It is common, even among the laity, the doubt about the reality of time. We think it is possible that time is an illusion and that the perception of his passage is just awareness of something other than time. There are a number of arguments made by philosophers, both to defend and to attack the intuition that time is real. One of them, and perhaps the best known, is the argument of McTaggart, which tries to establish some condition for the (...) existence of time and that time, thought through that condition and applied to reality, leads to a contradiction, which makes him conclude that time can not exist, and therefore does not exist. What I intend in this article is to present the argument of McTaggart along with some original and non-original objections, and try to show that if we accept the Prior’s approach of the flow of time, the cogency of the argument of McTaggart is lost. (shrink)

David Hume's famous riddle of induction implies a second problem related to the question of whether the laws and principles of nature might change in the course of time. Claims have been made that modern developments in physics and astrophysics corroborate the translational invariance of the laws of physics in time. However, the appearance of a new general principle of nature, which might not be derivable from the known laws of physics, or that might actually be a non-physical one (this (...) means completely independent of physical science) supports the notion that the course of nature can change in time. Here it is argued that natural selection satisfies the criteria that identify a general principle of nature which so far, appears to be non-derivable from the known laws of physics and therefore, it is likely that it arose in the course of time, thus leaving open again the quest for a true solution to Hume's second problem. (shrink)

My main purpose in this article is to present an argument for the idea that necessity qua truth in all possible worlds, without other qualifications, leads us to contradiction. If we do not want to accept the contradiction, we will face a dilemma: or accepting that everything we take as contingent is in fact necessary, or accepting that we cannot translate some sentences – at least the indexed to worlds sentences – to the possible worlds vocabulary. We have an intuition (...) – and we develop an argument for it – that if “P”, evaluated in w*, is a contingent truth, so it cannot be the case that “P in w*” is a necessary truth. Generally, the argument tries to show that “P”, evaluated in w*, and “P in w*” are made true by the same contingent fact. If we suppose that “P in w*” is necessary, we would have to suppose that the fact that makes it true is also necessary, which would be contradictory with the fact that makes “P” true in w*, if we accept that what makes “P” in w* and “P in w*” true is the same fact. I attain such an aim by presenting an argument that is divided in two parts, one to imply the contradiction and the other to show that there is no relevant difference between the indicated sentences, by showing how the dilemma arises, and by answering some possible objections. This is an important objective because the possible worlds vocabulary is the default vocabulary to treat the modalities of necessity and possibility. And if it is flawed, it is important that we identify the flaw and fix it – which is exactly what we intend to do at the end of this article, by suggesting some qualification at the necessity notion, that the necessity is the native truth in all possible worlds. And this would save the possible worlds vocabulary from the presented objection. (shrink)

Molecular biology is a relatively new and very successful branch of science but currently it faces challenges posed by very complex issues that cannot be addressed by a traditional reductionist approach. However, despite its origins in the providential shift of some theoretical physicists to biology, currently molecular biology is immersed in a blind trend in which high-throughput technology, able to generate trillions of data, is becoming the leading edge of a discipline that has traded rational and critical thinking for computer (...) power, data crunching and statistics in hope of finding, once more, its way. However, the complex questions facing MB may only be solved by a paradigm shift in the causal way of thinking, so that complex, emergent, non-linear phenomena may be effectively understood in top-down and not in bottom-up terms. (shrink)

Postmodern thought has focused itself on the critique of modern epistemology that was founded on a clear distinction between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. For postmodern thought such a distinction is non-existent or dubious at best. Postmodernism has carried to its logical conclusion the postulates of structuralism; therefore, for postmodern thought there is no general intrinsic meaning in a fact of thing, but there are only particular ways for attributing meaning to such facts and things. Hereunder, we (...) attempt to trace the genealogy of postmodern thought on the history and philosophy of science, because science, traditionally regarded as the summit of knowledge and rationality by modern epistemology, has not been immune to the wholesale critique practiced by this new school of philosophical cynicism that we call postmodernism. (shrink)

The goal of this thesis to defend the philosophical view of the new ante rem substantivism against its supposed alternatives. To achieve such goal, we will present four views about the nature of laws, two kinds of realism and two kinds of anti-realism, and evaluate them critically. The disadvantages from those theories are going to be presented for us to show that they are insufficient to provide a metaphysics that is able to explain the world's counterfactuality, universality, and regularity, and (...) that just one form of realism, the new ante rem substantivism, can. This goal is important because the concept of laws of nature is widely used in many areas of science and philosophy, and because according to the view we accept, the laws may fulfill some theoretical roles, and not others. We intent to show that the new ante rem substantivism's laws are able to fulfill the roles that scientists would hope the natural laws to fulfill. (shrink)

