The automation of online social life is an urgent issue for researchers and the public alike. However, one of the most significant uses of such technologies seems to have gone largely unnoticed by the research community: religion. Focusing on Islamic Prayer Apps, which automatically post prayers from its users’ accounts, we show that even one such service is already responsible for millions of tweets daily, constituting a significant portion of Arabic-language Twitter traffic. We argue that the fact that a (...) phenomenon of these proportions has gone unnoticed by researchers reveals an opportunity to broaden the scope of the current research agenda on online automation. (shrink)

Many maintain that petitionary prayer is pointless. I argue that the theist can defend petitionary prayer by giving a general account of how divine and creaturely causation can be compatible and complementary, based on the claim that the goodness of something depends on its cause. I use Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical framework to give an account that explains why a world with creaturely causation better reflects God’s goodness than a world in which God brought all things about immediately. In (...) such a world, prayer could allow us to cause good things in a distinctive way: by asking God for them. (shrink)

The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any (...) difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to solve this puzzle without denying either that God must do the best he can or that petitioning God can make a difference to what he does. (shrink)

There is a concern about the effectiveness of petitionary prayer. If I pray for something good, wouldn’t God give it to me anyway? And if I pray for something bad, won’t God refrain from giving it to me even though I’ve asked? This problem has received significant attention. The typical solutions suggest that the prayer itself can alter whether something is good or bad. I will argue that this is insufficient to fully address the problem, but also that (...) the problem requires another assumption which can be doubted, thereby opening up a new way to solve the problem. (shrink)

Prayer is not just about the composition of a message from the sender to God the receiver. I say this because I believe that prayer is not primarily conversation but fellowship and communion. There is a relation of trust in which the recipient of trust is true and faithful. Prayer loses its theological character and becomes a psychological phenomenon that is an introspection into oneself if there is no trusting faith and God who is faithful. Prayer (...) is far more than human communication; prayer is true communion that expresses faith in God's trustworthiness. (shrink)

I critically respond to Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation. I attack his Contrastive Reasons Account of what it takes for a request to be answered and provide an alternative account on which a request is answered as long as it has deliberative weight for the person asked. I also raise issues with Davison’s dismissive treatment of direct divine communication. I then emphasize the importance of value theory for addressing the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Whether a (...) defense of petitionary prayer is successful depends on whether it can support the sort of requests that are central to the theological practices of the religion in question, explaining how they could be known to be effective, and this depends on the value theory of the theology in question. As an example, I show the relevance the traditional distinction between temporal and spiritual goods could have for knowing whether one’s prayers have been answered. How prayers could make a difference also depends on the theology in question, raising issues of ecclesiology and collective action that demand further attention. (shrink)

Prayer is not a psychoactive chant that may trigger a meditative mood or transfigure us into a mystic. It is a simple set of words that are metaphorically arranged which induces a state of being aware and conscious beyond the mundane. It makes an amendment between us and God and makes us to be aware of God, Its creation and the purpose of our existence. The Lords’ Prayer indeed conditions us to know the reality beyond the personality of (...) the mind. (shrink)

in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008).

Every year, the member Churches of the World Council of Churches (WCC) are called to actively participate in the meetings organized in the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity. From my perspective, these moments are an extraordinary opportunity to share in the richness of the Orthodox tradition, which means an act of confession and authentic witness. In the first part, I will present critically the canonical synthesis of the Orthodox, the concept of “Ecumenical Eucharist” and of Lima Liturgy, followed (...) by the recommendations of the Special Commission for Orthodox participation in the WCC regarding confessional and interconfessional common prayer. Then, this article will make a historical presentation of the week of prayer. It is very important to know how this initiative started and how it was accepted at the beginning and over the years. At least in Romania, where we have an Orthodox majority, this week has become a controversial issue produced by those who are against ecumenical dialogue. A special attention is for the actual practice approved by the Romanian Patriarchate. Finally, the article will present the statements of the new Orthodox documents and it will end with some conclusions about this moment of common Christian witness. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the possibility of what I call “non-doxastic theistic prayer”, namely prayer that proceeds without full belief in God – or in the kind of God who could be the recipient of such prayer. After developing a working definition of prayer, I proceed to discuss a few prominent forms of prayer and explore the ways in which such prayer might legitimately be performed non-doxastically. I conclude by examining the possibility that (...) some forms of what I call “prayerful pretense” may be more epistemically and morally virtuous than their fully doxastic counterparts. (shrink)

