Results for 'Rules'

669 found
Order:
  1. Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion.Indrek Reiland - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Many philosophers think that games like chess, languages like English, and speech acts like assertion are constituted by rules. Lots of others disagree. To argue over this productively, it would be first useful to know what it would be for these things to be rule-constituted. Searle famously claimed in Speech Acts that rules constitute things in the sense that they make possible the performance of actions related to those things (Searle 1969). On this view, rules constitute games, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Wouldn't It Be Nice? Moral Rules and Distant Worlds.Abelard Podgorski - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):279-294.
    Traditional rule consequentialism faces a problem sometimes called the ideal world objection—the worry that by looking only at the consequences in worlds where rules are universally adhered to, the theory fails to account for problems that arise because adherence to rules in the real world is inevitably imperfect. In response, recent theorists have defended sophisticated versions of rule consequentialism which are sensitive to the consequences in worlds with less utopian levels of adherence. In this paper, I argue that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Schmidtz on Moral Recognition Rules: A Critique.Thomas M. Besch - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):138-153.
    David Schmidtz's reconstruction of morality advances Hart-type recognition rules for a “personal” and an “interpersonal” strand of morality. I argue that his view does not succeed for reasons owed both to the way in which Schmidtz construes of the task of reconstructing morality and the content of the moral recognition rules that he proposes. For Schmidtz, this task must be approached from a Hart-type “internal” perspective, but this leaves his reconstruction with an unresolved problem of parochiality. He reconstructs (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Descartes' Rules and the Workings of the Mind.Eric Palmer - 1997 - North American Kant Society:269-282.
    I briefly consider why Descartes stopped work on the _Rules_ towards the end of my paper. My main concern is to accurately characterize the project represented in the _Rules_, especially in its relation to early-modern logic.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5.  70
    Axiomatizations with Context Rules of Inference in Modal Logic.Valentin Goranko - 1998 - Studia Logica 61 (2):179-197.
    A certain type of inference rules in modal logics, generalizing Gabbay's Irreflexivity rule, is introduced and some general completeness results about modal logics axiomatized with such rules are proved.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  6. Measuring the Consequences of Rules.Holly M. Smith - 2010 - Utilitas 22 (4):413-433.
    Rule utilitarianism has recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest triggered by Brad Hooker’s sophisticated treatment in Ideal Code, Real World.1 An intriguing new debate has now broken out about how best to formulate rule utilitarianism – whether to evaluate candidate moral codes in terms of the value of their consequences at a fixed rate (such as 90%) of social acceptance (as Hooker contends), or to evaluate codes in terms of the value of their consequences throughout the entire range of possible (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  7. Are There Indefeasible Epistemic Rules?Darren Bradley - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19 (3).
    What if your peers tell you that you should disregard your perceptions? Worse, what if your peers tell you to disregard the testimony of your peers? How should we respond if we get evidence that seems to undermine our epistemic rules? Several philosophers have argued that some epistemic rules are indefeasible. I will argue that all epistemic rules are defeasible. The result is a kind of epistemic particularism, according to which there are no simple rules connecting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  8.  15
    The Design and Operation of Rules of Origin in Greater Arab Free Trade Area: Challenges of Implementation and Reform.Bashar H. Malkawi - 2019 - Journal of World Trade 53 (2):243–272.
    Rules of origin (ROO) are pivotal element of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA). ROO are basically established to ensure that only eligible products receive preferential tariff treatment. Taking into consideration the profound implications of ROO for enhancing trade flows and facilitating the success of regional integration, this article sheds light on the way that ROO in GAFTA are designed and implemented. Moreover, the article examines the extent to which ROO still represents an obstacle to the full implementation (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9.  20
    Reforming Rules of Origin in Greater Arab Free Trade Area for Effective Economic Integration.Bashar H. Malkawi - 2017 - Economic Research Policy Forum Brief 29:1-7.
    Free trade agreements are about reducing tariffs, market access in services, protection of intellectual property rights, streamlining customs procedures, trade remedy measures, and dispute settlement mechanism. Equally important if not even more important than these provisions is the designation of rules of origin. Many benefits can be lost if restrictive rules of origin are incorporated. Rules of origin are supposed to be straightforward and easy-to-follow methods used to determine origin of imported goods. The policy question that arises (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Why Legal Rules Are Not Speech Acts and What Follows From That.Marcin Matczak - manuscript
    The speech-act approach to rules is commonplace in both Anglo-American and continental traditions of legal philosophy. Despite its pervasiveness, I argue in this paper that the approach is misguided and therefore intrinsically flawed. My critique identifies how speech-act theory provides an inadequate theoretical framework for the analysis of written discourse, a case in point being legal text. Two main misconceptions resulting from this misguided approach are the fallacy of synchronicity and the fallacy of a-discursivity. The former consists of treating (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Truth and Assertion: Rules Vs Aims.Neri Marsili - 2018 - Analysis 78 (4):638–648.
