Legal positivism's ``separation thesis'' is usually taken in one of two ways: as an analytic claim about the nature of law – roughly, as some version of the Social Thesis; or as a substantive claim about the moral value of law – roughly, as some version of the Value Thesis. In this paper I argue that we should recognize a third kind of positivist separation thesis, one which complements, but is distinct from, positivism's analytic and moral claims. The Neutrality Thesis (...) says that the correct analytic claim about the nature of law does not by itself entail any substantive claims about the moral value of law. I give careful formulations of these three separation theses, explain the relationships between them, and sketch the role that each plays in the positivist approach to law. (shrink)

*A shortened version of this paper will appear in Current Controversies in Philosophy of Science, Dasgupta and Weslake, eds. Routledge.* This paper describes the case that can be made for a high-dimensional ontology in quantum mechanics based on the virtues of avoiding both nonseparability and non locality.

In morally grounding a public justification requirement, public reason liberals frequently invoke the idea that persons should be construed as “free and equal.” But this tells us little with regard to what it is about us that makes us free or how a claim about our status as persons can ultimately ground a requirement of public justification. In light of this worry, I argue that a public justification requirement can be grounded in a Nozick-inspired argument from the separateness of persons (...) (one that is consistent with the idea that individuals are free and equal). As I claim, one particular feature of the fact of our separateness – the possession of a basic psychology consisting of beliefs, intentions, sentiments, and a variety of desire-like psychological states – does the most work in grounding both a principle of liberty (PL) and a requirement of public justification (RPJ). Together, PL and RPJ provide the basic framework for a theory of public reason liberalism. (shrink)

In a new study, Ben-Haim et al. use subliminal stimuli to separate conscious and unconscious perception in macaques. A programme of this type, using a range of cognitive tasks, is a promising way to look for conscious perception in more controversial cases.

The difference between the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons requires that there be a shift in the moral weight that we accord to changes in utility when we move from making intrapersonal tradeoffs to making interpersonal tradeoffs. We examine which forms of egalitarianism can, and which cannot, account for this shift. We argue that a form of egalitarianism which is concerned only with the extent of outcome inequality cannot account for this shift. We also argue that (...) a view which is concerned with both outcome inequality and with the unfairness of inequality in individuals‘ expected utilities can account for this shift. Finally, we limn an alternative view, on.. (shrink)

The separation of powers principle deeply heritaged in the US constitutionalism affected and continues to influence the law and public policy in the nation. The tripartite scheme of government was quarreled over the history how we have to perceive any best adequate interaction among the Congress, Executive and Judiciary. The Constitution itself merely quibbles on this point, and the Supreme Court justices, in some cases, would not be done as a clear cut for the scope of constitutional power conferred on (...) each branch. As the stare decisis is a rule in the common law countries, it is less prospective to anticipate that a quantum leap can be made for the new paradigm of constitutional government in the US. In this challenge, the paper deals with the sensitive area of three powers involving the issue of presidential privilege and immunity, justiceability and standing, as well as judicial control of public agencies. In the course of discussion, several landmark cases were illustrated to make a point for the angulated controversies, typically involving the pressing pubic issues and officers of absolute or qualified immunity. Given the diverse structure of government, the US model had been followed by many new born republics in 20th centuries. The author would wish that the paper provides a comparative lesson for the circle of those countries. (shrink)

This paper argues that instrumental rationality is more permissive than expected utility theory. The most compelling instrumentalist argument in favour of separability, its core requirement, is that agents with non-separable preferences end up badly off by their own lights in some dynamic choice problems. I argue that once we focus on the question of whether agents’ attitudes to uncertain prospects help define their ends in their own right, or instead only assign instrumental value in virtue of the outcomes they (...) may lead to, we see that the argument must fail. Either attitudes to prospects assign non-instrumental value in their own right, in which case we cannot establish the irrationality of the dynamic choice behaviour of agents with non-separable preferences. Or they don’t, in which case agents with non-separable preferences can avoid the problematic choice behaviour without adopting separable preferences. (shrink)