1 Th. 5:17 tells us to pray without ceasing. Many have worried that praying without ceasing seems impossible. Most address the problem by giving an account of the true nature of prayer. Unexplored are strategies for dealing with the problem that are neutral on the nature of prayer, strategies consistent, for example, with the view that only petition is prayer. In this article, after clarifying the nature of the problem for praying without ceasing, I identify and explore (...) the prospects of five different strategies that are neutral in this sense. I also raise problems for each strategy. (shrink)

Landefeld need not be faulted for not cobbling together a unified doctrine of prayer compatible with Stoic physics and logic where none exists in Epictetus. Perhaps this ex-slave fervently needed to unseat contempt for and defiance in the faces of his cruel, abusive human masters with praise of and obedient devotion to a maximally beneficent and providential divine master.

Prophet (pbuh) has given notice that the Salah [prayer] is the first deed in which the Muslim servant will be brought to account on the Day of Judgement. The Prophet (pbuh) also informed that if the believer’s obligatory (fardh) prayers are lacking this will be made up from voluntary (nawafil) prayers and that the servant comes close to Allah by fulfilling obligatories and continues to draw near to him with voluntary deeds. One of nawafil is the prayer which (...) is performed before and after the obligatory Friday prayer. When we examine the Prophetic narrations about those prayers -which is also called the first and the second sunnah- and their authenticity, we witness that the Prophet (pbuh) performed prayers in differing raka’ah numbers after the obligatory Friday prayer and urged to it, but there is no authentic and clear traditon indicating that He (pbuh) perfomed any prayer before it. However, by taking into account some general statements of Prophet (pbuh), some weak narrations and some practices of companions it has been said that the Friday prayer has a sunnah before it and moreover it is a Sunnah Muakkadah (stressed sunnah) which is performed in two or four raka’ahs. This article aims to present the narrations about whether the Prophet (pbuh) and companions used to perform any prayers before and after the obligatory Juma’ prayer and their number of raka’s, to determine their authenticity and to evaluate them by reporting the comments about them. (shrink)

In a previous issue of this journal Michael Veber argued that God could not answer certain prayers because doing so would be immoral. In this article I attempt to demonstrate that Veber’s argument is simply the logical problem of evil applied to a possible world. Because of this, his argument is susceptible to a Plantinga-style defense.

I defend a solution to the puzzle of petitionary prayer based on some ideas of Aquinas, Gregory the Great, and contemporary desert theorists. I then address a series of objections. Along the way broader issues about the nature of desert, what is required for an action to have a point, and what is required for a puzzle to have a solution are discussed.

Scott Davison has raised an epistemic challenge to the doctrine of petitionary prayer. Roughly, the challenge is that we cannot know or have reason to believe that a prayer has been answered. Davison argues that the epistemic challenge undermines all the extant defenses of petitionary prayer. I argue that it does not.

The puzzle of petitionary prayer: if we ask for the best thing, God was already going to do it, and if we ask for something that's not the best, God's not going to grant our request. In this paper, we give a new solution to the puzzle.

This paper examines the interrelation between justice and mercy in Anselm’s prayers. Divine justice and human injustice seem to rightly cut off a human being from any assistance, grace, or reformation, since human beings has set themselves in a condition of injustice from which they cannot extricate themselves. Mercy then seems the only solution, but appears not only unjust, but also to trump divine justice, a position inconsistent with Anselm’s explicit statements. So then, how are justice and mercy rendered compatible, (...) even complementary with each other? Human beings are brought into integral roles for each other as intercessors within a divine economy of justice offering mercy within the scope of that very justice. Anselm’s rhetorically and dramatically structured prayers perform an educative as well as petitionary function in assisting the human being to locate, understand, and exert themselves within that divine economy of justice and mercy. (shrink)

I respond to Daniel and Frances Howard-Snyder’s criticisms of my arguments in another place for the conclusion that human supplicants would have little responsibility (if any) for the result of answered petitionary prayer, and criticize their defense of the claim that God would have good reasons for creating an institution of petitionary prayer.

