomy and Microbiology, Bangladesh Medical College to observed. The pattern of coronary dominance and its relation with atherosclerosis was observed. Atherosclerosis was found in 49(44.5%) samples, among which 37(56.%) were from male and 12(26.7%) from female hearts. This difference was significant (P<0.01). Right dominance was observed in 72 (65.5%) cases while 17 (15.5%) had left dominance and 21 (19.1%) had balanced type (...) of circulation. Balanced type of circulation was observed more among females (14; 66.7%) while left dominance was more frequent among males (13; 76.5 %). This deference on the basis of sex was significant (P<0.05). Significant (P<0.001) relationship was also observed between atherosclerosis and dominance of coronary artery. It may be concluded that atherosclerosis was present in almost half of the studied subjects and was found more among males. Left dominance was more frequently present among males it was associated with atherosclerosis. (shrink)

The concept of neutrosophic locally compact and neutrosophic compact open topology are introduced and some interesting propositions are discussed.

Our investigative question is what part of the human psyche is active when we are sleeping. We use the single-counter-example method, extracted from Classical Logic, to prove that it could not be the case that one of our existing models for the human psyche could explain the human sleep. The models of the human psyche that we consider are the Freudian, the Jungian, and our own. By proving that no known part could be active whilst we sleep, and we prove (...) all by presenting known facts, we reach the conclusion that we need a new model of psyche to account for the entire complexity of our beings. We associate sleep with dreams. Upon discussing the human dreams in more details, we end up applying the principles of the inference to the best explanation to explain the human dreams by means of references to the spiritual world. That makes us think about how the spiritists would describe our psyche, and we then present a new model. The new model is obviously a fruit of speculation. This time, the model involves all Freudian elements, our extensional elements, body, and soul. We use the synthetic method to construct our new model. Since our sleep time is so important, to the point of obliging us to build a new model for the human psyche, we worry about protecting it. We then use studies on the impact of noise on humans to talk about how bad the consequences of having a person speaking to us during sleep are. This trivially extends to people that are in hypnotic state. We try to make a case against hypnosis and interference with the sleep of human beings by referring to health, spiritual, and world consequences. Our main result is then a new model for the human psyche, and this time a model that has to do with what is beyond what has already been formally acknowledged by us. A secondary result is that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or to speak to them as they sleep. Our conclusions are that there is definitely something beyond our rationality that happens during our sleep time and this something has not been identified by Freud, Jung or us this far. Besides, that we should not allow people to hypnotize others or speak to them as they sleep. (shrink)

This essay challenges the notion of avoiding uncomfortable thoughts and emotions in mental health. It argues that accepting these experiences, as supported by therapies like Exposure and Response Prevention for Pure OCD, promotes greater wellbeing. By cultivating a compassionate relationship with inner experiences, individuals can foster resilience amidst challenges.

This reply to an ongoing debate between conspiracy theory researchers from different disciplines exposes the conceptual confusions that underlie some of the disagreements in conspiracy theory research. Reconciling these conceptual confusions is important because conspiracy theories are a multidisciplinary topic and a profound understanding of them requires integrative insights from different fields. Specifically, we distinguish research focussing on conspiracy *theories* (and theorizing) from research of conspiracy *belief* (and mindset, theorists) and explain how particularism with regards to conspiracy theories does not (...) mean we cannot define a problematic subclass of conspiracy beliefs, while avoiding the problems of generalism. We hope this reply helps conspiracy theory researchers recognize the differences between studying conspiracy theories and conspiracy beliefs and appreciate the possibilities for fruitful, integrative, and interdisciplinary research. (shrink)

DECODING THE MENO The truth the dialectic Meno attempts to search for is human excellence or virtue. Part of this process is defining exactly what each concept really means. In truth, however, Plato has given the reader the answer – the greatest human virtue or excellence is imagination. The answer is subtly weaved into the dialogue itself. Plato has subliminally communicated the pattern of excellence.

