Results for 'fictional entities'

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  1. Fictional Entities.Fiora Salis - 2013 - Online Companion to Problems in Analytic Philosophy.
    In this entry I present one of the most hotly debated issues in contemporary analytic philosophy regarding the nature of fictional entities and the motivations that might be adduced for and against positing them into our ontology. The entry is divided in two parts. In the first part I offer an overview of the main accounts of the metaphysics of fictional entities according to three standard realist views, fictional Meinongianism, fictional possibilism and fictional (...)
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  2. A Suitable Metaphysics for Fictional Entities.Alberto Voltolini - 2015 - In S. Brock & A. Everett (eds.), Fictional Objects. Oxford University Press. pp. 129-146.
    There is a list of desiderata that any good metaphysics of fictional entities should be able to fulfill. These desiderata are: 1) the nonexistence of fictional entities; 2) the causal inefficacy of suchentities;3)the incompleteness of such entities;4)the created character of such entities; 5) the actual possession by ficta of the narrated properties; 6) the unrevisable ascription to ficta of such properties; and 7) the necessary possession by ficta of such properties. (Im)possibilist metaphysics uncontroversially satisfy (...)
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  3. Fictional Characters and Their Discontents: Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics of Fictional Entities.Shamik Chakravarty - 2021 - Dissertation, Lingnan University
    In recent metaphysics, the questions of whether fictional entities exist, what their nature is, and how to explain truths of statements such as “Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street” and “Holmes was created by Arthur Conan Doyle” have been subject to much debate. The main aim of my thesis is to wrestle with key proponents of the abstractionist view that fictional entities are abstract objects that exist (van Inwagen 1977, 2018, Thomasson 1999 and Salmon 1998) (...)
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  4. Fiction As a Vehicle for Truth: Moving Beyond the Ontic Conception.Alisa Bokulich - 2016 - The Monist 99 (3):260-279.
    Despite widespread evidence that fictional models play an explanatory role in science, resistance remains to the idea that fictions can explain. A central source of this resistance is a particular view about what explanations are, namely, the ontic conception of explanation. According to the ontic conception, explanations just are the concrete entities in the world. I argue this conception is ultimately incoherent and that even a weaker version of the ontic conception fails. Fictional models can succeed in (...)
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  5. Reference Fiction, and Omission.Samuel Murray - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):235-257.
    In this paper, I argue that sentences that contain ‘omission’ tokens that appear to function as singular terms are meaningful while maintaining the view that omissions are nothing at all or mere absences. I take omissions to be fictional entities and claim that the way in which sentences about fictional characters are true parallels the way in which sentences about omissions are true. I develop a pragmatic account of fictional reference and argue that my fictionalist account (...)
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  6. Fictional Realism and Indeterminate Identity.Brendan Murday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:205-225.
    Fictional realists hold that fictional characters are real entities. However, Anthony Everett [“Against Fictional Realism”, Journal of Philosophy (2005)] notes that some fictions leave it indeterminate whether character A is identical to character B, while other fictions depict A as simultaneously identical and distinct from B. Everett argues that these fictions commit the realist to indeterminate and impossible identity relations among actual entities, and that as such realism is untenable. This paper defends fictional realism: (...)
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  7. Is the Paradox of Fiction Soluble in Psychology?Florian Cova & Fabrice Teroni - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):930-942.
    If feeling a genuine emotion requires believing that its object actually exists, and if this is a belief we are unlikely to have about fictional entities, then how could we feel genuine emotions towards these entities? This question lies at the core of the paradox of fiction. Since its original formulation, this paradox has generated a substantial literature. Until recently, the dominant strategy had consisted in trying to solve it. Yet, it is more and more frequent for (...)
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  8.  88
    Singular Reference in Fictional Discourse?Manuel García-Carpintero - 2019 - Disputatio 11 (54):143-177.
    Singular terms used in fictions for fictional characters raise well-known philosophical issues, explored in depth in the literature. But philosophers typically assume that names already in use to refer to “moderatesized specimens of dry goods” cause no special problem when occurring in fictions, behaving there as they ordinarily do in straightforward assertions. In this paper I continue a debate with Stacie Friend, arguing against this for the exceptionalist view that names of real entities in fictional discourse don’t (...)
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  9. The Fictionality of Plays.John Dilworth - 2002 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (3):263–273.
    The category of works of fiction is a very broad and heterogeneous one. I do have a general thesis in mind about such works, namely, that they themselves are fictional, in much the same way as are the fictional events or entities that they are about. But a defense of such a broad thesis would provide an intractably complex topic for an introductory essay, so I shall here confine myself to a presentation of a similar thesis for (...)
