The literature acknowledges a distinction between immoral, amoral and moral management. This paper makes a case for the employee (at any level) as a moral agent, even though the paper begins by highlighting a body of evidence which suggests that individual moral agency is sacrificed at work and is compromised in deference to other pressures. This leads to a discussion about the notion of discretion and an examination of a separate, contrary body of literature which indicates that some individuals in (...) corporations may use their discretion to behave in a socially entrepreneurial manner. My underlying assumption is that CSR isn’t solely driven by economics and that it may also be championed as a result of a personal morality, inspired by employees’ own socially oriented personal values. A conceptual framework is put forward and it is suggested that individuals may be categorized as Active or Frustrated Corporate Social Entrepreneurs; Conformists or Apathetics, distinguished by their individualistic or collectivist personal values. In a discussion of the nature of values, this paper highlights how values may act as drivers of our behavior and pays particular attention to the values of the entrepreneur, thereby linking the existing debate on moral agency with the field of corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

In our book The Inessential Indexical we argue that the various theses of essential indexicality all fail. Indexicals are not essential, we conclude. One essentiality thesis we target in the third chapter is the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action. Our strategy is to give examples of what we call impersonal action rationalizations , which explain actions without citing indexical attitudes. To defeat the claim that indexical attitudes are essential for action, it suffices that there could be even (...) one successful impersonal action rationalization. In what follows we bolster our case against an essential connection between action and the de se (or indexicality), first by developing a range of new action models and secondly by responding to challenges from Dilip Ninan, Stephan Torre, and José Luis Bermúdez . (shrink)

Any effort to specify identity conditions for corporations faces significant challenges. Corporations are amorphous. Nature draws no hard lines defining where they start or stop, whether in space or time. Corporations are also frustratingly dynamic. They often change the most basic aspects of their composition by exchanging parts, splitting and merging, changing ownership, and reworking fundamental internal operations. -/- Even so, we apply corporate identity conditions all the time. Both law and common intuition recognize that corporations do things—like pollute (...) environments or mislabel addictive medications—that call for judgment. Imposing judgment on corporations presupposes some implicit view of corporate identity that allows us to say, “This corporation that we now judge is the same one that misbehaved.” -/- This chapter draws on evidence from court decisions and experimental philosophy to unpack the fundamentally different visions of corporate identity implicitly encoded in law and in common intuition. The discrepancies suggest important lessons for lawmakers and corporate managers. (shrink)

How can we know whether we are punishing the same corporation that committed some past crime? Though central to corporate criminal justice, legal theorists and philosophers have yet to address the basic question of how corporate identity persists through time. Simple cases, where crime and punishment are close in time and the corporation has changed little, can mislead us into thinking an answer is always easy to come by. The issue becomes more complicated when corporate criminals undergo (...) any number of transformations—rebranding, spinning-off a division, merging, changing ownership, changing management, swapping lines of business, etc. These changes are common among all corporations, including those trying to conceal or limit liability for past crimes. This article takes a first step toward developing a workable and philosophically satisfying theory of corporate personal identity and discusses its prospects for fulfilling the retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrent purposes of criminal law. (shrink)

The fear that business corporations have claimed unwarranted constitutional protections which have entrenched corporate power has produced a broad social movement demanding that constitutional rights be restricted to human beings and corporate personhood be abolished. We develop a critique of these proposals organized around the three salient rationales we identify in the accompanying narrative, which we argue reflect a narrow focus on large business corporations, a misunderstanding of the legal concept of personhood, and a failure to distinguish different (...) kinds of constitutional rights and the reasons for assigning them. Corporate personhood and corporate constitutional rights are not problematic per se once these notions are decoupled from biological, metaphysical, or moral considerations. The real challenge is that we need a principled way of thinking about the priority of human over corporate persons which does not reduce the efficacy of corporate institutions or harm liberal democracies. (shrink)

Because corporate social responsibility can be beneficial to both companies and its stakeholders, interest in factors that support CSR performance has grown in recent years. A thorough integration of CSR in core business processes is particularly important for achieving effective long-term CSR practices. Here, we explored the individual CSR-related competencies that support CSR implementation in a corporate context. First, a systematic literature review was performed in which relevant scientific articles were identified and analyzed. Next, 28 CSR directors and (...) managers were interviewed. The literature review complemented with interview data resulted in the following eight distinct CSR-related competencies: Anticipating CSR challenges; Understanding CSR-relevant systems and subsystems; Understanding CSR-relevant standards; CSR management competencies, including Leading CSR programs, Managing CSR programs, and Identifying and realizing CSR-related business opportunities; Realizing CSR-supportive interpersonal processes; Employing CSR-supportive personal characteristics and attitudes; Personal value-driven competencies, including Ethical normative competencies, Balancing personal ethical values and business objectives, and Realizing self-regulated CSR-related behaviors and active involvement; and Reflecting on personal CSR views and experiences. Based on these results, implications for further research on this topic, as well as implications for practitioners, are discussed. (shrink)

The Call for Papers for this conference suggests the topic, “international codes of business conduct.” This paper is intended to present a shift from a discussion of codes, or constraints to be placed upon business, to an entirely different topic: to responsibility, which yields duty, and the reciprocal concept, right. Beyond the framework of external regulation and codes of conduct, voluntary or otherwise, lies another possible accounting system: one of real corporate responsibility, which arises out of the evident capability (...) of businesses to engage in rationally self-regulated activity. If such responsibility can be shown to be comprehensible, then it could bind the activities of corporations ethically, and in rationally compelling legitimate law, just as your activities and mine are bound. Perhaps we can bind the officers of corporations as responsible persons, but I would like to introduce an undiminished conception of responsibility that will back legitimate law for the corporations themselves, as artificial persons. That is the purpose of Part 1 of this paper. In Part 2 I will turn to the case of multinational corporations in particular. I will draw conclusions regarding their general duties and rights, and will dip explicitly into ethical formulations, as well as the ground of legitimate law. I will also indicate a particular rational requirement, or duty, for politically and environmentally sustainable business practices of multinationals. In Part 3 I will discuss jurisdiction for instituting legal sanctions in multinational cases. I will argue that the national laws and civil suits that may be pursued within a court in one nation can actually stand as legitimate checks against abuses carried out by the arms of multinational corporations that reside in other nations. (shrink)

In its January 20th, 2010 decision in Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission, the United States Supreme Court ruled that certain restrictions on independent expenditures by corporations for political advocacy violate the First Amendment of the Constitution, which provides that “Congress shall make no law […] abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Justice Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, (...) held that “[b]y suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and non-profit, the Government prevents their voices and view-points from reaching the public and advising voters on which person or entities are hostile to their interests” (Citizens United vs. Federal Election Commission 558 U.S. 38-9 (2010); emphasis added). Much of the language of the opinion, and some of its reasoning, as this passage illustrates, presupposes that corporations are agents capable of speech, and that it is (at least in part) in the light of this that limitations on political advocacy by corporations are prohibited by the Constitution. -/- While there are other strands in the argument, they are interwoven with the conception of the corporation as agent and speaker, with its voice and its viewpoints. The dissenters on the court objected on precisely this point (among others). Justice Stevens wrote sarcastically in his dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor, that “[u]nder the majority’s view, I suppose it may be a First Amendment problem that corporations are not permitted to vote, given that voting is, among other things, a form of speech” (558 U.S. 33 (2010)). Justice Sotomayor suggested in oral argument that the Court’s century-old practice of treating corporations as persons rests on a conceptual mistake. -/- My concern in this essay is not with the question whether the restrictions violate the Constitution. There are many issues that bear on this which will be outside the scope of my discussion. My concern is with the proper conceptual framework for understanding the agency of corporations and corporate speech, and the role that conceptions of these play in the background of the majority’s reasoning. The issue is legal, but it also has philosophical, conceptual and semantic aspects. It will be the latter aspects, and their potential to shed light on legal reasoning, that are my main focus. An adequate framework requires saying what properly speaking the corporation is, how agency is expressed through the corporation, whose agency it is, centrally whether the corporation is an agent or person in its own right, and in what sense it can be said to be capable of speech. I draw on recent work in collective action theory, particularly with respect to the semantics of collective action sentences (Ludwig 2007) and the analysis of the proxy agency in collective action (Ludwig 2014), to show (i) that corporations are neither genuine agents nor (therefore) capable of engaging in genuine speech, (ii) that consequently the First Amendment does not apply to corporations per se, and (iii) that a better understanding of the mechanisms of corporate agency casts doubt on more indirect arguments for extending the First Amendment to “corporate speech” as well. (shrink)

