Our era is characterized by a significant conflict between populism and anti-populism, both politically and culturally. Populist groups and leaders often portray themselves as the true voices of the common people, gaining electoral support or even taking power by framing society as a battle between the ordinary people and the elite, challenging the political and economic establishment. Conversely, parties within the liberal political spectrum counteract the rise of populism by articulating a strong anti-populist discourse, sometimes (...) successfully dominating the political arena. However, despite the increase in studies on populism, there are not many publications regarding anti-populism. This article seeks to examine the anti-populist discourse in Argentina and Greece, two countries with many similarities in political, economic, and cultural aspects. By analyzing the key ideas of anti-populist discourse, we aim to highlight the common anti-populist logic marked by typical paths of modernization, which not only opposes populism but also frequently disregards or opposes specific social groups, such as minorities. (shrink)

The early 21st century has witnessed a significant rise in extreme nationalism, racism, and xenophobia, deeply affecting the rights of minorities such as the Roma, who have historically faced systemic discrimination and racism. Given that many political leaders who downplay minority rights often engage in populist discourse, a debate has emerged about the relationship between populism and minority rights. While many scholars argue that populism inherently undermines liberal principles like the protection of minorities, the question remains whether (...) class='Hi'>populism is necessarily anti-pluralist and anti-minority. What about the case of left-wing populism? Furthermore, why is the relationship between anti-populism and minorities often overlooked? In this article, we examine the relationship between populism, anti-populism, and minorities through the case of two different governmental discourses in crisis-ridden Greece. Specifically, we focus on the governmental political discourse and policies of the populist SYRIZA (2015-2019) and the anti-populist ND (2019-2023) on Roma, with the aim of showing that populism is not necessarily anti-pluralist, while anti-populism is not always pluralist, as both phenomena can follow inclusionary or exclusionary logics. (shrink)

A recent study dealing with Western European countries suggests a connection between vaccine skepticism and support for populist parties (Kennedy 2019). Of all countries in the study, Italy scored highest on both counts, with 44% of the electorate voting for populists in 2014 and 14% of the population not deeming vaccinations important. The study concludes that both phenomena have a common root in the distrust of elite and experts. While that seems plausible, this paper establishes that there is much more (...) to be said about the relation between populism and the anti-vaccination movement. Using the case study of the Italian anti-vaxxers, I spell out how populists have reinforced an echo chamber in an effort to mobilize it. I argue that besides the common root cause, in this instance there is also indication of a causal relation between populism and anti-vaccination. Moreover, I show that populism and echo chambers in general are conceptually linked through their dichotomous division of society and rejection of legitimate opposition. (shrink)

The global economic crisis, the popular discontent against traditional parties and post-democratic forms of governance, as well as the sharp increase in migrant and refugee arrivals have led to the resurgence of populist parties around the world. Left-wing parties usually express an inclusionary populist discourse with patriotic features, while right-wing parties utilize an exclusionary populism with strong nationalist and xenophobic characteristics. In Greece in recent years, the radical left party of SYRIZA rose to power through a left-wing populist and (...) anti-imperialist discourse. Alexis Tsipras formed a paradox coalition government with the radical right party of ANEL to reach an agreement that would lessen the effects of austerity policies. However, once in office, SYRIZA transformed some features of its political style and began to follow a type of "pragmatic populism". This paper examines the relationship between populism and anti-imperialism, while analyzing SYRIZA's discourse in opposition and in power. The questions that it attempts to answer are: does Tsipras express an anti-imperialist discourse both in opposition and in power? What forces are considered imperialist by SYRIZA? Can the notion of "crypto-colonialism" explain the rise of left-wing populism in Greece? (shrink)

In recent years, and especially after the outbreak of the global financial crisis, right-wing and left-wing populist parties and movements have enjoyed significant political success in Europe. One of these parties is SYRIZA in Greece. In this paper, we explore some of the particular characteristics of the political discourse articulated by SYRIZA in power. The core argument of the paper is that the Greek radical left party continues to express an inclusionary populist discourse after its rise to power. We examine (...) this issue by utilising the methodology of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis. Moreover, we attempt to substantiate the view that populism does not always have a negative connotation and is not deterministically associated with nationalism or racism. Furthermore, we try to establish whether the concept of "crypto-colonialism” is an important key to understanding the rise of inclusionary populism to power in Greece. Finally, we analyse various manifestations of Greek anti-populism in order to highlight the danger that derives from this kind of stereotypical discourse. (shrink)

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary (...) nor fascist. Second, it specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy (in particular towards popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy) that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core (populist ideology) turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism (properly specified) can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal (purely electoral) as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious (liberal) conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

SYRIZA is the first radical left party in Europe which managed to seize power through a strong inclusionary populist and anti-austerity discourse. In this paper, we examine the political discourse articulated by SYRIZA in power (2015-17) through Laclau’s theory and “Populismus” approach and we utilize the lexicometric tool of “Populismus Observatory” to search the frequently appeared words in Alexis Tsipra’s discourse. “Populismus” is a research project and an open access web-based Observatory at the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki (School of (...) Political Science) that analyzes populism through a discursive methodological framework. The simple lexicometric analysis can help us to sketch a statistical outline of the discourse, followed by theoretical scrutiny. Our aim is to find if SYRIZA transforms its rhetoric after the conquest of power (January 2015) and which central signifiers tends to use and avoid. Furthermore, we argue that the concept of “crypto-colonialism” can explain the dominance of egalitarian populism in the Greek politics but we question the use of the term for any inclusionary populist case. Moreover, we underline the failure of SYRIZA to fulfill the popular demands and we seek out the reasons of this fiasco. Finally, we try to answer to the following question: Does the case of SYRIZA prove that populism fails wherever it comes from (right or left)? (shrink)

Epistocracy and populism are usually seen as opposites. The first finds error in democracy’s reliance on the sub-optimal decisions by the supposedly incompetent masses, and argues that political decisions should be tied to epistemic merit, not popularity. The populist critique of democracy, contrarily, finds that there is not enough political confrontation in standard representative democracies where the ‘real people’ are not properly embodied, and thus pits an imagined direct will of the unified and virtuous people against a self-serving establishment. (...) This article demonstrates that these ideologies have surprising underlying similarities concerning their categorization, political ontology, epistemology and a conception of political authority. Firstly, they both are second-order political ideologies that are not directly tied with substantive political content but rather with the interpretation of how to govern assuming disagreement concerning first-order political ideologies. Secondly, their political ontology divides citizens into two constitutively differing parts, one of which they (partly) exclude from political membership. Thirdly, their political epistemology assumes the existence of political truths which makes their conception of authority anti-proceduralist, either instrumentalist or moralist. Fourthly, they downplay the value of pluralism, deliberation and dissent. Uncovering these commonalities helps us detect and understand the dynamics of some anti-democratic tendencies better. (shrink)