The thesis of this article is that there has never been any ground for the controversy between the doctrine of free will and determinism, that it is based upon a misapprehension, that the two assertions are entirely consistent, that one of them strictly implies the other, that they have been opposed only because of our natural want of the analytical imagination. In so saying I do not tamper with the meaning of either phrase. That would be unpardonable. I mean free (...) will in the natural and usual sense, in the fullest, the most absolute sense in which for the purposes of the personal and moral life the term is ever employed. I mean it as implying responsibility, merit and demerit, guilt and desert. I mean it as implying, after an act has been performed, that one " could have done otherwise " than one did. I mean it as conveying these things also, not in any subtly modified sense but in exactly the sense in which we conceive them in life and in law and in ethics. These two doctrines have been opposed because we have not realised that free will can be analysed without being destroyed, and that determinism is merely a feature of the analysis of it. And if we are tempted to take refuge in the thought of an "ultimate ", an "innermost" liberty that eludes the analysis, then we have implied a deterministic basis and constitution for this liberty as well. For such a basis and constitution lie in the idea of liberty. -/- The thesis is not, like that of Green or Bradley, that the contending opinions are reconciled if we adopt a certain metaphysic of the ego, as that it is timeless, and identifies itself with a desire by a " timeless act". This is to say that the two are irreconcilable, as they are popularly supposed to be, except by a theory that delivers us from the conflict by taking us out of time. Our view on the contrary is that from the natural and temporal point of view itself there never was any need of a reconciliation but only of a comprehension of the meaning of terms. (The metaphysical nature of the self and its identity through time is a problem for all who confront memory, anticipation, etc.; it has no peculiar difficulties arising from the present problem.) -/- I am not maintaining that determinism is true; only that it is true insofar as we have free will. That we are free in willing is, broadly speaking, a fact of experience. That broad fact is more assured than any philosophical analysis. It is therefore surer than the deterministic analysis of it, entirely adequate as that in the end appears to be. But it is not here affirmed that there are no small exceptions, no slight undetermined swervings, no ingredient of absolute chance. All that is here said is that such absence of determination, if and so far as it exists, is no gain to freedom, but sheer loss of it; no advantage to the moral life, but blank subtraction from it. -- When I speak below of "the indeterminist" I mean the libertarian indeterminist, that is, him who believes in free will and holds that it involves indetermination. (shrink)

The role of intuition in Kant’s account of experience receives perennial philosophical attention. In this essay, I present the textual case that Kant also makes extensive reference to what he terms “images” that are generated by the imagination. Beyond this, as I argue, images are fundamentally distinct from empirical and pure intuitions. Images and empirical intuitions differ in how they relate to sensation, and all images (even “pure images”) actually depend on pure intuitions. Moreover, all images differ from intuitions in (...) their structure or format. I then turn to a question that naturally arises on the resulting view: if the imagination produces images, and if images are fundamentally distinct from intuitions, then how do intuitions relate to the imagination? I outline reasons for thinking that intuitions and their essential features do not depend on the imagination at all. Though this essay does not decisively argue for this thesis, the resulting view provides a clear account of the distinction between the senses and the imagination in Kant’s theory of sensibility. (shrink)

This paper compares the naturalistic interpretations of religion offered by the Chinese Confucian philosopher Xunzi (c. 310-219 BCE) and the American pragmatist philosopher John Dewey (1859-1952), and shows how each philosopher reconceived the nature of religious life in fundamentally non-supernatural, ethical, and therapeutic terms. While acknowledging that there are important differences between their respective views—especially on such matters as the nature and scope of ethical knowledge, the nature of ethics, and what form an ideal society will take—and that their views (...) were furthermore shaped by very different historical and cultural contexts, the paper argues that both philosophers nevertheless took this naturalized, ethical and therapeutic conception of religion to be the correct and more profound way to understand religious life, and the best way to develop an appropriate sense of oneness with and reverence for the social and natural worlds that we inhabit. For both Xunzi and Dewey, in short, religious attitudes, experiences, and practices are valuable not because they put us into proper relations with something supernatural, but rather because of their capacity to orient and enrich our lives at both the individual and social levels and put us into proper relations with other human beings and the natural world. Overall, the paper argues that a comparative study of Xunzi’s and Dewey’s interpretations of religion not only reveals features of their thought that we might otherwise miss, but also helps us to better understand the range of possible forms that a naturalistic interpretation of religion can take. (shrink)

l. There is an antinomy in Hare's thought between Ought-Implies-Can and No-Indicatives-from-Imperatives. It cannot be resolved by drawing a distinction between implication and entailment. 2. Luther resolved this antinomy in the l6th century, but to understand his solution, we need to understand his problem. He thought the necessity of Divine foreknowledge removed contingency from human acts, thus making it impossible for sinners to do otherwise than sin. 3. Erasmus objected (on behalf of Free Will) that this violates Ought-Implies-Can which he (...) supported with Hare-style ordinary language arguments. 4. Luther a) pointed out the antinomy and b) resolved it by undermining the prescriptivist arguments for Ought-Implies-Can. 5. We can reinforce Luther's argument with an example due to David Lewis. 6. Whatever its merits as a moral principle, Ought-Implies-Can is not a logical truth and should not be included in deontic logics. Most deontic logics, and maybe the discipline itself, should therefore be abandoned. 7. Could it be that Ought-Conversationally-Implies-Can? Yes - in some contexts. But a) even if these contexts are central to the evolution of Ought, the implication is not built into the semantics of the word; b) nor is the parallel implication built into the semantics of orders; and c) in some cases Ought conversationally implies Can, only because Ought-Implies-Can is a background moral belief. d) Points a) and b) suggest a criticism of prescriptivism - that Oughts do not entail imperatives but that the relation is one of conversational implicature. 8. If Ought-Implies-Can is treated as a moral principle, Erasmus' argument for Free Will can be revived (given his Christian assumptions). But it does not 'prove' Pelagianism as Luther supposed. A semi-Pelagian alternative is available. (shrink)

