A growing conceptual and empirical literature is advancing the idea that language extends our cognitive skills. One of the most influential positions holds that language – qua material symbols – facilitates individual thought processes by virtue of its material properties (Clark, 2006a). Extending upon this model, we argue that language enhances our cognitive capabilities in a much more radical way: the skilful engagement of public material symbols facilitates evolutionarily unprecedented modes of collective perception, action and reasoning (interpersonal synergies) creating dialogically (...) extended minds. We relate our approach to other ideas about collective minds ( Gallagher, 2011, Theiner et al., 2010 and Tollefsen, 2006) and review a number of empirical studies to identify the mechanisms enabling the constitution of interpersonal cognitive systems. (shrink)

A widely debated issue in contemporary metaphysics is whether the modal profile of ordinary objects has to be explained in non-modal terms (that is, Thesis 1). However, how to solve such an issue with respect to occurrences – namely, processes and events – is a question that has been largely neglected in the current metaphysical debate. The general goal of this article is to start filling this gap. As a first result of the article, we make it plausible that, if (...) Thesis 1 holds for objects, then it also holds for processes and events. Then, we develop a metaphysical account of processes derived from Fine’s (1999, 2022) suggestions, according to which a process is a variable embodiment that is manifested by different events at the different times it goes on – namely, Thesis 2. We raised the challenge from the completion of a process that asks the Finean account of processes to explain relevant modal features of processes in non-modal terms. As a second result, we argue that four initially plausible strategies for solving such a challenge fall short of solving it. As a third result, we show that the theory of variable embodiments Fine formulates for objects must differ from the theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. We conclude by investigating some revisions to a theory of variable embodiments that aims to model processes. (shrink)

Processes are occurrents that were, are, or will be happening. They endure or they perdure, i.e. they are either “fully” present at every time they happen, or they rather have temporal parts. According to Stout (2016), they endure. His argument assumes that processes may change. Then, Stout argues that, if something changes, it endures. As I show, Stout’s Argument misses its target. In particular, it makes use of a notion of change that is either intuitive but illegitimate or technical but (...) question-begging. (shrink)

Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy is being investigated as a treatment for a range of psychiatric illnesses. Current research suggests that the kinds of subjective experiences induced by psychedelic compounds play key roles in producing therapeutic outcomes. To date, most knowledge of therapeutic psychedelic experiences are derived from psychometric assessments with scales such as the Mystical Experience Questionnaire. While these approaches are insightful, more nuanced and detailed descriptions of psychedelic-induced changes to subjective experience are required. Drawing on recent advancements in qualitative methods arising (...) from the interdisciplinary field of phenomenological psychopathology, we propose a systematic and comprehensive investigation into how Psychedelic-Assisted Psychotherapy alters subjective experience. This research program aims to characterise the nature of therapeutic psychedelic experiences by drawing on concepts from philosophical phenomenology. Such characterisations should, moreover, contribute to our understanding of the mechanisms of psychedelic therapy, the role of integration therapy, and related philosophical debates. (shrink)

The paper provides some introductory comments and a preliminary translation of Avicenna’s Burhān, IV, 2. I shall first set the stage by outlining the structure of the book (sec. 1). I will then briefly introduce (sec. 2) a number of notions that are dealt with in the first treatise of the Burhān (e.g. definition, description). Burhān, IV, 2 is split into two parts: the first focuses mainly on Aristotle’s An. Post., B, 4, whereas the second covers some of the topics (...) of B, 5 and B, 6. Accordingly, sec. 3 will be devoted to a cursory presentation of Aristotle’s arguments in An. Post., B, 4 along with a more detailed discussion of its Avicennan counterpart, focusing on the indemonstrability of definition; sec. 4, finally, will be a presentation of the second part of the chapter, concerning the relationship between definition and division. An English translation of the entire chapter is appended to the paper and is accompanied by some notes. (shrink)

Monists and pluralists disagree concerning how many ordinary objects there are in a single situation. For instance, pluralists argue that a statue and the clay it is made of have different properties, and thereby are different. The standard monist’s response is to hold that there is just a single object, and that, under the description “being a statue”, this object is, e.g., aesthetically valuable, and that, under the description “being a piece of clay”, it is not aesthetically valuable. However, Fine (...) provided an ontological reading of the expression “an object under a description”: the theory of rigid embodiments. The debate between monists and pluralists reduplicates in the domain of ordinary occurrences, like walks and conferences. Specifically, they disagree whether an occurrence in progress (also called “process”) like John’s walk that is happening at tn is identical to some completed occurrence (also called “event”) like John’s walk that happened between, e.g., t1 and tn. Under the adoption of the pluralist’s position, the article aims to provide a novel theory of ordinary occurrences that develops the ontological reading of “under a description” to account for occurrences in progress and completed occurrences. As a first result, we formulate a theory according to which both occurrences in progress and completed occurrences are rigid embodiments. As a second result, we argue that the suggested theory is explanatorily powerful to the extent it solves two puzzles that we call “the Puzzle from the Completion of a Process” and “the Metaphysical-cum-Semantical Puzzle”. (shrink)

