Results for 'Testimonial Injustice'

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  1. (1 other version)Testimonial Injustice: The Facts of the Matter.Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela & Andrés Páez - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    To verify the occurrence of a singular instance of testimonial injustice three facts must be established. The first is whether the hearer in fact has an identity prejudice of which she may or may not be aware; the second is whether that prejudice was in fact the cause of the unjustified credibility deficit; and the third is whether there was in fact a credibility deficit in the testimonial exchange. These three elements constitute the facts of the matter (...)
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  2. Testimonial Injustice and the Nature of Epistemic Injustice (3rd edition).Emily McWilliams - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.
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  3. Testimonial Injustice and the Ideology Which Produces It.Dan Lowe - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):215-231.
    Recently, some scholars have argued that testimonial injustice may not only be due to prejudice toward the speaker, but also prejudice toward the content of what the speaker says. I argue that such accounts do not merely expand our picture of epistemic injustice, but give us reason to radically revise our approach to reducing testimonial injustice. The dominant conception of this project focuses on reducing speaker prejudice. But even if one were to successfully do so, (...)
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  4. Prejudice, Harming Knowers, and Testimonial Injustice.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (1):53-73.
    Fricker‘s Epistemic Injustice discusses the idea of testimonial injustice, specifically, being harmed in one‘s capacity as a knower. Fricker‘s own theory of testimonial injustice emphasizes the role of prejudice. She argues that prejudice is necessary for testimonial injustice and that when hearers use a prejudice to give a deficit to the credibility of speakers hearers intrinsically harm speakers in their capacity as a knower. This paper rethinks the connections between prejudice and testimonial (...)
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  5. Lysistrata's Lament: Interrogative Analogues of Testimonial Injustice.Dennis Whitcomb - forthcoming - In Aaron Creller & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Inquiry: Philosophical Perspectives. Routledge.
    When a person commits a testimonial injustice, the unjust thing they do consists in their reaction to an assertion (theorists diverge on the details; paradigmatically the relevant unjust thing consists in prejudicially refraining from believing the assertion). Whatever reactions to questions are analogous to these reactions to assertions, those things are "interrogative injustices". I explore some models of those things and apply them to some non-ideal cases. One of the models appeals to mental states like curiosity and wonder, (...)
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  6. Introduction: Testimonial Injustice and Trust.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian (eds.) - 2024 - Routledge.
    This introduction to the edited volume on "Testimonial Injustice and Trust" provides (a) a brief overview of the philosophical debate on the notion of ‘testimonial injustice’ and (b) a summary of the 18 chapters constituting this volume. The contributions are divided into four thematic sections. These are (I) Rethinking Testimonial Injustice, (II) Testimonial Injustice and the Question of Trust, (III) The Public Spheres of Testimonial Injustice, and (IV) Testimonial (...) and Public Health. The contributions criticize, complement, or expand on Fricker’s central case of testimonial injustice and the proposed virtue of testimonial justice, thereby contributing to its better understanding and extending its scope. Moreover, through the application of theories of epistemic injustice, and testimonial injustice in particular, to new real-world cases and contexts, they seek to render our theories and concepts more robust and valuable. (shrink)
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  7.  53
    Expanding testimonial injustice: beyond externalism and the deficiency view.Lou Thomine - 2024 - In Lena Schützle, Barbara Schellhammer, Anupam Yadav, Cara-Julie Kather & Lou Thomine (eds.), Epistemic Injustice and Violence: Exploring Knowledge, Power, and Participation in Philosophy and Beyond. Bielefeld: transcript Verlag. pp. 105 - 111.
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  8. Epistemic Injustice in Late-Stage Dementia: A Case for Non-Verbal Testimonial Injustice.Lucienne Spencer - 2022 - Social Epistemology 1 (1):62-79.
    The literature on epistemic injustice has thus far confined the concept of testimonial injustice to speech expressions such as inquiring, discussing, deliberating, and, above all, telling. I propose that it is time to broaden the horizons of testimonial injustice to include a wider range of expressions. Controversially, the form of communication I have in mind is non-verbal expression. Non-verbal expression is a vital, though often overlooked, form of communication, particularly for people who have certain neurocognitive (...)
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  9. Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):433-447.