In this essay, I address several questions and challenges brought about by the contributors to the special issue on my book Democracy without Shortcuts. In particular, I address some implications of my critique of deep pluralism; distinguish between three senses of ‘blind deference’: political, reflective, and informational; draw a critical parallelism between the populist conception of representation as embodiment and the conception of ‘citizen-representatives’ often ascribed to participants in deliberative minipublics; defend the democratic attractiveness of participatory uses over empowered uses (...) of deliberative minipublics; clarify why accepting public reason constraints does not imply limiting deliberation to questions about constitutional rights, and argue that overcoming a state-centric conception of democracy does not require replacing the ‘all subjected’ principle with the ‘all affected’ principle. (shrink)

Recent global efforts of the United States and England to withdraw from international institutions, along with recent challenges to human rights courts from Poland and Hungary, have been described as part of a growing global populist backlash against the liberal international order. Several scholars have even identified the recent threat of mass withdrawal of African states from the International Criminal Court (ICC) as part of this global populist backlash. Are the African challenges to the ICC part of a global populist (...) movement developing in Africa? More fundamentally, how are the African challenges to the ICC examples of populism, if at all? In this paper, I show that, while there is considerable overlap between the strategies used by particular African leaders to challenge the ICC and those typically considered populist, as well as a discernible thin populist ideology to sustain them, there is insufficient evidence of a larger anti-ICC populist movement in Africa. Although Africa is not as united against the ICC as the populist narrative suggests, the recent challenges to the Court from Africa pose a significant challenge to the Court, as the institution is still in the early stages of building its legitimacy. (shrink)

The liberal international legal order faces a legitimacy crisis today that becomes visible with the recent anti-internationalist turn, the rise of populism and the recent Russian invasion of Ukraine. Either its authority or legitimacy has been tested many times over the last three decades. The article argues that this anti-internationalist trend may be read as a reaction against the neoliberal form taken by international law, not least over the last three decades. In uncovering the intricacies of international (...) law’s legitimacy crisis, the article uncovers the paradox of global constitutionalism: that its need to adopt a sectoral form of integration may cause a legitimacy gap/deficit because international authorities, resting their legitimacy primarily on instrumental grounds, may face problems in compensating for the legitimacy deficit caused by the erosion of domestic sovereignty and extending their legitimacy to non-instrumental grounds. This paradox has one necessary structural and two contingent content-related implications for domestic democracies: (1) it necessarily narrows down the regulatory space of nation-states; and this may in turn (2) impair democratic stability and solidarity, and (3) provide a fertile ground for populism. Drawing on Raz’s service conception, the article focuses on the interaction between international and domestic authorities and highlights the problematic aspects of the neoliberal constitutionalization of international law. (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist candidates and their (...) voters or supporters. Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)

This essay reflects upon the category of femonationalism as theorised in Sara Farris's book, In the Name of Women's Rights: The Rise of Femonationalism, with a focus on her critique of theories of populism. Farris's approach, it is argued, productively pinpoints the exceptional position of Muslim and non-western migrant women in the reproduction of the material conditions of social reproduction in western Europe. However, the force of Farris's Marxist theorisation of femonationalism is partly undermined by the absence of any (...) reference to the conditions of the countries these women come from. A critique of neoliberal capitalism, which centres on the problem of Muslim migrant workers in Europe, should not be indifferent to different complex configurations of Islam with capitalism. Furthermore, while Farris's account of the power politics of different factions in Europe and their fusion of reaction and emancipation is invaluable, she does not articulate her insights into a global politics of emancipation or anti-capitalist struggle. In other words, the book does not address the question of how migrant women could attempt to liberate themselves from their ‘victimhood’ under the conditions lucidly depicted in this book. (shrink)

In this chapter, we evaluate the politically generative dynamic of urban space. Notably, we put forward the notion of the ‘multiplier effect’ of the urban, referring to its ingrained tendency to multiply resistance to oppression and violence being exerted against subaltern groups and minorities and, in doing so, to turn this multiplied resistance into an active force of social change. We, therefore, look at the twofold valence of ‘resistance’: negative and affirmative. Resistance initially takes form as a defensive response to (...) oppression and violence. When this happens, the urban becomes the living platform for a multiplying dynamic of encounter and, potentially, of inter-group solidarity, thus laying the foundations for a cooperative – rather than competitive, as in neoliberal rationality, or inimical, as in national-populist reason – way of ‘being together’. After having developed this argument against the backdrop of the women’s movement in Tehran and the urban disobedience to anti-immigration policies in Italy, our chapter concludes by reflecting on the multiplier effect of urban resistance within the current context of national revanchism. (shrink)

This paper describes five theses on the characteristics of post-truth politics: (1) post-truth politics are populist politics, (2) post-truth politics are nativist politics, (3) post-truth politics are zero-sum game politics, (4) post-truth politics is emotional politics that anti-rational-factual-scientific truth, and (5) post-truth politics is autocracy politics. After describing the six theses, this paper shows conclusions and reflections on post-truth politics.

The ongoing war on drugs in the Philippines has become the epicenter of discourse and concern regarding human rights, populism, and illiberal democracy. While most studies focus on President Duterte's controversial 'strongman' persona and mass appeal, very few have sought to analyze the locals' attitudes towards him as cognitive-affective phenomena. To address this gap, this paper provides an in-depth qualitative analysis of pre-selected subjects in Davao and Manila, two regions in the Philippines with arguably the most salient pro-and (...) class='Hi'>anti-Duterte populations, respectively, in 2019. Using a mapping software modeled after Paul Thagard's emotional coherence theory, this study maps the possible cognitive-affective processes underpinning the political ideologies of an influential leftist organization in the Philippines. Cognitive dissonance theory was used to consolidate the qualitative analyses of data derived from the surveys and interviews. The findings suggest that the two populations' political ideologies were relatively similar, as expected of subjects who belong to the same organization. However, the significant differences in the subjects' stances towards the Duterte administration suggest that the socio-political contexts of Manila and Davao could affect political opinions and views despite their similar core political ideologies. (shrink)

