This chapter contains sections titled: Truth and Falsity Truth and Belief Truth and Correspondence Truth and Coherence Defining and Testing for Truth: Correspondence and Coherence Sources.

Để đạt được cột mốc 20,000 KENP, thời gian đã rút ngắn đáng kể, khi chúng tôi chỉ mất hơn một tháng. Điều này là nhờ có sự đóng góp lớn của ba tác phẩm Wild Wise Weird, Better Economics for the Earth, và Meandering Sobriety. Trong đó, cuộc đua song mã giữa Wild Wise Weird và Better Economics for the Earth là động lực lớn nhất để đưa chúng tôi chạm đến cột mốc 20,000 KENP sớm như (...) thế. (shrink)

Wittgenstein's Nachlass: The Bergen Electronic Edition is the only CD-ROM to give you instant facsimile and text access to the 20,000 pages of the philosopher's Nachlass as catalogued by Professor von Wright in his 1982 publication The Wittgenstein Papers. -/- The result of 10 years of academic research and editorial work by the Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen this electronic edition is the first scholarly resource to apply a uniform, well-documented, consistent set of editorial principles to the (...) writings. The CD-ROM is a joint publication between Oxford University Press and the Wittgenstein Archives and is published in Text & Facsimile and Text Only formats. (shrink)

The AISDL Team is delighted to celebrate the event of our study, titled “Near-Suicide Phenomenon: An Investigation into the Psychology of Patients with Serious Illnesses Withdrawing from Treatment,” surpassing the 100,000-view landmark at 22:20 Hanoi time, April 7, 2023. This unthinkable event occurred only 24 days after publication.

Abstract: Fast food refers to quick, convenient, and ready-to-eat meals that are usually sold at chain restaurants or take-out establishments. Fast food is often criticized for its unhealthy ingredients, such as high levels of salt, sugar, and unhealthy fats, and its contribution to the growing obesity epidemic. Despite this, fast food remains popular due to its affordability, convenience, and widespread availability. Many fast food chains have attempted to respond to these criticisms by offering healthier options, such as salads and grilled (...) chicken sandwiches, and by using more natural and locally sourced ingredients. The aim in this paper to propose a deep learning model for the classification of fast food dishes. The proposed model, Xception, was trained on natural images and was fine-tuned to make up the fast food meals. The researchers collected the Fast Food V2 dataset from Kaggle depository, the dataset, contained 20,000 images. The dataset has ten labels of food images comprised of Baked Potato, Burger, Crispy Chicken, Donut, Fries, Hot Dog, Pizza, Sandwich, Taco, and Taquito. The dataset was split into three sets: training, validation and testing. The accuracy, F1-score, recall, precision on the separate test set showed that classification of fast food was accuracy (95.13%), Precision (95.34%), Recall (95.13%), and F1-Score (95.14%). (shrink)

This descriptive correlational study anchored on Lazarus and Folkman’s Coping Theory identified the pedagogical problems met and the coping strategies adapted by elementary school teachers during the pandemic in one school district in the Division of Aklan during the height of the pandemic in 2021. This also tried to find out the extent of pedagogical problems experienced by the teacher respondents related to curriculum, fellow teachers, learners, school, and parents, and the coping strategies applied to manage the problems they encountered. (...) Forty-six grade school teachers purposively selected in the identified elementary schools in the district participated in the study. A researcher-made survey questionnaire validated by experts was used in the gathering of data. Findings revealed that teacher respondents were between 31-40 years old, mostly female and single, with average monthly income from 10,000 to 20, 000, travel less than 6 km from their homes to the work station, and are proficient in terms of ICT competence. The extent of pedagogical problems experienced by the respondents related to curriculum and fellow teachers was slightly a challenge; and to learners, school-related aspects, and parents as not at all considered as challenges. To cope with these challenges, the respondents’ top three activities were attending webinars for professional growth, enjoying quality time with their families, and going to and praying in the church. These imply that grade school teachers are more particular about improving themselves professionally and strengthening their faith in God than doing other things that affect their physical and mental health. (shrink)