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  10. Composition as a Fiction.Gideon Rosen & Cian Dorr - 2002 - In Richard Gale (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Metaphysics. Blackwell. pp. 151--174.
    Region R Question: How many objects — entities, things — are contained in R? Ignore the empty space. Our question might better be put, 'How many material objects does R contain?' Let's stipulate that A, B and C are metaphysical atoms: absolutely simple entities with no parts whatsoever besides themselves. So you don't have to worry about counting a particle's top half and bottom half as different objects. Perhaps they are 'point-particles', with no length, width or breadth. Perhaps (...)
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  11. Ingarden Vs. Meinong on the Logic of Fiction.Barry Smith - 1980 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1/2):93-105.
    For Meinong, familiarly, fictional entities are not created, but rather merely discovered (or picked out) from the inexhaustible realm of Aussersein (beyond being and non-being). The phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, in contrast, offers in his Literary Work of Art of 1931 a constructive ontology of fiction, which views fictional objects as entities which are created by the acts of an author (as laws, for example, are created by acts of parliament). We outline the logic of fiction which (...)
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  12.  65
    An Asymmetry Of Implicit Fictional Narrators In Literature And Film.Mario Slugan - 2010 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 7 (2):26-37.
    Recently, the debate on the ubiquity of fictional narrators – whether every fictional narrative has a fictional narrator – has spread from film to literature. George Wilson reacted to Noël Carroll’s and Andrew Kania’s claims that no fictional narrators but 1 explicit ones such as Ishmael from Herman Melville’s Moby-Dick exist. a near-ubiquity position claiming that almost every fictional novel, except those consisting exclusively of dialogue, has at least a minimal narrating agency or a (...) narrator. Yet, he disassociated himself from the usual ontological-gap argument made to support such claims. In other words, he denied the main tenet of an argument made by Jerrold Levinson; the claim that only fictional entities are able of presenting fictional events to the reader or viewer. (shrink)
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  13. Fictional Creations.Maarten Steenhagen - 2021 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism.
    Many people assume that fictional entities are encapsulated in the world of fiction. I show that this cannot be right. Some works of fiction tell us about pieces of poetry, music, or theatre written by fictional characters. Such creations are fictional creations, as I will call them. Their authors do not exist. But that does not take away that we can perform, recite, or otherwise generate actual instances of such works. This means we can bring such (...)
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  14. Crossworks ‘Identity’ and Intrawork* Identity of a Fictional Character.Alberto Voltolini - 2012 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 262 (4):561-576.
    In this paper I want to show that the idea supporters of traditional creationism (TC) defend, that success of a fictional character across different works has to be accounted for in terms of the persistence of (numerically) one and the same fictional entity, is incorrect. For the supposedly commonsensical data on which those supporters claim their ideas rely are rather controversial. Once they are properly interpreted, they can rather be accommodated by moderate creationism (MC), according to which (...) characters arise out of a reflexive stance on a certain make-believe process. For MC, success of a fictional character across different works amounts to the fact that, first, different work-bound ficta are related with each other by means of a relation weaker than numerical identity, transfictional sameness, and second, that all those ficta are related by transfictional inclusion to a fictum that in some sense gather them all, the so-called general character. Since a general character is an abstract constructed entity, moreover, the more those particular ficta are generated, the more general fictional characters including all of them arise. (shrink)
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  15.  46
    Imagination Extended and Embedded: Artifactual Versus Fictional Accounts of Models.Tarja Knuuttila - forthcoming - Synthese:1-21.
    This paper presents an artifactual approach to models that also addresses their fictional features. It discusses first the imaginary accounts of models and fiction that set model descriptions apart from imagined-objects, concentrating on the latter :251–268, 2010; Frigg and Nguyen in The Monist 99:225–242, 2016; Godfrey-Smith in Biol Philos 21:725–740, 2006; Philos Stud 143:101–116, 2009). While the imaginary approaches accommodate surrogative reasoning as an important characteristic of scientific modeling, they simultaneously raise difficult questions concerning how the imagined entities (...)
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  16. How Creationism Supports for Kripke’s Vichianism on Fiction.Alberto Voltolini - 2011 - In F. Lihoreau (ed.), Truth in Fiction. Ontos Verlag. pp. 38--93.