While most discussions of corruption focus on administration, institutions, the law and public policy, little attention in the debate about societal reform is paid to the “internalities” of anti-corruption efforts, specifically to character-formation and issues of personal and corporate integrity. While the word “integrity” is frequently mentioned as the goal to be achieved through institutional reforms, even in criminal prosecutions, the specifically philosophical aspects of character-formation and the development of corporate and individual virtues in a rational and systematic (...) way tend to be neglected. This paper focuses on the “internalities” of anti-corruption work with special emphasis on the pre-requisites that need to be ensured on behalf of the social elites in order for proper individual and collective character- formation to take place throughout the society. The author argues that a systematic pursuit of socially recognised virtues, both those pertaining to society as a whole and those specific to particular professions and social groups, is the most comprehensive and strategically justified way of pursuing anti-corruption policy, while institutional and penal policies can only serve an auxiliary role. The pursuit of institutional and criminal justice policies against corruption in a society that is subject to increasing relativism with regard to values and morality is at best ineffective, and at worst socially destructive. Thus the paper suggests a re-examination of the social discourse on the level of what the author calls “value strategy” and the gradual building of a plan to create and solidify specifically designed features of “corporate character” for key sectors of the society. This approach can serve as the main long-term strategy to improve the public profile of integrity and reinforce morality in both the public and civil sectors. (shrink)

The constitutions of many nations have been explicitly or implicitly founded upon principles of the social contract derived from Thomas Hobbes. The Hobbesian egoism at the base of the contract fairly accurately represents the structure of market enterprise. A contractarian analysis may, then, allow for justified or rationally acceptable universal standards to which businesses should conform. This paper proposes general rational restrictions upon multi-national enterprises, and includes a critique of unjustified restrictions recently proposed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and (...) Development (OECD). I propose restrictions that may be tighter than the OECD and international law currently demand, because reason requires that the activities of enterprises accord with standards of environmental and governmental sustainability in addition to consortium, national law and international law agreements. I argue that it is justifiable that indictments may be presented by a citizen or a government against the local arm of a multinational enterprise in response to violations committed by an arm within a different country. (shrink)

Modern tourism is an industry which role in ensuring the economic development of individual states and the world economy as a whole cannot be overestimated. The success of tourism and travel enterprises often depends on their corporate reputation. This article is devoted to the study of the elements and their connection with the peculiarities of different segments behavior. To assess the consumer's response to the corporative reputation the ranking methods were used in course of decrease of exponent importance; Likert (...) five-grade scale. There were taken the constituent parts of corporate nature and the main elements of company reputation as the variables, which influence the consumer's decision on buying the service. Paper examines three issues: the possibility of a connection between the company's nature and corporative reputation elements; the factors affecting the purchase decision of tourism service; and the corporative reputation's place in the formation of consumer's behavior of the tourism company client. During the research there was found the connection between the company's nature and the corporate reputation elements, there were also found factors that effect the decision about buying the tourism product; the personal experience and the opinion of reference group turned out to be the most important. The essential influence of the corporate reputation on the client's behavior was found. Nevertheless, the obtained results differ for different groups, which were formed according to gender, age, income rate, belonging to a profession and the typical consumer behavior. The obtained results may be used by the companies of tourism and travel industry for identifying the target audience and for the development of the PR-campaigns. (shrink)

Modern tourism is an industry which role in ensuring the economic development of individual states and the world economy as a whole cannot be overestimated. The success of tourism and travel enterprises often depends on their corporate reputation. This article is devoted to the study of the elements and their connection with the peculiarities of different segments behavior. To assess the consumer's response to the corporative reputation the ranking methods were used in course of decrease of exponent importance; Likert (...) five-grade scale. There were taken the constituent parts of corporate nature and the main elements of company reputation as the variables, which influence the consumer's decision on buying the service. Paper examines three issues: the possibility of a connection between the company's nature and corporative reputation elements; the factors affecting the purchase decision of tourism service; and the corporative reputation's place in the formation of consumer's behavior of the tourism company client. During the research there was found the connection between the company's nature and the corporate reputation elements, there were also found factors that effect the decision about buying the tourism product; the personal experience and the opinion of reference group turned out to be the most important. The essential influence of the corporate reputation on the client's behavior was found. Nevertheless, the obtained results differ for different groups, which were formed according to gender, age, income rate, belonging to a profession and the typical consumer behavior. The obtained results may be used by the companies of tourism and travel industry for identifying the target audience and for the development of the PR-campaigns. (shrink)

The purpose of this symposium is to shed light on the genealogy of the idea of a business corporation, an economic institution which has long been regarded with a mixture of awe and apprehension. Each of the four original contributions addresses the history of some of its key features. In the process, each contributor reveals some of the insights that history has to teach us regarding the central concepts that inform contemporary debates about the nature of the corporation, the contours (...) of the corporation's purpose, the sources of corporate power, the functions of corporate law, the duties of directors, the status of shareholders, and the legitimacy of corporate rights. (shrink)

One of the most important challenges for political theory is to identify the extent to which corporations should be facilitated and restricted in law. By way of background to that challenge, we need to develop a view about the nature and potential of corporations and corporate bodies in general. This chapter discusses two fallacies that we should avoid in this exercise. One, a claim popular among economists, that corporate bodies are not really agents at all. The other, a (...) claim associated with US jurisprudence, that not only are they agents, they are persons whose rights call in the same way as the rights of individual persons for legal recognition and protection. (shrink)

The paper advances the hypothesis that David Hume’s philosophy explains the corporeal dimension of the self, particularly, one’s belief in a body as being ‘her own body’, as a part of one’s self, in light of three different perspectives: through the operations of the imagination, the associative principles and the perception of mental and physical parallel states; through the occurrence of certain passions in the mind, particularly, pride, humility, and self-interest which direct one’s attention to a body that is felt (...) to be her own body; through the consciousness of the ability of the will to guide the power of moving certain parts of the body. Finally, it is argued that the mental phenomenon of belief in one's own body is a mutual construction of the human mind, that is, it is produced simultaneously by intellectual, affective, and volitional operations. (shrink)

The Article analyzes the notion of legal “thinghood” in the context of the person–thing bifurcation. In legal scholarship, there are numerous assumptions pertaining to this definition that are often not spelled out. In addition, one’s chosen definition of “thing” is often simply taken to be the correct one. The Article scrutinizes these assumptions and definitions. First, a brief history of the bifurcation is offered. Second, three possible definitions of “legal thing” are examined: Things as nonpersons, things as rights and duties, (...) and things as property. The first two definitions are rejected as not being very interesting or serving any heuristic function. Conversely, understanding legal things as property is meaningful, useful, and helps to understand what it means to say that animals are legally things. Defining things as property has certain rather important implications, which are analyzed at the end of the Article. For instance, not everything needs to be either a person or a thing: The historical institution of outlawry involved treating individuals neither as legal persons nor as legal things. One must conclude that the person–thing bifurcation is less fundamental than is often assumed. (shrink)

In this article we compare the experiences of women members of the board of directors of U.S. and Norwegian corporations. Based on the personal stories of two women directors from each country, we discuss similarities and differences in the role and characteristics of women corporate directors and the processes and behaviours they are involved in as directors within and outside the boardroom. We also investigate the role of gender-related dynamics in these two countries, focusing on board roles and processes, (...) and the visible and invisible board structures with which women corporate directors contend. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to relate the critical core of Jesus Conill’s last book, Bodily Intimacy and the Human Person. From Nietzsche to Ortega and Zubiri, with the problem of nihilism, as a structure that survives in our contemporary societies, especially in the context of neurosciences, technology and our way of relating to both. After outlining the key insights of the book, especially its innovative conception of bodily intimacy, I will retrieve some contributions from Nietzsche’s notes regarding nihilism, (...) to show that after the “death of God”, other instances take his place, the logics of nihilism remain intact and underly the majority approach of neurosciences. I will conclude that the elements presented by Conill for a strong intimacy and subjectivity will be necessary for the task, still pending, of overcoming nihilism. (shrink)

I intend to discuss Hume’s theory of personal identity in Books I and II of the Treatise of Human Nature. First, I intend to argue that Hume’s distinction between a ‘personal identity with regard to thought and imagination’ and a ‘personal identity with regard to passions and self-interest’ is only methodological, not radical. That is, the philosopher does not sug-gest the existence of two distinct ideas of personal identity in mind. Secondly, I try to show the contribution of the passions (...) of pride and humility to the production of a belief in personal identity. Pride and humility contribute to the liveliness of this belief by producing the person’s interest in his sensations and actions of the past and the future. Thirdly, I want to show how passions and self-interest make it possible to explain the corporeal aspect of the belief in personal identity. I propose to discuss how the body and its qualities can be understood as constituent elements of the notion of personal identity. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop two philosophically suggestive arguments that the late Justice Stevens made in Citizens United against the idea that business corporations have free speech rights. First, (1) while business corporations conceived as real entities are capable of a thin agency conceptually sufficient for moral rights, I argue that they fail to clear important justificatory hurdles imposed by interest or choice theories of rights. Business corporations conceived as real entities lack an interest in their personal security; moreover, they (...) are incapable of exercising innate powers of choice. Second, (2) I argue that the structure and functionally individualized purpose of a business corporation—to increase value for its shareholders—undermines the implicit joint commitment necessary to derive corporate rights of free speech from non-operative shareholder-member rights. Since one cannot transfer innate moral rights such as free speech, any exercise of this right on behalf of another must be limited in scope. (shrink)