The exploration of the mind is a fundamental pursuit spanning philosophy and psychology, with implications reaching into diverse practical realms. This paper delves into the intricacies of mental states, examining historical perspectives from ancient philosophers to modern theorists. Philosophical inquiries into intentionality, consciousness, and the nature of mental phenomena are scrutinized, alongside empirical investigations by psychologists. The discourse navigates through contrasting theories such as dualism, materialism, and functionalism, shedding light on the challenges of reconciling subjective experiences with objective observations. The (...) problem of other minds and the tension between internalism and externalism are dissected, revealing the complex interplay between individual cognition and external influences. Ultimately, this analysis underscores the intricate nature of philosophical inquiries into consciousness and the mind. (shrink)

This paper examines Plato’s conception of shame and the role intoxication plays in cultivating it in the Laws. Ultimately, this paper argues that there are two accounts of shame in the Laws. There is a public sense of shame that is more closely tied to the rational faculties and a private sense of shame that is more closely tied to the non-rational faculties. Understanding this division between public and private shame not only informs our understanding of Plato’s moral psychology, but (...) his political and ethical theory as well. (shrink)

In the quest for mental peace and philosophical insight, the most profound approach is to let the mind function freely, without the interference of a controlling thinker. This essay explores the philosophical and cognitive implications of an unimpeded mind, drawing from Eastern traditions such as Zen Buddhism and Taoism, alongside contemporary cognitive science. It argues that the natural rhythm of thought is disrupted by the ego’s need for control, leading to mental fragmentation and turbulence. By embracing the concept of “no-mind” (...) or non-interference, individuals can achieve a harmonious flow of consciousness. Contemporary cognitive science supports this view, showing that reducing self-referential thinking enhances cognitive flexibility and emotional regulation. This harmonious state, akin to the flow experienced by top athletes and artists, offers a path to greater psychological well-being and deeper philosophical understanding. (shrink)

The article “Philosophy is crucial in the age of AI” by Anthony Grayling and Brian Ball explores the significant role philosophy has played in the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its continuing relevance in guiding the future of AI technologies. The authors trace the historical contributions of philosophers and logicians, such as Gottlob Frege, Kurt Godel, and Alan Turing, in shaping the foundational principles of AI. They argue that philosophical inquiry remains essential, especially in addressing complex issues like consciousness, (...) creativity, and the alignment of AI with human values. The article emphasizes the interdisciplinary collaboration needed to navigate the ethical and societal challenges posed by advancing AI systems, suggesting that philosophy is crucial in ensuring these technologies develop responsibly and ethically. (shrink)

This paper explores the profound teachings of the Yoga Sutras and their application in modern psychological and therapeutic contexts. Yoga, as defined by Patanjali, aims to tranquil the fluctuations of the mind and achieve spiritual liberation through the integration of conscious and unconscious processes. The critique of Western dualism (more specifically Cartesian’ dualism) in favor of a unified perspective with Samkhya philosophy is discussed, emphasizing the role of the intellect, karma, and self- awareness in achieving mental calm and freedom from (...) suffering. Modern challenges such as social media’s impact on identity and the rise of mental as well as psychological disorders are examined through the lens of the methods of Yoga Philosophy, highlighting the efficacy of mindfulness and yoga therapies in promoting self-regulation, inner well-being, and peace. (shrink)

This essay explores the inherent blankness of life, describing it as devoid of fixed meaning, purpose, or morality. It discusses how humans struggle with this blankness, often attempting to avoid or fill it through various activities and pursuits. The essay distinguishes between natural biological activities and those driven by fear and anxiety, emphasizing how societal conditioning contributes to the latter. It delves into the role of rationality in avoiding blankness, the discomfort of silence, and the vibrancy that this blankness holds. (...) Ultimately, it advocates for embracing this blankness as a source of freedom, vitality, and profound insight into the nature of existence. (shrink)

The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of “evaluative moral progress-claims”, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and (...) 6 outline the ambiguous character of “making moral progress”. (shrink)

In psychology, stress is a feeling of emotional strain and pressure. Stress is a type of psychological pain. Small amounts of stress may be beneficial, as it can improve athletic performance, motivation and reaction to the environment. Excessive amounts of stress, however, can increase the risk of strokes, heart attacks, ulcers, and mental illnesses such as depression and also aggravation of a pre-existing condition. Psychological stress can be external and related to the environment but may also be caused by internal (...) perceptions that cause an individual to experience anxiety or other negative emotions surrounding a situation, such as pressure, discomfort, etc., which they then deem stressful. (shrink)