Within the framework of the epistemological debate on disagreement, this paper aims to examine the sceptical thesis that holds that, if it is impossible to rationally choose among two excluding positions, the only sensible or rational thing to do is to suspend judgement. The idea that ordinary life does not constitute the source of scepticism is presented, which rules out real disagreement between epistemic pairs as its foundation. Sceptical scenes differ ontologically from everyday scenes, without such ontological difference entailing an (...) epistemic difference, since epistemic practices do not vary from one sceptical scene to other types of scenes. (shrink)

In emotion research, both conceptual analyses and empirical studies commonly rely on emotion reports. But what do people mean when they say that they are angry, afraid, joyful, etc.? Building on extant theories of emotion, this paper presents four new studies (including a pre-registered replication) measuring the weight of cognitive evaluations, bodily changes, and action tendencies in people’s use of emotion concepts. The results of these studies suggest that the presence or absence of cognitive evaluations has the largest impact on (...) people’s emotion attributions, and that bodily changes and action tendencies are considered to depend on cognitive evaluations. Implications for theories of emotion (concepts) and the interpretation of emotion reports are discussed. (shrink)

The present paper aims to revisit the virtues and disadvantages of epistemic conservatism, which claims that it is rational to adhere to a belief until there is evidence to the contrary. Two main theses are put forward: first, while conservatism presents several epistemological flaws, from a contextualist point of view it is not only desirable but also is essential to knowledge accumulation in everyday life; second, conservatism provides a solution to sceptical challenges and to the problem of easy knowledge.

La literatura sobre razonamiento probatorio busca incidir en la determinación de los hechos en los procesos judiciales. Para alcanzar dicho propósito, no basta con dirigir la mirada hacia disciplinas extrajurídicas exitosas e integrar lo que de ellas pueda extraerse a las teorías jurídicas de la prueba y a la práctica judicial. Es necesario, además, considerar el tipo de hechos a probar, los roles de las reglas jurídicas aplicables, y asumir que litigantes y jueces, actuando en un contexto institucional, podrán ser (...) más o menos agudos en la discusión fáctica, entre otras cosas. Minimizar la influencia de tales factores expone a los estudios probatorios a tener un bajo rendimiento práctico. Algo de esto ha ocurrido con la llamada concepción racionalista de la prueba. Su innegable aporte al debate académico en español no ha ido a la par de su impacto judicial. Para explicar esta brecha entre teoría y práctica, identificamos tres creencias-obstáculo que afectan a su discurso sobre la prueba y que deben ser sorteadas si lo que se busca es influir en la forma en que se juzgan los hechos en un sistema judicial realmente existente. (shrink)

John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein's defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams' objection misses its target because of this new twist.

Are feelings an essential part or aspect of emotion? Cases of unconscious emotion suggest that this is not the case. However, it has been claimed that unconscious emotions are better understood as either (a) emotions that are phenomenally conscious but not reflectively conscious, or (b) dispositions to have emotions rather than emotions proper. Here, I argue that these ways of accounting for unconscious emotions are inadequate, and propose a view of emotions as non-phenomenal attitudes that regard their contents as relevant (...) to one's motivations. (shrink)

En este artículo argumento que, pese al llamado “escepticismo cartesiano”, el significado y alcance de la refutación cartesiana del escéptico y del ateo pueden comprenderse a la luz de tres hitos metafísicos. En la primera sección examino de qué forma este filósofo emplea argumentos escépticos como método, no como fin. Tal como enfatizo, el cogito es el punto en que la duda hiperbólica debe detenerse. Luego, en la segunda sección, discuto por qué Descartes es contrario al fideísmo. Debido a que (...) este se relaciona con el escepticismo, y con la imposibilidad de probar la existencia de Dios, Descartes prueba que Él existe. Sostengo, en la sección final, que Dios es garante de la certeza epistemológica, incluso en el caso de las ideas claras y distintas, cuya confiabilidad pareciera en peligro debido a la hipótesis escéptica del genio maligno. Según el francés, entonces, probar que Dios existe es necesario para garantizar el conocimiento cierto, y es base para inferir la existencia del mundo externo. Los tres hitos, entonces, parecen suficientes para delimitar el sentido y alcance del llamado escepticismo cartesiano. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to offer a critical analysis of the political projections that Antonio Damasio has put forward of his specific conception of homeostasis. By starting from a complex conception of homeostasis, one that focuses not only on the maintenance of life but also on flourishing, Damasio argues that certain cultures are contrary to the homeostatic imperative. I will suggest that, even if we adopt the complex interpretation of homeostasis (rather than the deflated one that is usual (...) in most evolutionary approaches), resorting to the concept of homeostasis would lead to a condemnation of modern capitalist societies, not from an ethical or political point of view, but from a strictly evolutionary one (i.e., a point of view that takes into consideration the preservation of the conditions under which our species can survive in the future). (shrink)