Economic policy evaluations require social welfare functions for variable-size populations. Two important candidates are critical-level generalized utilitarianism (CLGU) and rank-discounted critical-level generalized utilitarianism, which was recently characterized by Asheim and Zuber (2014) (AZ). AZ introduce a novel axiom, existence of egalitarian equivalence (EEE). First, we show that, under some uncontroversial criteria for a plausible social welfare relation, EEE suffices to rule out the Repugnant Conclusion of population ethics (without AZ’s other novel axioms). Second, we provide a new characterization of CLGU: (...) AZ’s set of axioms is equivalent to CLGU when EEE is replaced by the axiom same-number independence. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to examine the separability of law and morality within an analytic jurisprudential framework. The paper is comprised of four parts. First, the separability thesis will be discussed and defined. Second, Hart’s legal positivist account of law will be presented, which defends the separability thesis. Third, two objections from a natural law perspective (classical and contemporary) will be proposed against the legal positivist position, thereby rejecting the separability thesis. Each objection will (...) be accompanied by a possible Hartian reply. Finally, I will offer a novel analysis of the arguments as well as state why I find the Hartian approach preferable to the natural law theorist’s in regard to the separability thesis. (shrink)

The ‘syntax’ and ‘combinatorics’ of my title are what Curry (1961) referred to as phenogrammatics and tectogrammatics respectively. Tectogrammatics is concerned with the abstract combinatorial structure of the grammar and directly informs semantics, while phenogrammatics deals with concrete operations on syntactic data structures such as trees or strings. In a series of previous papers (Muskens, 2001a; Muskens, 2001b; Muskens, 2003) I have argued for an architecture of the grammar in which finite sequences of lambda terms are the basic data structures, (...) pairs of terms syntax, semantics for example. These sequences then combine with the help of simple generalizations of the usual abstraction and application operations. This theory, which I call Lambda Grammars and which is closely related to the independently formulated theory of Abstract Categorial Grammars (de Groote, 2001; de Groote, 2002), in fact is an implementation of Curry’s ideas: the level of tectogrammar is encoded by the sequences of lambda-terms and their ways of combination, while the syntactic terms in those sequences constitute the phenogrammatical level. In de Groote’s formulation of the theory, tectogrammar is the level of abstract terms, while phenogrammar is the level of object terms. (shrink)

When it comes to epistemic normativity, should we take the good to be prior to the right? That is, should we ground facts about what we ought and ought not believe on a given occasion in facts about the value of being in certain cognitive states (such as, for example, the value of having true beliefs)? The overwhelming answer among contemporary epistemologists is “Yes, we should.” This essay argues to the contrary. Just as taking the good to be prior to (...) the right in ethics often leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what an agent should do, so too, this essay argues, taking the good to be prior to the right in epistemology leads one to sanction implausible trade-offs when determining what a subject should believe. Epistemic value—and, by extension, epistemic goals—are not the explanatory foundation upon which all other normative notions in epistemology rest. (shrink)

This article describes the Full Bayesian Significance Test for the problem of separate hypotheses. Numerical experiments are performed for the Gompertz vs. Weibull life span test.

Consider the concept combination ‘pet human’. In word association experiments, human subjects produce the associate ‘slave’ in relation to this combination. The striking aspect of this associate is that it is not produced as an associate of ‘pet’, or ‘human’ in isolation. In other words, the associate ‘slave’ seems to be emergent. Such emergent associations sometimes have a creative character and cognitive science is largely silent about how we produce them. Departing from a dimensional model of human conceptual space, this (...) article will explore concept combinations, and will argue that emergent associations are a result of abductive reasoning within conceptual space, that is, below the symbolic level of cognition. A tensor-based approach is used to model concept combinations allowing such combinations to be formalized as interacting quantum systems. Free association norm data is used to motivate the underlying basis of the conceptual space. It is shown by analogy how some concept combinations may behave like quantum-entangled particles. Two methods of analysis were presented for empirically validating the presence of non-separable concept combinations in human cognition. One method is based on quantum theory and another based on comparing a joint probability distribution with another distribution based on a separability assumption using a chi-square goodness-of-fit test. Although these methods were inconclusive in relation to an empirical study of bi-ambiguous concept combinations, avenues for further refinement of these methods are identified. (shrink)

Sources for Stoicism present conflicting accounts of the Stoic principles. Some suggest that the principles are inseparable from each other. Others suggest that they are separable. To resolve this apparent interpretive dilemma, I distinguish between the functions of the principles and the bodies that realize those functions. Although the principles cannot separate when realizing their roles, the Stoic theory of blending entails that the bodies that realize those roles are physically separable. I present a strategy for further work on the (...) principles in light of this interpretation. (shrink)

One of the oldest questions in science and philosophy is whether reality is fundamentally discrete, or fundamentally continuous. In this short essay I show that this question should first be classified into two main categories. 1) Intrinsic existence, 2) Behavioral existence. I show that the first category should be continuous by definition, while the second category could probably be either continuous or discrete.