    There is a fundamental disagreement about which norm regulates assertion. Proponents of factive accounts argue that only true propositions are assertable, whereas proponents of non-factive accounts insist that at least some false propositions are. Puzzlingly, both views are supported by equally plausible (but apparently incompatible) linguistic data. This paper delineates an alternative solution: to understand truth as the aim of assertion, and pair this view with a non-factive rule. The resulting account is able to explain all the relevant linguistic data, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. On Rules of Inference and the Meanings of Logical Constants.Panu Raatikainen - 2008 - Analysis 68 (4):282-287.
    In the theory of meaning, it is common to contrast truth-conditional theories of meaning with theories which identify the meaning of an expression with its use. One rather exact version of the somewhat vague use-theoretic picture is the view that the standard rules of inference determine the meanings of logical constants. Often this idea also functions as a paradigm for more general use-theoretic approaches to meaning. In particular, the idea plays a key role in the anti-realist program of Dummett (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  13. Belief Revision Generalized: A Joint Characterization of Bayes's and Jeffrey's Rules.Franz Dietrich, Christian List & Richard Bradley - 2016 - Journal of Economic Theory 162:352-371.
    We present a general framework for representing belief-revision rules and use it to characterize Bayes's rule as a classical example and Jeffrey's rule as a non-classical one. In Jeffrey's rule, the input to a belief revision is not simply the information that some event has occurred, as in Bayes's rule, but a new assignment of probabilities to some events. Despite their differences, Bayes's and Jeffrey's rules can be characterized in terms of the same axioms: "responsiveness", which requires that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  14. Playing Fair and Following the Rules.Justin Tosi - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (2):134-141.
    In his paper “Fairness, Political Obligation, and the Justificatory Gap” (published in the Journal of Moral Philosophy), Jiafeng Zhu argues that the principle of fair play cannot require submission to the rules of a cooperative scheme, and that when such submission is required, the requirement is grounded in consent. I propose a better argument for the claim that fair play requires submission to the rules than the one Zhu considers. I also argue that Zhu’s attribution of consent to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  15. The Exemplification of Rules: An Appraisal of Pettit’s Approach to the Problem of Rule-Following.Daniel Watts - 2012 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):69-90.
    Abstract This paper offers an appraisal of Phillip Pettit's approach to the problem how a merely finite set of examples can serve to represent a determinate rule, given that indefinitely many rules can be extrapolated from any such set. I argue that Pettit's so-called ethnocentric theory of rule-following fails to deliver the solution to this problem he sets out to provide. More constructively, I consider what further provisions are needed in order to advance Pettit's general approach to the problem. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. Changing the Rules: Architecture and the New Millennium.David Kirsh - 2001 - Convergence 7 (2):113-125.
    Architecture is about to enter its first magical phase: a time when buildings actively co-operate with their inhabitants; when objects know what they are, where they are, what is near them; when social and physical space lose their type coupling; when wall and partitions change with mood and task. As engineers and scientists explore how to digitse the world around us, the classical constraints of design, ruled so long by the physics of space, time, and materials, are starting to crumble. (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. Reflections on Moral Disagreement, Relativism, and Skepticism About Rules.Denis Robinson - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (2):131-156.
    Part I of this paper discusses some uses of arguments from radical moral disagreement — in particular, as directed against absolutist cognitivism — and surveys some semantic issues thus made salient. It may be argued that parties to such a disagreement cannot be using the relevant moral claims with exactly the same absolutist cognitive content. That challenges the absolutist element of absolutist cognitivism, which, combined with the intractable nature of radical moral disagreement, in turn challenges the viability of a purely (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Virtue Ethics and Rules.Timothy Chappell - unknown
    Examines the place of rules in virtue ethics, and concludes by reviewing examples that the idea that virtue ethics can have no place for rules is groundless.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  54
    Es Braucht Die Regel Nicht: Wittgenstein on Rules and Meaning.Kathrin Glüer & Åsa Wikforss - 2010 - In Daniel Whiting (ed.), The Later Wittgenstein on Language. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    According to the received view the later Wittgenstein subscribed to the thesis that speaking a language requires being guided by rules (thesis RG). In this paper we question the received view. On its most intuitive reading, we argue, (RG) is very much at odds with central tenets of the later Wittgenstein. Giving up on this reading, however, threatens to deprive the notion of rule-following of any real substance. Consequently, the rule-following considerations cannot charitably be read as a deep and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  20. Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods.Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press.
