Results for 'subpersonal self'

970 found
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  1. Self, belonging, and conscious experience: A critique of subjectivity theories of consciousness.Timothy Lane - 2015 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 103-140.
    Subjectivity theories of consciousness take self-reference, somehow construed, as essential to having conscious experience. These theories differ with respect to how many levels they posit and to whether self-reference is conscious or not. But all treat self-referencing as a process that transpires at the personal level, rather than at the subpersonal level, the level of mechanism. -/- Working with conceptual resources afforded by pre-existing theories of consciousness that take self-reference to be essential, several attempts have (...)
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  2. The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4:931.
    This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such (...)
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  3. Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution.Raphaël Millière - 2017 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 11:1-22.
    There is converging evidence that high doses of hallucinogenic drugs can produce significant alterations of self-experience, described as the dissolution of the sense of self and the loss of boundaries between self and world. This article discusses the relevance of this phenomenon, known as “drug-induced ego dissolution (DIED)”, for cognitive neuroscience, psychology and philosophy of mind. Data from self-report questionnaires suggest that three neuropharmacological classes of drugs can induce ego dissolution: classical psychedelics, dissociative anesthetics and agonists (...)
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  4. The Self in the Age of Cognitive Science: Decoupling the Self from the Personal Level.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophic Exchange 2018.
    Philosophers of mind commonly draw a distinction between the personal level – the distinctive realm of conscious experience and reasoned deliberation – and the subpersonal level, the domain of mindless mechanism and brute cause and effect. Moreover, they tend to view cognitive science through the lens of this distinction. Facts about the personal level are given a priori, by introspection, or by common sense; the job of cognitive science is merely to investigate the mechanistic basis of these facts. I (...)
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  5. The Self, Self-knowledge, and a Flattened Path to Self-improvement.Robert D. Rupert - manuscript
    This essay explores the connection between theories of the self and theories of self-knowledge, arguing (a) that empirical results strongly support a certain negative thesis about the self, a thesis about what the self isn’t, and (b) that a more promising account of the self makes available unorthodox – but likely apt – ways of characterizing self-knowledge. Regarding (a), I argue that the human self does not appear at a personal level the autonomous (...)
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  6. Inner Opacity. Nietzsche on Introspection and Agency.Mattia Riccardi - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (3):221-243.
    Nietzsche believes that we do not know our own actions, nor their real motives. This belief, however, is but a consequence of his assuming a quite general skepticism about introspection. The main aim of this paper is to offer a reading of this last view, which I shall call the Inner Opacity (IO) view. In the first part of the paper I show that a strong motivation behind IO lies in Nietzsche’s claim that self-knowledge exploits the same set of (...)
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  7. Is depressive rumination rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-145.
    Most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population. On the reasonable assumption that minds or brains are prone to occasional malfunction, these disorders do not seem to pose distinctive explanatory problems. Depression, however, because it is so prevalent and costly, poses a conundrum that some try to explain by characterizing it as an adaptation—a trait that exists because it performed fitness-enhancing functions in ancestral populations. Heretofore, proposed evolutionary explanations of depression did not focus on thought processes; instead, (...)
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  8. M-Autonomy.Thomas Metzinger - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-12):270-302.
    What we traditionally call ‘conscious thought’ actually is a subpersonal process, and only rarely a form of mental action. The paradigmatic, standard form of conscious thought is non-agentive, because it lacks veto-control and involves an unnoticed loss of epistemic agency and goal-directed causal self-determination at the level of mental content. Conceptually, it must be described as an unintentional form of inner behaviour. Empirical research shows that we are not mentally autonomous subjects for about two thirds of our conscious (...)
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  9. Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice.Louise Richardson-Self - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4):1-24.
    In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...)
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  10. Truly, Madly, Deeply: Moral Beauty & the Self.Ryan P. Doran - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    When are morally good actions beautiful, when indeed they are? In this paper, it is argued that morally good actions are beautiful when they appear to express the deep or true self, and in turn tend to give rise to an emotion which is characterised by feelings of being moved, unity, inspiration, and meaningfulness, inter alia. In advancing the case for this claim, it is revealed that there are additional sources of well-formedness in play in the context of moral (...)