This essay illustrates the main aspects of the discussion between Brentano and Stumpf about «tonal fusion». In his Tonpsychologie, Stumpf essentially moved from a Brentanian standpoint. Yet, he did not adopt Brentano’s subsequently developed new theory of «sensible qualities», so that a polemic eventually arouse between them. Far from representing a marginal issue, the episode is relevant to our understanding of their relationship. The discussion as to the mechanism of tonal fusion reveals a general divergence between Brentano and Stumpf concerning (...) the idea of human sensibility as a whole and of the method of psychology. (shrink)

Hegel’s treatment of character in §395 of Encyclopedia is considered together with the commentaries given in his lectures. In these texts Hegel addresses some philosophical problems concerning character. In Hegel’s view, in fact, human character has a “natural basis” and yet depends on a free individual choice. Attention is drawn at Kant’s treatment of the same subject matter in Anthropology form a pragmatic point of view, which is the source of Hegel’s tripartite arrangement of Naturell, temperament and character. Diverging from (...) Kant, however, Hegel introduces a dialectic development within the development of character. (shrink)

The theory of variable embodiments has been primarily formulated to model ordinary objects as things that change their parts over time. A variable embodiment /f/ is a sui generis whole constructed from a principle f, the principle of a variable embodiment, and it is manifested at different times by different things picked out by such a principle f. This principle is usually clarified as a function that picks out, at any given time the variable embodiment exists, its corresponding manifestation at (...) that time, and it fails to pick out anything at any other time. The first purpose of this article is to examine and refute three natural understandings of such a principle. Specifically, first, we argue against the view that it should be understood extensionally as either a partial function or total function. Next, we provide some motivations to reject the understanding of the principle as a function in intensional terms, where the notion of intension is analyzed in terms of a specific version of a possible world semantics. The second goal of the article is to make it plausible that the principle has an intensional character and, on the basis of the results achieved, to formulate some constraints that an account of such a principle should meet. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the late XiVth century and puts it into perspective within the context of the contemporary debate concerning semantic paradoxes. The author of the text is the italian logician Peter of Mantua (d. 1399/1400). The treatise is relevant both from a theoretical and from a historical standpoint. By appealing to a distinction between two senses in which propositions are said to be true, it offers an unusual (...) solution to the paradox, but in a traditional spirit that contrasts a number of trends prevailing in the XiVth century. It also counts as a remarkable piece of evidence for the reconstruction of the reception of English logic in italy, as it is inspired by the views of John Wyclif. Three approaches addressing the Liar paradox (Albert of Saxony, William Heytesbury and a version of strong restrictionism) are first criticised by Peter of Mantua, before he presents his own alternative solution. The latter seems to have a prima facie intuitive justification, but is in fact acceptable only on a very restricted understanding, since its generalisation is subject to the so-called revenge problem. (shrink)

We aim to show that Kant’s theory of time is consistent by providing axioms whose models validate all synthetic a priori principles for time proposed in the Critique of Pure Reason. In this paper we focus on the distinction between time as form of intuition and time as formal intuition, for which Kant’s own explanations are all too brief. We provide axioms that allow us to construct ‘time as formal intuition’ as a pair of continua, corresponding to time as ‘inner (...) sense’ and the external representation of time as a line Both continua are replete with infinitesimals, which we use to elucidate an enigmatic discussion of ‘rest’ in the Metaphysical foundations of natural science. Our main formal tools are Alexandroff topologies, inverse systems and the ring of dual numbers. (shrink)

Basilio Sabazio was the first in Italy to argue for the unity and corruptibility of either sublunar or celestial matter. In this paper new insight of his intellectual activity between Napoli and Milano is provided, and in particular his relationship with Scipione Capece, from whose letter to Giovan Francesco di Capua, Count of Palena we learn that Sabazio was an expert in philology and astronomy. The surviving part of an essay by Sabazio to the astronomer Francesco Cigalini from Como is (...) here edited with some informations about Cigalini’s reply. A newly recovered Sabazio’s astronomical work is here edited – from which his endorsement of Eraclides Ponticus’ astronomical system is evident –, as well as his Consilium to Pope Paolo III about the urgency of convening a general council. (shrink)