The aim of the 17 original papers here is to summarize and analyze Wittgenstein's thought. At the time these were being written, the Oxford/Intelex CDROM ($2040 on Amazon but available thru interlibrary loan and steeply discounted on the net) with 20,000 some pages of W's nachlass was not yet available, and only those fluent in German and willing to find and slog thru the incomplete Cornell microfilm were able to examine it. To this day it much of it remains (...) untranslated from the German typescripts and handwritten manuscripts. I note this at the outset as W's untranslated or unpublished writings often shed crucial light on his thought and few to this day have made substantial use of them. In addition there are huge problems with translation of his early 20 th century Viennese German into modern English. One must be a master of English, German, and Wittgenstein in order to do this and very few are up to it. Several of the current authors note unfortunate translation errors in the only available English editions and I have seen similar comments countless times. As is well known, W's thought changed dramatically between the publication of the Tractatus (TLP) in 1922 and the Philosophical Investigations(1953). The continuity or lack thereof between his early and late work is the subject of a vast literature and is taken up here by several authors. Ishiguro on the picture theory and Mounce on the logical system in TLP are good, but for me the endless discussions of exactly how he was mistaken in his early work is of as little interest as the mistakes in most previous philosophy. Ammereller on Intentionality is a good, if prosaic, summary of (mostly) the early and middle W on belief and interpretation which, like virtually everyone, totally fails to give an adequate overview of W's pioneering work. In giving the general outline of our innate evolutionary psychology (ie, roughly our personality) and showing how this describes behavior, W represents a major milestone in human thought. There are unmistakeable indications of this even in his early writings (eg, see p 40, 49-58 here) and it has been documented by Hacker (eg, see his paper in The New Wittgenstein) and others but without any comprehensive account to date.Overall an exceptional book for introducing W to a general philosophical audience. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Monografia apresentada à banca examinadora da Escola Municipal Manuel Teodoro de Arruda, anexa do Colégio Frei Cassiano de Comacchio em Belo Jardim, para a obtenção do título de concluinte do curso de Normal Médio, oferecido pela instituição. A natureza do trabalho, em suma, consiste em apresentar perspectivas de trans formação social para a comunidade de jovens e adultos, o principal programa cunho do trabalho é a Educação de Jovens e Adultos a EJA, e como esse programa intervém na sociabilidade e (...) na mudança do meio social do educando, além de tratar a educação como a principal fonte e meio de mudança de vida dessas pessoas que voltam às escolas. Orientador(a): professora Maria Angelita Pinheiro BELO JARDIM 2017 DEDICATÓRIA Dedicamos este trabalho primeiramente a todos que acreditaram em sua realização, em especial à professora de práticas pedagógicas e também orientadora, Maria Angelita Pinheiro, pelo incentivo e esforço à nossa preparação ao dia de hoje. Bem como, dedicamos este à Alana Thais da Silva, que em todo o desenvolvimento deste, esteve ao nosso lado. AGRADECIMENTOS Agradecemos primeiramente a Deus, que pôde nos proporcionar saúde e sabedoria para a conclusão deste. Agradecemos também à todos que acreditaram na realização deste trabalho, como fruto da realização de um sonho, que é tornarmos normalistas. A nossos colegas de classe que puderam nos proporcionar alegria para continuarmos. Agradecemos em especial mesmo, à Alana Thais da Silva e a Dawson de Barros Monteiro, ambos por oferecer amor e carinho quando o cansaço chegava, e também pela colaboração nas pesquisas que adentravam noites e dias. Enfim, agradecemos a todos que puderam plantar uma semente nesse nosso terreno, para que no futuro pudéssemos colher bons frutos nessa etapa decisiva em nossas vidas. À todos nosso muito obrigado. EPÍGRAFE “Educação não transforma o mundo. Educação muda as pessoas. Pessoas transformam o mundo.” Paulo Freire RESUMO Este trabalho teve por objetivo abordar a Educação de Jovens e Adultos (EJA) como transformação social na vida daquelas pessoas que não tiveram a oportunidade de estudar ou, por motivo maior, tiveram que abandonar os estudos na idade própria. Muitos vão à procura dos estudos por motivo de conquistar um emprego melhor, outros por motivos de se sociabilizar melhor, e por vários outros motivos. Também é possível afirmar que o retorno para a escola na terceira idade é possível, e que para os jovens, os estudos abrirão as portas para o mundo do trabalho, mostrando que o indivíduo alfabetizado tem valor na sociedade, e que a escola, como um ambiente de aprendizagem, tem o poder de transformar o indivíduo e torná-lo um cidadão crítico, democrático e participativo. Palavras Chaves: Educação de Jovens e Adultos. Aprendizagem. Transformação Social. ABSTRACT The purpose of this study was to approach the education of young people and adults (EJA) as a social transformation in the lives of people who did not have the opportunity to study or, for greater reason, had to drop out of school at their own age. Many go in search of their studies for the sake of gaining a better job, others for the sake of socializing better, and for many other reasons. It is also possible to state that the return to school in the third age is possible, and that for the youngest, studies will open the door to the world of work, showing that the literate individual has value in society and that the school as a learning environment, has the power to transform the individual and make him / her a critical, democratic and participatory citizen. Keywords: Education for Youth and Adults. Learning. Social transformation LISTA DE ILUSTRAÇÕES FIGURA 1 – Gráfico sobre o percentual do Analfabetismo..............................................................27 FIGURA 2 – Gráfico sobre o Analfabetismo por região do Brasil....................................................28 SUMÁRIO INTRODUÇÃO.......................................................................................... ..................................... 10 CAPÍTULO 1 – CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA TRAJETÓRIA DA EDUCAÇÃO POPULAR NO BRASIL E PROCESSOS DE ALFABETIZAÇÃO........................................................................ 13 1.1 Históricos da Educação de Jovens e Adultos em seu Contexto Inicial............................ 13 1.1.1 Do Brasil Colônia ao Varguismo: Jesuítas, Pombal, Corte Imperial e Governo Vargas.............................................................................................. ................................. 13 1.2 A Educação de Jovens e Adultos Pós-Varguismo............................................................ 15 1.3 Acerca do Movimento Brasileiro de Alfabetização(Mobral)............................................ 15 1.3.1 Metodologia de Ensino no Mobral: Uma Abordagem Superficial.......................... 16 1.4 A Evolução da Educação de Jovens e Adultos: do Regime Militar ao seu Contexto Atual............................................................................................... .................................................. 17 CAPÍTULO 2 – REFLEXÕES ACERCA DA ALFABETIZAÇÃO............................................... 20 2.1 Análises Histórico-Antropológica Acerca da Escrita e a Alfabetização........................... 20 2.2 Alfabetização e Pragmatismo: Conceitos Acerca da Leitura e Escrita no Âmbito Educacional......................................................................................... ............................................. 21 2.3 O Analfabetismo como Antagonia ao Alfabetismo........................................................... 25 CAPÍTULO 3 – REFLEXÕES TEÓRICAS SOBRE A EDUCAÇÃO DE JOVENS E ADULTOS............................................................................................. .......................................... 29 3.1 Pensamentos de Paulo Freire Sobre a Educação Popular................................................. 29 3.2 Acerca do Método Freiriano........................................................................................... .. 31 3.2.1 Etapas do Método.............................................................................................. ...... 31 3.2.2 O Método.............................................................................................. ................... 31 3.2.3 As Fases de Aplicação do Método........................................................................... 32 3.2.4 História............................................................................................ ........................ 33 3.3 O Perfil do Professor Alfabetizador.................................................................................. 33 3.4 Perfil do Estudante da Educação de Jovens e Adultos e os Motivos de Evasão............... 35 3.5 Pensando em Métodos............................................................................................. ......... 37 CONCLUSÃO........................................................................................... ...................................... 41 REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS...................................................................................... ...... 43 10 INTODUÇÃO Este trabalho tem por objetivo abordar a Educação de Jovens e Adultos (EJA) como modelo, espelho ou meio de uma transformação social, na vida daquelas pessoas que não tiveram oportunidade de estudar, ou por motivos maiores, tiveram que abandonar os estudos na idade ideal, essa visão é explicada pelos motivos da evasão escolar. Foram pesquisados os motivos que levaram essas pessoas a desistirem de estudar e porque retornaram as salas de aula muito tempo depois, destacando principalmente como cunho primordial, os alunos das turmas da EJA (Educação de Jovens e Adultos), que, em suma, pode-se concluir que o principal motivo de evasão na idade adequada era as baixas condições que eram submetidos, e por isso, abandonavam a escola para trabalhar, por isso que a maioria dos estudantes da EJA, são trabalhadores e pessoas que já carregam e possuem uma experiência de vida. Educação de jovens e adultos (EJA) é uma modalidade da qual participam aqueles que não frequentaram a escola durante a infância ou na idade ideal. Os motivos apresentados pelos quais não conseguiram estudar são, na maioria das vezes, alheios a vontade de cada um, a exemplo foi-se citado: o fato de se ter que trabalhar para sobreviver, não ter acesso a escola no local onde mora e até mesmo a evasão escolar. Por isso é comum ainda haver escolas que alfabetizam jovens e adultos. Alfabetizar jovens e adultos é uma ocupação antiga que não se limita a uma tarefa meramente escolar, está intimamente ligada a sonhos, expectativas e a anseios de mudança. E com isso, a escolha do tema deste trabalho se deu com o convívio com jovens e adultos durante o estágio supervisionado na EJA. Geralmente, é depois da adolescência que o indivíduo reconhece que necessita do conhecimento escolar e passa a buscá-lo. Pois, é muito gratificante para uma pessoa leiga poder aprender a ler e a escrever, consciente da necessidade e importância de tal ato para sua vida, um mundo novo se abre, e o indivíduo é posto num contexto “como se fosse cega e de repente abrisse os olhos e enxergasse coisas que até então não via” . Alfabetizar tais pessoas é proporcionar para elas grandes mudanças, uma nova visão de mundo, a chance de ter uma vida melhor, pelo menos com mais oportunidades. Por isso remete-se, então, para além de uma alfabetização e sim de uma transformação social destes indivíduos. A EJA é um direito assegurado pela Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (LDBEN)2, é assegurado gratuitamente aos que não tiveram acesso a escola na idade própria e segundo a LDBEN o poder público deverá estimular o acesso e permanência do jovem e do adulto na escola. Porém, esse estímulo é a cada dia deixado de lado, como afirma o professor doutor em filosofia e educação do Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim, Dawson de Barros Monteiro. “[...] as atuais políticas públicas educacionais, mostram um exemplo de problemas, pois aqui na perspectiva contemporânea, é deveras nítida a deficiência da incentivação pública a estes indivíduos.” (Monteiro 2016, PROEJA p. 185). Abordando acerca dos objetivos, destacamos a abordagem do surgimento da EJA ante o alto índice de pessoas analfabetas no Estado, que por inúmeros motivos tiveram que abandonar os estudos por um longo período de tempo, ou para muitos, que nunca sequer tinham ido à escola. É necessário também dar luz e enaltecer a primordialidade da socialização dos que ingressam em uma escola mesmo depois da idade certa; nessa linha de raciocínio é necessário abordar e enaltecer as concepções ideológicas da transformação social no espaço da EJA, bem como compreender a importância desta para a atual sociedade. Por fim, abordar, entender e compreender as questões antropológicas dos motivos de evasão escolar; enxergar a EJA e a transformação social como utopia do indivíduo que retorna ao espaço educacional. E com isso, vislumbrar que em toda a sociedade a questão do Analfabetismo é um problema público educacional e social. 12 1. CONTRIBUIÇÕES DA TRAJETÓRIA DA EDUCAÇÃO POPULAR NO BRASIL E PROCESSOS DE ALFABETIZAÇÃO A educação de Jovens e Adultos antecede até mesmo as datas documentadas: de forma indireta, adultos interessavam-se em aprender as primeiras letras do alfabeto, sendo considerado o alicerce para a aprendizagem, ou seja, codificar cada símbolo daquele para formular palavras; ou ao menos também, interessar-se à escrever o próprio nome. Este Capítulo abordará a trajetória da Educação de Jovens e Adultos EJA, no Brasil, e sua contribuição para a população brasileira e ao mesmo tempo os processos de alfabetização que são contribuições para que esta aconteça de maneira eficaz. 1.1 HISTÓRICOS DA EDUCAÇÃO DE JOVENS E ADULTOS EM SEU CONTEXTO INICIAL 1.1.1 DO BRASIL COLÔNIA AO VARGUISMO: JESUÍTAS, POMBAL, CORTE IMPERIAL E GOVERNO VARGAS Alfabetizar jovens e adultos não é um ato de ensino-aprendizagem, é a construção de uma perspectiva de mudança: no início, época da colonização do Brasil, as poucas escolas existentes era para o privilégio das classes média e a burguesia da colônia, nessas famílias os filhos possuíam acompanhamento escolar na infância; não havia a necessidade de uma alfabetização pra jovens e adultos, esse bloco etário não tinha acesso a uma instrução escolar e quando a recebiam era de forma indireta, de acordo com Ghiraldelli Jr. a educação brasileira teve seu início com o fim dos regimes das capitanias hereditárias, ele cita que: “[...] A educação escolar no período colonial, ou seja, a educação regular e mais ou menos institucional de tal época, teve três fases: a do predomínio dos jesuítas; a das reformas do Marquês de Pombal, principalmente a partir da expulsão dos jesuítas do Brasil e de Portugal em 1759; e a do período em que Dom João VI, então rei de Portugal, trouxe a corte para o Brasil (1808-1821)”. (Ghiraldelli Jr. 2008, p. 24). O ensino dos jesuítas tinha como fim não apenas a transmissão de conhecimento científico escolar, mas a propagação da fé cristã. A história da EJA no Brasil no período colonial deu-se de forma assistemática, nesta época não se constatou iniciativas governamentais significativas. Os métodos jesuíticos permaneceram até o período pombalino com a expulsão dos jesuítas, neste período, Pombal organizava as escolas de acordo com os interesses do Estado, com a chegada da coroa portuguesa na colônia, a educação perdeu o seu foco que já não era amplo. Após a proclamação da Independência do Brasil foi outorgada a primeira constituição brasileira, e no artigo 179 dela constava que a “instrução primária era gratuita para todos os cidadãos”; mesmo a instrução sendo gratuita não favorecia as classes pobres, pois estes não tinham acesso à escola, ou seja, a escola era para todos, porém inacessível a quase todos. No decorrer dos séculos houve várias reformas, Soares cita que: “[...] No Brasil, o discurso em favor da Educação popular é antigo: precedeu mesmo a proclamação da República. Já em 1882, Ruy Barbosa, baseado em exaustivo diagnóstico da realidade brasileira da época, denunciava a vergonhosa precariedade do ensino para o povo do Brasil e apresentava propostas de multiplicação de escolas e de melhoria qualitativa do ensino” (SOARES, 2002, p. 8). A constituição de 1934, no governo ditatorial de Getúlio Vargas não teve êxito, sendo assim criase uma nova constituição escrita por Francisco Campos. Para a constituição de 1937 que Ghiraldelli Jr. Cita que: “[...] A constituição de 1937, fez o Estado abrir mão da responsabilidade para com a educação publica, uma vez que ela afirmava que o Estado desempenharia um papel de subsidiário, e não central, em relação ao ensino”. O ordenamento democrático alcançado em 1934, quando a letra da lei determinou a educação como direito de todos, e obrigação dos poderes públicos, foi substituído por um texto que desobrigou o Estado de manter e expandir o ensino” (GHIRALDELLI Jr., 2008, p. 78). Nessa perspectiva, o Estado passou a não ter mais o papel de bancar os educadores para levar o conhecimento para toda a nação, num plano ideológico mundial, vemos que a educação é um princípio fundamental para o crescimento do país e deixar esta ferramenta de lado, acarreta num colapso conhecido como “grande taxa de Analfabetismo”. A constituição de 1937, foi criada no intuito de estabelecer o favorecimento do Estado pois o mesmo tira sua responsabilidade; “gera nesse contexto histórico-social uma população sem educação, ou a educação para poucos, uma sociedade frágil e suscetível a aceitar tudo que lhe é imposto pelo poder coercitivo” afirma o professor doutor em filosofia do Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim, Dawson de Barros Monteiro: logo se entende que esta constituição não tinha o interesse que o conhecimento crítico se propagasse, mas buscava favorecer o ensino profissionalizante, pois dentro do contexto histórico o Brasil precisava mais capacitar os jovens e adultos para o trabalho nas indústrias. 1.2 A EDUCAÇÃO DE JOVENS E ADULTOS PÓS-VARGUISMO Segundo Cunha (1999), o fim do Estado Novo trouxe ao país um processo de redemocratização e a necessidade de aumento da quantidade de eleitores. Nesse sentido, o primeiro projeto lançado pelo governo foi uma campanha que previa a alfabetização do educando em três meses, além da conclusão do curso primário num prazo bem menor que o convencional. A educação era considerada unilateral e tinha o professor como transmissor de conhecimento. O educador, que era voluntário ou mal remunerado, seria o único sujeito deste processo. A campanha extinta em 1963, não rendeu bons resultados, mas ajudou a ideia preconceituosa de que o adulto não precisaria mais aprender a ler e que já havia encontrado seu lugar no mundo. Esse desprezo pela classe trabalhadora, o proletariado, ainda persistiu na década de 1990, quando o então ministro da Educação do governo Collor de Mello, o professor, físico e político José Goldemberg, afirmou que a tentativa de alfabetização de adultos não diminuiria o índice de analfabetos; ao contrário, perturbaria a ordem social. Com os resultados insatisfatórios dessa campanha, surgiram críticas a esse projeto: seria necessária a qualificação dos professores e a adequação do programa, do material didático e dos métodos de ensino à clientela atendida. No final dos anos 1950, Paulo Freire propunha uma nova pedagogia, posteriormente trabalhada neste trabalho. Apesar de ser encarregado de desenvolver o Programa Nacional de Alfabetização de Adultos, com o golpe militar de 1964, Paulo Freire foi exilado e um programa assistencialista e conservador foi criado: o Movimento Brasileiro de Alfabetização (Mobral). 1.3 ACERCA DO MOVIMENTO BRASILEIRO DE ALFABETIZAÇÃO (Mobral) Na época do regime militar (1964-1985), surge um movimento de alfabetização de jovens e adultos, na tentativa de erradicar o analfabetismo, pelo menos é o que se tinha em teoria; chamado MOBRAL, esse método tinha como foco o ato de ler e escrever, essa metodologia assemelha-se a de Paulo Freire com codificações, cartazes com famílias silábicas, quadros, fichas e etc., porém, não utilizava o diálogo como ideologia educacional de Freire e não se preocupava com a formação crítica dos educandos. A principal ideologia objetiva do Mobral era apenas a alfabetização funcional que em seu conceito é o ensino alicerce da compreensão de textos simples, capacitando os educandos a decodificação mínima de letras para a interpretação de textos, sem a apropriação da leitura e da escrita de pessoas entre 15 e 30 anos. A respeito do Mobral Bello cita que: “[...] O projeto Mobral permite compreender bem esta fase ditatorial por que passou o Brasil. A proposta de educação era toda baseada em aos interesses políticos vigentes na época. Por ter de repassar o sentimento de bom comportamento para o povo e justificar os atos da ditadura, esta instituição estendeu seus braços a uma boa parte das populações carentes, através de seus diversos programas.” (BELLO, 1993, p. 56). 1.3.1 METODOLOGIA DE ENSINO NO MOBRAL: UMA ABORDAGEM SUPERFICIAL A metodologia utilizada pelo Programa de Alfabetização Funcional baseava-se em seis objetivos: 1. Desenvolver nos alunos as habilidades de leitura, escrita e contagem 2. Desenvolver um vocabulário que permita o enriquecimento de seus alunos; 3. Desenvolver o raciocínio, visando facilitar a resolução de seus problemas e os de sua comunidade; 4. Formar hábitos e atitudes positivas, em relação ao trabalho; 5. Desenvolver a criatividade, a fim de melhorar as condições de vida, aproveitando os recursos disponíveis; 6. Levar os alunos: • A conhecerem seus direitos e deveres e as melhores formas de participação comunitária; • A se empenharem na conservação da saúde e melhoria das condições de higiene pessoal, familiar e da comunidade; • A se certificarem da responsabilidade de cada um, na manutenção e melhoria dos serviços públicos de sua comunidade e na conservação dos bens e instituições; • A participarem do desenvolvimento da comunidade, tendo em vista o bem-estar das pessoas. Os técnicos do MOBRAL defendiam que o método utilizado baseava-se no aproveitamento das experiências significativas dos alunos. Desta forma, embora divergisse ideologicamente do método de Paulo Freire utilizava-se, semelhantemente a este, de palavras geradoras e de uma série de procedimentos para o processo de alfabetização: 1. Apresentação e exploração do cartaz gerador; 2. Estudo da palavra geradora, depreendida do cartaz; 3. Decomposição silábica da palavra geradora; 4. Estudo das famílias silábicas, com base nas palavras geradoras; 5. Formação e estudos de palavras novas; 6. Formação e estudos de frases e textos A principal e essencial diferença na utilização destes procedimentos em relação ao método Paulo Freire era o fato de no Mobral haver uma uniformização do material utilizado em todo o território nacional, não traduzindo assim a linguagem e as necessidades do povo de cada região, principal característica da metodologia freiriana. 1.4 A EVOLUÇÃO DA EDUCAÇÃO DE JOVENS E ADULTOS: DO REGIME MILITAR AO SEU CONTEXTO ATUAL Em 1974, foi implantado o CES (Centro de Estudos Supletivos), que dava a oportunidade de uma certificação rápida, mas superficial, com um ensino tecnicista e auto instrucional. Esse ensino supletivo foi implantado em acordo com a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação, LDBE 5592/71. Nesta lei um capítulo foi dedicado especificamente a Educação de Jovens e Adultos. Em 1974 o MEC lança o CES. A década de 1980 foi marcada pelo desenvolvimento de projetos e pesquisas na área da alfabetização de adultos. Em 1985, o Mobral foi cessado, dando lugar a Fundação EDUCAR que apoiava tecnicamente e financeiramente as iniciativas de alfabetização existentes. Nos anos 80, difundiram-se várias pesquisas acerca da língua escrita que de certa forma refletiam na EJA. Com a promulgação da constituição de 1988 o Estado passou a ampliar o seu dever ante a Educação de Jovens e Adultos. De acordo com o artigo 208 da constituição brasileira de 1988: “O dever do Estado com a Educação será efetivado mediante a garantia de: I – ensino fundamental obrigatório e gratuito, assegurado inclusive sua oferta gratuita para todos os que a ele não tiveram acesso na idade própria.” A importância da Educação de Jovens e Adultos passou a ser reconhecida internacionalmente mediante as conferências organizadas pela UNESCO nos anos 1990. A partir de então, surgiu no Brasil uma mobilização nacional no sentido de diagnosticar metas e ações da EJA. A LDBE de 1996 garante igualdade de acesso e permanência na escola e ensino de qualidade, além da valorização experiência extraescolar. Ainda nos anos 1990, emergiram iniciativas em favor da EJA, onde o governo incumbiu também a municípios a engajarem-se nesta política, ocorrem parcerias com ONG’s, municípios, universidades, grupos informais, populares, fóruns estaduais e nacionais e através de fóruns a história da EJA passou a ser registrada no intitulado “Boletim da Ação Educativa”. O antigo ensino supletivo passou a se chamar Educação de Jovens e Adultos, e ganhou um sentido mais amplo: preparar e inserir ou reinserir o estudante no mercado de trabalho. Os objetivos da educação no país são revistos, cabendo agora à escola a responsabilidade de formar o adulto trabalhador. Recentemente, novas iniciativas como a EJA e o Proeja, têm surgido a fim de garantir metodologias adequadas a discentes com esse perfil. Em 2000, o Conselho Nacional de Educação estabeleceu, no parecer nº 11, (das Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais para a Educação de Jovens e Adultos), as funções e as bases legais da EJA fundamentadas na LDBE, nos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais e nas Diretrizes Curriculares Nacionais O decreto nº 5478/05, institui o Programa Nacional de Integração da Educação Profissional à Educação Básica na Modalidade de Educação de Jovens e Adultos – Proeja, abrangendo a formação inicial e continuada de trabalhadores e a Educação Profissional Técnica de nível médio. Eventos onde são gerados debates e trocadas experiências, como os fóruns EJA, têm sido importantes e primordiais na estruturação da EJA e de seus objetivos. É notório que nesta fase da história da Educação brasileira, a EJA possui foco amplo. Para haver uma sociedade igualitária e uma Educação eficaz é necessário que todas as áreas da Educação sejam focadas e valorizadas, não é possível desvencilhar uma da outra. 2. REFLEXÕES ACERCA DA ALFABETIZAÇÃO A alfabetização é definida como o processo de aprendizagem onde se desenvolve a habilidade de ler e escrever de maneira adequada e a utilizar esta habilidade como um código de comunicação com o seu meio. É o processo onde os educadores procuram dar mais atenção durante o período de educação inicial escolar, através do desenvolvimento das atividades da alfabetização, que envolvem o aprendizado do alfabeto e dos números, a coordenação motora e a formação de palavras, sílabas e pequenas frases. Através destas tarefas, o indivíduo consegue adquirir a habilidade de leitura, de compreensão de textos e da linguagem de maneira geral, incluindo a operação de números, que são competências necessárias para avançar aos níveis escolares seguintes. A alfabetização consegue desenvolver também a capacidade de socialização do indivíduo, uma vez que possibilita novas trocas simbólicas com a sociedade, além de possibilitar o acesso a bens culturais e outras facilidades das instituições sociais. A incapacidade de adquirir a habilidade da leitura e da escrita é chamada de analfabetismo ou iliteracia. 2.1 ANÁLISE HISTÓRICO-ANTROPOLÓGICA ACERCA DA ESCRITA E A ALFABETIZAÇÃO A comunicação oral antecede a comunicação escrita. É oralmente que se expressam a maioria das pessoas desde os tempos mais remotos. A história nos mostra que até mesmo os povos humanos da pré-história utilizavam símbolos gráficos para fazer registros em cavernas, em grutas, em rochas e etc., ou seja, já havia a necessidade de expressão gráfica. Bajard diz que: “[...] A escrita surgiu na mesopotâmia por volta do ano 4000 a.C., entre os Sumérios. Era uma escrita representada por desenhos, figuras rupestres e etc. que indicavam ações cotidianas e corriqueiras desses povos como a caça ou a pesca; essa fase ficou conhecida como pictográfica, após ela veio a fase ideográfica, onde os símbolos já representavam também alguma ideia, tornou-se fonética, depois alfabética e a partir daí a escrita foi evoluindo-se, alfabetos foram surgindo de acordo com as particularidades de cada língua.”(BAJARD, 2001, p. 15). A fase alfabética determinou a necessidade da transformação de códigos alfabéticos escritos, dando início ao que hoje chamamos de alfabetização. Ferreiro cita que: “[...] A invenção da escrita foi um processo histórico de construção de um sistema de representação, não um processo de codificação. Uma vez construído, poder-se-ia pensar que o sistema de representação é aprendido pelos novos usuários, como um sistema de codificação. Entretanto, não é assim, no caso dos dois sistemas envolvidos no início da escolarização (o sistema de codificação seria dos números e o sistema de representação seria da linguagem). As dificuldades que as crianças enfrentam são dificuldades conceituais semelhantes as da construção do sistema, e por isso pode-se dizer em ambos os casos que a criança reinventa esses sistemas, no caso da Educação para Jovens e Adultos, esse processo também poderá acontecer mediante a participação ativa do estudante e o empenho do mestre que para ele leciona. Bem entendido, não se trata de que as crianças reinventem as letras nem os números, mas que para poderem se servir desses elementos como elementos de um sistema, deve compreender seu processo de construção e suas regras de produção, o que coloca o problema epistemológico fundamental: Qual é a natureza da relação entre o real e a sua representação?” (FERREIRO, 2001, p. 12). A alfabetização não é uma ação prioritária para a fase infantil da vida. Ferreiro cita que: “[...] é recente a tomada de consciência sobre a importância da alfabetização inicial como a única solução real para o problema da alfabetização remediativa (de adolescentes e adultos)”. (FERREIRO, 2001, p. 09). 