In the early 20th century, the most numerous and well-funded institutions in the United States—corporations—used public relations to make a widespread and fundamental change in the way they constitute and regulate their relations of knowledge with the public. Today, we can see this change reflected in a variety of areas such as journalism, political outreach, social media, and in the ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ administration of Donald J. Trump. This article traces practices of corporate truth-telling and knowledge production across (...) three periods I will call the personal, the legal, and public relations, which are roughly coincident with the antebellum period, the Gilded Age, and the 20th century, respectively. In sum, what can be found in public relations and now broadly across society, is that relations of knowledge have come to be refigured as relations of power, subordinating traditional epistemological concerns like justification and belief in favor of government and control. (shrink)

The concept of the person is widely assumed to be indispensable for making a rights claim. But a survey of the concept's appearance in legal discourse reveals that the concept is stretched to the breaking point. Personhood stands at the center of debates as diverse as the legal status of embryos and animals to the rights and responsibilities of corporations and nations. This Note argues that personhood is a cluster concept with distinct components: the biological concept of the human being, (...) the notion of a rational agent, and unity of consciousness. Use of these component concepts (in lieu of the concept of the person) in legal reasoning would promote greater systematicity and coherence. (shrink)

Several European and North American states encourage or even require, via good Samaritan and duty to rescue laws, that persons assist others in distress. This paper offers a utilitarian and contractualist defense of this view as applied to corporations. It is argued that just as we should sometimes frown on bad Samaritans who fail to aid persons in distress, we should also frown on bad corporate Samaritans who neglect to use their considerable multinational power to undertake disaster relief or (...) to confront widespread social ills such as those currently befalling public health (obesity) and the environment (climate change). As such, the corporate duty to assist approach provides a novel justification for sustainable business practices in such cases. The paper concludes by arguing that traditional stakeholder approaches have not articulated this duty of assistance obligation, though a new utilitarian stakeholder theory by Thomas Jones and Will Felps may be coextensive. (shrink)

In recent times, new perspectives related to business development and building solid community strategies are being introduced in many countries around the world. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a topic that academia as well as businesses are interested in carefully and thoughtfully in order to benefit businesses as well as maintain the sustainable development of enterprises environment, bringing maximum benefits to the social community and stakeholders. But on the other hand, developing these strategies into practice is not easy, especially (...) with regard to developing countries. Vietnam is a country that is giving importance to social responsibility issues in recent years, this country is focusing on persuading fastidious businesses in the world in sustainable cooperation with business models, business applications in many areas of operation, and at the same time have more abundant labor resources and diverse business practice markets. -/- The author's theory brings certain values to readers through the author's perspectives and research, including definitions and models. In addition, research on the current state of social responsibility in developing countries by referencing and synthesizing various documents and sources of authors who have studied before but is not really exhaustive. The thesis focuses on reports of companies in Vietnam (e.g Vinamilk Corp., Vingroup Corp., FPT Corp.), social networking sites, websites with many research sources on CSR and combined with general social and personal knowledge. The results obtained are that specific reports on the implementation of corporate social responsibility in Vietnam are gradually progressing and leading to movements for other small and medium enterprises to join in response to create sustainable development strategy for each business. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity of joint (...) actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

This work aims to uphold that a subject‘s body schema can be extended beyond their physical body, that is, that external artifacts, such as tools, can be a part of the said body schema. To support this thesis a new definition of ―body schema‖ is proposed, one that starts by pointing out that body schema as a sub-personal sensorimotor is a necessary condition, albeit not a sufficient one, besides pursuing to include environmental interactions as a sufficient condition. Together, these elements (...) favor the generation and modification of body schema and, consequently, its extension. (shrink)

This article presents an ethical analysis and critique of personalized service in the tradition of Catholic social teaching (CST) that is both Catholic and Personalist. It tackles the ethical issues involved when service delivery is personalized, issues that affect both the consumers and the service providers. It focuses on nonprofessional services that are offered by low-skilled blue-collar workers through corporations that are organized to produce efficient service to a high volume of consumers. Customer service involves intersubjectivity, that is, interaction between (...) two persons as subjects. Ethics in the service context is not only about treating consumers in a just manner; the threats to the personhood of the service providers are also significant, for their work cannot be separated from their very being. By focusing on the ethical issues of emotional labor and consumerism of human service, the study will argue that the human interaction in personalized service runs the risk of alienating us from our authentic selves and from each other. If the objective of personalized service is to create authentic human relationship in the service encounter, the latter can arise even in a nonpersonalized service. We do not have to personalize our actions in order to create genuine human interaction. Instead, what we must do is to treat each other as persons. (shrink)

In this article, we critically reflect on the responsibilities that the food industry has for public health. Although food companies are often significant contributors to public health problems, the mere possibility of corporate responsibility for public health seems to be excluded in the academic public health discourse. We argue that the behavior of several food companies reflects a split corporate personality, as they contribute to public health problems and simultaneously engage in activities to prevent them. By understanding (...) responsibility for population health as a shared responsibility, we reassess the moral role of the food industry from a forward-looking perspective on responsibility and ask what food companies can and should do to promote health. (shrink)

I argue that Social Trinitarians can and should conceive of God as a group person. They can by drawing on recent theories of group agency realism that show how groups can be not just agents but persons distinct from their members – albeit, I argue, persons of a different kind. They should because the resultant novel view of the Trinity – that God is three ‘intrinsicist’ persons in one ‘functional’ person – is theologically sound, effectively counters the most trenchant criticisms (...) of Social Trinitarianism, and enjoys independent theological support from the biblical notion of ‘corporate personality’. (shrink)

The concept of ‘Ethnicity’ still enjoys some currency in the historical and social science literature. However, the cogency of the idea remains disputed. First coming to prominence in the 1980s, the word is often used to depict the character of social relations in the context of conflicts over sovereignty. The case of Northern Ireland presents a paradigmatic example. This article is a rejoinder to Ian McBride’s contention that my scepticism about the notion lacks justification. With reference to disputes over the (...) state, I show in response that ‘ethnicity’ in effect means nationality. I further claim that the nation state is a successor to the dynastic state. In clarifying the meaning of this arrangement, the article brings out how the nation is a juridical rather than empirical category. More specifically, it derives from the notion of corporate personality in law. For this reason, its retrospective integrity is a matter of fabrication, depending on the fiction of ancestral continuity. At the same time, its future-oriented cohesiveness means that it must be invested with a unifying will. I conclude that the legitimacy of a nation state rests on its democratic will, whose coherence is expressed in the action of its government. (shrink)

Societies need markets, so just as trustworthy professionals are needed in fields such as healthcare, law and education, modern societies need trustworthy market managers, including corporate officers and directors. But in its screening of candidates, U.S. corporate business has lagged behind fields such as medicine and law, which in the nineteenth century addressed their need for screening by upgrading professional education and establishing licensing of individual practitioners. Corporate business, by contrast, has been too tolerant of problematic executives, (...) particularly executives of a type shown by recent research in psychology to exhibit a set of personality traits including below average concern about bad effects of their actions on other people. Over-representation of this problematic type has cost corporate business the trust and respect it could earn by resting fully on a time-honored alternative foundation already espoused by many trustworthy teachers and practitioners of business. Society needs these trustworthy people of business to work together to establish screening of candidates for high level corporate positions by upgrading MBA education and establishing licensing for these positions. For reasons again based on current findings in psychology, screening candidates for the MBA could be significantly strengthened by requiring historical studies, particularly history of the corporate legal structure in the U.S. and history of the MBA itself. Upgrading the MBA and establishing correlated licensing could open the way toward corrections in the legal form of the corporation to bring it into line with hospitals, law courts and universities as places where responsible professionals pursue their callings on behalf of society. (shrink)

Despite the enormity of the financial losses flowing from the 2008 financial crisis and the outrageousness of the conduct that led up to it, almost no individual involved has been prosecuted for criminal conduct, much less actually gone to prison. What this chapter argues is that the failure to punish those in management for their role in this misconduct stems from a misunderstanding of the need to prove that they personally knew of this wrongdoing and harbored an intent to defraud. (...) But not only would negligence be a sufficient legal and moral basis for imposing terms of imprisonment in these cases, mere causal responsibility would also be enough, for causal responsibility has embed in it all we need to find those causally responsible morally responsible too, and once some basis for moral responsibility is established, the imposition of terms of imprisonment is both legally permitted and morally just. (shrink)

