In this paper, I first argue that waste is best understood as (a) any process wherein something useful becomes less useful and that produces less benefit than is lost—where benefit and usefulness are understood with reference to the same metric—or (b) the result of such a process. I next argue for the immorality of waste. My concluding suggestions are that (W1) if one person needs something for her preservation and a second person has it, is avoidably wasting it, and refuses (...) to allow the first to make some greater use of it, the second may be morally wrong and that (W2) if one person needs something for her preservation understood according to her metric and a second person has it, is avoidably wasting it according to his own metric, and refuses to allow the first to make some greater use of it, the second is morally wrong. (shrink)

In this chapter, I argue that the notion which Michael Walzer calls jus ad vim might improve the moral evaluation for using military lethal force in conflicts other than war, particularly those situations of conflict short-of-war. First, I describe his suggested approach to morally justifying the use of lethal force outside the context of war. I argue that Walzer’s jus ad vim is a broad concept that encapsulates a state’s mechanisms for exercising power short-of-war. I focus on his more narrow (...) use of jus ad vim which is the state’s use of lethal force. Next I address Tony Coady’s critique of jus ad vim. I argue that Coady highlights some important problems with jus ad vim, but these concerns are not sufficient to dismiss it completely. Then, in the final section, I argue that jus ad vim provides an appropriate “hybrid” moral framework for judging the ethical decision-making outside of war by complementing other conventional just war distinctions. A benefit of jus ad vim is that it stops us expanding the definition of war while still providing the necessary ethical framework for examining violent conflict outside that context. (shrink)

Just war scholars are increasingly focusing on the importance of jus post bellum – justice after war – for the legitimacy of military campaigns. Should something akin to jus post bellum standards apply to terrorist campaigns? Assuming that at least some terrorist actors pursue legitimate goals or just causes, do such actors have greater difficulty satisfying the prospect-of-success criterion of Just War Theory than military actors? Further, may the use of the terrorist method as such – state or non-state – (...) jeopardize lasting peace in a way that other violent, for instance military, strategies do not? I will argue that there appears to be little reason to believe that terrorist campaigns are in principle less able to secure or at least contribute to a lasting peace than military campaigns; quite to the contrary. Or, put differently, if terrorism is an unlikely method for securing peace, then war is an even more unlikely one. (shrink)

The burgeoning literature on jus post bellum has repeatedly reaffirmed three positions that strike me as deeply implausible: that in the aftermath of wars, compensation should be a priority; that we should likewise prioritize punishing political leaders and war criminals even in the absence of legitimate multilateral institutions; and that when states justifiably launch armed humanitarian interventions, they become responsible for reconstructing the states into which they have intervened – the so called “Pottery Barn” dictum, “You break it, you own (...) it.” Against these common positions, this chapter argues that compensation should be subordinate to reconstruction, with resources going where they are most needed and can do the most good, rather than to the most aggrieved. Just punishment, meanwhile, presupposes just multilateral institutions – the victor cannot be trusted to mete out punishment fairly. And just interveners, who have already taken on such a heavy burden, are entitled to expect the international community to contribute to reconstruction after they have made the first and vital steps. After presenting each of these objections in greater depth, the chapter proceeds to draw some tentative inferences from the threads running through each, and suggest that they illustrate a distinctive flaw in the way in which jus post bellum is addressed by many just war theorists, who not only see the war as the grounds of post bellum duties, but also take it to specify their content: Specifically, they take the rights violations with which wars are imbued to be the basis for post-war action, but take the content of post-war duties to be focused on rectifying those rights violations, rather than the more forward-looking goal of establishing a lasting peace. This backward-looking orientation unduly confines these theorists to making attributions of fault, to a limited palette of normative concepts, and to a focus on the belligerents rather than the international community as a whole. Undoubtedly warfare creates a distinctive normative relationship between belligerent states (though we must question how much of this devolves to the citizens of those states). War does generate grounds for post-war duties – but there are other grounds for those duties too, moreover the grounds should not determine the content. It of course matters that the citizens of two states harmed one another in violation of their rights. But when the war is done, peacebuilding should be the priority, not raking over the wrongs of both sides. Sections 2–4 present the objections, Section 5 offers the tentative analysis and proposes a shift in focus toward an ethics of peacebuilding, and Section 6 concludes. (shrink)

Critical analysis of development of concept of jus ante bellum.

An examination of the applicability of conventional and revisionist just war principles to the global war on terror.

What one is ultimately interested in with regard to ‘just cause’ is whether a specific war, actual or potential, is justified. I call this ‘the applied question’. Answering this question requires knowing the empirical facts on the ground. However, an answer to the applied question regarding a specific war requires a prior answer to some more general questions, both descriptive and normative. These questions are: What kind of thing is a ‘just cause’ for war (an aim, an injury or wrong (...) suffered, or something different altogether)? I call this ‘the formal question’. Then there is what I call the ‘the general substantive question’. Depending on the previous answer to the formal question, the general substantive question can be formulated as: ‘Which causes are just?’ or as ‘Under what conditions is there a just cause?’ A final question, which has recently elicited increased interest, is what I call ‘the question of timing’: does the ‘just cause’ criterion only apply to the initiation of a war or also to the continuation of a war, that is, can a war that had a just cause at the beginning lose it at some point in its course (and vice versa)? I argue that a just cause is a state of affairs. Moreover, the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus ad bellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied; and this account has certain theoretical and practical advantages. As regards the general substantive question, I argue that all kinds of aims can, in principle, be legitimately pursued by means of war, even aims that might sound dubious at first, like vengeance or the search for glory. Thus, the pursuit of such aims does not make the war disproportionate or deprive it of just cause. As regards the question of timing, I argue that the criteria of jus ad bellum apply throughout the war, not only at the point of its initiation. While starting a war at t1 might be justified, continuing it at time t2 might be unjustified (and vice versa), and this insight does not require an addition to jus ad bellum but is already contained in it. (shrink)

Interest in just war theory has boomed in recent years, as a revisionist school of thought has challenged the orthodoxy of international law, most famously defended by Michael Walzer [1977]. These revisionist critics have targeted the two central principles governing the conduct of war (jus in bello): combatant equality and noncombatant immunity. The first states that combatants face the same permissions and constraints whether their cause is just or unjust. The second protects noncombatants from intentional attack. In response to these (...) critics, some philosophers have defended aspects of the old orthodoxy on novel grounds. Revisionists counter. As things stand, the prospects for progress are remote. In this paper, we offer a way forward. We argue that exclusive focus on first-order moral principles, such as combatant equality and noncombatant immunity, has led revisionist and orthodox just war theorists to engage in “proxy battles.” Their first-order moral disagreements are at least partly traceable to second-order disagreements about the nature and purpose of political theory. These deeper disputes have been central to the broader discipline of political theory for several years; we hope that bringing them to bear on the ethics of war will help us move beyond the present impasse. (shrink)

Jus post Bellum is, like Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello, a part of just war theory. Jus post Bellum is distinguished from the other parts of just war theory by being primarily concerned with the principles necessary for securing a just and lasting peace after the end of a war. Traditionally, jus post bellum has focused primarily on three goals: [1] compensating those who have been the victims of unjust aggression, while respecting the rights of the aggressors, [2] (...) punishing and rehabilitating those guilty of war crimes and other violations of the principles of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello and [3] developing measures that will prevent future war and violence (Orend 2000 and May 2012). In this chapter, I outline an account of political forgiveness and explain the role that political forgiveness can have in promoting the goals of jus post bellum. My conception of political forgiveness requires some unpacking. Let me begin with individual forgiveness, which I understand along familiar Butlerian lines as the renunciation of resentment (Butler, Sermon IX in McNaughton 2017: 75-83), though with a bit of a twist. More exactly, ● An individual, I, forgives J for doing F if and only if I renounces all her own warrant for resenting J for doing F. Resentment is a judgment-sensitive attitude, and, therefore, it tends to track judgments concerning its warrant (Scanlon 1998: 20 and Smith 2015). In cases of perfect forgiveness, I’s renunciation causes her to cease feeling resentment toward J for doing F, though, of course, less perfect cases are possible. I reject the idea that there is a sharp discontinuity between individual and political forgiveness, a position argued for by, e.g., Peter Digeser (1998 and 2001). By contrast, I understand political forgiveness as the renunciation of resentment by the relevant political body in question. With greater precision, ● A sovereign political body, P, forgives J for doing F if and only if P renounces all warrant that its citizens have for resenting, as part of their public lives, J for doing F. A little more explanation is in order. Sovereign political bodies, such as national governments, claim degrees of control over the lives of their citizens, in both their public and their private aspects, though the claims with respect to the former tend to be considerably more expansive than the claims with respect to the latter. I assume here that, at least in the case of legitimate governments, these claims of control are often valid. Such governments may reasonably renounce certain grounds for motivating action in the public sphere. For example, governments may renounce all warrant that its citizens have, as part of their public lives, for hating members of marginalized groups. In practice, this means that, while citizens might continue to act in their private lives out of hatred for members of these groups, their appeal to this hatred is seen by the state as irrelevant to matters of law and public policy as well as being wholly out-of-place in public discourse. Political forgiveness toward J for doing F, as I understand it, involves an analogous rejection of resentment, on the part of citizens in their public lives, toward J for doing F. I turn now to the matter of how political forgiveness supports securing a just and lasting peace between former belligerents. With respect to the first goal of jus post bellum, political forgiveness helps to balance compensation for victims and respect for the rights of defeated aggressors by countering the all-too-human tendency to overvalue harms done to oneself and to members of one’s group. As regards the second goal, political forgiveness plays a similar role but also provides a model for rehabilitation by exemplifying among the victorious the behavior to be emulated by the vanquished. Finally, political forgiveness promotes the third goal of jus post bellum by providing a space for nations to meet as moral equals rather than allowing one nation to have the moral high ground over the other. None of this, of course, means that political forgiveness should be unearned or that it should be confused with condonation (Kolnai 1973 and Pettigrove 2004). However, the question of what is required to put oneself in a position to be forgiven as part of jus post bellum is a matter that goes beyond the scope of this chapter. (shrink)

