Results for 'epistemic pragmatism'

999 found
Order:
  1. Epistemic Pragmatism: An Argument Against Moderation.Juan Comesaña - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (2):237-260.
    By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known orbeing justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  2. A Pragmatist’s Guide to Epistemic Utility.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):613-638.
    We use a theorem from M. J. Schervish to explore the relationship between accuracy and practical success. If an agent is pragmatically rational, she will quantify the expected loss of her credence with a strictly proper scoring rule. Which scoring rule is right for her will depend on the sorts of decisions she expects to face. We relate this pragmatic conception of inaccuracy to the purely epistemic one popular among epistemic utility theorists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  3. Rational Epistemic Akrasia for the Ambivalent Pragmatist.Neil Sinhababu - 2021 - In Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), Being of Two Minds: The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence.
    Epistemic akrasia can be rational. I consider a lonely pragmatist who believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, and also believes on pragmatic grounds that she should believe in him. She rationally believes that her imaginary friend doesn’t exist, rationally follows various sources of evidence to the view that she should believe in him to end her loneliness, and rationally holds these attitudes simultaneously. Evidentialism suggests that her ambivalent epistemic state is rational, as considerations grounded in the value (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. The Solution to Poor Opinions is More Opinions: Peircean Pragmatist Tactics for the Epistemic Long Game.Catherine Legg - 2018 - In Michael Peters, Sharon Rider, Tina Besley & Mats Hyvonen (eds.), Post-Truth, Fake News: Viral Modernity & Higher Education. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 43-58.
    Although certain recent developments in mendacious political manipulation of public discourse are horrifying to the academic mind, I argue that we should not panic. Charles Peirce’s pragmatist epistemology with its teleological arc, long horizon, and rare balance between robust realism and contrite fallibilism offers guidance to weather the storm, and perhaps even see it as inevitable in our intellectual development. This paper explores Peirce’s classic “four methods of fixing belief”, which takes us on an entertaining and still very pertinent tour (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  5. Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2021 - Erkenntnis:1-24.
    The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  6. Nietzschean Pragmatism.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (1):56-70.
    Nietzsche holds that one should believe what best promotes life, and he also accepts the correspondence theory of truth. I’ll call this conjunction of views Nietzschean pragmatism. This article provides textual evidence for attributing this pragmatist position to Nietzsche and explains how his broader metaethical views led him to it.The following section introduces Nietzschean pragmatism, discussing how Nietzsche expresses it in BGE, and distinguishing it from William James’s pragmatism about truth. The second section explains how Nietzsche’s skepticism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  7. Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - forthcoming - Mind.
    Many theories of rational action are predicated on the idea that what it is rational to do in a given situation depends, in part, on what it is rational to believe in that situation. In short: they treat epistemic rationality as explanatorily prior to practical rationality. If they are right in doing so, it follows, on pain of explanatory circularity, that epistemic rationality cannot itself be a form of practical rationality. Yet, many epistemologists have defended just such a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality.David Christensen - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):501-517.
    Many writers have recently urged that the epistemic rationality of beliefs can depend on broadly pragmatic (as opposed to truth-directed) factors. Taken to an extreme, this line of thought leads to a view on which there is no such thing as a distinctive epistemic form of rationality. A series of papers by Susanna Rinard develops the view that something like our traditional notion of pragmatic rationality is all that is needed to account for the rationality of beliefs. This (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  9. Epistemic Democracy Without Truth: The Deweyan Approach.Michael Fuerstein - forthcoming - Raisons Politiques.
    In this essay I situate John Dewey’s pragmatist approach to democratic epistemology in relation to contemporary “epistemic democracy.” Like epistemic democrats, Dewey characterizes democracy as a form of social inquiry. But whereas epistemic democrats suggest that democracy aims to “track the truth,” Dewey rejects the notion of “tracking” or “corresponding” to truth in political and other domains. For Dewey, the measure of successful decision-making is not some fixed independent standard of truth or correctness but, instead, our own (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Pragmatism, Pluralism, and the Burdens of Judgment.Eric T. Morton - 2018 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2):135-154.
