It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual (...) schema of transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendental ego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology and to overcome the aporia presented. (shrink)

Abstract: -/- In this paper we discuss how through our bi-weekly Socratic dialogue groups with inmates at the Metropolitan Correctional Center downtown San Diego, we were able to bring the inmates to a sense of aporia or puzzlement. Not only did the dialogues help to uncover assumptions, uncovering the dots, so to speak, but also to help reconnect the dots and see their world from a different perspective. It allowed them to question their lives in a safe and non-judgmental (...) environment. They felt empowered by these dialogues to become their own life’s judges, freeing themselves from feeling oppressed by the judgments of others. (shrink)

The compass we use to navigate life needs to be cultivated from an early age. My sense is that the arts, including Plato’s dialogues cultivate our navigational sense. It does not tell us rationally what is good or what is bad. It is not that simple. Remember, the stars we sail by, are not fixed, either. So we need to develop a sense for what may be right or not in any particular situation. We may have a general sense, but (...) need to learn how to apply this general sense to specific situations, which are unique. In every new situation we have to figure out what is the right thing to do. And this may be different for different people as well. Too often we look for a one-fits-all solution, including our moral sense of right and wrong. And this is where we so often end up resorting to a violent “solution,” just to end it all. While we may have acquired so many technological advancements in our modern world, on the level of understanding how to navigate the world we may have regressed even, now that we can increasingly rely of highly technically advanced weapons. Again, violence seems to bear the only “solution.” -/- Yet, with our compass intact, we might be better able to recognize the red flags when we see them in real life and not find ways to rationalize, justify or ignore the reality right before our eyes. When we recognize them early, they can be handled so much easier and better. Molehills are less difficult than mountains. And to get rid of a mountain, you may just have to blow it up, using violence... (shrink)

This article sketches, and works to motivate, a controversial approach to Posterior Analytics II.19. But its primary goal is to recommend a novel solution to one particular interpretive aporia that’s especially vexed recent scholars working on Post. An. II.19. The aporia concerns how to understand the enigmatic "ē ek pantos" ( “or from all...”) in the genealogical account of foundational knowledge at II.19 100a3-9. Our proposed solution to the aporia is discussed in connection with a number of (...) larger philosophical issues concerning Aristotle’s theory of epistēmē. (shrink)

This paper considers the aporia in Dialectic of Enlightenment in two aspects of the self-destruction and self-critique of enlightenment and then emphasizes the dual vision which Horkheimer and Adorno hold on rationality. Firstly, it traces the explanation of the self-destruction of enlightenment so as to make explicit that it results in another form of the aporia, the self-critique of enlightenment. This is followed by formulating the criticism into two aspects, that Horkheimer and Adorno’s aporia leads them to (...) be confronted by a self-contradiction. I argue that the criticism neglects their narrative strategy of history as critique and the methodology of immanent critique of Horkheimer and Adorno. In conclusion, it is elucidated that Horkheimer and Adorno rightly posit their aporia and suggest a proper solution, by which we could take the dual vision on rationality and their own model of immanent critique as its significances. (shrink)

The intuitive mind is a sacred gift and the rational mind is a faithful servant. We have created a society that honors the servant and has forgotten the gift. – Albert Einstein -/- In my philosophical discussions with elementary school children, I use questions not just to uncover hidden assumptions the children may have, but to lead them to a place of aporia – puzzlement, a place of “not-knowing.” If some children assume that to be brave is to be (...) fearless, I not only ask why they assume this, but go on to ask how it is that we can be called brave, if we’re not even afraid? What’s there to be brave about? With this question, I try to bring the children to a place of “aporia,” a place of puzzlement. Aporia empowers thinking. -/- Philosophy is the pursuit of clear thinking; it is also the pursuit of wisdom, a deeper truth (see quote). -/- Wonder captivates us and connects us to the world around us. In “doing” philosophy with children, this sense of wonder is expanded upon. In their book, Journey of the Universe Swimme and Tucker state, “For or a young mammal, behavior is open-ended in a way that is rarer in adults… In a word, what often occupies their consciousness is play…. they enter into many kinds of relationships out of sheer curiosity.” -/- In doing philosophy with children, we play with ideas. Shobhan Lyons states in her article, “What makes a philosopher?”, in Philosophy Now, “Linking philosophy and truth is a common approach; but I believe that philosophy is less a search for truth and more an engagement with possibilities; …” For example, whereas fear may be a good thing in some instances, it may not be in others. Lying may be necessary in some instances and a good thing (although, it doesn’t imply that lying in itself is a good thing), and in other cases it may be harmful and hurtful. So how do you decide? This is where navigational skills come into play. What may work in some instances may in fact be the entirely wrong thing to do in other cases. So how can you tell? This is where you need to learn how to respond to complex situations. -/- I conclude with examples of aporia questions for 8 picture book stories. “Dragons and Giants,” in Frog and Toad Together, by Arnold Lobel: -/- The question is, are Frog and Toad brave? Children often conclude that to be brave you cannot be afraid. Since Frog and Toad are afraid, they cannot be brave. -/- An aporia question is, whether you can be brave without being afraid? If you are not in the least afraid, what makes you brave? Another aporia question is, whether Frog and Toad would be foolish rather than brave if they were not to jump out of the way of the snake, the avalanche or the hawk. A third aporia question has to do with the question how we know we are foolish or brave when dealing with that which is dangerous. -/- . (shrink)