I argue that the social dimension of alienation, as discussed by Williams and Railton, has been underappreciated. The lesson typically drawn from their exchange is that moral theory poses a threat to the internal integrity of the agent, but there is a parallel risk that moral theory will implicitly construe agents as constitutively alienated from one another. I argue that a satisfying account of agency will need to make room for what I call ‘genuine ethical contact’ with others, both as (...) concrete objects in the world external to ourselves and as subjects who can recognize us reciprocally. (shrink)

This paper presents a puzzle for Act Consequentialists who do not want to shoot Pelé. The puzzle arises from cases involving the promotion of virtue, and motivates a systematic restriction on the separability of reasons.

Thomas Aquinas consistently defended the thesis that the separated rational soul that results from a human person’s death is not a person. Nevertheless, what has emerged in recent decades is a sophisticated disputed question between “survivalists” and “corruptionists” concerning the personhood of the separated soul that has left us with intractable disagreements wherein neither side seems able to convince the other. In our contribution to this disputed question, we present a digest of an unconsidered middle way: the separated soul is (...) an incomplete person. (shrink)

How can we resist the repugnant conclusion? James Griffin has plausibly suggested that part way through the sequence we may reach a world—let us call it “J”—in which the lives are lexically superior to those that follow. If it would be preferable to live a single life in J than through any number of lives in the next one, then it would be strange to judge K the better world. Instead, we may reasonably “suspend addition” and judge J superior, as (...) if aggregating the lives in the larger world intrapersonally. I argue that the addition of new people with separate preferences renders this inference illicit when comparing J+ and K. When one pairwise comparison suspends addition and the other does not, the result is an intransitive value judgement: J < J+ < K < J, producing the mere addition paradox. (shrink)

This paper sketches a framework for the separation of church and state and, with the framework in view, indicates why a government’s maintaining such separation poses challenges for balancing two major democratic ideals: preserving equality before the law and protecting liberty, including religious liberty. The challenge is particularly complex where healthcare is either provided or regulated by government. The contemporary problem in question here is the contraception coverage requirement in the Obama Administration’s healthcare mandate. Many institutions have mounted legal challenges (...) to the mandate on grounds of religious freedom. The paper proposes a number of interconnected principles toward a resolution of the problem: for the institutional realm, specific principles for church-state separation and a principle concerning the protection of citizens’sense of identity; and for the ethics of citizenship in the conduct individuals, principles that provide an adequate place for natural (thus secular) reason in lawmaking and political decisions. (shrink)

The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modern thinking until the present time, has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. If the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is (...) impossible for the finite spirit in a strictly a priori sense – this is the thesis supported here which is not at all close to Hegel. As the argumentation rather has to consider the conditions of realization concerning the Being-of-nature, too, it is compelled to take up empirical elements – concerning the organism, for instance, system-theoretical aspects, physical and chemical features of the nervous system, etc. With that, on the one hand, empirical-scientific premises are assumed (e.g. the lawlikeness of nature), which on the other hand become (now close to Hegel) possibly able to be founded in the frame of a Hegelian-idealistic conception. In this sense, a double strategy of empirical-scientific concretization and objective-idealistic foundation is followed up, which represents the methodical basic principle of the developed considerations. In the course of the undertaking, the main aspects of the whole Hegelian design concerning the philosophy of nature are considered – space and time, mass and motion, force and law of nature, the organism, the pro-blem of evolution, psychic being – as well as Hegel's basic thesis concerning the philosophy of nature, that therein a tendency toward coherence and idealization manifests itself in the sense of a (categorically) gradually rising succession of nature: from the separateness of space to the ideality of sensation. In the sense of the double strategy of concretization and foundation it is shown that on the one hand possibilities of philosophical penetration concerning actual empirical-scientific results are opened, and on the other hand – in turn – a re-interpretation of Hegel's theorem on the basis of physical, evolution-theoretical and system-theoretical argumentation also becomes possible. In this mutual crossing-over and elucidation of empirical and Hegelian argumentation not only do perspectives of a new comprehension of nature become visible, but also, at the same time – as an essential consequence of this methodical principle – thoughts on the possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. (shrink)