    Robert Talisse and Scott Aikin have argued that substantive versions of value pluralism are incompatible with pragmatism, and that all such versions of pluralism must necessarily collapse into versions of strong metaphysical pluralism. They also argue that any strong version of value pluralism is incompatible with pragmatism’s meliorist commitment and will block the road of inquiry. I defend the compatibility of a version of value pluralism with pragmatism, and offer counterarguments to all of these claims.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. A Pragmatist Critique of Dogmatic Philosophy of History.Serge Grigoriev - 2017 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 110:95-115.
    The paper begins by introducing a heuristic distinction between the “dogmatist” and the “pragmatist” approaches to philosophy of history. Dogmatists tend to use history to exemplify and shore up their pre-existing philosophical convictions. Pragmatists, on the other hand, construe philosophy of history as a form of critical reflection on the actual historical practice, with epistemic criteria of proper practice emerging in the course of the research itself, not antecedently deduced from general philosophical considerations. The core of the paper discusses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. Pluralism, Pragmatism and American Democracy: A Minority Report.H. G. Callaway - 2017 - Newcastle, England: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
    This book presents the author’s many and varied contributions to the revival and re-evaluation of American pragmatism. The assembled critical perspective on contemporary pragmatism in philosophy emphasizes the American tradition of cultural pluralism and the requirements of American democracy. Based partly on a survey of the literature on interest-group pluralism and critical perspectives on the politics of globalization, the monograph argues for reasoned caution concerning the practical effects of the revival. Undercurrents of “vulgar pragmatism” including both moral (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Iconoclast or Creed? Objectivism, Pragmatism, and the Hierarchy of Evidence.Maya J. Goldenberg - 2009 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 52 (2):168-187.
    Because “evidence” is at issue in evidence-based medicine (EBM), the critical responses to the movement have taken up themes from post-positivist philosophy of science to demonstrate the untenability of the objectivist account of evidence. While these post-positivist critiques seem largely correct, I propose that when they focus their analyses on what counts as evidence, the critics miss important and desirable pragmatic features of the evidence-based approach. This article redirects critical attention toward EBM’s rigid hierarchy of evidence as the culprit of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  14. Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles.Nate Jackson - 2014 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 12 (2):163-179.
    This paper elucidates the pragmatist elements of Thomas Reid's approach to the justification of first principles by reference to Charles S. Peirce. Peirce argues that first principles are justified by their surviving a process of ‘self-criticism’, in which we come to appreciate that we cannot bring ourselves to doubt these principles, in addition to the foundational role they play in inquiries. The evidence Reid allows first principles bears resemblance to surviving the process of self-criticism. I then argue that this evidence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  15.  51
    Evidentialists’ Internalist Argument for Pragmatism.Tsung-Hsing Ho - 2021 - Logos and Episteme 12 (4):427-436.
    A popular evidentialist argument against pragmatism is based on reason internalism: the view that a normative reason for one to φ must be able to guide one in normative deliberation whether to φ. In the case of belief, this argument maintains that, when deliberating whether to believe p, one must deliberate whether p is true. Since pragmatic considerations cannot weigh in our deliberation whether p, the argument concludes that pragmatism is false. I argue that evidentialists fail to recognize (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Suspension of Judgment, Rationality's Competition, and the Reach of the Epistemic.Errol Lord - 2020 - In Sebastian Schmidt & Gerhard Ernst (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon: Routledge. pp. 126-145.
    Errol Lord explores the boundaries of epistemic normativity. He argues that we can understand these better by thinking about which mental states are competitors in rationality’s competition. He argues that belief, disbelief, and two kinds of suspension of judgment are competitors. Lord shows that there are non-evidential reasons for suspension of judgment. One upshot is an independent motivation for a certain sort of pragmatist view of epistemic rationality.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  17. An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.