FEEL FREE TO CITE - IGNORE IN-PDF REQUEST -/- Husserl defines affection in the Analyses1 as "the allure given to consciousness, the particular pull that an object given to consciousness exercises on the ego."2 That something becomes prominent for the ego implies that the object exerts a kind of 'pull' upon the ego, a demanding of egoic attention. This affective pull is relative in force, such that the same object can be experienced in varying modes of prominence and affective relief (...) depending upon bodily comportment, egoic attentiveness, etc. The phenomenon of affection allows Husserl to describe the genesis of association in terms of the lawful, regular exertions of affection upon the ego, prompting (for example) the reproduction of remembered pasts in retention on a purely passive level. Affection thus provides Husserl a non-Humean mechanism for the lawful phenomenon of association. In this light, we can see that affection plays a crucial role in the passive phenomenon of association and thereby in the constitution of sense. The precise role played by affection, however, remains quite problematic in the Analyses. Husserl is rather unclear on this point, and two of the leading commentators on the Analyses, Anthony Steinbock and Bruce Bégout, offer opposing viewpoints. Is affection the precondition for the constitution of any sense unity, as Steinbock suggests, or is it the.. (shrink)

We provide an overview of Searle's contributions to speech act theory and the ontology of social reality, focusing on his theory of constitutive rules. In early versions of this theory, Searle proposed that all such rules have the form 'X counts as Y in context C' formula – as for example when Barack Obama (X) counts as President of the United States (Y) in the context of US political affairs. Crucially, the X and the Y terms are here identical. A (...) problem arises for this theory for cases involving 'free-standing Y terms', as for example in the case of money in a computerized bank account. Here there is no physical X to which a status function might be attached. We conclude by arguing that Searle's response to this problem creates difficulties for his naturalistic framework. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of articulating ethics with justice, as it would seem impossible to think the practical application of one without denying the other at the same time. Indeed, as Levinas puts it, justice is violence within ethics when trying to compare the incomparable. On the contrary, ethics is an asymmetrical and irreversible relationship between two, where justice seems to have no room at all. This work seek to provide an articulation between both immeasurable dimensions by a renewed (...) attention to the issue of temporality of ethics and by including the concept of impure, taken from the work of Jean Guitton, from which it is understood that both dimensions are co-implicated from the very difference that constitute them. (shrink)

This paper contends that Ananda Abeysekara’s notion of un-inheritance, developed via a Derridean analysis of contemporary Sri Lankan politics and society, can act as a helpful supplement to the concept of justice. What one finds in Abeysekara’s analysis is an interpretation of justice as ultimately aporetic: justice both opens up to the possibility of its ever greater concrete realization and continually defers its completion. This paper begins by examining the aporetic character of justice as articulated by Derrida. It then proceeds (...) to Abeysekara’s account, situated as it is within a largely political consideration of Sri Lanka’s multicultural heritage and the recent conflicts that have arisen there. Abeysekara offers the notion of un-heritance as a way of thinking the possibility of justice precisely when political—and also religious—traditions come to an impasse, thus recognizing the inescapably aporetic structure of justice itself. (shrink)

This chapter is an examination of the way aporiai are employed in Aristotle’s scientific account of animal reproduction, and how they are resolved. I argue that – surprising as it may be, given what Aristotle says in Metaphysics B about the importance of going through aporiai – there seems to be nothing of much significance about his use of them, at least if we assume that genuine cases of aporiai are being tracked by use of aporia-language. I demonstrate this (...) negative thesis by systematically going through the examples. There seems to be no common purpose for which they are raised, they have no single type of structure, and they are not caused by any one sort of difficulty. (shrink)