Businesses cause social harm, meaning harm to society at large and not just to those with whom a business is contractually linked. Evidence introduced: normative claims that businesses should be "socially responsible"; positive claims that they contribute to social well-being; and negative claims that they are sometimes military-like, causing extensive harm for which no one is held personally responsible. The latter point to corporate survivalism, which acknowledges no mandatory civil responsibilities. Neither law nor social pressure has yet counteracted this (...) mind set. Business ethics might, but not if its practitioners examine only narrowly contractual relationships. (shrink)

In this paper, we try to provide a theory that explains human behavior, and thinking in their totality. We missed the corporeal part when writing the theory about our new model for the human psyche: It was missing explaining that some things are physical, such as memories, involuntary organic movements, disease, etc. If we had developed a philosophical model for the soma, we would also miss the essence of the individual, what we have decided to call psyche. In order to (...) explain how our hand could not stand the pressure and ended up releasing the link that then got lose and killed somebody, we need the philosophical explanation involving the soma. In order to explain why a person had a shared-ego moment, we need the philosophical explanation involving the psyche. In this way, it is missing creating a theory that unifies all in order to produce a set that can explain any situation that involves human behavior and thinking. We are then calling the entity that collects all in one, which is needed for our better understanding, Human Persona. Persona because that reminds us of individuality, unique characteristics that tell us that the individual we call John Smith, of id 143, is someone special. Human because we do talk about personality of animals, and we would like to make sure we create an impression of difference and superiority when referring to humans. The tools we here use are logical analysis, deductive reasoning, selection and collection of real-life evidence, etc. (shrink)

Today, many people have realized that the climate change and biodiversity loss issues lie in how and to what extent humans consume products for their lives in the Anthropocene era. Consumerism has pushed natural resource exploitation to its peak, and the depletion of resources is becoming increasingly prevalent. The beauty and personal care industry has a large market and high profits, especially in the high-income segment. However, this advantage also carries the risk of facing scrutiny, investigations, and criticism from civil (...) society organizations, environmental activists, and consumers. More than anyone else, the industry is vulnerable to the perils of unfavourable societal assessments, particularly the repercussions of consumer-led boycott actions. In this discourse, we suggest that, given the current circumstances, it is imperative for multinational beauty corporations to take a proactive role in allocating resources towards the development of sustainable agriculture practices. This entails not only advocating for the widespread adoption of environmentally conscious production methods but also dedicating efforts towards conducting research and innovation in the area of nature-friendly manufacturing techniques. Doing so will help demonstrate their commitment to the environment and actively provide convincing evidence to consumers of their social responsibility through emission reduction and biodiversity conservation activities. (shrink)

The article considers the question of the role of psychosocial intervention in forming the professional Ethics of PR-specialists. -/- There are three ethical areas (social, corporate, personal) of professional Ethics of PR-activities. The first area of professional Ethics of PR-activities is social. It consists of responsibility of PR-specialist before society. The second area of professional Ethics of PR-activities is corporate. It consists of the responsibility of PRspecialists before the PR profession in general, a PR agency, increasing the reputation (...) of the profession of PR. The third area of professional Ethics of PR-activities is personal. This area is the basis of the Ethics of PR-activities. This area is the foundation for the development of corporate and social professional Ethics of PR-activities. -/- The authors formulate three levels of psychosocial intervention according to the three ethical areas of professional Ethics of PR-activities. They are social, corporate, and personal. The aim of psychosocial intervention on the first level (social) is to deepen knowledge, transform the attitude towards social phenomena and society in general. The aim of psychosocial intervention on the second level (corporate) is to deepen the knowledge (professional development), actualize professional subjectivity, relevant professional activity at this level. The aim of psychosocial intervention on the third level (personal) is to deepen the subjection of PR-experts. The authors define professional competencies of the PR-specialists, which they have to get on the three levels. (shrink)

In the Gorgias, Socrates argues that just punishment, though painful, benefits the unjust person by removing injustice from her soul. This paper argues that Socrates thinks the true judge (i) will never use corporal punishment, because such procedures do not remove injustice from the soul; (ii) will use refutations and rebukes as punishments that reveal and focus attention on psychological disorder (= injustice); and (iii) will use confiscation, exile, and death to remove external goods that facilitate unjust action.

Since Uber’s founding in 2009, individuals associated with Uber have engaged in (or been accused of engaging in) numerous categories of corporate malfeasance: failure to protect data privacy, theft of trade secrets, sexual misconduct (including sexual assault and sexual harassment), lack of worker safety, lack of consumer safety, and racial discrimination. Thus, Uber is a good test case for the question of whether corporate behavior can provide moral justification for a boycott. More specifically, an examination of the 2017 (...) #deleteUber controversy will invite the reader to consider questions such as the following: When is a personal boycott morally justified, and when (if ever) is a personal boycott morally obligatory? How are personal boycotts related to larger-scale organized boycotts? What are the factors that make an organized boycott morally justified (or unjustified)? Is there a sound argument for the conclusion that we should #deleteUber? (shrink)

Listening is not an incorporeal experience; we do not listen with our non-extended minds. We listen with all our body, and music can change completely our personal structure. It is through sound experience that we change and asset ourselves. Studies in the doctrine of affects often use sonorous metaphors and concepts such as Stimmung, resonance, consonance, that refer to sound experience. In this paper, I try first of all to show how listening is rooted in body experience. Then, I argue (...) for a new consideration of the notion of person that takes into account the fundamental sonorous basis – psycho-acoustic – of its constitution. Thanks to sounds we can reach a new conceptualization of emotional relations between persons which we attain through the person’s ordo amoris. Additionally, with the analysis of sounds we grasp some aspects of emotional experience related to the singular person (intra-personal). So, if sounds are profoundly related to corporeal experience, so strongly involving affects as to modify our personal structure and form a person’s constitution, and affects can really do that, their relationship need to be inquired where both sound experience and affection are rooted: corporeity. (shrink)

The mind-body problem is a perennial philosophical problem that seeks to uncover the relationship or causal interaction that exists between the corporeal and incorporeal aspects of the human person. It thrives under the assumption that the human person is made up of two distinct entities, that is, mind and body, which explains their assumed causal relation. As attractive as this may seem, not all philosophers agree to this feigned idea of interaction and bifurcation of the human person. One philosopher of (...) note, who sorts to address this problem in the 17th century, is René Descartes. For Descartes, minds and bodies are distinct kinds of substance, where bodies are spatially extended substances (a res extensa) and minds are unexpended substances characterised primarily by thought (a res cogitans). But, if minds and bodies are radically dissimilar, how could they causally interact? This paper therefore attempts to examine the philosophical foundations of Cartesian dualism. It also articulates the major arguments adopted by Descartes through his methodic doubts to address the mind-body problem. The paper concludes by highlighting some fundamental criticisms of Cartesian Interactionism in the light of recent trends in parapsychology and neuro-scientific research. (shrink)

PT. A noção de “pessoa”, pensada a partir do legado antropológico e filosófico do ocidente, afirma-se como uma unidade corporal e espiritual que determina a sua singularidade no seio da comunidade. A “pessoa” assim perspectivada assume uma importância destacada na reflexão ética das aplicações científicas de artificialização da vida humana. Muito concretamente, a noção de “pessoa” deve contribuir para a fundamentação ética das terapêuticas de transplantação. A transplantação representa um dos mais notáveis avanços da medicina do século XX e com (...) um impacto incontornável na prestação de cuidados de saúde. Os transplantes são considerados o tratamento mais eficaz para patologias crónicas que afectam a funcionalidade de determinados órgãos vitais, restituindo ao doente uma melhoria na sua saúde e/ou qualidade de vida. O sucesso desta terapêutica é, no entanto, condicionado pela disponibilização de pessoas que queiram fazer dádiva de si, do seu próprio corpo, para o bem-estar de outrem. Deste modo, a doação, realizada após a morte da pessoa ou ainda em vida, enfrenta vários desafios técnicos, mas também, e principalmente, desafios éticos. A nossa dissertação centra-se na reflexão ética da doação de órgãos e tecidos para transplante e no impacto que a dádiva de uma parte específica do corpo pode comportar na noção de “pessoa”. Deste modo, ao mesmo tempo em que se procura promover a doação de órgãos para aumentar o número de transplantes, também se vão delineando estratégias para salvaguardar a integridade corporal do dador e a eminente dignidade que o constitui como pessoa. As estratégias consistem fundamentalmente num diálogo entre o princípio de autonomia, que determina a singularidade da pessoa, e o princípio de solidariedade, que é desencadeado pela relação com o outro. Estes princípios éticos, articulados e uma vez cumpridos, são os alicerces da doação voluntária e altruísta, e impedem a instrumentalização e exploração da pessoa dadora. -/- EN. The western anthropological and philosophical notion of ‘person’ emerges as a corporal and spiritual entity, which determines his singularity at the level of community. From this perspective, the notion of ‘person’ holds an important place in ethical considerations concerning the scientific applications of artificial manipulation of human life. More precisely, the notion of ‘person’ must contribute towards the ethical basis of transplant therapeutics. The transplantation of human organs and tissues is one of the most notable advances in twentieth century medicine, and, as such, has had an unquestionable impact on health care practice. Transplants are now seen as the best treatment for chronic diseases that impair the function of some vital organs, improving the patient health and/or quality of life. The success of organs transplantation depends entirely upon the altruism of people giving their bodies for the well-being of others. Organ donation, performed during life or after death, raises not only technical, but also mainly ethical challenges. This work focuses on the ethical considerations associated with human organs and tissue donation for transplantation and on the impact that a donation of an organ has on the notion of ‘person’. At the same time that one recognizes the need to increase the number of organs for transplanting, there is also the need to preserve the donor’s corporal integrity and his eminent dignity. Strategies to preserve the donor’s corporal integrity and dignity must take into consideration the dialogue between the principle of autonomy, which is characterized by the singular entity, and the principle of solidarity, born out of one’s relationship with those around you. These ethical principles, once engaged and fulfilled, are the bases of a voluntary and altruistic donation, and prevent the donor from becoming a mere instrument and being exploited as such. (shrink)