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  11. Internalism from the Ethnographic Stance: From Self-Indulgence to Self-Expression and Corroborative Sense-Making.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    By integrating Bernard Williams’s internalism about reasons with his later thought, this article casts fresh light on internalism and reveals what wider concerns it speaks to. To be consistent with Williams’s later work, I argue, internalism must align with his deference to the phenomenology of moral deliberation and with his critique of ‘moral self-indulgence’. Key to this alignment is the idea that deliberation can express the agent’s motivations without referring to them; and that internalism is not a normative claim, (...)
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  12. What makes communism possible? The self-realisation interpretation.Jan Kandiyali - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (3):273-294.
    In the Critique of Gotha Programme, Karl Marx famously argues that a communist society will be characterised by the principle, ‘From each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs!’ I take up a question about this principle that was originally posed by G.A. Cohen, namely: what makes communism (so conceived) possible for Marx? In reply to this question, Cohen interprets Marx as saying that communism is possible because of limitless abundance, a view that Cohen takes to be (...)
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  13. The Space of Reasons as Self-Consciousness.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    In reasoning, we draw conclusions from multiple premises. But thinkers can be fragmented. And if there is no single fragment of the agent that thinks all of the premises, then the agent cannot draw any conclusions from them. It follows that reasoning from multiple premises depends on their being thought together. But what is it to think premises together? What is the condition that contrasts with fragmentation? This paper provides an answer to this question that is simple but compelling: to (...)
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  14. Epistemic value in the subpersonal vale.J. Adam Carter & Robert D. Rupert - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9243-9272.
    A vexing problem in contemporary epistemology—one with origins in Plato’s Meno—concerns the value of knowledge, and in particular, whether and how the value of knowledge exceeds the value of mere true opinion. The recent literature is deeply divided on the matter of how best to address the problem. One point, however, remains unquestioned: that if a solution is to be found, it will be at the personal level, the level at which states of subjects or agents, as such, appear. We (...)
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  15. Migration and the Point of Self-Determination.Mike Gadomski - forthcoming - Social Theory and Practice.
    Many philosophers argue that the right of self-determination confers to states a right to exclude would-be migrants. Drawing on the case of anti-colonial struggles of the 20th century, I argue that self-determination should be thought of as fundamentally a claim against intergroup hierarchy. This means that self-determination only grants a right to exclude in cases where immigration poses a genuine oppressive threat. Cases involving immigration into wealthy and powerful states rarely meet this criterion, and so talk of (...)
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  16.  75
    Elements of Wolff and Crusius in Kant's Concept of Self-Legislation.Achim Vesper - 2024 - Lexicon Philosophicum 12:19-40.
    The concept of self-legislation or autonomy is one of the outstanding innovations of Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, it should not be ignored that it also builds on previous positions. Even if Kant in the Groundwork classifies all other moral principles as heteronomous, it is important to recognize that Kant incorporates elements of Wolff’s theory of self-legislation and Crusius’ theory of obligation into his theory of autonomy. In this essay, I present the relevant themes in Wolff and Crusius and discuss (...)
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  17. Do Good People Love Themselves? On Rational Self-love in Kant.Bas Tönissen - 2024 - Kant Studien 115 (4):433-453.
    Kant is frequently read as saying that all self-love is bad, and the virtuous agent is one who suppresses self-love as much as possible. This paper argues that this is mistaken and that the right kind of self-love – what Kant calls rational self-love – plays an important role in a successful moral life. It shows how Kant provides a detailed taxonomy of different kinds of self-love. He contrasts the (practical) incentive of self-love with (...)
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  18. (1 other version)Temporal Dynamism and the Persisting Stable Self.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller & Shira Yechimovitz - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.
    Empirical evidence suggests that a majority of people believe that time robustly passes, and that many also report that it seems to them, in experience, as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists deny that time robustly passes, and many contemporary non-dynamists—deflationists—even deny that it seems to us as though time robustly passes. Non-dynamists, then, face the dual challenge of explaining why people have such beliefs and make such reports about their experiences. Several philosophers have suggested the stable-self explanation, according to (...)
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  19.  92
    On the Existential Basis of Self-Sovereign Identity and Soulbound Tokens: An Examination of the “Self” in the Age of Web3.Tomer Jordi Chaffer & Justin Goldston - 2022 - Journal of Strategic Innovation and Sustainability 17 (3).