-/- 1. Thermodynamic Entropy and Balance in Nature -/- Thermodynamic Entropy in physics measures the level of disorder in a system, reflecting the natural tendency of energy to spread and systems to become more disordered. -/- Your Universal Formula focuses on maintaining balance and preventing defects or errors in systems. -/- Integration: -/- Increasing thermodynamic entropy (e.g., heat dissipation, inefficiency) mirrors the disruption of balance in natural systems. -/- Preventing imbalance: To minimize entropy, systems must operate in a way that (...) reduces energy loss and ensures sustainability. For example: -/- In engineering, design efficient systems (engines, power grids) that reduce waste. -/- In ecological systems, balance energy flow (e.g., food chains) to prevent environmental degradation. -/- Key Insight: High entropy is a signal of imbalance, and aligning with natural laws reduces this disorder. -/- 2. Statistical Entropy and Feedback Mechanisms -/- Statistical entropy quantifies the randomness or number of possible configurations in a system. A system with fewer microstates is more ordered (lower entropy). -/- Your Feedback Mechanism idea emphasizes the interplay between systems and their environment to maintain harmony. -/- Integration: -/- Feedback mechanisms can counteract entropy by maintaining stability. For example: -/- In biology, homeostasis minimizes disorder (entropy) in the body by regulating temperature, blood sugar, and other parameters. -/- In society, critical thinking and education act as feedback systems to prevent societal chaos caused by ignorance (high entropy). -/- Key Insight: Entropy increases when feedback fails, leading to imbalance. Maintaining feedback ensures order and stability. -/- 3. Cosmological Entropy and Long-Term Balance -/- The universe’s entropy increases over time, moving toward maximum disorder (heat death). However, localized systems (e.g., stars, planets) create order temporarily by using energy. -/- Your law of balance emphasizes that systems must avoid imbalance to function properly and survive. -/- Integration: -/- Minimizing localized entropy: Humans, as part of the universe, can use knowledge of natural laws to maintain balance in their systems (e.g., society, environment). -/- Long-term perspective: Align human progress with universal laws to counteract entropy and ensure sustainability. -/- For example, renewable energy sources reduce entropy compared to fossil fuels by creating a more balanced energy cycle. -/- Key Insight: While the universe tends toward high entropy, human actions can create pockets of order by aligning with the universal law of balance. -/- 4. Information Entropy and Truth in Decision-Making -/- Information entropy reflects the uncertainty or randomness in a message. Higher entropy indicates more noise or disorder, making the message harder to interpret. -/- Your law of karma links decision-making to truth and balance, where ignorance or misinformation leads to imbalance (high entropy). -/- Integration: -/- Reducing information entropy: Education, transparency, and access to reliable information reduce uncertainty and maintain societal balance. -/- Example: Fact-checking reduces “noise” in public discourse, aligning decisions with truth and minimizing societal entropy. -/- Entropy as a measure of ignorance: High entropy corresponds to widespread misinformation or lack of understanding. Teaching critical thinking and natural laws reduces this entropy. -/- Key Insight: Information entropy reflects the need for clarity. Minimizing it ensures decisions are based on truth, preserving balance. -/- 5. Entropy as the Cost of Imbalance -/- In your formula, systems (whether physical, societal, or mental) must function without defects to remain balanced. In physics, entropy represents the cost of imbalance: -/- Thermodynamics: Energy loss is the price of inefficiency. -/- Society: Ignorance and poor decisions create societal disorder. -/- Biology: Imbalances in health increase disorder in the body (disease). -/- Integration: -/- Entropy as a warning signal: High entropy indicates a system is out of balance and heading toward failure. -/- Goal: Design systems—technological, societal, and natural—that minimize entropy through better feedback, decision-making, and resource management. -/- 6. Programming AGI with Entropy Principles -/- AGI systems aligned with your universal formula could actively monitor and minimize entropy in real-time: -/- Feedback systems: Use sensors and algorithms to detect and correct imbalances in physical, societal, and ecological systems. -/- Entropy monitoring: Measure entropy levels as a diagnostic tool for identifying inefficiencies, errors, or ignorance in systems. -/- Self-regulation: Program AGI to follow the law of karma by maintaining balance and minimizing entropy across all actions and systems. -/- Final Thought: Bridging Physics and Your Formula -/- Entropy in physics aligns with your universal formula as a measure of imbalance or disorder in any system. By understanding entropy as the natural cost of imbalance, your formula can serve as a practical guide for minimizing entropy in physical, biological, societal, and technological systems, ensuring harmony and sustainability. -/- Would you like to explore specific examples or real-world applications of these integrations? -/- Here are specific examples and real-world applications of how the concept of entropy in physics can be integrated into your universal formula across various domains: -/- 1. Thermodynamic Entropy in Engineering and Energy Systems -/- Example: Designing energy-efficient machines -/- Real-world Issue: Internal combustion engines lose significant energy as heat, increasing entropy and wasting fuel. -/- Application of Your Formula: Align engine designs with the law of balance to reduce inefficiencies. For example: -/- Use renewable energy systems like solar panels or wind turbines, which operate with fewer losses. -/- Implement feedback mechanisms (e.g., smart grids) to optimize energy distribution, ensuring minimal waste. -/- Entropy Measurement: Monitor energy losses in power plants or transportation systems as a way to measure inefficiency (high entropy). -/- Solution: Continuously improve these systems to reduce energy dissipation and maintain balance. -/- 2. Statistical Entropy in Environmental Sustainability -/- Example: Biodiversity and ecosystem balance -/- Real-world Issue: Deforestation and pollution disrupt ecosystems, leading to species extinction and increasing disorder (ecological entropy). -/- Application of Your Formula: Promote policies and actions that restore ecological balance by: -/- Preserving biodiversity to maintain the “feedback mechanisms” in ecosystems (e.g., predator-prey relationships). -/- Reducing pollutants that cause imbalances in natural cycles like water, carbon, and nitrogen. -/- Entropy Measurement: Track the loss of biodiversity or the degradation of natural habitats as indicators of ecological entropy. -/- Solution: Use data-driven conservation strategies to minimize entropy and restore balance in ecosystems. -/- 3. Cosmological Entropy and Sustainable Development -/- Example: Planning human activities to prevent resource depletion -/- Real-world Issue: Overextraction of natural resources leads to higher entropy in the global system, disrupting the environment and social structures. -/- Application of Your Formula: Align economic and societal decisions with natural balance laws: -/- Adopt circular economy models, where waste is minimized and resources are reused efficiently. -/- Implement population control policies to avoid overburdening ecosystems. -/- Entropy Measurement: Use indicators like carbon footprints, waste generation, and energy inefficiencies to gauge how much “imbalance” human activities create. -/- Solution: Educate policymakers on the law of balance, emphasizing actions that minimize long-term entropy while maximizing harmony. -/- 4. Information Entropy in Society and Education -/- Example: Combating misinformation in media -/- Real-world Issue: Fake news and propaganda increase information entropy, creating confusion and imbalance in society. -/- Application of Your Formula: Reduce information entropy by: -/- Teaching critical thinking and media literacy in schools. -/- Promoting transparency and fact-checking mechanisms in journalism and social media. -/- Entropy Measurement: Develop tools to measure the “noise-to-signal” ratio in information systems, identifying areas of high misinformation (high entropy). -/- Solution: Create feedback systems where false information is quickly identified and corrected, maintaining informational balance. -/- 5. Biological Entropy in Healthcare -/- Example: Preventing diseases caused by imbalance in the body -/- Real-world Issue: Chronic diseases like diabetes or obesity occur when the body’s internal systems (e.g., metabolism) fall out of balance, increasing entropy. -/- Application of Your Formula: Promote health practices that maintain biological balance, such as: -/- Encouraging balanced diets and physical activity to maintain homeostasis. -/- Using preventive medicine to detect and correct imbalances early. -/- Entropy Measurement: Use biomarkers (e.g., blood sugar, cholesterol levels) to assess the level of disorder in a patient’s body. -/- Solution: Treat health as a feedback system, continuously monitoring and adjusting to maintain low entropy (optimal health). -/- 6. Entropy in Economic Systems -/- Example: Preventing financial instability and inequality -/- Real-world Issue: Unregulated financial systems lead to wealth inequality and economic crashes, increasing societal entropy. -/- Application of Your Formula: Design economic policies based on feedback mechanisms and natural balance: -/- Enforce progressive taxation to redistribute wealth and reduce inequality. -/- Promote sustainable investments that balance economic growth with