The rise of experimental philosophy has placed metaphilosophical questions, particularly those concerning concepts, at the center of philosophical attention. X-phi offers empirically rigorous methods for identifying conceptual content, but what exactly it contributes towards evaluating conceptual content remains unclear. We show how x-phi complements Rudolf Carnap’s underappreciated methodology for concept determination, explication. This clarifies and extends x-phi’s positive philosophical import, and also exhibits explication’s broad appeal. But there is a potential problem: Carnap’s account of explication was limited to empirical and (...) logical concepts, but many concepts of interest to philosophers are essentially normative. With formal epistemology as a case study, we show how x-phi assisted explication can apply to normative domains. (shrink)

The first aim of the paper is to show that under certain conditions generative syntax can be made suitable for Montague semantics, based on his type logic. One of the conditions is to make branching in the so-called X-bar syntax strictly binary, This makes it possible to provide an adequate semantics for Noun Phrases by taking them as referring to sets of collections of sets of entities ( type <ett,t>) rather than to sets of sets of entities (ett).

The closing chapters of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics x are regularly described as “puzzling,” “extremely abrupt,” “awkward,” or “surprising” to readers. Whereas the previous nine books described—sometimes in lavish detail—the multifold ethical virtues of an embodied person situated within communities of family, friends, and fellow-citizens, NE x 6-8 extol the rarified, god-like and solitary existence of a sophos or sage (1179a32). The ethical virtues that take up approximately the first half of the Ethics describe moral exempla who experience fear fighting for (...) their communities, are sensitive to the esteem and recognition of others, and feel love for a desire to live together with a wide variety of kinds of friends. Such good people take pleasure in prudently expending sums to improve their communities—communities in which they exchange goods and participate in ruling and being ruled in a cooperative fashion. The exemplum of x 7-8, by contrast, is a person whose activity consists almost entirely in exercising his or her mind (nous)—a part of one’s soul that Aristotle explicitly notes is disconnected from human emotions and that can be exercised, insofar as one as wise, in a wholly solitary fashion (1178a15-16, a19-20; 1177a33-34). Although Aristotle’s claim that a “life in accord with the mind” is best and most pleasant (1178a6-7) may jar the intuitions of many people—he himself endorses Anaxagoras’ claim that the happy person will appear as “someone who is absurd” (atopos, 1179a15) to most people—it is false to claim that his conclusions in NE x 6-8 are unexpected or unanticipated, or that the text is in any way discontinuous with what precedes it. The Nicomachean Ethics exhibits aspects of ring-composition both within the work as a whole and within book 10. In NE i 5 Aristotle introduces his rendition of a trope that he inherits (most immediately) from Plato, viz. that the problem of the good can be considered like a contest between three different kinds of life—the life of enjoyment (apolaustikos), the life of politics (politikos), and the life of contemplation (theôrêtikos). NE x 6-8 returns to that contest, rendering a verdict about which life takes first, second, and third place. As the opening lines of NE x 6 note, that verdict presupposes central claims articulated between the first and last books of the Ethics, specifically about the nature of the virtues, the nature of friendship, and the nature of pleasure. NE i 5 and x 6-8 thus serve as “bookends” which encase arguments and proposition located between them. Book 10 exhibits a similar ring-composition. NE x opens with methodological reflection on the gap between the theoretical positions that thinkers articulate and the way they live their lives (especially in the case of scolds who simultaneously criticize pleasure on a scientific level but seek it on a practical level [1172a33-b8]). Chapter 8 concludes with an explicit reiteration of the methodological point, a reiteration that underscores how Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives incorporates central aspects of the discussion of pleasure in NE x 1-5. Aristotle’s reiteration of the problem of a gap between theory and practice also draws attention to the centrality of his treatment of pleasure in his adjudication of the three lives. Although the life of pleasure takes a distant third in the contest of lives, the contemplative life wins the contest in part because it itself is the most pleasant form of life. The central philosophical problem looming behind Aristotle’s treatment of the contest of lives concerns the relationship between the notion of activity (energeia) and the notion of a way of life (bios). In the last four decades, much of the scholarship on NE x 6-8 has sought to address the question of what activities a certain way of life includes or excludes. “Monistic” or “dominant” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including only contemplative activities whereas “inclusivist” end interpretations of the best life have viewed it as including non-contemplative activities. Although this chapter largely side-steps this debate—partially because there are ample recent first-rate introductory treatments of the debate, partially because I have addressed the question elsewhere in my own writing —I argue that focusing solely on the contest between the two best ways of life overshadows the way that Aristotle incorporates insights from the third way of life into the best way of life. Although the notion of a contest among different kinds of lives presupposes that the lives are mutually exclusive, Aristotle has no problem saying that the contemplative life trumps the life of pleasure because the contemplative life is more pleasant. I proceed in two parts. In the first part I examine what I will call the “outer” ring of the Ethics, namely the relationship between the contest of lives proposed in NE i 5 and its overall resolution in x 6-8. I show how i 5 and x 6 establish the framework for the contest, how x 7 adjudicates that contest in large part by relying upon premises articulated in the interim between books 1 and 10, and how x 6 and x 8 determine the second and third place positions in the contest. In the second part I focus on what I will call the “inner” ring of NE x. More than half of NE x struggles with the nature of pleasure, its role in a happy life, and the methodological problems of examining pleasure within a practical science. I show how x 1 and x 8 are “bookends” that underscore the methodological problem of examining pleasure and how the contest of lives draws upon the proximate conclusions concerning the nature of pleasure in NE x 1-5. (shrink)

In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One in itself, according (...) to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it. (shrink)

Scientific models share one central characteristic with fiction: their relation to the physical world is ambiguous. It is often unclear whether an element in a model represents something in the world or presents an artifact of model building. Fiction, too, can resemble our world to varying degrees. However, we assign a different epistemic function to scientific representations. As artifacts of human activity, how are scientific representations allowing us to make inferences about real phenomena? In reply to this concern, philosophers of (...) science have started analyzing scientific representations in terms of fictionalization strategies. Many arguments center on a dyadic relation between the model and its target system, focusing on structural resemblances and “as if” scenarios. This chapter provides a different approach. It looks more closely at model building to analyze the interpretative strategies dealing with the representational limits of models. How do we interpret ambiguous elements in models? Moreover, how do we determine the validity of model-based inferences to information that is not an explicit part of a representational structure? I argue that the problem of ambiguous inference emerges from two features of representations, namely their hybridity and incompleteness. To distinguish between fictional and non-fictional elements in scientific models my suggestion is to look at the integrative strategies that link a particular model to other methods in an ongoing research context. To exemplify this idea, I examine protein modeling through X-ray crystallography as a pivotal method in biochemistry. (shrink)

“X-Firsters” hold that there is some normative feature that is fundamental to all others (and, often, that there’s some normative feature that is the “mark of the normative”: all other normative properties have it, and are normative in virtue of having it). This view is taken as a starting point in the debate about which X is “on first.” Little has been said about whether or why we should be X-Firsters, or what we should think about normativity if we aren’t (...) X-Firsters. Hence the chapter’s two main goals. First, to provide a simple argument that one shouldn’t be an X-Firster about the normative domain, which starts with the observation that analogous views have dubious merits in analogous domains. Second, to offer an alternative view—taking normativity to be a determinable explained in terms of its determinates—that offers an interesting way to think about the structure and unity of normativity. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es presentar una aproximación fenomenológica a la experiencia intersubjetiva en contraste a las teorías de la mente y a como estas conciben dicho tipo de experiencia. Se identificará un supuesto esencial de estas teorías según el cual todo tipo de intersubjetividad supone una inferencia y, por lo tanto, elementos normativos. Se argumentará que las investigaciones de Husserl a propósito del concepto de “sentido noemático”, en relación con su concepción del horizonte experiencial, revelan un tipo de (...) experiencia constitutiva e intersubjetiva que es condición de posibilidad de la normatividad supuesta por los teóricos de la mente. Esto sugiere un camino a seguir para lograr encontrar soluciones a cuestiones escépticas tales como el solipsismo y la existencia del mundo exterior. -/- The purpose of this paper is to present a phenomenological approach to intersubjective experience contrasting it with the theories of mind and how them conceive such kind of experience. It will be identified an essential presupposition of these theories according to which all kind of intersubjectivity involve an inference, and therefore, normative elements. It will be argued that Husserl’s investigations regarding the notion of “noematic sense”, related with his concept of experiential horizon, disclose a kind of constitutive and intersubjective experiences which serves as a possibility condition of the normativity which is took for granted by the theories of mind. This suggests a road to follow when trying to find solutions to skeptical problems such as solipsism and the existence of the external world. (shrink)

This research aims to determine student learning outcomes in work and energy subjects at the Jambi City Madrasah Aliyah Laboratory for the 2022/2023 academic year. The type of research that researchers have carried out is descriptive qualitative. The population in this study were students of class X MIPA 1 and class X MIPA 2 at the Madrasah Aliyah Laboratory, Jambi City. The sample in this research was class X MIPA 1, totaling 20 students, using a purposive sampling technique. Researchers collected (...) data using essay questions adjusted to the material work and energy indicators. The research results show that students' learning outcomes in work and energy materials are or are categorized in the Sufficient category. (shrink)

Genres inform our appreciative practices. What it takes for a work to be a good work of comedy is different than what it takes for a work to be a good work of horror, and a failure to recognize this will lead to a failure to appreciate comedies or works of horror particularly well. Likewise, it is not uncommon to hear people say that a film or novel is a good work, but not a good work of x (where x (...) is the genre of that work). A work can be good all things considered, but genre membership provides us with an additional set of evaluative criteria over and above those of the medium, which colors how we interpret and appreciate the work. Given this importance, it is not surprising that philosophers of art have been interested in providing an account of what, exactly, a genre is. Despite this interest, there is not widespread agreement about what it takes for something to be a genre, nor what kinds of considerations are relevant in determining whether a work is a member of that genre. Beyond this, we might also want to know to what degree we ought to consider genre in evaluating a work of art and why it should matter at all. Here, I explore the variety of recent theories that philosophers have taken up on the topic of genre and why we should ultimately think of genres as artistic practices rather than the alternatives. (shrink)

A characteristic form of philosophical inquiry seeks to answer ‘what is x?’ questions. In this paper, we ask how philosophers do and should adjudicate debates about the correct answer to such questions. We argue that philosophers do and should rely on a distinctive type of pragmatic and meta-representational reasoning – a form of rationalizing self-interpretation – in answering ‘what is x?’ questions. We start by placing our methodological discussion within a broader theoretical framework. We posit a necessary connection between epistemic (...) methodology and metasemantics. In our view, the correct semantic assignment for a representation must be justifiable from the epistemic perspective of the subject herself, given suitable empirical information and cognitive powers. So the upshot of your own ideal, fully informed epistemic methods will determine the correct answers to ‘what is x?’ questions. The bulk of the paper is devoted to articulating and defending our rationalizing self-interpretation account of philosophical methodology. By working through a specific example, we seek to isolate the relevant inputs into deliberation and the methods for adjudicating between competing answers to a ‘what is x?’ question. We suggest that the self-interpretive methods we isolate generalize across the board as a way of identifying the real nature of familiar topics. We also explain how these methods undercut the case for a priori conceptual analysis. (shrink)

Uptake is typically understood as the hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s communicative intention. According to one theory of uptake, the hearer’s role is merely as a ratifier. The speaker, by expressing a particular communicative intention, predetermines what kind of illocutionary act she might perform. Her hearer can then render this act a success or a failure. Thus the hearer has no power over which act could be performed, but she does have some power over whether it is performed. Call this (...) the ratification theory of uptake. Several philosophers have recently endorsed an alternative theory of uptake, according to which the hearer can determine the nature of the act the speaker performs. According to this theory, if the hearer regards an utterance as illocutionary act y, then it is act y, even if the speaker intended to perform act x. Call this the constitution theory of uptake. The purported advantage of this theory is that it identifies a common but underanalysed way in which speakers can be silenced. I argue that despite its initial intuitive pull, the constitution theory of uptake should be rejected. It is incompatible with ordinary intuitions about speech, it entails a conceptual impossibility, and it has unsavoury political implications, entailing that marginalised speakers barely qualify as agents. (shrink)

Abstract. Gettier’s famous examples intended to show that knowledge cannot always be equated with justified true belief. The Gettier problem can also be considered as a problem for topological epistemic logic: If knowledge and justified belief are conceived as topological operators K and B on topological spaces (to be considered as universes of possible worlds), one may ask whether it happens that there is a proposition A such that KA ≠ A & BA or not. If this is the case, (...) the epistemological logic defined by the topological operators K and B may be said to be non-traditional since there is for them a “Gettier proposition” where knowledge does not coincide with justified true belief. As far as we know, for the first time, this topological Gettier problem is discussed in Steinvold’s PhD dissertation (Steinsvold 2012). In Baltag, Bezhanishvili, Özgün, and Smets (2013), Steinvold’s co-derived set account is criticized since it can be easily “Gettierized”. Baltag et alii claim (without proof) that their topological account of Stalnaker’s logic KB of knowledge and belief does not have this flaw. In the following we will give some topological conditions that determine whether a topological KB model does or does not cope with the Gettier challenge. First, it will be shown that every KB model defines a (topologically slightly simplified) model that is rather similar to it but a is a model of traditional JTB (knowledge = justified true belief) logic of knowledge and belief. The existence of such doppelgangers of all KB models may be read as a qualified and partial topological rehabilitation of traditional JTB epistemology. Second, we consider the Gettier problem for a special class of models of Stalnaker’s combined logic of knowledge and belief KB, namely, for T0 Alexandroff spaces. We prove that, that almost all Alexandroff spaces do not face Gettier counterexamples. Third, we prove that the Stone spaces of Boolean algebras of regular closed subsets of Hausdorff (or T2) spaces X do not face Gettier counterexamples if the X are not pseu–docompact, and these Stone spaces do face Gettier counterexamples for compact spaces X. Succinctly formulated, Stalnaker’s KB logic of knowledge and belief can avoid Gettier problems for some models, while it falls back to traditional pre-Gettier JTB epistemology for other models. In contrast, co-derived set semantics is doomed to fail always in the sense that its models always fall prey to Gettier counterexamples. (shrink)

In biomedical ethics, there is widespread acceptance of moral realism, the view that moral claims express a proposition and that at least some of these propositions are true. Biomedical ethics is also in the business of attributing moral obligations, such as “S should do X.” The problem, as we argue, is that against the background of moral realism, most of these attributions are erroneous or inaccurate. The typical obligation attribution issued by a biomedical ethicist fails to truly capture the person's (...) actual obligations. We offer a novel argument for rife error in obligation attribution. The argument starts with the idea of an epistemic burden. Epistemic burdens are all of those epistemic obstacles one must surmount in order to achieve some aim. Epistemic burdens shape decision-making such that given two otherwise equal options, a person will choose the option that has the lesser of epistemic burdens. Epistemic burdens determine one's potential obligations and, conversely, their non-obligations. The problem for biomedical ethics is that ethicists have little to no access to others' epistemic burdens. Given this lack of access and the fact that epistemic burdens determine potential obligations, biomedical ethicists often can only attribute accurate obligations out of luck. This suggests that the practice of attributing obligations in biomedical ethics is rife with error. To resolve this widespread error, we argue that this practice should be abolished from the discourse of biomedical ethics. (shrink)

The exploration of chemical periodicity over the past 250 years led to the development of the Periodic System of Elements and demonstrates the value of vague ideas that ignored early scientific anomalies and instead allowed for extended periods of normal science where new methodologies and concepts are developed. The basic chemical element provides this exploration with direction and explanation and has shown to be a central and historically adaptable concept for a theory of matter far from the reductionist frontier. This (...) is explored in the histories of Prout’s hypothesis, Döbereiner Triads, element inversions necessary when ordering chemical elements by atomic weights, and van den Broeck’s ad-hoc proposal to switch to nuclear charges instead. The development of more accurate methods to determine atomic weights, Rayleigh and Ramsey’s gas separation and analytical techniques, Moseley’s X-ray spectroscopy to identify chemical elements, and more recent accelerator-based cold fusion methods to create new elements at the end of the Periodic Table point to the importance of methodological development complementing conceptual advances. I propose to frame the crossover from physics to chemistry not as a loss of accuracy and precision but as an increased application of vague concepts such as similarity which permit classification. This approach provides epistemic flexibility to adapt to scientific anomalies and the continued growth of chemical compound space and rejects the Procrustean philosophy of reductionist physics. Furthermore, it establishes chemistry with its explanatory and operational autonomy epitomized by the periodic system of elements as a gateway to other experimental sciences. (shrink)

The Gamer’s Dilemma is based on the intuitions that in single-player video games fictional acts of murder are seen as morally acceptable whereas fictional acts of sexual assault are seen as morally unacceptable. Recently, it has been suggested that these intuitions may apply across different forms of media as part of a broader Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far. This study aims to empirically explore this issue by determining whether fictional murder is seen as more morally acceptable than fictional sexual (...) assault across different media types, and whether audio-visuality and the degree of agency afforded by the medium influences these judgments. An experimental survey study was developed where participants responded to imaginary fictional scenarios as part of a 2 (engages with fictional murder or fictional sexual assault) X 2 (in a high or low agency) X 2 (audio-visual or non-audio-visual medium) factorial design. It was found that fictional murder was seen to be more morally acceptable than fictional sexual assault across all media types, providing empirical support for the Paradox of Fictionally Going Too Far. It was also found that the audio-visuality and degree of agency influenced judgments of moral acceptability. (shrink)

I defend the feasibility of a medical conscience in the following sense: a medical professional can object to the prevailing medical norms because they are incorrect as medical norms. In other words, I provide an account of conscientious objection that makes use of the idea that the conscience can issue true normative claims, but the claims in question are claims about medical norms rather than about general moral norms. I further argue that in order for this line of reasoning to (...) succeed, there needs to be an internal morality of medicine that determines what medical professionals ought to do qua medical professionals. I utilize a constructivist approach to the internal morality of medicine and argue that medical professionals can conscientiously object to providing treatment X, if providing treatment X is not in accordance with norms that would have been constructed, in light of the end of medicine, by the appropriate agents under the appropriate conditions. (shrink)

Two competing accounts of value incomparability have been put forward in the recent literature. According to the standard account, developed most famously by Joseph Raz, ‘incomparability’ means determinate failure of the three classic value relations ( better than , worse than , and equally good ): two value-bearers are incomparable with respect to a value V if and only if (i) it is false that x is better than y with respect to V , (ii) it is false that x (...) is worse than y with respect to V and (iii) it is false that x and y are equally good with respect to V . Most philosophers have followed Raz in adopting this account of incomparability. Recently, however, John Broome has advocated an alternative view, on which value incomparability is explained in terms of vagueness or indeterminacy . In this paper I aim to further Broome’s view in two ways. Firstly, I want to supply independent reasons for thinking that the phenomenon of value incomparability is indeed a matter of the indeterminacy inherent in our comparative predicates. Secondly, I attempt to defend Broome’s account by warding off several objections that worry him, due mainly to Erik Carlson and Ruth Chang. (shrink)

Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...) scientists propose to draw the distinction between veridical experience and illusion in terms of the satisfaction or non-satisfaction of “hidden assumptions” deployed in the course of normal perceptual inference, I argue for a different approach. I contend that there are, in a sense, no illusions – illusions are as “open” as veridical experiences. Percepts lack the kinds of intentional content that would be needed for perceptual misrepresntation. My view gives a satisfying solution to a philosophical problem for disjunctivism about the good case/bad case distinction: with respect to illusions, every "bad case" of seeing an X can be equally well construed as a "good case" of seeing some Y (different from X). -/- . (shrink)

Contrary to common misconceptions, today's logic is not devoid of existential import: the universalized conditional ∀ x [S→ P] implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction ∃ x [S & P], not in all cases, but in some. We characterize the proexamples by proving the Existential-Import Equivalence: The antecedent S of the universalized conditional alone determines whether the universalized conditional has existential import, i.e. whether it implies its corresponding existentialized conjunction.A predicate is an open formula having only x free. An existential-import predicate (...) Q is one whose existentialization, ∃ x Q, is logically true; otherwise, Q is existential-import-free or simply import-free.How abundant or widespread is existential import? How abundant or widespread are existential-import predicates in themselves or in comparison to import-free predicates? We show that existential-import predicates are quite abundant, and no less so than import-free predicates. Existential.. (shrink)

This chapter presents a series of experiments that elicit causal judgments using statements that do not include the verb "to cause". In particular, our interest is in exploring the extent to which previously observed effects of normative considerations on agreement with what we call "cause"-statements, i.e. those of the form "X caused ..." extend as well to those of the form "X V-ed Y", where V is a lexical causative. Our principal finding is that in many cases the effects do (...) not extend in this way, and moreover that the cases where we do find the same pattern are those where the causal verb used has a negative valence of its own. We draw two main conclusions from this finding. First, it reveals how the almost exclusive focus on "cause"-statements in the experimental study of causal judgment has led to findings that are unrepresentative of the full range of ordinary causal thinking, and provides a proof of concept as to how this thinking can be studied in its full variety. Second, the results of our experiments provide significant indirect support for the contention that the effect of moral considerations on agreement with "cause"-statements reflect the fact that these statements are most often used to assign responsibility for an event, and not just to describe the causal structure of what happened. It is not causal judgments in general that result from a process in which normative considerations play a role, but perhaps only those judgments that express a determination of moral responsibility. (shrink)

In this work, author evaluated past theories and perspectives behind the definitions of science and/or branches of science. Also some of the philosophers of science and their specific philosophical interests were expressed. Author considered some type of interactions between some disciplines to determine, to solve the philosophical/scientific problems and to define the possible solutions. The purposes of this article are: (i) to define new synthesis method, (ii) to define new perspective for the philosophy of science, (iii) to define relation between (...) new philosophy perspective and philosophy of science, (iv) to define and organize name, number, relations, and correct structure between special science branches and philosophy of science, (v) to define necessary and sufficient number of branches for philosophy of science, (vi) to define and express the importance and place of new philosophy of science perspective in the new system, (vii) to extend the definition/limits of philosophy of science, (viii) to re-define meanings of some philosophical/scientific theories, (ix) to define systematic solution for the conflicts, problems, confusions about philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science, (x) to define new branches of science, (xi) to re-construct branches and hierarchy of science, (xii) to define new theories about science and branches of science. Author considered R-Synthesis as a method for the evaluation of the philosophy, philosophy of science, sciences and branches of science. This R-Synthesis includes evaluation of eight categories of general/specific perspective, 21-dimensions, and 12 general subjects (with related scope and contents) for the past 12,000 years. It is a kind of synthesis of science and non-science, physical science and non-physical science, religious science and non-religious science, and others. In this article, author defined 27 possible definitive/certain result cases for this new synthesis. Author defined the possible formation stages shortly to express new disciplines, new constructional and/or complementary theories. These theories are considered to define 21 major effective disciplines. New philosophy perspective is defined (R-Philosophy) shortly. New perspective and sub branches are defined for the philosophy of science. Major sciences are defined due to new basic philosophies. 42-basic components are defined for each science branch. New and/or re-constructed sciences, branches of science, basic sciences, and new hierarchy of science are defined with figure. Electromagnetic sciences, information sciences, and system sciences are defined specifically. Hybrid Sciences, New Era Science, and Ideal Scientific System are defined with general/specific figure. Relation between the some old branches and new branches of science was expressed generally due to new perspective of philosophy of science. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of trustworthiness typically define trustworthiness as an agent being reliable in virtue of a specific motivation such as goodwill. The underlying thought motivating this view is that to be trustworthy is to be more than merely reliable. If motivational accounts are correct, this is a problem for non-motivational accounts of trustworthiness, as motivations are not required for trustworthiness. In this paper, I defend the non-motivational approach to trustworthiness and show that the motivational approach is inadequate. I do this (...) by making a novel distinction between trusting-to and trusting-as relations. A trusting-to relation is a relation in which a trustor ‘X’ trusts the trustee ‘Y’ to do something. Trusting-as relations are an overlooked relation implicit in all trusting-to relations. They describe the social relationship that holds between X and Y. I will argue that trusting-as relations determine whether any specific motivations are required for trustworthiness trusting-to relations. Thus, I show that acknowledging trusting-as relations enables us to provide a satisfactory explanation of the motivation intuition without making specific motivations constitutive features of trust. -/- . (shrink)

In his book Slaves of the Passions, Mark Schroeder defends a Humean theory of reasons. Humeanism is the view that you have a reason to X only if X‐ing promotes at least one of your desires. But Schroeder rejects a natural companion theory of the weight of reasons, which he calls proportionalism. According to it, the weight of a reason is proportionate to the strength of the desire that grounds it and the extent to which the act promotes the object (...) of that desire. In this paper, I aim to do three things: (1) to show why Schroeder's arguments against proportionalism do not refute it; (2) to identify the real trouble with proportionalism; and (3) to suggest a better way of understanding it (preferentialism). According to this theory, the overall strength of reasons is determined by the agent's preferences. (shrink)

I defend the thesis that Kantian analytic judgments are about objects (as opposed to concepts) against two challenges raised by recent scholars. First, can it accommodate cases like “A two-sided polygon is two-sided”, where no object really falls under the subject-concept as Kant sees it? Second, is it compatible with Kant’s view that analytic judgments make no claims about objects in the world and that we can know them to be true without going beyond the given concepts? I address these (...) challenges in two steps. First, given Kant’s distinction between an object in general = x from an object of sensible intuition, I argue that analytic judgments are about objects in the former sense, no matter whether the purported objects can be given in our intuition. Second, using Kant’s method of representing certain logical relations of concepts with such figures as circles, I construct a model to show that analytic truths are truths about objects in general = x and yet can be determined solely by the intensional relation between the given concepts plus certain Kantian-logical laws. Analytic truths are thus shown as formal in the Kantian sense that they do not presuppose the purported objects as givable in our intuition. This account of the formality of analytic truths captures Kant’s diagnosis of the Leibnizian illusion that we can make material claims about the world by analytically true judgments. (shrink)