2.2 ALFABETIZAÇÃO E PRAGMATISMO: CONCEITOS ACERCA DA LEITURA E ESCRITA NO ÂMBITO EDUCACIONAL Alfabetizar é um tema que está ligado ao ensino da leitura e da escrita de códigos alfabéticos, existem inúmeros significados para essa problemática atual. Larousse limita o significado de alfabetizar a ensinar a ler. “[...] Vários conceitos definem alfabetizar como o ato de ensinar a ler, aos poucos esses conceitos vem mudando, ainda que livros e dicionários definam-no assim. Hoje muitos educadores e alfabetizadores utilizam o termo “letramento”, letrar vai além de alfabetizar, se trata da compreensão da leitura e escrita, a criança, o jovem ou o adulto estão alfabetizados ao saberem ler e escrever e letrados ao compreenderem o que leram e escreveram, estão letrados quando dominam a leitura e a escrita e fazem o uso social de ambos.” (LAROUSSE, 2003, p. 21). Soares, acerca do assunto, cita ao ser questionada sobre tal definição: “Letramento é de certa forma o contrário de analfabetismo, aliás, houve um momento em que as palavras letramento e alfabetismo se alteravam para nomear o mesmo conceito. Ainda hoje há quem prefira a palavra letramento, eu mesmo acho a palavra alfabetismo mais vernácula que letramento, que é uma tentativa da palavra inglesa literary, mas curvo-me ao poder das tendências linguísticas, que estão dando preferência a letramento. Analfabetismo é definido como o estado de quem não sabe ler e escrever, seu contrário, alfabetismo ou letramento, é o estado de quem sabe ler e escrever, ou seja, letramento é o estado em que vive o indivíduo que não só sabe ler e escrever, mas que poderá exercer as práticas sociais de leitura e escrita que circulam na sociedade em que vivem.” (SOARES, 2007). . Os Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais (PCN’s) da Língua Portuguesa (Brasil, 2001, p. 21) fala explicitamente sobre este termo, mas a sua proposta vai de encontro as propostas do letramento, isso é perceptível ao observar o que é citado nos PCN’s a respeito de pesquisas e investigações referentes a alfabetização nas séries escolares. A alfabetização é um processo contínuo, inicia-se desde os primeiros anos de vida, com a linguagem e a partir daí tudo que a pessoa aprende serve como base para uma aprendizagem eficaz. A alfabetização, como a educação em geral, é um direito de todos, infelizmente para muitos ela não pode acontecer na infância, a preocupação de como fazê-la com qualidade e êxito impulsiona investigações de como alfabetizar para compreender a leitura e a escrita. Ferreiro cita que: “[...] É difícil falar de alfabetização evitando as posturas dominantes neste campo, por um lado, o discurso oficial e, por outro, o discurso meramente ideologizante, que chamarei “discurso da denúncia”. O discurso oficial centra-se nas estatísticas, o outro despreza essas cifras tratando de desvelar “a face oculta” da alfabetização, onde o discurso oficial fala de quantidade de escolas inauguradas, o discurso da denúncia enfatiza a má qualidade dessas construções ou desses locais improvisados que carecem do indispensável para a realização de ações propriamente educativas.” (FERREIRO, 2005, p. 09). A Alfabetização de Jovens e Adultos não é uma ação recente, teve início desde a colonização apesar de ter sido reconhecida oficialmente somente após o ano de 1945, muitos motivos interferem o processo de alfabetização na infância de alguns jovens e adultos, outros nem sequer iniciam esse processo, logo nesta fase e ao longo dos anos sentem a necessidade de alfabetizar-se. Segundo Moll: “[...] Nesse sentido, quando falamos “em adultos em processo de alfabetização” no contexto social brasileiro, nos referimos a homens e mulheres marcados por experiências de infância na qual não puderam permanecer na escola pela necessidade de trabalhar, por concepções que as afastavam da escola como de que “mulher não precisa aprender” ou “saber os rudimentos da escrita já é suficiente”, ou ainda, pela seletividade construída internamente na rede escolar que produz ainda hoje itinerários descontínuos de aprendizagens formais. Referimo-nos a homens e mulheres que viveram e vivem situações limite nas quais os tempos de infância foi, via de regra, tempo de trabalho e de sustento das famílias.” (MOLL, 2004, p. 11). Ler e escrever são uma arte, principalmente para muitos que não aprenderam a ler e escrever na infância e consequentemente na vida adulta sentem falta desses atos, nas últimas décadas a oferta de ensino aumentou bastante, porém o acesso ainda é limitado para muitos, nem todos os brasileiros tiveram ou tem a oportunidade de alfabetizar-se na infância diversos fatores contribuem ou contribuíram para isso, como a necessidade de trabalhar nessa fase da vida, a falta de acesso a escola, ou até mesmo a falta de interesse, ao chegar na juventude ou na fase adulta a pessoa percebe o quanto a educação básica lhe faz falta e começa a persistir em busca do conhecimento. No decorrer da história da educação a alfabetização de jovens e adultos teve diferentes focos e contou com significantes projetos de alfabetização como o MOBRAL e Método Paulo Freire que será visto neste trabalho. O processo de aquisição da leitura e da escrita não é uma preocupação apenas de professores e alfabetizadores, a alfabetização é a base para uma educação eficaz, portanto para o aluno estar bem nas séries posteriores ele precisa de uma alfabetização sólida. Vivemos atualmente na sociedade do conhecimento, não só do conhecimento do senso comum como sempre foi, mas do conhecimento científico que facilita aos indivíduos uma vivência social de acordo com as imposições do meio e para tal o conhecimento transferido no ambiente escolar é fundamental. Atualmente a EJA tem objetivos maiores além da alfabetização por parte dos alunos, da necessidade de estar capacitado para o mercado de trabalho, ser atuante na sociedade e também o interesse político de reduzir o máximo a estatística de analfabetismo no país, este fator favorecerá com a pretensão de um dia o Brasil se tornar uma grande potência mundial. As primeiras formas de alcançar melhores condições de trabalho e ampliar conhecimento é que faz com que muitos jovens e adultos que não se alfabetizaram na infância ingressem em uma turma de EJA oferecida pelas escolas ou por grupos comunitários que desenvolvem projetos de alfabetização, ser alfabetizado nestas fases da vida depende de muita motivação e força de vontade, não basta apenas querer, a alfabetização de jovens e adultos ocorre de maneira intencional e consciente, segundo Pinto: “Os conceitos de “necessitar saber” vem da origem do interior do ser, considerado em sua plena realidade, enquanto o de “saber” e “não saber” (como fatos empíricos) coloca-se na superfície do ser humano, é um acidente social, além de ser impossível definir com rigor absoluto os limites entre o “saber e o não saber” (daí que não há uma fronteira exata entre o alfabetizado e o analfabeto). Porque o “necessitar” é uma coisa que ou é satisfeita (se é exigência interior) ou, se não é, não permite ao indivíduo subsistir como tal entre (por exemplo: as necessidades biológicas). O “necessitar” ao qual se referem a leitura e a escrita é de caráter social (uma vez que tem por fundamento o trabalho).” (PINTO, 2007, p. 92). É válido ressaltar que o direito a educação de Jovens e Adultos é assegurado por lei e as instituições de ensino devem realizá-la de maneira que atenda tal clientela sem ignorar suas limitações. Alfabetizar jovens e adultos é muito mais que transferir-lhes noções de leitura e escrita, o jovem ou adulto ao ingressar em uma escola ele tem um objetivo delimitado e compreende a escola como um meio para alcançar tal objetivo, o professor alfabetizador se torna então um mediador entre o aluno e o conhecimento, por isso ele precisa estar bem informado, motivado e querendo realizar um trabalho de construção. Há algumas décadas era comum grupos de pessoas adultas se reunirem para aprender escrever o nome e conhecer as letras do alfabeto, tais pessoas ficavam extremamente maravilhadas, pois dentro do contexto delas tal aprendizado era suficientemente satisfatório. Atualmente grupos ainda se reúnem, mas as expectativas são outras, só o aprendizado do próprio nome não é suficiente, o mercado de trabalho exige mais, até mesmo o simples fato de precisar identificar o itinerário do ônibus requer leitura. Segundo Libâneo: “A escola de hoje precisa não apenas conviver com outras modalidades de educação não formal, informal e profissional, mas também articular-se e integrar-se a elas, a fim de formar cidadãos mais preparados e qualificados para um novo tempo”. (LIBÂNEO, 2003, p. 53). Para isso o ensino escolar deve contribuir para: • Formar indivíduos capazes de pensar e de aprender permanentemente; • Prover formação global para atender à necessidade de maior e melhor qualificação profissional; • Desenvolver conhecimentos, capacidades e qualidades para o exercício consciente da cidadania; • Formar cidadãos éticos e solidários. A motivação é a chave para o sucesso da educação de jovens e adultos, desmotivados eles não conseguirão enfrentar as barreiras cotidianas, tudo se tornará mais difícil, cabe aos professores e a escola em geral incentivá-los para que não desistam. 2.3 O ANALFABETISMO COMO ANTAGONIA AO ALFABETISMO O analfabetismo é a qualidade de analfabeto, uma palavra de origem latina (analphabētus) que se refere àquelas pessoas que não sabem ler nem escrever. Porém, o termo costuma ter um uso mais extenso e é usado para fazer alusão aos indivíduos que são ignorantes ou que carecem de instrução elementar em alguma disciplina. O analfabetismo surge perante a falta de aprendizagem. Por isso, nos países que contam com programas de escolarização obrigatória, o analfabetismo é minoritário, mesmo para além do facto de que a compreensão de leitura das pessoas possa ser deficiente. Analfabeto é a pessoa que não sabe ler nem escrever. Segundo definição da UNESCO, “uma pessoa funcionalmente analfabeta é aquela que não pode participar de todas as atividades nas quais a alfabetização é requerida para uma atuação eficaz em seu grupo e comunidade, e que lhe permitem, também, continuar usando a leitura, a escrita e o cálculo a serviço do seu próprio desenvolvimento e do desenvolvimento de sua comunidade”. O analfabetismo no país ainda continua sendo um obstáculo para o progresso e desenvolvimento da humanidade. O importante é ressaltar que não estamos falando de ignorância. Analfabeto Funcional: sabe ler e escrever textos e frases curtas, mas não consegue interpretá-los, também não sabem realizar operações de matemática. Existem três níveis de Analfabetismo funcional: Existem três níveis distintos de alfabetização funcional, a saber: • Nível 1 - também conhecido como alfabetização rudimentar, compreende aqueles que apenas conseguem ler e compreender títulos de textos e frases curtas; e apesar de saber contar, têm dificuldades com a compreensão de números grandes e em fazer as operações aritméticas básicas; • Nível 2 - também conhecido como alfabetização básica, compreende aqueles que conseguem ler textos curtos, mas só conseguem extrair informações espessas no texto e não conseguem tirar uma conclusão a respeito do mesmo; e também conseguem entender números grandes, conseguem realizar as operações aritméticas básicas, entretanto sentem dificuldades quando é exigida uma maior quantidade de cálculos, ou em operações matemáticas mais complexas. • Nível 3 - também conhecido como alfabetização plena, compreende aqueles que detêm pleno domínio da leitura, escrita, dos números e das operações matemáticas (das mais básicas às mais complexas). Pode-se afirmar que, nos dias de hoje, a sociedade está experimentando uma nova forma de analfabetismo, chamado de analfabetismo digital. Este tipo de carência está relacionado com a falta de conhecimento necessário para utilizar computadores pessoais, celulares e agendas eletrônicas e dominar os sistemas que operam estas máquinas como, por exemplo, navegar na rede mundial de computadores. O grave problema do analfabetismo no mundo continua sendo um dos grandes temas prioritários a solucionar desde que se realizou a Conferência Mundial da Educação para Todos, ocorrida em 1990, em Jomtiem, Tailândia. Esta conferência foi assistida por representantes do mundo todo e chegou-se à conclusão de que a alfabetização é um dos fatores chave para resolver um dos problemas mais urgentes da sociedade, que a realização plena do ser humano só se dá através da educação e promovê-la é fundamental para o desenvolvimento das nações. Assim sendo, a educação é uma ferramenta extremamente útil para combater a pobreza e a desigualdade, elevar os níveis de saúde e bem estar social, criar as bases para um desenvolvimento econômico sustentável e a manutenção de uma democracia duradoura. Por este motivo a educação foi incluída na lista dos oito Objetivos de Desenvolvimento do Milênio das Nações Unidas, que fixou para o ano de 2015 a data limite para alcançar 100% de educação primária para todas as crianças do planeta. Para o plano ideológico da história da Educação de Jovens e Adultos, pode-se afirmar que tais medidas, no Estado brasileiro, refletiram na queda da taxa de analfabetismo ao longo dos anos. Segundo o professor doutor em filosofia do Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim, Dawson de Barros Monteiro, o modelo teórico das iniciativas de alfabetização de jovens e adultos, mesmo tendo um cunho mais político no processo, este pôde remeter-se na queda do índice de habitantes analfabetos no Brasil, desde o Estado Novo ao governo Lula, esta ideologia teórica levou à pratica, uma nova visão de Brasil, uma perspectiva de habitantes mais preocupados com sua educação, ao menos ter o alicerce de poder gozar pelo menos do próprio saber a ler e a escrever, mesmo em um plano inicial. Mostra-se aí que as políticas educacionais mesmo sem o principal intuito de alfabetizar a população geraram programas que foram fomentados e mastigados pela população, que estes puderam ao menos voltar às salas de aula, a quem desistira quando jovem; ou mesmo entrar no âmbito educacional e conhecer de perto o ensino e a escola para aqueles que não puderam nem entrar nesta. A seguir o gráfico mostra como o índice de analfabetos decaiu a partir dos programas para a erradicação do analfabetismo primordialmente com a Educação de Jovens e Adultos. Figura 1. Gráfico com a queda da taxa de analfabetismo no Brasil no período de 1940 e 2010 É observado que a partir dos anos 1940, no governo Getúlio Vargas e o Estado Novo, o índice era de que em cada 100 pessoas quase 56 encontravam-se vítimas do analfabetismo no Brasil, número que ao passar dos anos vai declinando, chegando em 2010 com um índice em torno que, em cada 100 pessoas quase 10 encontravam-se analfabetas, isso é uma conquista tanto para o Estado que cresce no plano internacional, para a educação nacional que remete a ideia que os programas funcionam de forma ótima, e para o estudante que ingressa em uma sala da EJA. O próximo gráfico traz o índice por regiões brasileiras entre um plano de uma década, 2000 a 2010. Trazendo luz a queda no índice da taxa percentual. Figura 2. Gráfico com a taxa de analfabetismo por regiões do Brasil entre 2000 e 2010 Por fim, concluísse que com os programas educacionais de Educação de Jovens e Adultos, pôsse à erradicação e diminuição brusca do índice de percentual de analfabetos no país, uma vez que esses tendem ao cunho da erradicação dessas taxas que fazem com que a perspectiva do Brasil seja favorável ou desfavorável no plano internacional, já que a educação na contemporaneidade é fundamental para o crescimento do país. 3. REFEXÕES TEÓRICAS SOBRE A EDUCAÇÃO DE JOVENS E ADULTOS Ao abordar a Educação de Jovens e Adultos como tema é fundamental conhecer e destacar o pensamento de alguns autores e educadores como Paulo Freire e outros que ao longo da vida profissional dedicaram-se a alfabetizar e que contribuem para a formação docente continuada. Este capítulo aborda tais reflexões e as particularidades do tema. 3.1 PENSAMENTO DE PAULO FREIRE SOBRE A EDUCAÇÃO POPULAR Educação popular é uma educação comprometida e participativa orientada pela perspectiva de realização de todos os direitos do povo. Quando se pensa em educação popular nos remetemos à imagem de Paulo Freire que foi o grande mentor, é uma educação que visa à formação do indivíduo com valores, conhecimento e consciência de cidadania, busca utilizar o que a pessoa já tem de conhecimento popular para transformar na matéria-prima do ensino. Esta educação popular é muito utilizada em assentamentos rurais, favelas, aldeias indígenas, pequenas comunidades, ONG’s dentre outras; por se tratar de uma educação que atende as necessidades em comum de um povo, uma educação em que tem os mesmos interesses em ampliar os seus conhecimentos e tornar cidadãos conscientes do seu papel na sociedade. Paulo Freire, o mais célebre educador brasileiro, tinha o pensamento de que a escola tinha que ensinar o aluno a “ler o mundo” para obter transformações, tendo em vista que se o aluno não saber a realidade do mundo em que vive não é possível lutar em busca de melhorias; para que haja transformação é essencial a conscientização, por isso Paulo Freire criou o seu método de ensino, pois não acreditava que uma pessoa adulta dor nordeste por exemplo que não conhecia “uva” pudesse aprender a ler e escrever apenas utilizando cartilhas com frases: EVA VIU UVA, pensou em aproximar os alunos a sua própria realidade, à sua rotina do dia a dia com as palavras geradoras. De acordo com a revista Nova Escola “Grandes Pensadores”: Freire dizia que ninguém ensina nada a ninguém, mas as pessoas também não aprendem sozinhas, os homens se educam entre si mediados pelo mundo. O pensamento de Paulo Freire é que o professor não é detentor do conhecimento e que não domina todas as áreas do conhecimento e é de fundamental importância a troca de experiências entre professor e aluno, o conhecimento de um completa o outro, todos nós somos dotados de inteligências e exercemos inteligências, porém nem todos a desenvolvem para a mesma área, muitas vezes um professor é excelente na sua profissão e não tem habilidades como pedreiro e o pedreiro constrói lindas casas e edifícios, mas não é alfabetizado e quando esse professor encontra este pedreiro podem trocar experiências distintas e ambos aprendem entre si. Para Freire um professor dedicado para a educação popular tem que acreditar em mudanças, não pode ensinar apenas a ler e escrever, é preciso haver uma mudança de paradigma, e transmitir esperanças, fazer com que o aluno se transforme em sujeito pensante, crítico e consciente do que lhe envolve no dia a dia, o professor tem que ter prazer, alegria e transmitir aos alunos. Paulo Freire diz que: “Há uma relação entre a alegria necessária à atividade educativa e a esperança. A esperança de que professor e alunos juntos podemos aprender, ensinar, inquietar-nos, produzir e juntos igualmente resistir aos obstáculos à nossa alegria. Na verdade, do ponto de vista da natureza humana a esperança não é algo que a ela se justaponha. A esperança faz parte da natureza humana.” (FREIRE, 2002, p. 80). Para Freire é importante que o professor tenha esperança, uma vez que os jovens e adultos se espelham nos professores, e com esperança pode se acreditar em uma mudança de direção para a vida e para o mundo, para a sociedade, cita uma história popular que um passarinho viu um incêndio na floresta e correu para chamar os amigos para apagar o fogo, mas ninguém quis ir, então resolveu ir sozinho apagar o fogo, viu um rio e foi pegando água e jogando no fogo, certamente esse pássaro sabia que sozinho não poderia apagar toso o fogo, mas teve esperança que tomando a iniciativa talvez os outros pudessem acreditar que também seria capaz. Podemos comparar Paulo Freire a este passarinho, pois ele apenas deu início a essa educação e a cada dia pessoas se juntam a suas ideologias a fim de transformar a educação no nosso país e começam a mudar este paradigma. 3.2 ACERCA DO MÉTODO FREIRIANO O Método Paulo Freire consiste numa proposta para a alfabetização de adultos desenvolvidos pelo educador Paulo Freire, que em sua implementação concorreu com programas como o de Frank Laubach. Freire afirmou ter desenvolvido o método enquanto era diretor do Departamento de Extensões Culturais da Universidade do Recife, quando formou um grupo para testar o método na cidade de Angicos, no Rio Grande do Norte. 3.2.1 ETAPAS DO MÉTODO 1. Etapa de investigação: busca conjunta entre professor e aluno das palavras e temas mais significativos da vida do aluno, dentro de seu universo vocabular e da comunidade onde ele vive. 2. Etapa de tematização: momento da tomada de consciência do mundo, através da análise dos significados sociais dos temas e palavras. 3. Etapa de problematização: etapa em que o professor desafia e inspira o aluno a superar a visão mágica e acrítica do mundo, para uma postura conscientizada. 3.2.2 O MÉTODO • As palavras geradoras: o processo proposto por Paulo Freire inicia-se pelo levantamento do universo vocabular dos alunos. Através de conversas informais, o educador observa os vocábulos mais usados pelos alunos e a comunidade e, assim, seleciona as palavras que servirão de base para as lições. A quantidade de palavras geradoras pode variar entre 18 a 23 palavras, aproximadamente. Depois de composto o universo das palavras geradoras, elas são apresentadas em cartazes com imagens. Então, nos círculos de cultura, inicia-se uma discussão para dar-lhes significado dentro da realidade daquela turma. • A silabação: uma vez identificadas, cada palavra geradora passa a ser estudada através da divisão silábica, semelhantemente ao método tradicional. Cada sílaba se desdobra em sua respectiva família silábica, com a mudança da vogal. Por exemplo: BA-BE-BI-BO-BU. • As palavras novas: o passo seguinte é a formação de palavras novas. Usando as famílias silábicas agora conhecidas, o grupo forma palavras novas. • A conscientização: um ponto fundamental do método é a discussão sobre os diversos temas surgidos a partir das palavras geradoras. Para Paulo Freire, alfabetizar não pode se restringir aos processos de codificação e decodificação. Dessa forma, o objetivo da alfabetização de adultos é promover a conscientização acerca dos problemas cotidianos, a compreensão do mundo e o conhecimento da realidade social. 3.2.3 AS FASES DE APLICAÇÃO DO MÉTODO Freire propõe a aplicação de seu método nas cinco fases seguintes: • 1ª fase: levantamento do universo vocabular do grupo. Nessa fase, ocorrem as interações de aproximação e conhecimento mútuo, bem como a anotação das palavras da linguagem dos membros do grupo, respeitando seu linguajar típico. • 2ª fase: escolha das palavras selecionadas, seguindo os critérios de riqueza fonética, dificuldades fonéticas - numa sequência gradativa das mais simples para as mais complexas, do comprometimento pragmático da palavra na realidade social, cultural, política do grupo e/ou sua comunidade. • 3ª fase: criação de situações existenciais características do grupo. Trata-se de situações inseridas na realidade local, que devem ser discutidas com o intuito de abrir perspectivas para a análise crítica consciente de problemas locais, regionais e nacionais. • 4ª fase: criação das fichas-roteiro neles havia indicações de possíveis subtemas ligadas as palavras geradoras e sugestões de encaminhamentos para análise dos temas selecionados que funcionam como roteiro para os debates, as quais fossem apenas sugestões esses roteiros eram de grande valia, principalmente no inicio do trabalho quando a alfabetizador era também iniciante. • 5ª fase: criação de fichas de palavras para a decomposição das famílias fonéticas correspondentes às palavras geradoras. 3.2.4 HISTÓRIA Freire aplicou publicamente seu método pela primeira vez no Centro de Cultura Dona Olegarinha, um círculo de cultura do Movimento de Cultura Popular no Recife. Foi aplicado inicialmente a cinco alunos, dos quais três aprenderam a ler e escrever em 30 horas e outros dois desistiram antes de concluir. Baseado na experiência de Angicos, em janeiro de 1963, onde em 45 dias, alfabetizaram-se 300 trabalhadores, João Goulart, presidente do Brasil na época, chamou Paulo Freire para organizar o Plano Nacional de Alfabetização. Este plano, iniciado em janeiro de 1964, tinha como objetivo alfabetizar 2 milhões de pessoas em 20 000 círculos de cultura, e já contava com a participação da comunidade - só no estado da Guanabara, se inscreveram 6 000 pessoas. Mas, com o Golpe de Estado no Brasil em 1964, em abril, toda essa mobilização social foi reprimida e Paulo Freire foi considerado subversivo, sendo preso e, depois, exilado. Assim, esse projeto foi abortado. Em seu lugar, surgiu o Movimento Brasileiro de Alfabetização, igualmente uma iniciativa para a alfabetização, porém distinta do método freiriano. 3.3 O PERFIL DO PROFESSOR ALFABETIZADOR Alfabetizar jovens e adultos é uma ação peculiar e nem sempre se dá da mesma forma com se alfabetiza uma criança na infância o professor alfabetizador deve partir dor princípios de açãoreflexão-ação e deve estar aliado à formação continuada. A formação continuada permite refletir suas ações e repensar a sua prática, elaborando planos e/ou projetos que possam aprimorar a sua prática educativa. Alfabetizar na EJA envolve também a afetividade, o gosto e a responsabilidade. É fundamental que o professor da EJA tenha a consciência da valorização do outro, é importante valorizar o conhecimento que este aluno possui, pois durante toda a vida o aluno adquire um vasto conhecimento do senso comum e valorize também as suas experiências de vida, entretanto o diálogo tem que estar presente nas aulas, o professor tem que usar uma linguagem simples e acessível. O professor é um incentivador um meio para alcançar a motivação dos alunos e nesta fase da vida motivação é um aspecto fundamental. A prática da ação-reflexão-ação permite ao professor lançar estratégias para o sucesso do processo de ensino-aprendizagem. Ao observar turmas da EJA é comum observar que os professores regentes em tais turmas são geralmente professores experientes que despertam a confiança em seus alunos e que acreditam na educação como foco de mudança. Segundo Leal: “O conhecimento na ação, ou o conhecimento tácito, seria aquele constituído na prática cotidiana do exercício profissional. Concebemos que esse é um saber que se constrói com base nos conhecimentos prévios de formação inicial, articulado com os saberes gerados na prática cotidiana, de forma assistemática e muitas vezes sem tomada de consciência acerca dos modos de construção. Para um projeto de formação numa base reflexiva, torna-se fundamental conhecer e valorizar esses conhecimentos que são constituídos pelos professores, seja através de uma reflexão teórica, seja através desses processos eminentemente assistemáticos.” (LEAL, 2005, p. 114). A aprendizagem não pode ser simplesmente transmitida, ela é um processo de construção onde professora busca oferecer meios que favoreçam tal construção, a do conhecimento: tudo o que já foi vivido pelo aluno serve como base, o professor deve utilizar também a vivência e o conhecimento prévio do aluno para ajudá-lo na construção do saber. Aquilo que é oferecido ao alfabetizando deve fazer sentido para ele, se o professor partir de um ponto desconhecido que foge à realidade do aluno ele poderá não alcançar a compreensão necessária ao letramento. A principal função do professor na EJA é mediar, interagir o aluno com o meio, usar metodologias que favoreçam o processo de construção de ensino-aprendizagem, o aluno da atualidade espera muito mais que aprender a assinar o nome, portanto exercício de mera memorização, atividades mecânicas não permitem o êxito na EJA. A interdisciplinaridade deve fazer parte também desse processo os temas transversais como, ética, valores e cidadania são temas que norteiam a construção do conhecimento nesta fase. A educação de Jovens e Adultos traz muitos desafios tanto para professores quanto para alunos e são esses desafios que constroem práticas eficazes de alfabetização. Kelly Camargo Pulice in Moll esclarece muito bem o papel do educador na EJA, ao citar: “O papel do educador é pensar formas de intervir e transformar a realidade, problematizando-a, dialogando com o educando. Em sala de aula o importante não é “depositar” conteúdos, mas despertar uma nova forma de relação com a experiência vivida. Portanto, antes de qualquer coisa, é preciso conhecer o aluno: conhecê-lo como indivíduo num contexto social, com seus problemas, seus medos, suas necessidades, valorizando seu saber, sua cultura, sua oralidade, seus desejos, seus sonhos, isto possibilita uma aprendizagem integradora, abrangente, não compartimentalizada, não fragmentada.” (MOLL, 2004, p. 11). 3.4 PERFIL DO ESTUDANTE DA EJA E OS MOTIVOS DE EVASÃO Os alunos da EJA são geralmente pessoas vindas de famílias de baixa renda, sendo que muitas vezes os pais também não são alfabetizados, isso faz com que muitas vezes se sentem discriminados pela sociedade; vivemos em uma sociedade que para toda a nossa rotina é necessário a leitura,para se tomar um ônibus é necessário conseguir identificá-lo, para fazer compras tem que conhecer os números, contudo esse aluno da EJA pode se sentir excluído da sociedade, quando pensamos em exclusão nos remetemos a pessoas com deficiência, mas a exclusão não se limita a deficiência intelectuais e mentais, para esses alunos que por alguns motivos não estudaram nos primeiros anos de vida este termo também cabe. O autor Bieler fala sobre a importância da inclusão. “[...] A perspectiva da educação inclusiva vai além da deficiência. Esta é apenas uma das áreas que seriam beneficiadas com ela (educação inclusiva) A qualidade da educação é que está em debate porque hoje não se considera (nos sistemas educacionais ) a diversidade dos alunos, os níveis de necessidade e as características individuais. A proposta da educação inclusiva melhoraria a qualidade do ensino para todos. Não se trata só de incluir deficientes nas sala de aula.” (BIELER, 2004, p. 11). O aluno da EJA possui necessidade educacional especial independente de ter ou não deficiência física. Uma vez que estes alunos vão para a escola após um longo dia de serviço, sua mente já está cansada, ao contrario de uma criança que não trabalha e nem tem preocupações com a família, como os adultos. A maioria destes alunos da EJA tem a necessidade de voltar a escola para se sentir incluído na sociedade, procuram melhores condições de vida , almeja um melhor cargo no trabalho, muitos buscam a leitura com o objetivo de ser mais participativos e críticos na sociedade e até por motivos religiosos como o sonho de aprender ler para conseguir ler a bíblia, entretanto boa parte destes alunos busca uma realização pessoal, principalmente os mais idosos que as vezes são motivos de chacotas por estarem estudando nesta fase da vida. Os alunos da EJA por se tratarem de adolescentes acima de 14 anos e adultos, já tem suas experiências de vida, muitas vezes até traumas podem ter sido criados por não ter conseguido estudar anteriormente por vários motivos, desta forma os alunos criam um bloqueio, por isto o professor deve estar seguro para tentar quebrar estes bloqueios. Às vezes estes alunos podem estar com sua autoestima muito baixa, aí entra o papel do professor para traçar práticas adequadas para incentivá-los a motivação. A autoestima é fundamental para este processo de alfabetização, pois quando há esperanças se tem forças para vencer os desafios na busca de um objetivo. As turmas da EJA funcionam geralmente a noite que é o horário disponível para pessoas que trabalham diariamente, deve haver muita força de vontade e incentivo para jovens e adultos concluírem o curso. O número de evasão na EJA é muito grande, os alunos se sentem desmotivados e cansados; a grande maioria trabalha o dia inteiro, pegam ônibus lotado, muitas mulheres não trabalham fora, porém trabalham em casa. É fundamental que os professores da EJA sejam dinâmicos, aproximem o conteúdo à realidade do aluno, procurem sempre inovar e não criem barreiras para afastar esses alunos. O professor da EJA tem que estar motivado para conseguir motivar os alunos, todavia que os alunos são reflexos dos professores. Quando se pensa em evasão na EJA é de suma importância conhecer o perfil destes alunos, para tentar entender por que se dá esta evasão. As causas evasão na EJA são muitas, podemos destacar o cansaço após um dia de serviço, a distância entre casa/escola que aumenta as possibilidades de assaltos, entre outros fatores que se dá por conta da violência urbana. Outro fator é o apoio da família que nem sempre existe, o apoio do governo, da escola, direção, professores muitas vezes não estimulam os alunos; e também o desinteresse interfere sobre esta questão. É notório que existem fatores que contribuem direta ou indiretamente na evasão escolar, isso é uma preocupação de muitos, tais como escola, gestão escolar, governo, entre outras instituições. O fracasso escolar também é uma das causas de evasão, na Proposta Curricular para o 1º segmento do ensino fundamental (1997) consta que: “No público que efetivamente frequenta os programas de educação de jovens e adultos, é cada vez mais reduzido o número daqueles que não tiveram nenhuma passagem anterior pela escola. É também cada vez mais dominante a presença de adolescentes e jovens recém saídos do ensino regular, por onde tiveram passagens acidentadas.” É fundamental que aluno e professor compreendam que erros podem ser transformados em aprendizagem, é possível aprender com eles, os erros não podem ser contribuintes para causar evasão. De acordo com Cortella (1999, p. 112): “[...] O erro não ocupa um lugar externo ao processo de conhecer, investigar é bem diferente de receber uma revelação límpida, transparente e perfeita. O erro é parte integrante do conhecer não porque “errar é humano”, mas porque nosso conhecimento sobre o mundo dá-se em uma relação viva e cambiante (sem o. 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In the heart of southeast Texas, an industrial powerhouse often referred to as the 'Golden Triangle', the oil refineries and petrochemical plants stand as stalwart testaments to the region's economic evolution. Interestingly, before the discovery of oil at Spindletop, the lumber and cattle industries powered this region's economy. A profound shift occurred when the Lucas Gusher, a fountain of oil spurting thousands of feet into the air, struck the lands of Spindletop Hill on January 10, 1901. This remarkable discovery (...) of the Spindletop oilfield on a slat dome formation south of Beaumont, Texas, marked the birth of the modern petroleum industry and fundamentally transformed the region's geopolitical, economic, and cultural landscapes. People from all over the country relocated to Gladys City and Beaumont in search of work and new opportunities, creating a boomtown as the town's population swelled from 10,000 to 50,000. The newfound urbanization brought by the oil industry transformed the town and the surrounding areas, creating a ripple effect across the region that would be felt for generations to come. The surge in oil-driven economic activity transmuted the region into a vibrant nexus of commerce, with the oil industry emerging as a critical architect of growth and advancement. This newfound affluence incited by the petroleum sector ushered in an era of economic diversification, laying the groundwork for industrialization’s further evolution. The Spindletop Oil Fields not only underscored the United States’ ascent as the foremost petroleum-producing nation but also signaled the nation’s initiation into the Petroleum Age. It was Spindletop that solidified its position as America’s first significant oil field, becoming an enduring symbol of its industrial might. By 1985, over 153,000,000 barrels of oil had been produced and extracted from the Spindletop oil fields, underscoring the magnitude of this extraordinary resource. (shrink)