According to John Searle, default positions, i.e., those intelligibility and action presuppositions, are some departing points from which pre-reflective and pragmatic assumptions are made. Postulating such points helps us deal with certain perennial philosophical issues, by leaving them aside. These problems are the existence of the external world, truth and facts, “direct” perception, the meaning of words, and causality. In this article, we argue that those default positions described by Searle constitute a default humanity, and their absence would dehumanize us. (...) This is particularly relevant in a default position: cooperation, which is the basis of collective intentionality and the milestone of human civilization. (shrink)

I propose and defend the conjecture that what explains why Gettiered subjects fail to know is the fact that their justified true belief depends essentially on unknown propositions. The conjecture follows from the plausible principle about inference in general according to which one knows the conclusion of one’s inference only if one knows all the premises it involves essentially.

In a recent paper in this journal, David Chalmers introduced the meta-problem of consciousness as “the problem of explaining why we think consciousness poses a hard problem” (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). A solution to the meta-problem could shed light on the hard problem of consciousness. In particular, it would be relevant to elucidate whether people’s problem intuitions (i.e. intuitions holding that conscious experience cannot be reduced to physical processes) are driven by factors related to the nature of consciousness, or rather (...) by factors that are independent of consciousness. Whether people hold problem intuitions, and what factors drive those intuitions, are largely empirical questions. However, there is a lack of empirical research on these issues to date. The results of four studies will show that (1) problem intuitions are not widespread, and (2) when they arise, they do so because of factors that are unrelated to the nature of consciousness. This suggests that consciousness is, after all, not so problematic. (shrink)

It is generally assumed that emotion concepts are purely descriptive. However, recent investigations suggest that the concept of happiness includes information about the morality of the agent's life. In this study, we argue that normative influences on emotion concepts are not restricted to happiness and are not about moral norms. In a series of studies, we show that emotion attribution is influenced by whether the agent's psychological and bodily states fit the situation in which they are experienced. People consider that (...) emotions are not just about feeling in certain ways, but also about feeling the right way. (shrink)

This paper argues that a necessary condition on inferential knowledge is that one knows all the propositions that knowledge depends on. That is, I will argue in support of a principle I call the Knowledge from Knowledge principle: (KFK) S knows that p via inference or reasoning only if S knows all the propositions on which p depends. KFK meshes well with the natural idea that (at least with respect to deductively valid or induc- tively strong arguments) the epistemic status (...) of one’s belief in the conclusion of an argument is a function of the epistemic status of the attitudes one has to the premises of that argument. One gets what one puts in: S’s belief in the conclusion C of an argument A has epistemic status E for S only if S’s belief in each of the premises C depends on also has epistemic status E.1 This is compatible, of course, with the epistemic status of S’s conclusion being greater than the epistemic status of the premises on which the conclusion of her reasoning depends. Furthermore, even though KFK applies more straightforwardly to non-suppositional inferences, we can also plausibly apply the principle to sup- positional reasoning if we treat S’s assuming for the sake of argument that p,2 as S assuming for the sake of argument that she knows that p.3 Although extremely plausible, philosophers have failed to present a concerted case in support of KFK. Most of their energy goes to articulating and/or defending some form of closure principle for knowledge.4 What is more, recently versions of this principle have been dismissed as problematic but I think without the reasons in its support been fully appreciated. This paper is an e fort to change the current state of affairs. Its focus is positive, however: my goal is to make the best case I can in support of KFK.5 To that end, the paper presents the reasons we have to accept KFK (§1), consid- ers an objection to the principle (§2), and situates the principle in the broader normative context of knowledge norms (§3). (shrink)

El Test de Turing es un método tan controvertido como desafiante en Inteligencia Artificial. Se basa en la imitación de la conducta lingüística de humanos, y tiene como objetivo recabar evidencia empírica en favor de la tesis de que las máquinas programadas podrían pensar. Alan Turing, su creador, ha sido catalogado como conductista por la mayor parte de los comentaristas. En este capítulo muestro que no lo es. Por el contrario, Turing es un funcionalista, porque todo el énfasis del juego (...) de la imitación está en el engaño de la máquina hacia los humanos. Por ello el género es importante en dicho juego, al menos en su versión preliminar. (shrink)