    This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
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  10. Epistemic Transitional Justice: The Recognition of Testimonial Injustice in the Context of Reproductive Rights.Romina Rekers - 2022 - Redescriptions: Political Thought, Conceptual History and Feminist Theory 1 (25):65–79.
    This article focuses on the epistemic transition to testimonial justice. It argues that the recognition of testimonial injustice in the context of reproductive rights may play a central role in this transition. First, I show how testimonial injustice undermines women’s legal protection against sexual violence and rights triggered by it such as the right to abortion. Second, I argue that the epistemic transition initiated by the #MeToo and #YoSiTeCreo movements call for transitional justice. In support, (...)
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  11. The Expansionist View of Systematic Testimonial Injustice: South Asian Context.Kazi A. S. M. Nurul Huda - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (2):171-181.
    In this paper, I offer an expansionist view of the Frickerian central case of testimonial injustice, citing examples from the South Asian context. To defend this expansionist position, I provide an argument in three parts. First, I argue that credibility deficit and credibility excess are entangled with each other in such a way that often, one produces the other. Secondly, I contend that we should not say that systematic testimonial injustice is a consequence of credibility deficit (...)
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  12. Making life more interesting: Trust, trustworthiness, and testimonial injustice.Aidan McGlynn - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (1):126-147.
    A theme running through Katherine Hawley’s recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker’s notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker’s own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker’s account that Hawley’s criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker’s proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of (...)
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  13. Epistemic Virtue Signaling and the Double Bind of Testimonial Injustice.Catharine Saint-Croix - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.
    Virtue signaling—using public moral discourse to enhance one’s moral reputation—is a familiar concept. But, what about profile pictures framed by “Vaccines work!”? Or memes posted to anti-vaccine groups echoing the group’s view that “Only sheep believe Big Pharma!”? These actions don’t express moral views—both claims are empirical (if imprecise). Nevertheless, they serve a similar purpose: to influence the judgments of their audience. But, where rainbow profiles guide their audience to view the agent as morally good, these acts guide their audience (...)
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  14. Contextual Injustice.Jonathan Ichikawa - 2020 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 30 (1):1–30.
    Contextualist treatments of clashes of intuitions can allow that two claims, apparently in conflict, can both be true. But making true utterances is far from the only thing that matters — there are often substantive normative questions about what contextual parameters are appropriate to a given conversational situation. This paper foregrounds the importance of the social power to set contextual standards, and how it relates to injustice and oppression, introducing a phenomenon I call "contextual injustice," which has to (...)
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  15. What is the characteristic wrong of testimonial injustice?Richard Pettigrew - manuscript
    My aim in this paper is to identify the wrong that is done in all cases of testimonial injustice, if there is one. Miranda Fricker (2007) proposes one account of this distinctive wrong, and Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. (2014) offers another. I think neither works. Nor does an account based on giving due respect to the testifier's epistemic competence. Nor does an account based on exposing the testifier to substantial risk of harm. Rachel Fraser (2023) describes a further account, (...)
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  16. You are just being emotional! Testimonial injustice and folk-psychological attributions.Rodrigo Díaz & Manuel Almagro - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5709-5730.
    Testimonial injustices occur when individuals from particular social groups are systematically and persistently given less credibility in their claims merely because of their group identity. Recent “pluralistic” approaches to folk psychology, by taking into account the role of stereotypes in how we understand others, have the power to explain how and why cases of testimonial injustice occur. If how we make sense of others’ behavior depends on assumptions about how individuals from certain groups think and act, this (...)
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  17. Bystander Omissions and Accountability for Testimonial Injustice.J. Y. Lee - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):519-536.
    Literature on testimonial injustice and ways that perpetrators might combat it have flourished since Miranda Fricker’s ground-breaking work on testimonial injustice. Less attention has been given, however, to the role of bystanders. In this paper, I examine the accountability that bystanders may have for their omissions to redress testimonial injustice. I argue that bystander accountability applies in cases where it is opportune for bystanders to intervene, and if they are also sufficiently equipped and able (...)
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  18.  97
    Book Review: Jennifer Lackey, Criminal Testimonial Injustice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023, 224pp. [REVIEW]Robert Vinten - 2024 - Manuscrito 47 (4):1-13.