    There are several arguments for internalist theses concerning our justification to employ rules of inference (and belief-forming methods more generally). In this paper, I discuss three such arguments – one based on simple cases, one based on a general conception of epistemic responsibility, and one based on our intuitive reactions to skeptical scenarios. I argue that none of these arguments is successful. Along the way, I argue that there are belief-forming methods that thinkers are epistemically entitled to employ – (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  55
    Social Rules and the Social Background.Michael Schmitz - 2013 - In Michael Schmitz, Beatrice Kobow & Hans Bernhard Schmid (eds.), The Background of Social Reality. Springer. pp. 107--125.
    How can people function appropriately and respond normatively in social contexts even if they are not aware of rules governing these contexts? John Searle has rightly criticized a popular way out of this problem by simply asserting that they follow them unconsciously. His alternative explanation is based on his notion of a preintentional, nonrepresentational background. In this paper I criticize this explanation and the underlying account of the background and suggest an alternative explanation of the normativity of elementary social (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22. General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume's Treatise.Jack Lyons - 2001 - Hume Studies 27 (2):247-278.
    An examination of the role played by general rules in Hume's positive (nonskeptical) epistemology. General rules for Hume are roughly just general beliefs. The difference between justified and unjustified belief is a matter of the influence of good versus bad general rules, the good general rules being the "extensive" and "constant" ones.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  23. Dewey and Dancy and the Moral Authority of Rules.Tom Spector - 2007 - Contemporary Pragmatism 4 (2):65-75.
    Dewey's pragmatist regard for the place of rules in moral deliberation occupies a middle ground between the rejection of rules found in Jonathan Dancy's moral particularism and full scale subsumptivism of actions to rules. Concerning the authority rules should play in one's moral thinking, however, Dewey is closely aligned with the particularists: he rejects their authority over individual cases. This essay takes Dewey's naturalistic approach to the derivation of rules to argue that in some cases (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. “Truth-Preserving and Consequence-Preserving Deduction Rules”,.John Corcoran - 2014 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):130-1.
    A truth-preservation fallacy is using the concept of truth-preservation where some other concept is needed. For example, in certain contexts saying that consequences can be deduced from premises using truth-preserving deduction rules is a fallacy if it suggests that all truth-preserving rules are consequence-preserving. The arithmetic additive-associativity rule that yields 6 = (3 + (2 + 1)) from 6 = ((3 + 2) + 1) is truth-preserving but not consequence-preserving. As noted in James Gasser’s dissertation, Leibniz has been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Following Rules of Nature, Not the Pedestrian Muse: Reply to Yamada.Daniel Dohrn - manuscript
    I criticize Yamada's account of rule-following. Yamada's conditions are not necessary. And he misses the deepest level of the rule-following considerations: how meaning rules come about.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Chapter 5. Constructing a Demonstration of Logical Rules, or How to Use Kant’s Logic Corpus.Huaping Lu-Adler - 2015 - In Robert R. Clewis (ed.), Reading Kant's Lectures. De Gruyter. pp. 137-158.
    In this chapter, I discuss some problems of Kant’s logic corpus while recognizing its richness and potential value. I propose and explain a methodic way to approach it. I then test the proposal by showing how we may use various mate- rials from the corpus to construct a Kantian demonstration of the formal rules of thinking (or judging) that lie at the base of Kant’s Metaphysical Deduction. The same proposal can be iterated with respect to other topics. The said (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. Estudio crítico: Martin Kusch A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Defending Kripke's Wittgenstein, Montreal and Kingston, Ithaca, McGuill-Queen's University Press, 2006.Pedro Karczmarczyk - 2007 - Fenomenologia. Diálogos Possíveis Campinas: Alínea/Goiânia: Editora da Puc Goiás 42 (89):157-188.