This chapter considers how the adoption of autonomous weapons systems (AWS) may affect jus ad bellum principles of warfare. In particular, it focuses on the use of AWS in non-international armed conflicts (NIAC). Given the proliferation of NIAC, the development and use of AWS will most likely be attuned to this specific theater of war. As warfare waged by modernized liberal democracies (those most likely to develop and employ AWS at present) increasingly moves toward a model of individualized warfare, how, (...) if at all, will the principles by which we measure the justness of the commencement of such hostilities be affected by the introduction of AWS, and how will such hostilities stack up to current legal agreements surrounding their more traditional engagement? This chapter claims that such considerations give us reason to question the moral and legal necessity of ad bellum proper authority. (shrink)

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello (...) rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

This paper uses Shachar’s conception of jus nexi to explore three interrelated ideas. I first contend that Shachar’s analysis of the monetary value of birthright citizenship may be applied to temporary workers, lawful permanent residents and naturalized citizens as an exposé of inherited privilege in diverse communities and as a means of identifying which forms of membership and belonging are worth owning. Second, I use the idea of jus nexi to question which additional work relationships and identity networks that might (...) qualify as genuine connections to a given state. Finally, I question whether an operationalized version of jus nexi, that is an alternative category of citizenship, would supplant or complement existing jus soli and jus sanguinis rules. Here, I seek to apply Shachar’s theoretical contributions to current political debates and warn that a genuine connection test is increasingly being misused to support a nativist agenda. (shrink)

Contemporary international law separates the international justice of war from the domestic justice of society, but empirically, there is a correlation between democratic governance and military effectiveness, which could have a number of causes. A contemporary reconstruction from _The Seven Military Classics_ of Chinese military philosophy offers potential lessons for how domestic virtues may yield military and geopolitical victory. This chapter reconstructs arguments from the seven treatises into a collective an amalgamated conception of “good governance” that weaves together military strategy (...) and virtue ethics and maintains that good governance at home actually wins wars abroad. A reconstructed classical Chinese conception of “good governance” presents theoretical and ethical challenges, but also offers viable justicial content for contemporary jus ad bellum considerations beyond sovereign self-defense or human rights. It presents a way of instantiating the sprawling conception of human rights that falls short in contemporary discourse. (shrink)

Legal positivists maintain that the legality of a rule is fundamentally determined by social facts. Yet for much of legal history, ordinary officials used legal terminology in ways that seem inconsistent with positivism. Judges regularly cited, analyzed, and predicated their decisions on the ‘laws of justice’ which they claimed had universal legal import. This practice, though well-documented by historians, has received surprisingly little philosophical attention; I argue that it invites explanation from positivists. After taxonomizing the positivist’s explanatory options, I suggest (...) that the most viable option appeals to conceptual change: classical Romans, early modern Europeans, founding-era Americans were not using ‘law’ (or ‘lex’ or ‘jus’) to refer to the subject matter of contemporary legal philosophy. But the strategy is costly. It renders positivism’s truth surprisingly parochial. And it supplies new reasons for doubting positivist accounts of contemporary practices, including the treatment of moral principles in modern adjudication. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this paper is to draw attention to an issue which has been largely overlooked in contemporary just war theory – namely the impact that the conditions under which an army is assembled are liable to have on the judgments that are made with respect to traditional principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. I argue that the way in which an army is assembled can significantly alter judgments regarding the justice of a war. In doing (...) so, I present and defend a principle of ‘just assembly’ and argue that satisfying this principle is an essential part of any deliberation regarding the justice of a particular conflict. (shrink)

A famous Indian argument for jus ad bellum and jus in bello is presented in literary form in the Mahābhārata: it involves events and dynamics between moral conventionalists (who attempt to abide by ethical theories that give priority to the good) and moral parasites (who attempt to use moral convention as a weapon without any desire to conform to these expectations themselves). In this paper I follow the dialectic of this victimization of the conventionally moral by moral parasites to its (...) philosophical culmination in the fateful battle, which the Bhagavad Gītā precedes. Arjuna’s lament is an internalization of the logic of conventional moral expectations that allowed moral parasitism, and Krishna’s push for a purely procedural approach to moral reasoning (bhakti yoga) does away with the good as a primitive of explanation and provides the moral considerations that allow us to see that the jus ad bellum and jus in bello coincide: the just cause is the approximation to the procedural ideal (the Lord), which is also just conduct. Jeff McMahan is correct in claiming that it is wrong for the unjust to attack the just. But it is also not obviously correct that it is the same set of moral considerations in war and peace that mark out the sides, for peace is largely characterizable by conventional morality, which all are forced to abandon in war. Walzer is correct that there are different sets of standards at play at war and peace, and that getting hands dirty in immorality is a price worth paying in war, but Walzer is thereby incorrect for a subtle reason: conventional standards by way of which jus ad bellum and jus in bello appear corrupt are themselves actually corrupt when the need for a just war arises. It is because moral parasites use conventional morality as a means of hostility and not as a means of fair, inclusive social interaction that conventional morality is corrupted and turned into a tool of the unjust. It is hence unjust to employ these standards to judge those whose cause is just, though such a judgement is conventional. Those who fight for a just cause thereby justly get their hands dirty by departing from conventional moral standards. But this is to the disadvantage of parasites who can only function in a climate where the conventionally good are constrained by conventional morality. Just war so understood deprives parasites their weapon of choice. (shrink)

This thesis examines the key moral principles that should govern decision-making by police and military when using lethal force. To this end, it provides an ethical analysis of the following question: Under what circumstances, if any, is it morally justified for the agents of state-sanctioned security institutions to use lethal force, in particular the police and the military? Recent literature in this area suggests that modern conflicts involve new and unique features that render conventional ways of thinking about the ethics (...) of armed conflict, and the use of lethal force, as inadequate or redundant. In particular, there is an increased concern with the moral difficulties created by “non-standard” cases. This is where the police or military are obliged to operate outside their conventional contexts. In such non-standard cases, on what moral basis can (or should) state actors – especially the police and military – use lethal force? One approach argues that there is nothing morally exceptional about the use of lethal force by police or military. This says the only available moral justification for using lethal force is killing in self-defence or defence of others. In contrast, I use an institutional approach to develop a moral framework for the state’s morally exceptional use of lethal force. The institutional approach is concerned with the ends (telos) or purpose of a social institution. It says that the moral purpose of a social institution alters the moral responsibilities of its agents; what is referred to as role morality. My analysis demonstrates that there is an important moral distinction between justified killing in self-defence and state-sanctioned uses of lethal force. My claim is that police and military uses of lethal force are not morally justified in the same way as the average person’s use of lethal force (i.e. self-defence or defence of others). Instead, I argue that the state-sanctioned institutional role of police and military give these state actors special moral duties, and therefore exceptional moral justification, for using lethal force. I argue that the institutional end of the police is the preservation of public safety. This includes using lethal force where it is necessary to protect life and prevent serious injury to jurisdictional inhabitants. In contrast, a morally responsible state uses military force to defend the “common good.” That is, when it is necessary to defend the peaceful functioning of a state from armed threats or other forms of political violence. I then conclude that non-standard cases require the addition of jus ad vim (or the just use of military force short-of-war) as a hybrid element to the moral framework for the state-sanctioned use of lethal force. This provides a better way of applying ethics to the use of military force when defending the common good against serious threats in non-standard cases. This is because jus ad vim complements the conventional military paradigm by permitting the use of military capabilities to defend the common good. But, at the same time, it inhibits the move towards the more destructive levels of violence characteristic of conventional warfighting. (shrink)