This essay is a systematic exposition and partial defense of Kant's philosophy of prayer. "Does Kant even HAVE a philosophy of prayer?" you may ask. Read on...and you'll see.

An exploratory pilot study with a small homogenous sample of Christian English speaking participants provided support for an alternative research hypothesis that a Christ consciousness contemplation with Heart Prayer of HeartMath techniques was significantly associated with increasing psychophysiological coherence, sense of coherence, spirituality and health perceptions. Participants described feelings of a peaceful place in oneness and connection with Christ. Integrative findings point towards Christ consciousness as an ultimately non-dual process of sensing vibrational resonance radiating from the human heart. Implications (...) for further research are discussed. (shrink)

Even thirty years after Thomas Morris wrote The Logic of God Incarnate, there are some claims that Morris makes that require examination in analytic Christology. One of those claims is a concession that Morris gives to modalists near the end of the book, where he says that the two-minds view he has defended can be used to provide a consistent modalistic understanding of Jesus’s prayer life. This view, he says, blocks the inference from the fact that Jesus prays to (...) the Father to the additional claim that Jesus and the Father are numerically distinct. I argue that Oneness Pentecostals can appropriate central concepts from The Logic of God Incarnate as Morris suggests, and further that this means Oneness Pentecostals should abandon the claim that Jesus believes he just is the Father. Once Oneness Pentecostals abandon this claim, they can give a possible explanation of how it is that Jesus relates to the Father in prayer even though he just is the Father. (shrink)

Der Band untersucht die drei Grundbegriffe von Gebet, Praxis, Erlösung – so ist das Gebet selbst eine Praxis, eine Handlung. Genauer genommen ist es eine auf Erlösung gerichtete Praxis, die von Liebe, Uneigennützigkeit und Großzügigkeit getragen ist. Meistens findet das Gebet in persönlichen Beziehungen oder in der Geschichte statt und kann als kontemplative Haltung theoretisch begründet werden.

Theology is about God and Creation, or more precisely perhaps about our ideas of them, how they are formed and somewhat justified, although it is stressed that they can be neither proved nor disproved. This book is a thematic compilation drawn from past works by the author over a period of thirteen years. A new essay, about prayer, was added in 2022.

This review shows how Auden was a philosopher of religion and therefore, this review calls for reassessing the poet Auden as a philosopher concerned with prayer and the necessity of the transcendent in life.

In prayers lie the experiences, dreams, and identity of the individual. These strengthen faith while fortifying one’s character. This research examines the Dororo of the Ayta Ambala, a native prayer considered a convergence of the community’s experiences, aspirations, and faith. Using a Filipino-centric research approach (Maka-Pilipinong Pananaliksik), nine Dororo were gathered from Sitio Mampuweng, Olongapo City, Zambales, and classified into three types: Dororong Ritwal, a collective prayer for the community; Dororong Panganganito, a healing ritual; and Pansariling Dororo, personal (...) prayers for daily needs. Four themes emerged within the prayers: gratitude, protection, abundant harvest, and remembrance of the deceased. The Dororo reflects Ayta Ambala’s connection to nature, community, and spirituality. This research emphasizes the importance of documentation and knowledge transmission to preserve cultural heritage. The Dororo demonstrates the resilience of the Ayta Ambala amidst modernization and external religious influences while safeguarding their traditional identity. (shrink)

The problem of freedom and determinism has vexed philosophers for several millennia, and continues to be a topic of lively debate today. One of the proposed solutions to the problem that has received a great deal of attention is the Theory of Agent Causation. While the theory has enjoyed its share of advocates, and perhaps more than its share of critics, the theory’s advocates and critics have always agreed on one thing: the Theory of Agent Causation is an incompatibilist theory. (...) That is, both believers and nonbelievers in the theory have taken it for granted that the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is one according to which freedom and determinism are incompatible. In fact, so entrenched is this assumption that no one on either side of the debate has ever questioned it. Yet it turns out that this assumption is wrong – the most plausible version of the Theory of Agent Causation is a compatibilist one. (shrink)