    When one has both epistemic and practical reasons for or against some belief, how do these reasons combine into an all-things-considered reason for or against that belief? The question might seem to presuppose the existence of practical reasons for belief. But we can rid the question of this presupposition. Once we do, a highly general ‘Combinatorial Problem’ emerges. The problem has been thought to be intractable due to certain differences in the combinatorial properties of epistemic and practical reasons. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  18. Prospects For Peircean Epistemic Infinitism.Scott F. Aikin - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):71-87.
    Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  19. The Epistemic Vs. The Practical.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    What should we believe if epistemic and practical reasons for belief point in different directions? I argue that there’s no single answer, but rather a Dualism of Theoretical and Practical Reason is true: what we epistemically ought to believe and what we practically ought to believe may come apart, and both are independently authoritative. I argue in particular against recently popular views that subordinate the epistemic to the practical: it’s not the case that epistemic reasons bear on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. Reflections on Cognitive and Epistemic Diversity: Can a Stich in Time Save Quine?Michael Bishop - 2009 - In Dominic Murphy & Michael A. Bishop (eds.), Stich and His Critics. Wiley-Blackwell.
    In “Epistemology Naturalized” Quine famously suggests that epistemology, properly understood, “simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (1969, 82). Since the appearance of Quine’s seminal article, virtually every epistemologist, including the later Quine (1986, 664), has repudiated the idea that a normative discipline like epistemology could be reduced to a purely descriptive discipline like psychology. Working epistemologists no longer take Quine’s vision in “Epistemology Naturalized” seriously. In this paper, I will explain why I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  21. From Doubt to its Social Articulation: Pragmatist Insights.Mathias Girel - 2013 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 5 (2):6-23.
    In addition to providing a rebuttal of the “paper-doubts” of the would-be skeptic, pragmatists have also been quite responsive to the social dimensions of doubt. This is true concerning the causes of doubt. This is true also regarding its consequences: doubt has consequences on epistemic trust; on the way we discuss truths, either about the sciences or about the “construction of good”. Readers of Dewey’s The Quest for Certainty and of some of his most important political writings can easily (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Nietzsche’s Epistemic Perspectivism.Steven Hales - 2020 - In Michela Massimi & Ana-Maria Cretu (eds.), Knowledge From a Human Point of View. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 19-34.
    Nietzsche offers a positive epistemology, and those who interpret him as a skeptic or a mere pragmatist are mistaken. Instead he supports what he calls per- spectivism. This is a familiar take on Nietzsche, as perspectivism has been analyzed by many previous interpreters. The present paper presents a sketch of the textually best supported and logically most consistent treatment of perspectivism as a first- order epistemic theory. What’s original in the present paper is an argument that Nietzsche also offers (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. A new name for some old ways of thinking: pragmatism, radical empiricism, and epistemology in W.E.B. Du Bois’s “Of the Sorrow Songs”.Walter Scott Stepanenko - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (2):173-192.
    When William James published Pragmatism, he gave it a subtitle: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking. In this article, I argue that pragmatism is an epistemological method for articulating success in, and between, a plurality of practices, and that this articulation helped James develop radical empiricism. I contend that this pluralistic philosophical methodology is evident in James’s approach to philosophy of religion, and that this method is also exemplified in the work of one of James’s (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Publicity of Belief, Epistemic Wrongs and Moral Wrongs.Michael J. Shaffer - 2006 - Social Epistemology 20 (1):41 – 54.
    It is a commonplace belief that many beliefs, e.g. religious convictions, are a purely private matter, and this is meant in some way to serve as a defense against certain forms of criticism. In this paper it is argued that this thesis is false, and that belief is really often a public matter. This argument, the publicity of belief argument, depends on one of the most compelling and central thesis of Peircean pragmatism. This crucial thesis is that bona fide (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Democracy and Inquiry in the Post-Truth Era: A Pragmatist Solution.Daniel Labrador Montero - 2020 - Disputatio. Philosophical Research Bulletin 9 (13).