PLEASE NOTE: This is the corrected 2nd eBook edition, 2021. ●●●●● _Critique of Impure Reason_ has now also been published in a printed edition. To reduce the otherwise high price of this scholarly, technical book of nearly 900 pages and make it more widely available beyond university libraries to individual readers, the non-profit publisher and the author have agreed to issue the printed edition at cost. ●●●●● The printed edition was released on September 1, 2021 and is now available through (...) all booksellers, including Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and brick-and-mortar bookstores under ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6. ●●●●● In light of the length of this book, readers who would like to have a more detailed description of the book's objectives and method may find it helpful to read the detailed and clearly written Wikipedia entry about this work: From the Wikipedia search page, use the search phrase "Critique of Impure Reason". At least at the time of this writing (11/29/2021), the Wikipedia entry is well-researched and accurate. ●●●●● In addition, a "Primer on Bartlett's CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON" has been made available by the author. It is available under its title through PhilPapers and other philosophy online archives. ●●●●● COMMENDATIONS OF THIS WORK, from the back cover of the published edition: ●●●●● “I admire its range of philosophical vision.” – Nicholas Rescher, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, author of more than 100 books. ●●●●● “Bartlett’s _Critique of Impure Reason_ is an impressive, bold, and ambitious work. Careful scholarship is balanced by original analyses that lead the reader to recognize the limits of meaning, knowledge, and conceptual possibility. The work addresses a host of traditional philosophical problems, among them the nature of space, time, causality, consciousness, the self, other minds, ontology, free will and determinism, and others. The book culminates in a fascinating and profound new understanding of relativity physics and quantum theory.” – Gerhard Preyer, Professor of Philosophy, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, author of many books including _Concepts of Meaning_, _Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics_, _Intention and Practical Thought_, and _Contextualism in Philosophy_. ●●●●● “[This work’s] goal is of a unique and difficult species: Dr. Bartlett seeks to develop a formal logical calculus on the basis of transcendental philosophical arguments; in fact, he hopes that this calculus will be the formal expression of the transcendental foundation of knowledge.... I consider Dr. Bartlett’s work soundly conceived and executed with great skill.” – C. F. von Weizsäcker, philosopher and physicist, former Director, Max-Planck-Institute, Starnberg, Germany. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written an American “Prolegomena to All Future Metaphysics.” He aims rigorously to eliminate meaningless assertions, reach bedrock, and place philosophy on a firm foundation that will enable it, like science and mathematics, to produce lasting results that generations to come can build on. This is a great book, the fruit of a lifetime of research and reflection, and it deserves serious attention.” — Martin X. Moleski, former Professor, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY, studies of scientific method, the presuppositions of thought, and the self-referential nature of epistemology. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written a book on what might be called the underpinnings of philosophy. It has fascinating depth and breadth, and is all the more striking due to its unifying perspective based on the concepts of reference and self-reference.” – Don Perlis, Professor of Computer Science, University of Maryland, author of numerous publications on self-adjusting autonomous systems and philosophical issues concerning self-reference, mind, and consciousness. ●●●●● ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning_ comprises a major and important contribution to philosophy. Thanks to the generosity of its publisher, this massive 885-page volume has been published as a free open access eBook (3.75MB) as well as an open access printed edition. It inaugurates a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophical thought by providing compelling and long-sought-for solutions to a wide range of philosophical problems. In the process, the work fundamentally transforms the way in which the concepts of reference, meaning, and possibility are understood. The book includes a Foreword by the celebrated German philosopher and physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. ●●●●● In Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ we find an analysis of the preconditions of experience and of knowledge. In contrast, but yet in parallel, the new _Critique_ focuses upon the ways—unfortunately very widespread and often unselfconsciously habitual—in which many of the concepts that we employ _conflict_ with the very preconditions of meaning and of knowledge. ●●●●● This is a book about the boundaries of frameworks and about the unrecognized conceptual confusions in which we become entangled when we attempt to transgress beyond the limits of the possible and meaningful. We tend either not to recognize or not to accept that we all-too-often attempt to trespass beyond the boundaries of the frameworks that make knowledge possible and the world meaningful. ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason_ proposes a bold, ground-breaking, and startling thesis: that a great many of the major philosophical problems of the past can be solved through the recognition of a viciously deceptive form of thinking to which philosophers as well as non-philosophers commonly fall victim. For the first time, the book advances and justifies the criticism that a substantial number of the questions that have occupied philosophers fall into the category of “impure reason,” violating the very conditions of their possible meaningfulness. ●●●●● The purpose of the study is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. As a consequence, the boundaries of _possible meaning_ are determined. ●●●●● Bartlett, the author or editor of more than 20 books, is responsible for identifying this widespread and delusion-inducing variety of error, _metalogical projection_. It is a previously unrecognized and insidious form of erroneous thinking that undermines its own possibility of meaning. It comes about as a result of the pervasive human compulsion to seek to transcend the limits of possible reference and meaning. ●●●●● Based on original research and rigorous analysis combined with extensive scholarship, the _Critique of Impure Reason_ develops a self-validating method that makes it possible to recognize, correct, and eliminate this major and pervasive form of fallacious thinking. In so doing, the book provides at last provable and constructive solutions to a wide range of major philosophical problems. ●●●●● CONTENTS AT A GLANCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Preface ▪▪▪▪▪ Foreword by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker ▪▪▪▪▪ Acknowledgments ▪▪▪▪▪ Avant-propos: A philosopher’s rallying call ▪▪▪▪▪ Introduction ▪▪▪▪▪ A note to the reader ▪▪▪▪▪ A note on conventions ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART I ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ WHY PHILOSOPHY HAS MADE NO PROGRESS AND HOW IT CAN ▪▪▪▪▪ 1 Philosophical-psychological prelude ▪▪▪▪▪ 2 Putting belief in its place: Its psychology and a needed polemic ▪▪▪▪▪ 3 Turning away from the linguistic turn: From theory of reference to metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 4 The stepladder to maximum theoretical generality ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART II ▪▪▪▪▪ THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ A New Approach to Deductive, Transcendental Philosophy ▪▪▪▪▪ 5 Reference, identity, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 6 Self-referential argument and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 7 Possibility theory ▪▪▪▪▪ 8 Presupposition logic, reference, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 9 Transcendental argumentation and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 10 Framework relativity ▪▪▪▪▪ 11 The metalogic of meaning ▪▪▪▪▪ 12 The problem of putative meaning and the logic of meaninglessness ▪▪▪▪▪ 13 Projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 14 Horizons ▪▪▪▪▪ 15 De-projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 16 Self-validation ▪▪▪▪▪ 17 Rationality: Rules of admissibility ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART III ▪▪▪▪▪ PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Major Problems and Questions of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Science ▪▪▪▪▪ 18 Ontology and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 19 Discovery or invention in general problem-solving, mathematics, and physics ▪▪▪▪▪ 20 The conceptually unreachable: “The far side” ▪▪▪▪▪ 21 The projections of the external world, things-in-themselves, other minds, realism, and idealism ▪▪▪▪▪ 22 The projections of time, space, and space-time ▪▪▪▪▪ 23 The projections of causality, determinism, and free will ▪▪▪▪▪ 24 Projections of the self and of solipsism ▪▪▪▪▪ 25 Non-relational, agentless reference and referential fields ▪▪▪▪▪ 26 Relativity physics as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 27 Quantum theory as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 28 Epistemological lessons learned from and applicable to relativity physics and quantum theory ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART IV ▪▪▪▪▪ HORIZONS ▪▪▪▪▪ 29 Beyond belief ▪▪▪▪▪ 30 _Critique of Impure Reason_: Its results in retrospect ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ SUPPLEMENT ▪▪▪▪▪ The Formal Structure of the Metalogic of Reference ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX I ▪▪▪▪▪ The Concept of Horizon in the Work of Other Philosophers ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX II ▪▪▪▪▪ Epistemological Intelligence ▪▪▪▪▪ References ▪▪▪▪▪ Index ▪▪▪▪▪ About the author. 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The aim of this paper is to evaluate the level of gender bias in Aristotle’s Generation of Animals while exercising due care in the analysis of its arguments. I argue that while the GA theory is clearly sexist, the traditional interpretation fails to diagnose the problem correctly. The traditional interpretation focuses on three main sources of evidence: (1) Aristotle’s claim that the female is, as it were, a “disabled” (πεπηρωμένον) male; (2) the claim at GA IV.3, 767b6-8 that females are (...) a departure from the kind; and (3) Aristotle’s supposed claim at GA IV.3, 768a21-8 that the most ideal outcome of reproduction is a male offspring that perfectly resembles its father. I argue that each of these passages has either been misunderstood or misrepresented by commentators. In none of these places is Aristotle suggesting that females are imperfect members of the species or that they result from the failure to achieve some teleological goal. I defend the view that the GA does not see reproduction as occurring for the sake of producing males; rather, what sex an embryo happens to become is determined entirely by non-teleological forces operating through material necessity. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s view in GA II.5 that females have the same soul as the male (741a7) as well as the argument in Metaphysics X.9 that sexual difference is not part of the species form but is an affection (πάθος) arising from the matter (1058b21-4). While the traditional interpretation has tended to exaggerate the level of sexism in Aristotle’s
developmental biology, the GA is by no means free of gender bias as some recent scholarship has claimed. In the final section of the paper I point to one passage where Aristotle clearly falls back on sexist assumptions in order to answer the difficult question, “Why are animals divided into sexes?”. I argue that this passage in particular poses a serious challenge
to anyone attempting to absolve Aristotle’s developmental biology of the charge of sexism. (shrink)

The project of “public reason” claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of “public reason,” in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to (...) pick out from the multitude of particularized accounts of what constitutes “civic order,” no “public reason” so derived could adequately capture - and thus be able to secure in a practical sense - any single determinate civic order, much less one that would be consistent with all citizens' conceptions of public order. Part I of this Article raises a number of issues for consideration relating to the epistemology of law and focuses especially on the concept of public reason and its critique. Part II addresses alternative approaches to legal reasoning suggested by classical accounts of practical reasoning and virtue theory and considers the operation of such legal analysis outside the area of substantive due process; Part III analyzes post-Lawrence case law confirming the dilemma created by the Supreme Court's ambiguous approaches to substantive due process and concludes that only one interpretation - that articulated fully in Washington v. Glucksberg and given lip service in Lawrence v. Texas - provides a method for resolving novel substantive due process challenges that is philosophically sound as well as historically coherent. Rather than perpetuating a fiction that denies the propriety of lawmaking unless based on principles that all citizens can rationally agree upon, an appropriate model of substantive due process analysis recognizes that law must inevitably be based upon principles that cannot be agreed upon by all citizens in virtue of rationality alone. -/- Abstract Footnotes (291) Beta -/- Revise My Submission -/- -/- One-Click Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase -/- Facebook | Twitter | Digg | Del.icio.us | CiteULike | Permalink Using the URL or DOI link below will ensure access to this page indefinitely -/- Based on your IP address, your paper is being delivered by: New York, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] Illinois, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] Brussels, Belgium Processing request. [Processing request.] Seoul, Korea Processing request. [Processing request.] California, USA Processing request. [Processing request.] -/- If you have any problems downloading this paper, please click on another Download Location above, or view our FAQ File name: SSRN-id1004757. ; Size: 424K -/- Sample Cover You will receive a black and white printed and perfect bound version of this document in 8 1/2 x 11 inch format, with glossy color front and back covers. Currently shipping to the US addresses only. Your order will be shipped within three business days. Quantity: Total Price = $0.50 plus shipping (U.S. Only) -/- If you have any problems with this purchase, please email [email protected] or call 1-585-442-8170. Reason's Freedom and the Dialectic of Ordered Liberty -/- Edward C. Lyons University of Notre Dame Law School -/- Cleveland State Law Review, Vol. 55, p. 157, 2007 -/- Abstract: The project of "public reason" claims to offer an epistemological resolution to the civic dilemma created by the clash of incompatible options for the rational exercise of freedom adopted by citizens in a diverse community. The present Article proposes, via consideration of a contrast between two classical accounts of dialectical reasoning, that the employment of "public reason," in substantive due process analysis, is unworkable in theory and contrary to more reflective Supreme Court precedent. Although logical commonalities might be available to pick out from the multitude of particularized accounts of what constitutes "civic order," no "public reason" so derived could adequately capture - and thus be able to secure in a practical sense - any single determinate civic order, much less one that would be consistent with all citizens' conceptions of public order. -/- Part I of this Article raises a number of issues for consideration relating to the epistemology of law and focuses especially on the concept of public reason and its critique. Part II addresses alternative approaches to legal reasoning suggested by classical accounts of practical reasoning and virtue theory and considers the operation of such legal analysis outside the area of substantive due process; Part III analyzes post-Lawrence case law confirming the dilemma created by the Supreme Court's ambiguous approaches to substantive due process and concludes that only one interpretation - that articulated fully in Washington v. Glucksberg and given lip service in Lawrence v. Texas - provides a method for resolving novel substantive due process challenges that is philosophically sound as well as historically coherent. -/- Rather than perpetuating a fiction that denies the propriety of lawmaking unless based on principles that all citizens can rationally agree upon, an appropriate model of substantive due process analysis recognizes that law must inevitably be based upon principles that cannot be agreed upon by all citizens in virtue of rationality alone. -/- Keywords: substantive due process, practical reason, public reason, Rawls, Casey, Lawrence, Glucksberg, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, dialectic, autonomy, freedom -/- . (shrink)

For Jizang (549−623), a prominent philosophical exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. Given anything X, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to X in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. This philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his notion of the Way (dao), which seems to indicate a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition as a conscious (...) state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever. The issue then becomes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skilful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? How is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? In this book chapter, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position. (shrink)

Sheep production is the most representative livestock activities in Brazil and in the world. However, the reproductive performance of these animals is determined by factors genetic, physical environment, management and, especially, nutritional. Thirty half-breed lambs from Dorper × Santa Inês were used, with initial weight and age of 31.87 ± 0.5 kg and 157 days, respectively. These animals were prepared on a diet with three food levels (ad libitum, 30% and 70%). Morphometric measurements were measured at intervals of 16 to (...) 20 days in 56 experimental days. The measurements performed were scrotal circumference (CE), chest circumference (CT), body condition score (ECC), withers height (AC) and scrotal bag thickness (EBE), body weight (CP) and semen collection. Interaction occurrence for biometric measurements between food levels and age (p <0.05). The TC and ECC values were higher in animals fed ad libitum (p <0.001). EBE had higher values in animals ad libitum and at 211 days of age (p <0.001). The CP was increasing for the animals ad libitum and (p <0.05) throughout the experiment, while the T30 was only in the initial period. T70 animals did not grow during the whole experiment. CE was influenced by diet (p <0.001) and age (p <0.001) independently. So that animals under food restriction had less development and was higher in older animals. The AC values were influenced only by age (p <0.001), demonstrating the effect of age growth. We conclude that it is not advantageous to submit lambs, it corrects food reproduction. Although it was not possible to assess whether initial malnutrition would bring future problems for the animal's seminal quality, it proved to be immensely negative for the onset of puberty and the development of reproductive structures. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS AKUMBUGU, F. E., et al. Correlation between Body and Testicular Biometric Characteristics of West African Dwarf Rams. Multidisciplinary Advances in Veterinary Science. 2.4, 2018 ALLAOUI, A. et al. Factors affecting scrotal measurements and weight of Ouled Djellal rams in Eastern and South-eastern Algeria. APCBEE procedia, v. 8, p. 260-265, 2014. ALVES, J. M. et al. Estação de nascimento e puberdade em cordeiros Santa Inês. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 35, n. 3, p. 958-966, 2006. ALVES, K. S. et al. Níveis de energia em dietas para ovinos Santa Inês: características de carcaça e constituintes corporais. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 32, n. 6, p. 1927-1936, 2003. BIELLI, A. et al. Low maternal nutrition during pregnancy reduces the number of Sertoli cells in the newborn lamb. Reproduction, Fertility and Development, v. 14, n. 6, p. 333-337, 2002. BROWN, D. C.; STIRLING, H. F.; KELNAR, C. J. H. Precocious puberty. Paediatrics and Child Health, v. 4, n. 3, p. 184-188, 1994. BUDAI, C. Performance and adaptability of the Dorper sheep breed under Hungarian and Romanian rearing conditions. Scientific Papers Animal Science and Biotechnologies, v. 46, n. 1, p. 344-349, 2013. CARNEIRO, P. L. S. et al. Desenvolvimento ponderal e diversidade fenotípica entre cruzamentos de ovinos Dorper com raças locais. Pesquisa Agropecuária Brasileira, v. 42, n. 7, p. 991-998, 2007. CARRIJO JUNIOR, O. A. et al. Morphological evaluation of the testicles of young santa Inês rams submitted to different regimes of protein supplementation and drenching. Ciência animal brasileira, Goiânia, v. 9, n. 2, p. 433-441, abr./jun. 2008. CASTRO, F.A.B. de et al. Desempenho de cordeiros Santa Inês do nascimento ao desmame filhos de ovelhas alimentadas com diferentes níveis de energia. Semina: Ciências Agrárias, v. 33, n. 6 supl 2, p. 3379-3388, 2012 CEZAR, M. F. et al. Avaliação de parâmetros fisiológicos de ovinos Dorper, Santa Inês e seus mestiços perante condições climáticas do trópico semi-árido nordestino. Ciência e Agrotecnologia, v. 28, n. 3, p. 614-620, 2004. CHACÓN, L. et al. Características de la pubertad en corderos de pelo y sus cruces en Colombia en condiciones de baja altitud. Revista MVZ Cordoba, v. 24, n. 1, p. 7099-7103, 2019. CHEMINEAU, P. et al. Training manual on artificial insemination in sheep and goats. Rome: FAO; 1991. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Comportamento Sexual dos Animais Domésticos. 2020. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Fisiologia do ciclo estral dos animais domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. Da Silva EIC. Formulação de ração para ovinos. 1ª ed. Belo Jardim, PE: IPA, 2021. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Puberdade e Estacionalidade Reprodutiva dos Animais. 2020. FAO. Animal Production and Health Paper, v. 83. ELMAZ, Ö. et al. Prediction of postpubertal reproductive potential according to prepubertal body weight, testicular size, and testosterone concentration using multiple regression analysis in Kıvırcık ram lambs. Turkish journal of veterinary and animal sciences, v. 32, n. 5, p. 335-343, 2008. JUCÁ, A. F. et al. Performance of the Santa Ines breed raised on pasture in semiarid tropical regions and factors that explain trait variation. Tropical animal health and production, v. 46, n. 7, p. 1249-1256, 2014. FOURIE, P. J. et al. Scrotal, testicular and semen characteristics of young Dorper rams managed under intensive and extensive conditions. Small Ruminant Research, v. 54, n. 1-2, p. 53-59, 2004. GUNN, R. G.; SIM, D. A.; HUNTER, E. A. Effects of nutrition in utero and in early life on the subsequent lifetime reproductive performance of Scottish Blackface ewes in two management systems. Animal Science, v. 60, n. 2, p. 223-230, 1995. HÖTZEL, M. J. et al. Morphometric and endocrine analyses of the effects of nutrition on the testis of mature Merino rams. Reproduction, v. 113, n. 2, p. 217-230, 1998. Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). Produção Pecuária municipal. Rio de Janeiro, v. 46, p.1-8, 2018. KENYON, P. R.; MALONEY, S. K.; BLACHE, D. Review of sheep body condition score in relation to production characteristics. New Zealand Journal of Agricultural Research, v. 57, n. 1, p. 38-64, 2014. KHERADMAND, A.; BABAEI, H.; ALI BATAVANI, R. Effect of improved diet on semen quality and scrotal circumference in the ram. Veterinarski arhiv, v. 76, n. 4, p. 333-341, 2006. KORKMAZ, M. K.; EMSEN, E. Growth and reproductive traits of purebred and crossbred Romanov lambs in Eastern Anatolia. Anim. Reprod., v. 13, n. 1, p. 3-6, 2016. KRIDLI, R. T. et al. Age at puberty and some biological parameters of Awassi and its first crosses with Charollais and Romanov rams. Italian journal of animal science, v. 5, n. 2, p. 193-202, 2006. LOUW, D. F. J.; JOUBERT, D. M. Puberty in the male Dorper sheep and Boer goat. S. Afr. J. Agric. Sci, v. 7, p. 509-520, 1964. MAIA, A. S. C.; SILVA, R. G.; ANDRADE, P. C. Efeitos da temperatura e da movimentação do ar sobre o isolamento térmico do velo de ovinos em câmara climática. Revista Brasileira de Zootecnia, v. 38, n. 1, p. 104-108, 2009. MARTINS, R. D. et al. Avaliação da sazonalidade reprodutiva de carneiros Santa Inês criados no Distrito Federal. R. Bras. Zootec., Viçosa, v. 32, n. 6, supl. 1, p. 1594-1603, Dec. 2003. MENDES, A. M. P. et al. Zoneamento bioclimático para a raça ovina Dorper no Estado de Pernambuco. Pesquisa Agropecuária Brasileira, v. 49, n. 12, p. 986-993, 2014. MOULLA, F. et al. Characterization of the onset of puberty in Tazegzawt lambs, an endangered Algerian sheep: Body weight, thoracic perimeter, testicular growth, and seminal parameters. Veterinary world, v. 11, n. 7, p. 889, 2018. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC). Nutrient Requirements of Small Ruminants: Sheep, Goats, Cervids, and New World Camelids. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2007. NOTTER, D. R.; LUCAS, J. R.; MCCLAUGHERTY, F. S. Accuracy of estimation of testis weight from in situ testis measures in ram lambs. Theriogenology, v. 15, n. 2, p. 227-234, 1981. SEJIAN, V. et al. Effect of body condition score on the allometric measurements and reproductive performance of Garole X Malpura ewes under hot semi-arid environment. Journal of Dairy, Veterinary & Animal Research, v. 2, n. 6, p. 1-4, 2015. PACHECO, A.; MADELLA-OLIVEIRA, A. F.; QUIRINO, C. R. Biometria e formas dos testículos em cordeiros da raça Santa Inês explorados em regime de manejo intensivo. Revista Brasileira de Ciências Agrárias, v. 5, n. 1, p. 123-128, 2010. REGO NETO, A. A. et al. Population genetic structure of Santa Inês sheep in Brazil. Tropical animal health and production, v. 50, n. 3, p. 503-508, 2018. RHIND, S. M. Effects of maternal nutrition on fetal and neonatal reproductive development and function. Animal Reproduction Science, v. 82, p. 169-181, 2004. RIBEIRO, E. L. A.; GONZÁLEZ-GARCÍA, E. Indigenous sheep breeds in Brazil: potential role for contributing to the sustainability of production systems. Tropical animal health and production, v. 48, n. 7, p. 1305-1313, 2016. RIBEIRO, M. S. et al. Repeatability and effect of age on reproductive characteristics in Santa Ines rams. Archivos de zootecnia, v. 67, n. 257, p. 143-147, 2018. RUSSEL, A. J. F.; DONEY, J. M.; GUNN, R. G. Subjective assessment of body fat in live sheep. The Journal of Agricultural Science, v. 72, n. 3, p. 451-454, 1969. SILVA, N. V. et al. Medidas in vivo e da carcaça e constituintes não carcaça de ovinos alimentados com diferentes níveis do subproduto agroindustrial da goiaba. Revista Brasileira de Saúde e Produção Animal, v. 17, n. 1, p. 101-115, 2016. SILVA, P. et al. Influence of placentally mediated fetal growth restriction on the onset of puberty in male and female lambs. Reproduction, v. 122, n. 3, p. 375-383, 2001. SIQUEIRA FILHO, E. R. Influência dos níveis protéicos fornecidos na dieta sobre o sistema reprodutivo de carneiros. 2007. 75 f. Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual Paulista, Faculdade de Medicina Veterinária e Zootecnia de Botucatu, 2007. SOUZA, J. S da et al. Biometric measurements of Santa Inês meat sheep reared on Brachiaria brizantha pastures in Northeast Brazil. Plos one, v. 14, n. 7, p. e0219343, 2019. (shrink)

Objective: to evaluate CANLPH score and systemic immune inflammation index (SII) in patients with symptomatic rheumatic mitral stenosis (MS) undergoing percutaneous mitral balloon valvuloplasty (PMBV). -/- Methods: 62 patients who underwent PMBV in our clinic between 2018 and 2021 were included retrospectively. The patients were divided into 2 groups according to echo score. The CANLPH score was calculated from the cut-off values of C-reactive protein to albumin ratio (CAR), neutrophil to lymphocyte ratio (NLR) and platelet to hemoglobin ratio (PHR), determined (...) with the Youden index and SII by the formula platelet x neutrophil/lymphocyte. P <0.05 was considered statistically significant. -/- Results: The mean age of the patients was 44.5±10.4 years (40 female, 64.5%). The mean values of SII and CANLPH scores were higher in the Echo score >8 group (p <0.001, both). The mean mitral gradient before and after PMBV was 12.6±5.7mm Hg and 5.0±2.4 mm Hg, and the mean valve area was 1.12±0.27 cm2 and 1.85±0.29 cm2. A statistically significant and negative correlation was observed between the gradient decrease after the procedure and the CANLPH score and SII (r=-0.426, p=0.001 and r=-0.418, p=0.001, respectively). In receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve analysis, it was concluded that the ability of CANPLH score to predict the higher Echo scores was noninferior to SII with an area under curve (AUC:0.820 (0.701-0.906) and AUC:0.786 (0.664-0.880), z statistics 0.576 and p=0.564. -/- Conclusion: SII and CANLPH scores are correlated with Echo score. A significant negative relationship was found with both biomarkers and gradient decrease after the PMBV. (shrink)