¿Cómo objetivar la subjetividad sin caer en subjetivismos inmanentistas ni en objetivismos ajenos a la existencia personal? Desde el realismo filosófico la clave parece encontrarse en la adecuada articulación entre conciencia y subjetividad. Estudiaremos las teorías de la conciencia de Antonio Millán-Puelles y Karol Wojtyła desde la onto-fenomenología para hallar el modo de superar esta aporía. -/- How to objectify subjectivity without falling into either immanent subjectivisms or objectivisms foreign to personal existence? From the perspective of realist philosophy the key (...) seems to be found in an appropriate articulation between consciousness and subjectivity. We are going to study the theories of consciousness in Antonio Millán-Puelles and Karol Wojtyła from onto-phenomenology in order to find the way to overcome this aporia. (shrink)

Resumen. El proceso de transformación digital que vivimos y el desarrollo progresivo de las tecnologías disruptivas emergentes están afectando al derecho, y en particular al constitucional, al menos tal y como se había entendido hasta ahora, especialmente desde la perspectiva del paradigma de los derechos fundamentales y de las categorías y conceptos utilizados en la dogmática constitucional. Este pequeño trabajo, desde una perspectiva multidiciplinar, incluyendo la dogmática constitucional (análisis constitucional) y la sociología jurídica (análisis social), constituye una aportación al debate (...) dogmático en torno a las aporías que enfrentan los derechos fundamentales en la era digital. Abstract. We are immersed in a process of digital transformation in which emerging disruptive technologies are affecting the law, and in particular constitutional law, at least as we had understood it until now, especially from the perspective of the fundamental rights paradigm and of the categories and concepts used in constitutional dogmatic. This small contribution, from a multidisciplinary approach, including constitutional dogmatic (constitutional analysis) and legal sociology (social analysis) perspectives, constitutes a contribution to the dogmatic debate around the aporia of fundamental rights in the digital age. (shrink)

Plato’s nephew Speusippus has been widely accepted as the historical person behind the mask of the anti-hedonists in Phlb. 42b–44c. This hypothesis is supported by, inter alia, the link between Socrates’ char- acterization of them as δυσχερεῖς and the frequent references of δυσχέρεια as ἀπορία to Speusippus in Aristotle’s Metaphysics MN. This study argues against assigning any privileged status to Speusippus in the assimilation of δυσχέρεια with ἀπορία. Instead, based on a comprehensive survey of how δυσχερ- words were used in (...) classical antiquity, the semantic shift of δυσχέρεια can be explained in an alternative way. (shrink)

In his final monograph, Barry Stroud argues that certain fundamental concepts, like the concept of causation, are not only indispensable to any thought of an objective, independent world, but that they are also, therefore, invulnerable to skeptical attack. Given some assumptions about thought and objectivity, this leads him into the following metaphysical aporia: We can neither metaphysically establish that the objective, independent world is as we must think of it nor that it is not that way. I will argue (...) that the source of this aporia is a notion of objectivity in terms of the complete independence from any relation to thought whatsoever. This is a notion never explicitly argued for, as Stroud does not identify its origin. I then argue that a Kantian notion of objectivity can both be justified by tracing it to its origin in what we understand thinking and perceiving to be and dissolve Stroud’s aporia. If there is a way we must think of the world, and if we conceive of this world as completely independent of any relation to thought, then it is indeed hard to see why the world would agree with the fundamental form of thought. But if the objective, independent world is instead conceived of in relation to thought rather than independently of it and in terms of the independence from subjects and acts of thinking and perceiving, then it becomes intelligible how the world in relation to thought can agree with our fundamental concepts, while the world independent of any relation to thought might not. (shrink)

In the last third of the 20th century, the Bielefeld School of social history, headed by Hans- Ulrich Wehler and Jürgen Kocka, rose to prominence. It had contrasting concerns: the focus on structures and processes of development sidelined intentional action and coexisted with a political rewriting of the past that indicted the interests and decisions of dominant elites in Germany from 1870 to 1933. History was viewed, oddly enough, as retrospective politics. This article analyses the main aporiae implied by both (...) the School’s programme and its scholarly output. How did a structuralist historiography contrive backward-looking political denunciations? Is our time entitled to judge and accuse the past? Notwithstanding the weight of structures and processes, were there real alternatives for the historical agents? Did systemic causality grant elbowroom to intentional action? What chances were then missed and why? Overall, the surmise that there were always choices clashes with received narratives of inevitability. (shrink)