If we want to say what “fundamentality” means, we have to start by approaching what we generally see at the empty place of the predicate “____ is fundamental”. We generally talk about fundamental entities and fundamental theories. At this article, I tried to make a metaphysical approach of what is for something to be fundamental, and I also tried to talk a little bit of fundamental incomplete and complete theories. To do that, I start stating the notion of “entity” and (...) looking at the difference at perceived entities. The difference led us to talk about the entities’ structures and their powers, and about the supervenience between these last two. The supervenience talk made us to see the fight between emergentism and reductionism as the difference between the irreducibility of laws and the reducibility of powers and structures to lower-order domains. Then, we conclude that “fundamentality” is a mereological relation – a relation that a whole structure has to a certain combination of its structural parts or that a power has to a certain combination of its constituent powers – of to be identical and to exist in virtue of them. (shrink)

This paper discusses there is no sustainable theoretical alternative for building knowledge without principles including cooperation –aimed at the preparation and distribution of beliefs– among individuals. This principle helps to conceive both the relation among internalist and externalist theories, and a cognitive explanation based on the concept of epistemic warrant. The concluding remark is that concepts, like evidence or reliability, can only be conceived as skills of subjects belonging to a community.

En el presente artículo intento señalar una serie de dificultades implícitas en la teoría del carácter desarrollada por David Hume, y, por extensión, en su propuesta compatibilista. Sugeriré que el rechazo humeano de todo concepto metafísico de causalidad pone a Hume en una posición problemática, en tanto sólo puede ofrecer como alternativa una concepción de causalidad (demasiado fuerte para un libertario y demasiado débil para un determinista) que difícilmente puede constituirse en la base de su propia teoría del carácter. -/- (...) In the present paper I aim to point out a series of difficulties which lie beneath Hume's theory of character and, by extension, beneath his compatibilist argument. I shall suggest that Hume's rejection of every metaphysical conception of causality leads him to a problematic situation, insofar as he can only offer as an alternative conception of causality (too strong for a libertarian and too weak for a determinist) that can hardly become the basis of his own theory of character. (shrink)

Contrary to what has been assumed by several of Epictetus' commentators, I will argue in the present paper that the concept of aidōs in Epictetus cannot be reduced to the modern notion of moral conscience, given that the mental phenomenon of aidōs (which is closer to the idea of shame than has been assumed by some authors) involves the presence of a transcendent other. The consequences concerning the ethical and theological foundations of Epictetus' thought which derive from this impossibility cannot (...) be neglected if we aim to comprehend the singularity of the author's place in Stoicism. (shrink)

According to Kemp Smith, Descartes believed that animals were devoid of feelings and sensations. This is the so-called ‘monstrous thesis,’ which I explore here in light of two Cartesian approaches to animals. Firstly, I examine their original treatment in function of Descartes’ early metaphysical approach, i.e., all natural phenomena are to be elucidated in terms of mental scrutiny. As pain would only exist in the understanding, and animals have neither understanding nor souls, Descartes held that they did not suffer. Secondly, (...) I look at the Cartesian late naturalism; specifically, at how animals are subsequently regarded as machines that may suffer. Lastly, I conclude that the ‘monstrous thesis’ is not Cartesian because animals are machines with feelings and sensations. However, Descartes’ surprising indulgence towards humans who kill and eat animals supposes that empathy for beings who may suffer is not necessary. This may raise doubts as to another ‘monstrous thesis.'. (shrink)

In support of Descartes’ epistemology, Lex Newman advances the ‘Non-atheistic-knowledge- thesis’, i.e., indefeasible knowledge cannot be gained unless the existence of God is proved. Here I expound the ‘non-atheistic-thesis-of-Cartesian-metaphysics’, which, unlike Newman’s, refers to how four Cartesian metaphysical conclusions require the existence of God. To test whether such conclusions need divine existence, we may ask what would happen if God did not play any decisive role in the Meditations. As I argue, four unpalatable consequences would follow for Cartesian metaphysics, which (...) would ruin Descartes’ plan to refute the skeptic and the atheist alike. (shrink)

Saul Kripke argued that the requirement that knowledge eliminate all possibilities of error leads to dogmatism . According to this view, the dogmatism puzzle arises because of a requirement on knowledge that is too strong. The paper argues that dogmatism can be avoided even if we hold on to the strong requirement on knowledge. I show how the argument for dogmatism can be blocked and I argue that the only other approach to the puzzle in the literature is mistaken.