Central to this chapter is a basic philosophical concept of the nature of modern science which exists amongst positivists, like Auguste Comte, who rejects as illegitimate all that cannot be directly observed in the investigation and study of any subject. Our daily experience of the nature of science continues to give us reasons to unlearn what can be considered as prejudices and errors in our conception of the nature of science. Consequently, the question "what is the nature of modern science?" (...) still perplexes us, and the answers we provide to this question often reveal how distorted our vision of history and thought has become over the years. This chapter shall, via the method of critical analysis in philosophy pass through Comte's three stages of arriving at the truth. This approach rejects as non-scientific all that cannot be directly observed in the investigation and study of any subject against Whitehead's approach in which he tries to make a “dispassionate consideration of the nature of things, antecedently to any special investigation into their details”. This is a standpoint Whitehead terms “metaphysical.” This explains why he developed a comprehensive metaphysical system for the understanding of science, society, and self as found in his major texts. In this light, science cannot be done without taking metaphysics into account. (shrink)

Separation of institutions, functions and personnel – Checks and balances – Hungary, Poland, Czechia, Slovakia – Short tradition of separation of powers in Central Europe – Fragile interwar systems of separation of powers – Communist principle of centralisation of power – Technocratic challenge to separation of powers during the EU accession – One-sided checks on the elected branches and empowering technocratic elitist institutions – Populist challenge to separation of powers in the 2010s – Re-politicising of the public sphere, removing most (...) checks on the elected branches, and curtailing and packing the unelected institutions – Technocratic and populist challenges to separation of powers interrelated more than we thought. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that self respect constitutes an important value, and further, an important basis for equality. It also argues that under conditions of inequality producing segregation, voluntary separation in the educational sector may be more likely to provide the resources necessary for self respect. A prima facie case of voluntary separation for stigmatized minorities when equality as equal status and treatment is not an option under either the terms of integration or involuntary segregation is defended.

Commentators such as Kemp Smith (1941), Mendelbaum (1974), and Bricke (1980) have taken the distinctions of reason to pose either a counterexample to or a limitation of scope on the Separability Principle. This has been convincingly addressed by various accounts such as Garrett (1997), Hoffman (2011), and Baxter (2011). However, I argue in this paper that there are two notions of ‘distinction of reason’, one between particular instantiations (token distinctions of reason) and one between general ideas (type distinctions of (...) reason). Discussion of the distinctions of reason in the secondary literature has without fail focused on token distinctions of reason, but I will argue that type distinctions of reason prove problematic for Hume’s Separability Principle. I find a way around this problem that is consonant with Hume’s account of general ideas, but which can hardly be said to be an account which he explicitly or even implicitly endorsed. (shrink)

TABLE OF CONTENTS: Introduction; de Broglie's paradox.; Quantum theory of distant particles; The EPR paradox; Einstein locality and Bell's inequality; Recent research on Bell's inequality; General consequences of Einstein locality; Nonloeality and relativity; Time-symmetric theories; The Bohm-Aharonov hypothesis; Experiments on Einstein locality; Reduction of the wave packet; Measurements, reality and consciousness; Conclusions.

Résumé : Avec ce second dialogue, Salviati veut lever les difficultés de Simplicio sur la distinction réelle d’essence et d’être ainsi que sur la notion d’acte d’être (actus essendi). Ayant le sentiment d’avoir brûlé les étapes, il lui propose de revenir en amont sur la détermination du sujet exact de la métaphysique selon Thomas d’Aquin. Il progressera en deux points : le passage de “l’être premier perçu” à “l’être commun” ou “être en tant qu’être” par un jugement dit de “séparation”, (...) puis la définition du sujet propre de la métaphysique comme “être négativement ou indifféremment immatériel”. Arrivé à cette conclusion, Salviati entend conduire Simplicio à comprendre l’autonomie des principes de la métaphysique vis-à-vis de la philosophie de la nature. Simplicio demeure curieux mais dubitatif. - Abstract: With this second dialogue, Salviati wants to remove Simplicio's difficulties on the actual distinction of essence and being as well as on the notion of the act of being (actus essendi). Feeling that he had skipped stages, he suggests going back to the determination of the exact subject of metaphysics according to Thomas Aquinas. He will progress in two steps: the transition from "first perceived being" to "common being" or "being as being" by a judgment of separation, and then the definition of the subject of metaphysics as "being negatively or neutrally immaterial". With this conclusion, Salviati intends to lead Simplicio to understand the autonomy of the principles of metaphysics towards philosophy of nature. Simplicio remains curious but dubious. (shrink)