    At the heart of Jennifer Lackey's recent book is highly original work in identifying a form of testimonial injustice that is quite distinct from those hitherto identified. Since the publication of Miranda Fricker’s Epistemic Injustice there has been an enormous flurry of work done on injustices where people are wronged as givers of knowledge (testimonial injustice) or where people are wronged in their capacity as a subject of social understanding (hermeneutical injustice). Fricker’s focus in (...)
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  19. Varieties of Testimonial Injustice.Jeremy Wanderer - 2016 - In Ian James Kidd, Gaile Pohlhaus & José Medina (eds.), The Routledge Handbook on Epistemic Injustice. New York: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group. pp. 27-40.
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  20. Epistemic Injustice: Phenomena and Theories (Author's preprint).Aidan McGlynn - 2024 - In Jennifer Lackey & Aidan McGlynn (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic injustice has become one of the most widely discussed topics in social epistemology, and has revived interest in issues in the intersections between epistemology and ethics and political philosophy. Much of the impetus for this recent explosion of interest has been the influential work of Miranda Fricker; however, Fricker’s framework and terminology for discussing the phenomena and the kinds of examples she’s interested in has not always been cleanly separated from the phenomena themselves. This chapter examines what’s distinctive (...)
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  21. Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice.Melanie Altanian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):595-612.
    Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and social-historical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell’s relational, reconstructive (...)
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  22. Intellectual Humility, Testimony, and Epistemic Injustice.Ian M. Church - 2020 - In Mark Alfano, Michael Patrick Lynch & Alessandra Tanesini (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Humility. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this exploratory paper, I consider how intellectual humility and epistemic injustice might contribute to the failure of testimonial exchanges. In §1, I will briefly highlight four broad ways a testimonial exchange might fail. In §2, I will very briefly review the nature of epistemic injustice. In §3, I will explore how both epistemic injustice and intellectual humility can lead to failures in testimonial exchange, and I’ll conclude by suggesting how intellectual humility and epistemic (...)
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  23. Epistemic Injustice and Suicide Claims.Lucienne Spencer & Matthew Broome - 2024 - Epistemic Injustice and Violence. Lena Schützle, Barbara Schellhammer, Anupam Yadav, Cara-Julie Kather, Lou Thomine (Eds.).
    Reports of the intent to kill oneself are not always met with the credibility they deserve, with potentially fatal results. We recognise this as testimonial injustice, whereby a person’s testimony is not taken seriously due to a pervasive identity prejudice attached to the speaker (Fricker 2007). To meet the government’s ‘zero suicide ambition’ for mental health patients, we need to adopt epistemically just methods of evaluating suicide claims.
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  24. A Tale of Two Injustices: Epistemic Injustice in Philosophy.Emmalon Davis - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-250.
    This chapter has two aims. First, I distinguish between two forms of testimonial injustice: identity-based testimonial injustice and content-based testimonial injustice. Second, I utilize this distinction to develop a partial explanation for the persistent lack of diverse practitioners in academic philosophy. Specifically, I argue that both identity-based and content-based testimonial injustice are prevalent in philosophical discourse and that this prevalence introduces barriers to participation for those targeted. As I show, the dual and (...)
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  25. Testimonial Smothering and Domestic Violence Disclosure in Clinical Contexts.Jack Warman - 2023 - Episteme 20 (1):107-124.
    Domestic violence and abuse (DVA) are at last coming to be recognised as serious global public health problems. Nevertheless, many women with personal histories of DVA decline to disclose them to healthcare practitioners. In the health sciences, recent empirical work has identified many factors that impede DVA disclosure, known as barriers to disclosure. Drawing on recent work in social epistemology on testimonial silencing, we might wonder why so many people withhold their testimony and whether there is some kind of (...)
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  26. Epistemic injustice in criminal procedure.Andrés Páez & Janaina Matida - 2023 - Revista Brasileira de Direito Processual Penal 9 (1):11-38.
    There is a growing awareness that there are many subtle forms of exclusion and partiality that affect the correct workings of a judicial system. The concept of epistemic injustice, introduced by the philosopher Miranda Fricker, is a useful conceptual tool to understand forms of judicial partiality that often go undetected. In this paper, we present Fricker’s original theory and some of the applications of the concept of epistemic injustice in legal processes. In particular, we want to show that (...)