Significant attention as been devoted to the problem of ‘divine hiddenness’ proposed by JL Shellenberg. I propose a novel response that involves denying part of the empirical premise in divine hiddenness arguments, which holds that nonresistant nonbelievers are capable of relationship with God. While Plantinga and others in ‘reformed’ epistemology have at times appealed to original sin as an explanation for divine hiddenness, such responses might seem outlandish to many, given the way that many find nonbelievers to be no more (...) or less epistemically or morally blameworthy than believers. Further, such appeals to original sin seem to give a ‘just-so’ story that at least leaves the situation dialectically balanced. I show that a classically Augustinian notion of original sin can provide a sufficient response to those objections, and that appeal to original sin can form an empirically grounded response to the divine hiddenness problem, beyond a simple defense. If the possibility of original sin-type scenarios is compatible with God’s perfect love, then the phenomenon of apparently nonresistant nonbelievers would push us toward considering the possibility that humans have lost those capacities for relationship with God by a Fall-like event in the past. (shrink)

Should religious believers proportion their religious beliefs to their evidence? They should: Religious faith is better, ceteris paribus, when the beliefs accompanying it are evidence-proportioned. I offer two philosophical arguments and a biblical argument. The philosophical arguments conclude that love and trust, two attitudes belonging to faith, are better, ceteris paribus, when accompanied by evidence-proportioned belief, and that so too is the faith in question. The biblical argument concludes that beliefs associated with faith, portrayed in the Hebrew Bible and the (...) New Testament, are typically, and normatively, exhorted on the basis of evidence. I hope to convince religious believers and nonbelievers alike that religious beliefs should be evidence-proportioned. (shrink)

J. L. Schellenberg has recently argued that there is a logical incompatibility between God’s being perfectly loving and there being non-resistant nonbelievers in the proposition that God exists. In this paper I highlight the parallel between this claim and the claim made by the logical problem of evil. Following Plantinga’s strategy in undermining the logical problem of evil, I argue that all that is needed to undermine the alleged incompatibility of divine love with non-resistant non-belief is a counterexample showing how (...) the two might possibly co-exist. But whereas most attempts to show this have been grounded anthropologically, by drawing on forms of love-relationship that God and humans have in common, I offer a defense of the compatibility of perfect divine love with human non-resistant non-belief in God’s existence grounded theologically, in the unique sort of love relationship that God wants with us, which is the relationship of “imaging.”. (shrink)

I offer a new, limited solution to divine hiddenness based on a particular epistemic paradox: sometimes, knowing about a desired outcome or relevant features of that desired outcome would prevent the outcome in question from occurring. I call these cases epistemically self-defeating situations. This solution, in essence, says that divine hiddenness or silence is a necessary feature of at least some morally excellent or desirable states of affairs. Given the nature of the paradox, an omniscient being cannot completely eliminate hiddenness, (...) just as an omnipotent being cannot create a rock so heavy that they cannot lift it. Epistemically self-defeating situations provide an undercutting defeater for the assumption that any nonresistant nonbeliever could always, at any time, be in conscious relationship with a perfectly loving God. Thankfully, silence is a temporary feature of epistemically self-defeating situations: once the outcome is achieved, agents can know in full. (shrink)

After a presentation of the problem of God's hiddenness, there is discussion of two arguments for God's nonexistence related to that problem. One is the Lack-of-evidence Argument (LEA), according to which there would have been good objective evidence of God's existence if he were to exist. The other is the Argument from Nonbelief (ANB), according to which there would not be as many nonbelievers as there actually are if God were to exist. Reasons are given for assessing ANB as a (...) stronger argument than LEA. (shrink)

In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we (...) feel when those we love believe the worst about us. And it is one of the salient wrongs of racism and sexism. Yet it is puzzling to many philosophers how we could wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about them. This paper defends the idea that we can morally wrong one another by what we believe about them from two such puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether we have the right sort of control over our beliefs for them to be subject to moral evaluation. And the second concerns whether moral wrongs would come into conflict with the distinctively epistemic standards that govern belief. Our answer to both puzzles is that the distinctively epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. This account of moral encroachment explains how epistemic norms governing belief are sensitive to the moral requirements governing belief. (shrink)