Robert M. Adams claims that Leibniz’s rehabilitation of the doctrine of incomplete entities is the most sustained effort to integrate a theory of corporeal substances into the theory of simple substances. I discuss alternative interpretations of the theory of incomplete entities suggested by Marleen Rozemond and Pauline Phemister. Against Rozemond, I argue that the scholastic doctrine of incomplete entities is not dependent on a hylomorphic analysis of corporeal substances, and therefore can be adapted by Leibniz. Against Phemister, I claim that (...) Leibniz did not reduce the passivity of corporeal substances to modifications of passive aspects of simple substances. Against Adams, I argue that Leibniz’s theory of the incompleteness of the mind cannot be understood adequately without understanding the reasons for his assertion that matter is incomplete without minds. Composite substances are seen as requisites for the reality of the material world, and therefore cannot be eliminated from Leibniz’s metaphysics. (shrink)

It is sometimes argued that the non-therapeutic, non-consensual alteration of children‘s genitals should be discussed in two separate ethical discourses: one for girls (in which such alterations should be termed 'female genital mutilation' or FGM), and one for boys (in which such alterations should be termed 'male circumcision‘). In this article, I call into question the moral and empirical basis for such a distinction, and argue that all children - whether female, male, or indeed intersex - should be free from (...) having parts of their genitals removed unless there is a pressing medical indication. (shrink)

These two essays (minuscule acts of reading the Bible) by a Hindu, is a nascent praxis of theology. They have been privately circulated and now I am putting them up.

I briefly discuss the problems of Chisholm's entia successiva--the mind and body being successive parts of a machine.

I critically examine the view that Descartes’s independence conception (IC) of substance plays a crucial role in his “separability argument” for substance dualism. I argue that IC is a poisoned chalice. I do so by considering how an IC-based separability argument fares on two different ways of thinking about principal attributes. On the one hand, if we take principal attributes to be universals, then a separability argument that deploys IC establishes a version of dualism that is unacceptably (...) strong. On the other hand, if we take principal attributes to be tropes, then IC introduces challenges which undermine the argument. This is partly because the assumption of tropes makes it possible to distinguish several versions of substance dualism, versions which differ with respect to their degree of generality. I argue that taking principal attributes to be tropes makes it challenging to establish any of these versions by way of an IC-based separability argument. I conclude the paper by suggesting a way forward for the proponent of the separability argument. (shrink)

A homeomorphism is built between the separable complex Hilbert space (quantum mechanics) and Minkowski space (special relativity) by meditation of quantum information (i.e. qubit by qubit). That homeomorphism can be interpreted physically as the invariance to a reference frame within a system and its unambiguous counterpart out of the system. The same idea can be applied to Poincaré’s conjecture (proved by G. Perelman) hinting at another way for proving it, more concise and meaningful physically. Furthermore, the conjecture can be generalized (...) and interpreted in relation to the pseudo-Riemannian space of general relativity therefore allowing for both mathematical and philosophical interpretations of the force of gravitation due to the mismatch of choice and ordering and resulting into the “curving of information” (e.g. entanglement). Mathematically, that homeomorphism means the invariance to choice, the axiom of choice, well-ordering, and well-ordering “theorem” (or “principle”) and can be defined generally as “information invariance”. Philosophically, the same homeomorphism implies transcendentalism once the philosophical category of the totality is defined formally. The fundamental concepts of “choice”, “ordering” and “information” unify physics, mathematics, and philosophy and should be related to their shared foundations. (shrink)

An isomorphism is built between the separable complex Hilbert space (quantum mechanics) and Minkowski space (special relativity) by meditation of quantum information (i.e. qubit by qubit). That isomorphism can be interpreted physically as the invariance between a reference frame within a system and its unambiguous counterpart out of the system. The same idea can be applied to Poincaré’s conjecture (proved by G. Perelman) hinting another way for proving it, more concise and meaningful physically. Mathematically, the isomorphism means the invariance to (...) choice, the axiom of choice, well-ordering, and well-ordering “theorem” (or “principle”) and can be defined generally as “information invariance”. (shrink)