In this paper I shall discuss the relationship between the two known Arabic translations of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and Avicenna’s Kitāb al-Burhān. I shall argue that Avicenna relies on both (1) Abū Bishr Mattā’s translation and (2) the anonymous translation used by Averroes in the Long Commentary as well as in the Middle Commentary (and also indirectly preserved by Gerard of Cremona’s Latin translation of Aristotle’s work). Although, generally speaking, the problem is relevant to the history of the transmission of (...) the Posterior Analytics from Greek through Syriac into Arabic, I do not intend to give a systematic presentation of the historical setting in which Aristotle’s work became readily available to the Arabo-Islamic culture. My aim here is rather to isolate and discuss some pieces of evidence concerning the texts that seem to have been available to Avicenna. In addition to that, I shall also provide evidence concerning the relationship with the Greek commentary tradition (in particular Philoponus and Themistius) that is likely to have influenced Avicenna in his discussion of Aristotle’s theory of demonstration and scientific knowledge. (shrink)

This essay addresses the interrelations between philosophy and experimental sciences that lie at the heart of Carl Stumpf’s epistemology. Following a biographical exposé demonstrating how Stumpf succeeded in acquiring a dual competence in both philosophical and scientific fields, we examine the vast array of academic disciplines encompassed by his research. Such a biographical treatment aims, indeed, to better promote the thrust of Stumpf’s assertion that philosophical enquiries should always be carried out in close connection with scientific practices, and underlines how (...) philosophico-scientific interactions established his work as a central pillar in the history of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century German thought. (shrink)

The critic of substance immobility through negation constitutes the starting point of the ‘voyage of discovery’ of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes, in which mind and body experiences are considered in terms of mutual recognition, without denying the subjectivity. In this article I am discussing some aspects of Hegel’s philosophy of spirit after Nietzsche’s ‘experimentalism’ and Dennett’s theory of mind, in order to articulate, through Bergson, two fundamental reasons. The first concerns the subject and the dramatic awareness of its constitutional temporality (...) and, at the same time, the possibility to transcend the limit of ‘here’ and ‘now’. On this basis, the second regards the indefensibility of nihilism, because, thanks to consciousness and its continuous activity, the temporal subject, from Hegel to Bergson, persists as a ‘dark side’, in which a constant ‘overcoming’ (élan) of an implicitly normative and essentially social practice takes place. (shrink)

Peter Damian’s epistle 28, usually called Dominus vobiscum, shows a complex theological discussion. In fact, the author intertwines different subjects: the reform of the Church, the exaltation of monasticism, and, in particular, the primacy of the eremitical life. However, what is central in Peter Damian’s discourse is the Eucharistic sacrament, which the author considers from the standpoint of a theological sensitivity centered on the liturgical dimension of the celebration and on its spiritual and religious value. This contribution analyses Peter Damian’s (...) treatment of the Eucharistic sacrament, placing it in the historical-theological and doctrinal context of the disputes on the sacrament that animated the Church since the mid-eleventh century. (shrink)

In his Spinozastudien Stumpf dismisses the commonplace interpretation of Spinoza’s parallelism in psychophysical terms. Rather, he suggests to read Ethics, II, Prop. 7, as the heritage of the scholastic doctrine of intentionality. Accordingly, things are the intentional objects of God’s ideas. On this basis, Stumpf also tries to make sense of the puzzling spinozian doctrine of the infinity of God’s attributes. In support of this exegesis, Stumpf offers an interesting reconstruction of the history of intentionality from Plato and Aristotle to (...) the late Scholastics. Besides its intrinsic value, Stumpf’s confrontation with Spinoza is illuminating in explaining his own position concerning a crucial phenomenological question such as intentionality. Actually, Stumpf avoids defining the mental in terms of intentionality and maintains, rather, a moderate but professed dualistic position, thus deeply diverging from both Brentano and Husserl. (shrink)

This essay is about the Wolfgang Köhler’s philosophical ideas expressed in his The Place of Value in a World of Facts of 1938. Köhler, who strongly supports a scientific world view, considers the question as to whether science is able to cope with human values, besides natural facts. Relying upon phenomenological analyses, and on his previous researches in natural philosophy, Köhler introduces his doctrine of “epistemological dualism”. From a historical point of view, this theory exhibits some similarity with the philosophical (...) ideas expressed by Köhler’s Berlin mentor Carl Stumpf. It is argued that Köhler’s epistemological dualism actually supports ontological monism and aims at offering a unified view of natural facts and human values. (shrink)

When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.

