Results for 'epistemic responsibility'

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  1.  14
    The Epistemic Responsibilities of Voters: Towards an Assertion-Based Account.Michele Giavazzi - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy:1-21.
    It is often claimed that democratic voters have epistemic responsibilities. However, it is not often specified why voters have such epistemic responsibilities. In this paper, I contend that voters have epistemic responsibilities because voting is best understood as an act that bears assertoric force. More precisely, voters perform what I call an act of political advocacy whereby, like an asserter who states or affirms that something is the case, they state or affirm that a certain course of (...)
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  2.  19
    Epistemic responsibility in the context of social crisis.Živan Lazović - 2021 - In Nenad Cekić (ed.), Етика и истина у доба кризе. Belgrade: University of Belgrade - Faculty of Philosophy. pp. 127-138.
    The main aim of this paper is to consider how various types of social crises create contexts in which the general assumption comes to full expression that without knowledge of relevant data, correct decisions cannot be made or adequate measures taken to overcome the crisis. Such contexts, on the one hand, increase the importance of successful discovery of the truth both for individuals and for society as a whole, which affects the tightening of epistemic standards, while on the other (...)
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  3. The Epistemic Responsibilities of Citizens in a Democracy.Cameron Boult - forthcoming - In Jeroen De Ridder & Michael Hannon (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology.
    The chapter develops a taxonomy of views about the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. Prominent approaches to epistemic democracy, epistocracy, epistemic libertarianism, and pure proceduralism are examined through the lens of this taxonomy. The primary aim is to explore options for developing an account of the epistemic responsibilities of citizens in a democracy. The chapter also argues that a number of recent attacks on democracy may not adequately register the availability of a minimal approach (...)
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  4. Epistemic Responsibility and Implicit Bias.Nancy McHugh & Lacey J. Davidson - 2020 - In Erin Beeghly & Alex Madva (eds.), Introduction to Implicit Bias. New York, NY, USA: pp. 174-190.
    A topic of special importance when it comes to responsibility and implicit bias is responsibility for knowledge. Are there strategies for becoming more responsible and respectful knowers? How might we work together, not just as individuals but members of collectives, to reduce the negative effects of bias on what we see and believe, as well as the wrongs associated with epistemic injustice? To explore these questions, Chapter 9 introduces the concept of epistemic responsibility, a set (...)
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  5. On Epistemic Responsibility While Remembering the Past: The Case of Individual and Historical Memories.Marina Trakas - 2019 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 14 (2):240-273.
    The notion of epistemic responsibility applied to memory has been in general examined in the framework of the responsibilities that a collective holds for past injustices, but it has never been the object of an analysis of its own. In this article, I propose to isolate and explore it in detail. For this purpose, I start by conceptualizing the epistemic responsibility applied to individual memories. I conclude that an epistemic responsible individual rememberer is a vigilant (...)
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  6. Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):493-506.
    It is widely acknowledged that individual moral obligations and responsibility entail shared moral obligations and responsibility. However, whether individual epistemic obligations and responsibility entail shared epistemic obligations and responsibility is rarely discussed. Instead, most discussions of doxastic responsibility focus on individuals considered in isolation. In contrast to this standard approach, I maintain that focusing exclusively on individuals in isolation leads to a profoundly incomplete picture of what we're epistemically obligated to do and when (...)
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  7. Can Atheism Be Epistemically Responsible When So Many People Believe in God?Sébasten Réhault - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 7 (1):181--198.
    Nowadays the argument for the existence of God based on the common consent of mankind is taken to be so bad that contemporary atheists do not even bother to mention it. And it seems very few theists think that the argument is worth defending. In this paper I shall argue to the contrary: not only is the argument better than usually thought, but widespread belief in God constitutes a prima facie defeater for every reasonable atheist.
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  8. Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action.Kenneth Boyd - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).
    One prominent argument for pragmatic encroachment (PE) is that PE is entailed by a combination of a principle that states that knowledge warrants proper practical reasoning, and judgments that it is more difficult to reason well when the stakes go up. I argue here that this argument is unsuccessful. One problem is that empirical tests concerning knowledge judgments in high-stakes situations only sometimes exhibit the result predicted by PE. I argue here that those judgments that appear to support PE are (...)
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  9.  5
    Epistemic Deontology and the Revelatory View of Responsibility.Timothy Perrine - forthcoming - Metaphilosophy.