Like the ‘thoughts and prayers’ so commonly offered by politicians in the aftermath of disaster, it is incredibly common to hear ‘autonomy and dignity’ invoked together in response to some threat to human wellbeing. As such, it seems natural to assume they must bear some kind of relation to one another. But are they merely two core human interests, that happen to be vulnerable to the same kinds of threat? Or are they interrelated in a deeper way? What I aim (...) to do in this chapter is draw on the philosophical literature on both concepts to consider how they might be connected, and explore whether certain ways of connecting them are more fruitful than others. I argue that the two most prominent connections drawn in the philosophical literature – that dignity is grounded in autonomy, and that respect for dignity is synonymous with respect for autonomy – are both highly problematic. Instead, I suggest we see autonomy and dignity as mutually supportive. Doing so has both practical and theoretical benefits: it can help us identify threats to both autonomy and dignity; and it exposes theoretical lacunae, especially within the autonomy literature. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness Argument is committed to a problematic implication that is weakened by research in cognitive psychology on affective forecasting. Schellenberg’s notion of a nonresistant nonbeliever logically implies that for any such person, it is true that she would form the proper belief in God if provided with what he calls “probabilifying” evidence for God’s existence. In light of Schellenberg’s commitment to the importance of both affective and propositional belief components for (...) entering into the proper relationship with God, this implication of his argument becomes an affective prediction or forecast. However, research in cognitive psychology has shown that in multiple and varied circumstances humans often make inaccurate predictions of their future affective states or reactions. Thus, this research provides strong empirical reasons to doubt that the implication is warranted. (shrink)

Pope Benedict XVI argued that it is "necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through the use of reason" and to understand "theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith." (Ratzinger 2006) The idea that faith per se can be reconciled with rationality per se presents a delicate analytical task for philosophy of religion, to consistently ground a belief system which is regarded by nonbelievers as inherently ungrounded and inconsistent, without negating any grounding postulates internal to the dogma. (...) Focussing on Abrahamic theism, with special emphasis on Christianity, I interpret the Biblical narrative as a symbolic representation of a universal normative structure grounded in social ontology and the value-commitments intrinsic to agency. (shrink)

This paper offers a fresh strategy for responding to J.L. Schellenberg’s argument from divine hiddenness, called the dianthropic strategy. First, it shows how Schellenberg’s understanding of openness is deficient by arguing that openness to relationship is consistent with initial concealment. Then, the paper develops the dianthropic strategy, which focuses on the role of other persons in making a relationship between God and the nonbeliever more likely. It distinguishes this strategy from the responsibility argument and anticipates objections.

In this article, I outline a strategy for challenging J.L. Schellenberg’s hiddenness argument, and specifically the premise within the argument that asserts the existence of what Schellenberg calls nonresistant nonbelief. Drawing on some of the philosophical resources of skeptical theism, I show how this premise is based on a particular “noseeum assumption”—what I call Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption—that underwrites a particular “noseeum argument.” This assumption is that, regarding putative nonresistant nonbelievers, more likely than not we’d detect these nonbelievers’ resistance toward God (...) if there were any. I give reasons for thinking that it is not more reasonable to affirm than to refrain from affirming Schellenberg’s Noseeum Assumption, and so reason to think that the hiddenness argument is not a good argument for atheism. I also defend the strategy I outline against several objections. (shrink)

An Intelligent Tutoring System (ITS) is a computer system that offers an instant, adapted instruction and customized feedback to students without human teacher interference. Reciting "Tajweed" the Holy Quran in the appropriate way is very important for all Muslims and is obligatory in Islamic devotions such as prayers. In this paper, the researchers introduce an intelligent tutoring system for teaching Reciting "Tajweed". Our "Tajweed" tutoring system is limited to "Tafkhim and Tarqiq in TAJWEED" the Holy Quran, Rewaya: Hafs from ‘Aasem. (...) The system was evaluated by reciting teachers and students, and the results were auspicious. (shrink)

According to the Book of Common Prayer, we have sinned against God “in thought, word, and deed.” In this paper I’ll explore one way of understanding what it might mean to sin against God in thought—the idea that we can at least potentially wrong God by what we believe. I will be interested in the philosophical tenability of this idea, and particularly in its potential consequences for the epistemology of religious belief and the problem of evil.