By the absolute Good, I understand the Idea of the Good; by the human goods, I understand pleasure and reason, which have been disqualified in Plato's "Republic" as candidates for the absolute Good (cf.R.505b-d). Concerning the Idea of the Good, we can distinguish a maximal and a minimal interpretation. After the minimal interpretation, the Idea of the Good is the absolute Good because there is no final cause beyond the Idea of the Good. After the maximal interpretation, the Idea of (...) the Good is the One. The maximal and the minimal interpretation go beyond the textual evidence. I will defend two theses: (1) Since the platonic Socrates deliberately gives no more information, it seems wise to stop with Socrates and to give only a formal, not a substantive, interpretation: The absolute good is the third item between and above knowledge and the known. (2) To mediate between the absolute Good and the human goods, Plato’s Eleatic Stranger introduced in the "Politicus" and "Philebus" an intermediate principle: "the appropriate" (to metrion). For more information concerning "the appropriate" cf. Ferber, Rafael (2010). Plato's Side Suns: Beauty, Symmetry and Truth. Comments concerning semantic monism and pluralism of the "Good" in the Philebus (65A 1-5). Elenchos, 31, p. 51-76, esp. 64-67. (shrink)

There is an intuitive difference in how we think about pluralism and attitudinal diversity in epistemological contexts versus political contexts. In an epistemological context, it seems problematically arbitrary to hold a particular belief on some issue, while also thinking it perfectly reasonable to hold a totally different belief on the same issue given the same evidence. By contrast, though, it doesn’t seem problematically arbitrary to have a particular set of political commitments, while at the same time thinking it perfectly reasonable (...) for someone in a similar position have a totally different set of political commitments. This chapter examines three explanatory theses that might be used to make sense of this difference: (1) that practical commitments are desire dependent in a way that beliefs are not; (2) that there are reasons to be resolute in practical commitments, but not in beliefs; and (3) that compromise in the face of practical political disagreement doesn’t mitigate controversy, whereas compromise in the face of disagreement about mere beliefs does mitigate controversy. (shrink)

PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, vol. 52, number 1, pp.44-63. R.M. Nugayev, Kazan State |University, USSR. -/- THE HISTORY OF QUANTUM THEORY AS A DECISIVE ARGUMENT FAVORING EINSTEIN OVER LJRENTZ. -/- Abstract. Einstein’s papers on relativity, quantum theory and statistical mechanics were all part of a single research programme ; the aim was to unify mechanics and electrodynamics. It was this broader program – which eventually split into relativistic physics and quantummmechanics – that superseded Lorentz’s theory. The argument of this paper is (...) partly historical and partly methodological. A notion of “crossbred objects” – theoretical objects with contradictory properties which are part of the domain of application of two different research programs – is developed that explains the dynamics of revolutionary theory change. (shrink)

I offer a close reading of the first part of Sartre's The Transcendence of the Ego, arguing that contrary to widely held interpretation, one of Sartre's main goals in that text is to defend the view that consciousness does not necessitate self-awareness, that not all conscious states need be, ipso facto, states of self-awareness. In addition, I explain that this view about the conceptual relationship between consciousness and self-awareness has important methodological implications. One of the standard strategies for accounting for (...) the possibility of the type of capacity to have I* thoughts and attitudes is based on the assumption that being conscious necessarily entails being self-aware in at least a minimal sense, and then proceeds to explain how it I*-thoughts and attitudes are possible on the basis of those minimal states of self-awareness. Yet if Sartre's account of self-awareness is so much as plausible, this kind of strategy is bound to be incomplete. By helping itself to a notion of minimal self-awareness that is purportedly constitutive of consciousness, it fails to account for what is, by its own lights, the most fundamental form of self-awareness. (shrink)

In A Priori Justification, Albert Casullo argues that extant attempts to explicate experiential justification—by stipulation, introspection, conceptual analysis, thought experimentation, and/or appeal to intuitions about hypothetical cases—are unsuccessful. He draws the following conclusion: “armchair methods” such as these are inadequate to the task. Instead, empirical methods should be used to investigate the distinction between experiential and non-experiential justification and to address questions concerning the nature, extent, and existence of the a priori. In this essay, I show that Casullo has not (...) refuted armchair explications of experiential justification, in particular those that appeal to introspectively accessible phenomenology. I do this by presenting a phenomenal theory of experiential justification that (a) has a significant degree of initial plausibility and (b) survives Casullo’s general attack on such theories. As a result, a premise in the central argument for Casullo’s signature proposal concerning the a priori is undermined. (shrink)