Stumpf’s doctrine of the categories is of great importance for our understanding of his philosophy. This theme had been widely discussed among German thinkers after Kant; Brentano himself had repeatedly dealt with it since his early works. However, Stumpf considerably diverges from Brentano on this crucial philosophical topic. Although a systematic discussion can be found only in Stumpf’s posthumous Erkenntnislehre, his core ideas on the categories can be traced to his early work on space of 1873. In fact, Stumpf claims (...) that the peculiar relationship between extension and color is analogous to the relationship that holds between substance and accidents. Thus, like any other category, substance empirically stems from perception. Sensory experience, for Stumpf, is made up of perceptual wholes, whose attributes are typically bound to each other, rather than separately given in bundles, as Hume and other associationists used to assume. Thus, the achievements of Stumpf’s holist psychology effectively contributes a solution to this classic metaphysical problem. (shrink)

This essay focuses on the relation between man and the world in Kant’s anthropology. Within Baumgarten’s Metaphysica, used as a manual by Kant for his lessons, empirical psychology is situated between cosmology and rational psychology. However, this view is untenable for Kant, at least after the first Critique. Consequently, whereas Baumgarten explains, for instance, obscure ideas referring to the bodily position in the world, Kant’s pragmatic approach excludes this. Yet, the concept of «Welt» retains paramount importance within Kant’s Anthropology. The (...) two parts of the work are thus harmonically linked: the first offers an account of a largely pathological human psychology; the second a way out of the pathology through the construction of a social and historical human world. Accordingly, anthropology responds to the «Weltbegriff» of philosophy and helps to correct the deviations from the final rational destination of mankind. (shrink)

Many nineteenth-century psychologists assume that the measurement of psychic intensity is a prerequisite to the development of a truly scientific psychology. In the first edition of the Psychology from an empirical point of view, Brentano deals with this question. He assumes that all psychic phenomena admit of a certain intensity. Later on, Brentano retreats this doctrine and claims that only sensible phenomena admit of an intensity, whereas intellectual presentations do not. As a consequence, Brentano introduces a radical gap between sensible (...) and noetic consciousness. By contrast, Stumpf maintains a continuity between sensations and presentations. The main difference between them is the degree of their intensity. The essay provides a discussion and a comparison of the above mentioned points of view. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze Kant's concept of character in the light of the concept of nature adopted in Kant's Pragmatic anthropology. In the Preface, Kant contrasts mechanical nature with freedom and opts for a pragmatic, rather than a physiological anthropology. In the Anthropological characteristics, however, Kant introduces his teleological concept of nature. Accordingly, he defends the view that there is no basic contrast between the purpose of nature (in the latter sense) and human freedom.

This essay addresses the attitude of some leading Neo-Kantian philosophers toward scientific psychology and psychophysics. Early influential figures like Friedrich A. Lange counted Gustav T. Fechner’s psychophysical law among their allies in the rehabilitation of the Kantian standpoint. Later on, however, Neo-Kantian philosophers firmly rejected psychological measurement as a whole and harshly criticized the methods adopted by several psychologists of their time. For example, the Marburg mathematician and philosopher August Stadler reduced the validity of Fechner’s law to the mere physiological (...) sphere, and Hermann Cohen conceived the application of mathematical integration to human sensations as an inane enterprise. (shrink)

Trust is an attitude that an agent (the trustor) has toward an entity (the trustee), such that the trustor counts upon the trustee to act in a way that is benefi- cial w.r.t. to the trustor’s goals. The notion of trust is relevantly discussed both in in- formation science and philosophy. Unfortunately, we still lack a satisfying account for this concept. The goal of this article is to contribute to filling this gap. First, we take issue with some central tenets (...) shared by the main philosophical accounts, such as that there is just one relation of trust, that this relation has three argument places, and that trust is reliance plus some extra factor. Second, we provide a novel account of trust, also discussing different levels of trust. According to the account we put forth here, the logical form of trust sentences is expressed by a four-place relation. Further, we distinguish and characterize four kinds of trust relations and their connections. We also argue that trust and reliance are different phenomena. Third, on the basis of the proposed account, we extend the Reference Ontology of Trust (ROT). We call the new version of ROT that includes this extension ”ROT 3.0”. Finally, we discuss the implications of the new ontological definitions in the applications we have done of the concept of trust in other works, also pointing out future applications made possible by these novel accounts of trust. (shrink)

In this paper, I look at Susan Stebbing’s articles and reviews that critically engage logical positivism. These appeared before the publication of A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic and helped shape the early British reception of logical positivism. I highlight Stebbing’s adoption of G.E. Moore’s tripartite distinction between knowing a proposition, understanding it, and giving an analysis of it and, in light of this distinction, her focus on whether the principle of verifiability can ground a plausible account of communication. Stebbing (...) thinks not, and I reconstruct her reasons, as well as her own account of communication. In doing this, I relate her criticisms to her rejection of methodological solipsism and her dissatisfaction with the logical positivist treatment of statements about other minds and the past. I also argue that Stebbing’s work provides a bridge to later criticisms of logical positivism from ordinary language philosophers. Foregrounding Stebbing’s engagement with logical positivism, especially her focus on communication, paints a fuller picture of how the logical positivists came to be part of analytic philosophy despite having different concerns than many of the British philosophers engaging their work. (shrink)