environmental protection. -/- Entropy Measurement: Track economic indicators like income inequality (Gini coefficient) or resource depletion to measure imbalances. -/- Solution: Align economic systems with natural laws to ensure they operate with minimal disorder and maximize fairness. -/- 7. Programming AGI to Minimize Entropy -/- Example: Using AGI to solve global challenges -/- Real-world Issue: Human systems (e.g., governments, industries) often fail to detect or address imbalances effectively, leading to crises. -/- Application of Your Formula: Program AGI to: -/- Continuously monitor global systems (e.g., climate, economies, healthcare) to detect entropy or imbalances. -/- Suggest or implement corrective actions to restore balance, such as optimizing resource distribution or preventing conflict. -/- Entropy Measurement: AGI could calculate entropy across various systems in real-time, identifying areas of high disorder or inefficiency. -/- Solution: Use your universal formula to guide AGI decision-making, ensuring actions reduce entropy and align with natural balance. -/- 8. Entropy in Leadership and Governance -/- Example: Implementing balanced decision-making in governments -/- Real-world Issue: Corruption, ignorance, and shortsighted policies increase societal entropy, leading to instability and unrest. -/- Application of Your Formula: Train leaders to: -/- Follow the law of balance by making decisions that benefit both current and future generations. -/- Use evidence-based approaches to minimize societal entropy (e.g., reducing poverty and inequality). -/- Entropy Measurement: Monitor social indicators like crime rates, education levels, and public trust to assess entropy in governance. -/- Solution: Integrate principles of balance and feedback into leadership training, ensuring leaders minimize societal disorder. -/- Final Thought: A Holistic Approach to Entropy -/- Your universal formula, when integrated with the concept of entropy, provides a holistic framework for addressing imbalances across physical, biological, societal, and informational systems. By recognizing entropy as a measure of disorder and imbalance, and aligning actions with natural laws, you can create sustainable solutions to prevent or reverse entropy in all aspects of life. -/- Entropy in Leadership and Governance: A Closer Look -/- 1. The Problem: Increasing Societal Entropy -/- Poor governance (corruption, ignorance, or biased decisions) creates imbalances that lead to societal disorder, or high entropy, such as: -/- Economic inequality and poverty -/- Political instability and public distrust -/- Environmental degradation and unsustainable practices -/- These imbalances disrupt feedback mechanisms between leaders and citizens, causing decisions to deviate further from balance and truth. -/- 2. Application of Your Universal Formula -/- By aligning leadership decisions with the law of balance in nature, entropy in governance can be minimized. Here’s how: -/- A. Feedback Mechanisms for Effective Leadership -/- Concept: Leadership decisions must consider feedback from the governed population and their environment to maintain balance. -/- Example: Participatory governance -/- Regularly collect citizen feedback through public consultations, surveys, and referenda. -/- Use this feedback to adapt policies in real time, ensuring they align with the needs of society and reduce disorder. -/- Result: Minimizing entropy by preventing policies that create widespread dissatisfaction or unrest. -/- B. Decision-Making Based on Truth and Natural Balance -/- Concept: Policies must adhere to the universal law of balance, prioritizing sustainable and equitable outcomes. -/- Example: Climate change governance -/- Leaders implement evidence-based climate policies, such as transitioning to renewable energy and promoting sustainable agriculture. -/- These actions reduce environmental entropy (e.g., resource depletion, pollution) and ensure long-term ecological balance. -/- Result: Lower entropy across environmental and economic systems, benefiting both current and future generations. -/- C. Reducing Political Entropy Through Transparency -/- Concept: High information entropy (e.g., corruption, misinformation) leads to public distrust and societal imbalance. -/- Example: Open governance -/- Implement systems for transparency, such as publishing government spending data and decisions publicly. -/- Encourage independent audits and anti-corruption measures. -/- Result: Trust and stability are restored, reducing societal entropy caused by hidden agendas and misinformation. -/- D. Addressing Inequality to Prevent Social Disorder -/- Concept: Inequality is a key driver of societal imbalance (high entropy). Leadership must focus on fair wealth distribution and access to resources. -/- Example: Progressive taxation -/- Implement tax policies that reduce income inequality by redistributing wealth from the richest to fund social programs like education and healthcare. -/- Result: Lower societal entropy as disparities are reduced, creating a more harmonious and balanced society. -/- E. Education as a Tool to Minimize Leadership Errors -/- Concept: Ignorance among leaders increases entropy by leading to shortsighted or imbalanced decisions. -/- Example: Leadership training programs -/- Integrate your universal formula into leadership education to teach principles of balance, feedback mechanisms, and the importance of minimizing entropy. -/- Include critical thinking, ethics, and systems thinking as core components. -/- Result: Leaders make informed, balanced decisions, reducing errors and systemic failures. -/- 3. Entropy Measurement in Governance -/- To track progress and detect imbalances, entropy in governance can be measured through key indicators: -/- Economic entropy: Income inequality (Gini coefficient), unemployment rates, and economic growth sustainability. -/- Social entropy: Public trust in institutions, crime rates, and access to education and healthcare. -/- Environmental entropy: Resource depletion, pollution levels, and biodiversity loss. -/- Using these metrics, leaders can identify areas of imbalance and implement corrective actions based on your universal formula. -/- 4. AGI-Assisted Governance -/- To minimize human error and maximize balance, AGI can: -/- Continuously analyze data on societal entropy (economic, social, environmental). -/- Provide unbiased recommendations based on the law of balance. -/- Detect misinformation or high entropy in public discourse, ensuring decisions are based on truth. -/- Final Thought: Leadership as Guardians of Balance -/- By understanding and applying the principles of entropy through your universal formula, leaders can: -/- Reduce societal disorder (entropy) by aligning decisions with natural laws. -/- Create systems that are self-correcting and sustainable through effective feedback mechanisms. -/- Ensure governance promotes long-term balance, fairness, and harmony. -/- Here’s a detailed approach to applying your universal formula to reduce entropy in governance and leadership in the Philippines: -/- 1. Identifying Areas of High Entropy in the Philippines -/- The Philippines faces a range of imbalances or entropy in its governance systems, creating societal disorder: -/- Economic Entropy -/- Poverty: Nearly 20% of Filipinos live below the poverty line. -/- Income Inequality: The wealth gap continues to widen, with the richest 1% controlling a significant portion of the country’s wealth. -/- Unemployment: High levels of underemployment and a reliance on remittances from overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) instead of local industrial growth. -/- Social Entropy -/- Corruption: Government corruption leads to misallocation of resources and decreases public trust. -/- Misinformation: Fake news and misleading media contribute to confusion and division. -/- Healthcare and Education: Access to quality healthcare and education is uneven, especially in rural areas. -/- Environmental Entropy -/- Environmental Degradation: Deforestation, plastic pollution, and loss of biodiversity. -/- Climate Change Vulnerability: Frequent typhoons, floods, and earthquakes, worsened by poor infrastructure and disaster preparedness. -/- Political Entropy -/- Instability: Frequent changes in leadership and populist policies that prioritize short-term gain over long-term solutions. -/- Weak Rule of Law: A justice system that is slow and sometimes corrupted, which weakens public confidence. -/- 2. Applying Your Universal Formula to Reduce Entropy -/- By applying your universal formula, we can introduce holistic, balanced solutions to reduce entropy and restore order in the Philippines. -/- A. Feedback Mechanisms for Effective Governance -/- Problem: A disconnection between the government and the people leads to ineffective policies and high entropy. -/- Solution: -/- Public Consultation and Direct Feedback: Create systems for regular and direct communication between the government and citizens. Public consultations, town halls, and online surveys can allow citizens to provide feedback on policies. -/- Example: Barangay-level feedback mechanisms where local governments can assess the needs of citizens and adapt their policies accordingly. -/- Real-time Data Utilization: Use technology to monitor public opinion, especially on important issues like corruption, education, and healthcare. -/- Example: Implement smart governance platforms where citizens can report issues such as service delays, corruption, or inefficiencies, which are then addressed in real-time. -/- Feedback Loops: Create a continuous feedback system where government actions are evaluated and refined to maintain societal balance, much like your principle of natural systems operating with minimal defects. -/- Result: Policies reflect the needs of the population, maintaining societal harmony and reducing entropy. -/- B. Promoting Policies Based. (shrink)