The Theosophical Society, founded in New York in 1875, was, at the turn of the Twentieth Century, a global phenomenon with 100,000 members. New Age philosopher Dr Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) was appointed as the first Secretary General of the German Section of the Theosophical Society on 19 October 1902. The Theosophical Society offered Rudolf Steiner a platform, a ready-made audience, infrastructure, and the insider experience of the world’s leading New Age spiritual society. The success of the Theosophical Society demonstrated that (...) there was a public appetite to hear about reincarnation, karma, maya, kamaloca, and other Eastern and alternative spiritual ideas. The Theosophical Society provided Rudolf Steiner a capable, multilingual, and determined personal assistant, Marie von Sivers (1867-1948). For Rudolf Steiner the Theosophical Society offered the perfect training ground for what would be, a decade later, his life’s work, the Anthroposophical Society. Rudolf Steiner grew the membership of the German Section of the Theosophical Society from 377 in 1905 to 3,702 in 1913. He earned cash from ticketing of his lectures and his Mystery plays, and from book sales of his personal publishing house, ‘Philosophisch-Theosophischer Verlag’. Another enterprise, the ‘Johannes-Bau-Verein’ (Johannes Building Association) was founded in 1911, independent of the Theosophical Society, to build a theatre in Munich to present Rudolf Steiner's plays. The building application was rejected by the Munich municipal authorities in 1912. The resistance to a build in Munich, provided impetus for the move to build in Dornach, Switzerland. The Anthroposophical Society was founded 28 December 1912 in Cologne, Germany. Most of the members of the German Section of the Theosophical Society members followed Rudolf Steiner into the Anthroposophical Society. The Theosophical Society expelled Rudolf Steiner from the Theosophical Society on 7 March 1913. The foundation stone for the Goetheanum (then still called the ‘Johannesbau’) was laid 20 September 1913. The Theosophical Society had served as the ideal prototype and springboard for founding and growing the Anthroposophical Society. (shrink)

Examining the status of cacao production, challenges, and prospects of cacao farmersin Zamboanga del Norte province were done in this study. The investigation revealed that cacaofarming was practiced by males (244 or 65.10%) and female cacao farmers (34%) who areprimarily married with secondary educational backgrounds. Most cacao farmers were theirproductive age ranging from 50-59 years old (42.93%), 40-49 years old (34.4%). However,fewer young people engaged in cacao farming aged below 40 years old (7.46%). The primaryoccupation of the respondents was farming (...) (86.13%), tilling their owned land (84.53%), andwith an average annual income below 60,000 pesos (50.40%). The average farm size was at 1-3hectares (80.00%), having a plain (40.27%) to rolling topography (47.47%) planted with UF 18(50.13%) and BR 25 (49.87%) varieties of cacao. Intercropping was observed (99.20%) withcoconut (79.20%) and banana (14.67%) planted along with cacao. Pest infestation of stem borer(59.73%) and bugs (22.67%) were observed at a low level (79.20%) and controlled usingLamdacyhalothrin (86.40%) as a chemical spray. Moreover, cacao diseases in farms were at alow incidence level (74.13%), with vascular streak dieback (53.06%) as the most commondisease among farms, and the method of controlling the spread was using chemicals (53.60%)and synthetic pesticides (100%) as a spray. Farms established 2 years from sowing (90.13%)observed farm management practices such as weeding twice a year (45.33%), fertilizerapplication 4 times a year (88.00%) using 1-3 bags per hectare (85.06%). Cacao trees produced0.50-1.50 (50.00%) of seeds per tree. Cacao products are sold in dried form (60.98%) withprices ranging from 81-100/kilogram through cooperative (100%). Farmers faced numerouschallenges, the most significant of which were the high cost of routine maintenance (such ascleaning/brushing) and shortage of laborers. The accessibility from the farm to the market roadwas also seen as a challenge among them. The province's cacao agricultural stakeholdersextended to support services to farmers such as free planting materials, credit assistance, cacaoproduction seminars, and post-harvest facilities, which were all considered valuable to farmersin addressing the challenges they faced on cacao farming and production. (shrink)

We take up the challenge of developing an international network with capacity to survey the world's scientists on an ongoing basis, providing rich datasets regarding the opinions of scientists and scientific sub-communities, both at a time and also over time. The novel methodology employed sees local coordinators, at each institution in the network, sending survey invitation emails internally to scientists at their home institution. The emails link to a ‘10 second survey’, where the participant is presented with a single statement (...) to consider, and a standard five point Likert scale. In June 2023, a group of 30 philosophers and social scientists invited 20,085 scientists across 30 institutions in 12 countries to participate, gathering 6,807 responses to the statement 'Science has put it beyond reasonable doubt that COVID-19 is caused by a virus'. The study demonstrates that it is possible to establish a global network to quickly ascertain scientific opinion on a large international scale, with high response rate, low opt-out rate, and in a way that allows for significant (perhaps indefinite) repeatability. Measuring scientific opinion in this new way would be a valuable complement to currently available approaches, potentially informing policy decisions and public understanding across diverse fields. (shrink)

As Bhaskar (1989:1) argues, we need to take philosophy seriously because it underwrites both what constitutes science and knowledge and which political practices are deemed legitimate. At present, the field of educational research internationally is witnessing a pragmatist trend, whereby practical education research is carried out without reference to ontological and epistemological concerns. For David Reynolds, a leading UK school effectiveness academic, '[p]recisely because we did not waste time on philosophical discussion or on values debates, we made rapid progress' (1998:20). (...) Equally, for Teddlie, '[t]he orientation of many in the US is to do rather than to reflect […] In reality many practitioners are currently interested in what could work at their school […rather…] than in ruminations about social inequalities associated with different socioeconomic classes' (Teddlie and Reynolds 2000:27). The purpose of this chapter is not only to reclaim critical realist social philosophy for educational research, but also to reclaim reality from the positivist and statistical methodology that underpins School Effectiveness Research (SER) and to make clear the difference that realism makes by virtue of its critical explanatory power in unmasking the ideological nature of SER and its adoption by New Labour. (shrink)

The first objective of the paper is to propose a classification and characterize the major approaches to the modes of cultural evolution: (1) Research programs on the origins of the cultural capacity of the human species. (2) Description and explanation of cultural change with the help of concepts or models inspired by the schemes of population genetics. (3) Research on parallel evolution of genes and culture. (4) Narrow coupling between biological evolution and cultural evolution, or the “gene-culture coevolution paradigm.” These (...) four modes of cultural evolution make sense at a different time-scale (respectively: more than 100 000 years; less than 100 years; greater than 1000 years; less than 1000 years). The second section of the paper provides an evaluation of the various programs, from various points of view: methodological, ethical, and epistemological. (shrink)