    The blockchain social movement led to the emergence of Web3, a new, token-orchestrated iteration of the World Wide Web comprised of decentralized applications. With Web3, users can adopt a unique digital identity, known as a self-sovereign identity, that allows them to have access to their data and be central administrators of their transportable and interoperable identity. An inherent feature of digital identity in Web3 is that, in some cases, it can live forever. Web3 users, therefore, may accumulate digital assets, (...)
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  20. The right to privacy and the deep self.Leonhard Menges - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly:1-22.
    This paper presents an account of the right to privacy that is inspired by classic control views on this right and recent developments in moral psychology. The core idea is that the right to privacy is the right that others not make personal information about us flow unless this flow is an expression of and does not conflict with our deep self. The nature of the deep self will be spelled out in terms of stable intrinsic desires. The (...)
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  21. On Willing Surrender as Virtuous Self-Constitution.Bennett Gilbert - 2024 - Consecutio Rerum: Rivista Critica Della Postmodernità 14:199-217.
    Our cultural situation is to seek a moral form of self-constitution, rather than an ontological or epistemological foundation. Such a moral ground lies in the paradox of willing surrender of the will to do wrong or dysfunctional acts in order to enter temporally-extended processes of moral change. But the paradox of willing surrender of the will requires analysis. The propositional form of it cannot be sustained and must instead give way to willingness as an ongoing choice. The self-reflexivity (...)
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  22.  39
    Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2024 - Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science.
    The distinction between personal-level and subpersonal-level attributions of cognition raises interesting questions. What is the relationship between personal-level and subpersonal-level attributions of cognition, for example? Does the personal/subpersonal distinction pick out two different kinds of cognitive processes, or does it merely reflect two different kinds of explanatory projects we might have? This piece gives an overview of the personal/subpersonal distinction and explores how the distinction is used to guide research in cognitive science and beyond.
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  23. The Personal/Subpersonal Distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):338-346.
    Daniel Dennett's distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations was fundamental in establishing the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. Since it was first introduced in 1969, the personal/subpersonal distinction has been adapted to fit different approaches to the mind. In one example of this, the ‘Pittsburgh school’ of philosophers attempted to map Dennett's distinction onto their own distinction between the ‘space of reasons’ and the ‘space of causes’. A second example can be found in much contemporary philosophy of psychology, (...)
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  24.  98
    A minimal dose of self-reflective humor in Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher story collection.Manh-Tung Ho - manuscript
    In this essay, I review one of my beloved fictional titles, Wild Wise Weird: The Kingfisher Story collection. The minimal sense of humor and satire in storytelling of Wild Wise Weird are sure to bring readers smiles, better yet, moments of quiet reflection, a much under-appreciated remedy in the world driven almost insane with the abundance of information co-created with AI technologies. I hope to deliver justice to the book.
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  25. Parental Involvement and Its Effect on College Students’ Academic Motivation and Self-Concept.Leila Ella Bleu Abay-Abay, Wendy Anne Badion, Janine Marigold Lopez, Marian Eunice Mangahas, Ariann Ramiro & Bea Teresa Sengco - 2024 - Psychology and Education: A Multidisciplinary Journal 18 (3):235-246.
    Parental involvement is one of the primary factors that affect children’s development and individuality. However, its effect on the academic motivation and self-concept of college students is not well understood, especially in the Philippines. The present study used the Ecological systems theory by Bronfenbrenner to investigate the effect of varying parental involvement on the academic motivation and self-concept of college students at Dr. Carlos S. Lanting College. Purposive sampling was used among 198 college students from Dr. Carlos S. (...)
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  26. The True Self and Decision-Making Capacity.James Toomey, Jonathan Lewis, Ivar R. Hannikainen & Brian D. Earp - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (8):86-88.
    Jennifer Hawkins (2024) offers two cases that challenge traditional accounts of decision-making capacity, according to which respect for a medical decision turns on an individual’s cognitive capacities at the time the decision is made (Hawkins 2024; Appelbaum and Grisso 1988). In each of her described cases (involving anorexia nervosa and grief, respectively), a patient makes a decision that—although instrumentally rational at the time—does not reflect the patient’s longer-term values due to being in a particular psychological state. Importantly, this state does (...)