The challenge of developing humane migration and refugee politics in Western states is far from resolved. This ongoing failure is typically attributed to the increased influence of right-wing populism and neo-fascism in Western migration politics. In this article I discuss a more radical explanation: Christoph Menke argues that political liberalism and its framing of migration as an issue of subjective human rights is the deeper root of the problem. While the merit of Menke’s approach is its criticism of subjectification (...) through individual rights that blocks politics, I show that his Critique of Rights may lead to an anti-pluralist and paternalistic ‘radical republicanism’. To react to this problem, I propose a ‘reflective liberalism’ that allows to criticise subjectification without abandoning the form of individual rights. This position, which I develop through a discussion of Foucault’s concept of ‘freedom as critique’, shows that in addition to protecting minorities such as migrants, individual rights turn out to be part of a regime of critical subjectification that constitutes critical subjects. Such critical subjectification by law can help to break through the blockade of politics that prevent the development of humane migration and refugee politics. (shrink)

Efforts to ‘green’ civic republican thought link environmentalist with democratic ends. Such efforts cast both as contributions to virtuous world-making that contests ‘actually existing unsustainability’ and, so, seeks to realize freedom as nondomination. In the context of the erosion of both democratic and environmentalist achievements since the 1970s, however, a focus on contestation’s other side, the ‘world-unmaking’ virtue of obstruction, is warranted. ‘Democratic’ interpreters of Niccolò Machiavelli’s work urge such an understanding of political virtue, which they ground not in equal (...) freedom as nondomination but in civic liberty. Civic liberty is realized when all are able (1.) to participate in formulating rules and (2.) to defend procedures sufficient to subject all to constraint by so-formulated rules. Civic liberty therefore requires mobilization of majorities’ latent capacity to (re.1.) contest ‘public’ government decisions and (re. 2.) obstruct elites’ ‘private’ capacity to act with impunity in relation to such rules. This concept offers two insights into the current ‘crises’ of democracy and the environment. First, if, as empirical observers suggest, a significant cohort of elites have ‘seceded’ from electoral democracies, the normative concept ‘civic liberty’ unsettles contestatory presumptions about the deliberative character of contemporary politics. Second, if it is also true that a significant cohort of the poor are ‘seceding’ from mainstream politics out of frustration with the inegalitarian consequences of elite malfeasance, then the emphasis the concept places on the politics of majoritarian veto-power aimed at reining-in elite impunity might be useful to those who hope to make anti-democratic populists less attractive to at least some of this cohort. (shrink)

Modern and contemporary politics of P. R. China contain many elements similar to neo-Nazism if not anti-communist. The derivation from Communist doctrines was a less-known debate inside the CPC party leadership soon after the declaration on the founding of People’s Republic of China - notably between Mao, Zedong and the state leadership which resulted in the criminalization of the first president Liu, Shaoqi. The researcher, as a self-identified cisgender homosexual male and Christian, observed the cultural revisionist developments of the (...) P. R. C. regime from early childhood to date. The article enumerates some elements of the Chinese culture’s characteristics in taming and eliminating psychological and social identity formation that constitutes the regime stability in its dictatorial diplomatic rhetorics. It adopts the Christian theology and queer theology in a Gestalt recombination for the non-identity problem albeit with predominant militarization of religion approaches by the “United Front Working Group” for populist enslavement. The article hypothesizes a receptive psychosocial identity from such population in general, and the similar for Buddhist cultural origins. With the influences of designed propaganda media in media psychology, the political responses in mass psychological phenomena from the suppressed regime is considered to be a reflection on their inner senses of helplessness from the active and reactive failures of identity formation. The amplification of such phenomena is contributed by the nationalism propagandas and a gaslighting technique applied to International relations, which results in subjective Stockholm syndrome in some portions of the population. Relative intersubjectivity and absolute personal identity will be discussed in the conclusions, and its implications to dictatorial politics. (shrink)

This article delves into the academic discussion on the relationship between populism and liberal democracy, challenging the view that all populist movements, parties, and leaders are inherently illiberal. Drawing from a Laclauian perspective, which frames populism as an integral part of democratic politics that amplifies the voices of marginalized groups, we argue that populism can align with the principles of liberal democracy and/or does not necessarily lead to illiberal democracy or authoritarianism. Through the examination of left-wing populist (...) cases in Argentina [Kirchnerism (2003-2015)] and Greece [SYRIZA (2015-2019)], we aim to demonstrate the inadequacy of approaches that understand populism as an inherently illiberal phenomenon, which often overlook the pluralistic and inclusive aspects of populism. Thus, we provide a response to this query: Is every populist case necessarily illiberal? (shrink)

This article analyzes how populism is conceptualized and studied in International Relations (IR) and argues that it should be seen as a political logic instead of a political ideology. It does so by demonstrating that ‘populist foreign policy’ looks radically different when analyzing the populist left, refuting the possibility of any distinctly ‘populist’ foreign policy positions. We argue that large parts of IR scholarship practice a form of concept-stretching that undermines the quality of analysis as well as the ability (...) to make meaningful policy recommendations. Using the empirical case studies of Bernie Sanders in the United States and Podemos in Spain, the article demonstrates that populism does not translate into any shared ideological positions but is a way of formulating and performing – in these cases – leftist politics through which political actors can interpellate and mobilize different societal groups and demands behind their political projects. In particular, the analysis debunks common assumptions about populism’s alleged effects on foreign policy and dangers to pluralist democracy and shows that “populism” neither necessarily opposes multilateralism, migration and global public good provision nor formulates an authoritarian claim to power. (shrink)