According to “epistemic-based contingent pacifism” a) there are virtually no wars which we know to be just, and b) it is morally impermissible to wage a war unless we know that the war is just. Thus it follows that there is no war which we are morally permitted to wage. The first claim (a) seems to follow from widespread disagreement among just war theorists over which wars, historically, have been just. I will argue, however, that a source of our inability (...) to confidently distinguish just from unjust wars lies in how we evaluate “morally heterogeneous” wars—i.e., wars with just and unjust aims. Specifically, the practice of reaching a univocal evaluation of a morally heterogeneous war as a whole by aggregating the evaluations of that war’s just and unjust aims is wrongheaded, because it undermines the action-guiding character of jus ad bellum. We ought instead to adopt what I call the “disaggregate approach” to jus ad bellum, according to which we evaluate the various aims of a war individually, without aggregating them into an evaluation of the war as a whole. Adopting this approach will eliminate a source of our disagreement over which wars have been just, and will ipso fact eliminate a basis for epistemic-based contingent pacifism. (shrink)

Even in just wars we infringe the rights of countless civilians whose ruination enables us to protect our own rights. These civilians are owed compensation, even in cases where the collateral harms they suffer satisfy the proportionality constraint. I argue that those who authorize or commit the infringements and who also benefit from those harms will bear that compensatory duty, even if the unjust aggressor cannot or will not discharge that duty. I argue further that if we suspect antecedently that (...) we will culpably refrain from compensating those victims post bellum, then this makes satisfying the war’s proportionality constraint substantially more difficult at the outset of the war. The lesson here is that failing to take duties of compensation in war seriously constrains our moral permission to protect ourselves. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine blame (...) for any wrongful killing done by autonomous weapons. Analyzing moral responsibility for autonomous weapons starts by recognizing that although they are capable of causing moral consequences, they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy in the moral sense. As such, their military role is that of a tool, albeit a rather sophisticated one, and responsibility for their use is roughly analogous to that of existing “smart” weapons. There will likely be some difficulty in managing these systems as they become more intelligent and more prone to unpredicted behavior, but the moral notion of shared responsibility and the legal notion of command responsibility are sufficient to locate responsibility for their use. (shrink)

Just war theory is currently dominated by two positions. According to the orthodox view, provided that jus in bello principles are respected, combatants have an equal right to fight, regardless of the justice of the cause pursued by their state. According to “revisionists” whenever combatants lack reasons to believe that the war they are ordered to fight is just, their duty is to disobey. I argue that when members of a legitimate state acting in good faith are ordered to fight, (...) they acquire a pro-tanto obligation to obey which does not depend for its validity on the justice of the cause being pursued. However, when the war is unjust, this obligation may be overridden, under certain conditions, by the obligation not to contribute to the unjustified killing of innocents. This is because the pro-tanto force of the duty to obey the law is best understood in terms of “presumptive”, rather than “exclusionary” reasons for action. This approach captures the insights of both the orthodox and the revisionist view, while avoiding the problems that afflict each of them. (shrink)

Robert Sparrow (among others) claims that if an autonomous weapon were to commit a war crime, it would cause harm for which no one could reasonably be blamed. Since no one would bear responsibility for the soldier’s share of killing in such cases, he argues that they would necessarily violate the requirements of jus in bello, and should be prohibited by international law. I argue this view is mistaken and that our moral understanding of war is sufficient to determine blame (...) for any wrongful killing done by autonomous weapons. Analyzing moral responsibility for autonomous weapons starts by recognizing that although they are capable of causing moral consequences, they are neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy in the moral sense. As such, their military role is that of a tool, albeit a rather sophisticated one, and responsibility for their use is roughly analogous to that of existing “smart” weapons. There will likely be some difficulty in managing these systems as they become more intelligent and more prone to unpredicted behavior, but the moral notion of shared responsibility and the legal notion of command responsibility are sufficient to locate responsibility for their use. (shrink)

Motivated by recent controversies concerning the relationship between modern mindfulness-based interventions and Buddhism, this article discusses the relationship between mindfulness and dogmatism in general, and dogmatism in ethics in particular. The point of view taken is primarily that of the psychology of judgment and deci-sion making: Various cognitive illusions affect the feelings of righteousness and certainty that tend to accompany ethical and moral judgments. I argue that even though there is some evidence that mindfulness practice im-proves judgment and decision making, (...) thisimprovement is rarely as strong as is implied in various contributions to the above-mentioned controversies. In addition, I reflect on claims that “the original teachings of the Buddha” jus-tify the moral stances taken. I argue that these stances likely arise, at least in part, due to the cultural transmission of cognitive dissonance of early Christianity rather than being inherent in the Buddha’s teachings. (shrink)

I argue that the criterion of just cause is not independent of proportionality and other valid jus ad bellum criteria. One cannot know whether there is a just cause without knowing whether the other (valid) criteria (apart from ‘right intention’) are satisfied. The advantage of this account is that it is applicable to all wars, even to wars where nobody will be killed or where the enemy has not committed a rights violation but can be justifiably warred against anyway. This (...) account also avoids the inefficiency of having proportionality considerations come up at two different points: in a separate criterion of just cause and in the criterion of proportionality proper. ‘Right intention’, the subjective element of the justification of a war, on the other hand, is not to be subsumed under the criterion of just cause: there can be a just cause without anybody knowing it. Conversely, however, the subjective element requires that those responsible for waging the war do know that the justifying objective conditions are fulfilled. This is in one sense more demanding than traditional just war theory; in another sense, however, it is less demanding: nobody needs to intend to fight for a ‘just aim’. (shrink)

In this article, I consider the permissibility of forming defensive alliances, which is a neglected topic in the contemporary literature on the ethics of war and peace. Drawing on the jus ad bellum criterion of proportionality in just war theory, I argue that if permissible defensive force requires that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, then, permissible defensive alliance formation seems to also require that its expected harms must be counterbalanced by its expected goods, as the (...) latter can result in much the same consequences as the former. Moreover, due to the incommensurability of values in play when making proportionality judgments, I argue for a value pluralist understanding of the criterion. On this view, defensive alliance formation is proportionate if the expected gains in certain values (goods) intuitively justify the expected losses in others (harms) when compared to the alternative expected value trade-offs of not allying. To explore the implications of my theoretical claims I consider them in relation to John Mearsheimer’s influential account of the causes of the Russo-Ukrainian War. On this account, the West’s strategy to assimilate Ukraine and Ukraine’s pursuit of NATO membership post-annexation of Crimea were disproportionate because the expected harms were unjustified when compared to the alternative expected goods and harms of forgoing Ukrainian membership of NATO. This does not imply that Russia’s aggression is just, but it does imply that the West and Ukraine are partially responsible for the war and that they acted impermissibly in attempting to expand/join NATO. (shrink)

*North American Society for Social Philosophy (NASSP) Book Award 2019.* -/- *International Studies Association (ISA) - International Ethics Section Book Award 2021.* -/- Although military mores have relied primarily on just war theory, the ethic of cooperation in warfare (ECW)—between enemies even as they are trying to kill each other—is as central to the practice of warfare and to conceptualization of its morality. Neither game theory nor unilateral moral duties (God-given or otherwise) can explain the explicit language of cooperation in (...) developing and enforcing principles of military ethics and the law of armed conflict. -/- The ethic of cooperation is borne of various motivations: reciprocity, self-preservation, and efficiency, to be sure, but also a sense of warrior honor and concern with human rights. This shared morality can persist despite making it more difficult for one side or the other to win and, unfortunately, its well-meaning motivations often lead to unintended tragic consequences. -/- This book explores three manifestations of this significant yet overlooked ethic of cooperation in warfare: (1) for a “fair fight,” (2) to protect classes of individuals (e.g., non-combatants or prisoners of war), and (3) to end the war quickly. Such cooperation can take unexpected forms, from ad hoc decisions on the battlefield to institutionalization in international law, and is the source of some critical tensions in one of the most significant developments in warfare in recent years: namely, how to handle terrorism or other forms of warfare that lie outside the purview of international law. -/- Each type of ECW raises questions internal to that ethic, such as inconsistencies in the concept of “parity” across different weapons bans, contradictions within the warrior ethic that heavily influence—and therefore confuse—notions of the “fair fight,” the disconnect between what protections a person receives and his responsibility for the war (e.g., political leaders), or the limited decisiveness of outcomes generated by very short wars. -/- Their simultaneous application also generates significant tensions and raises questions about the proper relationship of ECW to the immediate goal of war itself, which is to win, and thus yield either a political settlement or a justicial decision. For example, the ECWs for a “fair fight” and to protect classes of individuals can make it harder to win the war, but even more concerning is that they can also kill more people, which in the latter case contravenes its very purpose. -/- Human history is in some ways the story of trying to concurrently wage and tame war, and the architecture of warfare itself is informed by the ECW, in particular: (a) the political nature of war, (b) the abdication from jus ad bellum judgments in order to concentrate on justice within war (jus in bello), and (c) the ways in which modern nation-states collude to define “legitimacy” in war. -/- The combination of these three features leave questions of justicial right and responsibility for war disturbingly unresolved, it also generates new challenges in a geopolitical context in which cooperative and non-cooperative (e.g. contemporary terrorism) forms of warfare clash. (shrink)