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  27. Reasons for endorsing or rejecting ‘self-binding directives’ in bipolar disorder: a qualitative study of survey responses from UK service users.Tania Gergel, Preety Das, Lucy Stephenson, Gareth Owen, Larry Rifkin, John Dawson, Alex Ruck Keene & Guy Hindley - 2021 - The Lancet Psychiatry 8.
    Summary Background Self-binding directives instruct clinicians to overrule treatment refusal during future severe episodes of illness. These directives are promoted as having potential to increase autonomy for individuals with severe episodic mental illness. Although lived experience is central to their creation, service users’ views on self-binding directives have not been investigated substantially. This study aimed to explore whether reasons for endorsement, ambivalence, or rejection given by service users with bipolar disorder can address concerns regarding self-binding directives, decision-making (...)
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  28. Is a subpersonal virtue epistemology possible?Hadeel Naeem - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):350-367.
    Virtue reliabilists argue that an agent can only gain knowledge if she responsibly employs a reliable belief-forming process. This in turn demands that she is either aware that her process is reliable or is sensitive to her process’s reliability in some other way. According to a recent argument in the philosophy of mind, sometimes a cognitive mechanism (i.e. precision estimation) can ensure that a belief-forming process is only employed when it’s reliable. If this is correct, epistemic responsibility can sometimes be (...)
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  29. MATHEMATICAL PROBLEM SOLVING SKILLS AND ACADEMIC SELF-EFFICACYAS CORRELATES OF PRE-SERVICE NCE MATHEMATICS TEACHERS’ PERFORMANCE IN SOUTH-EAST, NIGERIA.Ebele Chinelo Okigbo & Olubu Ojo Ayegbusi - 2024 - Ijo - International Journal of Educational Research 7 (5):1-13.
    The study ascertained mathematical problem-solving skills and self-efficacy as correlates of Pre-service NCE Mathematics Teachers’ Performance in South-East, Nigeria. Seven research questions guided the study while seven hypotheses were tested at 0.05 level of significance. Correlation research design was used for the study. The population of the study was 197 pre-service NCE Mathematics teachers in South-East, Nigeria. All the population of 197 was studied as sample because, it is small and manageable. Mathematics Problem-Solving Skill Test (MPSST) and Pre-Service Teachers’ (...)
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  30.  79
    Embodiment as a synthesis of having a body and being a body, and its role in self-identity and mental health.Lars-Gunnar Lundh - 2024 - New Ideas in Psychology 74.
    The experience of embodiment is a central theme in phenomenological philosophy and has recently received increasing attention also within psychological science. In the present paper we argue (1) that the experience of embodiment represents a fundamental synthesis of having a body (the body as an object) and being a body (the body as felt “from within”); (2) that this synthesis is basic to an individual’s experience of self-identity; (3) that each individual, as an existential task, has to develop their (...)
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  31. Is a subpersonal epistemology possible? Re-evaluating cognitive integration for extended cognition.Hadeel Naeem - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Edinburgh
    Virtue reliabilism provides an account of epistemic integration that explains how a reliable-belief forming process can become a knowledge-conducive ability of one’s cognitive character. The univocal view suggests that this epistemic integration can also explain how an external process can extend one’s cognition into the environment. Andy Clark finds a problem with the univocal view. He claims that cognitive extension is a wholly subpersonal affair, whereas the epistemic integration that virtue reliabilism puts forward requires personal-level agential involvement. To adjust (...)
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  32.  45
    Virtue as a Skill: Self-Regulation and Social Psychology.Matt Stichter - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Skill and Expertise. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 487-501.
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  33. Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Agential Approach to Self-Knowledge.Xiuyuan An - 2023 - Tsinghua Studies in Western Philosophy 9 (2):111–127.
    The question of how we can be certain that we have an epistemic justification for our self-knowledge has been among a central debate in philosophy of mind. The basic idea of the immunity to error through misidentification thesis (IEM) in explaining self-knowledge is that certain self-ascriptions of mental states concerning first-person content are not prone to error for the self-conscious ‘I’-thoughts. One of the accounts that supports that claim is agentialism. According to this view, we can (...)