Philosophical counselling is generally understood as a movement in practical philosophy that helps counselees, i.e. clients, resolve everyday problems with the help of philosophy. Moving outside of the scope of what philosophy can do, however, is a problem. More specifically, when the philosophical counsellor moves outside of the so-called realm of philosophy into the realm of psychotherapy, i.e. medical framework, problem resolution and ameliorative goals might be on the table. This plays into the hands of critics who state that philosophical (...) counselling is encroaching on the terrain of the mental health professions without, inter alia, the proper evidence of its treatment efficacy. This paper is an attempt to keep the philosophical counsellor in the realm of philosophy, and by doing this to keep them busy with philosophising as such, i.e. philosophising as an end in itself. In particular, the article focuses on a novel interpretation of how to approach the counselee’s problem so that the philosophical counsellor does not fall prey to problem resolving and ameliorative endeavours. To substantiate this novel reinterpretation to the counselee’s problem, I turn to the notions of the Pyrrhonian aporia and the Derridean perhaps, in conjunction with a crucial position exclusively available to the counselee in philosophical counselling. (shrink)

Shaped by Hegel, philosophy’s approach to Antigone has always been firmly rooted in all the assumptions of realism, with proper, true-to-life, consistent, and plausible characters. These characterological mimetic interpretations often feed off of each other within the context of what’s perceived as “realist” drama, with its focus on characters and their insoluble, hence tragic, conflict. Starting with the twentieth-century avant-garde, however, theatre became less and less interested in characterological mimicry as a foundation of drama and what follows, as the foundation (...) of the theatrical experience itself. Along with the shift in our approach to character, we have also experienced a shift in our understanding of other Aristotelian components of drama and dramatic genres. As our sense of character and Thought shifted from stable to unstable, so did our understanding of tragedy and its role at the junction of theatre and philosophy. Tragedy has shifted from dialectic to aporia, from binary to polynary. Antigone—with its multiple interpretations and critical lenses—illuminates this fundamental shift in our understanding of tragedy and, thus, the fundamental shift in the relationship between theatre and philosophy in postdramatic theatre. (shrink)

The Eleventh Aporia results from the breakup of the entire Greek philosophy previous to Aristotle in two manners of conceiving and proposing the first principles (archai), specially the One (to hen): (i) the manner by which Physiologoi conceived the One as a principle, namely, assuming an underlying nature, different from the One in itself, not adequately characterized by the simple fact of being one and which is denoted by the concept of One, and (ii) the manner inaugurated by the (...) Pythagoreans and later endorsed by Plato, marked by the abandonment of the appeal to an underlying nature and by conceiving the One in itself (auto to hen) as a principle, depriving it of any connection with some reality not strictly characterized by being one. Aristotle faces this aporia in Metaphysics Iota 2 and, according to the interpretation I propose: (a) refuses the Pythagorean-Platonic manner of conceiving and proposing principles, (b) endorses the course of action of the Physiologoi, and, in doing so, (c) steps back and retakes the “project” of the Physiologoi at the point where it was interrupted, namely, during the search for a principle of motion. From this scenario, I will try to show that the final outcome of the Eleventh Aporia can be the introduction of the Prime Mover as the properly Aristotelian (and cosmological) candidate to the title of One between the principles. (shrink)

El pensador suizo Andreas Urs Sommer es, sin dudarlo, uno de los actuales especialistas de Nietzsche. En el año 2017 publica un texto titulado Nietzsche und die Folgen, un libro que recobra la figura del pensador alemán a la luz de ideas bastantes novedosas que hasta ahora no habían sido presentadas por la mayoría de los intérpretes de Nietzsche. En ese sentido, la filosofía experimental (Experimentalphilosophie) que presenta Sommer es la que ha llamado la atención de la crítica. Se trataría (...) de esconder bajo el juego experimental la filosofía de Nietzsche, omitiendo de ese modo un cierto tipo de compromiso de sus postulados filosóficos. Esta determinación está cobrando fuerza en la medida en que nos muestra las consecuencias de la filosofía experimental. Este trabajo pretende desarrollar, por un lado, los postulados centrales de la propuesta de Sommer para luego confrontarlos a la luz de la crítica y en qué medida dicha crítica es medular. Lo anterior da luces a una discusión que, más que inclinarse a la polémica, muestra el nutriente de una fructífera investigación. -/- The Swiss thinker Andreas Urs Sommer is, undoubtedly, one of Nietzsche’s current specialists. In the year of 2017 publishes a text entitled Nietzsche und die Folgen, a book that recovers the figure of the German thinker in the light of quite novel ideas that until now had not been presented by most of the interpreters of Nietzsche. In that sense, the experimental philosophy (Experimentalphilosophie) presented by Sommer is the one that has caught the attention of critics. It would be a matter of hiding Nietzsche’s philosophy under the experimental game, thus omitting a certain type of commitment from his philosophical postulates. This determination is gaining strength insofar as it shows us the consequences of experimental philosophy. This work aims to develop, on the one hand, the central postulates of Sommer’s proposal and then confront them in the light of criticism and to what extent such criticism is central. The foregoing gives light of a discussion that more than leaning to the controversy shows the nutrient of a fruitful investigation. (shrink)