As in all languages, Arabic and accordingly Quran which was revealed in a clear, fluent form of Arabic language, have words and concepts that are used in various meanings. The root “SHB” is one of these words which express different meanings depending on its context. This word is used ninety seven times in name and verb form in Quran to express “the togetherness/conversation which is constituted in different places and times, by people who have different ideas and beliefs, among themselves (...) (believer- believer or nonbeliever – nonbeliever) and with others (believer – nonbeliever) in this world and in the Hereafter”. -/- In this study, the basic/root meaning of the root “SHB” is identified firstly by the help of classical dictionaries, commentaries of Quran, and poems. Then the use of this word in Quran in name and verb forms is pointed, and its meanings which differ according to the verse, to the attaching words and to the context are identified. (shrink)

Despite its aesthetic appeal, the Iranian resort Majara is poised to be a sore point among local residents. Looking at the 200 vibrant oddly-shaped domes might make you feel you’re on a Wes Anderson movie set.The Majara Residence overlooking the Persian Gulf offers homes and resort-like accommodation, complete with cafes, restaurants, souvenir shops, tourist information, a prayer room, laundry, storage and more. Located at Hormuz (or Ormuz) Island, a historic port off the southern coast of Iran, the project is (...) designed to attract tourists to the small island and serve as an alternative to high-rise developments traditionally used to house visitors. Presence in Hormuz 2 is a series of urban development projects designed by the Tehran-based ZAV Architects. Majara (which means adventure) is the second phase of this multipurpose cultural residence, aimed at binding together the lives of local people and visitors culturally and economically. On the verge of opening, this project has been heavily criticised by environmental activists and urban experts citing ecological, economic, cultural and social concerns. Such projects have made locals mere servants in service of investors, which impedes the enhancement of their quality of life. (shrink)

Husserl and the phenomenology of religion have a delicate relationship that combines direct references to religious themes with broader analyses subsumable under the more general phenomenology of consciousness. This paper shows the themes and problems of a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of religious consciousness through an encounter with its elements. Word, Prayer, relationship with the Sacred and Faith are some of the indelible traces of a phenomenology of religious consciousness. The belief, however, is that phenomenology can be spoken of if (...) and only if the themes are addressed through the analysis of consciousness as the method teaches. Thus, an analysis of religious lived-experiences and transcendence (subjective and absolute) is joined by such phenomenologically diriment questions as a possible dichotomy between transcendence of immanence or immanence of transcendence. (shrink)

The second book of Aristotle’s Politics is generally taken to examine politeiai or constitutions that either exist in cities that are said to be well governed or were proposed by theoreticians and are thought to be well organized (II.1, 1260b30–32; II.12, 1274b26–28). Prominent are Aristotle’s examinations of Plato’s Republic and the constitution of Sparta; but Aristotle also devotes chapters to the examination of Plato’s Laws, the proposed constitutions of Phaleas of Chalcedon and Hippodamos of Miletus, and the existing constitutions of (...) Crete, Carthage, and Solon’s Athens. Prominent, also, is scholarly analysis of Aristotle’s remarks about the Republic and Sparta – whether his criticisms of Plato are insightful and fair or whether his remarks about Sparta are historically accurate and hit upon the causes of Sparta’s fourth century decline. Far less prominent, though, is scholarly discussion of Aristotle’s remarks about the other constitutions analyzed in Politics II, how Politics II as a whole is organized, or what light – if any – the book sheds on the Politics as a whole. Such scholarly neglect is unfortunate for at least two major reasons. First, Politics II claims that since the Politics proposes to study which political community is best of all for people who are most able to live in accord with one’s prayers (kat’ euchên), it is necessary to investigate other constitutions reputed to be best (II.1, 1260b27–29). Such a claim suggests a close link between Politics II and Politics VII/VIII but such a link needs elaboration. In what way does Politics II prepare the way for Politics VII/VIII? Secondly, Politics II contains not only criticism of other constitutions, but also substantive political theorizing – most noticeably about the organization of property in the best regime, the problem of political innovation, and the relationship between political theorizing and chance. Aristotle’s critiques of Plato’s Republic, the constitution of Hippodamos, and the constitution of Carthage generate a series of substantive theoretical reflections about the problematic nature of political innovation and political theorizing that rise above mere examinations of the views of his predecessors. Viewing Politics II solely as a repository of criticism loses sight of the theoretical insights Aristotle offers therein, self-conscious insights about the very nature of political theorizing. (shrink)