According to Kant, if an agent acts according to his/her conscience, then s/he has done all that s/he ought as far as morality is concerned. But Kant thinks that agents can be mistaken in their subjective determinations of their duties. That is, Kant thinks it is possible for an agent to believe that some action X is right even though it is an objective truth that X is not right; according to Kant, agents do not have infallible knowledge of right (...) and wrong. In this paper, I explore this doctrine in order to determine whether it is defensible. In particular, I confront the blameworthiness of acting contrary to fallible knowledge and the blamelessness of acting according to fallible judgment. (shrink)

Formulação de Ração para Caprinos -/- APRESENTAÇÃO -/- O material Formulação de Ração para Caprinos, assim como a edição para ovinos, visa servir de alicerce para demonstrar as exigências nutricionais atualizadas dos caprinos, além das equações que servem para determinar a exigência do animal em uma determinada situação. Além disso, demonstra a avaliação bromatológica dos principais alimentos utilizados para a alimentação do rebanho no Brasil, esses valores da composição nutricional servem de base, assim como as exigências para as técnicas matemáticas (...) empregadas na formulação manual de dietas. A abordagem desse material é a apresentação das exigências nutricionais dos caprinos mediante as bases científicas como o NRC (2007); e, através de equações de predileções, apresentar as exigências nutricionais sob as condições brasileiras, principalmente sob condições em que deverão ser incrementados uma dada porcentagem das exigências, por exemplo para os caprinos em atividade intensa e/ou moderada no semiárido nordestino. Posteriormente, apresentar exemplos práticos de formulação de dietas mediante as técnicas matemáticas empregadas para tal. Será abordada situações reais onde um profissional pode se deparar no cotidiano de propriedades caprinocultoras. O texto também é dividido em três capítulos com as exigências nutricionais, composição dos principais alimentos e a formulação prática de dietas que visem suprir as necessidades dos animais de forma clara e objetiva, com a finalidade de servir de ferramenta para que os produtores rurais, técnicos, zootecnistas, nutricionistas etc. possam conseguir elaborar dietas para fornecer uma ração de boa qualidade física e nutricional. -/- SUMÁRIO -/- EXIGÊNCIAS NUTRICIONAIS DOS CAPRINOS 1 Equações de predição do consumo de matéria seca (CMS) 2 Algumas exigências para caprinos 4 Tabelas de requerimentos nutricionais dos caprinos 6 Concentrações de nutrientes necessárias em rações de caprinos (% da MS) 12 Energia metabolizável para caprinos 15 Relação volumoso:concentrado (v:c) para caprinos 17 ALIMENTOS PARA CAPRINOS 19 FORMULAÇÃO DE RAÇÃO PARA CAPRINOS 34 RAÇÕES PRONTAS PARA CAPRINOS 78 CONCLUSÕES 86 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS 87 -/- -/- EXIGÊNCIAS NUTRICIONAIS DOS CAPRINOS -/- Para formular dieta para os caprinos, devemos seguir os mesmos passos tal qual para as demais espécies de interesse zootécnico. Os passos a serem seguidos para a elaboração de rações são: Após a caracterização do rebanho a ser alimentado, devemos buscar as equações de predileção para estimar as exigências nutricionais do lote servindo de alicerce para que a ração final obtenha as mesmas quantidades de nutrientes tal qual os animais requerem, por exemplo, um caprino reprodutor da raça Boer de 50 kg de PV sob condições de trabalho moderado, onde devemos incluir 50% da exigência da mantença, exige cerca de 795 g de NDT/ kg de MS ingerida, então após estabelecer os alimentos disponíveis e a composição bromatológica dos mesmos, o resultado final do balanceamento deverá ser igual a exigência de NDT do animal, podendo haver pouco excesso ou pouco défice. Como citado em outros trabalhos, as exigências dos animais variam em função do peso, idade, estado fisiológico etc. e que, para a elaboração de dietas, os nutrientes mais comumente trabalhados são a proteína bruta (PB), as necessidades energéticas podendo-se utilizar os nutrientes digestíveis totais (NDT), energia metabolizável (EM), energia digestível (ED) ou energia líquida (EL), as necessidades minerais dando ênfase aos de maior importância que são cálcio e fósforo e, raramente, as necessidades vitamínicas. Existem diferentes fontes teóricas e científicas que dispõem de tabelas de requerimentos nutricionais da espécie caprina de acordo com diferentes fatores, sendo eles os de peso vivo; ganho ou perda de peso; estado produtivo ou improdutivo de carne ou leite; animal em início, meio ou fim da gestação com um ou dois fetos; fêmeas paridas em lactação com uma ou duas crias ao pé etc. Também, segundo o NRC para caprinos (1981) e o para pequenos ruminantes (2007), os fatores de atividade leve, moderada ou intensa são levados em consideração. Apresentarei aqui algumas equações para predizer as exigências líquidas e as principais tabelas de requerimentos nutricionais dos caprinos expressas com base na necessidade do animal ou em percentual da ração, que servirão de base teórica para a formulação prática de rações para animais em diferentes situações. Equações de predição do consumo de matéria seca (CMS) É comum, na literatura acerca da criação e, principalmente, sobre a nutrição de caprinos observar que os especialistas trabalham com porcentagens de fornecimento de ingestão ou consumo de matéria seca (IMS ou CMS) para os animais de acordo com três fatores, um leva em consideração a origem do animal, outro o estado fisiológico e outro a categoria do animal. Para aclarar melhor vejamos a tabela 1 sobre as porcentagens de matéria seca em função do peso vivo para os caprinos. Tabela 1: Porcentagens ideais de consumo de matéria seca de acordo com o peso vivo de caprinos em diferentes etapas e origens Tipo de animal CMS em % do PV Cabras de origem temperada 5 a 6 Cabras de origem tropical 4 a 5 Mantença 3 Cabras gestantes 2,2 a 2,8 Cabras em lactação 3 a 5 Cabritos em crescimento 2,5 a 3 Fonte: Adaptações de BORGES & GONÇALVES, 2011 e SILVA & VALLE, 2018. No entanto, existem diferentes fórmulas para estimas as exigências de consumo de matéria seca dos caprinos, uma, apesar de não completa, é estabelecida pelo INRA, outras apresentadas pelo AFRC estimam para caprinos em mantença e lactação. Outras formas simplificadas indicam um consumo em porcentagem de acordo com o estado fisiológico ou origem. A equação de ingestão de matéria seca (IMS) determinada pelo INRA (1988) leva em consideração a produção de leite (se houver), o ganho diário de peso (se houver) e a porcentagem de volumoso fornecida ao caprino. IMS (g/dia) = (423,2 x kg leite/dia) + 27,8 x kg0,75 + (440 x kg de GPD) + (6,75 x %de volumoso) -/- Para um exemplo prático utilizando a fórmula proposta, suponhamos um caprino macho adulto (descartar a produção de leite = 0) com 50 kg PV, com ganho de peso diário de 100 g e recebendo uma dieta baseada em 80% de volumoso de boa qualidade, a IMS será: IMS (g/dia) = 27,8 x 50 kg0,75 + (440 x 0,1) + (6,75 x 80) = 1974 g MS/dia = 3,5% PV Outro exemplo prático utilizando a fórmula proposta pelo INRA, suponhamos uma cabra da raça Saanen com 60 kg de PV e produzindo 5 litros de leite/dia com 3,5% de gordura, com ganho de peso diário de 30 g e recebendo apenas concentrado, logo descartamos a parte volumosa então, a IMS será: IMS (g/dia) = (423,2 x 5) + (27,8 x 60 kg0,75) + (440 x 0,03) = 2730 g MS/dia = 4,54% PV Agora, a mesma cabra recebe suplementação volumosa à base de 40%, então: IMS (g/dia) = (423,2 x 5) + (27,8 x 60 kg0,75) + (440 x 0,03) + (6,75 x 40) = 3000 g MS/dia = 5% PV Outra forma de estimar a ingestão de matéria seca em gramas por dia é a proposta pelo AFRC (1993) que leva em consideração dois fatores, o peso vivo e a produção leiteira (com 3,5% de gordura), se houver, para cabras leiteiras prenhes e em lactação: CMS (kg/animal/dia) = 0,062 x PV0,75 + 0,305 x PL -/- Para utilizar essa fórmula, suponhamos uma cabra da raça Saanen, de 50 kg de PV, produzindo 5 kg de leite com 3,5% de gordura. Qual deverá ser seu consumo em matéria seca? CMS = 0,062 x 500,75 + 0,305 x 5 = 2,69 kg de MS/dia ou 5,38% do PV em MS Para caprinos adultos em mantença, o AFRC sugere a fórmula: CMS (kg/animal/dia) = 0,522 + 0,0135 x PV -/- Utilizando essa fórmula, qual deverá ser o CMS de um caprino da raça Alpina em mantença, que possui peso vivo de 45 kg? CMS = 0,522 + 0,0135 x 45 = 1,13 kg de MS/dia ou 2,5% do PV em MS Algumas exigências para caprinos Energia metabolizável (EM): 101,38 kcal/kg de PV0,75 para mantença, ou 2,0 a 2,4 Mcal/kg de MS 7,25 kcal/g de ganho de peso para animais em crescimento 1,25 Mcal/kg de leite com 4% de gordura para cabras em lactação Proteína bruta (PB): 32 g PB/Mcal de Energia digestível (ED) (EM = ED x 0,82) 4,15 g de PB/kg de PV0,75 para animais em mantença 0,284 g de PB/g de ganho para animais em crescimento 7,76 g de PB/kg de PV0,75 para cabras gestantes 96,9 g PB/kg de leite com 4% de gordura para cabras em lactação Minerais: Os principais minerais usados na formulação de ração para ruminantes são Ca e P, logo a estimativa de suas exigências são imprescindíveis, uma vez que a mistura elaborada pode apresentar deficiência de um ou ambos os minerais. O NRC (2007) propõe as seguintes equações para o cálculo dos requerimentos de Ca e P, em diferentes categorias: 1. Mantença: Cálcio (g) = ((0,623 x CMS) + 0,228)/0,45 Fósforo (g) = (0,081 + (0,88 x CMS))/0,65 Onde: CMS = consumo de matéria seca em kg/dia. 2. Crescimento: Cálcio (g) = (11 x GPD)/0,45 Fósforo (g) = (6,50 x GPD)/0,65 Onde: GPD = ganho de peso diário em kg. 3. Produção de leite: Cálcio (g) = (1,40 x L)/0,45 Fósforo (g) = (1,00 x L)/0,65 Onde: L = produção de leite em kg. É importante ressaltar que os requerimentos para cabras em lactação devem ser somados com os de mantença; dessa forma, como exemplo prático, uma cabra com 50 kg de PV que produz 3 kg de leite/dia requer cerca de 11,5 g de Ca (9,3 g de mantença + 2,2 g de produção). -/- 4. Gestação: Cálcio (g) = (0,23 x NC x PMnasc.)/0,45 Fósforo (g) = (0,132 x NC x PMnasc.)/0,65 Onde: NC = número de crias e PMnasc. = peso médio esperado da cria ou crias ao nascimento. Resumidamente, o NRC (2007) apresenta algumas indicações: 2 a 3 g de cálcio/kg de leite produzido ou 0,114 a 0,163% de Ca da MS 1,4 a 2,1 g de fósforo/kg de leite produzido ou 0,084 a 0,122% de P da MS Sal (NaCl): 0,5% da MS diariamente Potássio (K): 0,8% da MS diariamente Enxofre (S): 0,16% da MS diariamente Magnésio (Mg): 0,2% da MS diariamente -/- Tabelas de requerimentos nutricionais dos caprinos Resumidamente, a composição do concentrado dos caprinos, de acordo com a categoria, e as quantidades a serem fornecidas/animal/dia é a seguinte: Tabela 2: Composição do concentrado e quantidades fornecidas Fonte: CODEVASF, 2011. Agora, vamos dividir os requerimentos dos caprinos de acordo com situações, conforme os dados obtidos por NRC (2007), NUNES (1998) e RIBEIRO (1997): Tabela 3: Caprinos em mantença PV (kg) CMS (kg/animal¹) CMS (% PV) PB (g) PB (%) EM (Mcal) NDT² (g) NDT (%) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,28 2,8 25 9 0,57 160 57 1 1 20 0,49 2,4 40 8,2 0,96 270 55 1 1 30 0,66 2,2 50 7,6 1,30 360 55 2 1,5 40 0,82 2,0 65 8 1,60 450 55 2 1,5 50 0,97 1,9 80 8,2 1,90 530 55 3,5 2,5 60 1,11 1,8 90 8 2,20 610 55 3,5 2,5 70 1,25 1,8 95 7,6 2,50 680 55 4 3 80 1,40 1,7 105 7,5 2,70 750 54 4 3 90 1,50 1,65 120 8 3,00 820 55 4 3 100 1,62 1,6 130 8 3,20 900 56 5 3,5 -/- 1 – para converter matéria seca em matéria natural, dividir o valor em MS pela porcentagem de MS do ingrediente. Por exemplo, em uma ração encontrou-se 100 g MS de milho, sabendo-se que a % de MS do milho é 90%, então: 100/0,9 = 112 g de milho com base na matéria natural. 2 – 1 kg de NDT equivale a 4,4 Mcal de energia digestível (ED) e 1 Mcal de ED = 0,82 Mcal de EM. Tabela 4: Mantença e baixa atividade (incremento de 25% dos valores de mantença da tabela 3) – manejo extensivo, pastagem tropical e gestação inicial PV (kg) CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,3 30 0,71 200 1 0,7 20 0,5 50 1,20 335 2 1,4 30 0,67 60 1,62 452 2 1,4 40 0,84 80 2,02 560 3 2,1 50 0,99 90 2,38 662 4 2,8 60 1,14 105 2,73 760 4 2,8 70 1,28 120 3,07 852 5 3,5 80 1,41 130 3,39 942 5 3,5 90 1,54 145 3,70 1030 6 4,2 100 1,67 155 4,01 1114 6 4,2 Por exemplo, um animal com 40 kg de PV em mantença e submetido a baixa atividade, deverá receber PB na base de: Mantença: 65 g/dia + (65 x 25%) = 80 g/dia de PB Tabela 5: Mantença e média atividade (incremento de 50% dos valores de mantença da tabela 3) – terreno semiárido, pastagens levemente acidentadas (em encosta) e gestação inicial PV (kg) CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,36 33 0,86 239 1 0,7 20 0,60 55 1,44 400 2 1,4 30 0,81 74 1,95 543 3 2,1 40 1,01 93 2,42 672 4 2,8 50 1,19 110 2,86 795 4 2,8 60 1,37 126 3,28 912 5 3,5 70 1,53 141 3,68 1023 6 4,2 80 1,69 156 4,06 1131 6 4,2 90 1,85 170 4,44 1236 7 4,9 100 2,01 184 4,82 1336 7 4,9 -/- Por exemplo, um animal com 50 kg de PV em mantença e vivendo sob condições de média atividade (clima semiárido como algumas regiões de Pernambuco), deverá receber NDT na base de: Mantença: 530 g/dia + (530 x 50%) = 795 g/dia de NDT Tabela 6: Mantença e alta atividade (incremento de 75% dos valores de mantença da tabela 3) – terreno árido, vegetação escassa, pastagens montanhosas e gestação inicial PV (kg) CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,42 38 1,00 278 2 1,4 20 0,70 64 1,68 467 2 1,4 30 0,95 87 2,78 634 3 2,1 40 1,18 108 3,46 784 4 2,8 50 1,39 128 4,10 928 5 3,5 60 1,60 146 4,69 1064 6 4,2 70 1,79 165 5,27 1194 6 4,2 80 1,98 182 5,81 1320 7 4,9 90 2,16 198 6,35 1442 8 5,6 100 2,34 215 6,88 1559 8 5,6 -/- Por exemplo, um animal com 30 kg de PV em mantença, sob condições de clima árido e alta atividade, deverá receber NDT na base de: Mantença: 360 g/dia + (360 x 75%) = 630 g/dia ou 634 g como está na tabela 6 Tabela 7: Exigência para 100 g de ganho de peso diário PV (kg) CMS (kg/animal) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,1 29 0,42 116 1,32 0,73 20 0,2 29 0,57 159 1,43 0,71 30 0,3 28 0,72 199 1,49 0,7 40 0,4 27 0,88 245 1,54 0,69 50 0,4 26 1,03 286 1,58 0,68 60 0,5 25 1,19 331 1,61 0,67 70 0,5 24 1,36 379 1,64 0,67 -/- Tabela 8: Exigências para gestação de cabras em diferentes períodos PV (kg) Período CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 40 Início 1,07 77 2,45 680 3 2 4º mês 1,07 159 2,94 816 5 2,5 5º mês 0,97 215 4,10 1141 7 3 50 Início 1,20 91 2,84 789 3,5 2,5 4º mês 1,20 173 3,35 932 6 3,1 5º mês 1,09 235 4,56 1268 8,5 3,7 60 Início 1,33 105 3,19 887 4 3 4º mês 1,33 187 3,70 1027 7 3,8 5º mês 1,21 253 4,90 1363 10 4,5 70 Início 1,47 118 3,51 975 4,5 3,5 4º mês 1,47 200 4,01 1114 8 4,4 5º mês 1,34 273 5,23 1454 11,5 5,3 80 Início 1,60 130 3,84 1068 5 4 4º mês 1,60 212 4,25 1458 9 5 5º mês 1,46 293 5,41 1504 13 6 -/- Tabela 9: Requerimentos adicionais para a produção de 1 kg de leite segundo a % de gordura. Incluem-se os requisitos para aleitamento de filhote único, gêmeos ou trigêmeos no respectivo nível de produção leiteira Gordura (%) PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 2,5 60 1,20 330 2 1,5 3,0 65 1,21 335 2 1,5 3,5 70 1,23 340 2 1,5 4,0 75 1,25 345 3,5 2,5 4,5 80 1,26 350 3,5 2,5 5,0 85 1,28 355 3,5 2,5 5,5 90 1,29 360 4 3 6,0 95 1,31 365 4 3 -/- Tabela 10: Requerimentos por kg de leite com 3,5% de gordura – cabras alpinas PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 70 1,22 345 4 2 -/- Tabela 11: Requerimentos por kg de leite com 4,7% de gordura – cabras anglo-nubianas PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 80 1,50 415 6 4 -/- Tabela 12: Requerimentos para cada 0,1% de variação no teor de gordura do leite PB (g) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) Ca (g) P (g) 10 0,30 80 0,5 0,5 -/- Tabela 13: Requerimentos adicionais para gestação tardia CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) PB (%) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) NDT (%) Ca (g) P (g) 0,71 80 11 1,42 395 56 2 1,5 -/- Tabela 14: Requerimentos adicionais para ganho de peso diário (GPD) de 50 g CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) PB (%) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) NDT (%) Ca (g) P (g) 0,18 15 8,5 0,36 100 55,5 1 1 -/- Tabela 15: Requerimentos adicionais para ganho de peso diário (GPD) de 100 g CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) PB (%) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) NDT (%) Ca (g) P (g) 0,36 30 8,5 0,88 200 55,5 1 1 -/- Tabela 16: Requerimentos adicionais para ganho de peso diário (GPD) de 150 g CMS (kg/cab./dia) PB (g) PB (%) EM (Mcal) NDT (g) NDT (%) Ca (g) P (g) 0,54 45 8,5 1,32 300 55,5 2 1,5 -/- Seguindo o mesmo raciocínio da tabela 2 da CODEVASF, a tabela 17 apresenta valores de proteína bruta e quantidade de MS para caprinos de corte e leite em diferentes estágios produtivos. Tabela 17: Exigências de PB e quantidade de MS de caprinos em diferentes estágios Etapa produtiva PB % Quantidade/cab./dia Caprinos de corte Pré-desmame 18 110 – 150 g Pós-desmame 16 230 – 340 g Crescimento/engorda 14 450 g Flushing 14 – 16 450 g – 1,4 kg Gestação (2º e 3º mês) 14 – 16 230 – 450 g Gestação (último mês) 14 – 16 340 – 910 g Lactação (1 cria) 14 – 16 340 – 570 g Lactação (2 crias) 14 – 16 910 g Fêmeas de reposição 16 230 – 450 g Machos adultos 14 < 230 g Caprinos leiteiros Pré-desmame (2-4 meses) 18 Ad libitum Crescimento (4º mês até 6-8 semanas antes do parto) 14 – 16 450 – 680 g Fêmeas secas 14 – 16 450 – 910 g Fêmeas lactantes 14 – 16 330 g/kg de leite Machos adultos 14 – 16 450 – 910 g Fonte: adaptação de PARDO RINCÓN, 2007. pp. 567-568. Concentrações de nutrientes necessárias em rações de caprinos (% da MS) De forma geral, as rações para os caprinos seguem os mesmos padrões das dietas elaboradas e fornecidas para os ovinos. No entanto, sabendo-se que as exigências de ambas as espécies são diferentes, é necessário compreendermos que mesmo uma ração servindo para os ovinos e caprinos, esta pode não fornecer as quantidades desejadas pelos caprinos, ou ainda, a ração poderá conter excesso de nutrientes para este animal e acarretar problemas metabólicos e de eficiência alimentar, além das perdas econômicas uma vez que será adquirida e fornecida uma ração que não irá alcançar seu objetivo. Dito isto, através da literatura acerca da produção, nutrição e alimentação de caprinos de corte e leiteiros, a tabela 18 apresenta os níveis recomendados de rações para os caprinos de acordo com a categoria e estado fisiológico do animal, levando-se em consideração os requerimentos das tabelas 2 a 16 e os níveis de nutrientes de acordo com as grandes fábricas de ração recomendam e formulam as dietas. Tabela 18: Concentrações de nutrientes para rações de caprinos com base na % da MS Mantença CMS 1,5-3% PV - PB 10% - NDT 55% - EM (Mcal/kg) 2,0 - Ca 0,35% MS – P 0,25% MS Mantença CMS 1,8-2,4% PV – PB 7% - NDT 53% - Ca 0,3-0,8% MS – P 0,25-0,40% MS Gestação precoce CMS 2,4-3,0% PV – PB 9-10% - NDT 53% - Ca 0,3-0,9% MS – P 0,2-0,4% MS Gestação tardia CMS 2,4-3,0% PV – PB 13-14% - NDT 53% - Ca 0,3-0,9% MS – P 0,2-0,4% MS Lactação CMS 2,8-4,6% PV – PB 12-17% - NDT 53-66% - Ca 0,3-0,8% MS – P 0,25-0,45% MS Caprinos leiteiros castrados ganhando 100-150 g/diaa CMS 3,3-3,8% PV – PB 12% - NDT 67% - Ca 0,3-0,4% MS – P 0,3-0,35% MS Caprinos de corte castrados ganhando 100-150 g/diaa CMS 3,0-3,4% PV – PB 15-17% - NDT 67% - Ca 0,4% MS – P 0,3% MS Caprinos leiteiros inteiros ganhando 100-150 g/diaa CMS 3,2-3,7% PV – PB 10-15% - NDT 67-86% - Ca 0,4% MS – P 0,3% MS Caprinos de corte inteiros ganhando 100-150 g/diaa CMS 3,3-3,7% PV – PB 15% - NDT 67% - Ca 0,4% MS – P 0,3% MS Cabras gestantes CMS 2,2-2,8% PV – PB 20-24% - NDT 55-65% - Suplemento mineral 3% Cabras em lactação CMS 3,0-5,0% PV – PB 16-24% - NDT 65% - Ca 0,75 g/kg – P 0,3 Creep-feeding para cabritos CMS Ad libtum – PB 12-18% - NDT 80% Caprinos em crescimento CMS 2,5-3,0% PV – PB 14% - NDT 55-70% - Relação Ca:P 2:1 Machos adultos CMS 2,5-3,5% PV – PB 14-16% - NDT 60% - Relação Ca:P 2:1 Reprodutores em serviço CMS 2,5-3,0% PV – PB 10% - NDT 65% Confinamento de caprinos PB 14% - NDT 65% - Ca 0,8 % – P 0,4% Fonte: adaptação de BORGES & GONÇALVES, 2011 e NRC, 2007. A tabela 19 apresenta os valores de energia metabolizável (EM) em MJ/dia e a concentração proteica para formular rações para caprinos. Para transformar MJ em Mcal, saiba que 1 MJ equivale a 0,24 Mcal. Note que as concentrações de energia, proteína e/ou NDT, aportados nas tabelas aqui presentes variam em função das equações de predição ao qual são calculados os requerimentos. Tabela 19: Valores simples para formular rações para ovinos e caprinos em diferentes cenários de produção Estágio produtivo EM (MJ/dia) PB (%) Mantença EMm = 0,12 x PV + 1,5 6 – 8 Rápido crescimento EMm x 2 14 – 16 Gestação (3-4 meses) 1 feto EMm + 3 8 – 10 2 fetos EMm + 4 Gestação (último mês) 1 feto EMm + 4 8 – 10 2 fetos EMm + 8 Lactação (1º mês) 1 cria EMm + 8 12 – 14 2 crias EMm + 12 Fonte: DA SILVA, 2021. Por exemplo, utilizando a tabela 19, calcular a EM requerida em Mcal/dia para cabra Saanen de 60 kg de PV em mantença e depois para a mesma cabra em lactação com 1 cria: Mantença: 0,12 x 60 + 1,5 = 8,7 MJ para Mcal: 8,7 x 0,24 = 2,09 Mcal/dia Lactação: 8,7 + 8 = 16,7 MJ para Mcal: 4 Mcal/dia Note que os valores de produção devem ser adicionados aos de mantença. As exigências minerais dos caprinos, segundo autores, e o nível máximo tolerável na dieta são apresentadas na tabela 20. Tabela 20: Exigências minerais de caprinos MACROMINERAIS CHURCH (2002) (% MS) HART (2011) (% MS) NRC (2005) Nível máximo (% MS) Ca 0,2 – 0,8 0,3 – 0,8 1,5 P 0,2 – 0,4 0,25 – 0,4 0,6 Mg 0,1 – 0,2 0,18 – 0,4 0,6 K 0,5 – 0,8 0,8 – 2,0 2 S 0,15 – 0,25 0,2 – 0,32 0,3 – 0,5 Na 0,09 – 0,18 0,2 4 Cl 0,09 – 0,18 0,2 MICROMINERAIS CHURCH (2002) mg/kg MS HART (2011) mg/kg MS NRC (2005) Nível máximo (mg/kg MS) Co 0,1 – 0,2 0,1 – 10 25 Cu 7 – 11 10 – 80 15 Fe 30 – 50 50 – 1000 500 I 0,1 – 0,8 0,5 – 50 50 Mn 20 – 40 0,1 – 3 2000 Mo 0,5 0,1 – 3 5 Se 0,1 – 0,2 0,1 – 3 5 Zn 20 – 33 40 – 500 300 -/- Energia metabolizável para caprinos A energia metabolizável é a parte da energia bruta que não aparece em fezes, urinas e nos gases produtos da fermentação (principalmente metano). É determinada pela subtração das perdas de energia na urina e gases combustíveis da energia digestível (ED) consumida. É um pouco mais precisa que a ED em termos de estimativa da energia disponível, porém mais caro para determiná-la. Compara-se com a energia proveniente do NDT menos a energia dos gases da fermentação. Determinamos através da fórmula: EM = EB (energia bruta) – (energia perdida em fezes + energia perdida em gases da fermentação + energia perdida na urina) -/- Em muitos cálculos da formulação de dietas para animais de produção é utilizada a energia metabolizável no lugar do NDT. Logo, apresentamos as exigências de energia metabolizável dos caprinos em função do peso e da categoria fisiológica do animal. 1. Mantença (EMm): Pré-desmame (nascimento aos 3 meses de idade): Fêmeas e machos castrados 0,107 Mcal/kg PV0,75 Machos inteiros 0,125 Mcal/kg PV0,75 -/- Crescimento (do desmame aos 18 meses de idade): Fêmeas e machos castrados 0,128 Mcal/kg PV0,75 Machos inteiros 0,149 Mcal/kg PV0,75 -/- Adultos (> 18 meses de idade): Fêmeas e machos castrados 0,120 Mcal/kg PV0,75 Machos inteiros 0,138 Mcal/kg PV0,75 -/- 2. Ganho de peso (EMg): Pré-desmame 0,00320 Mcal/kg PV0,75 Crescimento 0,00552 Mcal/kg PV0,75 Adultos 0,00681 Mcal/kg PV0,75 -/- 3. Produção de leite (EMl): EMl (Mcal/dia) = (kg de leite x 1,179943) x ((1,4694 + (0,4025 x %gordura))/3,079) 4. Gestação (EMgest): EMgest (Mcal/dia) = (- 15,467 - (1,1439 x PMnasc) + (0,26316 x D) - (0,0021667 x NC) – (0,0010963 x D2) + (0,011772 x PMnasc x D) - (0,98352 x PMnasc x NC) + (0,011735 x PMnasc x D x NC)) x 0,239 Onde: PMnasc = peso médio esperado da cria ou crias ao nascimento em kg; D = dias de gestação e NC = número de crias. As exigências nutricionais dos caprinos servem de alicerce para a elaboração de uma dieta, uma vez que, diante os cálculos, é necessário estimar uma quantidade x de um dado alimento para suprir uma exigência final seja proteica, energética ou qualquer outra. Essas tabelas de exigências dos caprinos servem de base após a caracterização do lote para que deve ser elaborada uma mistura. Por exemplo, um lote de caprinos com 30 kg de peso vivo em mantença, quais são as exigências de cada animal? Basta consultar a tabela 3 deste manual para depois ser levantado os alimentos e a composição destes e começar a elaborar a dieta. Relação volumoso:concentrado (v:c) para caprinos Além do balanceamento dos nutrientes necessários, a relação v:c da dieta depende, basicamente, da qualidade do volumoso e da ração concentrada. Se o volumoso possuir boa qualidade, consequentemente seu valor nutricional será melhor e, para caprinos em mantença por exemplo, pode ser empregado em 100% da ração; por sua vez, se o volumoso possuir péssima qualidade nutricional será necessária a adição de concentrado na dieta diária do animal, não esquecendo de que essa ração concentrada deverá atender os requisitos do animal, logo a ração deverá ser de boa qualidade e balanceada. Além da qualidade do volumoso e/ou concentrado, a relação v:c depende também do objetivo final de criação, isto é, se é necessário engordar os animais em menos tempo para abate, ou em pastagem etc., portanto, também depende da necessidade de ganho de peso diário para os animais, uma vez que a finalidade é um GPD maior é utilizada uma relação concentrada maior que a volumosa. Segundo estudos, a relação volumoso:concentrado influencia diretamente em padrões como consumo de matéria seca, presença de fibras, digestibilidade da matéria seca e nutrientes e atividades de mastigação e ruminação. Segundo esses estudos, uma relação mais próxima de 50:50 aumenta o teor de fibra, aumenta a ingestão de MS e aumenta a digestibilidade da MS, mas diminui a da fibra, e diminuem as atividades físicas da mastigação e o processo de ruminação. O NRC, 2007 sugere as proporções de v:c para caprinos as mesmas dos ovinos, que são divididas em diferentes situações. -/- Exemplos de proporções de volumoso e concentrado na dieta de caprinos PV Kg VOLUMOSO % CONCENTRADO % Mantença 70 100 0 Cabras secas 70 100 0 Últimas 4 semanas de gestação 70 85 15 Últimas 4-6 semanas de lactação 1 cria 70 85 15 Últimas 4 semanas de gestação 70 65 35 Primeiras 6-8 semanas de lactação com 1 cria 70 65 35 Últimas 4-6 semanas de lactação com 2 crias 70 65 35 Primeiras 6-8 semanas de lactação com 2 crias 70 65 35 Cabras secas – primeiras 15 semanas de gestação 55 85 15 Cabras – últimas 4 semanas de gestação 55 70 30 Cabras – últimas 4 semanas de gestação 55 60 40 Cabras – primeiras 6-8 semanas de lactação com 1 cria 55 60 40 Cabras – primeiras 6-8 semanas de lactação com 2 crias 55 50 50 Cabras de reposição 30 65 35 40 65 35 50-70 85 15 Machos para reposição 40 70 30 60 70 30 80-100 70 30 Engorda 30 40 60 40 25 75 50 20 80 Cabritos recém-desmamados até adultos 10 10 90 20 15 85 30 15 85 40-60 15 85 Fonte: DA SILVA, 2021. -/- ALIMENTOS PARA CAPRINOS -/- De forma geral, sabemos que os alimentos dividem-se em dois grupos os alimentos volumosos e os concentrados. Os volumosos são aqueles que possuem carga nutritiva menor e que o animal deve consumir em maior quantidade para suprir suas exigências nutricionais, o teor de proteína desses alimentos é variável, mas, na maior parte, não ultrapassa os 20%; por sua vez, a quantidade de fibra é grande já que esse grupo engloba as forragens, pastagens, fenos, palhas, silagens, raízes, tubérculos etc. Dentro da classificação de alimentos volumosos, ainda encontramos os volumosos “proteicos” que são representados pelas forrageiras leguminosas e algumas gramíneas. Os concentrados, por sua vez, são aqueles com alta carga nutricional e que o animal, mesmo consumindo poucas quantidades (em torno de 1 kg), supre todas suas exigências nutricionais; estes são divididos em alimentos que fornecem mais energia do que proteína (energéticos) como o milho, e nos que fornecem mais proteína que energia (proteicos) como o farelo de soja. Existem uma série de alimentos que podem ser utilizados na alimentação dos caprinos. Existem ainda, os alimentos provenientes da caatinga com alto potencial para a alimentação dos caprinos; a composição proteica desses alimentos e a parte comestível que pode ser fornecida aos caprinos é apresentada na tabela 21. Como a maioria dos caprinos são criados em regiões onde há escassez alimentar e baixas oportunidades de fornecimento de ração concentrada, há os alimentos não usuais que possuem enorme capacidade para manter os animais ou para que continuem produzindo em períodos de seca, por exemplo. Na região semiárida do Brasil, os alimentos não-convencionais mais comumente utilizados são cactáceas como coroa de frade, mandacaru e a palma; e outros como algaroba, faveira, moringa, umbu, maniçoba, leucena, aveloz etc. Uma das melhores alternativas alimentares em épocas de escassez é a produção e o fornecimento de fenos de gramíneas locais, silagem de sorgo e girassol. Tabela 21: Forragens nativas do nordeste brasileiro usadas como alimento Fonte: CODEVASF, 2011. A composição bromatológica dos ingredientes utilizados na alimentação dos caprinos, que é indispensável para a elaboração de dietas que supram os requisitos é apresentada na tabela 22. Tabela 22: Composição bromatológica dos alimentos utilizados na alimentação de caprinos Alimento MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Concentrados energéticos Algaroba farelo integral 85 8,6 0,54 - - 0,31 0,14 Arroz farelo desengordurado 88,2 16,8 1,66 2,1 24,9 0,09 1,8 Arroz farelo desfinitizado 90,8 18 1,65 - - 0,31 2,04 Arroz farelo integral 88,9 13,4 16,4 3,3 87,5 0,11 1,73 Arroz farelo parboilizado 91,2 16,2 24,25 - - - 0,09 Arroz grão c/casca 89,1 8,2 3,9 2,0 56,1 0,09 0,08 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Arroz grão s/casca 86,2 8,5 1,2 - - 0,04 0,16 Aveia grão 90,4 14,6 3,8 3,2 83,3 0,13 0,35 Batata 29,1 3,1 0,3 3,1 84,6 0,33 0,08 Batata doce - 6 0,6 - - 0,05 0,11 Beterraba 14 2 0,4 - - 0,18 0,12 Cacau farelo 88,8 15,9 4,5 2,4 64,5 0,74 0,5 Centeio grão 88,4 18,1 1,9 - - 0,68 0,42 Cevada grão 89,9 12,4 1,5 2,8 76,8 0,05 0,37 Dendê torta 91 15,4 9,3 3,1 82,3 0,2 0,75 Faveira vagem 77,3 11,2 1,25 - 72,5 - - Mandioca raspa 87,7 2,8 0,5 3,0 82,2 0,21 0,07 Milheto grão 88,1 12,1 3,2 - - - - Milho grão/fubá 88 9 4 3,3 87,7 0,03 0,26 MDPS 87,9 7,1 3,15 2,8 75,9 0,04 0,22 Milho espiga silagem 55,2 8,1 3,7 3,2 85,9 0,05 0,27 Milho gérmen farelo 89,9 11 22,9 3,9 103,8 0,03 0,42 Milho grão reidratado silagem 65,8 9,3 4,7 3,75 99,6 - - Milho silagem grão úmido 66,7 9,2 4,6 3,3 88,2 0,03 0,25 Polpa cítrica 88,4 6,9 3,1 2,9 78,3 1,8 0,13 Soja casca 90,1 12,6 2,2 2,7 72,5 0,52 0,16 Sorgo grão 88 9,3 2,9 3,1 84,4 0,07 0,29 Sorgo grão reidratado silagem 65,3 9,15 3,4 3,0 79,9 - - Trigo farelo 87,6 16,7 3,6 2,95 77,3 0,17 1,01 Trigo grão 89,1 14,2 1,45 - - - - Concentrados proteicos Algodão caroço 90,6 23,1 19,2 3,45 88,2 0,27 0,75 Algodão farelo 28 89,8 28 2,0 2,8 68,1 0,26 0,77 Algodão farelo 38 89,7 38 1,5 2,7 65,6 0,24 0,97 Algodão farelo 42 90,5 42 1,6 3,0 69,8 0,22 0,96 Algodão torta 90,4 29,6 9,5 3,0 75,6 0,28 0,58 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Amendoim farelo 89,4 56 1,3 3,9 89,5 0,18 0,62 Amiréia 90,6 200 5,0 - 22 0,12 0,08 Babaçu farelo 90 20,6 1,6 2,75 71,9 0,13 0,36 Babaçu