The essay illustrates the figure of Demetrios Kavàkis Rhaoul, Byzantine official at the service of the last two Paleologue emperors and of the Despots of the Peloponnese, who was also George Gemistos Plethon’s friend and student. Two short works of his are here published for the first time, one on the Sun God and another on the classification of the religions professed by humanity, alongside two small inedited letters by Plethon. In the first of the two writings, Kavàkis clears the (...) reasons for his aversion towards any kind of religion or philosophy that places the divine beyond the visible world and that believes in the existence of an intelligible or, even worse, over-intelligible world. These ideas lead him to clash not only with Christianity, but also with Plato and with the ideas of his beloved teacher Plethon, who, however, seems to agree with him in a dream. In the second writing this peculiar solar religion is reaffirmed, against the religion of poets and the religions of transcendence, warning however that nature wants some respect for the religion of ancestors, whichever this might be, when it is functional to the life of the society and of the State. (shrink)

The author publishes the initial fragment of an unknown treatise by Leon Battista Alberti on the casting of statues written around 1455 and preserved in cod. Ottob. lat. 1870. The fragment contains a discussion on the nature of light and the element of fire.

As COVID-19 emerged as a phenomenon of the total environment, and despite the intertwined and complex relationships that make humanity an organic part of the Bio- and Geospheres, the majority of our responses to it have been corrective in character, with few or no consideration for unintended consequences which bring about further vulnerability to unanticipated global events. Tackling COVID-19 entails a systemic and precautionary approach to human-nature relations, which we frame as regaining diversity in the Geo-, Bio-, and Anthropospheres. Its (...) implementation requires nothing short of an overhaul in the way we interact with and build knowledge from natural and social environments. Hence, we discuss the urgency of shifting from current to precautionary approaches to COVID-19 and look, through the lens of diversity, at the anticipated benefits in four systems crucially affecting and affected by the pandemic: health, land, knowledge and innovation. Our reflections offer a glimpse of the sort of changes needed, from pursuing planetary health and creating more harmonious forms of land use to providing a multi-level platform for other ways of knowing/understanding and turning innovation into a source of global public goods. These exemplary initiatives introduce and solidify systemic thinking in policymaking and move priorities from reaction-based strategies to precautionary frameworks. (shrink)

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Introduction; de Broglie's paradox.; Quantum theory of distant particles; The EPR paradox; Einstein locality and Bell's inequality; Recent research on Bell's inequality; General consequences of Einstein locality; Nonloeality and relativity; Time-symmetric theories; The Bohm-Aharonov hypothesis; Experiments on Einstein locality; Reduction of the wave packet; Measurements, reality and consciousness; Conclusions.

We present in this paper a novel ontological theory of events whose central tenet is the Aristotelian distinction between the object that changes and the actual subject of change, which is what we call an individual quality. While in the Kimian tradition events are individuated by a triple ⟨ o, P, t ⟩, where o is an object, P a property, and t an interval of time, for us the simplest events are qualitative changes, individuated by a triple ⟨ o, (...) q, t ⟩, where q is an individual quality inhering in o or in one of its parts. Detaching the individuation of events from the property they exemplify results in a fine-grained theory that keeps metaphysics and semantics clearly separate, and lies between the multiplicative and the unitarian approaches. We discuss then the way language refers to events, observing that, in most cases, event descriptions refer to complex, cognitively relevant clusters of co-occurring qualitative changes, which exhibit a synchronic structure depending on the way they are described. Contra Bennett, who famously argued that the semantics of event names ultimately depends on “local context and unprincipled intuitions”, we show how the lexicon provides systematic principles for individuating such clusters and classifying them into kinds. Finally, we address some open challenges in the semantics of locative and manner modifiers. (shrink)

Rella came of age as a philosopher in Italy during the period of the "crisis of reason" or more generally the exhaustion of classical rationality in its authority to structure experience. For Rella, unlike many others, the tensions of the crisis are productive. In The Myth of the Other, he presents a unique perspective on four seminal French thinkers: Lacan, Foucault, Deleuze, and Bataille. Moe's masterful translation brings this remarkable Italian thinker to American readers for the first time. This slim (...) book mayvery well change the way American scholars think about the crisis of the other and the self coming our of French poststructuralism. (shrink)