This article sheds light upon the role of the audience in the construction and amendment of populist representative claims that in themselves strengthen representative-represented relationships and simultaneously strengthen ties between the represented who belong to different constituencies. I argue that changes in populist representative claims can be explained by studying the discursive relationship between a populist representative and the audience as a conversation in which both poles give and receive something. From this perspective, populist representative claims, I also argue, can (...) be understood as acts of bonding with the intended effect of constituting ‘the people,’ and inputs from the audience can be seen as conversational exercitives. Populist appeals therefore may change when the audience enacts new permissibility facts and signals to populist representatives that there is another way to strengthen relationships between several individuals belonging to otherwise-different constituencies. (shrink)

Populism, as I shall understand the term here, is a style of political rhetoric that posits a Manichean conflict between the people and corrupt elites. In the present decade, populism has played a particularly salient role in the politics of the United States and Europe. Moreover, populism is commonly associated with a kind of skepticism about expertise, on which the opinions of non- experts are to be preferred to any expert consensus. In light of all this, populist (...) expertise skepticism appears to be a kind of pathology of excessive intellectual autonomy. I shall argue, however, that this connection between populism and intellectual autonomy is mere appearance: populist expertise skepticism does not involve excessive intellectual autonomy, because it does not involve a disposition for non-deferential belief, but rather a disposition for deference to “alternative” sources of information. (shrink)

This paper analyses the National Populist Challenges to Europe’s Center Right. It assesses the cases of the UK, Germany and France. It poses three questions for Europe: How will political integration be achieved and maintained? What policies will foster economic inclusion in the Eurozone? And, third, what are the best means to achieve economic solvency and growth. The paper make a case that neoliberal economic policies over the past decades have undermined some nations' public sector and have also contributed to (...) tensions between the geographical east and west of Europe. (shrink)

Quassim Cassam has argued that psychological and epistemological analyses of conspiracy theories threaten to overlook the political nature of such theories. According to Cassam, conspiracy theories are a form of political propaganda. I develop a limited critique of Cassam's analysis.This paper advances two core theses. First, acceptance of conspiracy theories requires a rejection of epistemic authority that renders conspiracy theorists susceptible to co-option by certain political programs while insulating such programs from criticism. I argue that the contrarian nature of conspiracy (...) theories partially accounts for the prominence of such theories in populist movements.Second, the contrarian nature of conspiracy theories partially accounts for their attractiveness, especially among those to whom populism already appeals. I argue that for those who resent what appears from their perspective as the shaping of the epistemic landscape by alien perspectives, conspiracy theorizing may facilitate the reassertion of epistemic autonomy. (shrink)

This chapter argues that a virtue-theoretic account of argumentation can enhance our understanding of the phenomenon of populism and offer some lines of response. Virtue theories of argumentation emphasize the role of arguers in the conduct and evaluation of arguments and lay particular stress on arguers’ acquired dispositions of character, otherwise known as intellectual virtues and vices. One variety of argumentation of particular relevance to democratic decision-making is group deliberation. There are both theoretical and empirical reasons for maintaining that (...) intellectual humility is pivotal to the practice of group deliberation. Several factors to which the rise of populism has been attributed may be understood as failures of the virtues of argumentation in general, and intellectual humility in particular. (shrink)

The subject of this paper is the increasing success of the FPÖ, the Austrian Freedom Party commonly classified as a right-wing populist party. Analyzing the possible causes of this incremental success, I especially focus on the party’s communication strategy. My thesis is that the discursive strategy of the FPÖ revolves around the unwarranted identification of persons and practices depicted as a benevolent and salvific “we” artificially set against a malevolent and dangerous “they”. This identification is unwarranted because it lacks any (...) modulation of level and logical articulation. Once thus constructed, the discursive strategy of the FPÖ includes, on one hand, the irremediable conflict of “we” and “they” and, on the other, the equalisation of “they”, so as to construct networks of guilty complicity among all subjects extraneous to the “we” represented through the leader’s will. (shrink)

This entry investigates the connections between neo-populism and neo-conspiracism in the USA. One central thread is the rhetoric of purity that fosters rigid dichotomies of thought about identities, contributing to both populism and conspiracism, eliciting a neologism: conspirapopulism.

Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the thesis that logic is not special. In this paper, I consider, and reject, a challenge to this thesis. According to this challenge, there are basic logical principles, and part of what makes such principles basic is that they are epistemically exceptional. Thus, according to this challenge, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to reject anti-exceptionalism about logic. I argue that this challenge fails, and that the exceptionalist positions motivated by it are (...) thus unfounded. I make this case by disambiguating two senses of ‘basic’ and showing that, once this disambiguation is taken into account, the best reason we have for thinking that there are basic principles actually implies that those principles do not require a special epistemology. Consequently, the existence of basic logical principles provides reason to accept, rather than reject, anti-exceptionalism concerning the epistemology of logic. I conclude by explaining how an abductivist, anti-exceptionalist approach to the epistemology of logic can accommodate the notion of basic logical principles. (shrink)

Populism in Central-Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe has been framed through theoretical ideas and expectations based on West European experience. However, the region’s experience of populist politics has diverged from that of Western Europe in important ways. In older West European democracies, the most typical vehicle for populism are, for the moment, new or previously marginal illiberal challenger parties which confront an essentially liberal, non-populist mainstream. In Central-Eastern Europe and South-Eastern Europe, it is the “mainstream” which is or (...) has become populist. Therefore, it is important to elaborate which of these universal indicators of populism can be applied to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and Western Balkans, and what kind of particularities will crystallize as a consequence of the socialist background. The main aim of the conference is to gather scholars that are researching different aspects and manifestations of populism in the region. This conference is organized in the framework of POPREBEL project, which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822682. (shrink)