The article deals with the anthropological views of M. Olesnytskyі, a professor at the Kyiv Theological Academy (КТА), whose creative work has not yet been properly studied. It reveals the connection of his anthropological ideas with moral theology and ethical doctrine, which he had taught for a long time in the KTA. Anthropological implications of the moral formation of a human person are also paid attention to, in particular, the dependence of the moral character on anthropological factors. In this context, (...) the writing considers Olesnytskyі’s views on the peculiarities of a person’s body-build. The Kyiv scholar focused on the principles of human corporeality based on natural conditions. In particular, Olesnytskyі stressed that it was the earth’s conditions that formed the bodily nature of man. The article also explores those religious ideas that influenced the anthropological views of the Kyiv scholar, which is quite understandable in view of his Christian outlook. Olenytskyі demonstrates the possibility of effective application of contemporary philosophical studies to the theological and anthropological analysis of man as an individual. In this sense, the conceptual connections of the anthropological views of the Kyiv scholar with the ones of the influential contemporary European philosophers and anthropologists, such as А. Schopenhauer, R. H. Lotze, F. Schleiermacher, E. von Hartmann, and others, become clearly evident. The article emphasizes the significance of the concept of the unconscious for the moral anthropological doctrine of Olesnytskyі; it also argues for the connection of this concept to the leading European doctrines of the unconscious, which were elaborated in philosophy and psychology in the second half of the 19 th century. (shrink)

This book explores a universal question of human social order: Under what circumstances and to what extent is the individual to be held morally responsible for collective events? This question reaches far beyond the intentions and actions of a particular business enterprise, state or a similar large-scale collective. The philosopher Wolfgang Sohst (Berlin, Germany) investigates the subject with unprecedented thoroughness, covering the whole range of contemporary discussion on this subject. He provides a detailed analysis of the functions of individual members (...) in such a collective, the structural prerequisites for them to be held responsible for acts which they have not directly committed themselves and the transmission of responsibility even to successor generations of the perpetrators collective. -/- Table of contents: -/- Introduction 1 Actors and Moral Action 1.1 On the concepts of actors and action 1.2 The simultaneous emergence of actor and action 1.3 The difference between a unit of event and a unit of action 1.4 The difference between legal and moral responsible action -/- 2 The Continuum Between Individual and Corporate Actor 2.1 The relationship between a single human actor and a corporate actor 2.1.1 The primary responsibility of the individual actor and the ontological status of the collective 2.1.2 Additional arguments for putting collective responsibility onto the individual actor 2.2 The levels within structural consolidation 2.3 A different schematic view: Community, Society, State 2.4 Direct vs. organized sociality 2.5 Conflicts of application in assigning collective responsibility -/- 3 Individual and Collective Actions 3.1 A better form of social reductionism 3.2 Corporate bodies as a bundle of agency relationships 3.3 The horizon of view for collective social phenomena -/- 4 The Corporate Entity as a Moral Subject 4.1 Are corporate actors also morally responsible? 4.2 Corporate bodies as norm subjects -/- 5 Possible criteria for the moral qualification of collective action 5.1 Membership in a group 5.2 Success of an action 5.3 Shared intentionality or purpose, common interests and common consciousness 5.4 Social relationships between actors as a condition of collective action 5.5 Subjective and factual feelings of collective responsibility 5.6 The community of shared values 5.7 Social identity 5.8 Origin and ethnic belonging 5.9 No equality in injustice -/- 6 Norm-based and Purpose-oriented Organization 6.1 No collective responsibility without inner organization 6.2 Collective shame as an indication of collective responsibility 6.3 Individual responsibility for collective norms 6.4 The collective organization as an independent unit of purpose for the collective 6.4.1 The actualistic perspective 6.4.2 Structural persistence 6.4.3 Possible counter-examples of structural persistence 6.5 The other side of collective responsibility 6.6 Interim Result -/- 7 Moral Responsibility of the Individual from an International Perspective -/- 8 Social Norms and Our Responsibility for their Fulfillment 8.1 Norm dimensions 8.2 The overarching importance of norm ranking in assigning collective moral responsibility 8.3 Private and public norms 8.4 Subjective ‘ought’ and personal responsibility 8.5 The obligation to morally acceptable and coherent behavior -/- 9 The Difference between Culpability and Responsibility 10 The Temporal Horizon of Collective Moral Responsibility Index Bibliography. (shrink)

Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized (...) groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of playing roles in an organizational structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of cooperation I argue for is not grounded in collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, or joint commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of organized groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social phenomena depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors (e.g., documents, laws, job descriptions). The view of minimal cooperation among members of organized groups I offer provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of at least one social phenomenon. (shrink)

The later Stoics, especially – and most notably – Posidonius of Apamea, allegedly the greatest polymath of his age and the last in a celebrated line of great philosophers of the ancient world, gradually developed the belief that all parts of the universe, either ensouled or not, were actually interconnected due to the omnipresent, corporeal, primordial kosmikon pyr which, according to Stoicism, pervades each being as the honey pervades the honeycomb. As for reasonable beings, in particular, kosmikon pyr takes the (...) form of logos. Due to that power, Posidonius believes, the phases of moon, for instance, can affect the succession of tides and ebb–tides; on the same grounds, the signs can have major effect on the course of events and, therefore, allow for divination. That kind of interconnectedness, apart from justifying the interdependentness of all beings to each other, testifies for an utter kinship between them, for sympatheia. In this short paper I intent to show that Posidonius’s approach has been promptly adopted and utilized by modern holistic theories concerning Environmental Ethics, especially by Arne Naess’s Deep Ecology and Ecosophy T, in the context of which notions such as kinship, interconnectedness, interdependentness and identification of all beings are key parameters for the articulation of their argumentation. I also intent to outline some essential – in my opinion – differences in the way Posidonius and Naess make use of the notion of interconnectedness, together with some inconsistencies which can be potentially fatal, at least as far as a system of ethics is concerned. This is because notions such as cosmic sympathy may possibly establish an interesting, even charming and influential cosmology or metaphysics, but when it comes to ethics, in my opinion, they can only provide shaky grounds for establishing a firm one, since they allow for deterministic views, which more or less leave no room for personal responsibility, to wit for personal praise or blame. (shrink)

Governance encompasses the processes by which organizations are directed, controlled and held to account. It includes the authority, accountability, leadership, direction, and control exercised in an organization. Greatness can be achieved when good governance principles and practices are applied throughout the whole organization. Ethical Governance requires that public officials adhere to high moral standards while serving others. Authentic Governance entails the systematic process of continuous, gradual, and routine personal/corporate improvement, steering, and learning that lead to sustainable high personal/corporate (...) performance and excellence. Thus authentic governance represents the ability to discern right from wrong and the commitment to do what is right, good, and proper. Benevolent governance is perceived to be for benefit of the population as a whole. Sikhism, a panentheistic religion, originated in the Punjab province of the Indian subcontinent, during the 15th century. It is one of the youngest and fifth major world religions, founded by Guru Nanak. The fundamental beliefs of Sikhism have been enshrined in the sacred scripture, Sri Guru Granth Sahib [1-3]. These beliefs include faith in one universal creator, unity of all humankind, engaging in selfless service, striving for social justice for all, honest livelihood and ethical conduct while living a householder's life. Sri Guru Grant Sahib provides very useful insights for governance through religious or secular organizations, that address human rights, education, or diplomacy to end all forms of disparity/discrimination among people [4-5]. In this article, an attempt is made to understand how the doctrines of Sikhism encourage us for better governance and by which means. Whether these doctrines align with the above-mentioned forms of governance or conflict with these. It is pointed out the most of the attributes of good, ethical, authentic and benevolent governance are genuinely supported by the Sikh doctrines. The adherence to democratic and republican organizations, for providing high-quality governance, is encouraged in Sikh principles and practices. (shrink)