Many nongovernmental forms of business regulation aim at reducing ethical violations in commerce. We argue that such nongovernmental ethics standards, while often laudable, raise their own ethical challenges. In particular, when such standards place burdens upon vulnerable market participants (often, though not always, SMEs), they do so without the backing of traditional legitimate political authority. We argue that this constitutes a structural analogy to wars of humanitarian intervention. Moreover, we show that, while some harms imposed by such standards are desirable, (...) others are best thought of as a form of collateral damage. We thus look at the well-developed literature on just war theory for inspiration and find that the principles of jus ad bellum and jus in bello contain many insights that can be fruitfully adapted to the case of nongovernmental standard-setting. Consequently, we propose the Ius ad Normam—a set of principles that should guide would-be standard-setters in assessing whether imposing those burdens is ethically justifiable in particular cases. We also discuss how powerful multinational businesses often act simultaneously as standard-takers and standard-setters and explore the normative implications of this dual role. (shrink)

It is commonly accepted that recourse to war is justifiable only as a last resort. If a situation can be resolved by less harmful means, then war is unjust. It is also commonly accepted that violent actions in war should be necessary and proportionate. Violent actions in war are unjust if the end towards which those actions are means can be achieved by less harmful means. In this article, I argue that satisfaction of the last resort criterion depends in part (...) upon the likelihood of success of non-violent alternatives to war, and that the actual and potential effectiveness of non-violent resistance means that the last resort criterion of the jus ad bellum and the proportionality criterion of the jus in bello are harder to satisfy than is often presumed. (shrink)

This paper explores the central question of why soldiers in democratic societies might decide to fight in wars that they may have reason to believe are objectively or questionably unjust. First, I provide a framework for understanding the dilemma caused by an unjust war and a soldier's competing moral obligations; namely, the obligations to self and state. Next, I address a few traditional key thoughts concerning soldiers and jus ad bellum. This is followed by an exploration of the unique and (...) contradicting moral problems that confront modern soldiers and their officers. I argue that although traditional positions such as invincible ignorance provide a rather dangerous ‘head-in-the-sand’ mentality, soldiers serving a democratic government are nonetheless very limited in their legal and moral ability to interpret what is a justifiable war. However, a very few select senior officers are in positions to make such legal and moral decisions concerning jus ad bellum. (shrink)

Not the publicly asserted reasons (humanitarianism and self-defense) but cooptation of oil reserves was the objective behind the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. This underlying motive utterly fails to satisfy just war jus ad bellum conditions. This prioritization of petroleum is well documented and is consistent with decades old US policy towards the Middle East, especially as codified by Anthony Cordesman in 1998 and US DoD's Strategic Assessment 1999 and then adopted by Bush II. This fraudulent use of military (...) force raises a question as to how motives for war can be accurately identified prior to falsely justified belligerence. Some positive signs are noted herein as to political philosophers' better use of Rawls's reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

Michael Walzer argues that except in cases involving genocide or mass slaughter, humanitarian intervention is unjustifiable because “citizens get the government they deserve, or, at least, the government for which they are ‘fit.’”Yet, if people are autonomous and deserve the government that rules over them, then it would seem that they are responsible for the government’s actions, including their nation’s wars of aggression.That line of thought undermines the doctrine of noncombatant immunity, which is perhaps the most important of Walzer’s jus (...) in bello principles. In this way, the concept of self-determination frustrates Walzer’s attempts to keep jus ad bellum and jus in bello considerations separate. (shrink)

In The Birthright Lottery, Ayelet Shachar subjects the institution of birthright citizenship to close scrutiny by applying to citizenship the historical and philosophical critique of hereditary ownership built up over four centuries of liberal and democratic theory, and proposing compelling alternatives drawn from the theory of private law to the usual modes of conveyance of membership. Nonetheless, there are some difficulties with this critique. First, the analogy between entailed property and birthright citizenship is not as illustrative as Shachar intends it (...) to be; second, the mechanism of the birthright privilege levy is insufficient for addressing structural impediments to growth; and third, the principle of ius nexi, while an important corrective to currently dominant principles of nationality, will likely have effects both unnecessary and insufficient to correct the injustices that Shachar identifies. In the end, the most significant improvements in the lives of the neediest persons on the planet are more likely advanced through conventional arguments for the lowering of barriers to the circulation of goods, labor, and capital. This shift in attention from opening borders to extending citizenship risks being a distraction from more effective means of addressing the injustices associated with global inequality.Dans son livre The Birthright Lottery, Ayelet Shachar soumet l’institution de la citoyenneté par droit de naissance à un examen rigoureux, en appliquant à la citoyenneté la critique philosophique et historique de la propriété héritée construite pendant quatre siècles de théorie démocratique libérale, et en proposant aux modes habituels d’attribution de la citoyenneté une alternative séduisante tirée de la théorie du droit privé. Néanmoins, cette critique comporte certaines difficultés. Premièrement, l’analogie entre la transmission de la propriété par l’institution de la taille et la citoyenneté par droit de naissance n’est pas aussi éclairante que le soutient Shachar ; deuxièmement, le mécanisme de la taxe sur le privilège du droit de naissance est insuffisant pour s’attaquer aux obstacles structurels à la croissance ; et troisièmement, le principe du jus nexi, bien qu’on puisse le considérer comme un important correctif du principe de nationalité actuellement dominant, aura vraisemblablement des effets à la fois non nécessaires et insuffisants pour corriger les injustices que Shachar identifie. En fin de compte, les améliorations les plus significatives dans la vie des personnes les plus démunies de la planète sont vraisemblablement mieux défendues à l’aide des arguments conventionnels en faveur d’une baisse des barrières à la circulation des biens, du travail et du capital. Ce déplacement de l’attention de l’ouverture des frontières à l’extension de la citoyenneté risque de nous distraire des moyens plus efficaces de nous attaquer aux injustices associées à l’inégalité globale. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the legitimacy of using the term “to know” in morality and I develop an approach based on Kantian morality. In my analysis, I take the notion “to know” in the sense that Timothy Williamson does. That is to say, I regard it in opposition to the perspectives that claim “knowledge is jus-tified true belief”. Therefore, in the first part, I briefly introduce “knowledge first epistemology”. In the second part, I build a perspective pointing to the (...) strong correlation between acting and knowing. After that, I provide an analysis of Kantian morality in connection with my discussion. I show how Kant argues for a lawful certainty in morality that allows us to use the verb “know” (in the sense that is evaluated in the first part of this paper). In the next part, I comment on the un-analyzability of knowing in the practical sphere with reference to free will. In my conclusion, upon a general review of the paper, I introduce very briefly an alternative epistemology from Islamic thought regarding the theoreti-cal and practical sphere distinctions. (shrink)

The revisionist critique of conventional just war theory has undoubtedly scored some important victories. Walzer’s elegantly unified defense of combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity has been seriously undermined. This critical success has not, however, been matched by positive arguments, which when applied to the messy reality of war would deprive states and soldiers of the permission to fight wars that are plausibly thought to be justified. The appeal to law that is sought to resolve this objection by casting it (...) as a practical concern, a pragmatic worry about implementation, which while germane to debates over the laws of war, need not undermine our convictions in the fundamental principles the revisionists advocate. This response is inadequate. Revisionists have not shown that soldiers should obey the laws of war, in practice, when they conflict with their other moral reasons – our worries about application remain intact. Moreover, a theory of war that offers only an account of the laws of war, and a set of fundamental principles developed in abstraction from feasibility constraints, is radically incomplete. We need to know how to apply those fundamental principles, and whether, when applied, they lead to defensible conclusions. Only two options seem to remain. Perhaps the revisionists’ arguments for their chosen fundamental principles are sufficiently compelling that we should stick with them, and accept their troubling conclusions – in other words, accept pacifism. Alternatively, we need to revise our fundamental principles, so that when applied they yield conclusions that we can more confidently endorse. -/- Though it does not save the revisionist view from the responsibility dilemma and cognate objections, the appeal to law does raise an important, and previously inadequately theorized, question – or, rather, resurrects a neglected topic, discussed in depth by historical just war theorists such as Grotius and Vattel. There are good grounds for distinguishing the laws of war from the morality of war, and for adjusting the former to accommodate predictable noncompliance, that should not impact on our account of the latter. Nonetheless, I have argued that there are some profound moral insights underlying both combatant legal equality and noncombatant immunity: specifically, we cannot infer from a combatant’s side having not satisfied jus ad bellum that he may not justifiably use lethal force; and other things equal, it is more wrongful to harm a nonliable noncombatant than to harm a nonliable combatant. (shrink)