    Post-truth has become a commonplace strategy. No longer are objective facts viewed as having evidentiary value; scientific knowledge is on a par with emotions or personal beliefs. We intend to show that in the context of post-truth, those proffering and receiving an assertion do not care about the truth-value of the assertion or about the best way to gather evidence concerning it. Such attitudes raise several questions about how relativism can be a corrupting influence in contemporary democracies. We will analyse (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Metaethics for Neo-Pragmatists: A Pragmatic Account of Linguistic Meaning for Moral Vocabulary.Thomas Wilk - 2019 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins University
    In this dissertation, I aim to develop and defend a novel, pragmatist approach to foundational questions about meaning, especially the meaning of deontic moral vocabulary. Drawing from expressivists and inferentialists, I argue that meaning is best explained by the various kinds of norms that govern the use of a vocabulary. Along with inferential norms, I argue we must extend our account to discursive norms that govern normative statuses required to felicitously utter certain speech-acts—norms of authority—and the transitions in normative statuses (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  57
    L'empiètement pragmatique est-il pragmatiste ?Melanie Sarzano - 2020 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 45.
    L'empiètement pragmatique ("pragmatic encroachment" en anglais) est une théorie épistémologique récente, allant à contre-courant des thèses traditionnelles selon lesquelles savoir est une affaire purement épistémique : comprenez par-là que les notions épistémiques telles que la connaissance, la justification ou la rationalité des croyances dépendent uniquement de leur relation à la vérité. Dans un chapitre intitulé "Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value" (2009) Pascal Engel discute des rapports qu'il existe entre l'empiètement pragmatique et la question de la valeur de la connaissance. (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Practical Abilities and Logic Notes on a Pragmatist Approach to Logical Constants.Alessandro Moscaritolo - 2014 - Episteme NS: Revista Del Instituto de Filosofía de la Universidad Central de Venezuela 55 (1):65-83.
    This paper’s aim is to help winnow out some ideas about the role of formal logic in human doings at large. I start by discussing some metaphysical presuppositions of logical theory; specifically, I attempt to work towards a clearer understanding of the role of modalities, together with the notions of meaning and truth, in mainstream logical theory. I then appeal to a modal formal semantics (Brandom, 2007a) in order to outline the cognitive role of logical constants in general. From these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29. On Two Recent Arguments Against Intellectualism.Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - NCCU Philosophical Journal 43:35-68.
    Several authors have recently argued against intellectualism, the view that one’s epistemic position with respect to p depends exclusively on one’s truth-relevant factors with respect to p. In this paper, I first examine two prominent arguments for the anti-intellectualist position and find both of them wanting. More precisely, I argue that these arguments, by themselves, are underdetermined between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism. I then manifest the intuitive plausibility of intellectualism by examining the ordinary conversational pattern of challenging a claim.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  30.  65
    Metaphysics — Low in Price, High in Value: A Critique of Global Expressivism.Catherine Legg & Paul Giladi - 2018 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 54 (1):64.
    Pragmatism’s heartening recent revival (spearheaded by Richard Rorty’s bold intervention into analytic philosophy Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature) has coalesced into a distinctive philosophical movement frequently referred to as ‘neopragmatism’. This movement interprets the very meaning of pragmatism as rejection of metaphysical commitments: our words do not primarily serve to represent non-linguistic entities, but are tools to achieve a range of human purposes. A particularly thorough and consistent version of this position is Huw Price’s global expressivism. We (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  31. The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.
    It is plausible that there are epistemic reasons bearing on a distinctively epistemic standard of correctness for belief. It is also plausible that there are a range of practical reasons bearing on what to believe. These theses are often thought to be in tension with each other. Most significantly for our purposes, it is obscure how epistemic reasons and practical reasons might interact in the explanation of what one ought to believe. We draw an analogy with a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  32. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Gerhard Ernst & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  33. Three Independent Factors in Epistemology.Guy Axtell & Philip Olson - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):89–109.