    In this paper, I want to show that a reasonable thesis on truth in fiction, Fictional Vichianism (FV)—according to which fictional truths are true because they are stipulated to be true—can be positively endorsed if one grounds Kripke’s justification for (FV), that traces back to the idea that names used in fiction never refer to concrete real individuals, into a creationist position on fictional entities that allows for a distinction between the pretending and the characterizing use (...)
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  17. Spinoza on Fictitious Ideas and Possible Entities.Oberto Marrama - 2016 - The European Legacy 21 (4):359-372.
    The aim of this article is twofold: to provide a valid account of Spinoza’s theory of fictitious ideas, and to demonstrate its coherency with the overall modal metaphysics underpinning his philosophical system. According to Leibniz, the existence of romances and novels would be sufficient to demonstrate, against Spinoza’s necessitarianism, that possible entities exist and are intelligible, and that many other worlds different from ours could have existed in its place. I argue that Spinoza does not actually need to resort (...)
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  18. A Defense of Causal Creationism in Fiction.David Sackris - 2013 - Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46.
    In this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying (...)
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  19. Are There Non-Existent Entities?Theodore J. Everett - 2005 - In Larry Lee Blackman (ed.), The Philosophy of Panayot Butchvarov: a collegial evaluation. Edwin Mellen Press. pp. 3-19.
    There are things of which it is true to say that there are no such things. How can we resolve this paradox? Panayot Butchvarov argues that there are objects of reference that are not also entities, where the former must merely be thinkable but the latter must be indefinitely re-identifiable. This paper argues that fictional and many other unreal objects are indeed indefinitely re-identifiable, so they must be counted as existing things on Butchvarov's theory. The paradox is best (...)
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  20. The Organism – Reality or Fiction?Charles T. Wolfe - 2014 - The Philosophers' Magazine (67):96-101.
    A reflection on organisms as real entities, as constructions, or as fictions.
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  21. 'I' Am a Fiction: An Analysis of the No-Self Theories.Vineet Sahu - 2012 - Indian Philosophical Quarterly 39 (1-2):117-128.
    The pronoun ‘I’ refers to myself from the first-person perspective and a person (me) from the third person perspective. Essentially there is something common between the two perspectives taken: ‘I’ from the first person perspective refers to ‘self’; from the third person perspective refers to a ‘person’. Now ‘self’ and ‘person’ signify the same concept. ‘Self’ is a term used in context of first-person statements and ‘person’ is a term used in third person contexts. Both the terms refer to the (...)
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  22. Some Building Blocks for a Theory of the Firm as a Real Entity.David Gindis - 2007 - In Yuri Biondi, Arnaldo Canziani & Thierry Kirat (eds.), The Firm as an Entity: Implications for Economics, Accounting and the Law. London, UK: pp. 266-291.
    The firm is a real entity and not an imaginary, fictitious or linguistic entity. This implies that the firm as a whole exhibits a sufficient degree of unity or cohesiveness and is durable and persistent through time. The firm is essentially composed of a particular combination of constituents that are bound together by something that acts as an ontological glue, and is therefore non-reducible to other more basic entities, i.e., to its parts or its members. From our perspective, the (...)
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  23. Creationism and Cardinality.Daniel Nolan & Alexander Sandgren - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):615-622.
    Creationism about fictional entities requires a principle connecting what fictions say exist with which fictional entities really exist. The most natural way of spelling out such a principle yields inconsistent verdicts about how many fictional entities are generated by certain inconsistent fictions. Avoiding inconsistency without compromising the attractions of creationism will not be easy.
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  24.  77
    Ingarden versus Meinong o logice fikcji.Barry Smith - 1998 - In Z. Muszyński (ed.), Z badań nad prawdą i poznaniem. Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMC-S. pp. 283–296.
    : For Meinong, familiarly, fictional entities are not created, but rather merely discovered (or picked out) from the inexhaustible realm of Aussersein (beyond being and non-being). The phenomenologist Roman Ingarden, in contrast, offers in his Literary Work of Art of 1931 a constructive ontology of fiction, which views fictional objects as entities which are created by the acts of an author (as laws, for example, are created by acts of parliament). We outline the logic of fiction (...)
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  25. The Problem of Creation and Abstract Artifacts.Nurbay Irmak - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):9695-9708.
    Abstract artifacts such as musical works and fictional entities are human creations; they are intentional products of our actions and activities. One line of argument against abstract artifacts is that abstract objects are not the kind of objects that can be created. This is so, it is argued, because abstract objects are causally inert. Since creation requires being caused to exist, abstract objects cannot be created. One common way to refute this argument is to reject the causal inefficacy (...)