It has come to be widely accepted that jus post bellum includes responsibilities to rebuild. Consequently, duties to establish a sustainable peace are increasingly defined in terms of duties to protect and promote international human rights, including duties to effectively investigate human rights violations, to ensure access to effective remedy, and to transform institutional and legal contexts that have facilitated or sustained human abuse. But what are investigations by transitional bodies seeking when they take on these tasks? Often, investigators present (...) themselves as seeking the truth and claim value for their findings based on having produced a better description or explanation than was antecedently available. But is truth worth pursuing for its own sake in transitions from conflict or must it contribute to some other goal to be valuable? In what follows I argue that the value of truth in transitions from conflict lies in the role of truth in ascribing knowledge. The connection between truth and knowledge makes it important to preserve distinctively epistemological grounds for accepting and rejecting claims and narratives. These distinctively epistemological grounds explain how, if it is conceived of as adequate responsiveness to experience, truth is a legitimate and important goal in transitions from violence that is worth pursuing for its own sake. In particular, I argue that there is value in insisting that adequate responsiveness to experience serve as an arbiter in the reception of claims and narratives because when responsiveness to experience plays an arbitral role it becomes possible for bodies such as truth commissions to serve as vehicles by which groups may attain or ascribe knowledge. (shrink)

I shall argue that in some wars both sides are (as a collective) justified, that is, they can both satisfy valid jus ad bellum requirements. Moreover, in some wars – but not in all – the individual soldiers on the unjustified side (that is, on the side without jus ad bellum) may nevertheless kill soldiers (and also civilians as a side-effect) on the justified side, even if the enemy soldiers always abide by jus in bello constraints. Traditional just war theory (...) and self-proclaimed “revisionist” just war theory think otherwise since the former focuses on the law enforcement or public authority justification for inflicting harm and the latter on the self-defense justification. These are both intrinsically asymmetrical justifications: there is no justified self-defense (properly understood) against justified self-defense, nor is there justified law-enforcement against justified law-enforcement. However, there can, as I will show, be justified self-defense against force that is justified by a necessity justification, and there can be force justified by a necessity justification being used against force that is also justified by a necessity justification. The necessity justification is not intrinsically asymmetrical, and it is an indispensable justification in the context of war. Moreover, with regard to some forms of inflicting harm on others one may give special weight to one’s own interests and the interests of those to whom one has special responsibilities when assessing the proportionality of those acts. That is, the proportionality calculation may be agent-relative. This is in particular so in the case of foreseeably preventing innocent and non-threatening people from being saved (for instance, by shooting down a tactical bomber who would have saved them by destroying an ammunitions factory) but less so in the case of the intentional or foreseeable direct harming of innocent and non-threatening people (dropping bombs on people standing near an ammunitions factory). In the light of these considerations, I will then answer the question as to when soldiers may justifiably participate in war (and when not). (shrink)

In this paper we examine the ethical implications of emerging Nanotechnologically Enhanced Combat Systems (or 'NECS'). Through a combination of materials innovation and biotechnology, NECS are aimed at making combatants much less vulnerable to munitions that pose a lethal threat to soldiers protected by conventional armor. We argue that increasing technological disparities between forces armed with NECS and those without will exacerbate the ethical problems of asymmetric warfare. This will place pressure on the just war principles of jus in bello, (...) by encouraging the resort to tactics that either (i) make it more difficult to respect these principles or (ii) directly violate them, by virtue of attacking non-combatants or creating disproportionate numbers of casualties without a clear military goal. (shrink)

As Leibniz points out in the Méditation sur la notion commune de la jus tice, justice—defined as charity of the wise and universal benevolence—belongs “to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things, as numbers and proportions.” According to the interpretation of Patrick Riley, from this perspective the two manuscripts usually regarded as belonging to the Méditation should be seen as complementary parts of a unitary Platonizing work. According to Riley, the manuscript that now constitutes the first part (...) of the Méditation is concerned with definitions of ethical concepts viewed as “quasi-mathematical, demonstrable ‘eternal verities’”, whereas the manuscript that now constitutes the second part of the Méditation is concerned “with Platonic ‘ascent’, in the manner of Phaedrus and Symposium,” which recommends the transition from mere negative forbearance from harm to doing positive good. In formulating these claims, Riley uses scare quotes to indicate that he uses the terms “eternal verities” and “ascent” in an unusual way that diverges from the views of the historical Plato. According to his interpretation, Leibniz’s modifications of Platonism are restricted to peripheral parts such as the doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul or Pythagorean components such as the doctrine of metempsychosis. Therefore, Riley claims that when Leibniz is talking about knowing eternal truths, what he has in mind is literally the view that we know the same truths as the truths that the gods know and love but do not cause or change. (shrink)

Rita Floyd’s "The Morality of Security: A Theory of Just Securitization" is an important and insightful book that delineates a theory of just securitization (modified from the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria in just war theory) involving three sets of principles governing the just initiation of securitization, just conduct of securitization, and just desecuritization. This book is a much-needed addition to the security studies and just war scholarship. -/- Here, I explore the potential of Floyd’s just securitization (...) theory (JST) to provide insights into the moral justifiability of non-state groups that are not political entities engaging in resistance against forms of structural violence that pose an existential threat to those groups. Using the case study of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement and the threat of white supremacy to African Americans as an illustrative example, I argue that structural forms of violence can meet Floyd’s definition of an objective existential threat, justifying the resort to securitization by groups such as BLM. (shrink)

Although some claim that the term cyber war is merely metaphorical, there are good reasons to see cyber war as a form of warfare ‐ even if it is not war as we have hitherto known it. This poses the question whether the principles of the Just War Tradition, which claims to offer an alternative for pacifism and realism, apply to this specific kind of war too. This article argues that the jus in bello principles of discrimination and proportionality are (...) applicable, and that actually applying them would limit the harm cyber-attacks currently cause. Most cyber-attacks of recent years wrongly target civilians, and this amounts to a serious breach of these principles. The final part of this article looks at those who actually conduct the cyber-attacks, the cyber soldiers ‐ how do they fit into the military profession, and to what extent can we expect them to uphold the principles of Just War? (shrink)

The idea of natural law has a long history. It has had different meanings for different people and continues to occupy intellectual engagements as to the connotations of the expression ‘natural law’ in diverse and different contexts. This requires delving deep into the hoarypast and analyzing the gradual development of the idea of natural law through the ages. Understanding natural law necessitates exploring its relation with positive law, its application, and, notably, the import of the word ‘natural’ in the expression (...) ‘natural law’. Be that as it may, there is no denying the fact that there is an element of exclusivity in natural law that has kept it alive and going across generations. Even some of the jurists who adhered to the principles and tenets of legal positivism have shown an inclination towards the principles of natural law, especially as regards the relation between law and morality. It has survived the tests of time. The present paper seeks to explicate the various dimensions of natural law and explore its growth application. (shrink)

This essay advances the following set of arguments: First, that we must take seriously Hobbes's claim in Behemoth that "the science of just & unjust" is a demonstrable science, accessible to those of even the meanest capacity. Second, that Leviathan is the work in which this science, intended as a serious project in civic education, is set out. Third, that Hobbes is prepared to accept, like Plato & Aristotle, "giving to each his own," as a preliminary definition of justice, from (...) which however, he draws some very un-Aristotelian conclusions. Fourth, that though in Hobbes's theory "just & unjust" are equivalent of "lawful & unlawful," this is far from being a simple statement of legal positivism, but rather the conclusion of a practical syllogism. Fifth, that the impediments to this demonstrable science of justice being universally accepted, on Hobbes's account, are twofold, explained in terms of religion & the role of preachers & educators produced by the universities, on the one hand, & by the activity of "democratical gentlemen" & classical republicans dominating parliament, on the other. Sixth, that Hobbes's account of the transition from jus to lex, specified in terms of a transition from the state of nature to that of civil society, although Epicurean in origin, is much closer to a conventional civil law position. Adapted from the source document. (shrink)