    We articulate John Dewey’s “independent factors” approach to moral philosophy and then adapt and extend this approach to address contemporary debate concerning the nature and sources of epistemic normativity. We identify three factors (agent reliability, synchronic rationality, and diachronic rationality) as each making a permanent contribution to epistemic value. Critical of debates that stem from the reductionistic ambitions of epistemological systems that privilege of one or another of these three factors, we advocate an axiological pluralism that acknowledges each (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  34. Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.
    Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between knowledge and truth. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  35. No Exception for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (1):121-143.
    This paper defends a principle I call Equal Treatment, according to which the rationality of a belief is determined in precisely the same way as the rationality of any other state. For example, if wearing a raincoat is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value, then believing some proposition P is rational just in case doing so maximizes expected value. This contrasts with the popular view that the rationality of belief is determined by evidential support. It also contrasts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  36.  62
    Truth, Inquiry and Democratic Authority in the Climate Debate.Phillip Deen - 2014 - Public Affairs Quarterly 28 (4):375-394.
    Recent attempts to legislate climate science out of existence raises the question of whether citizens are obliged to obey such laws. The authority of democratic law is rooted in both truth and popular consent, but neither is sufficient and they may conflict. These are reconciled in theory and, more importantly, in practice once we incorporate insights from the pragmatist theory of inquiry.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Knowledge, Democracy, and the Internet.Nicola Mößner & Philip Kitcher - 2017 - Minerva 55 (1):1-24.
    The internet has considerably changed epistemic practices in science as well as in everyday life. Apparently, this technology allows more and more people to get access to a huge amount of information. Some people even claim that the internet leads to a democratization of knowledge. In the following text, we will analyze this statement. In particular, we will focus on a potential change in epistemic structure. Does the internet change our common epistemic practice to rely on expert (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  38. Conversation with Robert Brandom.Pietro Salis - 2018 - Aphex (18):1-27.
    In this broad interview Robert Brandom talks about many themes concerning his work and about his career and education. Brandom reconstructs the main debts that he owes to colleagues and teachers, especially Wilfrid Sellars, Richard Rorty, and David Lewis, and talks about the projects he’s currently working on. He also talks about contemporary and classical pragmatism, and of the importance of classical thinkers like Kant and Hegel for contemporary debates. Other themes go deeper into the principal topics of his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Conceptual Responsibility.Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  40.  28
    Entrepreneurial Beleifs and Agency Under Knightian Uncertainty.Randall Westgren & Travis Holmes - 2021 - Philosophy of Management 22 (2):199-217.
    At the centenary of Frank H. Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921), we explore the continuing relevance of Knightian uncertainty to the theory and practice of entrepreneurship. There are three challenges facing such assessment. First, RUP is complex and difficult to interpret. The key but neglected element of RUP is that Knight’s account is not solely about risk and uncertainty as states of nature, but about how an agent’s beliefs about uncertain outcomes and confidence in those beliefs guide their choices. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Equal Treatment for Belief.Susanna Rinard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1923-1950.
    This paper proposes that the question “What should I believe?” is to be answered in the same way as the question “What should I do?,” a view I call Equal Treatment. After clarifying the relevant sense of “should,” I point out advantages that Equal Treatment has over both simple and subtle evidentialist alternatives, including versions that distinguish what one should believe from what one should get oneself to believe. I then discuss views on which there is a distinctively epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  42. Means-End Reciprocity and the Aims of Education Debate.Guy Axtell - manuscript
    In the centennial year of John Dewey’s classic, Democracy and Education (1916), this paper revisits his thesis of the reciprocity of means and ends, arguing that it remains of central importance for debate over the aims of education. The paper provides a Dewey-inspired rebuttal of arguments for an ‘ultimate aim,’ but balances this with a development of the strong overlaps between proponents of pragmatism, intellectual virtues education (Jason Baehr) and critical thinking education (Harvey Siegel). Siegel’s ‘Kantian’ justification of critical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43.  66
    The Pragmatic Foundations of Non-Derivative Pluralism About Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - manuscript
    This paper offers a sketch of welfarist pluralism, a view that is intended to resolve a difficulty for non-derivative pluralists about normative reasons for belief. Welfarist pluralism is the view that all reasons for belief are rooted in wellbeing, and that wellbeing has as one of its components being in a positive epistemic state. The paper explores how this view can explain various pluralist intuitions and why it offers a plausible basis for combinatorial pluralists who believe that alethic and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Perplexity and Philosophical Progress.Helen De Cruz - 2021 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 45:209-221.