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  26. The Ontology of Theoretical Modelling: Models as Make-Believe.Adam Toon - 2010 - Synthese 172 (2):301-315.
    The descriptions and theoretical laws scientists write down when they model a system are often false of any real system. And yet we commonly talk as if there were objects that satisfy the scientists’ assumptions and as if we may learn about their properties. Many attempt to make sense of this by taking the scientists’ descriptions and theoretical laws to define abstract or fictional entities. In this paper, I propose an alternative account of theoretical modelling that draws upon (...)
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  27. Internal Versus External Representation.John Dilworth - 2004 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 62 (1):23-36.
    I argue that the concept of representation is ambiguous: a picture of 'a man', when there is no actual man that it depicts, both does, in one sense, and does not, in another sense, represent 'a man'--hence the need for a distinction of internal from external representation. Internal representation is also defended from reductive, non-referential alternative views, and from 'prosthesis' views of picturing, according to which seeing a picture of an actual man just is seeing through the picture to that (...)
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  28. The Ontology of Reference: Studies in Logic and Phenomenology.Barry Smith - 1976 - Dissertation, Manchester
    Abstract: We propose a dichotomy between object-entities and meaning-entities. The former are entities such as molecules, cells, organisms, organizations, numbers, shapes, and so forth. The latter are entities such as concepts, propositions, and theories belonging to the realm of logic. Frege distinguished analogously between a ‘realm of reference’ and a ‘realm of sense’, which he presented in some passages as mutually exclusive. This however contradicts his assumption elsewhere that every entity is a referent (even Fregean senses (...)
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  29. Review of Anthony Everett, The Nonexistent. [REVIEW]Catharine Abell - 2016 - British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (2):209-212.
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  30. The Vagueness Argument Against Abstract Artifacts.Daniel Z. Korman - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):57-71.
    Words, languages, symphonies, fictional characters, games, and recipes are plausibly abstract artifacts— entities that have no spatial location and that are deliberately brought into existence as a result of creative acts. Many accept that composition is unrestricted: for every plurality of material objects, there is a material object that is the sum of those objects. These two views may seem entirely unrelated. I will argue that the most influential argument against restricted composition—the vagueness argument—doubles as an argument that (...)
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  31. Voltolini's Ficta.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):57-66.
    As the subtitle “A Syncretistic Account of Fictional Entities” makes clear, Alberto Voltolini intends in this book to argue for a syncretic view of the ontology and the semantics of fiction. In the process, he offers sympathetic and clear presentations of the main contenders in the field, discussing first ontological matters (chapters 1–4) and then semantic questions (chapters 5–6), and concluding with an ‘ontological’ argument for the allegedly syncretic brand of realism about fictional entities he has (...)
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  32.  77
    Towards a New Theory of Modal Fictionalism.Áron Dombrovszki - 2017 - Ostium 13 (4).
    In our everyday discourse, most of us use modal statements to express possibility, necessity, or contingency. Logicians, linguists, and philosophers of language tend to use the possible world discourse to analyse the semantics of this kind of sentences. There is a disadvantage of this method: in the usual Quinean meta-ontology it commits the users to the existence of possible worlds. Even though there are many theories on metaphysics of these possible worlds, I will focus on the fictionalist approach, which aims (...)
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  33. Du Ch'telet on the Need for Mathematics in Physics.Aaron Wells - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):1137-1148.
    There is a tension in Emilie Du Châtelet’s thought on mathematics. The objects of mathematics are ideal or fictional entities; nevertheless, mathematics is presented as indispensable for an account of the physical world. After outlining Du Châtelet’s position, and showing how she departs from Christian Wolff’s pessimism about Newtonian mathematical physics, I show that the tension in her position is only apparent. Du Châtelet has a worked-out defense of the explanatory and epistemic need for mathematical objects, consistent with (...)
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  34. Uma solução artefactual para o problema da referência de objetos fictícios.Francisco Lages - 2017 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    Nosso trabalho pretende traçar um percurso teórico sobre a referência de objetos fictícios. Para tanto, apresentamos o tratamento de Frege, Russell e Meinong com o intuito de fornecer o pano de fundo clássico sobre o qual nosso tema se encontra. Tentamos mostrar a insuficiência desse quadro clássico de teses tendo em vista suas soluções para a referência de objetos fictícios e o resultado esperado por nós. Por isso, sugerimos a linha argumentativa delineada por Kripke a partir de Naming and Necessity, (...)