This paper examines an insoluble Cartesian problem for classical AI, namely, how linguistic understanding involves knowledge and awareness of u’s meaning, a cognitive process that is irreducible to algorithms. As analyzed, Descartes’ view about reason and intelligence has paradoxically encouraged certain classical AI researchers to suppose that linguistic understanding suffices for machine intelligence. Several advocates of the Turing Test, for example, assume that linguistic understanding only comprises computational processes which can be recursively decomposed into algorithmic mechanisms. Against this background, in (...) the first section, I explain Descartes’ view about language and mind. To show that Turing bites the bullet with his imitation game, in the second section I analyze this method to assess intelligence. Then, in the third section, I elaborate on Schank and Abelsons’ Script Applier Mechanism (SAM, hereby), which supposedly casts doubt on Descartes’ denial that machines can think. Finally, in the fourth section, I explore a challenge that any algorithmic decomposition of linguistic understanding faces. This challenge, I argue, is the core of the Cartesian problem: knowledge and awareness of meaning require a first-person viewpoint which is irreducible to the decomposition of algorithmic mechanisms. (shrink)

En este ensayo argumento que, en la ontología social de John Searle, existe un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación, las instituciones y los poderes deónticos. Son categorías de la realidad social que se retroalimentan y fortalecen mutuamente. La primera sección es introductoria a los conceptos y problemas aquí tratados, mientras que la segunda versa sobre el abecé de la ontología social. En la tercera sección abordo cómo las instituciones están ligadas a prácticas sociales; es decir, las primeras de alguna manera (...) sintetizan la existencia de las segundas. Sin instituciones no podría haber ciertas prácticas, y estas necesariamente llevan a la creación de instituciones. Finalmente, en la última sección argumento acerca de la existencia de un círculo virtuoso entre la cooperación (y la confianza), las instituciones y los poderes deónticos en la realidad social. Es decir, sostengo que existe un fenómeno de retroalimentación y de fortalecimiento mutuo, en tanto la existencia de una categoría fortalece la existencia de las demás categorías. (shrink)

Pese a su uso e importancia, no hay investigaciones semánticas sobre los pseudónimos. Aunque resulta claro que los nombres ficticios son importantes en la definición de la identidad de un artista, no ha habido mayor investigación sobre el rol que desempeñan. Aquí, justamente intento mostrar que son fundamentales en el arte, porque permiten crear la identidad de un personaje, pero ello ocurre principalmente en el mundo social. Dada la escasez de investigaciones sobre los pseudónimos y sobre su conexión con la (...) identidad, este artículo muestra: i) que no pueden ser designadores rígidos kripkeanos; ii) que la identidad que conllevan es puramente artística, y no metafísica. En la primera sección, apoyo parte de la propuesta de Kripke acerca de los designadores rígidos: los nombres propios, como tales designadores, deben analizarse a la luz de los mundos posibles; esto es, en términos de cómo podrían haber resultado las cosas de otra manera. En la segunda sección, examino los antecedentes y las consecuencias de que dichos nombres sean designadores rígidos. En la tercera, en cambio, argumento que los pseudónimos no pueden ser designadores rígidos como los nombres propios. Dicha conclusión es alcanzada a partir de la variación de un experimento mental kripkeano, uno que versa sobre Dios y el esfuerzo de Él para crear objetos. En la sección final muestro que los pseudónimos, en vez de designar rígidamente, crean personajes en el mundo social. Por ello la identidad que conllevan no es interna a los objetos; por el contrario, es un tipo de identidad que solo pertenece al mundo social. (shrink)

This article addresses a neglected problem in Searle’s social ontology, namely, how human civilization may collapse. In the first section, I provide the theoretical framework. In the second section, I offer the key elements to understanding Searle’s ontology as well as his philosophy of society, emphasizing the role of constitutive rules and deontic powers. In the third section I examine how they improve trust and co-operation. Global and local natural disasters are distinguished in the fourth section, because the former is (...) sufficient to undermine pacts, promises, constitutive rules and deontic powers, while the latter is neither sufficient nor necessary. In the fifth and final section, I put forward an argument via a thought experiment that allows us to anticipate what would occur if people did not keep promises and pacts, on the one hand, and did not respect constitutive rules and deontic powers, on the other hand. Such events, I argue, would result in the collapse of civilization. (shrink)