PLEASE NOTE: This is the corrected 2nd eBook edition, 2021. ●●●●● _Critique of Impure Reason_ has now also been published in a printed edition. To reduce the otherwise high price of this scholarly, technical book of nearly 900 pages and make it more widely available beyond university libraries to individual readers, the non-profit publisher and the author have agreed to issue the printed edition at cost. ●●●●● The printed edition was released on September 1, 2021 and is now available through (...) all booksellers, including Barnes & Noble, Amazon, and brick-and-mortar bookstores under ISBN 978-0-578-88646-6. ●●●●● In light of the length of this book, readers who would like to have a more detailed description of the book's objectives and method may find it helpful to read the detailed and clearly written Wikipedia entry about this work: From the Wikipedia search page, use the search phrase "Critique of Impure Reason". At least at the time of this writing (11/29/2021), the Wikipedia entry is well-researched and accurate. ●●●●● In addition, a "Primer on Bartlett's CRITIQUE OF IMPURE REASON" has been made available by the author. It is available under its title through PhilPapers and other philosophy online archives. ●●●●● COMMENDATIONS OF THIS WORK, from the back cover of the published edition: ●●●●● “I admire its range of philosophical vision.” – Nicholas Rescher, Distinguished University Professor of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, author of more than 100 books. ●●●●● “Bartlett’s _Critique of Impure Reason_ is an impressive, bold, and ambitious work. Careful scholarship is balanced by original analyses that lead the reader to recognize the limits of meaning, knowledge, and conceptual possibility. The work addresses a host of traditional philosophical problems, among them the nature of space, time, causality, consciousness, the self, other minds, ontology, free will and determinism, and others. The book culminates in a fascinating and profound new understanding of relativity physics and quantum theory.” – Gerhard Preyer, Professor of Philosophy, Goethe-University, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, author of many books including _Concepts of Meaning_, _Beyond Semantics and Pragmatics_, _Intention and Practical Thought_, and _Contextualism in Philosophy_. ●●●●● “[This work’s] goal is of a unique and difficult species: Dr. Bartlett seeks to develop a formal logical calculus on the basis of transcendental philosophical arguments; in fact, he hopes that this calculus will be the formal expression of the transcendental foundation of knowledge.... I consider Dr. Bartlett’s work soundly conceived and executed with great skill.” – C. F. von Weizsäcker, philosopher and physicist, former Director, Max-Planck-Institute, Starnberg, Germany. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written an American “Prolegomena to All Future Metaphysics.” He aims rigorously to eliminate meaningless assertions, reach bedrock, and place philosophy on a firm foundation that will enable it, like science and mathematics, to produce lasting results that generations to come can build on. This is a great book, the fruit of a lifetime of research and reflection, and it deserves serious attention.” — Martin X. Moleski, former Professor, Canisius College, Buffalo, NY, studies of scientific method, the presuppositions of thought, and the self-referential nature of epistemology. ●●●●● “Bartlett has written a book on what might be called the underpinnings of philosophy. It has fascinating depth and breadth, and is all the more striking due to its unifying perspective based on the concepts of reference and self-reference.” – Don Perlis, Professor of Computer Science, University of Maryland, author of numerous publications on self-adjusting autonomous systems and philosophical issues concerning self-reference, mind, and consciousness. ●●●●● ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason: Horizons of Possibility and Meaning_ comprises a major and important contribution to philosophy. Thanks to the generosity of its publisher, this massive 885-page volume has been published as a free open access eBook (3.75MB) as well as an open access printed edition. It inaugurates a revolutionary paradigm shift in philosophical thought by providing compelling and long-sought-for solutions to a wide range of philosophical problems. In the process, the work fundamentally transforms the way in which the concepts of reference, meaning, and possibility are understood. The book includes a Foreword by the celebrated German philosopher and physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker. ●●●●● In Kant’s _Critique of Pure Reason_ we find an analysis of the preconditions of experience and of knowledge. In contrast, but yet in parallel, the new _Critique_ focuses upon the ways—unfortunately very widespread and often unselfconsciously habitual—in which many of the concepts that we employ _conflict_ with the very preconditions of meaning and of knowledge. ●●●●● This is a book about the boundaries of frameworks and about the unrecognized conceptual confusions in which we become entangled when we attempt to transgress beyond the limits of the possible and meaningful. We tend either not to recognize or not to accept that we all-too-often attempt to trespass beyond the boundaries of the frameworks that make knowledge possible and the world meaningful. ●●●●● The _Critique of Impure Reason_ proposes a bold, ground-breaking, and startling thesis: that a great many of the major philosophical problems of the past can be solved through the recognition of a viciously deceptive form of thinking to which philosophers as well as non-philosophers commonly fall victim. For the first time, the book advances and justifies the criticism that a substantial number of the questions that have occupied philosophers fall into the category of “impure reason,” violating the very conditions of their possible meaningfulness. ●●●●● The purpose of the study is twofold: first, to enable us to recognize the boundaries of what is referentially forbidden—the limits beyond which reference becomes meaningless—and second, to avoid falling victims to a certain broad class of conceptual confusions that lie at the heart of many major philosophical problems. As a consequence, the boundaries of _possible meaning_ are determined. ●●●●● Bartlett, the author or editor of more than 20 books, is responsible for identifying this widespread and delusion-inducing variety of error, _metalogical projection_. It is a previously unrecognized and insidious form of erroneous thinking that undermines its own possibility of meaning. It comes about as a result of the pervasive human compulsion to seek to transcend the limits of possible reference and meaning. ●●●●● Based on original research and rigorous analysis combined with extensive scholarship, the _Critique of Impure Reason_ develops a self-validating method that makes it possible to recognize, correct, and eliminate this major and pervasive form of fallacious thinking. In so doing, the book provides at last provable and constructive solutions to a wide range of major philosophical problems. ●●●●● CONTENTS AT A GLANCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Preface ▪▪▪▪▪ Foreword by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker ▪▪▪▪▪ Acknowledgments ▪▪▪▪▪ Avant-propos: A philosopher’s rallying call ▪▪▪▪▪ Introduction ▪▪▪▪▪ A note to the reader ▪▪▪▪▪ A note on conventions ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART I ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ WHY PHILOSOPHY HAS MADE NO PROGRESS AND HOW IT CAN ▪▪▪▪▪ 1 Philosophical-psychological prelude ▪▪▪▪▪ 2 Putting belief in its place: Its psychology and a needed polemic ▪▪▪▪▪ 3 Turning away from the linguistic turn: From theory of reference to metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 4 The stepladder to maximum theoretical generality ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART II ▪▪▪▪▪ THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ A New Approach to Deductive, Transcendental Philosophy ▪▪▪▪▪ 5 Reference, identity, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 6 Self-referential argument and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 7 Possibility theory ▪▪▪▪▪ 8 Presupposition logic, reference, and identification ▪▪▪▪▪ 9 Transcendental argumentation and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 10 Framework relativity ▪▪▪▪▪ 11 The metalogic of meaning ▪▪▪▪▪ 12 The problem of putative meaning and the logic of meaninglessness ▪▪▪▪▪ 13 Projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 14 Horizons ▪▪▪▪▪ 15 De-projection ▪▪▪▪▪ 16 Self-validation ▪▪▪▪▪ 17 Rationality: Rules of admissibility ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART III ▪▪▪▪▪ PHILOSOPHICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE METALOGIC OF REFERENCE ▪▪▪▪▪ Major Problems and Questions of Philosophy and the Philosophy of Science ▪▪▪▪▪ 18 Ontology and the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 19 Discovery or invention in general problem-solving, mathematics, and physics ▪▪▪▪▪ 20 The conceptually unreachable: “The far side” ▪▪▪▪▪ 21 The projections of the external world, things-in-themselves, other minds, realism, and idealism ▪▪▪▪▪ 22 The projections of time, space, and space-time ▪▪▪▪▪ 23 The projections of causality, determinism, and free will ▪▪▪▪▪ 24 Projections of the self and of solipsism ▪▪▪▪▪ 25 Non-relational, agentless reference and referential fields ▪▪▪▪▪ 26 Relativity physics as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 27 Quantum theory as seen through the lens of the metalogic of reference ▪▪▪▪▪ 28 Epistemological lessons learned from and applicable to relativity physics and quantum theory ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ PART IV ▪▪▪▪▪ HORIZONS ▪▪▪▪▪ 29 Beyond belief ▪▪▪▪▪ 30 _Critique of Impure Reason_: Its results in retrospect ▪▪▪▪▪ ▪▪▪▪▪ SUPPLEMENT ▪▪▪▪▪ The Formal Structure of the Metalogic of Reference ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX I ▪▪▪▪▪ The Concept of Horizon in the Work of Other Philosophers ▪▪▪▪▪ APPENDIX II ▪▪▪▪▪ Epistemological Intelligence ▪▪▪▪▪ References ▪▪▪▪▪ Index ▪▪▪▪▪ About the author. 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Regarding the relation of Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, scholars have been divided to two opposing groups: unitarists and developmentalists. While developmentalists try to prove that there are some noticeable and even fundamental differences between Plato’s early and middle period dialogues, the unitarists assert that there is no essential difference in there. The main goal of this article is to suggest that some of Plato’s ontological as well as epistemological principles change, both radically and fundamentally, between the early and (...) middle period dialogues. Though this is a kind of strengthening the developmentalistic approach corresponding the relation of the early and middle period dialogues, based on the fact that what is to be proved here is a essential development in Plato’ ontology and his epistemology, by expanding the grounds of development to the ontological and epistemological principles, it hints to a more profound development. The fact that the bipolar and split knowledge and being of the early period dialogues give way to the tripartite and bound knowledge and benig of the middle period dialogues indicates the development of the notions of being and knowledge in Plato’s philosophy before the dialogues of the middle period. -/- Keywords Plato; early dialogues; middle dialogues; being; knowledge; development -/- Introduction The differences between two groups of the early and middle period dialogues have always been a matter of dispute. Whereas the developmentalists like Vlastos, Silverman (2002), Teloh (1981), Dancy (2004) and Rickless (2007) think that from the early to the middle dialogues Plato’s philosophy changes, at least in some essential points, the unitarists like Kahn, Cherniss and Shorey believe that there happens no development and the differences must be taken as natural, ignorable and even pedagogic. In his well-known article, Socrates contra Socrates in PLATO, Vlastos lists ten theses of difference between two groups of dialogues. The first group which includes Plato’s early dialogues he divides to 'elenctic' (Apology, Charmides, Crito, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Hippias Minor, Ion, Laches, Protagoras and Republic I) and 'transitional' (Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Lysis, Menexenus and Meno) dialogues. These transitional come after all the elenctic dialogues and before all the dialogues of the second group which compose Plato’s middle period dialogues, including (with Vlastos' chronological order) Cratylus, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic II-X, Phaedrus, Parmenides and Theaetetus (1991, 46-49). Vlastos asserts strictly that his list of differences are 'so diverse in content and method that they contrast as sharply with one another as with any third philosophy you care to mention, beginning with Aristotole’s' (ibid, 46). Vlastos’ list of differences between two Socrateses is considered a view breaking sharply between the early and the middle dialogues. Besides all ten differences between the two Socrateses in Vlastos’ list that can be supportive for our doctrine here, we intend to focus on some ontological as well as epistemological distinctions that have not completely been discussed hitherto. Contrary to the developmentalist theory of Vlastos, unitarian theory of Charles Kahn wishes to eliminate any substantial difference between the early and the middle dialogues. He distinguishes seven 'pre-middle' or 'threshold' dialogues including Laches, Charmides, Euthyphro, Protagoras, Meno, Lysis and Euthydemus from the other Socratic dialogues which he calls 'earliest group' (1996, 41). The threshold dialogues, Kahn thinks, 'embarke upon a sustained project' that is to reach to its climax in the middle period dialogues, namely Phaedo, Symposium and Republic. Believing in that there is no 'fundamental shift'between the early and middle dialogues (ibid, 40), Kahn thinks the Socratic dialogues are just the 'first stage' with a 'deliberate silence' towards the theories of later periods (ibid, 339). One of the reasons of the surprising fact that Plato gives no hint of the metaphysics and epistemology of the Forms in the early dialogues, he thinks, is the pedagogical advantages of aporia. He thinks that Plato 'obscurely', and mostly because of education, hinted to some doctrines and conceptions in his early dialogues and with the aim of clarifying them only in the later ones (ibid, 66). The seven threshold dialogues, Kahn asserts, 'had been designed from the first' to prepare the pupils and readers for the views expounded in the middle period dialogues (ibid, 59-60). To show that the differences of the two Socrateses of the early and middle period dialogue are in their onto-epistemological grounds and thence cannot be explained by a unitaristic view, we try to draw the ontological and epistemological principles of the early dialogues in the first part below in order to show, in the second part, that those principles have been developed in the middle period dialogues. -/- A. The Onto-Epistemologic Principles of the Early Dialogues Socratic dialogues are paradoxical about knowledge because while being knowledge-oriented always searching for knowledge, they deny it and even never discuss it directly. Three elements of Socrates’ way of searching Knowledge throughout the early dialogues, i.e. Socratic 'what is X?' question, his disavowal of knowledge and his elenctic method combined together produce something like a circle which works, more or less, in the same way in these dialogues. Though this circle is an embaressing inquiry always resulting in ignorance instead of knowledge, its motivation is surprisingly Socrates’ passionate enthusiasm for knowledge, an intensive love of wisdom. The starting point of this circle is Socrates’ confession of having no knowledge which might be explicitly asserted or presupposed, maybe because it was one of the famous characteristics of Socrates; a confession always paradoxically accompanied with his intense longing for knowledge (e.g., Gorgias 505e4-5). Every time Socrates encounters with someone who thinks he knows something (οἴεταί τι εἰδέναι) (Apology 21d5) and tries to examine him. This examination seems to be the simplest one asking just what it is that he knows. Socrates’ elenchus, therefore, is always connected with 'what is X?' (τίς ποτέ ἐστιν) question, a question that most of the early dialogues of Plato are concerned with; 'what is courage?' in the Laches, 'what is piety?' in Euthydemus, 'what is temperance?' in Charmides and 'what is beauty?' in Hippias Major. This question we call here 'Socratic question' and probably is the very question the historical Socrates used to employ, is tightly interrelated with both his disavowal and his elenchus. He disclaims knowledge because he cannot find the answer to the question himself and he rejects others’ since they cannot offer the correct answer too. Every interlocutor can claim he knows X, if and only if he can answer the Socratic question. Otherwise, he is more of an ignorant than of a knower of τί ποτέ ἐστι X. Knowing the answer to this question is, thus, knowledge’s criterion for Socrates. Having found out that he cannot answer what it is which he would claim to know, the interlocutor comes to the point Socrates was there at the beginning. The least advantage of this circle is that he becomes as wise as Socrates does about the subject, becoming aware that he does not know it. At the end of the circle they are both still at the beginning, not knowing what X is. So let us first take a glance at these three elements. Socratic disavowal of knowledge is strictly asserted in some passages. At Apology 21b4-5, Socrates says: -/- I do not know of myself being wise at all (οὔτε μέγα οὔτε σμικρὸν σύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφὸς ὤν) -/- Moreover, at 21d4-6: -/- None of us knows anything worthwhile (καλὸν κἀγαθὸν εἰδέναι) …. I do not know (οἶδα) neither do I think I know. -/- In Charmides Socrates speaks about a fear about his probable mistake of thinking that he knows (εἰδέναι) something when he does not (166d1-2). The somehow generalization of this disavowal can be seen in Gorgias. After calling his disavowal 'an account that is always the same' (509a4-5), Socrates continues (a5-7): -/- I say that I do not know (οἶδα) how these things are, but no one I have ever met, like now, who can say anything else without being absurd. -/- At the end of Hippias Major (304d7-8), Socrates affirms his disavowal of knowledge of 'what is X?' this time about the fine: -/- I do not know (οἶδα) what that is itself (αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὅτι ποτέ ἐστιν). Some other passages, however, made a number of scholars dubious about Socrates’ disavowal. Vlastos mentions Apology 29b6-7 as an evidence : 'that to do wrong and to disobey one’s master, both god and men, I know (οἶδα) to be evil and shameful'. He thinks that if we give this single text 'its full weight' it can suffice to show that Socrates does claim knowledge of a moral truth (1985, 7). Vlastos’ claim is not admittable since it would be too strange, I think, for a man like Socrates to violate his disavowal claim just after emphasizing it. We can see his claim just before the already mentioned passage: -/- And surely it is the most blameworthy ignorance to believe that one knows what one does not know. It is perhaps on this point and in this respect, gentlemen, that I differ from the majority of men and if I were to claim that I am wiser than anyone in anything it world be in this, that, as I have no adequate knowledge (οὐκ εἰδὼς ἱκανῶς) of things in the underworld, so I do not think I have (οὐκ εἰδέναι) (Apology 29b1-6) Vlastos tries to solve what he calls the 'paradox' of Socrates’ disavowal of knowledge distinguishing the 'certain' knowledge from 'elenctic' knowledge (1985, 11) and thinking that when Socrates avows knowledge, we must perceive it as an elenctic knowledge, a knowledge its content 'must be propositions he thinks elenctically justifiable' (ibid, 18). Irwin’s solution is the distinction of knowledge and belief. He approves that Socrates does not 'explicitly' make such a distinction, but still thinks that Socrates’ 'test for knowledge would make it reasonable for him to recognize true belief without knowledge, and his own claims are easily understood if they are claims to true belief alone' (1977, 40). While I agree with Vlastos up to a point, I strongly disagree with Irwin about the early dialogues. As I will try to show below, we are not permitted to consider any kind of distinction within knowledge in Socratic dialogues because only one category of knowledge is alluded to there and the distinction of knowledge and belief thoroughly belongs to the second Sorcates. Although no kind of distinction can be admittable here, I think Vlastos’ distinction can be accepted only if we regard it as a distinction between knowledge, which is unique and without any, even incomparable, rival, and a semi-idiomatic and ordinary one that is a necessary requirement for any argument, and thus, unavoidable even for someone who does not claim any kind of knowledge. An apparent evidence of this is Gorgias 505e6-506a4: -/- I go through the discussion as I think it is (ὡς ἄν μοι δοκῇ ἔχειν), if any of you do not agree with admissions I am making to myself, you must object and refute me. For I do not say what I say as I know (οὐδὲ γάρ τοι ἔγωγε εἰδὼς λέγω ἃ λέγω) but as searching jointly with you (ζητῶ κοινῇ μεθ᾽ ὑμῶν). -/- The minimal degree of knowledge everyone must have to take part in an argument, conduct it and use the phrase "I know" when it is necessary is what Socrates cannot deny. We can call it elenctic knowledge only if we agree that it is not the kind of knowledge that Socrates has always been searching, the one that can be accepted as the answer of Socratic 'what is X?' question. His disavowal of knowledge is applied only to the knowledge which can truly be the answer of Socratic question and pass the elenctic exam; a knowledge that, I believe, is never claimed by first Socrates. Socrates conducts his method of examining his interlocutors’ knowledge, our second element here, by almost the same method repeated in Socratic dialogues. That whether we are allowed to regard all the examinations of Socrates in the early dialogues as based on the same or not has been a matter of dispute. Vlastos himself (1994, 31) distinguished Euthydemas, Lysis, Menexenns and Hippias Major from the other Socratic dialogues because he thinks Socrates has lost his faith to elenchus in there. Irwin (1977, 38) distinguishes Apology and Crito where Socrates’ own convictions is present. Contrary to some scholars like Benson (2002, 107) who take elenchus in all the Socratic dialogues as a unique method, Michelle Carpenter and Ronald M. Polansky (2002, 89-100) argue pro the variety of methods of elenchus. Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith (2002, 145-160) even reject such a thing as Socratic elenchus which can gather all of the Socrates’ various arguments under such a heading. There can be no solution for the problem of elenchus, they think, is due to 'the simple reason that there is no such thing as 'the Socratic elenchos"'(p.147). Though we consider elenchus a somehow determined process and a part of Socratic circle in the early dialogues, all we assume is that whatever differences it might have in different dialogues, it has the same onto-epistemological principles and, thus, we are not going to take it necessarily as a unique method. This method sets out to prove that the interlocutors are as ignorant as Socrates himself is. That whether elenchus is constructive, capable of establishing doctrines as Vlastos (1994) or Brickhouse and Smith (1994, 20-21) believe or not is another issue to which this paper is not to claim anything. What is crucial for our discussion here is that elenchus does not reach to the very knowledge Socrates is looking for. This is strictly against Irwin who thinks that not only elenchus leads to positive results, 'it should even yield knowledge to match Socrates’ conditions'(1977, 68, cf. 48). He does not explain where and how they really yield to that kind of knowledge. He explains his elenctic method in his apology in the court (Apology 21-22), that how he used to examine wise men, politicians, poets and all those who had the highest reputation for their knowledge and every time found that they have no knowledge. If we accept, as I strongly do, that Socrates’ disavowal of his knowledge is not irony, it might seem more reasonable to agree that the process that has that disavowal as its first step cannot be irony as well. The key of the circle which can explain why Socrates disclaims knowledge and how he can reject others’ claim of having any kind of knowledge lies in the third element, Socratic question. In Hippias Major (287c1-2), Socrates asks: 'Is it not by Justice that just people are Just? (ἆρ᾽ οὐ δικαιοσύνῃ δίκαιοί εἰσιν οἱ δίκαιοι). He insists at 294b1 that they were searching for that by which (ᾧ) all beautiful things are beautiful (cf. b4-5, 8). At Euthyphro 6d10-11 it is said that the Socratic question is waiting for 'the form itself (αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος) by which (ᾧ) all the pious actions are pious; and at 6d11-e1: -/- Through one form (που μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ) impious actions are impious and pious actions pious. -/- Since the X itself is that by which X is X, knowing 'X itself' is the only way of knowing X. It is probably because of this that Socrates makes the distinction between the ousia as a right answer to the question and effect as a wrong one: -/- I am afraid, Euthyphro, that when you were asked what piety is (τὸ ὅσιον ὅτι ποτ᾽ ἐστίν) you did not wish to make clear its nature itself (οὐσίαν … αὐτοῦ) to me, but you said some effect (πάθος) about it. (Euthp. 11a6-9) -/- 1. Knowledge of what X is Now it is time to look for the onto-epistemological principles of Socratic circle and its three elements. It cannot reasonably be expected from the first Socrates to present us explicitly and clearly formulated principles of his onto-epistemology when such explications cannot be found even in the second Socrates who has some obviously positive theoris. Since there must be some principles underlying this first systematic inqury of knowledge, we must seek to them and be satisfied with elicitation of the first Socratas’ principle. What will be drawn out as his principles cannot and must not, thus, be taken as very fix and dogmatic principles. Some very slightest principles and grounds suffice for our purposes here. The first principle that is the prima facie significance of the Socratic question and his implementation of all those elenctic arguments I call the principle of 'Knowledge of What X is' (KWX): -/- KWX To know X, it is required to know what X is. -/- Aristotle (Metaphysics 1078b23-25, 27-29, 987b4-8) takes Plato’s τί ἐστι question as seeking the definition of a thing that is the same as historical Socrates’ search but applying to a different field. That Plato’s 'what is X?' question was a search for definition became the prevailed understanding of this question up to now. I am going neither to discuss the answer of Socratic question nor to challenge taking it as definition. What I am to insist is that knowledge is attached firmly to the answer of the question: Knowledge of X is not anything but the knowledge of what X is. It entails, certainly, the priority of this knowledge to any other kind of knowledge about X but it also has something more fundamental about the relation of knowledge and Socratic question. Socrates’ exclusive focus on the answer of his question can authorize the consideration of such an essential role for KWX in his epistemolgoy. The total rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are unable to answer the question can be regarded as a strong evidence for it. Socrates’ elenctic method and his rejection of others’ knowledge in the early dialogues, which all end aporetically with no one accepted as knower and nothing as knowledge, prevent us from finding any positive evidence for this. We have to be content, therefore, of negative evidences which, I think, can be found wherever Socrates rejects his interlocutors’ knowledge when they are not able to give an acceptable answer to his 'what is X?' question. 2. Bipolar Epistemology Socrates’ rejection of his interlocutors’ knowledge has another epistemological principle as its basis. Let me call this principle Bipolar Epistemology' (BE): BE There is no third way besides knowledge and Ignorance. -/- BE says that about every object of knowledge there are only two subjective statuses: knowledge and Ignorance. Socrates’ disavowal, however, says nothing but that he is ignorant of knowledge of X because he does not know what X is. This means that BE is presupposed here. Socrates’ elenchus and his rejection of interlocutors’ having any kind of knowledge are the necessary results of the fact that he does not let any third way besides knowledge and ignorance. The first Socrates never let anyone partly know X or have a true opinion about it, as he would not let anyone know anything about X when he did not know what X is. -/- 3. Bipolar Ontology The principle of BE in first Socrates’ epistemology is parallel to another principle in his ontology. Plato’s bipolar distinction between being and not being is as strict and perfect as his distinction between knowledge and ignorance. This principle I shall call the principle of 'Bipolar Ontology' (BO): BO Being is and not being is not. BO is apparently the same with the well-known Parmenidean Principle of being and not being (cf. Diels-Kranz (DK) Fr. 2.2-5). Euthydemus’ statement against the possibility of false knowledge can be good evidence for this principle: -/- The things which are not surely do not exist (τὰ δὲ μὴ ὄντα … ἄλλο τι ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν). (Euthydemus 284b3-4) -/- He continues (b4-5): -/- There is nowhere for not being to be there (οὖν οὐδαμοῦ τά γε μὴ ὄντα ὄντα ἐστίν). -/- That BE does not let true opinion as a third option besides knowledge and ignorance seems to be related to BO’s rejecting a third option besides being and not being, which is itself the basis of the impossibility of false belief. Socrates’ elaborate discussion of the problem of false belief in Theatetus that leads to a more decisive discussion and finally to some solutions in Sophist can make our consideration of BO for the first group of dialogues authentive. -/- 4. &5. Split Knowledge and Split Being The fourth principle I shall call the principle of 'Split Knowledge' (SK): -/- SK Knowledge of X is separated from any other knowledge (of anything else) as if the whole knowledge is split to various parts. -/- This Principle is hinted and criticized as Socrates’ way of treating with knowledge in Hippias Major: -/- But Socrates, you do not contemplate the entireties of things, nor do people you have used to talk with (τὰ μὲν ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων οὐ σκοπεῖς, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). (301b2-4) -/- Contrary to Rankin who regards the passage as 'antilogical, almost eristic in tone rather than presenting a serious philosophy of being' (1983, 54), I think it can be taken as serious. Hippias criticizes Sorcates that he does not contemplate (σκοπεῖς) the entireties of things (ὅλα τῶν πραγμάτων), a critique which Socrates is not its only subject but all those whom Socrates accustomed to talk with (ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι). This last phrase, I think, extends this critic beyond this dialogue to other Socratic dialogues. Hippias’ use of the perfect tense of the verb ἔθω (to be accustomed) is a good evidence of this extension. We can get, thus, these ἐκεῖνοι as Socrates’ interlocutors in his other dialogues that hints that this criticism has the epistemological groundings of the previous dialogues as its subject. What ἐκεῖνοι οἷς σὺ εἴωθας διαλέγεσθαι points to is that Hippias does not have in mind Socrates’ way of treating things only in this dialogue, but he is also criticizing Socrates’ way throughout his dialogues. At 301b4-5, Socrates and his interlocutors’ way of beholding things is described as such: -/- You people knock (κρούετε) at the fine and each of the beings (ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων) by taking each being cut up in pieces (κατατέμνοντες) in words (ἐν τοῖς λόγοις). This leads us to our next principle that is parallel to, and the ontological side of, SK, the principle of 'Split Being'(SB): -/- SB Everything (being) is separated from any other thing as if the whole being is split to many beings. -/- Socrates and his interlocutors and thus, as we saw, the Socratic dialogues are accused to regard everything as it is separated from all other things. This separation is en tois logois that, I think, can reasonably be taken as saying that Socratic dialogues (it refers of course to the dialogues before Hippias Major) cut up all things which have the same name/definition from all other things and try to understand them separately, without considering other things that are not in their logos. They, for example in Hippias Major, are cutting up to kalon and try to understand what it and all others inside this logos are by separating it from all other things. This is directed straightly against Socratic question and the way Socratic dialogues follow to find its answer, every time separating one logos. As Meyer (1995, 85) points out, every question 'presupposes that the X in question in a logos is something' and 'every answer to every question aims at unity' (84). The critique of Hippias Major is, therefore, at the same time a critique of SK and SB. It is also a critique of KWX because it is only based on KWX that Socratic dialogues could search for the answer of 'what is X' question supposing that knowing what X is is enough for the knowledge of X. SK and KWX are absolutely interdependent. What Socrates and all his previous interlocutors have neglected in Socratic dialogues, Hippias says, was 'continuous bodies of being' (διανεκῆ σώματα τῆς οὐσίας) (301b6). Either this theory actually belongs to the historical Hippias as it is being said or not, it is strictly criticizing SB. We have the same phrase with changing sūma to logos some lines later at 301e3-4: διανεκεῖ λόγῳ τῆς οὐσίας. Although this theory that can be observed as both an ontological and an epistemological theory is rejected by Socrates (301cff.), it is still against first Socrates’ onto-epistemological principles and might let us look at what is rejected as Socratic prineple. -/- 6. Knowledge is of Being The sixth principle that I think is presupposed by the first Socrates, is the 'Knowledge of Being' Principle (KB): -/- KB Knowledge is of Being. -/- This principle is obviously the source of the problem of false knowledge, a very important problem throughout Plato’s philosophy. We face this problem maybe for the first time in Euthydemus. In less than 20 Stephanus’ pages, 276-295, we are encountered with different interwoven problems about knowledge , all grounded in the problem of false opinion. Having challenged the obvious possibility of telling lies at 283e, at 284 Euthydemus discusses it saying that the man who speaks is speaking about 'one of those things that are (ἓν μὴν κἀκεῖνό γ᾽ ἐστὶν τῶν ὄντων)' (284a3) and thus speaks what is (λέγων τὸ ὄν) (a5). He must necessarily be saying truth when he is speaking what is because he who speaks what is (τὸ ὄν) and the things that are (τὰ ὄντα) speaks truth (τἀληθῆ λέγει) (a5-6). This is based on Parmenidean principle of the impossibility of being of not being which Euthydemus restates (284b3-4) and we mentioned discussing BO principle above. The things that are not are nowhere (οὐδαμοῦ) and there is no possibility for anyone to do (πράξειεν) anything with them because they must be made as being before anything else can be done, which is impossible (b5-7). The words, then, are of things that exist (εἰσὶν ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων λόγοι) (285e9) and as they are (ὡς ἔστιν) (e10). The result is that no one can speak of things as they are not. It is this impossibility of false speach that is extended to thinking (δοξάζειν) at 286d1 and leads to the impossibility of false opinion (ψευδής … δόξα) (286d4). The general conclusion is asserted at 287a extending this impossibility to actions and making any kind of mistake. Not only knowledge is of being but speech, thought and action are of being simply because of the fact that nothing can be of not being. -/- B. First Socrates’ Principles in the Middle Period Dialogues Out of what were presupposed or criticized mostly in five dialogues, Euthyphro, Euthydemus, Hippias Major, Laches and Charmides, we tried to draw the first Socrates’ principles. Our inquiry here is directed to find out the fate of these principles in the three dialogues of the middle period, Meno, Phaedo and Republic. To do this, first we ought to check the situation of Socratic circle in these dialogues. The Socratic circle that was predominant in the early dialogues, does not look like a circle here anymore though they certainly have some features in common. Meno, Phaedo and Republic II-X are not committed to the principles of the circle and the whole circle in disrupted in them. The difference of the two Socrateses towards acquiring knowledge is obvious. The Socrates of Meno, Phaedo and Republic is evidently more self-confident that he can get to some truths during his arguments as he does. They are in their first appearance, as almost all other dialogues, committed to Socrates’ disavowal. All of them try to keep the shape of the Socratikoi Logoi genre, which is committed to the historical Socrates’ way of discussion; a dramatic personage who is to challenge his interlocutors, ask them and refuse the answers. Nevertheless, the fact is that what we have in common between two groups of dialogues is mostly a dramatic structure. Whereas the first group’s arguments are based on Socrates’ disavowal and lead to no positive results, the second group is decisively going to achieve some positive results. The aim of the first Socrates was to show others that they are ignorant of what they thought they knew. The new Socrates of Meno, on the opposite, makes so much efforts to show that the slave boy has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the things that he does not know (οἶδε) (85c6-7). Despite his lack of knowledge, he has true opinions nevertheless. The way from these true opinions to knowledge, as Socrates states, is not so long. These true opinions are now like a dream but 'can become knowledge of the same things not less accurate than anyone’s' (οὐδενὸς ἧττον ἀκριβῶς ἐπιστήσεται περὶ τούτων) (c11-d1), if they be repeated by asking the same questions. The most outstanding text regarding Socrates’ disavowal is Meno 98b where he explicitly claims knowledge: -/- And indeed I also speak as (ὡς) one who does not know (εἰδὼς) but is guessing (εἰκάζων). However, [about the fact] that true opinion and knowledge are different, I do not altogether expect (δοκῶ) myself to be guessing (εἰκάζειν), but if I say about anything that I know (εἰδέναι) -which about few things I say- this is one of the things that I know (οἶδα). (98b1-5) This passage is very significant about Plato’s disavowal of knowledge. There can hardly be found, I think, anywhere else in Plato’s corpus where Socrates speaks about his knowledge of something as such. He says first that he speaks as someone who does not know. This ὡς οὐκ εἰδὼς λέγω comparing with what he used to say in the first group, οὐκ οἶδα, has this added ὡς. Socrates does not claim strongly anymore that he does not know anything but speaks only as someone who does not know. He needs this ὡς not only because he is going to accept that he does know some, though few, things immediately after this sentence, but also because he needs his previous disavowal to be loosened from Meno on. He does not merely say here that he knows something. It is then different from the examples mentioned before which could be taken as idiomatic or at least not emphatic. Socrates’ remarkable emphasis on distinguishing εἰδέναι from εἰκάζειν departs it from all other passages where he says only he knows something. Moreover, he claims definitely that he has knowledge about few (ὀλίγα) things. From the early to the middle dialogues, Socrates’ attitude to knowledge has totally renewed its face. He brings forth a new concept, true opinion, and he does not speak of knowledge as he used to before; the rough, perfect and unachievable knowledge of the first group has turned to something more smooth, realistic and achievable. Comparing with the early dialogues that did not set out from the first to reach positive results, the middle ones are extraordinarily and surprisingly positive and hence destroy the basis of the Socratic circle. The questions and answers are purposely directed to some specific new theories; most of them are not directly related to the topics or the main questions of the dialogues. They are suggested when Socrates draws the attention of the interlocutor away from the main question because of the necessity of another discussion. Even if the main question remains unanswered, we have still many positive theories, prominently of metaphysical type. These theories are so abundant and dominant in these dialogues, especially Phaedo and Republic, that one might think that they may appear to be arbitrarily sandwiched in there. This helps dialogues to keep their original Socratic structure while they are suggesting new theories. Hence, the Socratic question of 'what is X?', though is still used to launch the discussion, is loosened and is forgotten for most part of the dialogues. Meno that has first a differently formulated question, 'can virtue be taught?', leads finally to the Socratic question of 'What is virtue?'. Phaedo is dedicated to the demonstration of the immortality of soul and the life after death without having a central Socratic question. The case of Republic is more complicated. The first book, on the one hand, has all the criteria of a Socratic circle: its 'what is justice?' question, Socrates’ strong disavowal (e.g. 337d-e), his rejection of all answers and coming back to the first point without finding out any answer. This Book, considered alone, is a perfect Socratic dialogue, as many scholars regard it as early and separated from other books. The books II-X are, on the other hand, far from implementing a Socratic circle. They have still the 'what is justice?' question as their incentive leading question, but they are, in most of the positive doctrines and methods that encompass the main parts, ignoring the question. Even these books that, I believe, are the farthest discussions from the Socratic circle are so cautious not to break the Socratic structure of the dialogue as long as it is possible. What is changed is not the structure of the dialogue but the ontological and epistemological grounds based on which new theories are suggested. -/- 1. Knowledge of the Good We can clearly see in the second group of dialogues that the KWX principle loses the place it had before in our first group. It is not, of course, rejected, but still we cannot say that it has the same situation. KWX that was based on Socratic question, as we discussed before, was the leading principle of the first Socrates’ epistemology and of the highest position. Other epistemological principles, SK directly and BE indirectly, were relying on Socratic question and therefore on KWX. Such a position does not belong to KWX from Meno on. What makes it different in the second Socrates is another principle that is needed it not only as its complementary principle but also as what is more fundamental. Plato, then, does not reject KWX in this period, but, it seems, he transcends to another more basic principle; a principle we shall call the principle of 'Knowledge of the Good' (KG): -/- KG Knowledge of X requires knowledge of the Good. -/- Whereas all the dialogues of our first group are free from any discuscon about KG, it bears a very important role in the second group so as becomes the superior principle of knowledge in Republic. Trying to solve the problem of teachability of virtue, Socrates says that it can be teachable only if it is a kind of knowledge because nothing can be taught to human beings but knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) (Meno 87c2). The dilemma will be, then, whether virtue is knowledge or not (c11-12) and since virtue is good, we can change the question to: whether is there anything good separate from knowledge (εἰ μέν τί ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἄλλο χωριζόμενον ἐπιστήμης) (d4-5). Therefore, the conclusion will be that if there is nothing good which knowledge does not encompass, virtue can be nothing but knowledge (d6-8). What let us discuss KG as an epistemological principle for the second Secrates is the relation he tries to establish between knowledge and the Good which, though is alongside with the mentioned thesis and the idea of virtue as knowledge, goes much deeper inside epistemology asking to regard the Good as the basis of knowledge. The effort of Phaedo cannot succeed in establishing the Good as the criterion of explanation and knowledge since, I think, it needs a far more complicated ontology of Republic where Socrates can finally announce KG. What is said in Republic is totally compatible with Phaedo 99d–e and the metaphor of watching an eclipse of the sun. In spite of the fact that we do not have adequate knowledge of the Idea of the Good, it is necessary for every kind of knowledge: 'If we do not know it, even if we know all other things, it is of no benefit to us without it' (505a6-7). The problem of our not having sufficient knowledge of the Idea of Good is tried to be solved by the same method of Phaedo 99d-e, that is to say, by looking at what is like instead of looking at thing itself (506d8-e4). It is this solution that leads to the comparison of the Good with sun in the allegory of Sun (508b12-13). What the Good is in the intelligible realm corresponds to what the sun is in the visible realm; as sun is not sight, but is its cause and is seen by it (b9-10), the Good is so regarding knowledge. It has, then, the same role for knowledge that the sun has for sight. Socrates draws our attention to the function of sun in our seeing. The eyes can see everything only in the light of the day being unable to see the same things in the gloom of night (508c4-6). Without the sun, our eyes are dimmed and blind as if they do not have clear vision any longer (c6-7). That the Good must have the same role about knowledge based on the analogy means that it must be considered as a required condition of any kind of knowledge: -/- The soul, then, thinks (νόει) in the same way: whenever it focuses on what is shined upon by truth and being, understands (ἐνόησέν), knows (ἔγνω) and apparently possesses understanding (νοῦν ἔχειν). (508d4-6) -/- Socrates does not use agathon in this paragraph and substitutes it with both aletheia and to on. He links them with the Idea of the Good when he is to assert the conclusion of the analogy: -/- That which gives truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say, is the Idea of the Good: being the cause of knowledge and truth (αἰτίαν δ᾽ ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ ἀληθείας) so far as it is known (ὡς γιγνωσκομένης μὲν διανοοῦ). (508e1-4) Knowledge and truth are called goodlike (ἀγαθοειδῆ) since they are not the same as the Good but more honoured (508e6-509a5). KG, which had been implicitly contemplated and searched in Phaedo, is now explicitly being asserted in Republic. As what was quoted clearly proves, this principle is the very one which we can observe as the most fundamental principle of the second Socrates in Republic, corresponding to the role KWX had in the first Socrates. The Form of the Good in Republic, of which Santas speaks as 'the centerpiece of the canonical Platonism of the middle dialogues, the centerpiece of Plato’s metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and …' (1983, 256) much more can be said. Plato’s Cave allegory in Book VIII dedicates a similar role to the Idea of the Good. The Idea of the Good is there as the last thing to be seen in the knowable realm, something so important that its seeing equals to understanding the fact that it is the cause of all that is correct and beautiful (517b). Producing both light and its source in visible realm, it controls and provides truth and understanding in the intelligible realm (517c). -/- 2. Tripartite Epistemology BE is thoroughy rejected in the second Socrates and substituted by its opposite, the principle of 'Tripartite Epistemolgy' (TE): -/- TE Opinion is an epistemological status between knowledge and ignorance. BE of the first Socrates was denying any third way besides knowledge and ignorance which was the foundation of Socratic circle without which Socrates could not reject his interlocutors’ possessing any kind of knowledge. We cannot say, however, that the first Socrates had a third epistemological status in mind but rejected it. Such a status was unacceptable for him so that one can say that he would reject any kind of such status if suggested. There were only two possibilities about knowledge: either one knows something or he does not know it. TE, thus, was not the first Socrates’ discovery and, I think it is not the second Socrates’discovery. All we can see in our second group of dialouges is that he uses this principle as an already demonstrated one. Having examined the slave boy in Meno for the prupose of showing the working of recollection, it truns out that he has some opinions in him while he still does not know. Without trying to prove it, Socrates takes this as the distinction between knowledge and opinion: -/- So, he who does not know (οὐκ εἰδότι) about what he does not know (περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ) has within himself true opinions (ἀληθεῖς δόξαι) about the same things he did not know (περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε) (85c6-7). -/- The same distinction is set between ὀρθὴν δόξαν and ἐπιστήμην at 97b5-6 ff. (also cf. 97b1-2: ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζων … ἐπιστάμενος). He connects then their difference to the myth of Daedalus, the statue that would run away and escape. So are true opinions, not willing to remain long in mind and thus not worthy until one ties them down by αἰτίας λογισμῷ (98a3-4). Socrates says that this tying down is anamnesis. We face, in Phaedo, the same relation is settled between knowledge as the process of being tied down and getting the capability to give an account, on the one hand, and anamnesis, on the other hand. When a man knows, he must be able to give an account of what he knows (Phaedo 76b5-6) and since not all people are able to give such an account, those who recollect, recollect what once they learned (76c4). Although the distinction between knowledge and opinion is not explicitly used in Phaedo, referring to the parallel link between knowledge plus account and anamnesis in Phaedo and Meno, one can say that those who cannot recollect are not able to give account and, thus, are in a state of opinion. What is said at Phaedo 84a, though not yet a definite distinction between knowledge and opinion, makes a distinction between their objects so as we can agree that it is presupposed. The soul of the philosopher, Socrates says, follows reason, stays with it forever and contemplates the divine, which is not the object of opinoin (ἀδόξαστον) (84a8, cf. Meno 98b2-5). The distinction of knowledge and belief in Republic has a significant difference with what we discussed in Meno and Phaedo since the distinction of Meno was based on anamnesis and thus more an epistemological distinction. Even in Phaedo that we do not have any elaborate discussion about the distinction, the only hint to the matter at 76 is bound to the theory of anamnesis. In addition to the relation of the distinction with this theory, there is another evidence that does not permit us to consider the distinction as an ontological distinction. Let’s see Meno 85c6-7: -/- So, he who does not know about what he does not know has within himself true opinions about the same things he did not know (τῷ οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ ἔνεισιν ἀληθεῖς δόξαι περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε). (85c6-7) -/- This last sentence persists that the objects of knowledge and true opinion are the same. What Socrates is to say here is that whereas he does not know X he has true opinion about the same X. I think Socrates’ sentence that the slave boy οὐκ εἰδότι ἄρα περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ and his restatement of it by saying περὶ τούτων ὧν οὐκ οἶδε is because he wants to emphasize that the slave boy who does not know, has true opinion about the same thing. Socrates could say this just with using τούτων and there would be no necessity to bring περὶ ὧν ἂν μὴ εἰδῇ for οὐκ εἰδότι if he did not want to emphasize. -/- 3. Tripartite Ontology The distinction between knowledge and true opinion in Republic, on other side, has nothing to do with recollection, but is based on an ontological principle, 'Tripartite Ontology' (TO): -/- TO There are things that both are and are not. -/- This principle I confine, among our three dialogues of the second group, to Republic not extended to Meno and Phaedo, is obviously the opposite of BO. Speaking about the lovers of sights and sounds in the fifth book, Socrates distinguishes them from philosophers because their thought is unable to understand the nature of beautiful itself besides beautiful things (476a6-8) and hence they can only have opinions. The philosopher who, on the contrary, believes in beautiful itself and can distinguish it from beautiful things (476c9-d3), has knowledge because he knows, contrasting others who have opinion because they only opine (d5-6). Since those whose knowledge were degraded as opinion will complain about Socrates’ such calling their thought, he provides them the following argument (476e7-477b1): -/- - Does the person who knows, knows (γιγνώσκει) something (τὶ) or nothing (οὐδέν)? - He knows something (τί). - Something that is (ὂν) or is not (οὐκ ὄν)? - Something that is (ὂν) for how could something that is not be known (πῶς γὰρ ἂν μὴ ὄν γέ τι γνωσθείη)? - Then we have an adequate grasp of this: No matter how many ways we examine it, what completely is (παντελῶς ὂν) is completely knowable (παντελῶς γνωστόν) and what is in no way (μὴ ὂν δὲ μηδαμῇ) is in every way unknowable (πάντῃ ἄγνωστον). - A most adequate one. - Good. Now, if anything is such as to be and also not to be (ὡς εἶναί τε καὶ μὴ εἶναι), won’t it be intermediate (μεταξὺ) between what purely is (εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος) and what in no way is (μηδαμῇ ὄντος)? - Yes, it’s intermediate. - Then as knowledge (γνῶσις) is set over what is (τῷ ὄντι), while ignorance (ἀγνωσία) is of necessity set over what is not (μὴ ὄντι) mustn’t we find an intermediate between ignorance (ἀγνοίας) and knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) to be set over the intermediate, if there is such a thing? -/- From the third status of being we must reach to the third status of knowledge. The simple reading of this text can be an existential reading, taking the "is" of the mentioned sentences as existence. The problem is that when it is said that there is something that both is and is not reading "is" existentially, it sounds too bizarre to be acceptable. It cannot easily be understandable to have something as both existent and non-existent at the same time. This problem arose so many debates and led many scholars to reject the existential reading of "is" and suggest some other readings like predicative or veridical readings. I think though Plato’s complicated ontology of Republic cannot be correctly understood by a simple existential reading, this "is" cannot be free from existential sense of being and, thus, cannot be reduced to just a predicative or veridical sense of being. -/- 4. Bound Knowledges In addition to KG, the Good is also the basis of another principle in the second Socrates, namely the principle of 'Bound Knowledge' (BK): -/- BK Knowledge of everything is bound to the knowledge of the Good. -/- We distinguished BK from KG because we want to insist, in BK, on what had not been insisted upon in KG, that is, the binding role that the Good plays in the second Socrates, contrasting the absence of such a role in the first Socrates. Socrates remembers, in Phaedo, his wonderful keen on natural philosophers' wisdom when he was young. The origin of this enthusiasm was Socrates’ hope to know the cause of everything as they used to claim. When he was searching the matters of his interest on their basis, Socrates says, he became convinced he can get no acceptable answer from them and found himself blind even to the things he thought he knew before. One day he hears Anaxagoras’ theory that 'it is Mind that arranges and is the cause of everything (ὡς ἄρα νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος)' (Phd. 97c1-2 cf. DK, Fr.15.8-9, 11-12, 12-14) and thinks that he can finally find what he has always expected, i.e. something which can explain all things. What I intend to show here is that what makes Socrates hopeful is that Anaxagoras’ theory tries 1) to explain all things by one thing and 2) this explanation is understood by Socrates as if it is based on the concept of the Good. That Socrates was searching for one explanation for all things can be proved even from what he has been expecting from natural philosophers. The case is, nonetheless, more clearly asserted when he speaks about Anaxagoras’ theory. In addition to διακοσμῶν τε καὶ πάντων αἴτιος of 97c2 mentioned above, we have τὸ τὸν νοῦν εἶναι πάντων αἴτιον (c3-4) and τόν γε νοῦν κοσμοῦντα πάντα κοσμεῖν (c4-5) all emphasizing on the cause of all things (πάντα) which can clearly prove that one of the reasons which caused Socrates to embrace it delightfully was its claim to provide the cause of all things by one thing. Another reason was that Anaxagoras’ Mind, at least in Socrates’ view, was attempting to explain everything by the concept of the Good. This connection between Mind and Good belongs more to the essential relation they have in Socrates’ thinking than Anaxagoras’ theory because there are almost nothing about such a relation in Anaxagoras. The reason for Socrates’ reading can be that Mind is substantially compatible with Socrates’ idea of the relation between good and knowledge. Both the thesis 'no one does wrong willingly' and the theory of virtue as knowledge we pointed to above are evidences of this essential relation. Nobody who knows that something is bad can choose or do it as bad. The reason, when it is reason, that means when it is as it should be, when it is wise or when it knows, works only based on good-choosing. In this context, when Socrates hears that Mind is considered as the cause of everything, it sounds to him like this: good should be regarded as the basis of the explanation of all things. We see him, thus, passing from the former to the latter without any proof. This is done in the second sentence after introducing Mind: -/- I thought that if this were so, the arranging Mind would arrange all things and put each thing in the way that was Best (ὅπῃ ἂν βέλτιστα ἔχῃ). If one then wished to find the cause of each thing by which it either perishes or exists, one needs to find what is the best way (βέλτιστον αὐτῷ ἐστιν) for it to be, or to be acted upon, or to act. On these premises then it befitted a man to investigate only, about this and other things, what is the most excellent (ἄριστον) and best (βέλτιστον). The same man must inevitably also know what is worse (χεῖρον), for that is part of the same knowledge. (97c4-d5) This passage is a good evidence of Socrates’ leap from Anaxagoras’ Mind to his own concept of the Good that can explain why Socrates found Anaxagoras theory after his own heart (97d7). Mind is welcomed because of its capability for explanation on the basis of good to 'explain why it is so of necessity, saying which is better (ἄμεινον), and that it was better (ἄμεινον) to be so' (97e1-3). What Socrates thought he had found in Anaxagoras can indicate what he had been expecting from natural scientists before. Socrates could not be satisfied with their explanations because they were unable to explain how it is the best for everything to be as it is. It can probably be said, then, that it was the lack of the unifying Good in their explanation that had disappointed him. We must insist that we are discussing what Socrates thought that Anaxagoras’ theory of Mind should have been, not about Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. Phaedo 97c-98b, is not about what Socrates found in Anaxagoras but what he thought he could find in it. On the contrary, it should also be noted that it was not this that was dashed at 98b, but Anaxagoras’ actual way of using Mind. It was Anaxagoras’ fault not to find out how to use such an excellent thesis (98b8-c2, cf. 98e-99b). Socrates gives an example to show how not believing in 'good' as the basis of explanation makes people be wanderers between different unreal explanations of a thing. His words δέον συνδεῖν (binding that binds together) as a description for the Good we chose as the name of BK principle: They do not believe that the truly good and binding binds and holds them together (ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ δέον συνδεῖν καὶ συνέχειν οὐδὲν οἴονται). (99c5-6) -/- Having in mind Plato’s well-known analogy of the sun and the Good at Republic 508-509, we can dare to say that his warning of the danger of seeing the truth directly like one watching an eclipse of the sun in Phaedo (99d-e) is more about the difficulty of so-called good-based explanation than its insufficiency, a difficulty which is precisely confirmed in Republic (504e-505a, 506d-e). Moreover, BK is asserted in a more explicit way in the Republic, where the Good is considered not only as a condition for the knowledge of X, as was noted above discussing KG, but also as what binds all the objects of knowledge and also the soul in its knowing them. At Republic VI, 508e1-3, when Socrates says that the Form of the Good 'gives truth to the things known and the power to know to the knower (τοῦτο τοίνυν τὸ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρέχον τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις καὶ τῷ γιγνώσκοντι τὴν δύναμιν ἀποδιδὸν)', he wants to set the Good at the highest point of his epistemological structure by which all the elements of this structure are bound. This binding aspect of the Good is by no means a simple binding of all knowledges or all the objects of knowledge, but the most complicated kind of binding as it is expected from the author of the Republic. The kind of unity the Good gives to the different knowledges of different things is comparable with the unity which each Form gives to its participants in Republic: as all the participants of a Form are united by referring to the ideas, all different kinds of knowledge are united by referring to the Good. If we observe Aristotle's assertion that for Plato and the believers of Forms, the causative relation of the One with the Forms is the same as that of the Forms with particulars (e.g. Metaphysics 988a10-11, 988b4), that is to say the One is the essence (e.g., ibid, 988a10-11: τοῦ τί ἐστὶν, 988b4-6: τὸ τί ἢν εἶναί) of the Forms besides his statement that for them One is the Good (e.g., ibid, 988b11-13) the relation between the Good and unity may become more understandable. Since the quiddity of the Good (τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τἀγαθὸν) is more than discussion (506d8-e2), we cannot await Socrates to tell us how this binding role is played. All we can expect is to hear from him an analogy by which this unifying role is envisaged, the sun. The kind of unity that the Good gives to the knowledge and its objects in the intelligible realm is comparable to the unity that the sun gives to the sight and its objects in the visible realm (508b-c). The allegory of Line (Republic VI, 509d-511), like that of the Sun, tries to bind all various kinds of knowledges. The hierarchical model of the Line which encompasses all kinds of knowledge from imagination to understanding can clearly be considered as Plato’s effort to bind all kinds of knowledges by a certain unhypothetical principle. The method of hypothesis starts, in the first subsection of the intelligible realm, with a hypothesis that is not directed firstly to a principle but a conclusion (510b4-6). It proceeds, in the other subsection, to a 'principle which is not a hypothesis' (b7) and is called the 'unhypothetical principle of all things' (ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν) (511b6-7). This παντὸς must refer not only to the objects of the intelligible realm but to the sensible objects as well. Plato does posit, therefore, an epistemological principle for all things, a principle that all things are, epistemologically, bound and, thus, unified by. -/- 5. Bound Beings The ontological aspect of BK we shall call the principle of 'Bound Beings' (BB): -/- BB Being of all things are bound by the Good. -/- We saw in our principle of Split Being (SB) how the first Socrates was criticized because of his approach to split being and separate each thing from other things. The principle of Bound Beings intends to make the things more related, a duty which is done again by the Good. In the allegory of Sun, there are two paragraphs that evidently and deliberately extend the binding role of the Good to the ontological scene: -/- You will say that the sun not only makes the visible things have the ability of being seen but also coming to be, growth and nourishment. (509b2-4) -/- This clearly intends to remind the ontological role the sun plays in bringing to being all the sensible things in order to display how its counterpart has the same role in the intelligible realm (b6-10): -/- Not only the objects of knowledge (γιγνωσκομένοις) owe their being known (γιγνώσκεσθαι) to the Good, but also their existence (τὸ εἶναί) and their being (οὐσίαν) are due to it, though the Good is not being but superior to it in rank and power. That the Good is here represented as responsible for being of things in addition to their being known means, in my opinion, that Plato wants to posit BB in addition to BK. The allegory of Cave at the very beginning of the seventh Book (514aff.) can be taken as another evidence. The role of the Good, one might say, is confined to the intelligible realm because it is asserted that the role the Good plays in this realm is corresponding to that of the sun in the visible realm. The fact that Plato wants to observe the Good also as the ontological cause of the sensible things is obvious from his saying, in the allegory of Cave, that the Form of the Good 'produces light and its source (τὸν τούτου κύριον) [i.e. the sun] in the visible realm' (517c3). We can conclude, then, that the ontological function of the Good is not confined to the intelligible realm in which it is the lord and provides truth and understanding (c3-4) because it is also responsible to produce τὸν κύριον of light. 6. Proportionality of Being and Knowledge Insofaras BE and BO principles of the first Socrates gave way to TE and TO principles of the second Socrates, we cannot expect him to preserve KB in the same way as it was in the first Socrates. The new tripartite ontology and epistemology necessitates some modifications in KB which results in the principle of 'Proportionality of Being and Knowledge' (PBK): -/- PBK To every class of being there is a proportionate category of knowledge. -/- This principle, of course, does not entail the refutation of KB and thus is not kind of rejecting PBK but only a more complicated version of it. Based on PBK, we can still agree that knowledge is of being (KB) but the issue is that since none of the concepts of knowledge and being in the second Socrates are as simple as they were for the first Socrates, we need a more complicated principle for their relation here. Although from Meno 97a where the distinction of knowledge and true opinion is drawn out in the second group of the dialogues, we can expect a new relation, it is articulated in its most complete way in Republic and specifically in the allegory of Line. All the beings are divided there hierarchically to four classes, to each of them belongs a class of knowledge: imagination to images, belief to the sensible things (more correctly: the things of which they[in previous class] were images (ᾧ τοῦτο ἔοικεν)), thought to mathematical objects (?) and understanding to the Forms and the first principle. The degree of clarity that each of the classes of knowledge shares in (σαφηνείας ἡγησάμενος μετέχειν) is proportionate to the degree that its object shares in truth (ἀληθείας μετέχει). (511e2-4) -/- Conclusion From the six onto-epistemilogical principles of the first Socrates, four principles turn to their opposite in the middle period dialogues. While bipolar epistemology and ontology of the early dialogues give place to tripartite epistemology in the middle period dialogues and tripartite ontology in Republic, the split knowledge and being of the first Socrates are inclined to be substituted by bound knowledges and bound beings in the second Socrates and specifically in Republic. Not all our system of principles in this article is necessarily determinative. Either they are rightly formulated or not, our result would not be vulnerable if we accept that 1) making the distinction of knowledge and belief, 2) accepting the being of not being and 3) trying to bind both being and knowledge by the concept of the Good happens only in middle period dialogues, having been absent in the early ones. These are the favourite results all those somehow arbitrary and even oversimplified principles were to illustrate; that there is kind of a development in the epistemological as well as the ontological grounds of Plato’s philosophy. -/- Notes . (shrink)