In the following pages, the reader will find a detailed study of what Aristotle considered the most difficult aporia formulated in Metaphysics III (Beta), which is answered in chapter 2 of Book X (Iota): the Eleventh Aporia. In such aporia, Aristotle rivals: (i) the conception assumed by the ancient Physiologoi, which takes the One to be an underlying nature whose being is not exhausted by being One, and (ii) the Platonic-Pythagorean view, which prefers to conceive the One (...) in itself, according to its own determinations and apart from any connection with some reality outside it. (shrink)

This essay centers on the notion of the symbolic and its impact as developed by Claude Lévi-Strauss in his Introduction to the Work of Marcel Mauss. I examine Lévi-Strauss’ formulation of the “floating signifier” and its influence in French thought, particularly in the work of Jacques Lacan and Jacques Derrida. In doing so, I argue that Lévi-Strauss’ notion may be a misreading of the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure that has important implications for contemporary political issues on the left (...) in both theory and practice. (shrink)

This essay offers an examination of Agamben's statement that there is an important ambiguity in Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta as to whether actuality or potentiality is primary. I argue that this ambiguity is significant because it exposes the ontological dimension of Agamben's paradox of sovereignty.

In recent decades, the problem of post-truth has emerged. Values such as fairness, objectivity, and critical dialogue have become more difficult to achieve. Various characteristics are associated with this, such as the emergence of new technologies and a new era in political relations with the rise of fundamentalism and populism. Besides, the reference to postmodernism is always commonplace in the bibliography on the subject. Considering this, the article’s main objective is to philosophically analyze the theoretical foundation of post-truth, postmodernism. From (...) the methodological point of view, this theoretical study will take the interpretive approach as a reference. Interpretive hermeneutical criticism has been combined with a documentary analysis of the main works that address this problem. The article explains the main characteristics of the concept, considering the current and notorious interpretation, and then interprets the position that criticizes postmodernism as the theoretical basis of the post-truth era. It concludes by defining that the relationship between post-truth and its theoretical foundation has a dogmatic and contradictory character since it confronts subjectivist relativism with the dogma of a realist metaphysics. (shrink)

This study deals with the philosophical problems of historical conscience which arose in conjunction with the wake of 19th century Historicism, whose aim was to do away with the metaphysical presuppositions of German Idealism. The heyday of the historicist movement will be dealt with as well as its vacillating contradictions (its metaphysics).

Derrida’s thought on “trace,” “différance,” “writing,” and “supplement” is always thought the breaking of logocentrism, the essence, the positive meaning, and the closure of the metaphysics of presence; this thinking is accordingly regarded the thinking with the fundamental structure of difference and openness. By tracking back to Saussure, Husserl and Levinas, this fundamental difference breaks the myth of ideal meaning as well as the illusion of the absolute open; its lack of ideality and absoluteness contains the fundamental difference within itself (...) and thus has the structure of open. However, from a broader perspective, I will re-ask the question “Whether or not Derrida’s ‘trace,’ ‘différance,’ ‘writing,’ and ‘supplement’ have a structure of open.” When the web of differences encompasses everything even its own “exit,” this “open” thus conceals and denies other modes of thinking. With the impossibility of going out of this mode of thinking, the structure of différance is closed. (shrink)

At a crucial juncture in Plato’s Sophist, when the interlocutors have reached their deepest confusion about being and not-being, the Eleatic Visitor proclaims that there is yet hope. Insofar as they clarify one, he maintains, they will equally clarify the other. But what justifies the Visitor’s seemingly oracular prediction? A new interpretation explains how the Visitor’s hope is in fact warranted by the peculiar aporia they find themselves in. The passage describes a broader pattern of ‘exploring both sides’ that (...) lends insight into Plato’s aporetic method. (shrink)

The Nicomachean Ethics is generally thought to be a “dialectical” work, aimed at resolving aporia in a set of endoxa, which it takes as its starting-point. I argue that Aristotle’s aim in the treatise is, rather, to produce definitions of key ethical terms, and that his starting-points are limited to evaluative and discriminative judgments of a certain sort, which are demanded by the nature of the discipline and are not endoxa. I discuss also how the definitions are reached (focusing (...) on the cases of the virtues of character) and the roles that aporiai do play in the process. (shrink)