    According to Universal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible. The paper explores whether this puzzle can be resolved, and Universal Epistemic Deontology defended, by appealing to a view of responsibility I call the Revelatory View. On that view, an agent is responsible (...)
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  10. Responsible Epistemic Technologies: A Social-Epistemological Analysis of Autocompleted Web Search.Boaz Miller & Isaac Record - 2017 - New Media and Society 19 (12):1945-1963.
    Information providing and gathering increasingly involve technologies like search ‎engines, which actively shape their epistemic surroundings. Yet, a satisfying account ‎of the epistemic responsibilities associated with them does not exist. We analyze ‎automatically generated search suggestions from the perspective of social ‎epistemology to illustrate how epistemic responsibilities associated with a ‎technology can be derived and assigned. Drawing on our previously developed ‎theoretical framework that connects responsible epistemic behavior to ‎practicability, we address two questions: first, given the (...)
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  11. Response-Dependent Normative Properties and the Epistemic Account of Emotion.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):355-364.
    It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our (...)
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  12. The Ableism of Quality of Life Judgments in Disorders of Consciousness: Who Bears Epistemic Responsibility?Joel Michael Reynolds - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (1):59-61.
    In this peer commentary on L. Syd M. Johnson’s “Inference and Inductive Risk in Disorders of Consciousness,” I argue for the necessity of disability education as an integral component of decision-making processes concerning patients with DOC and, mutatis mutandis, all patients with disabilities. The sole qualification Johnson places on such decision-making is that stakeholders are educated about and “understand the uncertainties of diagnosis and prognosis.” Drawing upon research in philosophy of disability, social epistemology, and health psychology, I argue that this (...)
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  13. Responsibility Beyond Belief: The Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Dissertation,
    In this dissertation, I argue for a new conception of the epistemic condition on moral responsibility.
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  14. Responsibility for Collective Epistemic Harms.Will Fleisher & Dunja Šešelja - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-41.
    Discussion of epistemic responsibility typically focuses on belief formation and actions leading to it. Similarly, accounts of collective epistemic responsibility have addressed the issue of collective belief formation and associated actions. However, there has been little discussion of collective responsibility for preventing epistemic harms, particularly those preventable only by the collective action of an unorganized group. We propose an account of collective epistemic responsibility which fills this gap. Building on Hindriks' (2019) account (...)
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  15. Responsible Innovation in Social Epistemic Systems: The P300 Memory Detection Test and the Legal Trial.John Danaher - forthcoming - In Van den Hoven (ed.), Responsible Innovation Volume II: Concepts, Approaches, Applications. Springer.
    Memory Detection Tests (MDTs) are a general class of psychophysiological tests that can be used to determine whether someone remembers a particular fact or datum. The P300 MDT is a type of MDT that relies on a presumed correlation between the presence of a detectable neural signal (the P300 “brainwave”) in a test subject, and the recognition of those facts in the subject’s mind. As such, the P300 MDT belongs to a class of brain-based forensic technologies which have proved popular (...)
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  16. Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on My Paper 'Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty'.Robert Lockie - 2016 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (3):21-47.
    I here respond to four SERRC commentators on my paper ‘Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty’: Shira Elqayam, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Rik Peels and Hamid Vahid. I maintain that all accounts of epistemic justification must be constrained by two limit positions which have to be avoided. One is Conceptual Limit Panglossianism. The other is Conceptual Limit meliorism. Within these bounds one may offer an account of rationality or epistemic justification that is closer to Meliorism or Panglossianism. Remarked upon are (...)
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  17. The Epistemic Parity of Religious-Apologetic and Religion-Debunking Responses to the Cognitive Science of Religion.Walter Scott Stepanenko - 2021 - Religions 12 (7):466.
    Recent work in the cognitive science of religion has challenged some of the explanatory assumptions of previous research in the field. Nonetheless, some of the practitioners of the new cognitive science of religion theorize in the same skeptical spirit as their predecessors and either imply or explicitly claim that their projects undermine the warrant of religious beliefs. In this article, I argue that these theories do no additional argumentative work when compared to previous attempts to debunk religious belief and that (...)
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  18. Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness.Robert Cowan - 2018 - In Anna Bergqvist & Robert Cowan (eds.), Evaluative Perception. Oxford University Press.
    Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something wrong. In this paper I focus on a family of objections to Epistemic Sentimentalism that all take as a premise the claim that emotions possess a normative property that is apparently antithetical to it: epistemic reason-responsiveness, i.e., emotions have evidential bases (...)
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  19.  28
    An Interpersonal-Epistemic Account of Intellectual Autonomy: Questioning, Responsibility, and Vulnerability.Kunimasa Sato - 2018 - Tetsugaku: International Journal of the Philosophical Association of Japan 2:65-82.
    The nature and value of autonomy has long been debated in diverse philosophical traditions, including moral and political philosophy. Although the notion dates back to ancient Greek philosophy, it was during the Age of Enlightenment that autonomy drew much attention. Thus, as may be known, moral philosophers tended to emphasize self-regulation, particularly one’s own will to abide by universal moral laws, as the term “autonomy” originates from the Greek words “self” (auto) and “rule” (nomos). In parallel, modern epistemologists supposedly espoused (...)
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  20. Diversity in Epistemic Communities: A Response to Clough.Maya J. Goldenberg - 2014 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective Vol. 3, No. 5.
    In Clough’s reply paper to me (http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-1aN), she laments how feminist calls for diversity within scientific communities are inadvertently sidelined by our shared feminist empiricist prescriptions. She offers a novel justification for diversity within epistemic communities and challenges me to accept this addendum to my prior prescriptions for biomedical research communities (Goldenberg 2013) on the grounds that they are consistent with the epistemic commitments that I already endorse. In this response, I evaluate and accept her challenge.
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  21. Explaining (Away) the Epistemic Condition on Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford University Press. pp. 146–162.
    It is clear that lack of awareness of the consequences of an action can undermine moral responsibility and blame for these consequences. But when and how it does so is controversial. Sometimes an agent believing that the outcome might occur is excused because it seemed unlikely to her, and sometimes an agent having no idea that it would occur is nevertheless to blame. A low or zero degree of belief might seem to excuse unless the agent “should have known (...)
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  22.  63
    Foundations and Justification: A Response to Klein’s Objections to Foundationalism as a Solution to the Epistemic Regress Problem.Joshua Jose Ocon - 2021 - Talisik: An Undergraduate Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):32-45.
    Since the resurgence of infinitism in contemporary epistemology, Peter Klein has been consistent in providing arguments against the three other possible solutions (i.e., foundationalism, coherentism, skepticism) to the Regress Problem, which in turn is a key aspect of the justification condition for the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. Klein’s successful effort in reviving the often-dismissed solution and further advancing it as the sole solution to the Regress Problem cannot be ignored as he finds it necessary to not (...)
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  23. Towards a Response to Epistemic Nihilism.Jake Wright - 2021 - In Alison MacKenzie, Jennifer Rose & Ibrar Bhatt (eds.), The Epistemology of Deceit in a Postdigital Era: Dupery by Design. Springer Nature. pp. 39-59.
    This chapter develops an account of epistemic nihilism—roughly, the rejection of truth’s intrinsic or instrumental value in favor of statements that reject or obscure truth to secure an advantage for the speaker—by examining three instances of such nihilism: lying, bullshit, and trolling. It further argues that epistemic nihilism, exacerbated by changes in the media landscape, can pose a significant threat to liberal democratic institutions and ideals by undermining the democratic ideal of good faith engagement on a level playing (...)
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  24. Epistemic Leaks and Epistemic Meltdowns: A Response to William Morris on Scepticism with Regard to Reason.Mikael M. Karlsson - 1990 - Hume Studies 16 (2):121-130.
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  25. The “All Lives Matter” Response: QUD-Shifting as Epistemic Injustice.Jessica Keiser - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8465-8483.
    Drawing on recent work in formal pragmatic theory, this paper shows that the manipulation of discourse structure—in particular, by way of shifting the Question Under Discussion mid-discourse—can constitute an act of epistemic injustice. I argue that the “All Lives Matter” response to the “Black Lives Matter” slogan is one such case; this response shifts the Question Under Discussion governing the overarching discourse from Do Black lives matter? to Which lives matter? This manipulation of the discourse structure systematically obscures the (...)
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  26.  20
    Epistemic Cultural Constraints on the Uses of Psychology.Rami Gabriel - 2023 - New Ideas in Psychology 68 (1):100896.