This paper aims to suggest a new approach to Plato’s theory of being in Republic V and Sophist based on the notion of difference and the being of a copy. To understand Plato’s ontology in these two dialogues we are going to suggest a theory we call Pollachos Esti; a name we took from Aristotle’s pollachos legetai both to remind the similarities of the two structures and to reach a consistent view of Plato’s ontology. Based on this theory, when Plato (...) says that something both is and is not, he is applying difference on being which is interpreted here as saying, borrowing Aristotle’s terminology, 'is is (esti) in different senses'. I hope this paper can show how Pollachos Esti can bring forth not only a new approach to Plato’s ontology in Sophist and Republic but also a different approach to being in general. -/- Keywords Plato; being; difference; image; pollachos esti; pollachos legetai 1. Being, Not-Being and Difference The three dialogues where the notion of "difference" attaches to the notion of being, namely Parmenides II, Sophist and Timaeus,and specifically the first two we try to discuss here. In these dialogues, Plato is going to achieve a new and revolutionary understanding of being which is not anymore based on the notion of "same" as it was before in Greek ontology. It was his discovery, I think, that the notion of being in the Greek ontology is attached to the notion of the "same" and it is because of this attachment that there have always been many problems understanding being especially after Parmenides. That being has always been relying on the "same" can be found out from the way most of the Presocratics understood it. It was based on such a relationship between being and "same" that a later Ionian, Heraclitus of Ephesus, rejected Being by rejecting its sameness: unable to be the same, being cannot be being anymore but becoming. Heraclitus’ criticism of his predecessors’ understanding of being was due to his discovery that what they call being is not the same but different in every moment. The relation of being and sameness reaches to its highest point in Parmenides. What Plato does in using the "difference" is nothing but the establishment of a creative relation between being and "difference". In this new relation, although he is in agreement with Heraclitus that being is not the same but different, he does not do it by use of becoming. He disagrees, on the other hand, with Parmenides that such a relation between being and difference leads to not being. At Parmenides 142b5-6 it is said that if One is, it is not possible for it to be without partaking (μετέχειν) of being (οὐσίας), which leads to the distinction of being and one: -/- So there would be also the being of the one (ἡ οὐσία του̑ ἑνὸς) which is not the same (ταὐτὸν) as the one. Otherwise, it wouldn’t be its being, nor the one would partake of it. (142b7-c1) -/- The fact that what is (ἔστι) signifies (σημαῖνον) is other (ἀλλο) than what One signifies (c4-5), is being taken as a reason for their distinction. The conclusion is that when we say 'one is', we speak of two different things, one partaking of the other (c5-7). Having repeated these arguments of the otherness of being and one at 143a-b, Parmenides says that the cause of this otherness can be neither Being nor One but "difference": -/- So if being is something different (ἕτερον) and one something different (ἕτερον), it is not by being one that the one is different from being nor by its being being that being is other than one, but they are different from each other (ἕτερα ἀλλήλων) by difference (τῷ ἑτερῳ) and otherness (ἄλλῳ). (143b3-6) -/- The fifth hypothesis, 'one is not' (160b5ff.) is also linked with the notion of difference. When we say about two things, largeness and smallness, that they are not, it is clear that we are talking about not being of different (ἕτερον) things (160c2-4). When it is said that something is not, besides the fact that there must be knowledge of that thing, we can say that it entails also its difference: 'difference in kind pertains to it in addition to knowledge' (160d8). Parmenides explains the reason as such: -/- For someone doesn’t speak of the difference in kind of the others when he says that the one is different from the others, but of that thing’s own difference in kind. (160e1-2) -/- Although the theory of being as "difference" is not fulfilled yet, an exact look at what occurs in Sophist can make us sure that this was the launching step for "difference" to get its deserved role in Plato’s ontology. The notion of the "difference" is not yet well-functioned in Parmenides because we can see that being is still attached to the same: -/- For that which is the same is being (ὄν γὰρ ἐστι τὸ ταὐτόν) (162d2-3). -/- The notion of difference in Sophist is the key element based on which a new understanding of being is presented and the problem of not being is somehow resolved. The friends of Forms, the Stranger says, are those who distinguish between being and becoming (248a7-8) and believe that we deal with the latter with our body and through perception while with the former, the real being (ὄντως οὐσίαν) with our soul and through reasoning (a10-11). Being is then bound with the "same" by adding: -/- You say that being always stays the same and in the same state (ἣν ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν) but becoming varies from one time to another (δὲ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως). (248a12-13) -/- That the theory of the relation of being and capacity (247d8f., 248c4-5) matches more with becoming than with being (248c7-9) must be rejected because being is also the subject of knowledge which is kind of doing something (248d-e). It does, however, confirm that 'both that which changes and also change have to be admitted as existing things (ὄντα) (249b2-3). I believe that this is what Socrates would incline to do at Theaetetus 180e-181a, that is, putting a fight between two parties of Parmenidean being and Heraclitean becoming and then escaping. The solution is that becoming is itself a kind of being and we ought to accept what changes as being. This is what must be done by a philosopher, namely, to refuse both the claim that 'everything is at rest' and that 'being changes in every way' and beg, like a child, for both and say being (τὸὄν) is both the unchanging and that which changes (249c10-d4). This kind of begging for both is obviously under the attack of contradiction (249e-250b). For both and each of rest and change similarly are (250a11-12) but it cannot be said either that both of them change or both of them rest, being must be considered as a third thing both of the rest and change associate with (250b7-10). The conclusion is that 'being is not both change and rest but different (ἕτερον) from them instead' (c3-4). The notion of difference helps Plato to take being departed from both rest and change because it was their sophisticated relation with being that made the opposition of being and becoming. Plato is now trying to separate being from rest and, thus, from "same" by "difference". Such a crucial change is great enough to need a 'fearless' decision (256d5-6). The possibility of being of not being is resulted (d11-12) comes as the answer to the question 'so it’s clear that change is not being and also is being (ἡ κίνησις ὄντως οὐκ ὄν ἐστι καὶ ὄν) since it partakes in being?' (d8-9). It is then by the notion of difference that becoming is considered as that which both is and is not. This coincidence of being and not being about change is apparently similar to Socrates’ paradoxical statement at Republic 477a about what both is and is not. -/- Introduction The Republic 476-477 has always been a matter of controversy mainly about two interwoven points. The first problem is the meaning of being here; that whether what he has in mind is a veridical, existential or propositional sense of being. The second problem is his distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion which seems to lead, some believe, to the Two Worlds (TW) theory. The crucial point in Republic is that what is considered between knowledge (ἐπιστήμης) and ignorance (α͗γνοιας), namely opinion, must have a different object that leads Socrates to draw the distinction of knowledge and opinion between their objects. The problem of understanding being in the fifth book of the Republic is that when it is said that the Form of F is F but a particular participating in F, both is and is not F, it sounds too bizarre and unacceptable. It cannot be imaginable how a thing can be existent and non-existent at the same time. At the first sight, the only solution seems to be the degrees of existence which is called by Annas (1981, 197) a 'childish fallacy' and a 'silly argument'. Kirwan (1974, 118) thinks that Republic V does not attribute 'any doctrine about existence' to Plato and Kahn (1966, 250) claims that the most fundamental value of einai when used alone (without predicate) is not "to exist" but "to be so", "to be the case" or "to be true". The problems of understanding being in Republic and Sophist besides the difficulties of the existential reading led scholars to the other senses of being, mostly related to the well-known Aristotelian distinctions between different senses of being. In the predicative reading, Annas, for example, refers this difference to the qualified and unqualified application. Whereas the Form of F is unqualifiedly F, a particular instance of F can be F only qualifiedly (1981, 221). Vlastos’ well-known substitution of 'degrees of reality' for 'degrees of being/existence' must be categorized as a predicative reading. Kahn thinks that the basic sense of being for Plato is 'something like propositional structure, involving both predication and truth claims, together with existence for the subject of predication' (2013, 96). Believing that the complete-incomplete distinction terminology is misleading about Plato, he thinks that semantic functions are only second-order uses of the verb and it is the predicative or incomplete function which is fundamental. Suggesting a veridical reading, Fine (2003, 70 ff) thinks that while both existential and predicative readings separate the objects of knowledge and belief, it is only her reading which does not force such separation of the objects and thus does not imply TW. Stokes (1998, 266) thinks that though Fine is right saying that Plato does not endorse TW in book V, she is wrong in rejecting existential in favor of the veridical reading. The reception of existential reading can be seen more obviously in Calvert who thinks, in agreement with Runciman, that 'it would be safer to say that Plato’s gradational ontology is probably not entirely free from degrees of existence' (1970, 46). At Sophist 254d-e Plato singles out five most important kinds (or Forms!?) in which the same (ταὐτὸν) and difference (θάτερον) are regarded besides being, rest and change. They are, therefore, neither the same nor the difference but share in both (b3). Being (τὸ ὄν) cannot be the same also because if they 'do not signify distinct things' both change and rest will have the same label when we say they are (255b11-c1). We have then four distinct kinds, being, change, rest and same, none of them is the other. The case of difference is more complicated. When the stranger wants to assess the relation of being and difference, he can say simply neither that they are distinct nor that they are not. He has to make an important distinction inside being to get able to draw the relation of being and difference: -/- But I think you'll admit that some of the things that are (τῶν ὄντων) are said (λέγεσθαι) by themselves (αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά) but some [are said] always referring to (πρὸς) other things (ἄλλα) (255b12-13) -/- The difference is always said referring to other things (τὸδέγ’ ἕτερον ἀεὶ πρὸς ἕτερον) (255d1). It pervades all kinds because each of them should be different from the others and is so due to the difference and not its own nature (253e3f.) After asserting that change is different from being and therefore both is and is not (256d), the difference is described as what makes all the other kinds not be, by making each different from being. Given that all of them are by being, this association of being and difference is the cause of their being and not-being at the same time, the issue that its version at RepublicV made all those controversies we discussed above: -/- So in the case of change and all the kinds, not being necessarily is (Ἔστιν ἄρα ἐξ ἀναγκης τὸ μὴ ὄν). Τhat’s because as applied to all of them, the nature of the difference (ἡ θατέρον φύσις) makes each of them not be by making it different from being. And we’re going to be right if we say that all of them are not in the same way. And conversely [we’re also going to be right if we say] that they are because they partake in being. (Sophist 256d11-e3) -/- Plato’s new construction of five distinct kinds and the role he gives to thedifference among them is aimed to resolve the old problem of understanding being which has always been annoying from the time of Heraclitus and Parmenides. Both the ontological status of becoming and that of not being were, in Plato’s mind, based on the absolute domination of the notion of the Same over being. Now, not only becoming is understandable as being but also not being which is not the contrary of being anymore but only different (ἕτερον) (257b3-4). Though I agree partly with Frede that the account of not being which is needed for false statements is more complicated than just saying, as Cropsey (1995, 101) says, that Plato is substituting 'X is not Y' with 'X is different from Y', I totally disagree with him that when we say X is not beautiful, Plato could not have thought that it is not a matter of its being different from beautiful because 'it would be different from beauty even if it were beautiful by participation in beauty' (1992, 411). Conversely, as we will discuss, it is exactly the relation of the beautiful thing, X, and the beautiful itself, in which X shares that is to be solved by the notion of not being as difference. Though it is beautiful because of sharing in beauty, X is not beautiful because it is different from beautiful itself. What the difference is to do is to show how something can both be and not be the same thing. The difference is what makes one thing both be and not be a certain other thing. This equips the difference with the ability to explain a certain thing’s not-being when it is. Thanks to the notion of difference, it is now possible to explain not only not being but also the simultaneous being and not being of a thing: 'What we call "not-beautiful" is the thing that ἕτερόν ἐστιν from nothing other than του̑ καλου̑ φύσεως' (257d10-11). The result is that not beautiful happens to be (συμβέβηκεν εἶναι) one single thing among kinds of beings (τι τῶν ὄντων τινὸς ἑνὸς γένους) and at the same time set over against one of the beings (πρός τι τῶν ὄντων αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεθὲν) (257e2-4) and thus be something that happens to be not beautiful (εἶναί τις συμβαίνει τὸ μὴ καλόν); a being set over against being (ὄντος δὴ πρὸς ὄν ἀντίθεσις) (e6-7). Neither the beautiful is more a being (μα̑λλον ... ἐστι τῶν ὄντων) nor not beautiful less (e9-10) and thus both the contraries similarly are (ὁμοίως εἶναι) (258a1). This conclusion, it is emphasized again (a7-9), owes to θατέρου φύσις now turned out as being. Therefore, each of the many things that are of the nature of the difference and set over each other in being (τῆς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀντικειμένων ἀντίθεσις) is being as being itself is being (αὐτοῦ τοῦὄν τοςοὐσία ἐστιν) and not less. They are different from, and not the contrary of, each other (a11-b3). This is exactly τὸμὴὄν, the subject of the inquiry (b6-7). Hence, not being has its own nature (b10) and is one εἶδοςamong the many things that are (b9-c3). Such far departing from Parmenides’ ontological principle is done on the basis of the nature of the difference. It was the discovery of such a notion that made the stranger brave enough to say that not being is each part of the nature of the difference that is set over against being (258d7-e3, cf. 260b7-8). That the relation of being and difference is difference is the key element of the new ontology. The difference is, only because of its sharing in being, but it is not that which it shares in but different from it (259a6-8). Not being is exactly based on this difference: ἕτερον δὲ τοῦ ὄντος ὄν ἔστι σαφέστατα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εἶναι μὴ ὄν (a8-b1). 2. Difference and the Being of a Copy We discussed above that the sense of being of particulars in Republic V made so many debates that whether being is there used in an existential sense or not. Particulars in Republic are regarded as images in the allegories of Line and Cave. The being of an image/copy makes, thus, the same problem. Plato’s analogy of original -copy for the relation of Forms and their particulars in Republic has obviously a different attitude to being. The main question is that what is the ontological status of a copy in respect of its original? Are there two kinds of being, 'real being' versus 'being' as Ketchum says (1980, 140) or only one kind? What is the difference of being in an original and its copy? Is it a matter of degrees of being or reality as some commentators have suggested? Is it a matter of being relational? By reducing the ontological issue to an epistemological one, Vlastos’ suggestion of degrees of reality in an article with the same name does neither, I think, pay attention to the problem nor resolve it. He agrees that Plato never speaks of "degrees" or "grades" of reality (1998, 219). What allows him to entitle it as such are some of Plato’s words in Republic as well as Plato’s words in some other dialogues (1998, 219). When Plato states that the Forms only can completely, purely or perfectly be real he means, Vlastos says, they are cognitively reliable (1998, 229); an obvious reduction of the issue to an epistemological one. He thinks that when in Republic we are being said that a particular’s being F is less pure than its Form, it is because it is not exclusively F, but it is and is not F and this being adulterated by contrary characters is the reason of our confused and uncertain understanding of it (1998, 222). Ketchum rightly criticizes Vlastos’ doctrine in its disparting from ontology thinking that 'to understand Plato’s talk of being as talk of reality is to obscure the close relation that exists between "being" and the verb "to be"' (1980, 213). He thinks, therefore, that οὐσία must be understοοd as being rather than reality, τὸὄν as "that which is" and not "that which is real" and … (ibid). His conclusion is that degrees of reality cannot interpret Plato correctly and we must accept degrees of being. Allen believes that a 'purely epistemic' reading of the passage in Republic is patently at odds with Plato’s text (1961, 325). He thinks that not only degrees of reality but also degrees of reality must be maintained (1998, 67). What Cooper suggests gets close to this paper’s solution: -/- Plato does not I think wish to suggest that existence is a matter of degree in the way in which being pleasant or painful is a matter of degree. Rather there are different grades of ontological status. (1986, 241) -/- A more ontological solution for the problem of understanding the being of a copy and its relation with the being of its original is suggested by the theory of copy as a relational entity. Based on this interpretation, 'the very being of a reflection is relational, wholly dependent upon what is other than itself: the original…' (Allen, 1998, 62). As relational entities, particulars have no independent ontological status; they are purely relational entities which derive their whole character and existence from Forms (ibid, 67). Although these relational entities are and have a kind of existence, we must also say that 'they do not have existence in the way that Forms, things which are fully real, do' (ibid). Allen (1961, 331) extends his theory to Phaedo where it is said that particulars are deficient (74d5-7, 75a2-3, 75b4-8), 'wish' to be like (74d10) or desire to be of its nature (75a2); an extension that, like F.C. white (1977, 200), I cannot admit. He correctly states that Plato did not start out with a doctrine of particulars as images and semblances but come to such a view after Phaedo, or perhaps after Republic V (1977, 202). Though we may not agree with him about Republic V, if we have to consider its last pages also, we must agree with him that not only the ontology of Phaedo but also that of Republic II-V (except the last pages of the latter book) are somehow different from (but at the same time appealing to) the ontology of original-copy which should exclusively assign to Sophist, Timaeus and RepublicVI-VII besides the last pages of book V. The answer to the problem of Plato’s sense of being in RepublicV can be reached only if we read Republic V based on and as following Sophist. We can find out his meaning of that which both is and is not only by the ontological status he assigns to a copy in Sophist. The kind of being of a copy in Sophist reveals as Plato’s key for the lock of the problem of not being. Let’s see how the ontological status of a copy is the critical point of Plato’s ontology. In the earlier pages of Sophist, we are still in the same situation about not being. To think that that which is not is is called a rash assumption (237a3-4) and Parmenides’ principle of the impossibility of being of not being is still at work (a8-9). At 237c1-4, the problem of "not being" is noticed in a new way which shows some kinds of a more realistic position to the problem of not being. Nevertheless, not being is still unthinkable, unsayable, unutterable and unformulable in speech (238c10). Soon after mentioning that it is difficult even to refuse not being (238d), the solution to the problem appears: the being of a copy (εἴδωλον) (239d). A copy is, says Theaetetus, something that is made referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν) but still is 'another such thing (ἕτεροντοιου̑τον)' (240a8). Nevertheless, this 'another such thing' cannot be another such real or true thing. In answer to the question of the Stranger that if this 'another such thing' is the true thing (240a9), Theaetetus answers: οὐδαμῶς ἀληθινόν γε, ἀλλ’ ἐοικὸςμὲν (240b2). A copy’s being 'another such thing' does not mean another true thing but only a resemblance of it. Not only is not a copy another true thing besides the original, but it is the opposite of the true thing (b5) because only its original is the thing genuinely and being a copy is being the thing only untruly. The word ἐοικὸς is opposed to ὄντως ὄν in the next line (240b7): 'So you are saying that that which is like (ἐοικὸς) is not really that which is (οὐκ ὄντως [οὐκ] ὄν)'. But still a copy 'is in a way (ἔστι γε μήν πως)' (b9). While it is not really what it is its resemblance, it has its own being and reality because it really is a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως) (b11). The Stranger asks: -/- So it is not really what is (οὐκ ὄν ἄρα [οὐκ] ὄντως ἐστὶν) but it really is what we call a likeness (ὄντως ἣν λέγομεν εἰκόνα)? (b12-13) -/- This is Plato’s innovative ontological solution to the problem of not being. Theaetetus’ answer confirms this: 'Maybe that which is not is woven together with that which is' (c1-2). Therefore, a copy neither is what really is nor is not-being but only is what in a way is. Thanks to the ontological status of a copy, the third status intermediate between being and not being is brought forth. The essence of an image, in Kohnke’s words, does not consist 'solely in the negation of what is genuine and has real being' because otherwise 'it would be an ὄντως οὐκ ὄν,essentially and really a not being' (1957, 37). The characteristics of a copy can be summed up as folows: i) A copy is a copy by referring to a true thing (πρὸς τἀληθινὸν). ii) A copy is different from that of which it is a copy (ἕτερον). iii) A copy is not itself a true thing (ἀληθινόν) as that of which it is a copy but only that which is like it (ἐοικὸς). iv) It is not really that which really is (ὄντως ὄν) but only really a likeness (εἰκων ὄντως). The conclusion is that: v) A copy in a way (πως) is that means it both is and in not, the product of interweaving being with not being. This leads to the refutation of father Parmenides’ principle, accepting that 'that which is not somehow is (τό τε μὴ ὄν ὡς ἔστι)' and 'that which is, somehow is not (τό ὄν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι) (241d5-7). Besides copies and likenesses (εἰκόνων), we have also imitations (μιμημάτων) and appearances (φαντασμάτων) as the subjects of this new kind of being and thus false belief (241e3). In Timaeus, the world of becoming which cannot correctly be called and thus we have to call it "what is such" (τὸ τοιου̑τον) (49e5) or "what is altogether such" (τὸ διἀ παντὸς τοιου̑τον) (e6-7), consists solely of imitations (μιμημάτα) (50c5) which are identifiable only by the things that they are their imitations. The word τοιου̑τον which had been used to determine the situation of a copy in respect of its original, now becomes the definition of the world of becoming in which everything is an image of another thing, a Being, that stays always the same and is different and separated from its image. Cherniss, in my view rightly, draws attention to the very important point about the ontological status of an image that can at the same time be considered a criticism of the relational theory. What we are being said in Timaeus, he thinks,cannot be explained by saying that an image is not self-related and making its being relational. What is crucial about an image is that it 'stands for something, refers to something, means something and this meaning the image has not independently as its own but only in reference to something else apart from it' (1998, 296). This function finds its best explanation in the theory we are to suggest in the following. 3. πολλαχῶς ἔστι The best way to understand the ontological status of an image in Plato is to see first how his most clever pupil, Aristotle, resolved the same problem that Plato brought his theory of image for its sake. Aristotle’s theory of pollachos legetai is a brilliant and, at the same time, deviated version of Plato’s theory that is able, however, to help us read Plato in a better way. We discuss Aristotle’s theory to reach to a full understanding of Plato’s theory because it is, firstly, constructed in Aristotle in a more clear way and, secondly, it can also be taken as an evidence that our reading of Plato is legitimate. The phrase τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, a so much repeated phrase in Aristotle’s works, is his resolution for some of the ontological problems of his predecessors all treating being as if it has only one sense. Aristotle is right in his criticism of the philosophical tradition specially Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato since all did presuppose only one sense for being and his theory is, thus, a creative and revolutionary solution for many problems that all the past philosophers were stuck in. But it is at the same time somehow a borrowed theory. As we will discuss, both the structure of the doctrine and the problems it tries to resolve are the same as Plato’s doctrine (and even is comparable in its phraseology) though it is in Aristotle, as can be expected, a more clear and better structured doctrine. 1) Associated with the theory of pros hen and the theory of substance, the theory of several senses of being provides a structure which, I insist, is the best guide to understand Plato’s theory of Being in Sophist, Timeaus and Republic. a) Although the theory of pollachos legetai is not necessarily based on the theory of pros hen, they become tightly interdependent about being: -/- Being is said in many ways/senses (τὸ δὲ ὄν λέγεται μὲν πολλαχῶς) but by reference to one (πρὸς ἕν) [way/sense] and one kind of nature (μίαν τινὰ φύσιν). (Metaphysics 1003a33-34) -/- The doctrine of pros hen which is Aristotle’s initiative third alternative besides the homonymous and synonymous application of words, is primarily a linguistic theory that tries to provide a new theory to explain the different implementations of the same word. The pros hen implementation of being is to provide an alternative for the theory of the synonymous (in Plato: homonymous) implementation of being which says being is said in one sense (kath hen) (1060b 32-33). That both the pros hen and the kath hen implementation of a word has one thing (hen) as what is common, makes them in opposition to the homonymous implementation which does not consider anything in common. Whereas both pros hen and kath hen assume a common nature, with which all the implementations of the word have some kind of relation, their difference is that while kath hen takes all the implementations of the word as the same with the common nature, pros hen makes them different. Substance is called πρῶτον ὄν because it is said to be primarily: -/- For as is (τὸ ἔστιν) is predicated of all things, not however in the same way (οὐχ ὁμοίως) but of one sort of thing primarily and of others in a secondary way. So too τὸτί ἐστιν belongs simply (ἁπλῶς) to substance but in a limited sense (πῶς) to the others [other categories] (1030a21-23). -/- The word ἁπλῶς standing against κατὰ συμβεβηκός tries to make substance different from the accidents. When we are being said that τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται, it means that only the substance that is simply (ἁπλῶς) the ἕν, the common nature, τὸὄν. When we use the word 'being' about a substance, the being is said differently from when we use 'being' about an accident. The distinction between the substance and the other categories is a distinction between what simply is said to be and what only with reference to (pros) the substance is said to be. The doctrine of pros hen, changing kath hen to pros hen in respect of to on, makes a distinction that wants to show that while there is a kind of implementing the word being that is simply being, there is another kind which is called being only by reference to that which is simply being. In the doctrine of pros hen it is not so that all the things that are said to be are only by reference to a common one thing, but that while one thing is called being because it is that thing itself, the other things are called so without being that thing itself but only by referring to it. At the very beginning of book Γ, it is said that: -/- Being is said in many senses but all refer to one arche. Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substances, others because they are a process towards substances or destructions or privations or qualities of substances … (1003b5-9, cf. 1028a18-20) -/- Substance is what really is said to be and all other things that are said to be are said only in favor of it. This difference of substance from all other senses of being is what is, I believe, primarily aimed in Aristotle’s interrelated theories of pollachos legetai,pros hen and the theory of substance. b) The difference of the implementation of being in the case of substance and the accidents goes so deep that while substance is considered as the real being, the accidents are almost not being. An accident is a mere name (Metaphysics 1026b13-14) and is obviously akin to not being (b21). Aristotle adds that Plato was 'in a sense not wrong' saying that sophists deal with not being (τὸ μὴ ὄν) because the arguments of sophists are, above all, about the accidental (1026b13-16). At the beginning of book , he says about quality and quantity (which look to be more of a being than other accidents) that they are not existent (οὐδ̕ ὄντα ὡς εἰπεῖν) in an unqualified sense (ἁπλῶς) (1069a21-22). The two above-mentioned points, Aristotle’s (a) interwoven theories of pollachos legetai, pros hen and the theory of substance and (b) taking accidents almost as not being, comparedwith substance, brings forth a structure that I shall call Pollachos Legetai (with capital first letters). What is of the highest importance in this structure for me is the difference of substance from accidents and the kind of relation which is settled between them. There is a substance that without any qualification is said to be and the accidents that are said to be only by reference (pros) to it. Adding Aristotle’s point about accidents that they are nearly not being to this relation and difference, we can obviously see how much this structure is close to Plato’s original-copy ontology. We spoke of the relation of being and difference in Plato’s model and the way Plato construes the being of a copy. A copy is a copy only by referring to (pros) a model; it is different from (ἕτερον) that of which it is a copy; it is not itself a true thing as its model and not really that which is (ὄντως ὄν) but only is in a way (πῶς). If we behold the difference of substance and accident in the context of the theory of pollachos legetai and pros hen, we can observe its fundamental similarity with Plato’s original-copy theory in its structure. Allen draws attention to the fact that the relation between Forms and particulars in Plato’s original-copy model is 'something intermediate between univocity and full equivocity' (1998, 70, n. 24) and the same as what Aristotle calls it pros hen (ibid). What made us compare the two structures was not, of course, the complete similarity of two structures (we have to agree with many possible differences of the two theories) but exactly the specific relation between an original and its copy on the one hand, and a substance and its accident on the other hand. As substance and accident do not share a common character and the substance -accident model hints that they stand in a certain relation, there is no common character between the original and copy in Plato’s model as well. Furthermore, their similarity is not confined to their structure only; they are also aimed to solve the same problem. The central point of the theory is that all the predecessors took being in one sense and this was their weakness point. Besides the mentioned above passages about the relation of pollachos legetai and presocratics’, as well as Plato’s, ontology, the relation of the theory with the problem of not being is clear in several passages. In Metaphysics, it is said: 'Being is then said in many senses… It is for this reason that we say even of not being that it is not being' (1003b5-10). Discussing the accidental sense of being, Aristotle points that it is in the accidental way that we say, for example, that not-white is because that of which it is an accident is (1017a18-19, cf. 1069a22-24). We mentioned that he thought Plato was right saying that sophistic deals with not being because sophistic deals with accidental, which is somehow not being (1026b14-16). Plato turned sophistic not-being to what both is and is not and Aristotle to what accidentally is said to be. What helps Aristotle to resolve the problem of not being is his distinction between ἁπλῶς and κατὰ σθμβεβηκός. Aristotle’s "qua" (ᾕ) which is directly linked with his distinction between καθ’ αὑτο λέγεται and κατὰ συμβεβηκός λέγεται, is used to resolve the old problem of coming to be out of not being (Physics 191b4-10). He strictly asserts that his predecessors could not solve the problem because they failed to observe the distinction of "qua itself" from "qua another thing" (b10-13). He then continues: -/- We ourselves are in agreement with them in holding that nothing can be said simply (ἁπλως) to come from not being (μὴὄντος). But nevertheless we maintain that a thing may come to be from not being in an accidental way (κατὰ συμβεβηκός). For from privation which ὅ ἐστι καθ’ αὑτο μὴ ὄν, nothing can become. (Phy. 191b13-16, cf. b19-25) . (shrink)