This book has been ably reviewed by others. I am taking a second look at it now on the occasion of the publication of its sequel, a review of which I also provide in this volume. I have had the distinct pleasure of being a student and colleague of Vasilis Politis (VP) since the initiation of the project that led to these monographs, and the great privilege of witnessing the development of the project for more than a decade. VP’s Plato (...) is in a way the only one I have known. When I hear the terms ‘aporia’, ‘whether-or-not’, and ‘ti esti’, they ring in my ears like bells. In this double review, I hope to impress upon the reader the unique importance of this interpretation of Plato, both for the history of philosophy and philosophy more broadly, and thereby to give a sense of its melody and resonance. (shrink)

Definition, conditions and bearers of being a person - three philosophical aporias. -/- In this article I examine the philosophical question of how to define the concept of the person in a non-arbitrary way, how to find out the determining conditions of being a person and how to enumerate the bearers of being a person. I come to the conclusion that the question of a non-arbitrary definition, of the essential conditions and of the bearers of being a person has not (...) yet been clarified; it is not sufficiently clear what we actually mean or should mean by "person" - beyond conventions, disciplinary boundaries and doctrines. This results in three philosophical aporias of the concept of the person. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to introduce an original and radical phenomenology of life into Heidegger’s earliest lectures at Freiburg University. The motivation behind this aim lies in the exclusion of life from the existential analytic despite Heidegger’s preoccupation with the question of life during this very early period. Principally, the essay demonstrates how Husserl’s phenomenological insight into the intentionality of life has the potential to be transformed into a living aporia. Although this demonstration is set within the (...) general context of obtaining knowledge in and of life, it is achieved via a reciprocal critique of the possibility of a philosophy of life and Husserlian phenomenology to reveal the congruence life philosophy has with the project of phenomenology. In contrast to fundamental ontology, the essay ends by exposing Heidegger’s latent and inexplicit formulation of phenomenology in terms of a radical correlation that holds aporetically between living and unliving experience. (shrink)

In the framework of Husserl's phenomenology, intentionality is regarded as the main feature of every act of consciousness. Our consciousness is directed towards objects immanent in it, however in a variety of epistemological functions and operations, such as sensory perception, judgment, cognition, volition, imagination, etc. Husserl uses the technical terms noesis and noema to designate the intentional acts of consciousness and their outcome in the constitution of objects in consciousness. At the same time, the persistence of a hyletic data is (...) emphasized, which as pure sense data escapes the phenomenological reduction and remains as such a residuum in the consciousness. In my lecture I try to work out the clear implication of epistemological referentiality in the phenomenological basic notion of intentionality. Among other things, I rely on the conceptual history of intentionality, i. e. on the earlier theories of intentionality in the Middle Ages and the philosophical revival of this notion in the late 19th century by Franz Brentano. Referentiality defines itself as the referential access of consciousness to objects of sensory perception, judgment, cognition, etc., in which the objects form the final referents. In the phenomenological framework, intentionality refers to the intentional access of consciousness to objects irrespective of their consciousness-immanence or -transcendence. The analogy between intentionality and referentiality is therefore based on the act-character as well as the directionality of consciousness which suggests the characteristic attempt of consciousness to gain intentional-referential access to objects. The directionality of consciousness in every intentional act ultimately marks and confirms the referentiality i. e the referential access of consciousness to the object. Intentionality as intentional-referential access to objects becomes a problem, when the access of consciousness to the object proves to be inadequate. I try to show how this problem of referentiality inevitably arises in Husserl's phenomenology of inner time-consciousness, especially in his conception of a time-object (Zeitobjekt). The consciousness-immanence of a time-object, such as a melody, points to a problem, that the intertwining of the temporality of consciousness and that of time-object necessarily results in various aporias of time, as Paul Ricœur observes and discusses in detail in his seminal work Temps et Récit. Moreover, the residual persistence of hyletic data, that survives all phenomenological reductions, would establish an actual interface between consciousness and reality, as Jaakko Hintikka emphasizes in his essay The phenomenological dimension. The aporicity of time refers to the autonomy of time and, thereby, to the autonomy of time-object in its intentional in-existence in consciousness. The hyletic data as interface between consciousness and reality points to the necessary referential extension of consciousness to objects that are otherwise excluded in the context of phenomenology. From these and similar premises, I would like to demonstrate how the problem of referentiality in Husserl's philosophy of time inevitably presupposes a reversion of referentiality within the prevailing noesis-noema structure that underlies the consciousness-immanence of objects. (shrink)

An aporia posed by Theophrastus prompts Priscian to describe the process by which perception formally assimilates to its object as a progressive perfection. I present an interpretation of Priscian’s account of perception’s progressive perfection. And I consider a dilemma for the general class of accounts to which Priscian’s belongs based on related problems raised by Plotinus and Aquinas.