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  27. Testimony, epistemic egoism, and epistemic credit.Jason Kawall - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):463-477.
    It is generally acknowledged that testifiers can play a central role in the production of knowledge and other valuable epistemic states in others. But does such a role warrant any form of epistemic credit and is an agent more successful qua epistemic agent insofar as she is a successful testifier? I here propose an affirmative answer to both questions. The core of the current paper consists in a sustained defence of this proposal against a series of objections. I further argue (...)
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  28. Epistemic Injustice and Illness.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2016 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (2):172-190.
    This article analyses the phenomenon of epistemic injustice within contemporary healthcare. We begin by detailing the persistent complaints patients make about their testimonial frustration and hermeneutical marginalization, and the negative impact this has on their care. We offer an epistemic analysis of this problem using Miranda Fricker's account of epistemic injustice. We detail two types of epistemic injustice, testimonial and hermeneutical, and identify the negative stereotypes and structural features of modern healthcare practices that generate them. (...)
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  29. Echo Chambers, Epistemic Injustice and Anti-Intellectualism.Carline Klijnman - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (6):36-45.
    C. Thi Nguyen's (2020) recent account of echo chambers as social epistemic structures that actively exclude outsiders’ voices has sparked debate on the connection between echo chambers and epistemic injustice (Santos 2021; Catala 2021; Elzinga 2021).In this paper I am mainly concerned with the connection between echo chambers and testimonial injustice, understood as an instance whereby a speaker receives less epistemic credibility than they deserve, due to a prejudice in the hearer (Fricker 2007). In her reconstruction of (...)
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  30. Content Focused Epistemic Injustice.Robin Dembroff & Dennis Whitcomb - 2023 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7:48-70.
    There has been extensive discussion of testimonial epistemic injustice, the phenomenon whereby a speaker’s testimony is rejected due to prejudice regarding who they are. But people also have their testimony rejected or preempted due to prejudice regarding what they communicate. Here, the injustice is content focused. We describe several cases of content focused injustice, and we theoretically interrogate those cases by building up a general framework through which to understand them as a genuine form of epistemic (...)
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  31. Insult and Injustice in Epistemic Partiality.Jack Warman - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.
    Proponents of epistemic partiality in friendship argue that friendship makes demands of our epistemic lives that are at least inconsistent with the demands of epistemic propriety, and perhaps downright irrational. In this paper, I focus on the possibility that our commitments to our friends distort how we respond to testimony about them, their character, and their conduct. Sometimes friendship might require us to ignore (or substantially underweight) what others tell us about our friends. However, while this practice might help promote (...)
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  32. Epistemic Injustice.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2020 - 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology.
    Suppose a jury rejects a Black defendant’s testimony because they believe that Black people are often untrustworthy. Or suppose the male members of a board reject a female colleague’s suggestions because they believe that women are too often irrational. Imagine also a woman whose postpartum depression is dismissed by her doctor as mere ‘baby blues.’ All these three people suffer what contemporary English philosopher Miranda Fricker calls epistemic injustice. Epistemic injustice refers to a wrong done to someone as (...)
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  33. Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3421-3443.
    This paper argues that underlying social biases are able to affect the processes underlying linguistic interpretation. The result is a series of harms systematically inflicted on marginalised speakers. It is also argued that the role of biases and stereotypes in interpretation complicates Miranda Fricker's proposed solution to epistemic injustice.
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  34. (1 other version)Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2021 - Episteme 1 (Early view):1-18.
    Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker’s (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker’s words from constituting evidence for the hearer’s belief? By clarifying this point, it will be (...)
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  35. Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing: Introduction to Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Nadja El Kassar - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (2):99-108.
    In this introduction to the special issue ‘Epistemic Injustice and Collective Wrongdoing,’ we show how the eight contributions examine the collective dimensions of epistemic injustice. First, we contextualize the articles within theories of epistemic injustice. Second, we provide an overview of the eight articles by highlighting three central topics addressed by them: i) the effects of epistemic injustice and collective wrongdoing, ii) the underlying epistemic structures in collective wrongdoing, unjust relations and unjust societies, and iii) the (...)