The thought of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985) helps to place Islamist terrorism within a certain tradition of warfare and political theory. In fact, this form of violence can be clarified by Schmitt’s theoretical endowment, as this brief paper attempts to do. The end of the legal framework of the jus publicum europaeum and the emergence of non-state actors have put into question centuries-old certainties. Schmitt’s theory could help to put order in political concepts today ideologically misused. And his opposition to any (...) universalistic tendencies questions not only Jihadi ideology but also Western anti-terroristic rhetoric, which is equally part of the ongoing global war of annihilation feared by Schmitt during his entire life. (shrink)

In this paper, I analyse Agrippa’s trilemma, an old skeptical argument that questions the possibility of justifying any arbitrary belief p and its paradox about jus-tification. Assuming that neither infinitism nor skepticism are satisfactory positions, the main alternatives available to face the problem (foundationism, coherentism and epistemic externalism) are outlined, as well as some central arguments that show the serious difficulties they face. In the case of foundationalism, these problems arise from two dilemmas, which work together with the trilemma to (...) make our philosophical life even more difficult: the so-called Sellar’s dilemma and Bergmann’s dilemma —although the latter is a very general attack on internalism. The former calls into question the inte-lligibility of a key idea of standard foundationalism: the notion of justified basic belief. The second casts doubt on the rational sustainability of epistemic internalism, which is a usual presupposition of the presentation of the trilemma. I explore a Humean way out of the trilemma that also manages to escape such dilemmas. Like any position in this difficult territory the way out has costs. However, they do not seem unaffordable. Here I only intend to tentatively present the idea, as a possible way out of our difficulties, which deserves to be seriously discussed. (shrink)

Autonomous Weapons Systems (AWS) have not gained a good reputation in the past. This attitude is odd if we look at the discussion of other-usually highly anticipated-AI-technologies, like autonomous vehicles (AVs); whereby even though these machines evoke very similar ethical issues, philosophers' attitudes towards them are constructive. In this article, I try to prove that there is an unjust bias against AWS because almost every argument against them is effective against AVs too. I start with the definition of "AWS." Then, (...) I arrange my arguments by the Just War Theory (JWT), covering jus ad bellum, jus in bello and jus post bellum problems. Meanwhile, I draw attention to similar problems against other AI-technologies outside the JWT framework. Finally, I address an exception, as addressed by Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins and Bradley Strawser, who realized the unjustified double standard, and deliberately tried to construct a special argument which rules out only AWS. (shrink)

This is a non-philosophical essay. Its value lies in highlighting the selfless work done by the Christian Brothers in the early 1990s in Calcutta/Kolkata. This essay should be read against the backdrop of the scandal which continues to haunt the Brothers globally. If we allow ourselves to forget the Brothers during that time at Calcutta, we fail to map the intellectual and interior lives they successfully created in Calcutta in their communities when there were no mobiles or the internet in (...) West Bengal. Through their lives they resisted the paralyzing effects of materialism in the last century. (shrink)

War as intense armed conflict between states, governments, societies, or para groups, such as mercenaries, insurgents, etc is not old fashion but continues to be the vibrant and violet of society (ies). Many literatures relating to the war, Just war and just war theories pay attention mainly at the conflicts as a main cause of war but pass by about the cause of conflicts leading to the war. The objective of this paper is thus, to assess sources of conflicts leading (...) to the war, and come up with recommendation to narrow situations provoking conflicts leading to the war. Research approach employed was qualitative to qualify ideas and opinions of scholars, who conducted researches on war, just war and just war theories; books, journals and internet sources dedicated to the cause and consequences of war and sources concerned with the Jus Ad Bellum, Jus in Bello and Jus post Bellum have been reviewed. It was found that ambitions of humans to realize their unlimited natural rights, such as economic rights, political rights and extreme desire to un equitable utilization of such rights cause a war of “all against all”. The study recommends that authority better to avoid or reduce extent of conflict among humans, and humans to learn limit their unlimited natural rights for the sake of peace and security of the business. Key words: war, Just war theories, Jus Ad Bellum, Jus in Bello, Jus post bellum. -/- . (shrink)

