Results for 'auctorial say-so'

947 found
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  1. Inheriting the World.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Journal of Applied Logics 7 (2):163-70.
    A critical reflection on John Woods's new monograph, Truth in Fiction – Rethinking its Logic. I focus in particular on Woods’s world-inheritance thesis (what others have variously called ‘background,’ ‘the principle of minimal departure,’ and ‘the reality assumption,’ and which replaces Woods’s earlier ‘fill-conditions’) and its interplay with auctorial say-so, arguing that world-inheritance actually constrains auctorial say-so in ways Woods has not anticipated.
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  2. Exploding stories and the limits of fiction.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):675-692.
    It is widely agreed that fiction is necessarily incomplete, but some recent work postulates the existence of universal fictions—stories according to which everything is true. Building such a story is supposedly straightforward: authors can either assert that everything is true in their story, define a complement function that does the assertoric work for them, or, most compellingly, write a story combining a contradiction with the principle of explosion. The case for universal fictions thus turns on the intuitive priority we assign (...)
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  3. Trusting on Another's Say-So.Grace Paterson - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.
    We frequently trust others—even strangers—based on little more than the good word of a third party. The purpose of this paper is to explain how such trust is possible by way of certain speech acts. I argue that the speech act of vouching is the primary mechanism at work in many of these cases and provide an account of vouching in comparison to the speech act of guaranteeing. On this account, guaranteeing and vouching both commit the speaker to certain actions (...)
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  4. What can anyone say so far on the Peirce-CJC relation?Robert Junqueira - 2023 - Divyadaan: Journal of Philosophy and Education 34 (2):191-222.
    Charles S. Peirce (†1914) is often referred to as the founder of contemporary semiotics. Peirce provided the community of inquiry with a very convincing explanation of what a sign is. Peirce's definition of the sign bears a striking resemblance to that proposed in the 1606 volume of the CJC, the Coimbra Jesuit Course, authored by Sebastião do Couto (†1639). The community of inquiry holds the belief that Peirce drew from the writings of Couto to arrive at his triadic conception of (...)
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  5. KK is Wrong Because We Say So.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - forthcoming - Mind.
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  6. Identity and Immigration: A Quranic Perspective.Sayed Hassan Akhlaq - 212 - In John- Vensus - Hogan - George - Roralba (ed.), Building Community in a Mobile/Global Age: Migration and Hospitality. Washington DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. pp. 83-106.
    This article has begun pondering over the question of Islamic identity by narrating an ancient Muslim philosophers’ quotation. It could also be concluded with a poem from a modern Muslim philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938): “I have lived a long, long while,” said a fallen shore; “What I am know as ill as I knew of yore.” Then swiftly advanced wave from the Sea upshot; “If I roll, I am,” it said; “if I rest, I am not.” Both the first and (...)
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  7. An information-based treatment of punctuation in discourse representation theory.Bilge Say & Varol Akman - 1998 - In Carlos Martin-Vide (ed.), Mathematical and Computational Analysis of Natural Language: Selected papers from the 2nd International Conference on Mathematical Linguistics (ICML ’96), Tarragona, 1996. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins Publishing Company.
    Punctuation has so far attracted attention within the linguistics community mostly from a syntactic perspective. In this paper, we give a preliminary account of the information-based aspects of punctuation, drawing our points from assorted, naturally occurring sentences. We present our formal models of these sentences and the semantic contributions of punctuation marks. Our formalism is a simplified analogue of an extension --- due to Nicholas Asher --- of Discourse Representation Theory.
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  8. The Secular and the Sacred: Complementary And/or Conflictual?John P. Hogan & Sayed Hassan Akhlaq (eds.) - 2017 - Washington, DC, USA: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.
    The issue of the relation of the sacred to the secular has become paramount in virtually every country in the world. From church-state relations in the US, with the debates around abortion and same-sex marriage, to the vitriolic discussions in France over the veil (hijab) sacred-secular, faith-reason, transcendence-imminence -- impacts every aspect of personal, social, and political life. Indeed, the questions often asked are whether Huntington s, Clash of Civilizations is today s reality? Is clash and conflict inevitable? This volume (...)