The modelling of concepts, besides involving disciplines like philosophy of mind and psychology, is a fundamental and lively research problem in several artificial intelligence (AI) areas, such as knowledge representation, machine learning, and natural language processing. In this scenario, the most prominent proposed solutions adopt different (often incompatible) assumptions about the nature of such a notion. Each of these solutions has been developed to capture some specific features of concepts and support some specific (artificial) cognitive operations. This paper critically reviews (...) the most notable computational approaches to the representation of concepts. The main goals are (i) to provide a shared terminology for the desiderata of concepts and their computational representation; (ii) to classify and assess the heterogeneous computational approaches according to the provided terminology; (iii) to provide a reader who may not be very familiar with theories of concepts with an introduction to major themes in this research and with pointers to different research projects, and (iv) to offer philosophers, and potentially AI practitioners, a well-informed guide for selecting among various (and possibly competing) computational representations of concepts. (shrink)

Recent scholarship on climate and conflict has increasingly examined the dynamic relationship between environmental scarcities and geopolitical tensions. Overall, climate-related shocks often lead to escalated disputes over natural resources, thus positioning climate hazards not only as an environmental issue but also as a catalyst that intensifies existing geopolitical and social frictions. The discourse on climate and conflict has mostly centred on its direct effects on natural resources and environmental conditions. However, its role in precipitating conflicts underscores the critical need to (...) incorporate climate considerations within broader security and policy frameworks. In recent decades, one of the most compelling developments in this field is the inclusion of environmental issues within the security paradigm. Environmental degradation, global warming, and climate change are now recognized as critical threats that transcend national borders, impacting personal, national, and international security . These factors have broadened our comprehension of the relationships among environmental transformation, conflict, and vulnerability, and have highlighted the importance of conservation and sustainable development in fostering peace, stability, and human security. Despite the increased attention on climate in conflict and security studies, the mechanisms through which an environmental catastrophe, or the threat of it, gets securitized in conflict remain under investigated. Understanding how these threats are framed and leveraged by conflicting parties can provide critical insights into the intersection of environmental risks and geopolitical strategies, thereby enriching the discourse on environmental security and conflict dynamics. Most case studies focus on the securitization of natural resources, such as water in the Nile and Indus basins, concentrating on resource scarcity rather than potential catastrophes. Additionally, research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and domestic politics in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands shows how framing environmental threats as national security issues can influence power dynamics and foster global action. However, these cases suggest that previous research has predominantly investigated how states strategically employ environmental narratives within the framework of national security for political and economic advantages, often in contexts removed from direct conflict scenarios. Moreover, much of the discussion on environmental securitization has focused on state-centric perspectives and inter-state conflicts. This emphasis on state actions, both in domestic and international arenas, has left a significant gap concerning the weaponization of environmental threats by non-state actors within ongoing conflicts. In that sense, the contribution of my thesis is twofold. First, it analyzes the weaponization of a looming environmental catastrophe within a conflict setting. Second, it focuses on a case where non-state actors, specifically the Houthis, are primary securitization actors. More specifically, my thesis addresses the existing gap in the literature by analysing the case of the FSO Safer, a deteriorating oil storage tanker moored off the coast of Yemen. Before the United Nations’ successful offloading plan, the tanker held over one million barrels of crude oil, posing a significant risk of massive ecological and economic damage due to its poor condition and lack of maintenance since the onset of the Yemeni conflict. Despite the imminent threat of an ecological disaster, the conflicting parties in Yemen – the Houthis and the internationally recognized government – have used the Safer as a bargaining chip rather than prioritizing immediate remedial action. This has put the entire region in a state of suspense, with the potential for disastrous oil leakage that could impact the Red Sea's marine ecosystems and the broader geopolitical stability. The FSO Safer crisis has directly inspired the research question of this study, highlighting the need to understand the strategic use of environmental threats in geopolitical conflicts. This crisis vividly illustrates how impending ecological disasters are not solely managed as environmental or humanitarian issues but are intricately woven into the fabric of international security and conflict negotiation strategies. It prompts critical inquiries into how and why such existential threats are leveraged by involved parties to advance their geopolitical agendas. Therefore, the research question formulated for this study is: How are environmental threats utilized as strategic tools in geopolitical conflicts? (shrink)

This paper contains the first edition of a Latin poem preserved in cod. Barb. gr. 127, written by a Latin converted to Islam who urges the Sultan Bayezid II to come in Italy and to establish in Rome a “Universal Monarchy”. In the appendix it is provided the Italian translation of an utopian text by Isidor of Kiev, dealing with a future general gathering of the Hellenes to promote a more general council composed by wise men coming from all lands, (...) with the purpose to reach a philosophical and religious concordia. (shrink)