Nuestro recorrido será el siguiente. En el capítulo primero examinamos la noción de unión del cuerpo y el alma que Descartes formula desde el inicio de Las pasiones del alma (§2), noción anticipada por otros textos (Principia II §2) pero muy original, y que recusa todo dualismo, en tanto concibe una unión no substancial, en la que el alma está unida, de modo más o menos estrecho, a todos los cuerpos que la afectan, como "corps de dehors", de manera tal (...) que todos los sentimientos, internos o externos, en tanto referidos al cuerpo, pueden ser ubicados en una misma exterioridad respecto al alma (sección §1). Esta noción de unión: a) coincide plenamente con la experiencia del poder o capacidad del alma para actuar sobre el cuerpo, o recibir la acción del cuerpo, de manera tal de excluir definitivamente toda referencia a la substancia espiritual, corporal o compuesta; b) establece una diferencia meramente cuantitativa entre mi cuerpo y los cuerpos del mundo, porque la unión al cuerpo es más o menos estrecha, según sea más o menos inmediata la acción del cuerpo sobre el alma. La primera consecuencia de lo anterior es la siguiente: Las pasiones del alma no establece distinción alguna entre sentimientos interiores y exteriores, porque el lugar del agente (las partes de nuestro cuerpo, los cuerpos del mundo) no sirven ya más como criterio para la distinción entre los modos de la sensibilidad (sección §2). Es precisamente en este punto fundamental que la investigación cartesiana sobre las pasiones se distingue definitivamente del análisis de la sensibilidad realizado en la cuarta parte de Los Principios de la Filosofía, en donde la pasión era considerada como un sentimiento interior, junto con los apetitos naturales (IV §190), por oposición a los cinco sentidos exteriores (IV §§ 191-195). Luego del examen de la definición de pasión, en el próximo capítulo, podremos preguntar: dadas, por un lado, la interioridad de la pasión al alma, y por otro, el emplazamiento de todos los cuerpos en el mismo afuera, «dehors», respecto del alma, ¿cabe buscar, en la pasión, el sentimiento de un corps de dedans? Anticipemos que la reforma conceptual de la unión del cuerpo y el alma exige y a la vez resulta de una reforma lexical especialmente interesante porque, al excluir toda referencia a las substancias o a la substancialidad de la unión, a) identifica esta última con la capacidad o potencia del alma de afectar o ser afectada por el cuerpo (sección §3); b) debe describir la unión como un «estar (del alma) junto (al cuerpo), ( être jointe)», que califica la estrechez de la unión por la inmediatez de la acción (sección §4). Finalmente, esta conjunción del alma y del cuerpo anticipa de manera coherente la doctrina cartesiana del amor, el cual se define por la capacidad del alma de unirse (« se joindre ») a los objetos que la afectan en la apariencia de bondad. El capítulo segundo se dedicará a la definición de pasión (Pasiones §§21-28), el único sentimiento interior al alma misma porque el único que es tal como aparece, en una evidencia que no puede ser entendida mas que en relación, todavía indeterminada, con la evidencia primera ego sum, ego existo, en la Meditación Segunda, y especialmente con su última formulación, en la certeza del « creo ver » («videre videor»). El carácter inaugural de esta definición reside en los puntos siguientes: a) la relación con el alma convierte a la pasión en el único sentimiento que es tal como se siente, pero al mismo tiempo, b) inaugura una nueva forma de error posible, todavía indeterminado, pero de otro orden que aquél al que nos somete la naturaleza extrínseca del resto de las percepciones (sección §1). Ahora bien, la pasión es tal como se siente porque no es un « ver », videre, y por lo tanto no le corresponde revelar el ego sum (« ego sum qui sentio » VII, 29, 11), a través de un « creo ver », videre videor (sección §3). Quisimos probar que esto es perfectamente coherente con la doble enumeración de los modos del pensamiento, en la Segunda y Tercera Meditación, (VII, 28 y 35, respectivamente) y con la clasificación de los pensamientos (ideas, juicios, voluntades, afecciones), establecida en la Meditación Tercera (VII, 38) (sección §2). Pero la pasión, a la vez que inaugura una interioridad, se recibe en el alma, como algo que no proviene de ella (Pasiones §17). Es aquí, donde se da a conocer el carácter inaugural y a la vez paradójico de la pasión: en ella, la interioridad del alma a sí se conoce, por primera vez, en una modalidad particular de la recepción sensible. Examinamos esa doble condición, interioridad y recepción, en la sección §7, la última de este segundo capítulo. Dos consecuencias. La primera: a partir de la definición de pasión, la investigación sobre la cualidad sensible se independiza del examen de la realidad objetiva (sección §4). La pasión puede por lo tanto inaugurar una verdad y un modo de error que se separa definitivamente del objeto representado como cosa o privación de cosa. No seremos los primeros en decir que la pasión, el saber afectivo en general, sólo puede dirigirse a un no-objeto (F. Alquié). Pero hay que agregar que la definición de pasión, al recuperar su evidencia primera, abre a la meditación el campo de una realidad inobjetivable, o, mejor, de una modalidad de la objetividad definitivamente irreal, que ya ha sido descubierta por J-L. Marion, por lo menos para el caso particular de la admiración, y que sólo podrá ser de ser descripta en el momento de definir las pasiones particulares. La segunda consecuencia reside en la relegación definitiva de toda explicación de la pasión por la causa eficiente (sección §6). En efecto, Descartes deja de lado las funciones del cuerpo como criterio de clasificación de los modos de la sensibilidad, y la relega a la segunda parte de la segunda parte de su definición, de manera tal que la causa de la pasión no explica nada y por el contrario, es ella la que debe ser explicada. Si se admite una doble constitución de la metafísica cartesiana, nuestro esfuerzo conduce a mostrar que la noción de pasión, y la investigación que ella abre, pertenece a una metafísica presidida por su primera figura, cogitatio, antes que por la segunda, causa. La investigación sobre los efectos de la pasión, que comprende los artículos §§40 a 48 de Las pasiones del alma, y a la que dedicamos nuestro capítulo III, debe ser leída en continuidad al texto de la Meditación Sexta, en tanto viene a responder a la pregunta siguiente: ¿cuál es el modo de la pasividad que caracteriza a la pasión y la distingue de otros modos del sentimiento como de otros modos de constricción a la voluntad? Si la pasión, se recibe en el alma, ¿cómo se siente esa proveniencia, si por definición queda excluida toda relación al cuerpo como causa o como objeto? En primer lugar, aquello que caracteriza a la pasión es que ella tiene como efecto una disposición a querer. Pero, dado que la voluntad es esencialmente libre, la disposición a querer en el alma tiene a su vez un efecto igualmente necesario, este es, una respuesta del alma a la disposición a querer que es en ella, respuesta que Descartes llama (no) consentimiento a los efectos de la pasión (§46; §80). A partir del artículo §40, la investigación sobre las pasiones se introduce resueltamente en el ámbito de una moral, como una ciencia de los efectos (sección §1). En segundo lugar, y por lo anterior, la pasión, puede ser, en su interioridad y proximidad al alma, directamente contraria a la voluntad (365, 12-13), justamente, porque ella es el único sentimiento que tiene como efecto necesario en el alma una disposición a querer (§40). Lejos de presentar un mero obstáculo a una determinación del alma, la pasión se recibe como una invitación, a la cual el alma debe imperativamente responder. El punto a destacar (sección §2) es el siguiente: Descartes describe aquí una verdadera autoafección indirecta, por la cual el alma puede excitar en sí una pasión voluntaria (362, 28 ; 363, 2; 486, 6-9), autoafección de la cual es absolutamente incapaz en el caso del resto de los sentimientos, tal como quedaba establecido desde la Meditación Sexta. Así, el cuerpo que actúa inmediatamente sobre el alma, al cual ella está más estrechamente unida, abandona su condición de mero intermediario entre los cuerpos y el alma y pasa a ser, en una autoafección voluntaria, el intermediario entre una acción del alma y una pasión en el alma. En la sección §3 se agrega esto: la pasión, a diferencia de todos los sentimientos, no se siente en el instante. Por el contrario, en ella, el sentir se despliega en el tiempo y se hace por lo tanto independiente de la acción de los cuerpos sobre los sentidos internos o externos. Esto se debe a lo siguiente: primero, en la pasión, el cuerpo actúa como una totalidad indivisible. Segundo: el cuerpo actúa sobre sí. En la pasión, tercero, el cuerpo actúa de manera tal que su acción se presenta siempre como una exigencia al ejercicio efectivo de la libertad. Finalmente, en la pasión, la totalidad de las funciones del cuerpo se someten definitivamente a la voluntad, de manera que el alma puede afectarse a sí en una pasión voluntaria. Quisiéramos proponer (sección §3) que la experiencia del cuerpo en la pasión merece ser nombrada como la experiencia de un cuerpo de dedans, que se presenta en la repugnancia o el consentimiento y cuya acción no se siente en un lugar (en una internidad que no establece ninguna distinción con la exterioridad de los cuerpos del mundo), sino en el alma misma, en una interioridad que hace imposible la reducción del cuerpo sentido a la categoría común de objeto o causa. Ahora bien, la investigación sobre la pasión puede introducirse en el ámbito de la moral con una condición: que la pasión permita el acceso del ego a un alter ego, o según la fórmula tradicional utilizada por Descartes, a un «otro sí mismo», alter ipse. Es el problema que abordamos en el capítulo IV. Queda claro que las Meditaciones Metafísicas impiden, o mejor, ocluyen de modo parentemente definitivo, ese acceso. Pero, en Las pasiones del alma, Descartes, introduce un género muy particular de objeto , «otros objetos, que consideramos causas libres, capaces de hacer el bien y el mal » (§55, 374, 5-7). Más aún, la libertad del agente se erige en criterio de clasificación de segundo orden para todas las pasiones simples, con excepción del deseo. El punto a notar aquí (sección §1) es el siguiente: el ego no se ve afectado por la causa libre porque infiera que ella, a diferencia de otras, actúa moralmente sobre él, con independencia de toda determinación mecánica. Es al revés: el ego siente la acción de una causa libre porque se ve afectado por la libertad del agente; es esa afección la que otorga a los actos del otro el carácter moral de buenos o malos. Esto se prueba en el respeto o la veneración (§162): aquello que nos afecta no es la supuesta bondad o la maldad de los actos, sino inmediatamente aquello que los hace tales, esto es, la « capacidad » de hacer el bien o el mal. De aquí que el hijo, cuyos actos evidentemente no son morales, pueda nombrarse, entre los objetos de amor, como un « otro(s) sí mismo» (§82, 389, 15). A fin de precisar el sentido y los alcances de esta alteridad, debemos detenernos en la definición cartesiana del amor (secciones §§2-3). Esa definición debe, en primer lugar, distinguirse claramente de aquella que Descartes había ensayado dos años antes, en la carta a Chanut del 1 de febrero de 1647. El problema que preocupa a Descartes no es ya más la definición de un amor intelectual, sino la de un amor puro, que Descartes distingue precisamente de las pasiones que « participan del amor » (§82, título), mezcla de deseo y « otras pasiones particulares » (§82 389, 9-10). El amor puro es una pasión que no tiene relación alguna al cuerpo, porque se siente sin placer y es la primera de las pasiones « que pertenecen al alma », según la distinción establecida en los títulos de §137 y §139. Esta distinción se establece estrictamente