In the twenty-fourth aporia of Theophrastus' Metaphysics, there appears an important, if ‘bafflingly elliptical’, ascription to Plato and the ‘Pythagoreans’ of a theory of reduction to the first principles via ‘imitation’. Very little attention has been paid to the idea of Platonic and ‘Pythagorean’ reduction through the operation of ‘imitation’ as presented by Theophrastus in his Metaphysics. This article interrogates the concepts of ‘reduction’ and ‘imitation’ as described in the extant fragments of Theophrastus’ writings – with special attention to (...) his Metaphysics – in an attempt to make sense of how, precisely, Theophrastus characterizes the metaphysical systems of Plato and the ‘Pythagoreans’. A fuller examination of Aporia 24 produces important new understandings of the nature of the Early Academy in the mid fourth century B.C.E. Specifically, by ascribing the concept of reduction via ‘imitation’ to Plato and the ‘Pythagoreans’, Theophrastus is actually describing theories about the structure of the universe held by an important Platonist competitor and the contemporary head of the Academy in Athens, Xenocrates of Chalcedon (396/5–314/13 B.C.E.), who (a) took it upon himself to establish a Platonic doctrine that could be associated with his master’s writings and (b) coordinated that doctrine with the philosophical precepts of the Pythagoreans. As a consequence, we are prompted to question Aristotle’s famous ascription of a theory of ‘imitation’ to the metaphysics of the genuine contemporary or recently deceased Pythagoreans (such as Philolaus of Croton or Archytas of Tarentum) and consider how Xenocrates’ writings on Plato and the ‘Pythagoreans’ might be informing both Theophrastus’ and Aristotle’s descriptions of the Platonic and Pythagorean philosophical system(s). (shrink)

El Realismo Especulativo, Nuevo Realismo o Realismo Postcontinental es una corriente ecléctica que viene a superar las aporías e insuficiencias de la filosofía continental desde una perspectiva a la que se le podrían achacar los mismos problemas que la perspectiva idealista y constructivista de los filósofos continentales. Para el desarrollo de la filosofía es importante entablar conversación los autores de este movimiento. En el presente artículo se presenta una aproximación a los aciertos e insuficiencias de las ontologías de dos autores (...) de la corriente como son Markus Gabriel y Graham Harman. Se presentan los aciertos e insuficiencias del realismo neutro de Markus Gabriel y de la Ontología Orientada a los Objetos, en este orden. En el último epígrafe, a modo de conclusiones, se señalan los puntos en común de las ontologías y se aporta la idea de acontecimiento como línea de investigación que supere las aporías que emergen de la contraposición entre el idealismo y realismo. (shrink)

At Apology 33c Socrates explains that "some people enjoy … my company" because "they … enjoy hearing those questioned who think they are wise but are not." At Philebus 48a-50b he makes central to his account of the pleasure of laughing at comedy the exposé of the self-ignorance of those who presume themselves wise. Does the latter passage explain the pleasure of watching Socrates at work? I explore this by tracing the admixture of pain, the causes, and the "natural harmony" (...) that Socrates' general account of pleasure implies for laughing at comedy. These reflections precipitate an aporia about the moral effect of Socrates' elenchtic practice. I suggest a path through the aporia that keys from Socrates' notion of "human wisdom" and the distinctive structure Plato gives the dialogues. (shrink)

At least since Socrates, philosophy has been understood as the desire for acquiring a special kind of knowledge, namely wisdom, a kind of knowledge that human beings ordinarily do not possess. According to ancient thinkers this desire may result from a variety of causes: wonder or astonishment, the bothersome or even painful realization that one lacks wisdom, or encountering certain hard perplexities or aporiai. As a result of this basic understanding of philosophy, Greek thinkers tended to regard philosophy as an (...) activity of inquiry (zētēsis) rather than as a specific discipline. Discussions concerning the right manner of engaging in philosophical inquiry – what methodoi or routes of inquiry were best suited to lead one to wisdom – became an integral part of ancient philosophy, as did the question how such manners or modes of inquiry are related to, and differ from, other types of inquiry, for instance medical or mathematical. In this special issue of History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis, we wish to concentrate in particular on ancient modes of inquiry. (shrink)