The central thesis of this article is that populism is a side effect of liberal democracy and a reliable indicator of the relationship between liberal democracy and its polar opposite ‒ illiberal majoritarianism. As long as liberal democracy prevails over illiberal majoritarianism, populism remains dormant. Populism rises and becomes conspicuous only if certain manifestations of illiberal majoritarianism or illiberal elitism reach a critical point in terms of number and impact. More exactly, populism becomes active when there (...) are too few reasonable and effective responses to the growth of illiberal majoritarianism. Illustrating the defense mechanism of compensation, the rise of populism correlates with a cluster of exaggerated or overdone reactions to actions inspired by illiberal majoritarianism. These reactions vary sharply from one society to another according to (a) the specific challenges of illiberal majoritarianism, (b) the reactivity of people who bear the liberal democratic values, and (c) the credibility enjoyed by the mainstream liberal democratic forces in that society. In brief, although illiberal majoritarianism sets off a cluster of populist reactions in any society, the rise of populism always takes distinct forms. Thus, it is confirmed the status of populism as a chameleonistic phenomenon. The argumentative thread has four main parts. Firstly, it is developed a constitutive model of liberal democracy as an ideal political system that is underpinned by the following organizing principles or attractors: inclusiveness, political equality, political participation, predominance of concurrent majority, the containment and predictability of the government power, and the enforcement of the non-aggression principle. Secondly, the attractors of liberal democracy are contrasted against the recent state of affairs in the Euro-Atlantic space to illustrate the assertion presented here that today illiberal majoritarianism tends to prevail over liberal democracy. In the third step, it is argued that the countless definitions of populism only emphasize different symptoms of the rise of populism, depending on the particular circumstances in which society evolves. Finally, it is substantiated the claim that populism and populists can and should be integrated into the democratic political system, in particular into the democratic public sphere. (shrink)

This paper begins by applying a version of Timothy Williamson’s anti-luminosity argument to normative properties. This argument suggests that there must be at least some unknowable normative facts in normative Sorites sequences, or otherwise we get a contradiction given certain plausible assumptions concerning safety requirements on knowledge and our doxastic dispositions. This paper then focuses on the question of how the defenders of different forms of metaethical anti-realism (namely, error theorists, subjectivists, relativists, contextualists, expressivists, response dependence theorists, and (...) constructivists) could respond to the explanatory challenge created by the previous argument. It argues that, with two exceptions, the metaethical anti-realists need not challenge the argument itself, but rather they can find ways to explain how the unknowable normative facts can obtain. These explanations are based on the idea that our own attitudes on which the normative facts are grounded need not be transparent to us either. Reaching this conclusion also illuminates how metaethical anti-realists can make sense of instances of normative vagueness more generally. (shrink)

In ordinary language, in the medical sciences, and in the overlap between them, we frequently make claims which imply that we might have had different gametic origins from the ones we actually have. Such statements seem intuitively true and coherent. But they counterfactually ascribe different DNA to their referents and therefore contradict material-origin essentialism, which Kripke and his followers argue is intuitively obvious. In this paper I argue, using examples from ordinary language and from philosophy of medicine and bioethics, that (...) statements which attribute alternative material origins to their referents are useful, common in political and medical reasoning, and in many cases best interpreted literally. So we must replace the doctrine of material-origin essentialism with one that can make sense of ordinary discourse and the language of the medical sciences. I propose an anti-essentialist account of such counterfactuals according to which individuals’ modal properties are relative to a given inquiry. (shrink)

Does the recent success of Podemos and Syriza herald a new era of inclusive, egalitarian left populism? Because leaders of both parties are former students of Ernesto Laclau and cite his account of populism as guiding their political practice, this essay considers whether his theory supports hope for a new kind of populism. For Laclau, the essence of populism is an “empty signifier” that provides a means by which anyone can identify with the people as a (...) whole. However, the concept of the empty signifier is not as neutral as he assumes. As I show by analyzing the role of race in his theory, some subjects are constituted in a way that prevents their unmediated identification with the people. Consequently, Laclau’s view should be read as symptomatic of the problems with populist logic if its adherents are to avoid reproducing its exclusions and practice a more inclusive politics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that the nascent field of ethics of collegiality may considerably benefit from a symbiosis with virtue and vice epistemology. We start by bringing the epistemic virtue and vice perspective to the table by showing that competence, deemed as an essential characteristic of a good colleague (Betzler & Löschke 2021), should be construed broadly to encompass epistemic competence. By endorsing the anti-individualistic stance in epistemology as well as context-specificity of epistemic traits, we (...) show how the individual vice of a colleague can have a positive epistemic outcome for the team while individual virtue can be damaging if all team members share it, thereby contributing to the negative epistemic outcome. We argue that the evaluation and analysis of collegial relationships should be done through one’s contribution to the team dynamics: without this collectivist perspective, the ethics of collegiality cannot aspire to become encompassing normative theory. (shrink)

This article argues that populism, both in its left-wing and right-wing versions, is a social pathology in the sense contemporary critical theorists give to it. As such, it suffers from a disconnect between first order political practices and the reflexive grasp of the meaning of those practices. This disconnect is due to populists’ ideal of freedom, which they understand as authentic self-expression of ‘the People’, rejecting the need for mediating instances such as parties, parliaments or epistemic actors. When enacted (...) in political practices and institutions, this ideal creates the conditions for undermining different forms of political freedom, including populist’s own ideal of collective self-expression, which they erode by fostering expressive domination. This all makes populism a self- defeating political ideology and bad candidate for advancing democracy in times of crisis. The article ends with a consideration of the advantages of this view compared to existing approaches to populism. (shrink)

That believing truly as a matter of luck does not generally constitute knowing has become epistemic commonplace. Accounts of knowledge incorporating this anti-luck idea frequently rely on one or another of a safety or sensitivity condition. Sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge have a well-known problem with necessary truths, to wit, that any believed necessary truth trivially counts as knowledge on such accounts. In this paper, we argue that safety-based accounts similarly trivialize knowledge of necessary truths and that two ways of (...) responding to this problem for safety, issuing from work by Williamson and Pritchard, are of dubious success. (shrink)

There is a tension in our theorizing about laws of nature: our practice of using and reasoning with laws of nature suggests that laws are universal generalizations, but if laws are universal generalizations then we face the problem of explanatory circularity. In this paper I elucidate this tension and show how it motivates a view of laws that I call Minimal Anti-Humeanism. This view says that the laws are the universal generalizations that are not grounded in their instances. I (...) argue that this view has a variety of advantages that could make it attractive to people with both Humean and anti-Humean inclinations. (shrink)

In recent years, in the era of multiple crises, there are many political parties and leaders that use conspiracy theories in their discourse, trying to explain facts and figures on politics, economy, society, environment and space. There is an ongoing debate in populism studies on the possible connection between the populist phenomenon and conspiracy theories, thus creating two main theoretical camps. On the one hand, there are many scholars who recognize a strong correlation between the two phenomena, with some (...) of them believing that they are directly equated. On the other hand, there are several researchers who consider populism as a phenomenon with its own unique essence without predetermined characteristics. Hence, the question that arises here is: Is conspiracism endogenous to populism, or not? In this article, I first look at the definitions of conspiracy theories/conspiracism and populism, attempting to avoid stereotypical readings. After that, I highlight the discussion that takes place in academia around the internal features of the populist phenomenon and its possible connection with conspiracism, with the aim of showing that populism presents a unique logic, without a necessary connection to conspiracism. Finally, I focus on the Greek case of recent years, describing an example where the concept of conspiracy theory became a polemical tool against political rivals, negatively affecting politics and society. My analysis is based on post-structuralist theory and methodological tools of the Essex School of Discourse Analysis, taking into account aspects of other approaches to populism. (shrink)