torta 90,8 19,3 8,0 3,0 78 0,15 0,69 Crambe farelo 89,1 35,9 1,2 3,1 73,9 0,29 0,47 Canola farelo 89,4 40,1 2,5 3,5 83,4 0,62 0,82 Colza farelo 91,2 40 5,2 - - 0,65 1,34 Colza grão 93,3 23,6 43,7 - - 0,24 0,81 Farinha de ostras 95,7 33,7 - - - 36,2 5,3 Fava grão 87,1 22,2 0,9 2,6 - 0,12 0,53 Feijão moído 89,6 24,2 1,5 3,2 80,8 0,54 0,43 Guandu grão 88,5 21,1 0,8 2,5 - 0,1 0,32 Guandu grão tostado 89,3 20,3 0,8 2,5 - 0,1 0,31 Girassol farelo 90,2 31,4 1,9 2,9 71,1 0,3 0,9 Linhaça integral 90 21 34 - - 0,25 0,5 Linhaça torta - 32 3,5 - 75 0,4 0,8 Linhaça farelo 92 34 1,0 - - 0,6 0,6 Mamona farelo 89,6 38 2,7 2,95 70,9 0,7 0,77 Mamona farelo detoxificado 89,2 38,1 1,5 2,9 69,3 1,46 0,65 Mamona torta 89,2 31,8 7,0 3,3 81,6 0,72 0,84 Mamona torta detoxificada 86,3 34 5,5 3,0 73,9 2,14 0,8 Milho glúten 60 90,6 60 2,8 3,8 83,9 0,05 0,44 Milho glúten farelo 21 88,8 21 2,8 3,0 76,7 0,16 0,7 Nabo forrageiro torta 91,9 37,3 18,1 3,7 91,2 0,36 1,71 Milho (DDGS) 91,2 31,8 8,2 - 89 0,05 0,86 Resíduo de cervejaria 22,3 25,6 6,3 3,6 92,2 0,33 0,78 Milho – (DDG) 87,5 23,6 12,7 3,4 86,2 0,05 0,32 Milho (WDG) 31,8 32 6,7 - 93 0,05 0,35 Soja farelo 87 45 2,0 3,4 73 0,3 0,61 Soja farelo extrusado 96,7 41 10,6 3,7 89,7 0,07 0,57 Soja grão 92,8 37 18,8 4,1 87 0,25 0,58 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Soja grão tostado 91,7 39,1 21 3,9 94,2 0,25 0,49 Ureia 97,9 280 - - - - - Coprodutos e/ou subprodutos Arroz palha 89 4,4 - - - - - Abacaxi desidratado 87,1 8,8 1,5 2,1 58,8 0,41 0,18 Acerola subproduto 84,2 11,7 2,4 1,85 51,2 0,41 0,18 Aveia palha 88,8 4,6 2,3 - - - - Batata doce folha - 26,8 - - - - - Batata doce rama 17,4 11,5 2,3 2,4 66,8 1,44 0,32 Cana-de-açúcar bagaço 91 2,0 0,69 1,7 46,6 0,21 0,07 Café casca 84,8 10,1 1,6 1,8 49,7 0,33 0,13 Capim elefante colmo 22 5,8 - 2,0 55,9 - - Caju subproduto suco 88,7 13,9 3,1 - 47,2 0,43 0,1 Maça bagaço 9,9 9,8 - - - - - Mandioca casca 88,6 4,5 1,15 2,7 74,5 0,48 0,06 Maracujá subproduto 85,8 11,9 2,4 1,85 50,8 0,53 0,13 Trigo palha 90 3,9 - - - - - Uva bagaço 35,2 15,9 - - - - - Forragens secas Alfafa feno 85,8 18,7 2,0 2,1 66,4 1,17 0,33 Alfafa feno peletizado 90 25 - - - - - Aveia feno 90 10 2,3 2,0 54 0,4 0,27 Aveia preta feno 87,7 9,9 1,75 - - - - Azevém feno 93 13,5 1,4 - - - - Brachiaria B. feno 88 4,2 1,2 1,9 54 0,33 0,11 Brachiaria D. feno 89 7 1,35 1,9 54,5 0,27 0,14 Cevada feno 90 9 2,1 2,1 57 0,3 0,28 Coast-cross feno 87 10,5 1,75 1,9 53 0,27 0,38 Capim elefante feno 87,3 6 1,8 1,8 52 0,24 0,18 Capim gordura feno 90,7 4,5 2,2 1,5 45 - - Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Capim jaraguá feno 90 6,5 - - 53 0,47 0,12 Capim tifton 85 feno 88 9,9 1,45 2,2 57,7 0,33 0,27 Jureminha feno 88 15,9 2,0 1,9 51,7 - - Maniçoba feno 86 12 4,2 2,1 56,2 - - Trevo feno 89 16 2,2 2,1 57 1,73 0,24 Trigo feno 90 9 2,0 2,1 57 0,21 0,22 Triticale feno 90 10 - 2,0 56 0,3 0,26 Silagens (pré-secado) Alfafa silagem 30 18 3,0 2,0 55 1,4 0,29 Arroz silagem planta 37 8,5 - - - - - Aveia preta silagem 23,4 11 2,9 - - - - Aveia silagem 35 12 3,2 2,2 60 0,34 0,3 Azevém silagem 22,4 10,6 1,9 - - - - Cana-de-açúcar silagem 25,7 3,5 1,7 1,9 54,8 0,3 0,05 Cana silagem 0-0,5% CAO 28,9 2,8 1,1 2,2 62 - - Cana silagem 0,5% ureia 28,6 10 - - - - - Cana silagem 1% ureia 31 15 - - - - - Cana silagem 1,5% ureia 29 18 - - - - - Capim-colonião silagem 32 6,6 2,6 1,5 47,3 - - Capim-colonião silagem 2% melaço 26 2,3 1,2 1,5 54 - - Capim elefante silagem 27,5 5,5 2,2 1,7 50 0,31 0,2 Capim elefante silagem 1,5% melaço 23,7 1,5 0,9 0,25 13,3 - - Capim elefante silagem 3% melaço 19,2 1,1 0,8 0,2 11 - - Capim elefante silagem 4% melaço 18,8 1,1 0,7 0,2 10,3 - - Capim elefante silagem 7,5% melaço 19,3 1 0,7 - 11 - - Capim jaraguá silagem 32,2 1,4 0,9 - 15,4 - - Capim mombaça silagem 24,4 7,4 1,7 1,7 49,4 0,44 0,12 Cevada silagem 30 18 3,0 2,0 55 1,4 0,29 Estilosantes silagem 29,3 11,8 1,8 1,8 49 - - Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Girassol silagem 24,7 9,6 12,4 2,0 56,1 1,02 0,24 Mandioca silagem raiz 40,4 1,2 0,2 1,4 - 0,09 0,04 Milho silagem 31,1 7,2 2,9 2,3 63,8 0,28 0,19 Milheto silagem 19 15 3,8 2,3 62,7 - - Milho silagem sem espiga 21,3 6,4 1,4 1,9 53,6 - - Soja silagem 25,8 17,8 9,5 2,3 60 - - Sorgo silagem 32 9 2,7 2,1 59 0,48 0,21 Sorgo forrageiro silagem 28,1 6,3 3,4 2,3 63,9 0,14 0,14 Sorgo silagem com tanino 27,6 7,1 2,1 2,2 61,7 - - Sorgo silagem sem tanino 28 7,4 2,2 2,2 61 - - Triticale silagem 26,3 14 1,4 2,1 58 0,66 0,4 Trigo silagem 33 12 3,2 2,1 59 0,4 0,28 Forragens verdes Amendoim forrageiro 22,8 18,4 1,9 2,1 54,5 2,1 0,22 Cana-de-açúcar 28,9 2,8 1,5 2,3 64,5 0,24 0,08 Capim-angola 92 4,2 - - 42,6 0,1 0,19 Capim braquiária brizantha 34 6,9 2,0 1,8 52 0,31 0,11 Capim bb (46-60 dias) 20,8 9,5 4,0 2,0 55,7 0,71 0,47 Capim bb (61-90 dias) 24,9 6,5 4,0 2,1 58 0,46 0,38 Capim bb (91-120 dias) 27,7 4,8 1,2 1,9 54 0,58 0,17 Capim braquiária marandu 33,2 7,7 2,0 1,8 51,5 0,28 0,09 Capim bm (61-90 dias) 37,8 5,5 1,8 1,8 53 0,08 0,05 Capim braq. marandu outono 31 11,8 1,4 2,0 55 - - Capim bm primavera 27 11,3 2,0 2,1 58,7 - - Capim bm verão 29 12,3 1,8 2,0 54 - - Capim bb MG4 23 9,2 1,9 1,9 52,6 - - Capim bb MG4 (61-90 dias) 29 6,4 1,5 1,9 53 - - Capim bb piatã (61-90 dias) 34 4,7 1,7 1,9 55,8 - - Capim bb xaraés 23 9,3 1,5 2,0 56 0,6 0,09 Capim braquiária decumbens 28,5 6,7 1,8 1,8 51,5 0,4 0,1 Capim bd (61-90 dias) 27,8 7,2 2,1 1,7 49,3 0,3 0,19 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Capim bb (91-120 dias) 30 5,7 2,1 1,9 55,2 0,3 0,2 Capim bd (121-150 dias) 43,7 5,1 2,1 2,0 56,7 0,72 0,28 Capim braquiária humidícola 28 7,4 2,5 1,9 54,8 0,38 0,12 Capim buffel (61-90 dias) 34,6 7,8 1,8 1,8 52,3 - - Capim coast cross 32,6 12,2 2,5 - 65,4 0,46 0,16 Capim colonião outono 29,4 14,7 1,3 - - - - Capim colonião primavera 23,4 14,6 1,6 - - - - Capim colonião verão 26,7 16,5 2,6 - - - - Capim elefante 21,7 7 2,3 1,7 50 0,36 0,23 Capim elefante pastejo 24,5 3,3 0,8 0,3 15,7 - - Capim gordura 28 6,9 1,3 2,1 58 0,24 0,07 Capim gordura pastejo 24,8 1,7 0,8 - 8,5 - - Capim jaraguá 29,7 2,7 0,8 - 16,3 - - Capim massai (61-90 dias) 29,5 8 2,1 1,8 51,6 - - Capim mombaça 27 11 1,7 1,9 53 0,74 0,19 Capim mombaça (61-90 dias) 26,8 8,3 1,4 1,8 52 - 0,11 Capim setária (61-90 dias) 21,7 9 1,4 1,9 53,7 - - Capim sudão 19 12,9 2,9 2,0 55 - - Capim tanzânia 23,4 9,5 2,4 1,8 51 0,59 0,14 Capim tanzânia (61-90 dias) 31 5,6 1,7 1,8 53 - - Capim tifton 68 23 13,4 2,9 - - - 0,08 Capim tifton 85 27 12,9 2,0 1,4 39,5 0,54 0,5 Capim-de-rhodes 89 9,6 3,2 - 56,6 - - Crotalária 88,6 15,9 2,7 - 48,9 - - Cunhã 29 16,6 5,1 2,6 69,5 - 0,18 Galáxia 90 13,8 3,6 - 53,5 - - Gliricídia 22 17 5,4 2,2 59 - - Leucena 32 21,2 3,9 2,7 69 0,86 0,18 Maniçoba 24,8 19,4 7,1 2,5 65,3 - 0,18 Milheto 20 12,2 3,1 2,2 60 0,72 0,26 Mororó 47,4 11,3 3,8 2,3 62 - - Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Palma miúda 11,3 4,1 2,6 2,3 64,2 3,84 0,22 Sabiá 43,6 12 4,3 2,3 62,2 - - Sorgo forrageiro 24 6,9 3,0 1,8 51,6 0,13 0,13 Forragens verdes e cultivadas Alfafa 25 22 2,7 - 65 1,64 0,23 Aveia branca 90 15 - - - - - Aveia preta 21 8 1,6 2,2 61,5 0,31 0,25 Aveia + Azevém (cultivada) 19 19 4,8 - - - - Azevém 15 15 3,6 - 68 0,43 0,28 Azevém pré-florescimento 17,5 15 1,7 2,4 66,6 0,42 0,3 Azevém início floresc. 22,4 12 1,5 2,3 63 0,45 0,27 Cana-de-açúcar caule 26 2,9 3,2 - - - - Cana-de-açúcar caule+folhas 24 7 3,0 2,3 63,5 0,23 0,21 Centeio 25 13 1,5 2,2 60 0,26 0,29 Cornichão 21 18 2,0 2,3 63 0,92 0,27 Festuca 24 8,5 1,8 2,3 64 0,32 0,3 Trevo branco 16 19 2,1 2,4 64 1,1 0,37 Amendoim branco 36,6 16,8 2,4 2,4 67 1,23 0,18 Braquiarão - 9 1,7 2,3 57 0,3 0,17 Capim colonião (20-60 dias) - 11-5 - - 61-47 0,45¹ 0,24² Capim pangola 35 7,5 - - 55 - - Guandu (40->90 dias) - 21-13 - - - - - Fontes alternativas (Nordeste) Coroa de frade 11 8 3,5 2,5 - 2,06 0,17 Facheiro 10,5 7,5 2,4 2,5 - 5,03 0,12 Mandacaru 14,5 3,5 1,8 2,5 - 3,06 0,07 Palma gigante 12 5 1,9 2,5 - 2,35 0,13 Xique-xique 13 6 1,3 1,7 48,3 3,12 0,07 Cana-de-açúcar caldo 23 0,3 - 2,0 - 0,01 0,02 Cana-de-açúcar levedura 89 35 1,9 2,0 - 0,48 0,73 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Coco farelo 91 24 9,0 3,0 - 0,29 0,51 Capim buffel feno 87 4,5 1,2 1,2 - 0,21 0,06 Capim tifton feno 91 8,5 1,6 1,75 53 0,49 0,14 Cunhã feno 90,5 18 2,7 3,0 - 0,43 0,18 Erva-sal feno 89 9 1,6 - - 0,77 0,04 Feijão bravo feno 80 11,5 3,3 3,0 51 - - Flor de seda feno 75 14 6 1,9 - 2,6 0,22 Guandu feno - 14 2,7 - - - 0,11 Leucena feno 91 21 3,2 2,8 55 1,18 0,29 Mata-pasto feno 89 9,5 - - - 1,75 0,12 Sorgo forrageiro feno 90,8 4,2 - 2,0 - 0,4 0,22 Canafístula 40,8 12,9 4,6 2,0 54 - - Capim elefante roxo 20 8,5 3,5 - - 0,42 0,41 Géria 88 16 1,0 - - 1,17 0,21 Feijão dos arrozais 24 17 5,0 2,7 69 2,6 0,04 Glicirídia casca - 13 0,9 - - 2,06 0,18 Glicirídia caule - 5,6 0,4 - - 0,44 0,07 Glicirídia folha - 22,7 2,0 - - 2,44 0,18 Guandu parte aérea 35 19 5,0 - - 0,89 0,12 Jurema preta 35 12 9,0 - - 0,67 0,25 Leucena caule 49,4 7,5 2,1 - - 0,56 0,69 Leucena folha 35,5 24 2,2 - - 2,18 0,2 Mandioca folha 45 22 5,5 2,5 - 0,91 0,23 Siratro 25 16 2,7 - - 1,02 0,16 Umbuzeiro folha 15 15 8,6 - - 1,29 0,22 Mandioca parte aérea silagem 12,3 18 3,6 2,0 53 1,21 0,14 Caju castanha 97,5 21,9 40,1 5,5 128,9 - - Caju castanha farelo amêndoa 95 23,5 47 3,5 - 0,6 0,25 Caju farelo pseudofruto 89,5 14,8 6,0 - 75 0,06 0,04 Coco amêndoa farelo 96 25 21,7 2,7 - 0,31 0,26 Goiaba subproduto 55 8 4,7 - 35,7 0,15 0,36 Continuação MS% PB% EE% EM (Mcal/kg) NDT% Ca% P% Mandioca bagaço 87,6 2 0,6 - 65 0,14 1,8 Maracujá subproduto 92 11 0,7 1,8 52 0,42 0,22 Melão subproduto 92 14 2,1 0,95 37 0,56 0,8 Milho palha 92,3 5,1 0,4 2,5 54 0,15 0,13 Fontes de minerais Calcário 100% MS – 38% Ca e 1% Mg Calcário calcítico 100% MS – 33,6% Ca Calcário dolomítico 92% MS – 20,3% Ca e 9,6% Mg Cloreto de potássio 100% MS – 39,6% K Flor de enxofre 100% MS – 96% S Fosfato bicálcico 100% MS – 23% Ca – 18% P – 1% Mg – 0,08% K e 0,13% Na Fosfato tricálcico 99,6% MS – 40,2% Ca e 16% P Iodato de potássio 100% MS – 59,3% I Óxido de magnésio 98% MS – 0,58% Ca – 53,8% Mg e 0,03% Na Sal comum 99% MS – 39,5% Na – 2,7% Mn e 9,9% Zn – 1,3% Cu Selenito de sódio 100% MS – 45,6% Se Sulfato de cobalto 100% MS – 20% Co Sulfato de cobre 100% MS – 25,4% Cu Sulfato de manganês 100% MS – 32,5% Mn Sulfato de zinco 100% MS – 35% Zn Fontes proteicas de origem animal³ Proibidos na alimentação de ruminantes dada a IN MAPA – 8/2004 Art. 1º Fonte: DA SILVA, 2021. Na formulação de ração para os animais de produção, é importante levar em consideração que dos mais variados alimentos citados supra, e de tantos outros usados na alimentação e que não são usuais, existem perigos dado os fatores antinutricionais presentes nestes. Por exemplo, os taninos presentes no sorgo, as aflatoxinas presentes no farelo de amendoim, a sojina presente no farelo de soja, o efeito laxativo do farelo de trigo etc. Logo, quando se deseja formular uma dieta, é necessário obedecer às recomendações e nível de uso do ingrediente em quantidade ou porcentagem na ração. A tabela 23 mostra os níveis recomendados dos principais ingredientes para rações de caprinos. Tabela 23: Níveis recomendados de ingredientes para rações de caprinos Ingrediente Quantidade Milho 70% ou mais (depende) Farelo de soja Sem restrição de uso Grão de sorgo Substitui 100% do milho Farelo de trigo 10 – 40% Farelo de arroz Até 20% Farelo de arroz desengordurado 10 – 30% Farelo de amendoim 100 – 400 g/cab./dia Farelo de algodão Até 40% (não recomendável para reprodutores) Casca de amendoim 5% Aveia 70% Centeio moído 40% Polpa seca de cevada 40% Farelo de linhaça 15% Fubá de milho 50% Proteinoso de milho 25% Glúten de milho 10 – 25% Sabugo de milho desintegrado 5% Caroço de algodão 25% Farelo de girassol 30% Ureia 2% Casca de algodão 40% Casca de arroz 15% Torta de girassol Até 30% Torta de colza Até 20% Torta de linhaça Até 20% Torta de mamona 5 – 10% Torta de gergelim Até 30% Raiz fresca mandioca 1 – 2% do PV Polpa cítrica Até 30% Melaço de cana 150 – 230 g/cab./dia Melaço de cana em pó Até 5% Farelo de coco Até 30% Feijão Até 15% Gergelim Até 30% Girassol 20 – 30% Ureia 50 g/100 kg PV Bananeira Até 20% Farelo de cacau Até 30% Farelo de café Até 20% Bagaço de cana Até 30% Cana-de-açúcar picada fresca 1 – 2 kg/cab./dia Centeio 40 – 40% Cevada 40 – 60% Semente de girassol 400 – 500 g/cab./dia Torta de girassol 200 – 300 g/cab./dia Farelo integral de mandioca Até 50% Farelinho de trigo 150 g/cab./dia Grão de trigo Até 50% Fonte: DA SILVA, 2021; NUNES, 1998 e TEIXEIRA, 1998. Além dos alimentos convencionais ou não acima citados, existem os alimentos chamados de subprodutos que possuem alto potencial nutricional para a alimentação animal. A tabela 24 apresenta a composição de subprodutos da agricultura com alto potencial para serem utilizados na formulação de ração como ingrediente e/ou suplemento. Tabela 24: Composição de subprodutos e alimentos não usuais para rações de caprinos Alimento MS (%) PB (%) NDT (%) EE (%) FB (%) Ca (%) P (%) Abacate, farelo desengordurado 91 20,3 50 1,2 19,3 - - Abacate, casca 24 6,9 90 34,9 24,5 0,11 0,18 Continuação MS (%) PB (%) NDT (%) EE (%) FB (%) Ca (%) P (%) Abacate, semente 41 4,9 90 3,8 5,9 0,04 0,20 Abacaxi 14,7 2,7 80,1 1,4 2,7 0,14 0,07 Abacaxi, bagaço 87 4,6 68 1,5 20,9 0,27 0,13 Abacaxi, coroa 16 10 42,8 3,1 23,1 - - Abacaxi, cortado verde 18 7,8 56 2,2 27 0,28 0,08 Arroz, casca 92 3,3 12 0,8 42,9 0,10 0,08 Banana, polpa fruto 24 4,5 84 0,8 2,1 0,03 0,11 Batata, farelo tubérculo 89 8,4 90 0,4 7,3 0,16 0,25 Batata, tubérculo fresco 23 9,5 81 0,4 2,4 0,04 0,24 Batata, silagem tubérculo 25 7,6 82 0,4 4 0,04 0,23 Batata-doce, planta 20 19,5 49,4 2,5 14,5 - - Batata-doce, tubérculo 31 5 80 1,3 6 0,09 0,13 Batata-doce, farelo tubérculo 90 5,4 80 1 3,7 0,17 0,16 Beterraba-forrageira 13,8 11,3 79,2 0,6 7,5 0,22 0,22 Cenoura 12 9,9 84 1,4 9,1 0,4 0,35 Cenoura, planta 16 13,1 74 3,8 18,1 1,94 0,19 Cenoura, polpa 14 6,4 62,8 7,8 18,6 - - Cevada, palha 91 4,3 49 1,9 42 0,3 0,07 Laranja, silagem do bagaço 11,3 8,8 65 2,2 17,7 - - Limão, bagaço 93 6,9 77 1,5 15,9 - - Ervilha, feno da planta 88 13,6 58 2,5 30,2 1,39 0,28 Ervilha, silagem da rama 25 13,1 57 3,3 29,8 1,31 0,24 Ervilha, farelo da vagem 90 19,7 84 1,6 26,3 - - Feijão, palha 90 6,8 51 1,5 44,5 1,85 0,14 Feijão, farelo da palha 92,1 7,7 44,1 1,5 39,6 - - Gergelim, torta da semente 94,7 38 88,8 26 4 - - Maça, bagaço 89 4,9 69 5,1 17 0,13 0,12 Maça, silagem do bagaço 21,4 7,8 74 6,3 20,6 0,1 0,1 Maça, fruto 17 2,8 70 2,2 7,3 0,06 0,06 Melão 4,1 11,5 70,7 3,3 23 - - Melão, torta 6,1 11,5 74,6 3,3 23 - - Continuação MS (%) PB (%) NDT (%) EE (%) FB (%) Ca (%) P (%) Pera 17,3 - 86,7 - - - - Pera, bagaço 91,5 6,1 70,6 2,1 23,8 2,38 0,12 Pêssego 10 8,7 80 3,7 10,3 - - Repolho 9,5 25,3 85,3 4,2 15,8 0,64 0,35 Repolho, folhas 14,8 14,4 66,7 2,5 14,3 0,63 0,21 Romã, bagaço 26 8,4 68,4 4,9 16,6 - - Soja, palha 88 5,2 44 1,4 44 1,59 0,06 Tomate, bagaço 92 23,5 58 10,3 26,4 0,43 0,60 Tomate, silagem do bagaço 29,5 19,2 63,9 14,6 44,9 0,5 0,47 Tomate, fruto 6 16,4 69 5 9,1 0,16 0,49 Uva, bagaço 91 13 33 7,9 31,9 0,61 0,06 Uva, farelo 90 30,2 - - - - - Fonte: NUNES, 1998. -/- FORMULAÇÃO DE RAÇÃO PARA CAPRINOS -/- A formulação de dietas para caprinos de corte ou leiteiros é análoga ao esquema de formulação para os demais ruminantes. Sempre é necessário categorizar os animais para determinar situações como peso vivo do animal, estado fisiológico, isto é, se está produzindo ou não, idade etc.; posteriormente, faz-se necessário a busca pelas exigências nutricionais dos animais mediante a literatura, seja através das publicações do NRC, AFRC ou CSIRO, caso o lote possua peso diferente das tabelas, por exemplo média de 27 kg de PV, basta utilizar as equações de predição para determinar as exigências de MS, PB, NDT ou EM, Ca e P; encontrada as exigências dos caprinos é necessário a avaliação de quais são os ingredientes disponíveis na propriedade e sua composição nutricional para ser utilizado de métodos matemáticos ou programações de computador para balancear as quantidades de cada um para que possam suprir a exigência do animal. Aqui, apresentarei situações de formulação práticas, que o profissional poderá se deparar no cotidiano profissional, dos quais os animais serão alimentados com o uso do creep-feeding; e animais em mantença, confinados para o ganho de peso, sob pastejo, gestantes e, por fim, em lactação. Para a determinação das exigências dos animais utilizarei os valores aqui descritos que foram compilados do NRC, 2007 e NUNES, 1998 descritos nas tabelas do capítulo 1. Para os alimentos serão usados os valores aqui presentes e compilados de diversos autores e descritos na tabela 20 do capítulo 2. A abordagem matemática utilizada para formular as dietas serão explicadas pelos métodos de formulação do quadrado de Pearson simples, que balanceia apenas um nutriente, ou duplo, que balanceia mais de um nutriente; pelo método algébrico com duas equações e dois ingredientes, ou três equações e três ou mais ingredientes, do qual esse método é capaz de sempre balancear dois ou três nutrientes, sendo os usados a PB e NDT. Os cálculos serão explicados de forma didática visando a facilidade para todos. EXEMPLO 1: formular dieta para uso em creep-feeding, para lote de cabritos com média de 10 kg PV e CMS à vontade. A ração deverá conter 20% PB e 80% de NDT. Os alimentos disponíveis são fubá de milho, raspa de mandioca e farelo de soja. Deixar 2% para suplemento mineral e sal. Determine o aporte mineral da dieta final. 1º passo: determinação da composição dos alimentos: Ingrediente MS % PB % NDT % Ca % P % Fubá de milho 91 10 86 0,02 0,29 Raspa de mandioca 88 3 69 0,15 0,80 Farelo de soja 89 47 81 0,25 0,65 -/- 2º passo: montar o sistema com 3 equações e 3 incógnitas onde x é milho, y raspa de mandioca e z farelo de soja: Equação MS: x + y + z = 98 Equação PB: 0,1x + 0,03y + 0,47z = 20 Equação NDT: 0,86x + 0,69y + 0,81z = 80 3º passo: resolvendo o sistema, vamos obter: x +y +z = 98 0,1x +0,03y +0,47z = 20 0,86x +0,69y +0,81z = 80 x +y +z = 98 0,1x +0,03y +0,47z = 20 0,432y -3,232z = -92 (-8,6 foi adicionada a linha 3) x +y +z = 98 -0,07y +0,37z = 10,2 0,432y -3,232z = -92 ( -0,1 foi adicionada a linha 2) x +y +z = 98 -0,07y +0,37z = 10,2 -0,949z = -29,051 (6,171 foi adicionada a linha 3) x + y +z = 98 y -5,286z = -145,714 -0,949z = -29,051 (a 2ª linha foi dividida -0,07) x +y +z = 98 y -5,286z = -145,714 z = 30,627 (a 3ª linha foi dividida -0,949) -/- 3ª linha: z = 30,6 -/- 2ª linha: y -5,286z = -145,714 -/- Use as variáveis já calculadas: y -5,286⋅30,627 = -145,714 -/- Resolva y: y = 16,2 -/- 1ª linha: x +y +z = 98 -/- Use as variáveis já calculadas: x +⋅16,169 +⋅30,627 = 98 -/- Resolva x: x = 51,2 -/- 4º passo: verificação da ração: Ingrediente MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Fubá de milho 51,2 5,1 44 10,2 148,5 Raspa de mandioca 16,2 0,5 11,2 24,3 129,6 Farelo de soja 30,6 14,4 24,8 76,5 198,9 TOTAL 98 20 80 111 477 Exigência 98 20 80 - - DÉFICE - - - - - -/- 5º passo: a relação Ca:P é de 0,23:1, como para ruminantes o ideal é entre 1:1 e 2:1, é necessário a adição de uma fonte de Ca para aumentar a quantidade do mesmo na ração e aumentar a relação. Usando 2 kg (ER de 2%) de calcário, teremos: 1 kg calc. ---------- 0,38 kg Ca 2 kg calc. ---------- x kg Ca X = 0,76 kg de Ca. O total de Ca na ração será 871 g. E a relação agora será de 1,8:1, ideal. 6º passo: composição final da ração para creep-feeding para cabritos: Ingrediente MS kg MN kg % final MN PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Fubá de milho 51,2 56,3 50,6 5,1 44 10,2 148,5 Raspa de mandioca 16,2 18,4 16,6 0,5 11,2 24,3 129,6 Farelo de soja 30,6 34,4 31 14,4 24,8 76,5 198,9 Calcário 2 2 1,8 - - 760 - TOTAL 100 111,1 100 20 80 871 477 Exigência 100 - 100 20 80 - - DÉFICE - - - - - - - -/- 7º passo: segundo o NRC, o CMS de um cabrito com essas características é de 0,3 kg/dia. Então a ração deverá ser composta por: Ingrediente CMS g MS g MN g PB g NDT g Fubá de milho 300 153,6 168,8 15,4 132,1 Raspa de mandioca 48,6 55,2 1,5 33,5 Farelo de soja 91,8 103,1 43,2 74,4 Calcário 6 6 - - TOTAL 300 300 333,1 60 240 -/- As 60 g da PB equivalem aos 20% e os 240 g de NDT equivalem a 80%. Por fim, para uma boa ração de uso em creep-feeding para cabritos com 10 kg PV, são necessários 170 g de milho moído, 60 g de raspa de mandioca, 110 g de farelo de soja e 6 g de calcário. -/- EXEMPLO 2: você foi convidado para trabalhar em uma fazenda que produz leite de cabras da raça Saanen, a média da produção leiteira é de 5 kg/dia com um teor de 3,5% de gordura. Forneça ração volumosa em até 20% da MS total. Os alimentos disponíveis para a ração volumosa são silagem de milho e feno de braquiária; para a mistura concentrada são milho moído, ureia e farelo de soja. Dados o CMS é de 3 kg/dia e o peso médio do lote de 50 kg. 1º passo: determinação das exigências nutricionais da cabra: Exigência CMS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g (1) Mantença 3,0 0,075 0,530 3 2,1 Prod./kg 0,068 0,342 4 1,5 (2) Prod./kg x 5 0,340 1,71 20 7,5 (1 + 2) TOTAL 3,0 0,415 2,24 23 9,6 TOTAL % 100 13,8 74,7 0,77 0,32 -/- 2º passo: composição dos alimentos disponíveis: Ingrediente MS % PB % NDT % Ca % P % Silagem de milho 27 8 65 0,52 0,16 Feno de braquiária 89 8 60 0,23 0,10 Milho moído 90 9 86 0,02 0,29 Ureia 100 280 - - - Farelo de soja 90 45 84 0,29 0,65 -/- 3º passo: como 600 g (20% CMS) deverá ser aportada pela ração volumosa, vamos fornecer 300 g MS de ambos os volumosos. Teremos, então: Volumosos MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Silagem 0,3 0,024 0,195 1,6 0,5 Feno 0,3 0,024 0,180 0,7 0,3 TOTAL 0,6 0,048 0,375 2,3 0,8 Exigência 3,0 0,415 2,24 23 9,6 DÉFICE 2,4 0,367 1,865 20,7 8,8 -/- 4º passo: a ração concentrada deverá conter 0,367 kg de PB e 1,865 kg de NDT. Vamos fornecer uma quantidade fixa de 50 g de ureia, então: 50 x 280/100 = 140 g PB Calculando o novo défice da PB: 0,367 – 0,140 = 0,227 5º passo: montamos o sistema de duas equações e duas incógnitas para determinar a quantidade de x milho moído e y farelo de soja necessárias para suprir 0,227 kg PB e 1,865 kg de NDT. Lembrando que o défice de MS é de 2,4, ou seja, o total final de x + y não deverá ser superior. Equação PB: 0,09x + 0,45y = 0,227 Equação NDT: 0,86x + 0,84y = 1,865 Respondendo direto, já que aprendemos o método de resolução anteriormente: 0,86x + 0,84y = 1,865 0,86x + 4,30y = 2,17 0 - 3,46y = 0,305 y = 0,305/3,46 y = 0,088 kg de farelo de soja, ou 90 g. Substituindo y na equação PB: 0,09x + 0,45(0,09) = 0,227 0,09x + 0,0405 = 0,227 0,09x = 0,227 – 0,0405 0,09x = 0,1865 x = 2,07 kg de milho moído, ou 2,1 kg. 6º passo: verificação da ração concentrada: Ingrediente MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Milho 2,1 0,189 1,8 0,42 6,1 Ureia 0,05 0,140 - - - Farelo de soja 0,09 0,040 0,07 0,26 0,6 TOTAL 2,24 0,369 1,87 0,68 6,7 Exigência 2,4 0,367 1,865 20,7 8,8 DÉFICE 0,16 - - 20 2,1 -/- 7º passo: ajuste mineral para suprir o défice de 2,1 g de P com fosfato bicálcico e 20 g de Ca com calcário. Fazendo as relações, análogas a anteriores, e sabendo-se que o FB contém 18% de P e 23% de Ca e o calcário possui 38% de Ca, encontramos: Para P: 11,7 ou 12 g de fosfato bicálcico contendo 2,1 g de P e 2,8 g de Ca Para Ca: 45,5 g de calcário contendo 17,2 g de Ca 8º passo: composição final da dieta: Volumosos MS kg MN kg % final PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Silagem de milho 0,3 1,1 27,6 0,024 0,195 1,6 0,5 Feno de braquiária 0,3 0,34 8,5 0,024 0,180 0,7 0,3 Concentrados Milho moído 2,1 2,33 58,6 0,189 1,8 0,42 6,1 Ureia 0,05 0,05 1,3 0,140 - - - Farelo de soja 0,09 0,1 2,5 0,040 0,07 0,26 0,6 Calcário 0,046 0,046 1,2 - - 17,4 - Fosfato bicálcico 0,012 0,012 0,3 - - 2,7 2,1 TOTAL 2,9 3,98 100 0,417 2,24 23,1 9,9 Exigência 3,0 - 100 0,415 2,24 23 9,6 DÉFICE - - - - - - -/- Por fim, uma ração para cabras Saanen com 50 kg PV e produzindo 5 kg leite/dia com 3,5% de gordura, são necessários 600 g de mistura volumosa à base de 50% de silagem de milho e 50% de feno de braquiária e 2,6 kg de ração concentrada à base de 2,4 kg de milho, 100 g de farelo de soja, 50 g de ureia e 50 g para calcário e fosfato bicálcico. O CMS de cada cabra com essa ração será de 2,9 kg/dia, ou seja, dentro dos limites de 3 kg/dia, segundo o NRC, 2007. A relação Ca:P é 2,3:1, sendo uma relação aceitável, já que ruminantes suportam uma relação até 3:1. -/- EXEMPLO 3: formule uma dieta para animais em mantença situados na região semiárida de Pernambuco. Os animais possuem peso médio de 40 kg e estão em condições de atividade média, ou seja, 50% a mais dos requisitos de mantença segundo o NRC, 2007. Os alimentos disponíveis são capim tifton verde e fubá de milho. Dados o CMS é de 1,1 kg/dia. 1º passo: determinação das exigências nutricionais do animal: Exigência MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Mantença 1,1 0,064 0,448 3 2 X50% 0,032 0,224 2 1,5 TOTAL 1,1 0,096 0,672 5 3,5 TOTAL % 100 8,8 61,1 0,45 0,32 -/- 2º passo: composição dos alimentos disponíveis: Ingrediente MS % PB % NDT % Ca % P % Capim tifton 27 13 40 0,54 0,50 Fubá de milho 90 9 85 0,02 0,29 -/- 3º passo: montando o sistema de equações onde x milho e y capim terão que fornecer 0,096 kg de PB e 0,672 kg de NDT: Equação PB: 0,09x + 0,13y = 0,096 Equação NDT: 0,85x + 0,40y = 0,672 Resolvendo o sistema direto, temos: 0,85x + 0,40y = 0,672 0,85x + 1,223y = 0,907 0 + 0,823y = 0,235 y = 0,235/0,823 y = 0,286 kg de capim tifton, ou 290 g. Substituindo y na equação PB: 0,09x + 0,40(0,286) = 0,096 0,09x + 0,037 = 0,096 0,09x = 0,096 – 0,037 0,09x = 0,059 x = 0,656 kg de milho moído, ou 660 g. 4º passo: verificação da ração: Ingrediente MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Milho 0,656 0,059 0,558 0,1 1,9 Capim tifton 0,286 0,037 0,114 1,5 1,4 TOTAL 0,942 0,096 0,672 1,6 3,3 Exigência 1,1 0,096 0,672 5 3,5 DÉFICE 0,158 - - 3,4 0,2 -/- 5º passo: adição de fosfato bicálcico e calcário ao milho para suprir o défice de P e Ca: Para P: 1,2 g de fosfato bicálcico fornecerá 0,2 g de P e 0,28 g de Ca. Para Ca: 8,2 g de calcário fornecerá 3,1 g de Ca. 6º passo: verificação final da dieta: Ingrediente MS g MN g % final PB g NDT g Ca g P g Capim tifton 286 1060 58,9 37 114 1,5 1,4 Fubá de milho 656 729 40,6 59 558 0,1 1,9 Calcário 8,2 8,2 0,45 - - 3,12 - Fosfato bicálcico 1,2 1,2 0,05 - - 0,28 0,2 TOTAL 951,4 1798,4 100 96 672 5 3,5 Exigência 1100 - 100 96 672 5 3,5 DÉFICE - - - - - - - -/- Por fim, para mantença de lote de caprinos no semiárido com atividade média e 40 kg de PV, são necessários, para fins práticos, 1,1 kg de capim tifton, 730 g de milho misturado com 9 g de calcário e 1,5 g de fosfato bicálcico. A MS da ração satisfaz completamente as exigências de CMS do animal e sobre espaço de 0,149 kg de MS que o animal poderá ingerir com outras fontes de alimentos para um possível início de ganho de peso. A relação Ca:P da mistura é de 1,4:1. -/- EXEMPLO 4: um pequeno produtor de caprinos de Belo Jardim-PE deseja manter seu lote de animais no período da seca, onde a vegetação é escassa e o clima semiárido. Os alimentos disponíveis na propriedade são algarobeira e sementes de guandu. O lote de animais possui média de 40 kg PV. O CMS é de 1,1 kg/dia. 1º passo: exigências nutricionais do animal: Segundo o NRC, 1981 para uma seca e um clima tipicamente semiárido como o de Belo Jardim, são necessários acréscimos de 75% das exigências de mantença, ou seja, é necessário adicionar 75% a mais do valor de mantença para obter as exigências finais. Logo: Exigência MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Mantença 1,1 0,063 0,448 3 2 X75% 0,047 0,336 3 2 TOTAL 1,1 0,110 0,784 6 4 TOTAL % 100 10 71,3 0,55 0,36 -/- 2º passo: composição dos alimentos disponíveis: Ingrediente MS % PB % NDT % Ca % P % Algaroba 89 9 70 0,4 0,15 Guandu 89 23 80 0,15 0,45 -/- 3º passo: montando o sistema e respondendo direto vamos obter: Equação PB: 0,09x + 0,23y = 0,110 Equação NDT: 0,70x + 0,80y = 0,784 Resolvendo o sistema direto, temos: 0,70x + 0,80y = 0,784 0,70x + 1,789y = 0,856 0 - 0,989y = -0,072 y = -0,072/-0,989 y = 0,073 kg de sementes de guandu, ou 80 g. Substituindo y na equação PB: 0,09x + 0,23(0,08) = 0,110 0,09x + 0,0184 = 0,110 0,09x = 0,110 – 0,0184 0,09x = 0,0916 x = 1,02 kg de algaroba, ou 1,1 kg. 4º passo: verificação da ração: Ingrediente MS kg PB kg NDT kg Ca g P g Algaroba 1,02 0,092 0,715 4,1 1,5 Guandu 0,08 0,018 0,65 0,1 0,4 TOTAL 1,1 0,110 0,780 4,2 1,9 Exigência 1,1 0,110 0,784 6 4 DÉFICE - - - 1,8 2,1 -/- 5º passo: ajuste mineral para suprir Ca e P: Para P: 12 g de fosfato bicálcico tem 2,1 g de P e 2,7 g de Ca 6º passo: composição final da dieta: Ingrediente MS g MN g % final PB g NDT g Ca g P g Algaroba 1020 1146 91,8 92 715 4,1 1,5 Guandu 80 90 7,2 18 65 0,1 0,4 Fosfato bicálcico 12 12 1,0 - - 2,7 2,1 TOTAL 1112 1248 100 110 780 6,9 4 Exigência 1100 - 100 110 784 6 4 DÉFICE - - - - - - - -/- Por fim, para manter um lote de caprinos na seca com média de 40 kg PV, é necessário o fornecimento de, para fins práticos, 1200 g de algaroba, 100 g de sementes de guandu e 12 g de fosfato bicálcico. O CMS da dieta é ideal e a relação Ca:P é de 1,7:1. -/- EXEMPLO 5: formular dieta para caprinos reprodutores. Os alimentos disponíveis são palma miúda, triticale e farelo de algodão. O peso médio do reprodutor é de 70 kg e o CMS de 1,26 kg/dia. Por fim, calcular o aporte mineral da dieta. Será fornecido 1 kg de palma in natura/cabeça. 1º passo: exigências para caprino reprodutor com 70 kg PV: Exigência CMS kg PB g NDT g Ca g P g TOTAL 1,26 203 695 5 3 TOTAL % 100 16 55,1 0,4 0,24 -/- 2º passo: composição dos alimentos disponíveis: Ingrediente MS % PB % NDT % Ca % P % Palma 9 4 70 2 0,31 Triticale 87 14 85 0,04 0,32 Farelo de algodão 90 33 70 0,2 0,8 -/- 3º passo: fornecimento fixo de 1 kg de palma: Volumoso MS g PB g NDT g Ca g P g Palma 90 3,6 63 1,8 0,3 Exigência 1260 203 695 5 3 DÉFICE 1170 199,4 632 3,2 2,7 -/- 4º passo: calcular mistura de x triticale e y farelo de algodão que atenda a demanda de 0,1994 kg de PB e 0,632 kg de NDT. Montando a equação e resolvendo direto teremos: Equação PB: 0,14x 0,33y = 0,1994 Equação NDT: 0,85x + 0,70y = 0,632 Fator de multiplicação: 6,071 (0,85/0,14) Equação NDT: 0,85x + 0,70y = 0,632 Equação 3: 0,85x + 2,00y = 1,211 0 - 1,30y = 0,579 y = 0,445 kg de farelo de algodão Substituindo na equação PB: 0,14x + 0,33 x 0,445 = 0,1994 0,14x + 0,1469 = 0,1994 0,14x = 0,1994 – 0,1469 0,14x = 0,0525 x = 0,375 kg de triticale 5º passo: verificação da ração: Ingrediente MS g PB g NDT g Ca g P g Triticale 375 52,5 319 0,15 1,2 Farelo de algodão 445 146,9 312 0,9 3,6 TOTAL 820 199,4 631 1,05 4,8 Exigência 1170 199,4 632 3,2 2,7 DÉFICE - - - 2,15 - -/- 6º passo: ajuste mineral com calcário para suprir o défice de 2,15 g de Ca: 5,7 ou 6 g de calcário tem 2,3 g de Ca 7º passo: composição final da dieta: Ingrediente MS g MN g % final PB g NDT g Ca g P g Palma 90 1000 51,8 3,6 63 1,8 0,3 Triticale 375 431 22,3 52,5 319 0,15 1,2 Farelo de algodão 445 494,5 25,6 149,9 312 0,90 3,6 Calcário 6 6 0,3 - - 2,3 - TOTAL 916 1931,5 100 203 695 5 3 Exigência 1260 - 100 203 694 5,15 5,1 DÉFICE 344 - - - - - - -/- O CMS é inferior do que o recomendado, no entanto, as exigências foram supridas pelos alimentos. São necessários 1 kg de palma e uma mistura concentrada de 430 g de triticale, 500 g de farelo de algodão e 6 g de calcário/cabeça/dia. A relação Ca:P é de 1:1. -/- EXEMPLO 6: formular dieta para caprinos reprodutores que necessitam de 16% de PB e 60% de NDT. Os alimentos disponíveis são milho, silagem de capim-elefante e farelo de soja. Deixar 2% de ER para suplement. (shrink)