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  35. The Realistic Angel: Pictorial Realism as Hypothetical Verity.Christopher Buckman - 2015 - Aesthetic Investigations 1 (1):49-58.
    My main objective in this paper is to formulate a view of pictorial realism I call ‘hypothetical verity’. It owes much to John Kulvicki but diverges from his view in an important respect: rather than thinking that realistic pictures are true to our conceptions of things, I hold that they are true to what things would be like if they existed. In addition, I agree with Dominic Lopes that different realisms reflect different aspects of reality, but restate the case without (...)
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  36. Intentionality Without Exotica.R. M. Sainsbury - 2010 - In Robin Jeshion (ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought.
    The paper argues that intensional phenomena can be explained without appealing to "exotic" entities: one that don't exist, are merely possible, or are essentially abstract.
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  37. Self Unbound: Ego Dissolution in Psychedelic Experience.Chris Letheby & Philip Gerrans - 2017 - Neuroscience of Consciousness 3:1-11.
    Users of psychedelic drugs often report that their sense of being a self or ‘I’ distinct from the rest of the world has diminished or altogether dissolved. Neuroscientific study of such ‘ego dissolution’ experiences offers a window onto the nature of self-awareness. We argue that ego dissolution is best explained by an account that explains self-awareness as resulting from the integrated functioning of hierarchical predictive models which posit the existence of a stable and unchanging entity to which representations are bound. (...)
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  38.  84
    Force, Content and the Varieties of Unity.Michael Schmitz - forthcoming - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, content and the unity of the proposition. Routledge.
    In this paper I propose three steps to overcome the force-content dichotomy and dispel the Frege point. First, we should ascribe content to force indicators. Through basic assertoric and directive force indicators such as intonation, word order and mood, a subject presents its position of theoretical or practical knowledge of a state of affairs as a fact, as something that is the case, or as a goal, as something to do. Force indicators do not operate on truth- or satisfaction evaluable (...)
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  39. Philosophy of Games.C. Thi Nguyen - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (8):e12426.
    What is a game? What are we doing when we play a game? What is the value of playing games? Several different philosophical subdisciplines have attempted to answer these questions using very distinctive frameworks. Some have approached games as something like a text, deploying theoretical frameworks from the study of narrative, fiction, and rhetoric to interrogate games for their representational content. Others have approached games as artworks and asked questions about the authorship of games, about the ontology of the work (...)
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  40. In Defence of Existence Questions.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2014 - Monist 97 (7):460–478.
    Do numbers exist? Do properties? Do possible worlds? Do fictional characters? Many metaphysicians spend time and effort trying to answer these and other questions about the existence of various entities. These inquiries have recently encountered opposition: a group of philosophers, drawing inspiration from Aristotle, have argued that many or all of the existence questions debated by metaphysicians can be answered trivially, and so are not worth debating. Our task is to defend existence questions from the neo-Aristotelians' attacks.
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  41. I Am Also of the Opinion That Materialism Must Be Destroyed.Graham Harman - 2010 - Environment and Planning D 28 (5):1-17.
    This paper criticizes two forms of philosophical materialism that adopt opposite strategies but end up in the same place. Both hold that individual entities must be banished from philosophy. The first kind is ground floor materialism, which attempts to dissolve all objects into some deeper underlying basis; here, objects are seen as too shallow to be the truth. The second kind is first floor materialism, which treats objects as naive fictions gullibly posited behind the direct accessibility of appearances or (...)
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  42. A Typology of Posthumanism: A Framework for Differentiating Analytic, Synthetic, Theoretical, and Practical Posthumanisms.Matthew E. Gladden - 2016 - In Sapient Circuits and Digitalized Flesh: The Organization as Locus of Technological Posthumanization. Defragmenter Media. pp. 31-91.
    The term ‘posthumanism’ has been employed to describe a diverse array of phenomena ranging from academic disciplines and artistic movements to political advocacy campaigns and the development of commercial technologies. Such phenomena differ widely in their subject matter, purpose, and methodology, raising the question of whether it is possible to fashion a coherent definition of posthumanism that encompasses all phenomena thus labelled. In this text, we seek to bring greater clarity to this discussion by formulating a novel conceptual framework for (...)
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  43. Metaphor, Fictionalism, Make-Believe: Response to Elisabeth Camp.Kendall L. Walton - manuscript
    Prop oriented make-believe is make-believe utilized for the purpose of understanding what I call “props,” actual objects or states of affairs that make propositions “fictional,” true in the make-believe world. I, David Hills, and others have claimed that prop oriented make-believe lies at the heart of the functioning of many metaphors, and one variety of fictionalism in metaphysics invokes prop oriented make-believe to explain away apparent references to entities some find questionable or problematic (fictional characters, propositions, moral (...)