    This paper describes some epistemic cultural considerations which shape the uses of psychology. I argue the study of mind is bound by the metaphysical background of the given locale and era in which it is practiced. The epistemic setting in which psychology takes place will shape what is worth observing, how it is to be studied, how the data is to be interpreted, and the nature of the ultimate explanatory units. To demonstrate conceptual epistemic constraints, I discuss (...)
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  27. Repairing Epistemic Injustice: A Reply to Song.Jennifer Page - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5 (10):28-38.
    Seunghyun Song’s recent article on epistemic repair for Japan’s military sex slavery lays out the case for considering acknowledgment as a form of reparative justice particularly suited to redressing epistemic wrongs. I agree with Song, but press her on the relationship between epistemic repair and reparative justice more generally. I also outline other forms that backward-looking epistemic responsibility might take. Distinguishing between revisionism and denialism, I ask: Should individual agents who’ve publicly made denialist statements about (...)
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  28. Taking iPhone Seriously: Epistemic Technologies and the Extended Mind.Isaac Record & Boaz Miller - forthcoming - In Duncan Pritchard, Jesper Kallestrup‎, Orestis Palermos & J. Adam Carter‎ (eds.), Extended Epistemology. Oxford University Press.
    David Chalmers thinks his iPhone exemplifies the extended mind thesis by meeting the criteria ‎that he and Andy Clark established in their well-known 1998 paper. Andy Clark agrees. We take ‎this proposal seriously, evaluating the case of the GPS-enabled smartphone as a potential mind ‎extender. We argue that the “trust and glue” criteria enumerated by Clark and Chalmers are ‎incompatible with both the epistemic responsibilities that accompany everyday activities and the ‎practices of trust that enable users to discharge them. (...)
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  29. Conceptual Responsibility.Trystan S. Goetze - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
    This thesis concerns our moral and epistemic responsibilities regarding our concepts. I argue that certain concepts can be morally, epistemically, or socially problematic. This is particularly concerning with regard to our concepts of social kinds, which may have both descriptive and evaluative aspects. Being ignorant of certain concepts, or possessing mistaken conceptions, can be problematic for similar reasons, and contributes to various forms of epistemic injustice. I defend an expanded view of a type of epistemic injustice known (...)
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  30.  39
    Responsibility Where We Find It.John Beverley - 2021 - Dissertation, Northwestern University
    There is more responsibility on heaven and earth than dreamt of in most philosophy. This dissertation explores three debates in three sub-fields of philosophy, highlighting in each responsibilities agents find themselves with whether they like it or not. In the chapter "Trust Logic, Not Tortoises", I propose an answer to Wright’s Justification Question – to what extent are we justified in our knowledge of logic? – arguing early knowledge of logic is a species of know-how underwritten by dispositions to (...)
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  31. Review of Matthias Steup (Ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue[REVIEW]Thomas D. Senor - 2002 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (3).
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  32.  2
    Epistemic Responsibilism and Moorean Dogmatism.Martin Grajner - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 3 (VI):291-307.
    In this paper, I defend Moorean Dogmatism against a novel objection raised by Adam Leite. Leite locates the defectiveness of the Moorean reasoning explicitly not in the failure of the Moorean argument to transmit warrant from its premises to its conclusion but rather in the failure of an epistemic agent to satisfy certain epistemic responsibilities that arise in the course of conscious and deliberate reasoning. I will first show that there exist cases of Moorean reasoning that are not (...)
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  33. Epistemic Autonomy and Externalism.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - In Kirk Lougheed & Jonathan Matheson (eds.), Epistemic Autonomy. London: Routledge.
    The philosophical significance of attitudinal autonomy—viz., the autonomy of attitudes such as beliefs—is widely discussed in the literature on moral responsibility and free will. Within this literature, a key debate centres around the following question: is the kind of attitudinal autonomy that’s relevant to moral responsibility at a given time determined entirely by a subject’s present mental structure at that time? Internalists say ‘yes’, externalists say ’no’. In this essay, I motivate a kind of distinctly epistemic attitudinal (...)
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  34.  92
    Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement: Reply to Robin McKenna.Ian M. Church - 2012 - Philosophical Writings:100-103.
    There are two issues I want to very briefly raise in response to Robin McKenna’s paper, “Epistemic Contextualism, Epistemic Relativism, and Disagreement.” First, I want to question whether or not the disagreement problem faced by indexical contextualism is truly a problem. Secondly, I want to consider whether or not McKenna’s solution is really in keeping with indexical contextualism.