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  9. Saying Without Knowing What or How.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):351-382.
    In response to Stephen Neale (2016), I argue that aphonic expressions, such as PRO, are intentionally uttered by normal speakers of natural language, either by acts of omitting to say something explicitly, or by acts of giving phonetic realization to aphonics. I argue, also, that Gricean intention-based semantics should seek divorce from Cartesian assumptions of transparent access to propositional attitudes and, consequently, that Stephen Schiffer's so-called meaning-intention problem is not powerful enough to banish alleged cases of over-intellectualization in contemporary philosophy (...)
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  10. Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language.William Day - 2010 - In William Day & Víctor J. Krebs (eds.), Seeing Wittgenstein Anew. Cambridge University Press.
    "Lest one think that the focus on aspect-seeing in Wittgenstein is only a means to more contemporary philosophical ends, one ought to read Day’s remarkable 'Wanting to Say Something: Aspect-Blindness and Language'. Day considers the issue of aspect-blindness, arguing that universal aspect-blindness is impossible for beings with language. Specifically, he shows that a child’s first attempt at language, at trying “bloh” for “ball,” is neither an indication that the child sees the ball for the first time, nor an indication that (...)
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  11. So THAT'S what it's like!Sean Allen-Hermanson - forthcoming - In Companion to the Philosophy of Animal Minds. Routledge.
    Many philosophers have held that we cannot say what it is like to be a bat as they present a fundamentally alien form of life. Another view held by some philosophers, bat scientists, and even many laypersons is that echolocation is, somehow, at least in part, a kind of visual experience. Either way, bat echolocation is taken to be something very mysterious and exotic. I utilize empirical and intuitive considerations to support an alternative view making a much more mundane contention (...)
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  12. Saying the Unsayable.Chien-Hsing Ho - 2006 - Philosophy East and West 56 (3):409-427.
    A number of traditional philosophers and religious thinkers advocated an ineffability thesis to the effect that the ultimate reality cannot be expressed as it truly is by human concepts and words. However, if X is ineffable, the question arises as to how words can be used to gesture toward it. We can't even say that X is unsayable, because in doing so, we would have made it sayable. In this article, I examine the solution offered by the fifth-century Indian grammarian-philosopher (...)
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  13. You Say I Want a Revolution.Wendy Salkin - 2024 - The Monist 107 (1):39-56.
    An underexamined insight of W. E. B. Du Bois’s John Brown is that John Brown worked for much of his life to cultivate democratic relationships with the Black Americans with and for whom he worked. Brown did so through practicing deference and deliberation, and by seeking authorization. However, Brown’s commitment to these practices faltered at a crucial moment in decision making: when he raided Harpers Ferry absent widespread support. Examining this aspect of John Brown brings into relief an overlooked tragic (...)
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  14. What did Hecker say about laughter? Funny you should ask.Karl Pfeifer - 2020 - Israeli Journal of Humor Research 9 (2):44-48.
    The Darwin-Hecker hypothesis, viz. that laughter induced by tickling and humor share common underlying mechanisms, is so-called in part because of a quotation attributed to Ewald Hecker. However, a German counterpart of the quotation does not appear in the location cited. Some textual sleuthing is undertaken to find out what Hecker actually wrote and where he wrote it.
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  15. What Can You Say? Measuring the Expressive Power of Languages.Alexander Kocurek - 2018 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
    There are many different ways to talk about the world. Some ways of talking are more expressive than others—that is, they enable us to say more things about the world. But what exactly does this mean? When is one language able to express more about the world than another? In my dissertation, I systematically investigate different ways of answering this question and develop a formal theory of expressive power, translation, and notational variance. In doing so, I show how these investigations (...)
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  16. How does a tautology say nothing?Ian Proops - forthcoming - In Wittgenstein's pre-Tractatus writings: Interpretations and Reappraisals.
    In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein conceives of tautology as 'saying nothing'. More precisely, he holds -- or so this essay contends -- that it says nothing in virtue of possessing a zero quantity of sense. Insofar as it is the limit of a series of propositions of diminishing quantity of sense, tautology resembles a degenerate conic section. But it also resembles the result of a summing together of equal and opposite linear vector quantities. Both of these models shape Wittgenstein's conception of (...)