Aristotle classifies opposition (ἀντικεῖσθαι) into four groups: relatives (τὰ πρός τι), contraries (τὰ ἐναντία), privation and possession (στρέσις καὶ ἓξις) and affirmation and negation (κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις). (Cat. , 10, 11b15-23) His example of relatives are the double and the half. Aristotle’s description of relatives as a kind of opposition is as such: ‘Things opposed as relatives are called just what they are, of their opposites (αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστι τῶν ἀντικειμένων λέγεται) or in some other way in relation to them. (...) For example, the double is called just what it is double of the other (οἷον τὸ διπλάσιον, αὐτὸ ὃπερ ἐστίν, ἑτέρου διπλάσιον λέγεται). Again, knowledge and the knowable are opposed as relatives, and knowledge is called just what it is, of the knowable, and the knowable too is called just what it is, in relation to its opposite, knowledge; for the knowable is called knowable by something-by knowledge.’ (Cat., 10, 11b24-30) 2) Senses of relatives In Met., Δ, 1020b26-32 Aristotle distinguishes three senses of relatives: i) That which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded. E.g. double to half ii) The active to the passive; e.g. that which can heat to that which can be heated iii) The measurable to the measure, e.g. the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception. 3) Relatives and contraries Aristotle’s discussion of relatives is unbelievably ambiguous. While he enumerates relatives besides contraries, privation-possession and affirmation-negation as four types of opposition (Cat., 10, 11b15-23), not only does not he restrict relatives to oppositions but he also does not totally differentiate it from contraries. Aristotle distinguishes between two senses of relatives one of which is contraries: ‘We have distinguished elsewhere the two senses in which relatives are so called-some as contraries (ὡς ἐναντία), others as knowledge to things known, a term being called relative because what is said one to the other is said by the other to itself (τῷ λέγεσθαί τι ἄλλο πρὸς αὐτό). (Met., I, 1056b34-1057a1) It seems that this differentiation is the same as, and maybe the one he himself refers to, the differentiation between the second and the third senses of relatives in Met., Δ, 1021a27-32: ‘Relative terms which imply number or capacity, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else is related to it (πρός τι πὰντα ἐστὶ πρός τι τῷ ὃπερ ἐστὶν ἄλλου λέγεσθαι αὐτὸ ὃ ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μὴ τῷ ἄλλο πρὸς ἐκεινο); but that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else is related to it. For the thinkable implies that there is thought of it, but the thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought; for we should then have said the same thing twice.’ Although Aristotle confirms contrariety in relatives (e.g. virtue to vice and knowledge to ignorance), he denies that there is a contrary ‘to every relative’ as there can be no contrary to what is double or treble. (Cat., 7, 6b15-19) The fact that Aristotle dedicates one sense of relatives to contraries means that the fourfold division of oppositions is not such a strict division without any kind of community between them. In his example of the first sense, however, Aristotle says: ‘One and number are in a sense opposed, not as contrary, but as we have said some relative terms are opposed; for inasmuch as one is measure and the other measurable, they are opposed.’ (Met., I, 1057a4-6) Now, the question is: Is Aristotle’s first sense of relative a contrary or not? Aristotle tells us that the opposition in this sense of relatives is the opposition of measure and measurable. The second sense has two differences with the first one: i) it is not a contrary and ii) what is said by one of the relatives to the other is also said by the latter to the former. To differentiate it from the first sense, when the one is the measure of the other, the latter will be the measure of the former as well: ‘But though knowledge is similarly spoken of as related to the knowable, the relation does not work out similarly for while knowledge might be thought to be the measure, and the knowable the thing measured, the fact is that all knowledge is knowable, but not all that is knowable is knowledge, because in a sense knowledge is measured by the knowable.’ (Met., I, 1057a7-12) Aristotle’s assertion at Met., I, 1057a36-37 that ‘of relative terms, those which are not contrary have no intermediate’ ensures us that we must take the first sense as contraries. Here he mentions a criterion of differentiation between two senses: while the first sense accepts intermediates (as, for example, great and small do), the second one does not. (Met., I, 1057a37-b1) It seems, however, that it is only the second sense that is the essential sense of relatives because the first sense, Aristotle says, is an accidental sense: ‘The one is opposed then to the many in numbers as measure to things measureable; and these are opposed as relatives which are not from their very nature relatives.’ (Met., I, 1056b32-34) 4) Definition of relative Aristotle’s first definition of the category of relative (πρός τι) is as such: ‘We call relative all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something else (Πρός τι δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται, ὃσα αὐτὰ ἃπερ ἐστὶν ἓτερων εἶναι λέγεται, ἢ ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως πρὸς ἓτερον). (Cat., 7, 6a36-37; repeated almost without any change in: Cat., 7, 6b6-8) Aristotle’s examples are larger (because it is what it is than something else (τοῦθ᾿ ὃπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρου λέγεται) that means it is called larger than something) and double. (Cat., 7, 6a37-b1) Aristotle’s aporia regarding relative is about their relation with substances: whether no substance is spoken of as a relative, or whether this is possible with regard to some secondary substances. (Cat., 7, 8a13-15) In the case of primary substances, it seems that he is confident, at least at first, that neither themselves nor their parts are spoken of in relation to anything: neither an individual man is called someone’s individual man nor an individual hand is called someone’s individual hand (but someone’s hand). (Cat., 7, 8a15-21) Although it is obvious that most of secondary substances are not spoken of as relatives (a man is not called someone’s man) (Cat., 7, 8a21-25), there are some with them there is room for dispute: a head is someone’s head and a hand is called someone’s hand, which seem to be relatives. (Cat., 7, 8a25-28) Aristotle thinks this must be due to the previous definition’s being problematic: with that definition ‘it is either exceedingly difficult or impossible to reach the solution that no substance is spoken of as a relative.’ (Cat., 7, 8a28-32) Thus, Aristotle changes his previous definition to a new one: ‘Those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something’ (ἔστι τὰ πρός τι οἷς τὸ εἶναι ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ πρός τί). (Cat., 7, 8a32-34) Although the first definition does indeed apply to all relations, its problem is that it does not take ‘their own being relative’ (τῷ πρός τι αὐτοῖς εἶναι) the same as ‘their being what they are of other things’ (ἃπερ ἐστὶν ἑτέρων λέγεσθαι). (Cat., 7, 8a34-37) Although this change of definition is to exclude all substances from being relative, what Aristotle says in Topics (To., Z, 8, 146a39- ), seems to ignore this: ‘For of everything relative the substance is relative to something else, seeing that the being of every relative term is identical with being in a certain relation to something.’ 5) Necessary knowledge of the related Knowledge of that in relation to which a relative is spoken of is necessary when one knows the relative: it is impossible to know a relative and at the same time not to know that in relation to which it is spoken of. (Cat., 7, 8a37-b3) To prove this, Aristotle adheres to the definition of relatives: ‘If someone knows of a certain ‘this’ that it is a relative, and being for relatives is the same as being somehow related to something, he knows that also to which this is somehow related.’ (Cat., 7, 8a37-b3; cf. 7, 8b3-15 for Aristotle’s examples) This necessary knowledge of the related, if we call it so, dedicates Aristotle an epistemological reason, besides the ontological one mentioned in his definition, for the exclusion of substances. As we noted in our discussion of Aristotle’s definition of relatives, he changed his first definition to exclude all substances from being relatives. Therefore, it is evident that for him relatives must not include substances, either primary or secondary. Aristotle does have no problem with primary substances simply because it is evident for him that they cannot be relatives. The same can be said about most of the secondary substances as well. The problem for which he changed the definition of substances was about some secondary substances like ‘head’ or ‘hand’: the fact that it is possible to know a hand or head without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to which it is spoken of proves that they are not relatives. (Cat., 7, 8b15-21) 6) Reciprocation Aristotle regards reciprocation (ἀντιστρέφειν) necessary in all relations: ‘All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate.’ (Cat., 7, 6b28-29; cf. Cat., 10, 12b21-24) The sense of reciprocation is clear by his own examples: ‘The slave is called slave of a master and the master is called master of a slave; the double double of a half, and the half half of a double.’ (Cat., 7, 6b29-31) Reciprocation of relatives is so necessary that if there seems that we do not have reciprocation, it must necessarily be due to a mistake and that in relation to which something is spoken of must have not been given properly. (Cat., 7, 6b36-7a1) Aristotle’s example is this: If a wing is given as of a bird, ‘bird of a wing’ does not reciprocate because it has not been given properly: a wing is of a winged and not of a bird; a wing is wing of a winged and a winged is winged with a wing. (Cat., 7, 7a1-5) Even if we do not have a proper name to have a proper reciprocation, Aristotle points, we must invent names. (Cat., 7, 7a5-15 and 7b10-14) Thus, having proper names is the condition of necessary reciprocation: ‘All relatives are spoken of in relation to correlatives that reciprocate, provided they are properly given.’ (Cat., 7, 7a22-23) This condition is also said in another way: there is no reciprocation if a relation is given as related to some chance thing or to something that is accidentally the related thing like when, for example, a slave is given as of a man or a biped instead of being given as of a master. (Cat., 7, 7a25-31) 7) Simultaneity of relatives Aristotle believes that in most cases relatives are simultaneous: double and half or master and slave must exist at the same time: when there is a half, there is a double and when there is a slave, there is a master. (Cat., 7, 7b10-14) However, this receives some exceptions like knowable, which is prior and can, thus, exist before and without knowledge. (Cat., 7, 7b22-27) What approves this non-simultaneousness for Aristotle is that the destruction of knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. (Cat., 7, 7b27-31) The same is said about perception and perceptible. (Cat., 7, 7b35-8a9) Aristotle attaches simultaneity to reciprocation. This reciprocation, however, is not a simple reciprocation but ‘reciprocation as to implication of existence’ (ἀντιστρέφει μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι) with the condition that neither be in any way the cause of the other’s existence. (Cat., 13, 14b27-29; the same is said also at: Cat., 13, 15a4-11) Aristotle’s examples are the double and the half because when there is a double there is a half and when there is a half there is a double but neither is the cause of the other’s existence. (Cat., 13, 14b29-32) (We have ‘reciprocation as to implication of existence’ also in relation between genus and species but it seems that this has a totally different sense there. 8) Having no independent reality That a relative cannot be a substance, either a primary or a secondary substance, is discussed in our review of both the definition of relatives and their reciprocation. The differentiation of relatives and substances are so deep for Aristotle that after questioning the possibility of any common element or principle for substances and relatives (Met., Λ, 1070a33-36), he asserts that no substance, on the one hand, is the element of relatives and none of the relatives, on the other hand, is the element of substances. (Met., Λ, 1070b3-4) Aristotle does not, however, suffice to this. For him, relatives have the least substantiality, which is, for him, almost the same as reality: ‘The relative is least of all categories a real thing (φύσις τις) or substance, and less than quality and quantity; and the relative is an affection of quantity.’ (Met., M, 1088a22-25) Aristotle believes that an evidence of this least reality (ὄν) and substantiality is that relatives have no proper generation, destruction or movement while each of substance, quality and quantity have them. (Met., M, 1088a29-35) Moreover, neither motion (Phy., E, 1) nor any kind of change is applicable to relatives so that relatives are neither themselves alterations nor the subject of alterations (Phy., Z, 3) and the process of losing and acquiring states cannot be considered as alterations because these are the result of the alterations of non-relative things of which they are states. (Phy., Z, 3) Relative is not even matter but is something different. (Met., M, 1088a24-25) The reason is that the matter is potentially of a nature but relative is neither potentially nor actually of a nature. (Met., M, 1088b1-2) To understand the status of relatives in Aristotle’s world, we have to make a tripartite classification; a classification that though Aristotle himself did not make, his assertions approve it. Based on this division, there are three kinds of being in the world: i) Independent beings: This class includes only substances. ii) Dependent beings: This class includes qualities and quantities. Although they are real, they are ‘in’ substances and cannot exist without them. iii) Super dependent beings: This class includes at least relatives. The fact that relatives must be considered in a third class different from substances, on the one hand, and qualities and quantities, on the other hand, is obvious not only from the previously mentioned texts (Met., M, 1088a22-25, 29-35 and b1-2) in which relatives’ reality is considered less than all substances, qualities and quantities and different from matters but from this text: ‘For there is nothing either great or small, many or few, or, in general, relative which is not something (τι ὄν) different (ἓτερον) [that is also] many or few or great or small’. (Met, N, 1088a27-30) Therefore, super dependent beings are those beings that must necessarily be also something else, i.e. an independent or dependent being. Ackrill (1963, 99) points that some of the words used by Aristotle to exemplify relational entities, e.g. slave, are endowed with a complete sense and do not need to be supplemented by a correlate. (Thus, the linguist criterion of incompleteness would be deficient. Some other instances of relative entities like ‘state,’ ‘knowledge’ and perception are not necessarily followed by the genitive case. 9) Extent of relatives What is the extent of relatives? What are or are not included in relatives either among categories or among other concepts? Which concepts or things Aristotle regard as relative? i) Aristotle includes state (ἓξις) and position (θέσις) among relatives. (Cat., 7, 6b2-6; Cat., 7, 6b11-14; Cat., 8, 11a20-24) ii) Although relative is not matter but is something different (Met., M, 1088a24-25), matter is ‘non-being’ only in virtue of an attribute (Phy., A, 9) and is, thus, a relative term. (Phy., B, 2, 194b9) 10) Property and relativity Aristotle draws a contrast between two types of giving a property, absolute and relative: ‘A property is given either in its own right and for always or relative to something else and for a time.’ (To., E, 1, ^128b15-18) Being a civilized man, for example, is an absolute property for man while to command is a relative property for the soul. The absolute property, however, is considered not only potential to be discussed or observed in relation to many things or periods of time, it in fact ‘belongs to its subject relatively to every single thing that there is, so that if the subject is not distinguished relatively to everything else, the property will not have been given correctly.’ (To., E, 1, 129a18-20) Therefore, an absolute property is a property that ‘is ascribed to a thing in comparison with everything else and distinguishes it from everything else.’ (To., E, 1, 128b33- ) An absolute property is, then, absolutely relative and not conditionally relative, i.e. relative to a specific thing. This is what differentiates it from a relative property, which is relative to a certain thing: ‘A property relative to something else is one which separates its subject off not from everything else but from a particular definite thing.’ (To., E, 1, 128b33- ) One important difference between absolute and relative properties is that while an accident can be a relative property, it can never be an absolute property. (To., I, 5, ^102b20-36) For example, sitting, which is an accident, is also a property relatively to those who are not sitting. (To., I, 5, ^102b20-36) 11) Platonic theories as relatives At least three of Platonic theories Aristotle attaches to relatives: i) Forms ‘It seems that a Form is always spoken of in relation to a Form-this desire itself is for the pleasure itself, and wishing itself is for the good itself.’ (To., Z, 8, 147a^10) Moreover, the theory of Forms takes the relative prior to the absolute as, for example, it takes not the dyad but the number as first. (Met., A, 990b15-17) Aristotle believes that this is against not only the necessities of the case but only the Platonists’ opinion because Forms must be substances only, if they can be shared. (Met., A, 990b27-29) There are, however, things like ‘equal’ which are only relative: they are only in relation to something else. Now the theory that ideas are supposed to be substances only should entail the substantiality of merely relatives. The reason being that Forms are not shared incidentally but each thing shares in that which is not predicated of a subject. (Met., A, 990b29-31) ii) Unequal The Platonic theory of great and small or unequal, which we know more from Aristotle and has, in Platonic philosophy, a role like that of matter in Aristotelian philosophy, is also called relative by Aristole. (Met., M, 1089b4-15) iii) Potentiality Aristotle says that Platonists take what potentially is a ‘this’ and a substance but not actually so a relative because it is ‘neither potentially the one or being, nor the contradictory of the one nor of being, but one among beings.’ (Met., N, 1089b15-20) 12) All things as relative Aristotle attaches the theory that ‘everything is true’ to relativity and thinks the consequence of believing in this theory is that everything is true: ‘He who says all things that appear are true, makes all things relative.’ (Met., Γ, 1011a17-20) 13) Genera and species of relatives There are some genera, Aristotle hints, that are relative but their species are not relative. In such cases, the genera are spoken of in relation to something, but none of the particular cases are so spoken. (Cat., 8, 11a20-36) Aristole’s examples are knowledge and grammar of which the former is a relative but the latter is a quality. The consequence of this is that there is nothing absurd for a thing to be in both genera of relative and quality. (Cat., 8, 11a37- ) However, when the species is a relative, the genera will be a relative too. (To., Δ, 4, 124b15- ) Moreover, Aristotle asserts that ‘the differentiae of relative terms are themselves relative.’ (To., Z, 6, 145a14-16) Things that are called relative are called so, Aristotle says, ‘because the classes that include them are of this sort, e.g. medicine is thought to be relative bcs its genus, knowledge, is thought to be relative,’ (Met., Δ, 1021b4-6) 14) Relatives as indefinite? Fabio Morales takes 1088a29-b1 as a textual evidence supporting the assumption that Aristotle regarded relational terms as indefinite. (shrink)