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  35. Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - forthcoming - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.
    This chapter introduces some central issues in Epistemology, and, like others in the open textbook series Introduction to Philosophy, is set up for rewarding college classroom use, with discussion/reflection questions matched to clearly-stated learning objectives,, a brief glossary of the introduced/bolded terms/concepts, links to further open source readings as a next step, and a readily-accessible outline of the classic between William Clifford and William James over the "ethics of belief." The chapter introduces questions of epistemic value through Plato's famous (...)
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  36. Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
    The short abstract: Epistemic utility theory + permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk => permissivism about rational credences. The longer abstract: I argue that epistemic rationality is permissive. More specifically, I argue for two claims. First, a radical version of interpersonal permissivism about rational credence: for many bodies of evidence, there is a wide range of credal states for which there is some individual who might rationally adopt that state in response to that evidence. Second, a slightly (...)
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  37. Epistemic virtues a prerequisite for the truth-seeking and constructor of intellectual identity.Zahra Khazaei & Mohsen Javadi Hossein Hemmatzadeh - 2018 - Theology 9 (19):123-146.
    Abstract The present paper examines the role of epistemic virtues in the formation of intellectual identity and its impact on improving our truth-seeking behaviors. A epistemic virtue is a special faculty or trait of a person whose operation makes that person a thinker, believer, learner, scholar, knower, cognizer, perceiver, etc., or causes his intellectual development and perfection, and improves his truth-seeking and knowledge-acquiring behaviours and places him on the path to attain understanding, perception and wisdom. Virtue epistemology is (...)
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  38. The Epistemic Vs. The Practical.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    What should we believe if epistemic and practical reasons for belief point in different directions? I argue that there’s no single answer, but rather a Dualism of Theoretical and Practical Reason is true: what we epistemically ought to believe and what we practically ought to believe may come apart, and both are independently authoritative. I argue in particular against recently popular views that subordinate the epistemic to the practical: it’s not the case that epistemic reasons bear on (...)
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  39. Epistemic Error and Experiential Evidence.Melinda Campbell - 2012 - In Glimpse: Publication of the Society of Phenomenology and Media.
    In response to recent debates in color ontology, I present an account of color that resolves the issue in a new way by conceiving of colors as properties of appearances. Appearances are both objective and subjective: they are real-world events reducible to psychophysical interactions involving environmental stimuli and experiential states. The case is made for accepting experience as an actual component of colors themselves as well as being the fundamental epistemic evidence for their instantiation.
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  40. The Epistemic Role of Outlaw Emotions.Laura Silva - 2021 - Ergo 8 (23).
    Outlaw emotions are emotions that stand in tension with one’s wider belief system, often allowing epistemic insight one may have otherwise lacked. Outlaw emotions are thought to play crucial epistemic roles under conditions of oppression. Although the crucial epistemic value of these emotions is widely acknowledged, specific accounts of their epistemic role(s) remain largely programmatic. There are two dominant accounts of the epistemic role of emotions: The Motivational View and the Justificatory View. Philosophers of emotion (...)
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  41. "Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Agent Based Knowledge".Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor - forthcoming - In Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue.
    Epistemic Dexterity: A Ramseyian Account of Epistemic Virtue” by Abrol Fairweather & Carlos Montemayor: A modification of F.P. Ramsey’s success semantics supports a naturalized theory of epistemic virtue that includes motivational components and can potentially explain both epistemic reliability and responsibility with a single normative-explanatory principle. An “epistemic Ramsey success” will also provide a better account of the “because of” condition central to virtue-reliabilist accounts of knowledge from Greco, Sosa and Pritchard. Ramsey said that (...)
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  42. Epistemic Dilemma and Epistemic Conflict.Verena Wagner - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 58-76.
    In this paper, I will examine the notion of an epistemic dilemma, its characterizations in the literature, and the different intuitions prompted by it. I will illustrate that the notion of an epistemic dilemma is expected to capture various phenomena that are not easily unified with one concept: while some aspects of these phenomena are more about the agent in a certain situation, other aspects seem to be more about the situation as such. As a consequence, incompatible intuitions (...)
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  43. Responsibility for Attitudes, Object-Given Reasons, and Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - 2020 - In Gerhard Ernst & Sebastian Schmidt (eds.), The Ethics of Belief and Beyond. Understanding Mental Normativity. Abingdon, UK: pp. 149-175.