    El presente trabajo es un estudio del libro de Martin Kusch acerca den las tesis sostenidas en "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language" (WRPL) por Saul Kripke examinado a la luz de la controversia desatada por la publicación del mismo en 1982, una de las más intensas que han ocurrido en los últimos 25 años en el seno de la filosofía analítica. En nuestro estudio procedemos en tres etapas. En la primera, presentaremos el desafío del Wittgenstein de Kripke de (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28.  63
    Three Rules of Distribution: One Counterexample.John Corcoran - 1987 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 52:886-887.
    This self-contained one page paper produces one valid two-premise premise-conclusion argument that is a counterexample to the entire three traditional rules of distribution. These three rules were previously thought to be generally applicable criteria for invalidity of premise-conclusion arguments. No longer can a three-term argument be dismissed as invalid simply on the ground that its middle is undistributed, for example. The following question seems never to have been raised: how does having an undistributed middle show that an argument's (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  36
    Exclusion in Descartes's Rules for the Direction of the Mind: The Emergence of the Real Distinction.Joseph Zepeda - 2016 - Intellectual History Review 26 (2):203-219.
    The distinction between the mental operations of abstraction and exclusion is recognized as playing an important role in many of Descartes’ metaphysical arguments, at least after 1640. In this paper I first show that Descartes describes the distinction between abstraction and exclusion in the early Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in substantially the same way he does in the 1640s. Second, I show that Descartes makes the test for exclusion a major component of the method proposed in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30.  99
    Wittgenstein on Rules and Practices.Mark McCullagh - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Research 27:83-100.
    Some readers of Wittgenstein---I discuss Robert Brandom---think that his writings contain a regress argument showing that the notion of participating in a practice is more basic than the notion of following a rule, in explanations of linguistic correctness. But the regress argument bears equally on both these notions: if there is an explanatory regress of rules, then there is an explanatory regress of practices as well. Why then does Wittgenstein invoke the notion of a practice, apparently by way of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31.  94
    Rules, Norms and Basic Knowledge.Brian Weatherson - manuscript
    Lewis Carroll’s 1895 paper “Achilles and the Tortoise” showed that we need a distinction between rules of inference and premises. We cannot, on pain of regress, treat all rules simply as further premises in an argument. But Carroll’s paper doesn’t say very much about what rules there must be. Indeed, it is consistent with what Carroll says there to think that the only rule is -elimination. You might think that modern Bayesians, who seem to think that the (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32.  17
    A Critique of Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language".Chrysoula Gitsoulis - 2008 - Dissertation, Graduate Center, City University of New York
    (Submission date: Oct 16, 2008. Thesis supervisor: Paul Horwich) In Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Saul Kripke presents a controversial skeptical argument, which he attributes to Wittgenstein’s interlocutor in the Philosophical Investigations [PI]. The argument purports to show that there are no facts that correspond to what we mean by our words. Kripke maintains, moreover, that the conclusion of Wittgenstein’s so-called private language argument is a corollary of results Wittgenstein establishes in §§137-202 of PI concerning the topic of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules.Hannah Ginsborg - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (5):227-254.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  34. Hilpinen's Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic.Alex C. Michalos - 1971 - Philosophy of Science 38 (2):293-302.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  35. Dispositions, Rules, and Finks.Toby Handfield & Alexander Bird - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):285 - 298.
    This paper discusses the prospects of a dispositional solution to the Kripke–Wittgenstein rule-following puzzle. Recent attempts to employ dispositional approaches to this puzzle have appealed to the ideas of finks and antidotes—interfering dispositions and conditions—to explain why the rule-following disposition is not always manifested. We argue that this approach fails: agents cannot be supposed to have straightforward dispositions to follow a rule which are in some fashion masked by other, contrary dispositions of the agent, because in all cases, at least (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  36. Understanding Social Norms and Constitutive Rules: Perspectives From Developmental Psychology and Philosophy.Ingar Brinck - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):699-718.
    An experimental paradigm that purports to test young children’s understanding of social norms is examined. The paradigm models norms on Searle’s notion of a constitutive rule. The experiments and the reasons provided for their design are discussed. It is argued that the experiments do not provide direct evidence about the development of social norms and that the concepts of a social norm and constitutive rule are distinct. The experimental data are re-interpreted, and suggestions for how to deal with the present (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  37. Acceptance, Aggregation and Scoring Rules.Jake Chandler - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (1):201-217.