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  36. Anticipatory Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - 2021 - Tandf: Social Epistemology 35 (6):564–576.
    Epistemic injustices are wrongs that agents can suffer in their capacity as knowers. In this article, I offer a conceptualisation of a phenomenon I call anticipatory epistemic injustice, which I claim is a distinct and particularly pernicious type of epistemic injustice worthy of independent analysis. I take anticipatory epistemic injustice to consist in the wrongs that agents can suffer as a result of anticipated challenges in their process of taking up testimony-sharing opportunities. I distinguish my account from (...)
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  37. Los problemas probatorios de la injusticia testimonial en el derecho.Andrés Páez & Migdalia Arcila-Valenzuela - 2023 - Isonomía. Revista de Teoría y Filosofía Del Derecho 59:199-228.
    Resumen: Una de las formas más comunes y menos estudiadas de parcialidad judicial subjetiva es la disminución de la credibilidad otorgada a un testigo debido a un prejuicio identitario implícito del agente judicial. En la epistemología social, este fenómeno ha sido estudiado bajo la rúbrica de la injusticia testimonial. En este ensayo mostramos que para determinar la ocurrencia de un caso de injusticia testimonial en el derecho se deben cumplir tres condiciones que son imposibles de verificar empíricamente y (...)
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  38. Epistemic injustice in healthcare encounters: evidence from chronic fatigue syndrome.Havi Carel, Charlotte Blease & Keith Geraghty - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (8):549-557.
    Chronic fatigue syndrome or myalgic encephalomyelitis remains a controversial illness category. This paper surveys the state of knowledge and attitudes about this illness and proposes that epistemic concerns about the testimonial credibility of patients can be articulated using Miranda Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice. While there is consensus within mainstream medical guidelines that there is no known cause of CFS/ME, there is continued debate about how best to conceive of CFS/ME, including disagreement about how to interpret clinical studies (...)
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  39. The Harm of Ableism: Medical Error and Epistemic Injustice.David M. Peña-Guzmán & Joel Michael Reynolds - 2019 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 29 (3):205-242.
    This paper argues that epistemic errors rooted in group- or identity- based biases, especially those pertaining to disability, are undertheorized in the literature on medical error. After sketching dominant taxonomies of medical error, we turn to the field of social epistemology to understand the role that epistemic schemas play in contributing to medical errors that disproportionately affect patients from marginalized social groups. We examine the effects of this unequal distribution through a detailed case study of ableism. There are four primary (...)
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  40. Fear Generalization and Mnemonic Injustice.Katherine Puddifoot & Marina Trakas - 2024 - Episteme:1-27.
    This paper focuses on how experiences of trauma can lead to generalized fear of people, objects and places that are similar or contextually or conceptually related to those that produced the initial fear, causing epistemic, affective, and practical harms to those who are unduly feared and those who are intimates of the victim of trauma. We argue that cases of fear generalization that bring harm to other people constitute examples of injustice closely akin to testimonial injustice, specifically, (...)
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  41. Testimony as Joint Activity.Nicolas Nicola - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Miami
    Testimony is of epistemic and practical significance. It is of epistemic significance because majority of what we know and believe comes from being told. It is of practical significance because our agency can be undermined, bypassed, or overridden owing to systemic prejudices sustained by oppressive social or cultural practices and subsequently our routes to knowledge are either hindered or distorted. Things get more complicated when we introduce and examine how groups and other collectives testify and are recipients of testimony. For (...)
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  42. Genocide Denial as Testimonial Oppression.Melanie Altanian - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (2):133-146.
    This article offers an argument of genocide denial as an injustice perpetrated not only against direct victims and survivors of genocide, but also against future members of the victim group. In particular, I argue that in cases of persistent and systematic denial, i.e. denialism, it perpetrates an epistemic injustice against them: testimonial oppression. First, I offer an account of testimonial oppression and introduce Kristie Dotson’s notion of testimonial smothering as one form of testimonial oppression, (...)
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  43.  69
    A Posthumanist Social Epistemology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Epistemic Injustice.Justin Simpson - 2023 - Anthropos: Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 55 (2):195-213.