Nearly thirty years ago, Robert Alexy in his book The Concept and Validity of Law as well as in other early articles raised non-positivistic arguments in the Continental European tradition against legal positivism in general, which was assumed to be held by, among others, John Austin, Hans Kelsen and H.L.A. Hart. The core thesis of legal positivism that was being discussed among contemporary German jurists, just as with their Anglo- American counterparts, is the claim that there is no necessary connection (...) between law and morality. Robert Alexy has argued, however, that the law, besides consisting conceptually of elements of authoritative issuance and social efficacy, necessarily lays a claim to substantial correctness, which is derived from analytical arguments. Furthermore, if this claim to substantial correctness necessarily requires the incorporation of moral elements into law, then the ‘necessary connection thesis’, as defended by non-positivism, can be justified. Some of the most significant objections to this sort of claim, stemming from the Anglo-American world, are those introduced by Joseph Raz. In his ‘Reply’ to Robert Alexy, Raz raises at least three interesting criticisms, including, first, the ambiguity of ‘legal theory in the positivistic tradition’, second, the indeterminate formulations of the ‘separation thesis’, and, third, the necessary claim of law to legitimate authority as a moral claim. As a point of departure, I will argue that Raz’s three criticisms are misleading. For they do not enhance our understanding of the genuine compatibility or incompatibility between legal positivism and non-positivism. Despite the frequently reformulated theses of legal positivism and the various kinds of opponents responding thereto, the essential divergence between legal positivism and non-positivism was and remains the answer to the question of the relation between law and morality. Furthermore, I will clarify that in the strictest sense there can be three and only three logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality: the connection between them is either necessary, or impossible (i. e. they are necessarily separate), or contingent (i. e. they are neither necessarily connected nor necessarily separate). The first position is non-positivistic, while the latter two positions are, indeed, both positivistic, but in different forms: one may be called ‘exclusive’ legal positivism, the other ‘inclusive’ legal positivism. I will continue by showing that these three positions stand to one another in the relation of contraries, not contradictories, and that, taken together, they exhaust the logically possible positions concerning the relation between law and morality, never mind the tradition or authority from which these positions are derived. Raz mentions, however, many changeable formulations of the separation thesis, which even leads him to acknowledge ‘necessary connections between law and morality’. One who is trying to understand legal positivism would no doubt be puzzled by this claim. Nevertheless, I will argue that this is an alternative strategy of legal positivism, and it points to naturalistically oriented view. Although this necessary separation between law and morality, understood naturalistically, strikes one as strengthening the separation, in the end it leads to a weakened notion of necessity. This weakened necessary separation thesis, however, cannot be justified through the so-called claim of the law to legitimate authority, defended by Raz, for it is difficult to answer the question of whether a normally justified but factual authority can gain legitimate authority. Finally, the necessary connection between law and morality in a strong sense can still be justified by the claim of law to correctness, as per Alexy’s argument. (shrink)

Bill Cosby’s immorality has raised intriguing aesthetic and ethical issues. Do the crimes that he has been convicted of lessen the aesthetic value of his stand-up and, even if we can enjoy it, should we? This article first discusses the intimate relationship between the comedian and audience. The art form itself is structurally intimate, and at the same time the comedian claims to express an authentic self on stage. After drawing an analogy between the question of the moral character of (...) comedians and the aesthetic value of their stand-up and the debate over the ethical criticism of art, this article argues that it is reasonable to find a comedian’s performance less funny, because stand-up’s artistic success relies on this intimacy. It contrasts the comedy of Bill Cosby with that of Louis C.K. C.K.’s moral flaws are much more present in his comedy, and it is therefore more difficult to find him funny. Last, it is ethically permissible to enjoy their comedy, if no harm to others results, both because it does not corrupt the audience’s character and because amusement is valuable. (shrink)

Mill (1872, 1874) is an early proponent of the thesis that economics has a special domain in which it can operate relatively independently of findings from other sciences. Contra Mill, I argue that this so-called separateness-thesis is best defendedunder an externalist interpretation of Rational Choice Theory (RCT). Mill’s defence is consistent with an internalist interpretation of RCT. Internalism holds that RCT depicts psychological mechanisms operating in economic agents. I argue that such a defence fails to establish separateness, because it makes (...) economics highly depended on psychological findings. However, externalism understands RCT as an adequate description of how agents react to incentives if certain environmental structures are present. Under this interpretation, we can defend separateness by investigating which features of an environmental structure will lead agents to behave in accordance with RCT. Thereby, we can derive indicators that enable us to demarcate a separate domain for economics. (shrink)