Recent research into the nature of self in artificial and biological systems raises interest in a uniquely determining immutable sense of self, a “metaphysical ‘I’” associated with inviolable personal values and moral convictions that remain constant in the face of environmental change, distinguished from an object “me” that changes with its environment. Complementary research portrays processes associated with self as multimodal routines selectively enacted on the basis of contextual cues informing predictive self or world models, with the notion of the (...) constant, per-vasive and invariant sense of self associated with a multistable attractor set aiming to ensure personal integrity against threat of disintegrative change. This paper proposes that an immutable sense of self emerges as a global attractor which can be described as a project ideal self-situation embodied in frontal medial processes during more or less normal adolescent development, and that thereafter serves to orient agency in the more or less free development of embodied potentials over the life course in effort to realize project conditions, phenomenally identified with the felt pull towards this end as purpose of and source of meaning in life. So oriented, life-long self-development aims to embody solutions to problems at different timescales depending on this embodied purpose, ultimately in the service of evolutionary processes securing organism populations against threats of disintegrative change over timespans far beyond that of the individual. After characterizing the target sense of self, research circling this target is briefly surveyed. Self as global project and developmental neural correlates are proposed. Then, the paper discusses some implications for research in biological and artificial systems. Building from earlier work in cognitive neurorobotics, discussion affirms the value of reinforcement rituals including prayer in metaphysical self-development, considers implications for value alignment and rights associated with free will in the context of artificial intelligence and robot religion, and concludes by emphasizing the importance of self-development toward project ideals as source of meaning in life in the current social-political environment. (shrink)

Ghazali’s The Beginning of Guidance (Bidayetü'l Hidaye) is a book that represents the beginning for people's salvation. According to Ghazali, in order for the human to be guided, he must first follow the orders of this book and then read the book The Revival of Religious Sciences, which he says contains useful science. According to him, the book of Beginning of Guidance can offer the key to salvation. In this book he made major changes in the understanding of worship of (...) Islam and expanded both the content and the scope of worship. In this book, where the understanding of worship of Islam has become mystical; in addition to the prayers that the Qur'an declares as obligatory, the prophet Mohammed’s worship, the prayers of his companions, the remembrances of the Sufis, the wars made in the life of the ascetics are described in the form of orders that must be made in the way of liberation. Thus, he made the prayer not a part of life, but the whole life, saying that three times as much prayer as the God made obligatory, four times as much as Ramadan fasting, fifty-seven times a day prayer and chant every time of the day. There has been no previous study regarding the issue of Ghazali turning worship into ascetism with the book of Beginning of Guidance. In this paper, in addition to this work of Ghazali, the narrations in his other works will be taken into consideration. Thus, his project of Islam religion and mysticization will be introduced in more detail. There are two important factors that direct Gazali, who presents a way of life based on ascetism and seclusion, as an "ideal life". The first is the Sufi culture that he has been in since his childhood and has never broken. According to Ghazali, the life style of Sufi culture that takes the person away from the world is a prescription for salvation of Muslims who are under the threat of "secularization". The second is the distinction between the community and the upper class in the society with the effect of this Sufi culture. It is not possible to say the same thing for the common people belonging to the religion of 'imitation', while the upper class is liberated with the life of the feast and the deity. The only way of the salvation of the common people is to turn the prayers of the imitation religion to ascertism and to open the way of the seclusion. They can do it with the book Beginning of Guidance. Thus the common people can reach salvation just like the upper class by leaving this world behind. (shrink)