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  44.  33
    From Primal Scenes to Synthetic Cells.Hub Zwart - 2019 - eLife 8.
    Synthetic cells spark intriguing questions about the nature of life. Projects such as BaSyC (‘Building a Synthetic Cell’) aim to build an entity that mimics how living cells work from basic components. But what kind of entity would a synthetic cell really be? I assess this question from a philosophical perspective, and show how early fictional narratives of artificial life – such as the laboratory scene in Goethe’s Faust – can help us to understand the challenges faced by synthetic (...)
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  45. 0 = ∞ The Nietzschean Concept of Becoming in the Figures of Christ and Zorba the Greek.Peter Klapes - 2018 - Episteme 29:21-28.
    In his Twilight of the Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche praises Heraclitus, the Greek pre-Socratic, for his “assertion that being is an empty fiction.” 1 The philosophical notion of being, which seems to refer to fixed entities or substances, is eclipsed (at least in the mind of Nietzsche [and perhaps other philosophers—Gilles Deleuze comes to mind]) by the notion of becoming. As a result of our innate nothingness—which I defend linguistically, via the structuralist concept of the arbitrary nature of the linguistic (...)
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  46. Fictionalism, Realism, Empiricism on Scientific Models.Chuang Liu - 2014
    This paper defends an approach to modeling and models in science that is against model fictionalism of a recent stripe (the “new fictionalism” that takes models to be abstract entities that are analogous to works of fiction). It further argues that there is a version of fictionalism on models to which my approach is neutral and which only makes sense if one adopts a special sort of antirealism (e.g. constructive empiricism). Otherwise, my approach strongly suggests that one stays away (...)
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  47.  87
    The Ontology of Organismic Agency: A Kantian Approach.Hugh Desmond & Philippe Huneman - 2020 - In Andrea Altobrando & Pierfrancesco Biasetti (eds.), Natural Born Monads: On the Metaphysics of Organisms and Human Individuals. De Gruyter. pp. 33-64.
    Biologists explain organisms’ behavior not only as having been programmed by genes and shaped by natural selection, but also as the result of an organism’s agency: the capacity to react to environmental changes in goal-driven ways. The use of such ‘agential explanations’ reopens old questions about how justified it is to ascribe agency to entities like bacteria or plants that obviously lack rationality and even a nervous system. Is organismic agency genuinely ‘real’ or is it just a useful fiction? (...)
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  48.  75
    What We Talk About When We Talk About Mental States.Zoe Drayson - forthcoming - In Tamas Demeter, T. Parent & Adam Toon (eds.), Mental Fictionalism: Philosophical Explorations.
    Fictionalists propose that some apparently fact-stating discourses do not aim to convey factual information about the world, but rather allow us to engage in a fiction or pretense without incurring ontological commitments. Some philosophers have suggested that using mathematical, modal, or moral discourse, for example, need not commit us to the existence of mathematical objects, possible worlds, or moral facts. The mental fictionalist applies this reasoning to our mental discourse, suggesting that we can use ‘belief’ and ‘desire’ talk without committing (...)
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  49. Editoriale–Etichettare/descrivere/mostrare.Filippo Fimiani & Pietro Kobau - 2011 - Aisthesis: Pratiche, Linguaggi E Saperi Dell’Estetico 4 (2):2-7.
    “Art”—what is it? What sort of entities are artworks? “Art”—when is it? Normally, when we visit an art exhibition, when we listen to a concert or when we look at a performing art in a setting, we use to read the titles, the tags or something textual, a threshold not crafted by the author, about the exposed or executed artworks in order to grasp their subject, style, history, and author. But: how does a title, a non-fiction depiction or a (...)
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  50. Ernst Mach’ın Anti-Realizminin Fenomenalist Temeli ve Öznel İdealist Sonucu: Mach Solipsist Bir Düşünür Olabilir Mi?Alper Bilgehan Yardımcı - 2020 - Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):469-487.
    This article initially presents Ernst Mach's anti-realist or instrumentalist stance that underpin his opposition to atomism and reveal his idea that science should be based totally on objectively observable facts. Then, the details of Mach's phenomenalist arguments which recognize only sensations as real are revealed. Phenomenalist thought is not compatible with the idea of realism, which evaluates unobservable entities such as atom, molecule and quark as mind-independent things. In this context, Mach considers the atom as a thought symbol or (...)
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