dentro del ámbito del amor pasión porque no considera en ningún momento el alma en tanto separada del cuerpo, condición del amor intelectual (IV, 602, 4-8), sino como « nuestra mejor parte » (§139, 432, 5). El único que merece sin reparos el título de « amor puro » es el amor paterno, el único en el que se cumple la tríada, pureza, posesión perfecta, alteridad. En la sección §4 nos detenemos en los modos del engaño propio de las pasiones, en general, y del amor en particular, para entender el último rasgo que Descartes le otorga al amor puro, este es, el de ser un amor verdadero, que elude todas las formas de engaño a las que las pasiones pueden someternos, y puede por lo tanto ocupar el lugar del verdadero conocimiento. La teoría cartesiana del amor permite así dos conclusiones. Primera: la alteridad sirve para distinguir definitivamente el amor del deseo, el amor puro de las pasiones que participan de él, los grados de perfección del amor, amor paterno, amistad honesta, y, finalmente, la formas del amor, afección, amistad y devoción. Segundo, antes de toda reflexión sobre el deseo, es decir, antes de considerar la perfectibilidad del ego por la posesión de bienes que dependan exclusivamente de nuestra voluntad, Descartes escribe que el alma se perfecciona en el amor, por la unión al bien verdadero, mientras que se envilece y rebaja en su unión con un bien excesivamente estimado (§139, 432, 12-20 ; §142, 435, 18 –22). En la sección §5 examinamos el efecto del amor, la benevolencia, que Descartes, haciendo caso omiso de la tradición, define como una verdadera beneficencia, como un acto de donación, que no necesita de ningún deseo para hacerse efectivo. El punto a destacar aquí es que Descartes considera que el otro al que el alma se une es la « mejor parte » del todo que resulta de la unión (§82, 389, 16-17). Por este exceso, el generoso, sobre la estrechez de la unión al cuerpo, decide por la estrechez de la unión a otra alma, y privilegia el objeto de amor sobre el amor a la vida. Brevemente: la amistad cartesiana tiende a la devoción y rompe con toda noción de amistad fundada en la igualdad. Esto nos permite, en la sección §6 hacer notar cómo la teoría del amor resignifica un léxico que Descartes recibe de Aristóteles y Santo Tomás. La comparación, al menos inicial, con esos autores está dirigida a incluir a Descartes en una historia del amor. El quinto capítulo traza el largo itinerario de la noción de virtud, a través de la Correspondencia, y se detiene especialmente en las cartas mencionadas más arriba, ( a Elisabeth, 15 septiembre 1645; a Chanut, 1 febrero 1648) en las que Descartes ensaya y abandona una primera forma de moral definitiva, especialmente problemática, en tanto aspira, por primera vez, a deducir el amor a Dios de la idea de Dios, y se dirige a pensar al ego como parte de totalidades (familia, vecindad, Estado) que han sido, ellas también, creadas por Dios. Esta reflexión sobre el amor a Dios es todavía independiente de la reflexión sobre las pasiones, que recién comienza. Intentamos aquí despejar la intención cartesiana que puede resumirse así: de la misma manera que Dios, creador de toda verdad, es fundamento de toda ciencia y toda verdad se halla ya contenida en Su idea, es Dios, creador de totalidades físicas, sociales o políticas, el fundamento de todo amor, aunque no se lo conozca, o sólo confusamente, como tal; de modo que en todo acto de renuncia por la totalidad, amamos a Dios, en un amor sensible, aunque nada en Él sea imaginable. Sin embargo, una vez adquirida, en Las pasiones del alma, la definición de pasión e incluida la noción de consentimiento en la definición definitiva del amor, aquella vía de análisis, que parte de un ego ya incluido en las totalidades de las que forma parte como persona, agota definitivamente sus posibilidades y debe ser abandonada. Debemos preguntar, entonces: qué queda de esta ardua reflexión sobre el amor a Dios en Las pasiones del alma? Principalmente, Descartes recupera de aquellas cartas la reflexión sobre la Providencia divina, en los artículos §§146-147. Pero entre las cartas de 1645-1647 y el texto de Las pasiones del alma, hay una diferencia capital. La reflexión sobre la Providencia divina, en 1649, no hace mención alguna al amor, parece abandonar toda aspiración a fundar, en el amor a Dios, el amor a otros hombres y se dirige exclusivamente a establecer la regla del deseo, intermediario privilegiado entre pasión y acción (§143, 435, 26-29). Ahora bien, una moral que no tuviera otra regla que la del deseo presentaría dos características distintivas. Primero, la indagación sobre el bien verdadero se agota en la determinación del bien verdaderamente posible; son pues igualmente buenos todos los bienes igualmente estimables e igualmente posibles. De aquí, en segundo lugar, que la noción de virtud no pueda otorgar a la voluntad otro bien que su mero ejercicio, vacío de todo contenido. Ha sido pues posible interpretar que, la moral cartesiana, en el momento de alcanzar su fundamento, se independiza de ella, como otra potencia igualmente arbitraria, que no puede someterse a otro fin que el de imitar a Dios por la inmutabilidad de la decisión. En el capítulo sexto, dedicado a la definición de generosidad, nosotros propondremos, al contrario, que el texto de Las pasiones del alma, cuya teoría del amor aquella interpretación debe desconocer, permite otra lectura de la moral cartesiana. Sucede que Descartes cambia radicalmente el punto de partida de su reflexión : en las cartas de 1645-1647, la omnipotencia divina exigía considerar el ego como parte de distintas totalidades, a las que se haya ligado de hecho. En 1649, la unión no describe una situación existencial, impuesta por nacimiento, vecindad o juramento, porque no accede a una situación de hecho más que por el consentimiento libre y lúcido del ego a la unión efectiva con el bien amado. De aquí, proponemos, se siguen dos consecuencias. La primera (sección §2): una reformulación del problema del amor a Dios. La omnipotencia divina no se conoce como aquí como Providencia, es decir, en el decreto universal que determina la fatalidad de todas las cosas, sino en el acto singular de una donación personal y desmedida, la libre disposición de nuestras voluntades, por la cual la criatura se reconoce semejante a su Creador (§152). El generoso reconoce que el libre albedrío, el único bien por el cual puede estimarse a sí mismo, es, tal como quedaba establecido desde la Meditación Cuarta, un don divino y el reconocimiento por un don recibido es una pasión, la gratitud, la cual, a diferencia de la admiración, la esperanza o la seguridad, es una especie del amor, siempre virtuosa (§§193-194). En efecto, la reflexión sobre la Providencia, es apenas uno de los modos de reglar el deseo, el segundo, porque el primero es, justamente, la generosidad, que se define con total prescindencia del conocimiento de la fatalidad de todas las cosas (§145, 437, 27-438, 3). Investigamos aquí los tres rasgos del don divino: infinitud formal, pertenencia verdadera, distribución perfecta. La segunda consecuencia, que confirma la primera (secciones §§3-4), es la reformulación del amor a otros hombres. En efecto, no arriesgaremos demasiado al proponer que la definición de generosidad, lejos de agotarse en los artículos §§152-153, comprende los artículos §154 y §155 y culmina, finalmente, en el §156. Así entendida, la generosidad es una autoafección que, como tal, determina, prioritaria y precisamente, el modo en que el generoso es afectado por los otros hombres, en tanto causas libres, semejantes al ego, y por lo tanto semejantes a Dios. La generosidad se define pues en el horizonte de la alteridad porque el generoso no sería tal si no estimara a todos y cada uno de los hombres como generosos posibles (§154) y si no redescubriera su capacidad de hacer el mal por comparación al mal efectivamente realizado por ellos (§155). De aquí, finalmente, la regla definitiva de la moral cartesiana (§156), regla que, al definir la mejor acción posible, otorga un contenido definitivo a la firme resolución de hacer el bien, esta es: imitar la donación original, haciendo el bien a todos los hombres. Luego, la ausencia de una reflexión sobre el amor a Dios, en Las pasiones del alma, no es, todavía, una desaparición, ya que el acto de donación divina condiciona definitivamente la regla moral como una imitación, que se concibe como una repetición, igualmente gratuita, de aquella donación original. La relación entre ambos puntos se prueba en lo siguiente: Descartes afirma que el efecto necesario de la benevolencia generosa, la gratitud es uno de las principales vínculos de la sociedad entre los hombres (§194, 474, 13-15), la cual se funda pues en el mismo vínculo que une al hombre generoso con Dios: gratitud por la gratuidad de la donación (sección §6). La afirmación cartesiana es de un laconismo insalvable, pero recupera un texto hasta aquí descuidado, la Carta a Voetius de 1643, la primera reflexión cartesiana sobre el amor y la única dedicada a examinar las leyes que de él se deducen, como una jus caritatis (sección §7). Examinamos en la seccción §8 la problemática relación, o ausencia de relación, entre esas leyes de amistad y la ley civil, jus civile, basada en la autoridad del Príncipe. Finalmente, en la Conclusión, podemos detenernos en un problema ya dos veces pospuesto, este es, el que resulta de la equivalencia que Descartes establece entre amistad honesta y caridad cristiana. (IV, 309, 2-4; IV , 612, 14), equivalencia que la noción de generosidad está lejos de contradecir y que recupera la «gran afinidad» (VIII-2, 112, 24-25) entre las leyes de la amistad y las leyes de caridad, que Descartes había desarrollado en aquel capítulo séptimo de la Carta a Voetius. El carácter problemático de esta equivalencia es evidente: si el amor natural, por exceso, aspira a la caridad, es a riesgo que la caridad, por defecto, deje de ser cristiana. Esa afinidad no ha merecido mayor atención por parte de la metafísica y de sus historiadores. Pero, ha merecido la mayor atención por parte de la destitución de la metafísica que lleva a cabo Blaise Pascal quien descubre y acusa, en esa afinidad, el último esfuerzo de la filosofía cartesiana, dirigida a otorgarle al ego su última y más controversial primacía, la del acceso a Dios por el amor. -/- . (shrink)

Since its earliest incarnations, just war theory has included the requirement that war must be initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. However, while recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence in interest in just war theory, the authority criterion is largely absent from contemporary discussions. In this paper I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying, by arguing that the authority criterion plays a much more important role within just war theorising than is commonly supposed. As (...) standardly understood, the authority criterion provides a necessary condition for the justification of the resort to war, but has no bearing on the question of permissible conduct in war. In opposition, I argue for an alternative interpretation of the criterion, which attributes to it a fundamental role in assessing this latter question. With this revised interpretation in place, I then demonstrate its advantages by applying it to the practical issue of armed conflicts that are initiated and fought by non-traditional belligerents. While several theorists have recognised that this common feature of modern armed conflict poses a challenge to mainstream just war theory in general—and to the authority criterion in particular—I argue that existing discussions frequently misconstrue the nature of the challenge, since they assume the standard interpretation of the authority requirement and its role within the theory. I then show that the revised interpretation provides a clearer account of both the challenge posed by non-traditional belligerency and the kind of response that it requires. (shrink)