    Perplexity is an epistemic emotion with deep philosophical significance. In ancient Greek philosophy, it is identified as a catalyst for philosophical progress and personal philosophical transformation. In psychological terms, perplexity is the phenomenological sense of lacking immersion in the world, a state of puzzlement and alienation from one’s everyday surroundings. What could make such an emotion philosophically useful? To answer this question, I examine the role of perplexity in Jane Addams’s political theory and ethics. Addams, a social reformer and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. The Genealogical Method in Epistemology.Martin Kusch & Robin McKenna - forthcoming - Synthese 197 (3):1057-1076.
    In 1990 Edward Craig published a book called Knowledge and the State of Nature in which he introduced and defended a genealogical approach to epistemology. In recent years Craig’s book has attracted a lot of attention, and his distinctive approach has been put to a wide range of uses including anti-realist metaepistemology, contextualism, relativism, anti-luck virtue epistemology, epistemic injustice, value of knowledge, pragmatism and virtue epistemology. While the number of objections to Craig’s approach has accumulated, there has been (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  46. Having It All: Naturalized Normativity in Feminist Science Studies.Sharyn Clough - 2004 - Hypatia 19 (1):102-118.
    : The relationship between facts and values—in particular, naturalism and normativity—poses an ongoing challenge for feminist science studies. Some have argued that the fact/value holism of W.V. Quine's naturalized epistemology holds promise. I argue that Quinean epistemology, while appropriately naturalized, might weaken the normative force of feminist claims. I then show that Quinean epistemic themes are unnecessary for feminist science studies. The empirical nature of our work provides us with all the naturalized normativity we need.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47.  75
    Metaphysical Fundamentality as a Fundamental Problem for CS Peirce and Zhu Xi.James Dominic Rooney - forthcoming - Philosophy East and West.
    While the American pragmatist CS Peirce and the twelfth-century Confucian thinker Zhu Xi (朱熹) lived and worked in radically different contexts, there are nevertheless striking parallels in their view of knowledge and inquiry. Both reject the strict separation of theoretical and practical knowledge, conceiving of theoretical inquiry in a way that closely parallels practical reasoning, and they appeal to the fundamental nature of reality in order to draw conclusions about the way in which inquiry can be a component of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. Science, Religion, and “The Will to Believe".Alexander Klein - 2015 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 5 (1):72-117.
    Do the same epistemic standards govern scientific and religious belief? Or should science and religion operate in completely independent epistemic spheres? Commentators have recently been divided on William James’s answer to this question. One side depicts “The Will to Believe” as offering a separate-spheres defense of religious belief in the manner of Galileo. The other contends that “The Will to Believe” seeks to loosen the usual epistemic standards so that religious and scientific beliefs can both be justified (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  49. Rorty, Religion, and Humanism.Serge Grigoriev - 2011 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 70 (3):187-201.
    This article offers a review of Richard Rorty’s attempts to come to terms with the role of religion in our public and intellectual life by tracing the key developments in his position, partially in response to the ubiquitous criticisms of his distinction between private and public projects. Since Rorty rejects the possibility of dismissing religion on purely epistemic grounds, he is determined to treat it, instead, as a matter of politics. My suggestion is that, in this respect, Rorty’s position (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  50. An Externalist Decision Theory for a Pragmatic Epistemology.Brian Kim - 2019 - In Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. Routledge.
    In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking explanatory power or susceptible to counterexamples. Gettier cases are also worth reflecting on because they raise foundational questions for the pragmatist. Underlying these challenges is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 999