A direct implication of E=K seems to be that false beliefs cannot justify other beliefs, for no false belief can be part of one’s total evidence and one’s total evidence is what inferentially justifies belief. The problem with this alleged implication of E=K, as Comesaña and Kantin :447–454, 2010) have noted, is that it contradicts a claim Gettier cases rely on. The original Gettier cases relied on two principles: that justification is closed under known entailment, and that sometimes one is (...) justified in believing a falsehood. In this paper I argue that E=K, contrary to what Comesaña and Kantin would want us to believe, is compatible with the agent being justified in believing a falsehood. (shrink)

The paper aims to clarify some features of Epictetus ' specific usage of the concept of proairesis throughout his Discourses. This will be done by suggesting that a number of problematic expressions concerning proairesis and its freedom should be understood as rhetorical-pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' intellec-tualism. I will mainly focus on a series of problematic passages that have been discussed by several commentators concerning the concept of proairesis, and I will suggest that those passages are best interpreted as rhetorical (...) or, better, pedagogical expressions of Epictetus ' strictly intellectualist approach to the psychology of action. The interpretation I will propose does away with the need to resort to certain interpretations of those passages that threaten to obscure the otherwise clear picture of human action offered by Epictetus ' intellectualism concerning the psychology of action. El articulo tiene por objetivo clarificar algunos aspectos del uso especifico que realiza Epicteto a lo largo de las Dissertationes del concepto de proairesis. Esto se realizara sugiriendo que ciertas expresiones problematicas referidas a la proairesis y su libertad deben ser entendidas como expresiones retorico-pedagogicas del intelectualismo de Epicteto. Me concentrare fundamentalmente en una serie de pasajes problematicos que han sido discutidos por varios comentadores en relacion con el concepto de proairesis, y sugerire que esos pasajes deben ser interpretados como expresiones retoricas o, mejor, pedagogicas de enfoque estrictamente inte-lectualista de la psicologia humana que propone Epicteto. La interpretacion que propondre hace innecesario el recurso a ciertas interpretaciones de esos parajes que amenazan con oscurecer el panorama claro de la accion humana ofrecido por la concepcion intelectualista de la psicologia humana defendida por Epicteto. (shrink)

Human emotional expressions can communicate the emotional state of the expresser, but they can also communicate appeals to perceivers. For example, sadness expressions such as crying request perceivers to aid and support, and anger expressions such as shouting urge perceivers to back off. Some contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) systems can mimic human emotional expressions in a (more or less) realistic way, and they are progressively being integrated into our daily lives. How should we respond to them? Do we have reasons (...) to reply to the appeals made by AI emotional expressions? In this paper, we examine the conditions under which AI emotional expressions could give us prudential or even moral reasons to change our behavior. We argue that these conditions do not depend on whether the emotional expression is genuine or not, but rather on the presence of features some of which can be implemented in emotive AI given our current level of technological development. We extract recommendations and warnings for the development of emotive AI. (shrink)

In this paper, I address the issue of whether the evil demon could have caused the idea of God. In order to determine the capabilities of the evil demon, I perform a thought experiment in which I reaffirm the con-clusion that an imperfect being could have never caused an idea of perfection and infinitude, i.e., the idea of God. The article is divided into five sections and a conclusion. While the first section is introductory, the second looks at the problem (...) of God and knowledge certainty. Elucidating how reality is gradual according to Descartes, in the third section I address the distinction between objective, formal and eminent reality. In turn, in the fourth section, I argue that if the objective reality of God exists, that is, an idea of perfection, the imperfect evil demon could have never caused it. The last section examines the reverse argument of the fourth section, viz, whether God could have caused the existence of evil and imperfection. (shrink)

En las dos entregas anteriores abordamos el inicio de la evolución del pensamiento matemático, desde el uso de herramientas matemáticas para problemas de cálculo concreto en la antigua Babilonia, pasando por el inicio de las matemáticas abstractas, las demostraciones y el nacimiento de la “geometría por la geometría” desde la visión religioso-filosófica de Platón y los pitagóricos, hasta la síntesis de ambas visiones en las matemáticas de la India, China y el mundo árabe, que fue la puerta de entrada de (...) las matemáticas a Europa, alrededor del siglo XV. (shrink)