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  17. Not So Human, After All?Brendan Shea - 2016 - In Courtland Lewis & Kevin McCain (eds.), Red Rising and Philosophy. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 15-25.
    If asked to explain why the Golds’ treatment of other colors in Red Rising is wrong, it is tempting to say something like “they are all human beings, and it is wrong to treat humans in this way!” In this essay, I’ll argue that this simple answer is considerably complicated by the fact that the different colors might not be members of the same biological species, and it is in fact unclear whether any of them are the same species as (...)
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  18. Just Say No (For Now): The Ethics of Illegal Drug Use.Mathieu Doucet - 2017 - Law Ethics and Philosophy 5:9-29.
    The war on drugs is widely criticized as unjust. The idea that the laws prohibiting drugs are unjust can easily lead to the conclusion that those laws do not deserve our respect, so that our only moral reason to obey them flows from a general moral obligation to obey the law, rather than from anything morally troubling about drug use itself. In this paper, I argue that this line of thinking is mistaken. I begin by arguing that the drug laws (...)
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  19. Why can’t we say what cognition is (at least for the time being).Marco Facchin - 2023 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 4.
    Some philosophers search for the mark of the cognitive: a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions identifying all instances of cognition. They claim that the mark of the cognitive is needed to steer the development of cognitive science on the right path. Here, I argue that, at least at present, it cannot be provided. First (§2), I identify some of the factors motivating the search for a mark of the cognitive, each yielding a desideratum the mark is supposed (...)
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  20. What’s So Special About Sentences?Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1995 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 28 (4):409-25.
    This paper is a discussion of Frege's maxim that it is only in the context of a sentence that a word has a meaning. Quine reads the maxim as saying that the sentence is the fundamental unit of significance. Dummett rejects this as a truism. But it is not a truism since it stands in opposition to a conception of meaning held by John Locke and others. The maxim denies that a word has a sense independently of any sentence in (...)
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  21. 'When You (Say You) Know, You Can't Be Wrong': J.L. Austin on 'I Know' Claims.Sabina Vaccarino Bremner - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    In ‘Other Minds’, J.L. Austin advances a parallel between saying ‘I know’ and saying ‘I promise’: much as you are ‘prohibited’, he says, from saying ‘I promise I will, but I may fail’, you are also ‘prohibited’ from saying ‘I know it is so, but I may be wrong’. This treatment of ‘I know’ has been derided for nearly sixty years: while saying ‘I promise’ amounts to performing the act of promising, Austin seems to miss the fact that saying ‘I (...)
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  22. (1 other version)Why Do I Say ‘Image’ When Discussing Vision? Or - Can We Ever See a Chair in its Totality?Ayad Gharbawi - manuscript
    Can We Ever See a Chair in its Totality? Synopsis of Chapter Submitted -/- Ayad Gharbawi 2023 Submission - Philosophy – Can we ever see a chair in its totality? Key Words: Metaphysics; Vision; Mind; Unity of Vision; Limitations of Man’s Perception. Word Count: 3,036 Words. Dear Sir/Madam; I hope this email finds you well. -/- My book represents a fundamental break from the conventional methodologies of psychology as it aims to be far more precise in describing the attributes of (...)
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  23. Saying the unsayable: Wittgenstein's early ethical thought.Paul Formosa - 2007 - Sorites 19:74-87.
    In this paper I present an account of Wittgenstein’s ethics that follows from a so-called ‘metaphysical’ reading of the Tractatus. I argue Wittgenstein forwards two distinct theses. Negatively he claims that there can be no ethical propositions. Positively he claims that the ethical good, or good in-itself, is the rewarding happy life. The happy life involves living in perfect contented harmony with the world, however it is, because how the world is, is a manifestation of God’s will. Given the negative (...)
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  24. Did the NSA and GCHQ Diminish Our Privacy? What the Control Account Should Say.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - Moral Philosophy and Politics 7 (1):29-48.