While Eros has a central philosophical function in the dialogues of Plato, it all but disappears as a philosophical term in the thought of Aristotle, and is replaced by the more rational and reciprocal relation of friendship, φιλία. This essay asks what becomes of Eros in Aristotle’s thinking, whether as deity, natural or cosmic force, or mode of human relation. Drawing on the ancient epithet of Eros, Ἔρως λυσιµελής, unbinder of limbs, Aristotle’s usages of both ἔρως and λύσις (loosening, unbinding), (...) respectively are traced in their ambivalence for his fundamentally organismic philosophy, insofar as they disturb the organism’s ontological integrity. With the assistance of Kristeva’s notion of the abject, it is argued that while Aristotle’s overt stance is a polemic against eros, his principal metaphysical innovations – the recasting of ἀρχή as divine τέλος, and the separation of material and moving causes – are solutions (λύσεις) to aporias that may involve a traversal of the sublime that is also irreducibly corporeal and erotic. (shrink)

Investigo a noção schopenhaueriana de destino e os dois tipos de fatalismo especificados pelo filósofo, o demonstrável e o transcendente, para, em seguida, considerá-los ante a aposta na ideia geral de uma sabedoria de vida, e vice-versa. Como seria possível admitir, por exemplo, o papel da sabedoria, referente à capacidade de o indivíduo conduzir a vida do modo mais agradável e prudente possível, no horizonte de uma filosofia que especula sobre a atuação de um destino e de um fatalismo, que (...) tudo poderiam determinar na vida deste mesmo indivíduo? Haveria espaços concomitantes e não conflitivos para estes dois componentes no interior da filosofia schopenhaueriana? Ou se trataria de uma aporia? (shrink)

For millennia, knowledge has eluded a precise definition. The industrialization of knowledge (IoK) and the associated proliferation of the so-called knowledge communities in the last few decades caused this state of affairs to deteriorate, namely by creating a trio composed of data, knowledge, and information (DIK) that is not unlike the aporia of the trinity in philosophy. This calls for a general theory of knowledge (ToK) that can work as a foundation for a science of knowledge (SoK) and additionally (...) distinguishes knowledge from both data and information. In this paper, I attempt to sketch this generality via the establishing of both knowledge structures and knowledge systems that can then be adopted/adapted by the diverse communities for the respective knowledge technologies and practices. This is achieved by means of a formal–indeed, mathematical–approach to epistemological matters a.k.a. formal epistemology. The corresponding application focus is on knowledge systems implementable as computer programs. (shrink)

Like cognition, the language in which the cognition finds expression has, in principle, a function of synthesis, that is, a function of connecting the cognizing subject with the object of cognition. The language enables the human subject to have epistemic access to the object; in its form and function this epistemic access constitutes the necessary referentiality of the language itself. Cognition must inevitably refer to the object of knowledge in the mode of pre-linguistic sensory and abstract-conceptual accesses, as clearly highlighted (...) by Kant in his basic notion of the synthetic nature and structure of conceptual knowledge. This points to an aporetic ambiguity of the epistemic referentiality of language. In the process of cognition the subject should have an epistemic access to the particular. However, the conceptual cognition departs from the particular and is directed to a general universal idea. The ambiguity between the referential access and the referential departure in cognition necessarily requires a supplementation of the abstractlogical through the pre-linguistic-sensory or aesthetic knowledge, as emphasized by Alexander G. Baumgarten in his doctrine of sensory cognition (cognitio sensitiva) and the aesthetic-logical truth. Such a supplementation within the framework of a theory of perception seems to establish a unique form of epistemological reference, in which the subjective-epistemic access to the particular object does not terminate in the ontological finality of a concept or conceptual cognition, but transcends the cognition into the infinity of an aesthetic perception. (shrink)

This text tries to give some initial scopes for a constructivist approach to political philosophy and social organization based on the fact of friendship; particularly in the greeting taken as an event of friendship. The mere greeting, the most basic approach to empathy, would be the happening of a world, of a whole world characterized by its demand to be, to be realized and preserved. This requirement would come from an unfathomable archaic background, which would be accessible in the idea (...) of ​​the number of friends. It is an aporia that shows both the open, but not infinite, character of a reference group based on the tenderness of something common. (shrink)

Different reasons give rise to the question, what philosophy really is, and by tradition we know many answers. Plato’s answer can be found by examining his explicit statements about philosophy in his dialogues, or by analyzing his representation of Socrates – philosophy become fl esh. But an other way to fi nd an answer to the question lies in examining the things which – according to Plato – we cannot do without. There are three of them, namely the idea, logos (...) and aporia. These three taken together – the insight that we orient ourselves according to some unity in our different fi elds of life; that we cannot dismiss dialogue and debate; and questions outlive answers – paint a picture of philosophy as «unbehauptendes Denken»1 [undogmatic thought]. Such «unbehauptendes Denken» does not aim to insist on new claims against old ones, but instead seeks to analyze and to refl ect upon old views. (shrink)