Two questions often shape our view of the world. On the one hand, we ask what there is, on the other hand, we ask what there ought to be. Empirical research and normative theory, the methodological traditions concerned with these questions, entered a difficult relationship, from at least as early as around the time of the advent of modern sciences. To this day, there remains a strong separation between the two domains, with both tending to neglect discourses and results from (...) the other. Contrary to a verdict of strict segregation between »is« and »ought«, there are, nowadays, various attempts to integrate both theoretical approaches. This calls for a newly intensified discourse on the relation between empirical research and normative theory. In this volume, scholars from different disciplines – including psychology, sociology, economics, and philosophy – discuss possible desired or undesired influences on, and limits of, the integration of these two approaches. (shrink)

The switch to online education that occurred during the Corona pandemic brought to the fore questions about the value and desirability of a fully online university. This article explores to what extent is a fully online university desirable from an educational perspective, whereby education is seen as a valuable experience taken in itself, regardless of its output. I start from the hypothesis that a fundamental dimension of study practices at the university is the experience of collective thinking triggered by specific (...) material and social arrangements. I proceed to describe material conditions for triggering thinking in terms of what I call mediatic displacement, which is a way of integrating media into educational practices that enables a fluctuating type of attention. The paper concludes by arguing that we need to develop new technologies for online education and train our attention deliberately for online environments by establishing new protocols for dealing with the digital scattering of attention. (shrink)

The emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic initiated major disruptions to higher education systems. Physical spaces that previously supported interpersonal interaction and community were abruptly inactivated, and faculty largely took on the responsibility of accommodating classroom structures in rapidly changing situations. This study employed interviews to examine how undergraduate Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics (STEM) instructors adapted instruction to accommodate the mandated transition to virtual learning and how these accommodations supported or hindered community and belonging during the onset of the pandemic. (...) Interviews with 25 STEM faculty at an undergraduate Hispanic Serving Institution revealed a wide range of accommodations they made to their courses and how they managed communication with students. Faculty strived to support student belonging with responses ranging from caring to crisis management, though some faculty expressed feelings of powerlessness when unable to accommodate certain challenges. The case of a responsive and flexible instructor is presented to highlight a productive response to a crisis. These retrospective findings point to strategies to support faculty teaching in virtual learning environments in the future; increasing opportunities for student–student and student–faculty interaction, supporting faculty in learning technologies that support these interactions and addressing faculty’s feelings of powerlessness. (shrink)

The value of this essay is not to reiterate the extant views on horror literature, but to make available for the first time to the world at large the textual foundations of considering horror literature as a genre by itself. The Gothic is a different genre altogether though most of us want to conflate and confuse between these two genres. Someday I shall write at length about the nature of the horrific. Suffice to say for now that the focus is (...) that long ago, H. P. Lovecraft in his essay mentioned within this essay distinguished between the gothic as a literary genre and horror literature as another literary genre. And Lovecraft showed us that the horror as a literary genre is by far the greater of the two genres. This essay does not get into the literary values of either the gothic or the horror novel. That has been treated in a fuller manner by this author in his PhD thesis. (shrink)

High grade chromite ore has been decreased constantly due to the importance of chromium element in industrial uses such as metallurgical, chemical, and refractory industries. Therefore, beneficiation of low grade has been more significant .Response Surface Methodology (RSM) is combination of statistical and mathematical methods used for modeling and analyzing problems. In this study, the Central Composite Design (CCD) was applied by using Design-Expert (version 6.0.5) for modeling and optimizing the effect of operating variables on the performance of gravity separation (...) via pilot plant shaking table for chromite ore. Three operating variables were studied, namely feed rate, tilt angle, and flow rate during the tests. The sample under study is low grade chromite ore, containing (30.21%, Cr2O3). The mathematical model equations of ANOVA model revealed that the grade of concentrate is more sensetive for feed rate (g/min) compered to water flow rate (l/min).whereas , recovery of concentrate is more sensetive for tilt angle compered to water flow rate (l/min) and feed rate (g/min). Optimized responses for the beneficiation process were found at concentrate with 48.52% Cr2O3 in with 83.09% recovery and it was achieved at water flow rate 15.33 l/min, tilt angle 2.16 ≈ 2.00 degree, and feed rate of 195.38 g/min. (shrink)