'People travelled for numerous reasons,' so J.W. Drijvers submits at the beginning of his piece on travel and pilgrimage literature. Be it ‘commerce, government affairs, religion, education, military business or migration,’ people ‘made use of the elaborate system of roads and modes of transport such as wagons, horses and boats’ to traverse the far-reaching stretches of the Roman Empire. And for 4th century Christians in particular, participating in religious festivals as well as interaction with holy sites, sacred artifacts and clergymen (...) had become greater a reason to travel still. Motivation to travel, in other words, was aplenty. But what exactly allowed for Christian religious travel in the 4th century AD to develop as quickly as it did? (shrink)

In recent years noise seems to have become an interdisciplinary concept par excellence, apt to capturing important dynamics at work whether in technological, scientific, social, or aesthetic domains. But when economists, biologists, psychologists, and musicians speak of noise, are they really all referring to the same thing? In An Epistemology of Noise Cecile Malaspina takes this dispersion of the notion of noise as a starting point, and moreover accepts that, when removed from its mathematical formulation in information theory and (...) spread into diverse disciplines, noise takes on a metaphorical ambiguity. Yet rather than aiming to eliminate this ambiguity, Malaspina sets out to account for it. The key problem in An Epistemology of Noise is not to identify the legitimate usage of the concept of noise, but rather to examine what happens when noise moves between disciplines, and what the ‘noisiness’ of this movement tells us about the conditions for interdisciplinary knowledge. Noise here is both an object (or many objects) of inquiry and a condition for that inquiry, and presents us with the problem of how knowledge can find its ground in these ‘shifting sands’ (9). (shrink)

Thepaperaimstoexplorethepotentialofresearchbydesigninarchi- tecture and visual arts. The main objective of the paper is to analyze the different models and epistemological positions advanced in the academic milieus as far as doctoral research by design is concerned, to explore the differences and similar- ities between research by design in the field of architecture and in the field of visual arts. Even though the research by design in the fields of architecture and visual arts is focused on the production of knowledge through visual, associative, (...) and experimental research, the models of research by design in visual arts differ from those prevailing in architectural programs. The paper focuses on a corpus of models of doctoral research by design carried out within different university pro- grams in schools of architecture and visual arts, and various multi-university and supra-disciplinary programs (architecture and visual arts) which share the inten- tion to develop their research projects through creative practice. Two questions to which this paper aims to respond are the following: Under which circumstances and conditions a work in the field of architecture (drawn, graphic, or con-structed) or its formulation (verbal or written) can be recognized as active in the constitution of knowledge? What are the modes of inquiry specific to architectural and artistic practices that make it possible to build knowledge that can be transmitted and shared? (shrink)

This paper evaluates the claim that it is possible to use nature’s variation in conjunction with retention and selection on the one hand, and the absence of ultimate groundedness of hypotheses generated by the human mind as it knows on the other hand, to discard the ascription of ultimate certainty to the rationality of human conjectures in the cognitive realm. This leads to an evaluation of the further assumption that successful hypotheses with specific applications, in other words heuristics, seem to (...) have a firm footing because they were useful in another context. I argue that usefulness evaluated through adaptation misconstrues the search for truth, and that it is possible to generate talk of randomness by neglecting aspects of a system’s insertion into a larger situation. The framing of the problem in terms of the elimination of unfit hypotheses is found to be unsatisfying. It is suggested that theories exist in a dimension where they can be kept alive rather than dying as phenotypes do. The proposal that the subconscious could suggest random variations is found to be a category mistake. A final appeal to phenomenology shows that this proposal is orphan in the history of epistemology, not in virtue of its being a remarkable find, but rather because it is ill-conceived. (shrink)

Co-authored research paper written with José Vela Castillo on the subject of Pablo Román's wall of 1,000 images, Vienna, 2013. -/- “Vienna” or “The Wall” is an ongoing project by architect/artist Pablo Román that, upon its completion, will consist of the round number of 1,000 images taped onto an off-white wall. One of the many walls he has designed/produced in the past months (architectural or otherwise), its elementary condition is at the same time enhanced and diminished by its very presence (...) as wall-cum-images, or as images-out-of-a-wall, eroding its foundational condition to a flickering-tele-techno-pixelated spectral apparatus. Its radically modern and outdated presence reconfigures contemporary reflections on what architecture and what the modern is, indirectly referencing “Fundamentals,” the 2014 Venice Architecture Biennale curated by Rem Koolhaas. (shrink)

In common with traditional forms of epistemic internalism, epistemological disjunctivism attempts to incorporate an awareness condition on justification. Unlike traditional forms of internalism, however, epistemological disjunctivism rejects the so-called New Evil Genius thesis. In so far as epistemological disjunctivism rejects the New Evil Genius thesis, it is revisionary. -/- After explaining what epistemological disjunctivism is, and how it relates to traditional forms of epistemic internalism / externalism, I shall argue that the epistemological disjunctivist’s account of the intuitions underlying the New (...) Evil Genius thought experiment is at best incomplete. As presented, therefore, epistemological disjunctivism is unable to accommodate the core guiding intuitions of epistemic internalism. Given the stated aim of not being revisionary on this score, the view is at a dialectical disadvantage over the traditional forms of epistemic internalism the position is meant to replace. Unfortunately, therefore, at present, the impasse between internalism and externalism remains. (shrink)

Orthodox epistemological disjunctivism involves the idea that paradigm cases of visual perceptual knowledge are based on visual perceptual states which are propositional, and hence representational. Given this, the orthodox version of epistemological disjunctivism takes on controversial representational commitments in the philosophy of perception. Must epistemological disjunctivism involve these commitments? I don’t think so. Here I argue that we can take epistemological disjunctivism in a new direction and develop a version of the view free of these representational commitments. The basic idea (...) is that instead of conceiving of knowledge grounding perceptions as states in which one sees that such-and-such is the case, we should instead conceive of them as states or episodes in which one sees a thing, we should conceive of them as thing-seeings. I’ll suggest that we can cast such seeings in a knowledge grounding role without conceiving of them as representational. But this is because we can put thing-seeings to epistemological work, in the framework of epistemological disjunctivism, whilst remaining neutral on whether or not they are propositional, or representational at all. The point, then, is not to replace epistemological disjunctivism’s controversial representational commitments with controversial non-representational commitments. The point is, rather, that epistemological disjunctivism can be developed with fewer commitments in the philosophy of perception than is usually appreciated. (shrink)

A common epistemological assumption in contemporary bioethics held b y both proponents and critics of non-traditional forms of cognitive enhancement is that cognitive enhancement aims at the facilitation of the accumulation of human knowledge. This paper does three central things. First, drawing from recent work in epistemology, a rival account of cognitive enhancement, framed in terms of the notion of cognitive achievement rather than knowledge, is proposed. Second, we outline and respond to an axiological objection to our proposal that (...) draws from recent work by Leon Kass (2004), Michael Sandel (2009), and John Harris (2011) to the effect that ‘enhanced’ cognitive achievements are (by effectively removing obstacles to success) not worthy of pursuit, or are otherwise ‘trivial’. Third, we show how the cognitive achievement account of cognitive enhancement proposed here fits snugly with recent active externalist approaches (e.g., extended cognition) in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

Standpoint epistemology, the view that social identity is relevant to knowledge-acquisition, has been consigned to the margins of mainstream philosophy. In part, this is because the principles of standpoint epistemology are taken to be in opposition to those which guide traditional epistemology. One goal of this paper is to tease out the characterization of traditional epistemology that is at odds with standpoint epistemology. The characterization of traditional epistemology that I put forth is one which (...) endorses the thesis of intellectualism, the view that knowledge does not depend on non-epistemic features. I then suggest that two further components – the atomistic view of knowers and aperspectivalism – can be usefully interpreted as supporting features of intellectualism. A further goal of this paper is to show that we ought to resist this characterization of traditional epistemology. I use pragmatic encroachment as a dialectical tool to motivate the denial of intellectualism, and consequently, the denial of both supporting components. I then attempt to show how it is possible to have a view, similar to pragmatic encroachment, that takes social identity, rather than stakes, to be the feature that makes a difference to what a person is in a position to know. (shrink)

The default view in the epistemology of forgetting is that human memory would be epistemically better if we were not so susceptible to forgetting—that forgetting is in general a cognitive vice. In this paper, I argue for the opposed view: normal human forgetting—the pattern of forgetting characteristic of cognitively normal adult human beings—approximates a virtue located at the mean between the opposed cognitive vices of forgetting too much and remembering too much. I argue, first, that, for any finite cognizer, (...) a certain pattern of forgetting is necessary if her memory is to perform its function well. I argue, second, that, by eliminating clutter from her memory store, this pattern of forgetting improves the overall shape of the subject’s total doxastic state. I conclude by reviewing work in psychology which suggests that normal human forgetting approximates this virtuous pattern of forgetting. (shrink)

The ideas behind open source software are currently applied to the production of encyclopedias. A sample of six English text-based, neutral-point-of-view, online encyclopedias of the kind are identified: h2g2, Wikipedia, Scholarpedia, Encyclopedia of Earth, Citizendium and Knol. How do these projects deal with the problem of trusting their participants to behave as competent and loyal encyclopedists? Editorial policies for soliciting and processing content are shown to range from high discretion to low discretion; that is, from granting unlimited trust to limited (...) trust. Their conceptions of the proper role for experts are also explored and it is argued that to a great extent they determine editorial policies. Subsequently, internal discussions about quality guarantee at Wikipedia are rendered. All indications are that review and ?super-review? of new edits will become policy, to be performed by Wikipedians with a better reputation. Finally, while for encyclopedias the issue of organizational trust largely coincides with epistemological trust, a link is made with theories about the acceptance of testimony. It is argued that both non-reductionist views (the ?acceptance principle? and the ?assurance view?) and reductionist ones (an appeal to background conditions, and a?newly defined??expertise view?) have been implemented in editorial strategies over the past decade. (shrink)

Yirminci yüzyıl bilimde büyük değişim ve dönüşümlerin gerçekleştiği bir dönemdir. Bu yüzyıl içerisinde moleküler biyoloji, kuantum fiziği, genetik mühendisliği ve biyoteknoloji gibi çeşitli bilimlerin temellerinin atıldığı, bilimsel keşifler ve yenilikler neticesinde kuramların ve teknolojilerin hızla geliştiği ve bu gelişmelerin insanlık tarihini köklü bir şekilde etkilediği bir dönem olmuştur. Yirminci yüzyılda bilimsel ilerleme önceki dönemlerden çok daha hızlı bir oranda gerçekleşmiş ve toplumsal yaşam üzerindeki etkisinin daha derin olduğu gözlemlenmiştir. Bu nedenle yirminci yüzyıl genellikle icatların ve teknolojik gelişmelerin yüzyılı olarak adlandırılmaktadır (...) çünkü bilimsel keşiflerin sayısı artmakla birlikte çok sayıda bilim insanı mevcut teknolojiyi daha etkin bir şekilde kullanarak çalıştıkları alanlarda kapsamlı sonuçlara ulaşmışlardır. Dolayısıyla bilim ve teknoloji bu süre zarfında geçmişte olduğundan çok daha yakın hale gelmiştir. Bununla birlikte, bilimin ilerlemesinin hızlı bir şekilde devam etmesi ve mevcut araştırmaların önemli bir kısmının tarihsel bir bakış açısıyla incelenemeyecek kadar yeni ve çok sayıda olması nedeniyle bu yüzyıldaki bütün bilimsel gelişmelerden ve disiplinlerden bahsetmek mümkün değildir. Bu sebeple yazının kapsamını daraltmak açısından yirminci yüzyılda bilimi ve teknolojiyi en çok etkileyen alan olan fizik bilimindeki önemli konulara değinmek bu dönemin ruhunu anlamak ve bilimin dönüşümüne yönelik bir kavrayışa sahip olmak açısından daha uygun gözükmektedir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmada Dünya’mızı ve evreninin işleyişini anlama konusunda başvurduğumuz disiplinlerden biri olan fizik biliminde yirminci yüzyılda devrimsel bir düşünce olarak karşımıza çıkan Albert Einstein’ın özel ve genel görelilik kuramına yer verilmekle birlikte aynı zamanda günümüzde etkileri bilimsel ve teknolojik düzeyde devam eden kuantum mekaniğine yönelik genel bir perspektif sunulmaktadır. (shrink)

There are three theories in the epistemology of modality that have received sustained attention over the past 20 years: conceivability-theory, counterfactual-theory, and deduction-theory. In this paper we argue that all three face what we call the problem of modal epistemic friction. One consequence of the problem is that for any of the three accounts to yield modal knowledge, the account must provide an epistemology of essence. We discuss an attempt to fend off the problem within the context of (...) the internalism versus externalism debate about epistemic justification. We then investigate the effects that the PMEF has on reductive and non-reductive theories of the relation between essence and modality. (shrink)

In a recent paper in this journal, Carter and Peterson raise two distinctly epistemological puzzles that arise for anyone aspiring to defend the precautionary principle. The first puzzle trades on an application of epistemic contextualism to the precautionary principle; the second puzzle concerns the compatibility of the precautionary principle with the de minimis rule. In this note, I argue that neither puzzle should worry defenders of the precautionary principle. The first puzzle can be shown to be an instance of the (...) familiar but conceptually harmless challenge of adjudicating between relevant interests to reach assessments of threats when applying the precautionary principle. The second puzzle can be shown to rely on a subtle but crucial misrepresentation of the relevant probabilities at play when applying the precautionary principle. (shrink)

It is often assumed that the first stage of many classical arguments for theism depends upon some version of the Principle of Sufficient Reason being true. Unfortunately for classical theists, PSR is a controversial thesis that has come under rather severe criticism in the contemporary literature. In this article, I grant for the sake of argument that every version of PSR is false. Thus, I concede with the critics of PSR, that it is possible that there is, at least, one (...) fact that is ontologically brute. I then proffer an epistemological challenge to ontological bruteness. Specifically, I argue that whenever a knowledge seeker, S, perceives some unexplained fact, F, it is never reasonable for S to believe F is ontologically brute. I conclude that, even if PSR is false, it is more reasonable to believe that the key premise in the first stage of classical arguments for theism is true. (shrink)

We review some of the major accounts in the current epistemology of modality and identify some shared issues that plague all of them. In order to provide insight into the nature of modal statements in science, philosophy, and beyond, a satisfactory epistemology of modality would need to be suitably applicable to practical and theoretical contexts by limited beings. However, many epistemologies of modality seem to work only when we have access to the kind of knowledge that is at (...) least currently beyond our reach. Or, in the extreme case, it is argued that even if we knew all the relevant information about the respective domain – or even the entire state of the world – there would still remain a special class of modal truths that would be left unaccounted for. Neither picture bodes well for practical applicability, nor for the philosophical justification of these epistemologies. This is especially the case as we hold that one of the main motivations for modal inquiry typically arises in cases of imperfect information and limited cognitive resources. We close by providing a partial remedy to the situation by suggesting an overall framework of relative modality (RM) that can be used to both unify some existing modal epistemologies and, at the same time, make them more metaphysically modest. (shrink)

This article addresses an open problem in the area of cognitive systems and architectures: namely the problem of handling (in terms of processing and reasoning capabilities) complex knowledge structures that can be at least plausibly comparable, both in terms of size and of typology of the encoded information, to the knowledge that humans process daily for executing everyday activities. Handling a huge amount of knowledge, and selectively retrieve it according to the needs emerging in different situational scenarios, is an important (...) aspect of human intelligence. For this task, in fact, humans adopt a wide range of heuristics (Gigerenzer & Todd) due to their “bounded rationality” (Simon, 1957). In this perspective, one of the requirements that should be considered for the design, the realization and the evaluation of intelligent cognitively-inspired systems should be rep- resented by their ability of heuristically identify and retrieve, from the general knowledge stored in their artificial Long Term Memory (LTM), that one which is synthetically and contextually relevant. This requirement, however, is often neglected. Currently, artificial cognitive systems and architectures are not able, de facto, to deal with complex knowledge structures that can be even slightly comparable to the knowledge heuris- tically managed by humans. In this paper I will argue that this is not only a technological problem but also an epistemological one and I will briefly sketch a proposal for a possible solution. (shrink)

According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — that (...) is, an account of knowledge where only truth-related factors figure in whether or not a person knows. In the first part of this paper I try to clarify the intellectualist thesis and to distinguish what I take to be its two main strains. In the remainder of the paper I then take a more critical turn and argue that even if, as a matter of fact, traditional epistemology has endorsed intellectualism in both of its strains, this is a mistake on the part of the tradition. At least one way of understanding intellectualism should be rejected and its practicalist counterpart should be accepted instead. (shrink)

Chapter 20 of the Philosophy of Happiness book by Martin Janello. Please see the Table of Contents for its contextual order. An audio version of this and all other sections of the book, an entire on-line review copy, and a host of other pertinent materials are available without charge at the referenced website.

So-called “traditional epistemology” and “Bayesian epistemology” share a word, but it may often seem that the enterprises hardly share a subject matter. They differ in their central concepts. They differ in their main concerns. They differ in their main theoretical moves. And they often differ in their methodology. However, in the last decade or so, there have been a number of attempts to build bridges between the two epistemologies. Indeed, many would say that there is just one branch (...) of philosophy here—epistemology. There is a common subject matter after all. In this paper, we begin by playing the role of a “bad cop,” emphasizing many apparent points of disconnection, and even conflict, between the approaches to epistemology. We then switch role, playing a “good cop” who insists that the approaches are engaged in common projects after all. We look at various ways in which the gaps between them have been bridged, and we consider the prospects for bridging them further. We conclude that this is an exciting time for epistemology, as the two traditions can learn, and have started learning, from each other. (shrink)

It is now common to distinguish Metaphysical from Epistemological Disjunctivism. It is equally common to suggest that it is at least not obvious that the latter requires a commitment to the former: at the very least, a suitable bridge principle will need to be identified which takes one from the latter to the former. This paper identifies a plausible-looking bridge principle that takes one from the version of Epistemological Disjunctivism defended by John McDowell and Duncan Pritchard, which I label Reflective (...) Epistemological Disjunctivism, or (RED), to Metaphysical Disjunctivism. Moreover, it identifies a modification the proponent of (RED) could, and should, make to the Internalist component of their theory, and argues that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism remains, even if such a modification is made. The upshot is that the commitment to Metaphysical Disjunctivism on the part of (RED) is shown to be particularly robust. (shrink)

Pritchard argues that epistemological disjunctivism seems plainly false at first sight, but if it were right, it would represent the “holy grail of epistemology” (1), a view that allows us “to have our cake and eat it too” (3). This prospect motivates Pritchard to develop and defend an account that prima facie might seem simply false. It is disputable whether ED really seems plainly false at first sight or whether this intuition is based on a particular philosophical tradition. However, (...) in this paper I will not discuss whether ED is actually true. Rather, I will investigate whether, if true, it has the advantages over rival accounts that Pritchard claims. (shrink)

The renaissance of epistemology between the two world wars forms a bridge between early modern and contemporary philosophy of knowledge. This paper traces the resurgence of interest in epistemology at the turn of the century, as a reaction against the nineteenth-century development of Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealism, through the interwar renaissance of epistemology, prompted by major advances in mathematics, logic, and physics, and its ultimate transformation from a theory of ideas and judgement into a theory of propositional (...) attitudes, sentences, and meanings. (shrink)

This paper draws upon the works of Wilfred Sellars, Jerry Fodor, and Ruth Millikan to argue against epistemological holism and conceptual holism. In the first section, I content that contrary to confirmation holism, there are individual beliefs ("basic beliefs") that receive nondoxastic/noninferential warrant. In the earliest stages of cognitive development, modular processes produce basic beliefs about how things are. The disadvantage of this type of basic belief is that the person may possess information that should have defeated the belief but (...) that was not taken into account in the module's operations. For this reason, at more advanced stages of cognitive development, basic beliefs concern how things appear to be. These appearance beliefs are not formed holistically but should be checked against background beliefs before the person infers how things are. In the second section, I argue against functional-role/inferential-role semantics. Championing teleosemantics, I argue that many concepts' meanings are not determined by the meanings of other concepts. Rather, many concepts are skills of knowing how to identify of what the concept is. These skills can be developed independently of other beliefs or skills and are, in an important sense, theory-neutral. (shrink)

The renaissance of epistemology between the two world wars forms a bridge between early modern and contemporary philosophy of knowledge. This paper traces the resurgence of interest in epistemology at the turn of the century, as a reaction against the nineteenth-century development of Neo-Kantian and Neo-Hegelian idealism, through the interwar renaissance of epistemology, prompted by major advances in mathematics, logic, and physics, and its ultimate transformation from a theory of ideas and judgement into a theory of propositional (...) attitudes, sentences, and meanings. (shrink)

While epistemologists have long debated what it takes for beliefs to be justified, they've devoted much less collective attention to the question of what it takes for beliefs to be excused, and how excuses differ from justifications. This stands in contrast to the state of affairs in legal scholarship, where the contrast between justifications and excuses is a standard topic in introductory criminal law textbooks. My goal in this paper is to extract some lessons from legal theory for epistemologists seeking (...) to distinguish epistemic justifications from epistemic excuses. First, I'll provide a brief overview of appeals to the justification/excuse distinction in epistemology, focusing on the internalism/externalism debate. Then, I'll identify some choice points in legal theory for how to think about the function of the justification/excuse distinction, and will in turn correspond to analogous choice points in epistemology. Ultimately, I'll argue that depending on which way we go at some crucial junctures, we can motivate either a traditional, non‐factive, internalist conception of justification, or a purely factive one where truth is all that's required for a belief to be justified. But there's no clear path, via legal theory, to view that only beliefs that amount to knowledge are justified. (shrink)

Engaging with the philosophical writings of Iris Murdoch, we submit that there are difficulties associated with providing a good description of morality that are intimately connected with difficulties in understanding other human beings. We suggest three senses in which moral philosophical reflection needs to account for our understanding of others: (1) the failure to understand someone is not merely an intellectual failure, but also engages us morally; (2) the moral question of understanding is not limited to the extent to which (...) we understand a particular person, but also presents itself in how we picture difficulties in understanding people; and (3) “philosophical pictures of morality” fundamentally shape the conceptual framework we use to investigate morality, as well as the analysis of morality we find illuminative and satisfactory. Exploring the implications of these claims, we ask what it means to think of others as the same, or as different, from ourselves. We then consider the ethical significance of finding, or not finding, our feet in our encounters with others, dwelling on how the metaphor of movement reveals one way in which we are never at peace in the exploration of morality. (shrink)

In this paper, I respond to an objection raised by Duncan Pritchard and Jesper Kallestrup against virtue epistemology. In particular, they argue that the virtue epistemologist must either deny that S knows that p only if S believes that p because of S’s virtuous operation or deny that intuitive cases of testimonial knowledge. Their dilemma has roots in the apparent ease by which we obtain testimonial knowledge and, thus, how the virtue epistemologist can explain such knowledge in a way (...) that both preserves testimonial knowledge and grounds it in one’s virtues. I argue that the virtue epistemologist has a way to accomplish both tasks if we take epistemic trust to be an intellectual virtue. I briefly discuss what such trust must look like and then apply it to the dilemma at hand: showing that a key intellectual virtue plausibly operates in cases of testimonial knowledge and/or belief. (shrink)

This essay defends a novel form of virtue epistemology: Modal Virtue Epistemology. It borrows from traditional virtue epistemology the idea that knowledge is a type of skillful performance. But it goes on to understand skillfulness in purely modal terms — that is, in terms of success across a range of counterfactual scenarios. We argue that this approach offers a promising way of synthesizing virtue epistemology with a modal account of knowledge, according to which knowledge is safe (...) belief. In particular, we argue that the modal elements of the view offer important advantages over traditional virtue epistemology, which assigns a central explanatory role to aptness. At the same time, the virtue epistemological elements of the theory reveal new avenues for overcoming obstacles to traditional modal accounts of knowledge. Finally, we highlight the advantages of Modal Virtue Epistemology over alternative syntheses, such as Pritchard's (2012) hybrid approach. (shrink)

Bayesianism is our leading theory of uncertainty. Epistemology is defined as the theory of knowledge. So “Bayesian Epistemology” may sound like an oxymoron. Bayesianism, after all, studies the properties and dynamics of degrees of belief, understood to be probabilities. Traditional epistemology, on the other hand, places the singularly non-probabilistic notion of knowledge at centre stage, and to the extent that it traffics in belief, that notion does not come in degrees. So how can there be a Bayesian (...) epistemology? (shrink)

In this paper I explore Phyllis Rooney’s 2003 chapter, “Feminist Epistemology and Naturalized Epistemology: An Uneasy Alliance,” taking guidance from her critique of naturalized epistemology in pursuing my own analysis of another uneasy alliance: that between feminist epistemology and social epistemology. Investigating some of the background assumptions at work in prominent conceptions of social epistemology, I consider recent analyses of "epistemic bubbles" to ask how closely such analyses are aligned with ongoing research in feminist (...) epistemology. I argue that critical feminist insights in political philosophy are called for here, especially those that focus on multiple politically salient relationships and also emphasize practices of personal transformation as inseparably bound up with broader movements for social transformation. Insofar as feminist epistemology continues to carry another world in its heart, I argue that it will continue to rest uneasily with any effort to align it with—let alone subsume it within—the still emerging field of social epistemology. (shrink)

This article argues for epistemic decolonization by developing a relational model of knowledge, which we locate within indigenous knowledges. We live in a time of ongoing global, epistemic coloniality, embedded in and shaped by colonial ideas and practices. Epistemological decolonization requires taking nondominant knowledges and their epistemes seriously to open up the possibility of interrogating and dismantling the hegemony of the Western knowledge tradition. We here ask two related questions: What are the decolonial affordances of indigenous knowledges? And how do (...) these compare to other contemporary critiques of epistemic coloniality, specifically those mounted by posthumanism? In answer, we develop three definitional senses of relational with reference to indigenous knowledges. First, we define indigenous knowledges in relation to Western knowledge, with which they share a dialectical origin at the moment of colonial contact. Second, indigenous knowledges are relational in their ontological and axiological orientations. Third, relationality in indigenous knowledge suggests a trialectic space, rather than a dialectic space. We argue for the necessity of an anticolonial framework, which assigns priority to indigenous people’s perceptions and ways of knowing for theorizing recurring colonial relations and their (imperialistic) manifestations in producing and reproducing knowledge. (shrink)