    I argue that the problem of responsibility for attitudes is best understood as a puzzle about how we are responsible for responding to our object-given reasons for attitudes – i.e., how we are responsible for being (ir)rational. The problem can be solved, I propose, by understanding the normative force of reasons for attitudes in terms of blameworthiness. I present a puzzle about the existence of epistemic and mental blame which poses a challenge for the very idea of reasons (...)
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  44. Epistemic Deontologism and Role-Oughts.Jon Altschul - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):245-263.
    William Alston’s argument against epistemological deontologism rests upon two key premises: first, that we lack a suitable amount of voluntary control with respect to our beliefs, and, second, the principle that “ought” implies “can.” While several responses to Alston have concerned rejecting either of these two premises, I argue that even on the assumption that both premises are true, there is room to be made for deontologism in epistemology. I begin by offering a criticism of Richard Feldman’s invaluable work on (...)
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  45. Collective Inaction and Collective Epistemic Agency.Michael D. Doan - 2020 - In Deborah Tollefsen & Saba Bazargan Forward (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Responsibility. New York, NY, USA: pp. 202-215.
    In this chapter I offer a critique of the received way of thinking about responsibility for collective inaction and propose an alternative approach that takes as its point of departure the epistemic agency exhibited by people navigating impossible situations together. One such situation is becoming increasingly common in the context of climate change: so-called “natural” disasters wreaking havoc on communities—flooding homes, collapsing infrastructures, and straining the capacities of existing organizations to safeguard lives and livelihoods. What happens when philosophical (...)
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  46.  47
    Epistemic Internalism and the Challenge From Testimony.Felix Bräuer - 2019 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 1 (13):82-98.
    In this paper, I spell out a new challenge for epistemic internalism that emerges out of the current debate on testimonial justification. Based on recent developments within this debate, one might argue as follows: Epistemic internalism can’t account for the justification of our testimony-based beliefs, because (1) we should conceive of testimonial justification along anti-reductionist lines and (2) anti-reductionism is incompatible with epistemic internalism. In response to this challenge, I show that, despite initial appearances, epistemic internalism (...)
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  47. Epistemic Vs Ontic Classification of Quantum Entangled States?Michele Caponigro & Enrico Giannetto - 2012 - Discusiones Filosóficas 13 (20):137 - 145.
    In this brief paper, starting from recent works, we analyze from conceptual point of view this basic question: can be the nature of quantum entangled states interpreted ontologically or epistemologically? According some works, the degrees of freedom of quantum systems permit us to establish a possible classification between factorizables and entangled states. We suggest, that the "choice" of degree of freedom, even if mathematically justified introduces epistemic element, not only in the systems but also in their classification. We retain, (...)
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  48. Epistemic Gaps and the Mind-Body Problem.Thomas Foerster - 2019 - Dissertation, Cornell University
    This dissertation defends materialism from the epistemic arguments against materialism. Materialism is the view that everything is ultimately physical. The epistemic arguments against materialism claim that there is an epistemic gap between physical and phenomenal truths (for example, that knowing the physical truths does not put you in a position to know the phenomenal truths), and conclude from this that there is a corresponding gap in the world between physical and phenomenal truths, and materialism is false. -/- (...)
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    A Puzzle of Epistemic Paternalism.Rory Aird - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-20.
    Since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic in early 2020, conspiracy theories, misinformation, and fake news about the virus have abounded, drastically affecting global health measures to oppose it. In response, different strategies have been proposed to combat such Covid-19 collective irrationalities. One suggested approach has been that of epistemic paternalism – non-consultative interference in agents’ inquiries for their epistemic improvement. While extant literature on epistemic paternalism has mainly discussed whether it is (ever) justified, in this paper, (...)
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  50.  96
    Mind the Gaps: Ethical and Epistemic Issues in the Digital Mental Health Response to Covid‐19.Joshua August Skorburg & Phoebe Friesen - 2021 - Hastings Center Report 51 (6):23-26.
    Well before the COVID-19 pandemic, proponents of digital psychiatry were touting the promise of various digital tools and techniques to revolutionize mental healthcare. As social distancing and its knock-on effects have strained existing mental health infrastructures, calls have grown louder for implementing various digital mental health solutions at scale. Decisions made today will shape the future of mental healthcare for the foreseeable future. We argue that bioethicists are uniquely positioned to cut through the hype surrounding digital mental health, which can (...)
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