My central research focus over the past 30 years has been the articulation of what I call a radically temporal approach to philosophy. In the papers below, written between 2001 and 2022, I treat the varying ways in which radically temporal thinking manifests itself in the phenomenological perspectives of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Eugene Gendlin. I also discuss Jacques Derrida's deconstructive project and George Kelly's personal construct theory as examples of radically temporal thinking. With the aim of clarifying and (...) further defining the nature of this family of orientations, I have delineated the important ways in which it differs from a range of interlinked approaches in philosophy and psychology that includes hermeneutic and radical constructivisms, social constructionism, 4EA (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, and Affective) cognition, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of corporeal intersubjectivity, autopoietic self-organizing systems theory and American pragmatism. Among the authors whose work I have submitted to critique from the radically temporal perspective are: Francisco Varela (autopoietic self-organizing systems), Shaun Gallagher, Evan Thompson, Matthew Ratcliffe, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Dan Zahavi, Hanne De Jaegher, Michel Bitbol, Thomas Fuchs (enactive, embodied ('4EA') cognition), Gilles Deleuze (Deleuzian biopolitics), Ken Gergen and John Shotter ( social constructionism), Kym Maclaren ( critical phenomenology) and Jan Slaby (critical neuroscience). I argue that these authors' accounts of the relation between affect, motivation and intention, attention , reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, the basis of mathematical naturalism and sensori-motor models of behavior, and the relation between the body, language and culture remain burdened by traditional presuppositions that the radically temporal philosophies of Heidegger et al put into question. (shrink)