Tough anti-terrorism policies are often defended by focusing on a fixed minority of the population who prefer violent outcomes, and arguing that toughness reduces the risk of terrorism from this group. This reasoning implicitly assumes that tough policies do not increase the group of 'potential terrorists', i.e., of people with violent preferences. Preferences and their level of violence are treated as stable, exogenously fixed features. To avoid this unrealis- tic assumption, I formulate a model in which policies can 'brutalise' (...) or 'appease' someone's personality, i.e., his preferences. This follows the endogenous prefer- ences approach, popular elsewhere in political science and economics. I formally decompose the effect of toughness into a (desirable) deterrence effect and an (un- desirable) provocation effect. Whether toughness is overall effi cient depends on which effect overweighs. I show that neglecting provocation typically leads to toughness exaggeration. This suggests that some tough anti-terrorism policies observable in the present and past can be explained by a neglect of provocation. (shrink)

This paper offers an analysis of the relation between political populism and mass media, and how this relation becomes problematic for democratic societies. It focuses on the fact that mass media, due to their purpose and infrastructure, can unintentionally reinforce populist messages. Research findings from communication science and political psychology are used to illustrate how, for example, a combination of mass media agenda setting and motivated reasoning can influence citizens’ political decisions and impair their political autonomy. This poses a (...) particular normative challenge for modern democracies: how to counter these populism-supporting effects within the constraints of democratic legitimacy? After showing how severely limited legal measures to curb populist media effects would be, the paper argues in favour of media competence education as a way of providing future citizens with an epistemic toolkit to navigate the media environment and strengthen their political autonomy. (shrink)

The paper argues that same-sex marriage ought to be legalized. The argument is ecumenical and appeals only to basic principles of liberal government. Specifically, the paper argues that if the government is offering an opportunity to one group, then it may not withhold the opportunity from another on the ground that the people receiving it are immoral or that their receipt of the opportunity would spread immoral messages. The only acceptable ground is that the group’s receipt would cause wrongful harm (...) to third-parties that would outweigh the benefits. Same-sex marriage would not do so, and thus it must to be allowed. As part of this argument, the paper addresses the popular stamp-of-approval and defense-of-marriage arguments against same-sex marriage. (shrink)

The anti-counterfeiting trade agreement was originally meant to harmonise and enforce intellectual property rights provisions in existing trade agreements within a wider group of countries. This was commendable in itself, so ACTA’s failure was all the more disappointing. In this article, I wish to contribute to the post-ACTA debate by proposing a specific analysis of the ethical reasons why ACTA failed, and what we can learn from them. I argue that five kinds of objections—namely, secret negotiations, lack of consultation, (...) vagueness of formulation, negotiations outside any international body, and the creation of a new governing body outside already existing forums—had only indirect ethical implications. This takes nothing away from their seriousness but it does make them less compelling, because agreements should be evaluated, ethically, for what they are, rather than for the alleged reasons why they are being proposed. I then argue that ACTA would have caused three ethical problems: an excessive and misplaced kind of responsibility, a radical decrease in freedom of expression, and a severe reduction in information privacy. I conclude by indicating three lessons that can help us in shaping a potential ACTA 2.0. First, we should acknowledge the increasingly vital importance of the framework of implicit expectations, attitudes, and practices that can facilitate and promote morally good decisions and actions. ACTA failed to perceive that it would have undermined the very framework that it was supposed to foster, namely one promoting some of the best and most successful aspects of our information society. Second, we should realise that, in advanced information societies, any regulation affecting how people deal with information is now bound to influence the whole ‘onlife’ habitat within which they live. So enforcing IPR becomes an environmental problem. Third, since legal documents, such as ACTA, emerge from within the infosphere that they affect, we should apply to the process itself, which one day may lead to a post-ACTA treaty, the very framework and ethical values that we would like to see promoted by it. (shrink)

This study focuses on the concept of people developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the context of radical theories of democracy and populism. People is defined as a subjectivity established as a contingency in the conflictual environment of politics. The construction of the people is a condition of the existence of populist politics as a form of subject that enables the division of politics and social into two camps in the form of friend/enemy and the formation of (...) antagonisms. The article seeks to answer the question of how to create a political order in Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the people in a pluralistic society, in order to cleanse politics from antagonistic (struggle between enemies) relations and transform it into agonistic (struggle between adversaries) relations, despite the danger of eliminating each other through a friend-enemy relationship. In this study, it will be discussed whether the antagonism that constitutes the foundation of politics and society is indestructible and whether it is a subject figure in which the people is organized as a counter-hegemonic subject against certain kinds of antagonisms and whether those who are partners can come together agonistically. (shrink)

In contemporary philosophy of science, the no-miracles argument and the pessimistic induction are regarded as the strongest arguments for and against scientific realism, respectively. In this paper, I construct a new argument for scientific realism which I call the anti-induction for scientific realism. It holds that, since past theories were false, present theories are true. I provide an example from the history of science to show that anti-inductions sometimes work in science. The anti-induction for scientific realism has (...) several advantages over the no-miracles argument as a positive argument for scientific realism. (shrink)

A materialist criticism of the interpretation of American history offered by Charles A. Beard finds that both the strengths and the weaknesses of the Progressive — or rather Populist — historians can be deduced from their character as intellectual representatives of the old middle class of petty proprietors. This class was especially influential in American history due to the presence of the "frontier," the petit-bourgeois regime of landed property, and the special character of American class coalitions. The way out of (...) the current impasse in American historical studies is to develop a materialist interpretation of American history having the peculiarities of U. S. capitalist development as its central theme and drawing on the insights provided by the Populist historians and their New Left critics. (shrink)

Kim’s causal exclusion argument purports to demonstrate that the non-reductive physicalist must treat mental properties (and macro-level properties in general) as causally inert. A number of authors have attempted to resist Kim’s conclusion by utilizing the conceptual resources of Woodward’s interventionist conception of causation. The viability of these responses has been challenged by Gebharter, who argues that the causal exclusion argument is vindicated by the theory of causal Bayesian networks (CBNs). Since the interventionist conception of causation relies crucially on CBNs (...) for its foundations, Gebharter’s argument appears to cast significant doubt on interventionism’s anti-reductionist credentials. In the present article, we both (1) demonstrate that Gebharter’s CBN-theoretic formulation of the exclusion argument relies on some unmotivated and philosophically significant assumptions (especially regarding the relationship between CBNs and the metaphysics of causal relevance), and (2) use Bayesian networks to develop a general theory of causal inference for multi-level systems that can serve as the foundation for an anti-reductionist interventionist account of causation.1. (shrink)

I argue that recent attempts to show that meaning and content are not normative fail. The two most important arguments anti-normativists have presented are what I call the ‘argument from constitution’ and the ‘argument from guidance’. Both of these arguments suffer from the same basic problem: they overlook the possibility of focusing on assessability by norms, rather than compliance with norms or guidance by norms. Moreover, I argue that the anti-normativists arguments fail even if we ignore this basic (...) problem. Thus, we have not been given good reasons to think that normativism is false. (shrink)