    This paper seeks to intervene in environmental ethics and social epistemology. Within a predominant strand of environmental ethics, one witnesses accounts based on nonhumans’ ability to suffer, and consequently, the passivity of nonhumans. On the other hand, social epistemology is often not social enough insofar as it does not include nonhumans. Seminal accounts of epistemic injustice often conceal or exclude the possibility that nonhumans can be subjects of knowledge and victims of epistemic injustice because of an anthropocentric bias (...)
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  44. The New Hysteria: Borderline Personality Disorder and Epistemic Injustice.Natalie Dorfman & Joel Michael Reynolds - 2023 - International Journal of Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 16 (2):162-181.
    The diagnostic category of borderline personality disorder (BPD) has come under increasing criticism in recent years. In this paper, we analyze the role and impact of epistemic injustice, specifically testimonial injustice, in relation to the diagnosis of BPD. We first offer a critical sociological and historical account, detailing and expanding a range of arguments that BPD is problematic nosologically. We then turn to explore the epistemic injustices that can result from a BPD diagnosis, showing how they can (...)
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  45.  45
    A Posthumanist Social Epistemology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Epistemic Injustice.Justin Simpson - 2023 - Anthropos: Journal of Psychology and Philosophy 55 (2):195-213.
    This paper seeks to intervene in environmental ethics and social epistemology. Within a predominant strand of environmental ethics, one witnesses accounts based on nonhumans’ ability to suffer, and consequently, the passivity of nonhumans. On the other hand, social epistemology is often not social enough insofar as it does not include nonhumans. Seminal accounts of epistemic injustice often conceal or exclude the possibility that nonhumans can be subjects of knowledge and victims of epistemic injustice because of an anthropocentric bias (...)
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  46. Knowledge, Confidence, and Epistemic Injustice.Robert Vinten - 2024 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 11 (1):99-119.
    In this paper I begin by explaining what epistemic injustice is and what ordinary language philosophy is. I then go on to ask why we might doubt the usefulness of ordinary language philosophy in examining epistemic injustice. In the first place, we might wonder how ordinary language philosophy can be of use, given that many of the key terms used in discussing epistemic injustice, including ‘epistemic injustice’ itself, are not drawn from our ordinary language. We might (...)
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  47. Healthcare Practice, Epistemic Injustice, and Naturalism.Ian James Kidd & Havi Carel - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 84:1-23.
    Ill persons suffer from a variety of epistemically-inflected harms and wrongs. Many of these are interpretable as specific forms of what we dub pathocentric epistemic injustices, these being ones that target and track ill persons. We sketch the general forms of pathocentric testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, each of which are pervasive within the experiences of ill persons during their encounters in healthcare contexts and the social world. What’s epistemically unjust might not be only agents, communities and institutions, but (...)
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  48. “Me Too”: Epistemic Injustice and the Struggle for Recognition.Debra L. Jackson - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4).
    Congdon (2017), Giladi (2018), and McConkey (2004) challenge feminist epistemologists and recognition theorists to come together to analyze epistemic injustice. I take up this challenge by highlighting the failure of recognition in cases of testimonial and hermeneutical injustice experienced by victims of sexual harassment and sexual assault. I offer the #MeToo movement as a case study to demonstrate how the process of mutual recognition makes visible and helps overcome the epistemic injustice suffered by victims of sexual (...)
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  49. Testimonial Smothering’s Non-Epistemic Motives: A Reply to Goetze and Lee.Eric Bayruns García - 2022 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 1 (11):18-20.
    I argue that according to Kristie Dotson, non-epistemic motives such as social, ethical and material harm can motivate a speaker to smother her testimony. I present this exegesis of Dotson's view of testimonial smothering in response to J. L. Lee's and Trystan Goetze's reply to my commentary of Lee's view that anticipatory epistemic injustice is distinct from testimonial smothering.
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  50. Common Ground, Conversational Roles and Epistemic Injustice.Felix Bräuer - 2021 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 28 (2):399–419.
    People partaking in a conversation can add to the common ground of said conversation by performing different speech acts. That is, they can influence which propositions are presumed to be shared among them. In this paper, I am going to apply the common ground framework to the phenomenon of epistemic injustice. In doing so, I am going to focus on two kindsof speech acts: making assertions and asking certain kinds of questions. And I am going to look at three (...)
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