    A standard account of privacy says that it is essentially a kind of control over personal information. Many privacy scholars have argued against this claim by relying on so-called threatened loss cases. In these cases, personal information about an agent is easily available to another person, but not accessed. Critics contend that control accounts have the implausible implication that the privacy of the relevant agent is diminished in threatened loss cases. Recently, threatened loss cases have become important because Edward Snowden’s (...)
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  25. “Many people are saying…”: Applying the lessons of naïve skepticism to the fight against fake news and other “total bullshit”.Jake Wright - 2020 - Postdigital Science and Education 2 (1):113-131.
    ‘Fake news’ has become an increasingly common refrain in public discourse, though the term itself has several uses, at least one of which constitutes Frankfurtian bullshit. After examining what sorts of fake news appeals do and do not count as bullshit, I discuss strategies for overcoming our openness to such bullshit. I do so by drawing a parallel between openness to bullshit and naïve skepticism—one’s willingness to reject the concept of truth on unsupported or ill-considered grounds—and suggest that this parallel (...)
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  26. What Does it Mean to Say “The Criminal Justice System is Racist”?Amelia M. Wirts - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (4):341-354.
    This paper considers three possible ways of understanding the claim that the American criminal justice system is racist: individualist, “patterns”-based, and ideology-based theories of institutional racism. It rejects an individualist explanation of institutional racism because such an explanation fails to explain the widespread prevalence of anti-black racism in this system or indeed in the United States. It considers a “patterns” account of institutional racism, where consistent patterns of disparate racial effect mimic the structure of intentional projects of racial subjugation like (...)
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  27. What do our critical practices say about the nature of morality?Charlie Kurth - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):45-64.
    A prominent argument for moral realism notes that we are inclined to accept realism in science because scientific inquiry supports a robust set of critical practices—error, improvement, explanation, and the like. It then argues that because morality displays a comparable set of critical practices, a claim to moral realism is just as warranted as a claim to scientific realism. But the argument is only as strong as its central analogy—and here there is trouble. If the analogy between the critical practices (...)
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  28. That’s Just So-and-So Being So-and-So.Rob Lovering - 2019 - Philosophy in the Contemporary World 25 (1):61-73.
    When it comes to explaining someone’s puzzling, objectionable, or otherwise problematic behavior, one type of explanation occasionally employed in the service of doing so is as follows: “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so.” But what, exactly, do explanations of the type “That’s just so-and-so being so-and-so” mean? More specifically, in what way, if any, is it meaningful or informative to say such things? And what is the precise function of such explanations of someone’s behavior? Is it merely to present what one (...)
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  29. It Ain’t Necessarily So: The Misuse of 'Human Nature' in Law and Social Policy and Bankruptcy of the 'Nature-Nurture' Debate.Schwartz Justin - 2012 - Texas Journal of Women and the Law 21:187-239.
    Debate about legal and policy reform has been haunted by a pernicious confusion about human nature, the idea that it is a set of rigid dispositions, today generally conceived as genetic, that is manifested the same way in all circumstances. Opponents of egalitarian alternatives argue that we cannot depart far from the status quo because human nature stands in the way. Advocates of such reforms too often deny the existence of human nature because, sharing this conception, they think it would (...)
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  30. Science and Spirit in Stockholm.Charles Whitehead - 2011 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 18 (7-8):7-8.
    I find it hard to say whether TSC this year was the most balanced or the most biased since the first I attended in 1998. That year there were 35 plenary talks, of which 27 were distinctly materialist — that is, they assumed that consciousness ‘arises’ from ‘physical’ processes in the brain. This year there were also 35 plenaries, with 24 devoted to physicalist accounts. I cannot claim absolute precision for these figures, because it is not always easy to make (...)
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  31. Doxastic Justification and Testimonial Beliefs.Emmanuel Smith - 2023 - Episteme (N/A):1-14.
    I argue that a general feature of human psychology provides strong reason to modify or reject anti-reductionism about the epistemology of testimony. Because of the work of what I call “the background” (which is a collection of all of an individual's synthetizations, summarizations, memories of experiences, beliefs, etc.) we cannot help but form testimonial beliefs on the basis of a testifier's say so along with additional evidence, concepts, beliefs, and so on. Given that we arrive at testimonial beliefs through the (...)