In this very issue, Augusto (2022) formulates two requirements upon which to evaluate the adequacy of a foundational ontology. Specifically, the ontological categories: (i) should be understood as the most general kinds of things and (ii) are organized in a non-overlapping finite hierarchy. On the basis of such constraints, he claims that most existing foundational ontologies engineered in the context of Applied Ontology, including the UFO-B ontology, are inadequate. In this article, first we show that his objection against UFO-B can (...) be dissipated by pointing to a trivial terminological confusion. We then argue that his two constraints are not plausible. Then, we show that the disagreement between our point of view and Augusto’s framework is not restricted to those two constraints but extends over the notion of conceptualization of reality. (shrink)

This article presents some reflections on the concepts, terminology, and epistemological grounds of narrative theory. Our remarks are focused on the proposals advanced at the first RRN conference and they concern in particular two issues: the theoretical difference between classical and postclassical narratology and the paradigms of the contemporary debate. In the first part of the paper we focus on the definitional task of narrative theory; in the second part we describe the epistemology of and the theories built on two (...) opposite paradigms: the mimetic and the constructivist. Our conclusions highlight the continuity and the break points between contemporary theories, soliciting narratologists to answer to the many questions raised. (shrink)

This is a brief report of the first conference organized in Fribourg by the Réseau Romand de Narratologie. The title of the conference was Redefinitons of the Sequence in Postclassical Narratology.

È possibile ammettere, pensare e addirittura verificare che una cosa che sia accaduta nel passato possa non essere più accaduta in un momento presente? Ad esempio, si può, oggi, fare in modo che Roma non sia mai stata fondata? Come è possibile mutare la regolare causalità degli accadimenti di quel passato – il nostro e quello degli uomini che ci hanno preceduti – che sembra essere fondato sui vincoli di una strettissima necessità? E che dire quando questo sconvolgimento dell’ordine del (...) mondo arriva a toccare anche le possibilità logiche o le scelte di un “Divin Fattore”? D’altro canto, se ribaltiamo il discorso e ci volgiamo al futuro, sapere che qualcuno conosce in anticipo che ogni cosa avverrà o non avverrà, e come e quando, non limita forse la nostra libertà? Quale strada scegliere, allora? Abbandonare il principio di contraddizione, su cui è fondata la nostra logica, oppure lasciar cadere il predicato dell’onnipotenza e dell’onniscienza, che garantiscono a Dio di affacciarsi sulla scena del mondo contingente – quello che noi, qui e ora, vediamo e tocchiamo prima ancora di rappresentarcelo in modo astratto – cambiandolo a suo piacimento? O dovremo abbandonare il principio di un agente divino capace di sapere ogni cosa in anticipo, perché fuori dal tempo e tale da poter cambiare l’ordine nel quale siamo stati gettati? Dovremo forse limitarne la potenza a quella di un orologiaio sottomesso alle leggi che egli stesso ha creato per regolare il mondo? Oppure rinunciare alla capacità di agire diversamente da come si agisca, di dialogare con chi agisce secondo schemi e modelli di credenza radicalmente, o parzialmente diversi dai nostri, o anche solo di pensarlo e di immaginarlo possibile? Insomma, ci sono più cose in cielo e in terra o nella filosofia? Le domande si succedono l’una all’altra come le teste dell’Idra di Lerna, che ricrescevano dalla radice una volta tagliate*. Per usare un celebre modo di dire, molto usato nella filosofia italiana del secolo scorso, sembra quasi che si voglia in questo modo “mettere le brache al mondo”. La costellazione di temi e questioni che si viene così definendo è espressa filosoficamente con il termine “compatibilismo teologico” e riguarda in generale la possibilità che siano conciliabili, in modo tale che l’esistenza dell’uno non implichi la necessaria negazione dell’altro, la necessità dell’ordine del mondo, e con esso l’onnipotenza e la prescienza proprie di un soggetto divino come quello delle grandi religioni monoteiste, da una parte, e la contingenza degli accadimenti, e dunque la libertà umana di autodeterminarsi e di poter agire diversamente da come agisce, dall'altra. All’interno di una tradizione generalmente orientata a privilegiare l’aspetto etico del problema e a ragionare dunque a partire dal fondamento indiscusso del libero arbitrio, abbiamo scelto invece di affrontare le soluzioni di quegli autori che hanno individuato la chiave per affrontare il dilemma compatibilista in una prospettiva legata ad atteggiamenti di natura epistemica, come “credere”, “conoscere”, “sapere”, e percettiva, come “vedere”. (shrink)