The movement called Experimental Philosophy (‘x-Phi’) has now passed its tenth anniversary. Its central insight is compelling: When an argument hinges on accepting certain ‘facts’ about human perception, knowledge, or judging, the evoking of relevant intuitions by thought experiments is intended to make those facts seem obvious. But these intuitions may not be shared universally. Experimentalists propose testing claims that traditionally were intuition-based using real experiments, with real samples. Demanding that empirical claims be empirically supported is certainly reasonable; though experiments (...) are not necessarily the only means available. When experiments are conducted, adequately interpreting their results requires understanding the study’s design (and possibly flaws) that produced them. Experiment-based reports should document the design clearly. If Plato, writing his Meno, replaced accounts of Socrates demonstrating geometry to a slave-boy, with a survey of 100 real boys—some grasping his demonstrations, others not—what conclusions could be reached? Before answering, the reader needs details on key design questions, including (among others): (a) What population are these samples intended to represent? (E.g., ‘all slave boys’?; ‘math-ignorant people’?; ‘everyone’?) (b) What statistical tests were conducted, on what assumptions? (c) How was ‘significance’ of results determined? (d) Was the test instrument’s validity established? For readers wishing to explore x-Phi’s potentials, as contributors or as interpreters of their findings, this paper offers some cautionary considerations. Throughout their literature, examples can be found casting doubt on some experimentalists’ findings, due to design-related issues. Increased awareness of methodological questions would tighten the x-phi literature, going forward . (shrink)