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  32. How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testimony.Robert Hopkins - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (3):138-157.
    Is testimony a legitimate source of aesthetic belief? Can I, for instance, learn that a film is excellent on your say-so? Optimists say yes, pessimists no. But pessimism comes in two forms. One claims that testimony is not a legitimate source of aesthetic belief because it cannot yield aesthetic knowledge. The other accepts that testimony can be a source of aesthetic knowledge, yet insists that some further norm prohibits us from exploiting that resource. I argue that this second form of (...)
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  33. Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.
    ‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...)
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  34.  87
    (1 other version)We Owe It to Others to Think for Ourselves.Finnur Dellsén - 2021 - In Jonathan Matheson & Kirk Lougheed (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 306-322.
    We are often urged to figure things out for ourselves rather than to rely on other people’s say-so, and thus be ‘epistemically autonomous’ in one sense of the term. But why? For almost any important question, there will be someone around you who is at least as well placed to answer it correctly. So why bother making up your own mind at all? I consider, and then reject, two ‘egoistic’ answers to this question according to which thinking for oneself is (...)
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  35. The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.
    According to an influential Enlightenment ideal, one shouldn't rely epistemically on other people's say-so, at least not if one is in a position to evaluate the relevant evidence for oneself. However, in much recent work in social epistemology, we are urged to dispense with this ideal, which is seen as stemming from a misguided focus on isolated individuals to the exclusion of groups and communities. In this paper, I argue that that an emphasis on the social nature of inquiry should (...)
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  36. Our epistemic dependence on others: Nyāya and Buddhist accounts of testimony as a source of knowledge.Rosanna Picascia - 2023 - Journal of Hindu Studies 17 (1):62-80.
    This paper argues that philosophical debates between Nyāya and Buddhists on the nature and acquisition of testimonial knowledge present contrasting images of the role played by the epistemic agent in the knowing process. According to Nyāya, an individual can acquire testimonial knowledge automatically—and with little epistemic work—from a trustworthy speaker’s say-so. On the other hand, Buddhist epistemologists, who claim that testimonial knowledge is a species of inferential knowledge, argue that, in order to acquire knowledge from a speaker’s statements, an epistemic (...)
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  37. Knowing what you Want.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - In Lucy Campbell (ed.), Forms of Knowledge. Oxford.
    How do you know what you want? Philosophers have lately developed sophisticated accounts of the practical and doxastic knowledge that are rooted in the point of view of the subject. Our ability to just say what we are doing or what we believe—that is, to say so authoritatively, but not on the basis of observation or evidence—is an aspect of our ability to reason about the good and the true. However, no analogous route to orectic self-knowledge is feasible. Knowledge of (...)
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  38. Do we see apples as edible?Bence Nanay - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (3):305-322.
    Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out (...)
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  39. Code-consistent ethics review: defence of a hybrid account.G. Owen Schaefer - 2018 - Journal of Medical Ethics 44 (7):494-495.
    It is generally unquestioned that human subjects research review boards should assess the ethical acceptability of protocols. It says so right on the tin, after all: they are explicitly called research ethics committees in the UK. But it is precisely those sorts of unchallenged assumptions that should, from time to time, be assessed and critiqued, in case they are in fact unfounded. John Stuart Mill's objection to suppressers of dissent is instructive here: “If the opinion is right, they are deprived (...)
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  40. (1 other version)Action-oriented Perception.Bence Nanay - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):430-446.
    Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch-able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q-able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as (...)
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  41. Kripke’s Wittgenstein and Semantic Factualism.Miloš Šumonja - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (3).
    Recently, two new portrayals of Kripke’s Wittgenstein have emerged. Both understand KW as targeting the Tractarian picture of semantic fact as a speaker’s mental representation of the truth-conditions of the sentences he uses. According to the factualist interpretation, KW holds that meaning ascriptions are legitimate descriptions because semantic facts are not entities that explain people’s linguistic behavior. The second, Alex Miller’s non-standard non-factualist interpretation, sees KW as claiming that because no fact can explain our linguistic behavior, meaning ascriptions express a (...)
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  42. Kant and the Pre-Conceptual Use of the Understanding.Jonas Jervell Indregard - 2021 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 103 (1):93-119.