Il Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia Dei respectu futurorum contingentium, composto da Guglielmo di Ockham tra il 1321 e il 1324, costituisce uno snodo cruciale nelle discussioni medievali sul tema del fatalismo teologico e sulle questioni che vi sono implicate, come la conoscenza dei futuri contingenti e il compatibilismo tra prescienza divina e libero arbitrio. Raccogliendo e ripensando fonti di diversa provenienza, Roberto Grossatesta e Pietro Lombardo in primis, il Venerabilis inceptor sposta il problema sul piano epistemologico e linguistico, (...) affrontandolo dal punto di vista di un’analisi proposizionale degli enunciati che parlano dei contingenti futuri. In questo modo egli affida agli strumenti dell’argomentazione logica e dell’indagine semantica il compito di sciogliere le implicazioni teologiche della questione, in una teoria che garantisca al contempo la prescienza di Dio e la libera volontà umana. Il principio della soluzione ockhamiana, che costituirà un punto di riferimento – pro o contro – nei dibattiti teologici del XIV secolo, consiste nell’intreccio tra analisi proposizionale e logica fidei, in nome di una soluzione pragmatica del dilemma compatibilista: come mostra il caso esemplare della profezia, gli enunciati della scienza divina costituiscono i postulati di una logica della credenza che poi procede da quelle premesse, attraverso una catena argomentativa, a formulare i precetti che guideranno i passi del cristiano nel mondo. Il volume rende disponibile per la prima volta al lettore non soltanto la prima traduzione in italiano del Tractatus, ma anche un ricco apparato di testi (le distinctiones 38, 39 e 40 dell’Ordinatio, i capitoli 7 e 27 della Summa Logicae, la quaestio IV.4 dei Quodlibeta, le Quaestiones in Libros Physicorum 41 e 44, il prologo della Expositio in libros Physicorum e un estratto dalla Expositio in Librum Perihermeneias Aristotelis) che consente di ricostruire in modo coerente una teoria ockhamiana della contingenza e di gettare luce su una nuova interpretazione del pensiero del teologo e filosofo inglese. (shrink)

This paper aims to meet an objection that has been raised against structural empiricism known as the “loss of reality objection.” I argue that an inferential approach to scientific representation allows the structural empiricist to account for the representation of phenomena by data models and ensures that such a representation is not arbitrary. By the notions of immersion, derivation, and interpretation, I show how data models are able to represent phenomena in a non-arbitrary manner. I conclude this paper with a (...) programmatic outline of a view that arises from the theses defended throughout the article and that I would like to call “semantic structuralism.”. (shrink)

Contrary to the common opinion of the scarce important of politics in Plotinus’ thought, in this paper the relevance of this notion is stressed. Even though Plotinus’ main interest is evidently toward interiority and rational spirituality, men’s actual condition, born and living in a social context, forces him to acknowledge the importance of man’s social and political life. The discussion on virtues in Enneads I, 2 is essential in establishing the real weight of politics in Plotinus’ philosophy.

Our goal is to prove that the golden section, however important, is not the only key to understand a mathematical-formalizing approach to the idea of beauty. Having developed, from this point of view, reading keys linked to the post-modern, it is necessary to link together the multiple rivulets of knowledge that gather in this direction. Moreover the canons of the approaches presented up to now are very indicative for the understanding of many aspects of beauty, which however depends on the (...) historical moment and the cultures created in the various civilizations. Therefore we can affirm that there is no effective definition of "beauty" that can be codified through fixed canons, but that the concept is expressed by a series of stratifications and interpretations that tend to link several major variations, expressing the various answers given by man to the question: what is the beauty? (shrink)

O ficcionalismo, geralmente classificado como um tipo de nominalismo, apresenta como perspectiva precípua a tese de que os entes matemáticos são ficções. Para o ficcionalista, o discurso matemático é desprovido de conteúdo. Hartry Field, que é o principal defensor dessa concepção ontológica da matemática, contesta, em Science Without Numbers, a utilização de entes matemáticos na redação de teorias da física, alegando que a defesa mais plausível do realismo ontológico matemático é o argumento da indispensabilidade de Quine-Putnam. O ficcionalismo defendido por (...) Field nos permite, de acordo com Shapiro, classificá-lo no grupo filosofia-primeiro, ou seja, entre os filósofos que defendem que a filosofia deve ser responsável por legislar a respeito da prática matemática. Dessa forma, podemos considerar Field um revisionista epistemológico. Como se sabe, a dependência da ciência moderna em relação ao discurso matemático coloca a tese ficcionalista em xeque. Ainda assim, se partirmos dos pressupostos filosóficos da vertente formalista da filosofia da matemática, que concebe a matemática como constituída de um conjunto de regras sem significado que podem ser manipuladas de maneira puramente sintática, poderemos traçar importantes analogias entre matemática e ficção, tal como também entre metamatemática e metaficção. Para um formalista simpático à tese ficcionalista, o estatuto ontológico da matemática é semelhante ao das regras de um jogo de xadrez. (shrink)