In Aristotle’s writings regarding the biology of embryology, especially in the Generation of Animals, he contends that the mother’s menstrual fluids provide the material for the generation of the offspring, and the father’s form determines its formation as a member of that species (e.g. human). The katamenia (menstrual fluids) of the mother are said to be potentially all the body parts of the offspring, though actually none of them. So, the fluids are potentially the offspring. But are they a first (...) potentiality or second potentiality (first actuality) of a human, in the terminology of De Anima II? In this paper I will argue that katamenia are a first potentiality of a human. My first argument is that katamenia do not have the potential for human activities such as thinking, but rather the potential of becoming something having the potential for those activities. I answer the objection that katamenia are not even a first potentiality, by appealing to an important text contending that for any x whose source of becoming is external, x is potentially y if nothing in x with respect to matter needs to be changed in order for an external principle to make x into y. (shrink)

In this work, author expressed new R-Synthesis specifically. Good and/or correct perspective that must be behind the definitions and administration generally expressed. New perspective of the philosophy explained generally. Philosophy of GodForm is defined and expressed as connected/related with the following concepts: (a) basic principles, (b) 17 upper constructional philosophies, (c) 14 lower constructional philosophies, (d) eight basic philosophies. As special cases, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology, Philosophy of Wireless Administration and others defined as hybrid philosophies. 17 specific components/units which (...) can be considered to define the basic principles of the related formation, are proposed to be designed by GodForm and defined by the author. Philosophy of GodForm and its relation with Values and Positions specifically defined. New Era Theory and New Era Belief explained generally. Some specific religions/beliefs are defined as variants/forms of the Progressive Religion. Good and/or correct power authorities (R-Power Authority) are defined due to 29 categories. Functional position levels defined for the R-Power Authorities with a unique table. As result of the R-Synthesis, functional position levels of some philosophers, some scientists, and of Prophet Jesus, Prophet Mohamed, Prophets Mouses, Buddha, and of Confucius generally/specifically defined. Integration and past/present effects of some R-Power Authorities in 5 x 5 Ideal Political Construction specifically explained. New Era Belief, Concepts of GodX and Science relation explained with the following concepts: (1) Religion of GodForm, (2) Knowledge of GodX, (3) Nature of GodX. With this respect, some other characteristics of 7 GodX power authorities expressed with details as complementary information. Following concepts/systems defined to arrange and solve some/most/all religious problems, which are determined with R-Synthesis: (a) Religious Responsibilities and Positions, (b) Ideal Religious Administration, (c) Sustainable/Continuable Political Administration System, (d) Community Values Council/Authority for each world country, (e) Progressive Councils. 15 general religious position categories defined to express their good and/or correct meanings/values/responsibilities in the religious system. 21 general/specific cases/programs defined due to New Era Belief to solve possible past/present/future community values problems, to have continuous, judicious, and progressive administration about the 36 kinds of community values. Progressive Councils, which are related with the CUS-WW-HO, are defined. Progressive Religion Council and some of the related religious responsibilities expressed for the kind progressive religion studies due to the Philosophy of Progressive Religions. (shrink)

The concept of causation is essential for understanding relationships among various phenomena, yet its fundamental nature and the criteria for establishing it continue to be debated. This paper presents a new theory of causation through a quasi-axiomatic approach. The core of this framework is Probability Distribution Determinism (PDD), which updates traditional determinism by representing states of affairs as probability distributions, with the if-then function serving as its foundational definition. Based on PDD, by merely using appropriate naming strategies, it is possible (...) to derive systems in which the structural characteristics of relationships among things closely resemble those in the real world, such as having various forms of nested hierarchies. Additionally, there are two related yet distinctly different contexts about relationships in PDD: one emphasizes the potential influence of conditions on outcomes in the general sense, while the other focuses on attributing responsibility for the state changes in specific scenarios. The formula for determining the relationship in the general sense is established as S(Y |S1(X), Ψ) ̸≡ S(Y |S2(X), Ψ). Subsequently, within the PDD framework, the paper clarifies the legitimate use of a series of concepts related to causation in those two contexts, thus encompassing the entire detailed connotation of the concept of causation. The comparison with other theories of causation and the analysis of case applications demonstrate that the new theory applies not only to situations where other theories are competent but also to situations where they are not. This suggests that, although certain aspects within the new framework may require further analysis, it provides a highly promising direction for a deeper understanding of causation. (shrink)

This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...) stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the better. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption without providing any justification. Although this topic raises critical issues for practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. I conclude that the profile of vanishing cogency of the scheme may be unique and is determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing conditions. (shrink)

The main aim of this essay is to show that, for Stevens, the concept of reality is very fluctuating. The essay begins with addressing the relationship between poetry and philosophy. I argue, contra Critchley, that Stevens’ poetic work can elucidate, or at least help us to understand better, the ideas of philosophers that are usually considered obscure. The main “obscure” philosophical work introduced in and discussed throughout the essay is Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism. Both a (shellingian) philosopher and a (...) (stevensian) poet search for reality. In order to understand Stevens’ poetry better, I distingush several concepts of reality: initial reality (the external world of the common sense), imagined reality (a fiction, a product of one’s mind), final reality (the object of a philosopher’s and a poet’s search) and total reality (the sum of all realities, Being). These determinations are fixed by reason (in the present essay), whereas in Stevens’ poetic works, they are made fluid by the imagination. This fluidity leads the concept of reality from its initial stage through the imagined stage to its final stage. Throughout this process, imagined reality must be distinguished from both a mere fancy and its products. Final reality is, however, nothing transcendent. It is rather a general transpersonal order of reality created by poetry/the imagination. The main peculiarity of final reality is that it is a dynamic order. It is provisional at each moment. Stevens (and Schelling too) characterizes this order as that of a work of art which is a finite object, but has an infinite meaning. Stevens calls this order “the central poem” or the “endlessly elaborating poem”. If ultimate reality is a poem created by the imagination, one may ask who is the imagining subject. I argue that this agent is best to be thought as total reality, that is, as Being. Stevens, however, maintains that if there were such an agency, it would be an inhuman agency, “an inhuman meditation”. The essay concludes, in a Derridian manner, with the claim that this agency cannot have any name; it is the “unnamed creator of an unknown sphere, / Unknown as yet, unknowable, / Uncertain certainty” (OP: 127). It is best thought as an X, as an unknown variable. Being has no name. (shrink)

That i) there is a somehow determined chronology of Plato’s dialogues among all the chronologies of the last century and ii) this theory is subject to many objections, are points this article intends to discuss. Almost all the main suggested chronologies of the last century agree that Parmenides and Theaetetus should be located after dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Laws and Philebus. The eight objections we brought against this arrangement claim that to place the (...) dialogues like Meno, Phaedo and Republic both immediately after the early ones and before Parmenides and Theaetetus is epistemologically and ontologically problematic. -/- Key Words: Plato; chronology; knowledge; being; Parmenides -/- Introduction While the ancient philosophers, doxographers and commentators from Aristotle onward considered, more or less, the question of the date and arrangement of the dialogues (cf. Irwin 2008, 77 n. 69), they would not observe a firm necessity to consider the progress of Plato’s theories in dialogues, maybe because they did not think of any essential shift in there. We might be able to say, nevertheless, that the most prominent feature of the ancient attitude to Plato was its peculiar attention to the Republic and the Timaeus as the most mature works in his philosophy and also the consideration of Laws as a later work. This tendency can be discovered from the general viewpoint of the first chronologies of the early 19th century after starting to deal with the issue. That Schleiermacher observed Republic as the culmination of Plato’s philosophy and as one of the latest dialogues besides Laws and Timaeus could reflex the implicit chronology of the tradition in the first mirrors it found. Another tendency in Schleiermacher is taking the triology of Theaetetus, Sophist and Politicus as relatively early. From the last quarter of 19th century onward, stylometry helped scholars to establish a new framework to constructa new arrangement between the dialogues. Based on stylistic as well as literary findings, Campbell (1867, xxxff.) argued for the closeness of the style of Sophist and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Lawsthat, especially because of the certain evidence about this last dialogue’s lateness, led to the consideration of all as late dialogues. Almost every other stylistic effort after Campbell approved the similarities between Sophist and Politicus with Timaeus, Critias, Philebus and Laws. The result of all such investigations led to a new chronology that, despite some differences, has a fixed structure in all its appearances. 1. The Standard Chronology of the Dialogues The chronologies that are now commonly accepted are mostly based on the arrangement of dialogues to three groups corresponding to three periods of Plato’s life, which became predominant after applying stylistic features in assessing the similarities between dialogues. The fact that all the stylometric considerations reached to the similar results about the date of dialogues while they were assessing different stylistic aspects helped the new chronology become prevailing not only among stylistic chronologies but also between those like Fine, Kahn and Vlastos who were inclined more to the content-based arrangements. Even this latter group could not neglect the apparently certain results of using the method of stylometry. This was the main reason, I think, that made what they called content-based chronology be under the domination of stylometry much more than they could expect. The division of the dialogues into three separate groups became something that most of the scholars took for granted so far as Kahn thinks this division 'can be regarded as a fixed point of departure in any speculation about the chronology of the dialogues' (1996, 44). Thereafter, all the chronologists are accustomed to divide the dialogues to three groups of early, middle and late corresponding to the three stages of Plato’s life. Nevertheless, some of them tried to make subdivisions among each group and introduce some of the dialogues as transitional between different periods and thus reached to a fourfold classification of the dialogues. Although theycould never achieve to a consensus about the place of some dialogues, about which we will discuss soon, the whole spirit of theirchronological arrangements is the same and thus compelling enough for us to unify all of them with the label of 'Standard Chronology of Dialogues' (SCD). We brought together some of the most famous chronologies in the table below to make a comparison easier and to show how all are approximately of the same opinion about the place of some dialogues. The following points must be noted about this table: 1. I divided the dialogues to eight groups of early, late early, transitional, early middle, late middle, post-middle, early late, and late. Although none of the chronologists applies this classification, it can be helpful to compare them. In this table, for example, if one of the chronologist’s beholds one of the dialogues as later than all the dialogues of middle group, it is considered here as late middle. Otherwise, if it is emphasized that it is after all of them, it is considered as post-middle. The same is true about the dialogues of the late group in which I regarded the first dialogues of that period as early late only in those who explicitly considered some dialogues as earlier than other ones in the late group. Though, therefore, some of the dialogues might have not been considered as forming a distinct class, they are distinguished here. A. SCD’s Early and Transitional Dialogues When we move from stylometric to content-based chronologies, the homogeneity between the dialogues of each group is more understandable. Guthrie (1975, v. 4, 50) distinguishes three groups, the first of them includes Apology, Crito, Laches, Lysis, Charmides, Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, Hippias Major, Protagoras, Gorgiasand Ion. In addition to Meno, Phaedo and Euthydems, his first group does not include Cratylus and Menexenus. Unlike Guthrie, almost all the other content-based chronologiesof our study desire to distinguish two categories inside the first group of which the latter must be considered as the transitional group leading to the dialogues of the middle period. Kahn distinguishes four groups of dialogues and arranges two of them before middle period dialogues. The first group including Apology, Crito, Ion, Hippias Minor, Gorgiasand Menexenus he calls 'early' or 'presystematic' dialogues (1998, 124). The second group he calls the 'threshold', 'pre-middle' or 'Socratic' dialogues including seven: Laches, Charmides, Lysis, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Euthydemus and Meno. Based on Vlastos’ arrangement we must distinguish Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno as 'transitional' dialogues from the 'elenctic' dialogues that are the other dialogues of Kahn’smentioned first two groups plus the first book of theRepublic. Fine also distinguishes 'transitional' dialogues from early or 'Socratic' dialogues,but her transitional dialogues are Gorgias, Meno, Hippias Major, Euthydemus and Cratylus of which she thinks the last two dialogues are 'controversial' (2003, 1). Her Socratic dialogues are all the remaining dialogues of Kahn’s first two groups. In spite of all the differences between the mentioned chronologies, it can be seen that all of them are inclined to arrange the early dialogues in a way that: i) Besides the dialogues that are considered as late, it never includes Republic II-X, Theaetetus, Phaedrus and Parmenides. ii) It intends to consider the dialogues like Euthydemus and Hippias Majorthat look more critical as later among the earlier dialogues or as transitional group. iii) Those who do not consider Meno as a middle period dialogue place it in their second or transitional group. iv) None of the content-based chronologies considers Phaedo and Symposium as early. Stylometric chronologies also intend to put them either as last dialogues among their early ones or as middle. B. SCD’s Middle Period Dialogues Campbell listed Republic, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus as his second group of dialogues, an idea thatwas accepted by Brandwood. Ledger’smiddle period dialogueshad Euthydemus, Symposium and Cratylus in addition to the dialogues that Campbell and Brandwood had mentioned as middle. Among content-based chronologies, Guthrie’s list of middle period dialogues did not include Parmenides but some dialogues which had been considered as early in stylometric ones: Meno, Phaedo, Republic, Symposium, Phaedrus, Euthydemus, Menexenus and Cratylus. In sofar as I know, Euthydemus and Menexenus have not been considered as middle by other content-based chronologists and Guthrie is an exception among them. That Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium and Republic were middle period dialogues almost all the philosophical chronologists like Kahn, Fine, Vlastos (except Rep.I), Irwin andKraut came along. The dialogues they do not string along about are Meno, Cratylus, Parmenides and Theaetetus. Those like Guthrie, Kraut and Irwin who did not consider Meno as early presumably posit it among middles. The same can be said about Cratylus in the suggested chronologies of Guthrie, Kahn, Vlastos and Kraut. Nonetheless, it is different in case of Parmenides and Theaetetus. Whereas all the mentioned stylometric chronologists like Campbell, Brandwood and Ledger set them among middle period dialogues,the philosophical chronologists, it might seem at first, did not arrive at a consensus about them. While Guthrie and Fine put them as the first dialogues of the late group, Vlastos and Kraut set them as the latest of the middle group, as well as Kahn who puts them as post-middle and amongst the late period dialogues. Regardless the way they classify their groups, their disagreement does not affect the arrangement of the dialogues: they all posit Parmenides and Theaetetus after the series of Meno, Phaedo, Phaedrus, Symposium and Republic and before Sophist, Politicus, Timaeus, Philebus and Laws. To sum up SCD’s arrangement of the middle period dialogues we can add: v) Republic and Phaedrus have been considered by all the mentioned chronologists as dialogues of the middle period. vi) All the philosophical chronologies have reached a consensus about setting Phaedo and Symposium alongside with Republic and Phaedrus as middle. vii) While Stylometric alongside some philosophic chronologists arrange Parmenides and Theaetetus among their middle period dialogues and mostly as the latest among them, other philosophical chronologists put them as the early among the late dialogues. We can conclude then that SCD intends to locate these two dialogues at the boundary between the middle and late period dialogues. -/- . (shrink)

The main discourses on art during the nineteenth century defined the artist as a spirit that should express their unbridled creativity, and overall that had the strength to express its total personal autonomy from institutional processes of culture. Thus, Manet’s work A bar at the Folies—Bergere contains substantial elements that express and help us to understand both the role of the artist, as the crisis of meaning in the work of modern art and problematic public sphere, treated by Haberma's as (...) the field of social life in which we can develop our public opinion, and that is determined by common sense and rational consensus. In this sense, this article leverages how A bar at the Folies—Bergere questions the social representation of not only the public but the legitimizing institutions that support an artistic truth, to point to an x—ray that presents the structure and the gap between the public and artists, between artistic expression and cultural significance, and thus presents the cultural crisis warned by artists. (shrink)

A cross-sectional, descriptive study was done at a rural high school in Zakiganj Upazila of Sylhet District, Bangladesh, between January and December of 2014, to determine knowledge and practice of oral health and hygiene and oral health status among school going adolescents. Students from three classes: class VIII, IX and X, and aged 12-16 years were taken for the study. Study samples were collected by using simple random sampling technique. A total of 90 students were divided into two age groups: (...) 12-14 years and 15-16 years. A pre-designed, self-administered questionnaire was used for demographic survey and knowledge of oral health and hygiene (a 10-point questionnaire) and practice (a 7-point questionnaire). Then a plane mouth mirror and periodontal probe was used for examining oral health status in those school children. Oral hygiene status was measured by simplified Green and Vermillion Oral Hygiene Index. The mean age of the respondents was 14.37±0.50 years. Females were 68 (75.6%) and males were 22 (24.4%). 31 (34.4%) were from class VIII, 30 (33.3%) from class IX and 29 (32.2%) were from class X. 33.3% of the respondents have scored below the mean of the total knowledge score while 66.7% has scored above the mean (6.86±2.05). Pearson’s correlation coefficient (+0.342) revealed that an increase in knowledge score would lead to increase in practice score. The younger group had higher mean knowledge score than older group (7.15+1.35 vs. 6.58+2.54; P=0.017); however, no significant difference was found between males and females (6.90±1.74 vs. 6.85±2.15; P=0.432). There was no significant difference in Debris Index (DI), Calculous Index (CI) and Oral Health Index (OHI) scores in between age groups and genders. On educational status, significant difference was observed only in OHI score (P=0.001) among those three classes of students. Overall, only 31% had good oral hygiene, while 59% respondents had fair and 10% had poor oral hygiene status. (shrink)

Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...) middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period. -/- Keywords Plato; early dialogues; middle dialogues; being; knowledge; development -/- Introduction The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic. In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses is considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues. Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues (ibid, 59-60). To show that the differences of the two Socrateses of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. -/- A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: -/- I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) -/- Moreover, at 21d4-6: -/- None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. -/- In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): -/- I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd. -/- At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine: -/- I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence : 'that to do wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage: -/- And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4: -/- I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). -/- The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates. Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge. He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1: -/- Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious. -/- Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: -/- I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (Euthp. 11a6-9) -/- 1. Knowledge of what X is Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): -/- KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. -/- Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 2. Bipolar Epistemology Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): BE There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. -/- BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. -/- 3. Bipolar Ontology The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): BO Being is and not being is not. BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: -/- The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) -/- He continues (b4-5): -/- There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν). -/- That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive. -/- 4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): -/- SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. -/- This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in Hippias Major: -/- But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) -/- Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues. At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such: -/- You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): -/- SB Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings. -/- Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84). The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent. What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic prineple. -/- 6. Knowledge is of Being The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB): -/- KB Knowledge is of Being. -/- This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in Euthydemus. In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge , all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. -/- B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them. The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions. The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal is Meno 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge: -/- And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα). (98b1-5) This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things. From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested. -/- 1. Knowledge of the Good We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): -/- KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. -/- Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: -/- The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) -/- Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: -/- That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). -/- 2. Tripartite Epistemology BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): -/- TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one. Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion: -/- So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). -/- The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5). The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: -/- So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) -/- This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he did not want to emphasize. -/- 3. Tripartite Ontology The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): -/- TO There are things that both are and are not. -/- This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): -/- - Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing (οὐδέν)? - He knows something (τί). - Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? - Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? - Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον). - A most adequate one. - Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? - Yes, it’s intermediate. - Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? -/- From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being. -/- 4. Bound Knowledges In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): -/- BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. -/- We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good. That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: -/- I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) -/- Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. -/- 5. Bound Beings The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): -/- BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. -/- We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: -/- You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) -/- This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): -/- Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known (γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being (οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and power. That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light. 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): -/- PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. -/- This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) -/- Conclusion From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. -/- Notes . (shrink)

This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato (...) says that something both is and is not, he is applying difference on being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing Aristotle’s terminology, 'is is (esti) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s ontology in Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in general. -/- Keywords Plato; being; difference; image; pollachos esti; pollachos legetai 1. Being, Not-Being and Difference The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus,and specifically the first two we try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of "same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the same but different in every moment. The relation of being and sameness reaches to its highest point in Parmenides. What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being. At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be without partaking (μετέχειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of being and one: -/- So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία του̑ ἑνὸς) which is not the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one would partake of it. (142b7-c1) -/- The fact that what is (ἔστι) signifies (σημαῖνον) is other (ἀλλο) than what One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction. The conclusion is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor One but "difference": -/- So if being is something different (ἕτερον) and one something different (ἕτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its being being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other (ἕτερα ἀλλήλων) by difference (τῷ ἑτερῳ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6) -/- The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such: -/- For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in kind. (160e1-2) -/- Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for "difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the "difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being is still attached to the same: -/- For that which is the same is being (ὄν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταὐτόν) (162d2-3). -/- The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between being and becoming (248a7-8) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by adding: -/- You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13) -/- That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e). It does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, like a child, for both and say being (τὸὄν) is both the unchanging and that which changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are (250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but different (ἕτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s clear that change is not being and also is being (ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν) since it partakes in being?' (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement at Republic 477a about what both is and is not. -/- Introduction The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being. The second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and ignorance (α͗γνοιας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects. The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian distinctions between different senses of being. In the predicative reading, Annas, for example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly (1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of 'degrees of reality' for 'degrees of being/existence' must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the basic sense of being for Plato is 'something like propositional structure, involving both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of predication' (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading, Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and thus does not imply TW. Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that 'it would be safer to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of existence' (1970, 46). At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in which the same (ταὐτὸν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both (b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to get able to draw the relation of being and difference: -/- But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said (λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) but some [are said] always referring to (πρὸς) other things (ἄλλα) (255b12-13) -/- The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸδέγ’ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον) (255d1). It pervades all kinds because each of them should be different from the others and is so due to the difference and not its own nature (253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the same time, the issue that its version at RepublicV made all those controversies we discussed above: -/- So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀναγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν). Τhat’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that they are because they partake in being. (Sophist 256d11-e3) -/- Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to thedifference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the contrary of being anymore but only different (ἕτερον) (257b3-4). Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y', I totally disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X is not beautiful because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show how something can both be and not be the same thing. The difference is what makes one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference with the ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion of difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the simultaneous being and not being of a thing: 'What we call "not-beautiful" is the thing that ἕτερόν ἐστιν from nothing other than του̑ καλου̑ φύσεως' (257d10-11). The result is that not beautiful happens to be (συμβέβηκεν εἶναι) one single thing among kinds of beings (τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους) and at the same time set over against one of the beings (πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν) (257e2-4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful (εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν); a being set over against being (ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις) (e6-7). Neither the beautiful is more a being (μα̑λλον ... ἐστι τῶν ὄντων) nor not beautiful less (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are (ὁμοίως εἶναι) (258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again (a7-9), owes to θατέρου φύσις now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that are of the nature of the difference and set over each other in being (τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις) is being as being itself is being (αὐτοῦ τοῦὄν τοςοὐσία ἐστιν) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary of, each other (a11-b3). This is exactly τὸμὴὄν, the subject of the inquiry (b6-7). Hence, not being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἶδοςamong the many things that are (b9-c3). Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different from it (259a6-8). Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1). 2. Difference and the Being of a Copy We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem. Plato’s analogy of original -copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational? By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of "degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are some of Plato’s words in Republic as well as Plato’s words in some other dialogues (1998, 219). When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, purely or perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable (1998, 229); an obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one. He thinks that when in Republic we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than its Form, it is because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being adulterated by contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain understanding of it (1998, 222). Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology thinking that 'to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"' (1980, 213). He thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understοοd as being rather than reality, τὸὄν as "that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of being. Allen believes that a 'purely epistemic' reading of the passage in Republic is patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper suggests gets close to this paper’s solution: -/- Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are different grades of ontological status. (1986, 241) -/- A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to Phaedo where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. white (1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a doctrine of particulars as images and semblances but come to such a view after Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, Timaeus and RepublicVI-VII besides the last pages of book V. The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in RepublicV can be reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist. We can find out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology. In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-9). At 237c1-4, the problem of "not being" is noticed in a new way which shows some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being. Nevertheless, not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech (238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), the solution to the problem appears: the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν) but still is 'another such thing (ἕτεροντοιου̑τον)' (240a8). Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing (240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἐοικὸςμὲν (240b2). A copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικὸς is opposed to ὄντως ὄν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like (ἐοικὸς) is not really that which is (οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὄν)'. But still a copy 'is in a way (ἔστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως) (b11). The Stranger asks: -/- So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν) but it really is what we call a likeness (ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13) -/- This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being. Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image, in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and has real being' because otherwise 'it would be an ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,essentially and really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as folows: i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν). ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἕτερον). iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινόν) as that of which it is a copy but only that which is like it (ἐοικὸς). iv) It is not really that which really is (ὄντως ὄν) but only really a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως). The conclusion is that: v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of interweaving being with not being. This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that which is not somehow is (τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι)' and 'that which is, somehow is not (τό ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3). In Timaeus, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιου̑τον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" (τὸ διἀ παντὸς τοιου̑τον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word τοιου̑τον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and separated from its image. Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism of the relational theory. What we are being said in Timaeus, he thinks,cannot be explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following. 3. πολλαχῶς ἔστι The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of pollachos legetai is a brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works, is his resolution for some of the ontological problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense. Aristotle is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine. 1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic. a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being: -/- Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by reference to one (πρὸς ἕν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ φύσιν). (Metaphysics 1003a33-34) -/- The doctrine of pros hen which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of the same word. The pros hen implementation of being is to provide an alternative for the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being which says being is said in one sense (kath hen) (1060b 32-33). That both the pros hen and the kath hen implementation of a word has one thing (hen) as what is common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does not consider anything in common. Whereas both pros hen and kath hen assume a common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of relation, their difference is that while kath hen takes all the implementations of the word as the same with the common nature, pros hen makes them different. Substance is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily: -/- For as is (τὸ ἔστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way (οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way. So too τὸτί ἐστιν belongs simply (ἁπλῶς) to substance but in a limited sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23). -/- The word ἁπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (ἁπλῶς) the ἕν, the common nature, τὸὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident. The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (pros) the substance is said to be. The doctrine of pros hen, changing kath hen to pros hen in respect of to on, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of pros hen it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that: -/- Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20) -/- Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be are said only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of pollachos legetai,pros hen and the theory of substance. b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (Metaphysics 1026b13-14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was 'in a sense not wrong' saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) because the arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the beginning of book , he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ̕ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν) in an unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22). The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of pollachos legetai, pros hen and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents almost as not being, comparedwith substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call Pollachos Legetai (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (pros) to it. Adding Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to (pros) a model; it is different from (ἕτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὄντως ὄν) but only is in a way (πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the theory of pollachos legetai and pros hen, we can observe its fundamental similarity with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure. Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is 'something intermediate between univocity and full equivocity' (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it pros hen (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well. Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many senses… It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' (1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἁπλῶς and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ᾕ) which is directly linked with his distinction between καθ’ αὑτο λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then continues: -/- We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said simply (ἁπλως) to come from not being (μὴὄντος). But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτο μὴ ὄν, nothing can become. (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25) . (shrink)

Bioinformatics scientists often describe their own scientific activities as the practice of working with large amounts of data using computing devices. An essential part of their self-identification is also the development of ways to visually represent the results of this work. Some of these methods are aimed at building convenient representations of data and demonstrating patterns present in them (graphics, diagrams, graphs). Others are ways of visualizing objects that are not directly accessible to human perception (microphotography, X-ray). Both the construction (...) of visualizations and (especially) the creation of new computer visualization methods are considered in bioinformatics as significant scientific achievements. Representations of the three-dimensional structure of protein molecules play a special role in the inquiries of bioinformatics scientists. 3D-visualization of a macromolecule, on the one hand, is, like a graph, a representation of the results of computer processing of data arrays obtained by material methods – spatiotemporal coordinates of structural elements of the molecule. On the other hand, like microphotography, these 3D structures should serve as accurate representations of specific scientific objects. This leads to the parallel existence of two contradictory epistemic regimes: creative arbitrariness in making convenient, communicatively successful models, is combined with commitment to the object “as it really is”. The paradox is reinforced by the fact that the scientific study of objects in question (determining the properties of the structure, its functions, comparison with other structures) by means of computers does not require visualization at all. Its obviously high value for bioinformatics does not look justified if we take into account the prominent artificiality and artistry of the resulting images. However, the status of these images becomes clearer if we relate them to earlier notions of the role of the visual in scientific discovery. The highest estimation of visualization as the final result of scientific research was characteristic of Renaissance science. The artistic representation of ideal essential properties, instead of a strict correspondence to a particular biological object, is an epistemic virtue typical of the naturalists of the 17th and 18th centuries. Both suggested a close collaboration between the scientist and the artist; and standards for visualizing macromolecules in bioinformatics grow out of a similar collaboration (Geis’ drawings). The desire for maximum accuracy and detail inherits the regulation of “mechanical objectivity” (as Daston and Galison put it into words), for which it is also important to eliminate humans from the image production process (in bioinformatics, to transfer these functions to computer programs). Thus, 3D-visualization of protein structures bears traces of historically different value orientations, but the scientific practice of the 20th and 21st centuries, supplemented by computer technologies, allows them to be intertwined in particular disciplinary units. (shrink)

Jonathan Quong proposes the following “Stringency Principle” for proportionality in self-defense: “If a wrongful attacker threatens to violate a right with stringency level X, then the level of defensive force it is proportionate to impose on the attacker is equivalent to X.” I adduce a counter-example that shows that this principle is wrong. Furthermore, Quong assumes that what determines the stringency of a person’s right is exclusively the amount of force that one would have to avert from someone else in (...) order to have a necessity justification for one’s transgressing the right in order to avert said force. Yet, Quong provides no argument as to why, first, the stringency of a right should be measured exclusively with reference to permissible rights-infringement; and second, he provides no explanation as to why the permissibility of the rights-infringement should be established with reference to “someone else,” namely with reference to an “innocent person,” instead of with reference to the person against whom the right in question is actually being held: the aggressor. I argue that the latter option is certainly the more plausible one, but so amended the stringency principle will be unable to adjudicate any substantive questions about proportionality in self-defense. In particular, Quong’s account cannot “explain” – contrary to what Quong claims – the allegedly intuitive judgment that one must not kill in defense of property or in order to avoid minor injuries. (shrink)

Adviser: Professor Stefan Baumrin In the first chapter I introduce the distinction between metaethics and normative ethics and argue that metaethics, properly conceived, is a part of cognitive science. For example, the debate between rationalism and sentimentalism can be informed by recent empirical work in psychology and the neurosciences. In the second chapter I argue that the traditional view that one’s theory of semantics determines what one’s theory of justification must be is mistaken. Though it has been the case that (...) there are ‘typical’ combinations of semantic and justificational theories this is by no means forced on one. In the third chapter I examine two current kinds of expressivism; that of Blackburn and Copp. Each gives us an example of different combinations of semantic and justificatory theory. In Blackburn’s case he combines a use theory of meaning with a classic emotivist theory of justification, In Copp’s case it is a neo-Gricean philosophy of language with a realist’s theory of justification. I find both of these wanting as they ultimately collapse into relativistic subjectivism. In the fourth and fifth chapter I turn to developing Emotive Realism. The basic idea behind this view is that when someone says ‘x is wrong/right’ that person has (a) expressed a moral emotion about x and at the same time (b) expressed the belief that the emotion in (a) is the correct one to have. The belief expressed in (b) will be true or false depending on one’s theory of justification. In the fourth chapter I argue that we need separate semantic theories for thoughts and sentences. In the fifth chapter I fill in the details of Emotive Realism as I see it. (shrink)

DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva Instituto Agronômico de Pernambuco Embrapa Semiárido -/- • _____OBJETIVO -/- Os estudantes de Veterinária e de Zootecnia estão ligados à disciplina Reprodução Animal, um pelos mecanismos fisiológicos para evitar e tratar as possíveis patologias do trato reprodutivo dos animais domésticos, e outro para o entendimento dos processos fisiológicos visando o manejo reprodutivo e a procriação para a formação de um plantel geneticamente melhorado. Sendo assim, a finalidade do presente trabalho é apresentar os (...) mecanismos que regulam as diferenças sobre o desenvolvimento embrionário relativos à diferenciação e determinação sexual de machos e fêmeas, que também incluem o desenvolvimento dos órgãos envolvidos na reprodução e a origem das diferenças entre ambos os sexos. -/- •____INTRODUÇÃO -/- Os organismos que se reproduzem sexualmente são descendentes de organismos ao qual não existia a diferenciação sexual. Em algum momento da evolução surgiu a reprodução sexual como um mecanismo para incrementar a diversidade genética e facilitar a troca de informações genéticas mediante o material genético da fêmea com o do macho. Devido sua origem comum, na maioria das espécies, tanto os machos como as fêmeas possuem todos os genes necessários para desenvolverem-se em qualquer dos sexos. O que efetivamente faz diferença entre os sexos é a forma e a ordem ao qual se expressam os genes durante o processo de desenvolvimento. A diferenciação sexual é regulada principalmente por mecanismos epigenéticos, mais do que as diferenças genéticas de grande magnitude entre os sexos. Todo o controle epigenético de qualquer processo de desenvolvimento depende basicamente de uma série de expressões gênicas, através da qual a expressão de certa combinação de genes resulta na presença de determinadas proteínas, conhecidas como os fatores de transcrição, que induzem ou reprimem a expressão de outro(os) gene(es), a partir dos quais se produzem novas proteínas, que em certos casos também atuam como fatores de transcrição para outros genes, e assim sucessivamente. Logo, a expressão ou falta de expressão de um gene ao início da série pode resultar em um ladrão totalmente diferente da expressão de outros genes subsequentes, o que pode ocasionar profundas mudanças no processo de desenvolvimento e até a mutações indesejáveis. O padrão predeterminado de expressões gênica relativo a diferenciação sexual na maioria das espécies tanto domésticas quanto selvagens, leva ao desenvolvimento de um dos sexos (o padrão predeterminado dos mamíferos é o sexo feminino). Em consequência, a diferenciação faz com que um indivíduo do sexo oposto exija a expressão de um gene de determinação sexual que desvie a subsequente série de expressões gênica em direção ao dito sexo. Nos mamíferos, a expressão do gene SRY, localizado no cromossomo Y (e portanto ausente nas fêmeas), redige o padrão de diferenciação sexual de sua via pré-estabelecida feminina em direção ao padrão masculino. A existência de uma única diferença genética (presença do gene SRY nos machos e ausentes nas fêmeas), vai se amplificando e termina resultando no desenvolvimento de indivíduos diferentes entre si. Esse é um mecanismo de diferenciação sexual cromossômica. O primeiro passo de uma série de diferenciação sexual, em sentido estrito, não depende nem requer necessariamente a presença de um gene diferente em algum dos sexos. O gene “disparador” da diferenciação sexual pode estar presente em todos os embriões, porém pode expressar-se somente em algum deles, devido a fatores ambientais que formam parte da sua regulação epigenética, isto é, uma determinação sexual ambiental. Em algumas espécies de tartarugas ou de lagartos a expressão ou falta de expressão do gene “disparador”, por exemplo, depende da temperatura existente durante a incubação dos ovos, pelo qual alguns embriões desenvolvem-se como machos e outros como fêmeas, apesar de não existir diferença genética entre eles, simplesmente como consequência da temperatura: a determinação sexual depende da temperatura a que cada um deles foi submetido durante a incubação. Em certas espécies as temperaturas mais elevadas facilitam o desenvolvimento de fêmeas e outras de machos, enquanto que em outras espécies as temperaturas amenas (intermediárias) resultam em machos, e as inferiores como as superiores induzem o desenvolvimento de fêmeas. A existência dessa diversidade indica que a temperatura por si mesma não é a que induz ou a que provoca o desenvolvimento do macho e da fêmea, senão a que atua somente como um regulador inicial da diferenciação sexual. Em outras espécies o fator ambiental que regula a determinação sexual pode ser distinto. A densidade populacional, por exemplo, pode atuar como um regulador. Podemos concluir que a determinação sexual dependente da temperatura ou de outros fatores ambientais estabelece-se antes da determinação sexual cromossômica, a qual evoluiu depois como um método que oferece maior certeza e resultado, já que a proporção de machos e fêmeas não é afetada por mudanças ambientais ou de hábitat. -/- •___FORMAÇÃO INICIAL DA GÔNADA -/- Basicamente em todos os embriões, inicialmente se formam as chamadas gônadas indiferenciadas (com o potencial de desenvolver-se em ovários ou testículos) a partir da invasão das cristas genitais pelas células germinais primordiais, que migram desde seu local de origem no epiblasto, perto do lugar onde o saco vitelino se une com o intestino primitivo e que chegam até às cristas genitais que são engrossamentos de tecido situados na região mesonéfrica do embrião. A migração das células germinais primordiais ocorre muito cedo sobre o processo de desenvolvimento do embrião (dia 26 nos bovinos). Ao chegas as cristas genitais, as células germinativas proliferam-se e se organizam com as células somáticas já existentes nas cristas para ir formando a gônada (figura 1). Para regular essa remodelação e conformação adequada da gônada vários genes se expressam, como o OCT-4 (que aparentemente mantém a totipotencialidade da gônada), assim como o SF-1 (Fator esteroidogênico 1) e o WT-1 (gene associado ao tumor de Wilms). Esses dois últimos genes estimulam a proliferação celular e estabelecimento dos cordões sexuais. Nessa etapa inicial do desenvolvimento todos esses genes se expressam sem distinção de sexo, pelo que a gônada em formação mantém a capacidade de se diferenciar em testículo ou em ovário. -/- Figura 1: migração das células germinais primordiais em direção a crista gonodal. Diferenciação das gônadas femininas e masculinas. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- •___SEXO CROMOSSÔMICO -/- Têm-se observado que nos mamíferos a determinação sexual depende diretamente dos cromossomos. As fêmeas possuem dois cromossomos sexuais X (um contribuído do óvulo e o outro por um espermatozoide “X”). Os machos, por sua vez, possuem um cromossomo sexual X(proveniente do óvulo) e um cromossomo sexual Y, que provém de um espermatozoide “Y” (figura 2). A metade dos espermatozoides produzidos por um macho são X e a metade Y, isso porque durante a espermatogênese a divisão meiótica provoca que a partir de cada espermatócito primário, célula diploide que por pertencer a um indivíduo macho tem um cromossomo X e um Y, se originem das espermátides haploides a cada um das que eles tocam cromossomos X, e outras espermátides haploides as que eles tocam os cromossomos Y. Dessa forma, de acordo com o tipo do espermatozoide que fertilize o ovócito, se originará um indivíduo com cariótipo feminino “XX” ou um cariótipo masculino “XY” (figura 2). Esse processo é conhecido como sexo cromossômico, ao qual se determina o momento da fertilização. Figura 2: nos mamíferos todos os óvulos produzidos pelas fêmeas possuem um cromossomo sexual X. A metade dos espermatozoides produzidos pelos machos possuem um cromossomo X e a outra metade possui um cromossomo Y. Dependendo do cromossomo presente no espermatozoide que fertilize o óvulo pode-se gerar um indivíduo XX (fêmea) ou um XY (macho). Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- O cromossomo “Y” é uma “invenção” relativamente recente na história da evolução das espécies e do estudo da genética. Surgiu a partir de uma mutação de um cromossomo “X”, que resultou na perda de um de seus braços, que é por onde se originou a morfologia do cromossomo Y. A maioria dos genes presentes no cromossomo Y também existem no cromossomo X; assim mesmo somente alguns genes do cromossomo Y foram evoluídos até ser diferentes dos genes do cromossomo X. Embora os machos possuam um cromossomo que não está presente nas fêmeas, esse mesmo cromossomo não aporta toda a informação genética original. Todos os genes existentes nas fêmeas estão também presentes nos dos machos, já que eles também possuem um cromossomo X. Uma particularidade do cromossomo Y, ao existir somente uma cópia nos machos, é que ele sofre um entrecruzamento com um cromossomo análogo durante o processo de meiose, pelo que o cromossomo Y de um macho é idêntico ao de seu progenitor e ao de seus descendentes, exceto no caso em que ocorra uma mutação espontânea. Em contraste, os cromossomos X das fêmeas (um proveniente do pai e outro da mãe) se entrecruzam durante a meiose, por onde cada óvulo produzido pela fêmea terá uma combinação de alelos distinta em seu cromossomo X. Ao estudar as diferenças presentes na sequência de DNA do cromossomo Y, é possível identificar a distância filogenética entre os indivíduos (quanto mais diferenças existirem entre os cromossomos significa que seu ancestral comum está mais longe). Algo análogo ocorre com o DNA das mitocôndrias, que sempre são aportados pela mãe e nunca sofrem recombinação genética. Gene SRY -/- Um dos poucos genes do cromossomo Y que não possuem correspondência com o cromossomo X é o gene SRY (Sex-determining Region of the Y chromossome – região do cromossomo Y determinante do sexo). Esse gene se expressa somente na gônada em formação nos embriões machos, em particular em células precursoras das células de Sertoli; ele codifica uma proteína da família SOX (SRY-like Box) que é uma família formada por proteínas que possuem um domínio de união ao DNA e que atuam como fatores de transcrição. Ao produzir-se a proteína SRY nas células precursoras das células de Sertoli estimula-se a expressão (transcrição) de outro gene análogo, denominado SOX-9 que, por sua vez, atua como um fator de transcrição que ativa a expressão de outros genes, como o FGF-9 (Fibroblast Growth Factor-9), ou seja ele é o estimulante de ativação dos demais. Os produtos dos genes SOX-9 e FGF-9 iniciam uma cascata de expressões que provocam a diferenciação das células de suporte da gônada indiferenciada (crista genital) em células de Sertoli. Em seguida, essas células dirigem a diferenciação das células intersticiais da crista genital em células de Leydig, o que finalmente resulta na formação de um testículo. Outro dos efeitos da proteína codificada por SOX-9 é um estímulo maior da expressão de seu próprio gene, pelo qual é produzido um ciclo de retroalimentação positiva que favorece a continuidade do processo de formação testicular. Como nos embriões da fêmea não existe o gene SRY, a gônada indiferenciada não é estimulada para expressar os genes SOX-9 nem o FGF-9 nas células de suporte (que nesse caso serão precursoras de células da granulosa). A gônada, em mudança, expressa em forma constitutiva, isto é, sem a necessidade de estimulação, outra cascata de genes que incluem o WNT4 (Wingless-integration Factor 4) e o RAPO1 (Respondina-1), que por sua vez iniciam uma cascata de expressão gênica, a qual provoca a diferenciação das células somáticas da gônada indiferenciada para formação das células da granulosa e células da teca, esse feito conduz, por sua vez, a formação de um ovário. No embrião macho a proteína SOX-9 inibe a expressão dos genes WNT4 e RSPO-1, pelo que a presença do gene SRY, e portanto de SOX-9, inibem a formação de um ovário ao mesmo tempo que estimulam a formação do testículo (figura 3). Em suma, se o embrião possui genótipo XY (um embrião macho), o gene SRY começa a expressar-se sobre as células precursoras da gônada imediatamente depois da formação da mesma, quando os cordões sexuais primários estão se desenvolvendo na medula. A expressão do gene, assim como a presença subsequente das proteínas SOX-9 e FGF-9 estimula a distinção das células de Sertoli e que se organizem os tubos seminíferos a partir dos cordões sexuais primários. Em contrapartida, em um embrião com genótipo XX (fêmea) não existe o gene SRY, pelo qual é impossível que se elevem os níveis das proteínas SOX-9 e FGF-9 e as células precursoras não se diferenciam em células de Sertoli, e portanto os cordões sexuais primários sofrem regressão. Depois de alguns dias, começam a organizar-se os cordões sexuais secundários e as células precursoras iniciam a expressão do gene WNT4, o que leva as mesmas a diferenciar-se em células da granulosa, que serão a base para a conformação dos folículos ovarianos. Se em um embrião XY, macho, a expressão do gene SRY demora, é formada um ovo-testículo devido a que algumas das células somáticas das cristas gonodais começam a expressar o gene WNT4, e a diferenciar-se em células da granulosa, enquanto que em outras a proteína SRY chega a tempo para dirigir a diferenciação para formação das células de Sertoli. No ovário em formação é expressado um gene denominado DAX-1 (Dosage-sensitive Sex Reversal). Esse gene, localizado no cromossomo X, codifica uma proteína que é um membro da família dos receptores nucleares ao que lhe falta o domínio de união ao DNA, pelo que parece atuar no bloqueio de diversos fatores de transcrição, entre os que se encontra o SRY. Como a proteína DAX-1 impede a ação da proteína SRY, um excesso de expressão do gene DAX-1 pode provocar a feminilização gonodal de indivíduos XY, macho, embora tenham SRY. Em condições normais, a expressão adequada do gene DAX-1 não é capaz de evitar a masculinização gonodal de embriões com o gene SRY, daqui o nome de reversão sexual dependente da dose. Figura 3: série de expressão gênica para a determinação gonodal. SRY (Região do cromossomo Y determinante do sexo), SOX-9 (SRY-like Box-9), FGF-9 (Fator de crescimento de fibroblastos-9), WNT4 (Wingless-integration Factor-4), RSPO-1 (Respondina-1). Uma vez que o SRY induz a expressão de SOX-9 na gônada masculina, inicia-se um processo de feedback positivo mediante o qual os níveis de expressão de SOX-9 e FGF-9 vão aumentando, ao mesmo tempo que inibem a expressão de WNT-4 e RSPO-1. Na gônada feminina não se expressam SRY, SOX-9 e nem FGF-9, o que permite que se expressem os genes WNT-4 e RSPO-1, que iniciam uma cascata de sinalização que dirige a formação de um ovário. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- • ___DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DOS GENITAIS -/- Uma vez que se formam os testículos, todo o desenvolvimento subsequente dos órgãos e as características “masculinas” em lugar das femininas é em consequência dos hormônios produzidos pelos testículos em formação, incluindo os andrógenos e o hormônio inibidor dos ductos de Müller. Mediante a ausência de testículos todo o desenvolvimento dos órgãos genitais internos e externos segue um padrão feminino, sem levar em conta se estão presentes os ovários; o que significa a ausência de hormônios gonodais determina que o embrião se desenvolva como fêmea, uma vez que não requerem hormônios ovarianos para desencadear o padrão feminino. Por sua vez, as gônadas masculinas (os testículos), produzem substâncias que desviam o desenvolvimento em direção ao padrão masculino. Sob etapas relativamente rápidas da diferenciação todos os embriões possuem dois pares de dutos sexuais, os dutos de Wolff ou mesonéfricos e os dutos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos (figura 4). A testosterona secretada pelos testículos do feto macho em desenvolvimento atua sobre os dutos de Wolff, o que induz a formação posterior dos dutos deferentes, do epidídimo e das glândulas seminais (figura 4). Figura 4: formação dos órgãos genitais internos a partir dos dutos de Wolff no macho e dos dutos de Müller na fêmea. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- Os testículos produzem ao mesmo tempo, uma glicoproteína chamada Hormônio Inibidor dos Dutos de Müller (Müllerian Inhibiting Hormone, MIH, também chamado de Anti-Müllerian Hormone, AMH); como o seu nome indica, inibe o desenvolvimento dos dutos de Müller ou paramesonéfricos, provocando sua regressão, que impede a formação dos órgãos genitais característicos da fêmea como os ovidutos, o útero, a cérvix e a porção cranial da vagina (figura 4). O MIH é uma glicoproteína da família dos fatores de crescimento transformativo β (TGFβ). O gene MIH possui locais de união para os produtos dos genes SOX-9 e SF-1, pelo que a presença simultânea de ambos fatores de transcrição é necessária para a secreção do MIH e leva a cabo sua função de iniciação dos dutos de Müller sobre o embrião macho (vale lembrar que nessa etapa tanto a gônada de embriões machos como de embriões fêmeas expressam o gene SF-1, mas somente o macho expressa o SOX-9, para que unicamente esse último produza MIH). O certo é que na gônada do embrião fêmea não se produzem quantidades importantes da proteína SOX-9, além de que se produz a proteína DAX-1, mesma que antagoniza tanto a SOX-9 como a SF-1, todo o qual impede a produção de MIH e resulta no desenvolvimento dos dutos de Müller até a formação dos ovidutos, útero, cérvix e a porção cranial da vagina (figura 4). Assim, na fêmea, ao não haver testículos não circulam concentrações elevadas de andrógenos, o que impedirá o desenvolvimento dos dutos de Wolff, enquanto que os dutos de Müller se desenvolvem já que não haverá a presença do MIH para impedi-lo. O desenvolvimento dos genitais internos e externos femininos não requerem a presença de nenhum hormônio ovariano o que levará a cabo de maneira predeterminada (ou pré-estabelecida) na ausência de testículos. Outra estrutura interna que também se desenvolve de forma distinta nos machos e nas fêmeas é o seio urogenital, que no embrião macho é estimulado pela testosterona para formação da próstata, das glândulas bulbouretrais e da uretra peniana, enquanto que na fêmea forma a porção caudal da vagina. A respeito dos órgãos genitais externos (figura 5), nos embriões de ambos os sexos existem estruturas precursoras chamadas de tubérculo genital e pregas vestibulares. Na fêmea o tubérculo genital da origem ao clitóris e as pregas vestibulares dão origem aos lábios vulvares sem a necessidade da atuação de hormônios ovarianos, já que o padrão “por via pré-estabelecida” é feminino. Em contrapartida, no macho, tanto o tubérculo genital quanto as pregas vestibulares respondem ao hormônio 5α-dehidro-testosterona (DHT), ao qual se formam as células da pele da zona genital a partir da testosterona que é secretada pelos testículos. Para isso existem nas células a enzima 5α-reductasa, que transforma a testosterona em DHT. Uma vez formada, a DHT atua sobre as pregas vestibulares do embrião macho para que se fusionem e formem o escroto (em lugar dos lábios vulvares), e sobre o tubérculo genital para formar o pênis (em lugar do clitóris). Figura 5: estruturas que se desenvolvem nos embriões de cada sexo a partir do seio urogenital, o tubérculo genital e as pregas vestibulares. A cor do né de cada estrutura final corresponde com a cor do nome da estrutura a partir da qual se originou. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. -/- • ___DIFERENCIAÇÃO SEXUAL DO SISTEMA NERVOSO -/- Existem inúmeras diferenças funcionais entre o sistema nervoso da fêmeas e o do machos, em humanos podem incluir diferenças tão complexas como a maior capacidade de verbal da mulher ou a maior capacidade de orientação espacial do homem. Nessa parte será abordada aquelas diferenças que influenciam diretamente sobre a função reprodutiva, como as diferenças na regulação da secreção de gonadotropinas ou as diferenças na capacidade de comportamento sexual masculino ou feminino. É necessário lembrar que, apesar de que essas diferenças se originem durante um período crítico da vida fetal ou neonatal (dependendo da espécie), geralmente se fazem presentes até que o animal chegue a vida adulta e demonstre obter ou não a capacidade para se comportar como macho ou como fêmea uma vez que é exposto aos hormônios sexuais que são secretada depois da puberdade. Igualmente aos processos acima citados, podemos afirmar que nos mamíferos o padrão pré-estabelecido de comportamento sexual e de secreção de gonadotropinas é o feminino. Se durante os primeiros dias de vida neonatal uma rata fêmea não é exposta a nenhum hormônio gonodal, ao chegar a vida adulta ela terá a capacidade de se comportar como fêmea na presença de estrógenos, assim como de secretar um pico pré-ovulatório de GnRH/LH em resposta aos mesmos (figura 6). Essa rata, portanto, não poderá se comportar como macho embora que em sua vida adulta seja exposta a testosterona. O sistema nervoso do rato macho recém-nascido que é exposto aos andrógenos produzidos pelos testículos, em detrimento, faz com que adquiram o potencial para se comportar como machos em sua vida adulta e que perdem o potencial para ter conduta de fêmeas na presença e/ou administração de estrógenos (processo conhecido como desfeminização do SNC). Se por meios de experimentos injetamos testosterona em uma rata fêmea recém-nascida, essa rata não poderá se comportar como fêmea em sua vida adulta, e passará a se comportar como macho. A castração neonatal de um rato (visando evitar a exposição de seu SNC a andrógenos testiculares), assim mesmo, resultará em sua vida adulta um padrão feminino (SNC feminizado e não masculinizado). O hipotálamo das ratas adultas possui uma área em que o número, características e densidade dos corpos neurais difere em machos e fêmeas, essa área é denominada como “núcleo sexualmente dimórfico do hipotálamo”, e tem demonstrado que quando as ratas são tratadas com testosterona na vida neonatal, a morfologia de seu núcleo sexualmente dimórfico será masculinizado em sua vida adulta, enquanto que a castração neonatal de ratos resulta em um núcleo sexualmente dimórfico feminizado em sua vida adulta. Isso significa que a exposição ou não a testosterona na vida neonatal é o que determina que tipo de núcleo sexualmente dimórfico se desenvolverá, o que por sua vez está relacionado com o tipo de conduta que o animal poderá expressar em sua vida adulta. Não deixa de ser um paradoxo que ao injetar uma dose elevada de estrógenos nos primeiros dias de vida de uma rata, os núcleos sexualmente dimórficos da mesma se desenvolverão como macho e em sua vida adulta seu potencial de conduta estará masculinizado e desfeminizado. O hormônio “feminino” conhecido como estradiol, masculiniza o hipotálamo e a conduta do animal. Logo, se a rata neonatal for exposta a injeção de andrógeno não-aromatizado (que não pode ser transformado em estrógenos pelas células) ela não se masculiniza. A masculinização e desfeminização dos ratos ou das ratas tratados com testosterona, na realidade, não são provocados pela própria testosterona, senão pelos estrógenos que se formam dentro dos neurônios quando absorvem a testosterona do sangue e a aromatizam para transformá-la em estrógenos (figura 6). Figura 6: desfeminização e masculinização do sistema nervoso central por meio da testosterona, que quando não absorvida pela α-fetoproteína pode entrar nos neurônios, onde se aromatizam para serem transformados em estrógenos, hormônio que é responsável pela desfeminização. Fonte: ZARCO, 2018. Por que as ratas, que possuem ovários funcionalmente produtores de estrógenos, não se masculinizam? A resposta está em uma proteína denominada α-fetoproteína que circula em altas concentrações nos fetos e nos recém-nascidos. Essa proteína possui a capacidade de unir-se aos estrógenos, ao qual impede seu entrada nas células. Os ratos, em desenvolvimento, produzem testosterona, no entanto não possui afinidade pela α-fetoproteína, o que permite com que ela circule livremente. Ao chegar ao SNC, a testosterona (que não foi absorvida) pode entrar nos neurônios e dentro deles se aromatizam e transformam-se em estrógenos, que finalmente masculinizam o SNC. A diferenciação sexual do hipotálamo depende, em síntese, da presença ou ausência dos testículos, o que permite que se produza ou não o hormônio testosterona que pode não ser absorvida por parte da α-fetoproteína, transformar-se em estrógenos e masculinizar o SNC. -/- •___CONCLUSÃO -/- Nos mamíferos todo o processo que se requerem para o desenvolvimento de um macho depende da existência de somente um gene do cromossomo Y, o gene SRY; a ausência desse gene resulta no desenvolvimento de uma fêmea. A presença ou ausência do gene SRY determina, então, a cadeia de eventos morfogênicos que ocorrerá em sua expressão ou não, para desenvolver todos os órgãos e características de um macho ou de uma fêmea. Por essa razão, os indivíduos com uma monossomia XOA (síndrome de Turner) são fêmeas (por não possuir o cromossomo Y nem o gene SRY), enquanto que os indivíduos triploides XXY (síndrome de Kleinefelter) são machos embora possuam dois cromossomos X. Em algumas espécies, no entanto, têm-se identificado machos que são cromossomicamente XX; nesses casos é determinado invariavelmente que por ser um erro durante a meiose a região do cromossomo Y em que reside o gene SRY tem sido transloucada ao cromossomo X. Da mesma forma, em alguns casos tem sido encontrado fêmeas com cariótipo XY; que nelas se identifica uma mutação inabilitante do gene SRY. Isso demonstra experimentalmente que por meio da engenharia genética é possível produzir machos com cariótipo XY mas com o gene SRY eliminado (knockout). Como é de se esperar, esses machos desenvolvem ovários e todos seus órgãos genitais, tanto internos quanto externos, e se desenvolvem como fêmeas. Os machos cromossomicamente XX transgênicos aos que se insertam uma cópia do gene SRY, desenvolvem testículos e um fenótipo masculino, embora sejam estéreis por causa da ausência de alguns genes do cromossomo Y que são necessários para a realização de uma espermatogênese normal. As falhas nos mecanismos de diferenciação sexual podem, diretamente, ocasionar anormalidades como as observadas nas bezerras Freemartin, que são bezerras originadas de uma gestação gemelar em que seu gêmeo era macho. O que sucede é que na espécie bovina, quando há uma gestação gemelar, é produzido um certo grau de anastomose entre as placentas dos fetos, o que permite a troca de sangue e de células entre ambos. Os produtos recebem, então, algumas células de seu gêmeos, que encontram seu lugar no órgão correspondente e se integram a ele. No caso particular das gônadas, quando o ovário primitivo de um embrião fêmea é colonizado por algumas células gonodais de seu gêmeo macho, essas células expressam o gene SRY, o que fará com que essa região da gônada se diferencie como testículo. Como resultado, se desenvolve um ovo-testículo (com maior ou menor proporção de tecido testicular dependendo do grau de colonização da gônada em formação por células provenientes do gêmeo macho). Ademais, ao haver certa quantidade de tecido testicular produtor de MIH, circularão sobre o feto fêmea níveis desse hormônio que, embora baixos, afetarão o desenvolvimento normal dos dutos de Müller, fazendo com que as bezerras Freemartin possuam genitálias internas ausentes ou pouco desenvolvidas. Os andrógenos produzidos pelas zonas de tecido testicular, por fim, são suficientes para causar um certo grau de masculinização, que se manifesta como um clitóris mais grande que o normal ou um desenvolvimento corporal masculinizado. -/- REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- ARNOLD, Arthur P.; CHEN, Xuqi; ITOH, Yuichiro. What a difference an X or Y makes: sex chromosomes, gene dose, and epigenetics in sexual differentiation. In: Sex and gender differences in pharmacology. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2013. p. 67-88. CUNNINGHAM, James. Tratado de fisiologia veterinária. Elsevier Health Sciences, 2011. DERIVAUX, Jules; BARNABÉ, Renato Campanarut. Reprodução dos animais domésticos. Zaragoza: Acribia, 1980. DA SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro. Desenvolvimento Embrionário e Diferenciação Sexual nos Animais Domésticos. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Julho de 2020. HAFEZ, Elsayed Saad Eldin; HAFEZ, Bahaa. Reprodução animal. São Paulo: Manole, 2004. HIDALGO, C. Galina et al. Reproducción de animales domésticos. México: Limusa, 2008. MACLAUGHLIN, David T.; DONAHOE, Patricia K. Sex determination and differentiation. New England Journal of Medicine, v. 350, n. 4, p. 367-378, 2004. MCCARTHY, Margaret M.; ARNOLD, Arthur P. Reframing sexual differentiation of the brain. Nature neuroscience, v. 14, n. 6, p. 677, 2011. PLANT, Tony M.; ZELEZNIK, Anthony J. (Ed.). Knobil and Neill's physiology of reproduction. Academic Press, 2014. REY, Rodolfo. Diferenciación sexual embrio-fetal: De las moléculas a la anatomía. Revista chilena de anatomía, v. 19, n. 1, p. 75-82, 2001. SENGER, P. L. Embryogenesis of the pituitary gland and male or female reproductive system. In. Pathways to Pregnancy and Parturition. Current Conception Inc, v. 1, p. 8-76, 1997. ZARCO, L. Diferenciación sexual. In. PORTA, L. R.; MEDRANO, J. H. H. Fisiología reproductiva de los animales domésticos. Cidade do México: FMVZ-UNAM, 2018. -/- REALIZAÇÃO -/- . (shrink)

As physical entities that translate symbols into physical actions, computers offer insights into the nature of meaning and agency. • Physical symbol systems, generically known as agents, link abstractions to material actions. The meaning of a symbol is defined as the physical actions an agent takes when the symbol is encountered. • An agent has autonomy when it has the power to select actions based on internal decision processes. Autonomy offers a partial escape from constraints imposed by direct physical influences (...) such as gravity and the transfer of momentum. Swimming upstream is an example. • Symbols are names that can designate other entities. It appears difficult to explain the use of names and symbols in terms of more primitive functionality. The ability to use names and symbols, i.e., symbol grounding, may be a fundamental cognitive building block. • The standard understanding of causality—wiggling X results in Y wiggling—applies to both physical causes (e.g., one billiard ball hitting another) and symbolic causes (e.g., a traffic light changing color). Because symbols are abstract, they cannot produce direct physical effects. For a symbol to be a cause requires that the affected entity determine its own response. This is called autonomous causality. • This analysis of meaning and autonomy offers new perspectives on free will. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Think Least of Death: Spinoza on How to Live and How to Die by Steven NadlerJohn GreySteven Nadler. Think Least of Death: Spinoza on How to Live and How to Die. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2020. Pp. x + 234. Hardback, $39.95.Think Least of Death is not just an interpretation of Spinoza, but a defense of his philosophy. Nadler develops Spinoza's arguments in ways that are intended (...) both to reflect Spinoza's views and to persuade us that the views in question are true. He uses success language throughout to describe Spinoza's ideas ("What Spinoza discovered, and what he wants us to know, is that..." [11]) and arguments ("Spinoza... has demonstrated, rigorously and a priori, that..." [188]). Nadler is not just a Spinoza scholar here; he also thinks that Spinoza basically got it right. It would be a mistake, then, to evaluate Think Least of Death solely on its interpretive merits as a reading of Spinoza's Ethics. It is more fruitful to look at the places where Nadler not only describes, but apparently endorses, Spinoza's views.Following Nadler, I will focus here on the practical philosophy. Briefly put, Spinoza takes the right way of living to consist in adherence to the dictates of reason, which prescribe "that everyone love himself, seek his own advantage... and 'absolutely, that everyone should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can'" (191). These general principles issue in more specific directives based on facts about human nature. For instance, since the nature of the human mind is such that it always benefits from further understanding, reason directs us to strive for further understanding. To the extent that a human being lives in accordance with such dictates of reason, they will feel joyful, be free, and act virtuously. Conversely, when they are driven by their passions rather than reason, they will often feel sorrow, lack autonomy, and do things that are harmful to themselves and others. This is the source of whatever motivating power these directives have: necessarily, following them conduces to our self-interest.A crucial point for Nadler is that these facts about human nature are the same for each human being. This implies that "there is in fact an objective, non-arbitrary determination of what constitutes a more perfect or ideal human being" (28), the ideal that Spinoza variously refers to as the model of human nature or the free man. On Nadler's reading, Spinoza's notion of the free man (which he treats as equivalent to the model of human nature) is not "some creature of the imagination or reflection of personal taste" (29), but a representation of "the ideal state toward which every individual [human] naturally and necessarily... strives" (29). [End Page 708]A signal contribution of the book is to show that the free person's life is a realizable goal rather than an unattainable ideal. The free person is determined to act by reason alone, yes—but this is compatible with him or her also having passions, so long as those passions do not determine his or her behavior. A free person might feel fear at the prospect of death or suffering, but that fear will not determine what he or she does. Instead, the free person's actions will be determined by the guidance of reason and the positive affects (joy, love, self-esteem, and the like).Since the life of the free person is in principle attainable, Nadler proposes that we take the free person's life as a model for how we ourselves should live. For instance, when Spinoza writes that "a free man always acts honestly" (E 4P72), the implication is that we ourselves should always act honestly. Now, there is an apparent inconsistency in this position, nicely articulated by Don Garrett ("'A Free Man Always Acts Honestly, Not Deceptively': Freedom and the Good in Spinoza's Ethics," in Nature and Necessity in Spinoza's Philosophy [New York: Oxford University Press, 2018], 441–61). The free man—living entirely according to the guidance of reason—always acts honestly. Yet reason also guides us to seek our own advantage, and sometimes the... (shrink)

In the Third Antinomy of the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) [Kritik der reinen Vernunft], Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) associates freedom with infinity. According to the definition given in this book, only an infinite being not subject to causality can be defined as free. However, the fact that a finite being, such as a human, is always subject to the laws of nature implies that they are perpetually bound by causality, which hinders their freedom. Freedom devoid of causality cannot be theoretically (...) justified. Another reason for this is Kant’s assertion in the Second Analogy of Critique of Pure Reason, where he states that everything in the phenomenal world is subject to causality. Accordingly, freedom can be conceived not in the phenomenal world but only in the noumenal world. In the First Critique, freedom, defined as a cause without a cause, a cause without being the result of another cause, later be characterized as negative freedom in the third section of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) [Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten]. Such conceptualization of freedom cannot be determined by any other cause than itself. While there may be a theoretical foundation for accepting such a cause as uncaused, we have moral reasons to believe in it. This moral foundation in question guides us toward the notion of positive freedom. Here, unlike negative freedom, we are subject to moral laws, and as long as we comply with these, we can experience freedom as a finite being. This is because adhering to the laws we set for ourselves enables us to be morally the cause of our own actions. Thus, Kant renders freedom through positive freedom. Following this line of argument, negative freedom appears meaningful to us only within the framework of positive freedom. Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-2021) finds a problematic Kantian account of freedom as an uncaused cause in his book The Experience of Freedom (1988) [L’expérience de la liberté]. Because, according to this perspective, humans are not only subject to the laws of nature but also to moral cause-and-effect relationships with others, they exist at the ix limit of freedom. By this means, considering freedom as a duty imposed on the subject leads to ambiguous analyses such as negative/positive freedom in Kantian philosophyーIn post-Kantian philosophy, the ambiguity persists until Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775-1854)1 , who finds the solution by negating freedom. Therefore, according to Nancy, freedom should be considered not as a Kantian Idea but through its relationship with human finitude and experience. Thus, through the criticism directed at Kant in Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1929) [Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik], Nancy attempts to resolve the confusion created by the concept of freedom, which despite being associated with infinity in Kant, is made possible in the practical world through respect for the moral law. In this direction, Nancy finds the solution in the freedom that becomes conceptually elusive, transforming it into an act that goes beyond being a mere duty and which permeates all our experiences. In this book, Nancy introduces the initial stages of “community” and “singularity” concepts, which he would later develop further. For this, he begins the book's introductory section by emphasizing Martin Heidegger’s statement in §9 of Being and Time (1927) [Sein und Zeit], where “freedom” is mentioned as another name for existence. As a justification, he refers to the concept of Da-sein [being-there] and states that every being [être] is a being-in-common [être-en-commun], and freedom should be thought of through this. Namely, the problem of freedom is approached not as a political or ethical issue but as an ontological matter. Within the framework of beingin-common, this situation transforms into an ontological “generosity [générosité ontologique].” -/- 1 Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom [Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände], Schelling, approaches freedom not through infinity but rather through finitude. While Heidegger and Nancy pursue different paths, they both adhere to the idea of finitude freedom in Schelling. x Despite primarily emphasizing Heidegger’s thought in writing this text as his aggrégation thesis, Jean-Luc Nancy desires to transcend it and maintain a certain distance. This transcendence and distancing include authors from the French Phenomenological tradition, such as Georges Bataille (1897-1962), Maurice Blanchot (1907-2003), and Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998), and also incorporate the emphasis from Hannah Arendt (1906-1975) that death cannot be thought of independently of life. Referencing many philosophers from the continental philosophy tradition and developing a thematic reading through freedom, this bookーlike Nancy’s other worksーseeks ways to experience philosophy and thought freely in this own writing experience. So much so that this book, unlike Nancy’s other works like The Inoperative Community (1986) [La communauté désoeuvrée] ve Being Singular Plural (1996) [Être Singulier Pluriel], which is not widely discussed in secondary sources, is challenging to follow. Therefore, in examining this book as my Master’s research thesis and addressing the idea of freedom in Nancy, I found it appropriate to adopt a close reading method. Certainly, this research should not be considered independent of works such as The Discourse of Syncope (1976) [Le discours de la syncope], The Categorical Imperative (1983) [L’impératif catégorique], as they serve as examples of while engaging in philosophy, how Nancy refers and relates to the works within the philosophical tradition. (shrink)