Nuestro recorrido será el siguiente. En el capítulo primero examinamos la noción de unión del cuerpo y el alma que Descartes formula desde el inicio de Las pasiones del alma (§2), noción anticipada por otros textos (Principia II §2) pero muy original, y que recusa todo dualismo, en tanto concibe una unión no substancial, en la que el alma está unida, de modo más o menos estrecho, a todos los cuerpos que la afectan, como "corps de dehors", de manera tal (...) que todos los sentimientos, internos o externos, en tanto referidos al cuerpo, pueden ser ubicados en una misma exterioridad respecto al alma (sección §1). Esta noción de unión: a) coincide plenamente con la experiencia del poder o capacidad del alma para actuar sobre el cuerpo, o recibir la acción del cuerpo, de manera tal de excluir definitivamente toda referencia a la substancia espiritual, corporal o compuesta; b) establece una diferencia meramente cuantitativa entre mi cuerpo y los cuerpos del mundo, porque la unión al cuerpo es más o menos estrecha, según sea más o menos inmediata la acción del cuerpo sobre el alma. La primera consecuencia de lo anterior es la siguiente: Las pasiones del alma no establece distinción alguna entre sentimientos interiores y exteriores, porque el lugar del agente (las partes de nuestro cuerpo, los cuerpos del mundo) no sirven ya más como criterio para la distinción entre los modos de la sensibilidad (sección §2). Es precisamente en este punto fundamental que la investigación cartesiana sobre las pasiones se distingue definitivamente del análisis de la sensibilidad realizado en la cuarta parte de Los Principios de la Filosofía, en donde la pasión era considerada como un sentimiento interior, junto con los apetitos naturales (IV §190), por oposición a los cinco sentidos exteriores (IV §§ 191-195). Luego del examen de la definición de pasión, en el próximo capítulo, podremos preguntar: dadas, por un lado, la interioridad de la pasión al alma, y por otro, el emplazamiento de todos los cuerpos en el mismo afuera, «dehors», respecto del alma, ¿cabe buscar, en la pasión, el sentimiento de un corps de dedans? Anticipemos que la reforma conceptual de la unión del cuerpo y el alma exige y a la vez resulta de una reforma lexical especialmente interesante porque, al excluir toda referencia a las substancias o a la substancialidad de la unión, a) identifica esta última con la capacidad o potencia del alma de afectar o ser afectada por el cuerpo (sección §3); b) debe describir la unión como un «estar (del alma) junto (al cuerpo), ( être jointe)», que califica la estrechez de la unión por la inmediatez de la acción (sección §4). Finalmente, esta conjunción del alma y del cuerpo anticipa de manera coherente la doctrina cartesiana del amor, el cual se define por la capacidad del alma de unirse (« se joindre ») a los objetos que la afectan en la apariencia de bondad. El capítulo segundo se dedicará a la definición de pasión (Pasiones §§21-28), el único sentimiento interior al alma misma porque el único que es tal como aparece, en una evidencia que no puede ser entendida mas que en relación, todavía indeterminada, con la evidencia primera ego sum, ego existo, en la Meditación Segunda, y especialmente con su última formulación, en la certeza del « creo ver » («videre videor»). El carácter inaugural de esta definición reside en los puntos siguientes: a) la relación con el alma convierte a la pasión en el único sentimiento que es tal como se siente, pero al mismo tiempo, b) inaugura una nueva forma de error posible, todavía indeterminado, pero de otro orden que aquél al que nos somete la naturaleza extrínseca del resto de las percepciones (sección §1). Ahora bien, la pasión es tal como se siente porque no es un « ver », videre, y por lo tanto no le corresponde revelar el ego sum (« ego sum qui sentio » VII, 29, 11), a través de un « creo ver », videre videor (sección §3). Quisimos probar que esto es perfectamente coherente con la doble enumeración de los modos del pensamiento, en la Segunda y Tercera Meditación, (VII, 28 y 35, respectivamente) y con la clasificación de los pensamientos (ideas, juicios, voluntades, afecciones), establecida en la Meditación Tercera (VII, 38) (sección §2). Pero la pasión, a la vez que inaugura una interioridad, se recibe en el alma, como algo que no proviene de ella (Pasiones §17). Es aquí, donde se da a conocer el carácter inaugural y a la vez paradójico de la pasión: en ella, la interioridad del alma a sí se conoce, por primera vez, en una modalidad particular de la recepción sensible. Examinamos esa doble condición, interioridad y recepción, en la sección §7, la última de este segundo capítulo. Dos consecuencias. La primera: a partir de la definición de pasión, la investigación sobre la cualidad sensible se independiza del examen de la realidad objetiva (sección §4). La pasión puede por lo tanto inaugurar una verdad y un modo de error que se separa definitivamente del objeto representado como cosa o privación de cosa. No seremos los primeros en decir que la pasión, el saber afectivo en general, sólo puede dirigirse a un no-objeto (F. Alquié). Pero hay que agregar que la definición de pasión, al recuperar su evidencia primera, abre a la meditación el campo de una realidad inobjetivable, o, mejor, de una modalidad de la objetividad definitivamente irreal, que ya ha sido descubierta por J-L. Marion, por lo menos para el caso particular de la admiración, y que sólo podrá ser de ser descripta en el momento de definir las pasiones particulares. La segunda consecuencia reside en la relegación definitiva de toda explicación de la pasión por la causa eficiente (sección §6). En efecto, Descartes deja de lado las funciones del cuerpo como criterio de clasificación de los modos de la sensibilidad, y la relega a la segunda parte de la segunda parte de su definición, de manera tal que la causa de la pasión no explica nada y por el contrario, es ella la que debe ser explicada. Si se admite una doble constitución de la metafísica cartesiana, nuestro esfuerzo conduce a mostrar que la noción de pasión, y la investigación que ella abre, pertenece a una metafísica presidida por su primera figura, cogitatio, antes que por la segunda, causa. La investigación sobre los efectos de la pasión, que comprende los artículos §§40 a 48 de Las pasiones del alma, y a la que dedicamos nuestro capítulo III, debe ser leída en continuidad al texto de la Meditación Sexta, en tanto viene a responder a la pregunta siguiente: ¿cuál es el modo de la pasividad que caracteriza a la pasión y la distingue de otros modos del sentimiento como de otros modos de constricción a la voluntad? Si la pasión, se recibe en el alma, ¿cómo se siente esa proveniencia, si por definición queda excluida toda relación al cuerpo como causa o como objeto? En primer lugar, aquello que caracteriza a la pasión es que ella tiene como efecto una disposición a querer. Pero, dado que la voluntad es esencialmente libre, la disposición a querer en el alma tiene a su vez un efecto igualmente necesario, este es, una respuesta del alma a la disposición a querer que es en ella, respuesta que Descartes llama (no) consentimiento a los efectos de la pasión (§46; §80). A partir del artículo §40, la investigación sobre las pasiones se introduce resueltamente en el ámbito de una moral, como una ciencia de los efectos (sección §1). En segundo lugar, y por lo anterior, la pasión, puede ser, en su interioridad y proximidad al alma, directamente contraria a la voluntad (365, 12-13), justamente, porque ella es el único sentimiento que tiene como efecto necesario en el alma una disposición a querer (§40). Lejos de presentar un mero obstáculo a una determinación del alma, la pasión se recibe como una invitación, a la cual el alma debe imperativamente responder. El punto a destacar (sección §2) es el siguiente: Descartes describe aquí una verdadera autoafección indirecta, por la cual el alma puede excitar en sí una pasión voluntaria (362, 28 ; 363, 2; 486, 6-9), autoafección de la cual es absolutamente incapaz en el caso del resto de los sentimientos, tal como quedaba establecido desde la Meditación Sexta. Así, el cuerpo que actúa inmediatamente sobre el alma, al cual ella está más estrechamente unida, abandona su condición de mero intermediario entre los cuerpos y el alma y pasa a ser, en una autoafección voluntaria, el intermediario entre una acción del alma y una pasión en el alma. En la sección §3 se agrega esto: la pasión, a diferencia de todos los sentimientos, no se siente en el instante. Por el contrario, en ella, el sentir se despliega en el tiempo y se hace por lo tanto independiente de la acción de los cuerpos sobre los sentidos internos o externos. Esto se debe a lo siguiente: primero, en la pasión, el cuerpo actúa como una totalidad indivisible. Segundo: el cuerpo actúa sobre sí. En la pasión, tercero, el cuerpo actúa de manera tal que su acción se presenta siempre como una exigencia al ejercicio efectivo de la libertad. Finalmente, en la pasión, la totalidad de las funciones del cuerpo se someten definitivamente a la voluntad, de manera que el alma puede afectarse a sí en una pasión voluntaria. Quisiéramos proponer (sección §3) que la experiencia del cuerpo en la pasión merece ser nombrada como la experiencia de un cuerpo de dedans, que se presenta en la repugnancia o el consentimiento y cuya acción no se siente en un lugar (en una internidad que no establece ninguna distinción con la exterioridad de los cuerpos del mundo), sino en el alma misma, en una interioridad que hace imposible la reducción del cuerpo sentido a la categoría común de objeto o causa. Ahora bien, la investigación sobre la pasión puede introducirse en el ámbito de la moral con una condición: que la pasión permita el acceso del ego a un alter ego, o según la fórmula tradicional utilizada por Descartes, a un «otro sí mismo», alter ipse. Es el problema que abordamos en el capítulo IV. Queda claro que las Meditaciones Metafísicas impiden, o mejor, ocluyen de modo parentemente definitivo, ese acceso. Pero, en Las pasiones del alma, Descartes, introduce un género muy particular de objeto , «otros objetos, que consideramos causas libres, capaces de hacer el bien y el mal » (§55, 374, 5-7). Más aún, la libertad del agente se erige en criterio de clasificación de segundo orden para todas las pasiones simples, con excepción del deseo. El punto a notar aquí (sección §1) es el siguiente: el ego no se ve afectado por la causa libre porque infiera que ella, a diferencia de otras, actúa moralmente sobre él, con independencia de toda determinación mecánica. Es al revés: el ego siente la acción de una causa libre porque se ve afectado por la libertad del agente; es esa afección la que otorga a los actos del otro el carácter moral de buenos o malos. Esto se prueba en el respeto o la veneración (§162): aquello que nos afecta no es la supuesta bondad o la maldad de los actos, sino inmediatamente aquello que los hace tales, esto es, la « capacidad » de hacer el bien o el mal. De aquí que el hijo, cuyos actos evidentemente no son morales, pueda nombrarse, entre los objetos de amor, como un « otro(s) sí mismo» (§82, 389, 15). A fin de precisar el sentido y los alcances de esta alteridad, debemos detenernos en la definición cartesiana del amor (secciones §§2-3). Esa definición debe, en primer lugar, distinguirse claramente de aquella que Descartes había ensayado dos años antes, en la carta a Chanut del 1 de febrero de 1647. El problema que preocupa a Descartes no es ya más la definición de un amor intelectual, sino la de un amor puro, que Descartes distingue precisamente de las pasiones que « participan del amor » (§82, título), mezcla de deseo y « otras pasiones particulares » (§82 389, 9-10). El amor puro es una pasión que no tiene relación alguna al cuerpo, porque se siente sin placer y es la primera de las pasiones « que pertenecen al alma », según la distinción establecida en los títulos de §137 y §139. Esta distinción se establece estrictamente dentro del ámbito del amor pasión porque no considera en ningún momento el alma en tanto separada del cuerpo, condición del amor intelectual (IV, 602, 4-8), sino como « nuestra mejor parte » (§139, 432, 5). El único que merece sin reparos el título de « amor puro » es el amor paterno, el único en el que se cumple la tríada, pureza, posesión perfecta, alteridad. En la sección §4 nos detenemos en los modos del engaño propio de las pasiones, en general, y del amor en particular, para entender el último rasgo que Descartes le otorga al amor puro, este es, el de ser un amor verdadero, que elude todas las formas de engaño a las que las pasiones pueden someternos, y puede por lo tanto ocupar el lugar del verdadero conocimiento. La teoría cartesiana del amor permite así dos conclusiones. Primera: la alteridad sirve para distinguir definitivamente el amor del deseo, el amor puro de las pasiones que participan de él, los grados de perfección del amor, amor paterno, amistad honesta, y, finalmente, la formas del amor, afección, amistad y devoción. Segundo, antes de toda reflexión sobre el deseo, es decir, antes de considerar la perfectibilidad del ego por la posesión de bienes que dependan exclusivamente de nuestra voluntad, Descartes escribe que el alma se perfecciona en el amor, por la unión al bien verdadero, mientras que se envilece y rebaja en su unión con un bien excesivamente estimado (§139, 432, 12-20 ; §142, 435, 18 –22). En la sección §5 examinamos el efecto del amor, la benevolencia, que Descartes, haciendo caso omiso de la tradición, define como una verdadera beneficencia, como un acto de donación, que no necesita de ningún deseo para hacerse efectivo. El punto a destacar aquí es que Descartes considera que el otro al que el alma se une es la « mejor parte » del todo que resulta de la unión (§82, 389, 16-17). Por este exceso, el generoso, sobre la estrechez de la unión al cuerpo, decide por la estrechez de la unión a otra alma, y privilegia el objeto de amor sobre el amor a la vida. Brevemente: la amistad cartesiana tiende a la devoción y rompe con toda noción de amistad fundada en la igualdad. Esto nos permite, en la sección §6 hacer notar cómo la teoría del amor resignifica un léxico que Descartes recibe de Aristóteles y Santo Tomás. La comparación, al menos inicial, con esos autores está dirigida a incluir a Descartes en una historia del amor. El quinto capítulo traza el largo itinerario de la noción de virtud, a través de la Correspondencia, y se detiene especialmente en las cartas mencionadas más arriba, ( a Elisabeth, 15 septiembre 1645; a Chanut, 1 febrero 1648) en las que Descartes ensaya y abandona una primera forma de moral definitiva, especialmente problemática, en tanto aspira, por primera vez, a deducir el amor a Dios de la idea de Dios, y se dirige a pensar al ego como parte de totalidades (familia, vecindad, Estado) que han sido, ellas también, creadas por Dios. Esta reflexión sobre el amor a Dios es todavía independiente de la reflexión sobre las pasiones, que recién comienza. Intentamos aquí despejar la intención cartesiana que puede resumirse así: de la misma manera que Dios, creador de toda verdad, es fundamento de toda ciencia y toda verdad se halla ya contenida en Su idea, es Dios, creador de totalidades físicas, sociales o políticas, el fundamento de todo amor, aunque no se lo conozca, o sólo confusamente, como tal; de modo que en todo acto de renuncia por la totalidad, amamos a Dios, en un amor sensible, aunque nada en Él sea imaginable. Sin embargo, una vez adquirida, en Las pasiones del alma, la definición de pasión e incluida la noción de consentimiento en la definición definitiva del amor, aquella vía de análisis, que parte de un ego ya incluido en las totalidades de las que forma parte como persona, agota definitivamente sus posibilidades y debe ser abandonada. Debemos preguntar, entonces: qué queda de esta ardua reflexión sobre el amor a Dios en Las pasiones del alma? Principalmente, Descartes recupera de aquellas cartas la reflexión sobre la Providencia divina, en los artículos §§146-147. Pero entre las cartas de 1645-1647 y el texto de Las pasiones del alma, hay una diferencia capital. La reflexión sobre la Providencia divina, en 1649, no hace mención alguna al amor, parece abandonar toda aspiración a fundar, en el amor a Dios, el amor a otros hombres y se dirige exclusivamente a establecer la regla del deseo, intermediario privilegiado entre pasión y acción (§143, 435, 26-29). Ahora bien, una moral que no tuviera otra regla que la del deseo presentaría dos características distintivas. Primero, la indagación sobre el bien verdadero se agota en la determinación del bien verdaderamente posible; son pues igualmente buenos todos los bienes igualmente estimables e igualmente posibles. De aquí, en segundo lugar, que la noción de virtud no pueda otorgar a la voluntad otro bien que su mero ejercicio, vacío de todo contenido. Ha sido pues posible interpretar que, la moral cartesiana, en el momento de alcanzar su fundamento, se independiza de ella, como otra potencia igualmente arbitraria, que no puede someterse a otro fin que el de imitar a Dios por la inmutabilidad de la decisión. En el capítulo sexto, dedicado a la definición de generosidad, nosotros propondremos, al contrario, que el texto de Las pasiones del alma, cuya teoría del amor aquella interpretación debe desconocer, permite otra lectura de la moral cartesiana. Sucede que Descartes cambia radicalmente el punto de partida de su reflexión : en las cartas de 1645-1647, la omnipotencia divina exigía considerar el ego como parte de distintas totalidades, a las que se haya ligado de hecho. En 1649, la unión no describe una situación existencial, impuesta por nacimiento, vecindad o juramento, porque no accede a una situación de hecho más que por el consentimiento libre y lúcido del ego a la unión efectiva con el bien amado. De aquí, proponemos, se siguen dos consecuencias. La primera (sección §2): una reformulación del problema del amor a Dios. La omnipotencia divina no se conoce como aquí como Providencia, es decir, en el decreto universal que determina la fatalidad de todas las cosas, sino en el acto singular de una donación personal y desmedida, la libre disposición de nuestras voluntades, por la cual la criatura se reconoce semejante a su Creador (§152). El generoso reconoce que el libre albedrío, el único bien por el cual puede estimarse a sí mismo, es, tal como quedaba establecido desde la Meditación Cuarta, un don divino y el reconocimiento por un don recibido es una pasión, la gratitud, la cual, a diferencia de la admiración, la esperanza o la seguridad, es una especie del amor, siempre virtuosa (§§193-194). En efecto, la reflexión sobre la Providencia, es apenas uno de los modos de reglar el deseo, el segundo, porque el primero es, justamente, la generosidad, que se define con total prescindencia del conocimiento de la fatalidad de todas las cosas (§145, 437, 27-438, 3). Investigamos aquí los tres rasgos del don divino: infinitud formal, pertenencia verdadera, distribución perfecta. La segunda consecuencia, que confirma la primera (secciones §§3-4), es la reformulación del amor a otros hombres. En efecto, no arriesgaremos demasiado al proponer que la definición de generosidad, lejos de agotarse en los artículos §§152-153, comprende los artículos §154 y §155 y culmina, finalmente, en el §156. Así entendida, la generosidad es una autoafección que, como tal, determina, prioritaria y precisamente, el modo en que el generoso es afectado por los otros hombres, en tanto causas libres, semejantes al ego, y por lo tanto semejantes a Dios. La generosidad se define pues en el horizonte de la alteridad porque el generoso no sería tal si no estimara a todos y cada uno de los hombres como generosos posibles (§154) y si no redescubriera su capacidad de hacer el mal por comparación al mal efectivamente realizado por ellos (§155). De aquí, finalmente, la regla definitiva de la moral cartesiana (§156), regla que, al definir la mejor acción posible, otorga un contenido definitivo a la firme resolución de hacer el bien, esta es: imitar la donación original, haciendo el bien a todos los hombres. Luego, la ausencia de una reflexión sobre el amor a Dios, en Las pasiones del alma, no es, todavía, una desaparición, ya que el acto de donación divina condiciona definitivamente la regla moral como una imitación, que se concibe como una repetición, igualmente gratuita, de aquella donación original. La relación entre ambos puntos se prueba en lo siguiente: Descartes afirma que el efecto necesario de la benevolencia generosa, la gratitud es uno de las principales vínculos de la sociedad entre los hombres (§194, 474, 13-15), la cual se funda pues en el mismo vínculo que une al hombre generoso con Dios: gratitud por la gratuidad de la donación (sección §6). La afirmación cartesiana es de un laconismo insalvable, pero recupera un texto hasta aquí descuidado, la Carta a Voetius de 1643, la primera reflexión cartesiana sobre el amor y la única dedicada a examinar las leyes que de él se deducen, como una jus caritatis (sección §7). Examinamos en la seccción §8 la problemática relación, o ausencia de relación, entre esas leyes de amistad y la ley civil, jus civile, basada en la autoridad del Príncipe. Finalmente, en la Conclusión, podemos detenernos en un problema ya dos veces pospuesto, este es, el que resulta de la equivalencia que Descartes establece entre amistad honesta y caridad cristiana. (IV, 309, 2-4; IV , 612, 14), equivalencia que la noción de generosidad está lejos de contradecir y que recupera la «gran afinidad» (VIII-2, 112, 24-25) entre las leyes de la amistad y las leyes de caridad, que Descartes había desarrollado en aquel capítulo séptimo de la Carta a Voetius. El carácter problemático de esta equivalencia es evidente: si el amor natural, por exceso, aspira a la caridad, es a riesgo que la caridad, por defecto, deje de ser cristiana. Esa afinidad no ha merecido mayor atención por parte de la metafísica y de sus historiadores. Pero, ha merecido la mayor atención por parte de la destitución de la metafísica que lleva a cabo Blaise Pascal quien descubre y acusa, en esa afinidad, el último esfuerzo de la filosofía cartesiana, dirigida a otorgarle al ego su última y más controversial primacía, la del acceso a Dios por el amor. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of this article is to examine the problematic frontier that separates the phenomenology of the body and the phenomenology of animality. The main difficulty is to differentiate phenomenologically not only between embodiment and animality, but also between specifically human embodied experience and what is accessible to us through empathy in relation to the corporeality of the animal. I will tackle these questions by considering relevant textual material from the writings of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger. On the one (...) hand, I will show that although embodiment and animality are convergent on the level of the naturalistic attitude in Husserl’s Ideas II, they are divergent as soon as we place ourselves in the personalistic attitude, where the body enters into a different conjunction—namely, with the idea of person and of the spiritual world. On the other hand, Heidegger claims that, in spite of the abysmal bodily kinship with the animal, there is an essential difference between the human body and the animal organism, thus opposing the tendencies to humanize the animal and to animalize the human. (shrink)