Traditional just war theory maintains that the two types of rules that govern justice in times of war, jus ad bellum (justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war), are logically independent of one another. Call this the independence thesis. According to this thesis, a war that satisfies the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello rules will be satisfied; and a war that violates the ad bellum rules does not guarantee that the in bello (...) rules will be violated. A controversial implication of this is that it’s possible for soldiers to undergo acts that are instrumental in bringing about victory in an unjust war and yet do nothing morally wrong. Some authors – call them purists – claim that this cannot be correct. Participating in an unjust war is by itself morally wrong. Yitzhak Benbaji has given what is to my mind the strongest defense of the independence thesis. In this paper I critically examine Benbaji’s argument and conclude that it is not persuasive. My argument against Benbaji incorporates the concept of honor in the military. I seek to show, in part, that if the recent literature is correct concerning both the nature of honor and the importance of instilling it in soldiers, then Benbaji hasn’t given the purist a compelling reason to give up her view. (shrink)

The Husserlian concept of intersubjectivity has been criticized for the fact that it belongs exclusively to a philosophy of representation and to a solipsistic consciousness. In this conceptual framework, the other (ego) appears to be constituted by a singular ego through the synthesis of the series of its appearances (perceptive or imaginative representations) and by extrapolation (transposition) of its own “sphere of originality”. For this theory of constitution seemed to be essentially related to the concept of objective representation that post-Husserlian (...) phenomenologists have criticized and eventually replaced with another, in which affectivity is supposed to open the way to otherness, as we can see in Heidegger, Levinas, Merleau-Ponty, Michel Henry or Jacques Derrida. Our hypothesis is that the difficulty does not regard the theory of constitution, but the fact that the other and the community that he forms with me and with many others are thought only in terms of representation. Even those who discharged the “abstract” objective representation of Husserl’s function and replaced it with “affectivity” were not finally able to overpass the representational framework, because the other has always been for me (and vice-versa, I have been for him) only a “picture” (no matter whether representative or “affective”), something which simply “stands” before my eyes. But this is certainly a reductive way of understanding the relation between the I and the other. If we focus our attention on the phenomenon of community and not on some interpretations or simplifications of it, we realize that it is not sufficient that objective representation or affectivity or any other faculty constitute or disclose the other for the I (even if that is a necessary starting point). As a multilayered concept, “intersubjectivity”, in Husserl’s sense, is a system of transitions from mere appearance to transcendence, from passivity to activity, from cognitive and affective representation to volition and action. As soon as we see the relation between the I and the other as active, as an influence or intrusion of one consciousness in another, as an intention to “move” the other, to determine him to assume or to begin an action (a real one, effected in real life), the concept of intersubjectivity changes drastically, even though the “representation” of the other before the I and of the I in the eyes of the other remains a necessary interface. Accordingly, constitutive phenomenology has to take into consideration volition, action and communication not simply as extensions of the constitution of the thing. A reform of the theory of constitution, or rather its enlargement, to encompass this new type of “objectivity” (praxis) which would thus offer an adequate conceptual framework is strongly recommended. (shrink)

Utilitarianism is often rejected on the grounds that it fails to respect the separateness of persons, instead treating people as mere “receptacles of value”. I develop several different versions of this objection, and argue that, despite their prima facie plausibility, they are all mistaken. Although there are crude forms of utilitarianism that run afoul of these objections, I advance a new form of the view—‘token-pluralistic utilitarianism’—that does not.

We introduce a ranking of multidimensional alternatives, including uncertain prospects as a particular case, when these objects can be given a matrix form. This ranking is separable in terms of rows and columns, and continuous and monotonic in the basic quantities. Owing to the theory of additive separability developed here, we derive very precise numerical representations over a large class of domains (i.e., typically notof the Cartesian product form). We apply these representationsto (1)streams of commodity baskets through time, (2)uncertain (...) social prospects, (3)uncertain individual prospects. Concerning(1), we propose a finite horizon variant of Koopmans’s (1960) axiomatization of infinite discounted utility sums. The main results concern(2). We push the classic comparison between the exanteand expostsocial welfare criteria one step further by avoiding any expected utility assumptions, and as a consequence obtain what appears to be the strongest existing form of Harsanyi’s (1955) Aggregation Theorem. Concerning(3), we derive a subjective probability for Anscombe and Aumann’s (1963) finite case by merely assuming that there are two epistemically independent sources of uncertainty. (shrink)