    As the ongoing literature on the paradoxes of the Lottery and the Preface reminds us, the nature of the relation between probability and rational acceptability remains far from settled. This article provides a novel perspective on the matter by exploiting a recently noted structural parallel with the problem of judgment aggregation. After offering a number of general desiderata on the relation between finite probability models and sets of accepted sentences in a Boolean sentential language, it is noted that a number (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  38. Species, Rules and Meaning: The Politics of Language and the Ends of Definitions in 19th Century Natural History.Gordon R. McOuat - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (4):473-519.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  39. Constitutional Experiments: Representing Future Generations Through Submajority Rules.Kristian Skagen Ekeli - 2009 - Journal of Political Philosophy 17 (4):440-61.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  40.  35
    Virtues and Rules.Timothy Chappell - 2014 - In Stan van Hooft & Nafsika Athanassoulis (eds.), The Handbook of Virtue Ethics. Acumen Publishing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  41. Rules of Language and First Person Authority.Martin F. Fricke - 2012 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 6 (2):15-32.
    This paper examines theories of first person authority proposed by Dorit Bar-On (2004), Crispin Wright (1989a) and Sydney Shoemaker (1988). What all three accounts have in common is that they attempt to explain first person authority by reference to the way our language works. Bar-On claims that in our language self-ascriptions of mental states are regarded as expressive of those states; Wright says that in our language such self-ascriptions are treated as true by default; and Shoemaker suggests that they might (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Small Steps and Great Leaps in Thought: The Epistemology of Basic Deductive Rules.Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - In Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (eds.), Reasoning: New Essays on Theoretical and Practical Thinking. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We are justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens (or one much like it) as basic in our reasoning. By contrast, we are not justified in employing a rule of inference that permits inferring to some difficult mathematical theorem from the relevant axioms in a single step. Such an inferential step is intuitively “too large” to count as justified. What accounts for this difference? In this paper, I canvass several possible explanations. I argue that the most promising approach (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Rules, Privacy, and Physicalism.Jim Hopkins - 2012 - In J. Ellis & D. Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 107-144.
    Wittgenstein's arguments about rule-following and private language turn both on interpretation and what he called our 'pictures' of the mind. His remarks about these can be understood in terms of the conceptual metaphor of the mind as a container, and enable us to give a better account of physicalism.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Subliminal: How Your Unconscious Mind Rules Your Behavior, by Leonard Mlodinow (Vintage Books, 2013). [REVIEW]Kevin Lynch - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):229-234.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45.  59
    Electoral Design, Sub-Majority Rules, and Representation for Future Generations.Kristian Ekeli - 2016 - In Inigo Gonzalez-Ricoy & Axel Gosseries (eds.), Institutions for Future Generations. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 214-227.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Rules, Reductionism, and Normativity: A Naturalistic Rejoinder.Marcel Weber - 2008 - In Sven Walter & Helen Bohse (eds.), GAP.6: Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of the Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  47. Interpretive Rules and the Description of the Aspects.H. J. Verkuyl - 1976 - Foundations of Language 14 (4):471-503.
    This paper aims at showing that the generative-semantic framework is not essential to the proposal in H.J. Verkuyl On the Compositional Nature of the Aspects Reidel:Dordrecht 1972. Compositionality can be shown to be neutral as to the then-difference between generative-semantic and the interpretive-semantic branch of transformational grammar.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  48. Laws of Essence or Constitutive Rules? Reinach Vs. Searle on the Ontology of Social Entities.Barry Smith & Wojciech Zelaniec - 2012 - In Francesca De Vecchi (ed.), Eidetica del Diritto e Ontologia Sociale. Il Realismo di Adolf Reinach. Mimesis. pp. 83-108.
    Amongst the entities making up social reality, are there necessary relations whose necessity is not a mere reflection of the logical connections between corresponding concepts? We distinguish three main groups of answers to this question, associated with Hume and Adolf Reinach at opposite extremes, and with Searle who occupies a position somewhere in the middle. We first set forth Reinach’s views on what he calls ‘material necessities’ in the realm of social entities. We then attempt to show that Searle has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  99
    A Third Way: Ethics Guidance as Evidence-Informed Provisional Rules.Kirstin Borgerson & Joseph Millum - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics 10 (6):20-22.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  50. Patterns, Rules, and Inferences.Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Jonathan E. Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 282-290.
    The “Game of the Rule” is easy enough: I give you the beginning of a sequence of numbers (say) and you have to figure out how the sequence continues, to uncover the rule by means of which the sequence is generated. The game depends on two obvious constraints, namely (1) that the initial segment uniquely identify the sequence, and (2) that the sequence be non-random. As it turns out, neither constraint can fully be met, among other reasons because the relevant (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 669