En este trabajo examinamos el tópico de la responsabilidad en el derecho penal internacional a la luz de la filosofía de John Searle, y del fallo dictado por la Corte Penal Internacional en el caso de Thomas Lubanga. En el primer acápite analizamos la declaración de responsabilidad penal en función de la teoría de actos de habla de Austin y de Searle, tratándola como un acto ilocucionario cuyo significado es dependiente de un marco institucional específico. Luego, en el segundo acápite, (...) mostramos de qué forma tal marco puede reconstruirse como un ejemplo paradigmático de la realidad social construida descrita por Searle, especialmente en virtud del nexo entre mente, lenguaje y sociedad. A nuestro juicio, los conceptos de intencionalidad colectiva, atribución de funciones de estatus y poderes deónticos son fundamentales para entender tal nexo. En efecto, tal como argumentamos en la tercera sección, los sistemas de poderes deónticos asociados al derecho internacional no solo explican la aparición de Tribunales penales internacionales, como la Corte Penal Internacional, sino además el carácter imprescriptible de los crímenes de lesa humanidad. Los acuerdos internacionales que promueven y protegen los derechos humanos, y que tratan la imprescriptibilidad de aquellos crímenes, son objeto de análisis en la sección final, en donde exponemos algunas reflexiones finales a partir del caso Lubanga. (shrink)

Emergency situations require individuals to make important changes in their behavior. In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, official recommendations to avoid the spread of the virus include costly behaviors such as self-quarantining or drastically diminishing social contacts. Compliance (or lack thereof) with these recommendations is a controversial and divisive topic, and lay hypotheses abound regarding what underlies this divide. This paper investigates which cognitive, moral, and emotional traits separate people who comply with official recommendations from those who don't. In (...) four studies (three pre-registered) on both U.S. and French samples, we found that individuals' self-reported compliance with official recommendations during the COVID-19 pandemic was partly driven by individual differences in moral values, disgust sensitivity, and psychological reactance. We discuss the limitations of our studies and suggest possible applications in the context of health communication. (shrink)

This paper proposes a view on epistemic relativism that arises from the problem of the criterion, keeping in consideration that the assessment of criterion standards always occurs in a certain context. The main idea is that the epistemic value of the assertion “S knows that p” depends not only on the criterion adopted within an epistemic framework and the relationship between said criterion and a meta-criterion, but also from the collaboration with other subjects who share the same standards. Thus, one (...) can choose between particularist and methodist criteria according to the context of assessment. This position has the advantage of presenting a new perspective concerning both the criterion problem and the problem of inter-contextuality in the evaluation of different epistemic frameworks. (shrink)

Can we experience emotion without the feeling of accelerated heartbeats, perspiration, or other changes in the body? In his paper “What is an emotion”, William James famously claimed that “if we fancy some strong emotion and then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind” (1884, p. 193). Thus, bodily changes are essential to emotion. This is known as the Subtraction Argument. The Subtraction Argument is still (...) used to support Embodied theories of emotion. Proponents of Disembodied theories, however, have different intuitions regarding the role of bodily changes in the experience of emotion. In order to advance this debate, I conducted a series of studies testing people’s intuitions regarding the Subtraction Argument. Results show that, against James’ claims, most people consider that their hypothetical (Study 1) and actual (Study 2) emotions persist in the absence of bodily feelings. Furthermore, Study 1 found that participants’ responses were not related to individual differences in reflection or interoceptive awareness. These results pose a problem for Embodied theories of emotion and challenge extant explanations for the persistence of emotional experience in cases of impaired interoception. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a critique of the current view that reduces cancer to a cellular problem caused by specific gene mutations and to propose, instead, that such a problem might become more intelligible, if it is understood as a phenomenon that results from the breakdown of the morphological plan or Gestalt of the organism. Such and organism, in Aristotelian terms, is characterized for presenting a specific morphe or logos (form) and for having a telos (end) (...) to fulfill. A malignant tumor represents an entity separated from both the organic logos and the organic telos. According to the basic postulates of Semiophysics – a blend of Aristotelian physics and Catastrophe Theory developed by René Thom – an organism is a source (original) form individuated by a dominant pregnance that corresponds to its morphogenetic field. Here it is suggested that cancer in aged individuals might result from the progressive exhaustion of developmental constraints that regulate the process of ontogeny, that it is expected to go from the fertilized non-differentiated zygote to the mature fully developed organism, because there is no further point ahead in the developmental pathway past the reproductive age. Cancer in young individuals (before their reproductive maturity) may then be consequence of the premature derangement of such fundamental developmental constraints. In all cases the result is the loss of morphological coherence within the organism. Thus representing a conflict between an organized morphology (the organism) and a part of such a morphology that drifts towards an amorphous state (the tumor). (shrink)

This paper presents the theory of epistemic safety in relation to three problems: similarity, closure, and generality. Within the neo-Moorean framework of skepticism, the epistemic safety theory complements contextualist theories, where a difference is established between sceptical-thought and everyday contexts. In this way, it is claimed that conviction–i.e., when the bases upon which a belief is constructed remain unquestioned–is an intellectual virtue that makes trustworthy processes in near worlds possible. Finally, the aim of the paper is to highlight the modal (...) difference between beliefs that presuppose near worlds as their core and those that take nearby words as their core. (shrink)

Resenha de "Sobre o sentido e a referência" / Review of "On sense and reference".