    Does Kant hold that we can have intuitions independently of concepts? A striking passage from § 13 of the Critique of Pure Reason appears to say so explicitly. However, it also conjures up a scenario where the categories are inapplicable to objects of intuition, a scenario presumably shown impossible by the following Transcendental Deduction. The seemingly non-conceptualist claim concerning intuition have therefore been read, by conceptualist interpreters of Kant, as similarly counterpossible. I argue that the passage in question best supports (...)
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  43. Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives.C. D. Broad - 1949 - Hibbert Journal 48:105-114.
    Now it is plain that such consequences as these conflict sharply with common-sense notions of morality. If we had been obliged to accept Psychological Egoism, in any of its narrower forms, on its merits, we should have had to say: 'So much the worse for the common-sense notions of morality!' But, if I am right, the morality of common sense, with all its difficulties and incoherences, is immune at least to attacks from the basis of Psychological Egoism.
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  44. The Sense of ‘in’ in Aristotle’s Philosophy.Mohammad Bagher Ghomi - manuscript
    In Physics (Δ, 3, 210a14-24) Aristotle distinguishes eight senses in which one thing is said to be in another thing: 1. Part in whole; e.g. finger in hand 2. The whole in its parts: ‘For there is no whole over and above the parts.’ 3. Species in genus; e.g. man in animal 4. Genus in species (generally: the part of the specific form in the definition of the specific form) 5. Form in matter; e.g. health in the hot and the (...)
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  45. Philippa Ruth Foot (Bosanquet, 1939).Rosalind Hursthouse - 2011 - Somerville College Report 1011:81-83.
    Very soon after Philippa Foot’s death, there was a flood of newspaper obituaries and ‘posts’ on blogs referring to her as one of the greatest moral philosophers of the twentieth century. She was also, though very few of the writers were in a position to say so, a particularly loyal Somervillian. She read PPE at Somerville during the war, started teaching there after war work in London in 1947, became its first Philosophy Tutorial Fellow in 1949, Vice Principal in 1967, (...)
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  46. Nothing is alive.Jiri Benovsky - 2017 - Think 16 (47):115-125.
    Finding an adequate definition of "life" has proven to be a tricky affair. In this article, I discuss the idea that nothing is really alive: we only say so. I shall argue that 'being alive' is not a genuine property of things, and that it only reflects the way we think and talk about things. An eliminativist strategy will then allow us to free ourselves from the burden of having to find a definition of life, and will allow us to (...)
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  47. Do the Standards of Rationality Depend on Resource Context?Eric Sampson - 2022 - Acta Analytica 38 (2):323-333.
    People sometimes knowingly undermine the achievement of their own goals by, e.g., playing the lottery or borrowing from loan sharks. Are these agents acting irrationally? The standard answer is “yes.” But, in a recent award-winning paper, Jennifer Morton argues “no.” On her view, the norms of practical reasoning an agent ought to follow depend on that agent’s resource context (roughly, how rich or poor they are). If Morton is correct, the orthodox view that the same norms of practical rationality apply (...)
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  48. Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
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  49. The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Does Plato Make Room for Negative Forms in His Ontology?Necip Fikri Alican - 2017 - Cosmos and History 13 (3):154–191.
    Plato seems to countenance both positive and negative Forms, that is to say, both good and bad ones. He may not say so outright, but he invokes both and rejects neither. The apparent finality of this impression creates a lack of direct interest in the subject: Plato scholars do not give negative Forms much thought except as the prospect relates to something else they happen to be doing. Yet when they do give the matter any thought, typically for the sake (...)
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  50. John Stuart Mill et la question de la cruauté de la peine de mort.Benoît Basse - 2013 - Revue d'Études Benthamiennes.
    It is clear enough that utilitarianism contributed to the softening of many penal systems in the world by arguing that very cruel punishments should be excluded every time a less cruel one would be just as effective. But does utilitarianism as such oppose the death penalty ? It is well known that Beccaria and Bentham criticized capital punishment on utilitarian grounds. But the fact that John Stuart Mill held a speech in favour of the death penalty at the House of (...)
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