Purpose – Although there have been several studies on corporate justice and employee ethical behavior, little is known about the conditions in which this link develops. The purpose of this study is to investigate the direct effect of organizational justice and moral attentiveness toward employee ethical behavior. Importantly, this study also considers the moderating role of moral attentiveness on the links between organizational justice and employee ethical behavior. -/- Design/methodology/approach – The data was collected from 350 employees who were (...) assessed directly to supervisors in 12 manufacturing companies placed in Malaysia, operated full-time, and had regular interaction with their direct supervisors. In particular, using two-wave survey data obtained from 270 employees working in the manufacturing industry in Malaysia. -/- Findings – Results showed that organizational justice and moral attentiveness positively impact the employee ethical behavior as predicted. New to the literature, findings disclose that moral attentiveness strengthens this relationship. Importantly, the positive impact of organizational justice is sharply positive under high than low moral attentive employees and ceases to be significant among low morally attentive personnel. -/- Research limitations/implications – This research focused on the notion of ethics and how important it is for society. The principles, norms and ideals that guide an individual’s behavior are referred to as ethics. Because the authors need to be treated with dignity as human beings, ethical behavior is essential in society. -/- Practical implications – The findings of this study send a clear signal to managers that “failing to ensure that their employees perceive organizational justice” may undermine every effort made by them to improve their organizations’ ethical quality. Importantly, the findings emphasize the role of moral attentiveness in improving the ethical behavior of employees both directly and by strengthening the effectiveness of organizational justice to impact such a behavior positively. So, given the advantages of moral attentiveness in terms of improving employee ethical conduct, businesses should make every effort to hire and choose people who meet this requirement because it is not easy to spot this personality trait. Human resource managers may assess candidates’ moral attentiveness using a range of methods such as group debate, an in-basket exercise, organized interviews and business games that concentrate on specific ethical concerns. -/- Social implications – This research focused on the notion of ethics and how important it is for society. The principles, norms and ideals that guide an individual’s behavior are referred to as ethics. Because the authors need to be treated with dignity as human beings, ethical behavior is essential in society. (shrink)