La pregunta sobre la esencia de la tecnología no atañe sólo a la filosofía, sino que tiene un alcance más vasto y una repercusión más general; transforma cualitativamente la relación entre el hombre y la tecnología al añadir un elemento fundamental: la libertad.

Descartes niega que una máquina pueda ser inteligente, pues los mecanismos son predecibles, inflexibles y limitados. Los seguidores de la Inteligencia Artificial clásica (o IA fuerte) argumentan lo contrario. Pese a esto, Descartes y la IA proponen que la mente podría no estar adscrita a propiedades físicas, posibilidad explorada por el primero a partir de una intuición modal que separa mente y cuerpo. La IA fuerte se acerca a esta tesis cuando reduce la mente a una Máquina de Turing cuya (...) realización física resulta irrelevante. Aunque ambos argumentos presuponen teorías e implicancias diferentes, en este trabajo examino cómo el Funcionalismo resulta compatible con una forma de Dualismo, lo que aleja a la IA clásica del Materialismo que originalmente la inspiró. (shrink)

Este trabajo tiene como objetivo examinar cómo el legado kantiano de la razón crítica sigue vigente, pues se sostiene en un imperativo teórico fundado en la autonomía. Tal como argumento, este imperativo «categórico-teórico» se estructura gracias a la primacía de la razón práctica por sobre la razón teórica. El ensayo está estructurado en tres secciones. En la primera discuto brevemente el compromiso con la verdad propio de la ética de Sócrates y Platón, quienes inauguran el racionalismo crítico, según Popper. Luego, (...) en la segunda sección examino la filosofía kantiana y su propuesta, la cual ciertamente influye en el «Tratado contra el Método» de Paul Feyerabend. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, analizo la conexión entre razón crítica y razón teórica. En particular, muestro que la primera gobierna la segunda, y que la autonomía es parte de la naturaleza racional humana. Dicha naturaleza ciertamente explica por qué la razón crítica sigue vigente en la época contemporánea. (shrink)

In this paper I intend to present the Dilemma of Continuity of Matter and a possible solution to it. This dilemma consists in choosing between two misfortunes in explaining the continuity of matter: or to say that material objects are infinitely divisible and not explain what constitutes the continuity of some kind of object, or to say that there is a certain kind of indivisible object and not explain what constitutes the continuity of such an object. The solution we provide (...) is precisely the thesis that material objects consists of points, a thesis we try to make clearer, although we have not developed it much. (shrink)

Jonathan Haidt’s _Moral Foundation Theory _has been criticized on many fronts, mainly on account of its lack of evidence concerning the genetic and neurological bases of the evolved moral intuitions that the theory posits. Despite the fact that Haidt’s theory is probably the most promising framework from which to integrate the different lines of interdisciplinary research that deal with the evolutionary foundations of moral psychology, _i) _it also shows a critical underspecification concerning the precise mental processes that instantiate the triggering (...) of our evolved moral intuitions, and that _ii) _that underspecification coexists with and overspecification of the structure of human nature when it comes to exploring alternatives to capitalist societies. (shrink)

My main aim at this paper is to present Lewis Carrol’s Paradox on the justification of logical principles inasmuch as some attempts of solving it. This is important because if there are basic logical principles, it also seems necessary to exist some justification for them. By considering some observations from Ryle, Devitt and Kripke about the theme, we intend to briefly display their theories and their core critics among themselves and, mainly, the critics against adoption theory.

Reliabilism, one ofthe most significant naturalized epistemological theories, is an an attempt to justify knowledge on the basis of causal reliable procedures. This theory also seems to be the solution for the skeptic claims. However, as this paper suggests, this theory involves many problems; among others, how experiments could cause justified but false beliefs. This difficulty may reveal that naturalized epistemology cannot answer the radical question of skepticism, because it is not a scientific issue. As Quine thought, it implies a (...) metaphysical puzzle. Thus, every philosopher should face a practical decision: to admit it or to discard it as a non-sense question. (shrink)