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  34. Psychology, Personal and Subpersonal.Zoe Drayson - 2017 - Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Explanations in psychology are described as personal when they attribute psychological phenomena to the person, as when we attribute beliefs and thought processes to each other, for example. By contrast, explanations in psychology are described as subpersonal when they attribute psychological phenomena below the level of the person, as occurs when scientists describe parts of the brain as representing or evaluating, for example. The practice of subpersonal psychology raises a number of philosophical issues: whether it is acceptable to (...)
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  35. SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF SELF-ORGANIZATION OF WILDLIFE. Взгляд философа.Аркадий Гуртовцев - 2024
    Содержание: Предисловие – 1. Принцип клеточного строения организмов – 2.Принцип единства организма и среды – 3. Принцип единства организма и его вида – 4. Принцип единства наследственности и изменчивости организмов – 5. Принцип борьбы живых организмов за существование – 6. Принцип естественного отбора организмов и их видов – 7. Принцип популяционной эволюции организмов всех видов – Заключение – Приложение: мир живой природы в фотографиях -/- .
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  36. The fragmented mind: personal and subpersonal approaches to implicit mental states.Zoe Drayson - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In some situations, we attribute intentional mental states to a person despite their inability to articulate the contents in question: these are implicit mental states. Attributions of implicit mental states raise certain philosophical challenges related to rationality, concept possession, and privileged access. In the philosophical literature, there are two distinct strategies for addressing these challenges, depending on whether the content attributions are personal-level or subpersonal-level. This paper explores the difference between personal-level and subpersonal-level approaches to implicit mental state (...)
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  37.  90
    Are mental dysfunctions autonomous from brain dysfunctions? A perspective from the personal/subpersonal distinction.Marko Jurjako - 2024 - Discover Mental Health 4 (62):1-13.
    Despite many authors in psychiatry endorsing a naturalist view of the mind, many still consider that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions. This paper investigates the main reasons for this view. Some arguments rely on the analogy that the mind is like software while the brain is like hardware. The analogy suggests that just as software can malfunction independently of hardware malfunctions, similarly the mind can malfunction independently of any brain malfunction. This view has been critically examined in (...)
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  38. "Self-Made Person: The Reality and the Myth".Hugh LaFollette - manuscript
    To varying degrees, many of us think we are “self-made.” Some explicitly state—while others imply—that our accomplishments resulted (almost) entirely from our intelligence, ingenuity, and hard work There is qualified truth in this supposition, even although it is commonly overstated. Others think they are pawns in the chess game of life. However, although some have less control than those more privileged, few are devoid of control. This tandem of judgments is akin to our propensity to make asymmetrical judgments about (...)
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  39. The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. (...)
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  40. Confucius, Aristotle, and a New `Right’ to Connect China to the West: What Concepts of `Self’ and `Right’ We Might Have without the Christian Notion of Original Sin?Sinkwan Cheng - 2017 - In Ingolf U. Dalferth & Trevor W. Kimball (eds.), Self or no-self?: the debate about selflessness and the sense of self: Claremont Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Conference 2015. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. pp. 269-299.
    Concepts of “self” and “right” in three civilizations: primarily Confucian and ancient Greek, with references to Aristotle’s medieval Christian commentators; Uses the classical Greek and Chinese traditions’ common incompatibility with modern liberal notion of “right” to explore the commonalities between them, and on that basis endeavors to connect the East to the West with a “right” that could better harmonize the self with society, right with duty, and negative with positive freedom.
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  41. (1 other version)Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).
    Basic self-awareness is the kind of self-awareness reflected in our standard use of the first-person. Patients suffering from severe forms of depersonalization often feel reluctant to use the first-person and can even, in delusional cases, avoid it altogether, systematically referring to themselves in the third-person. Even though it has been neglected since then, depersonalization has been extensively studied, more than a century ago, and used as probe for understanding the nature and the causal mechanisms of basic self-awareness. (...)
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  42. Constructing persons: On the personal–subpersonal distinction.Mason Westfall - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (4):831-860.
    What’s the difference between those psychological posits that are ‘me” and those that are not? Distinguishing between these psychological kinds is important in many domains, but an account of what the distinction consists in is challenging. I argue for Psychological Constructionism: those psychological posits that correspond to the kinds within folk psychology are personal, and those that don’t, aren’t. I suggest that only constructionism can answer a fundamental challenge in characterizing the personal level – the plurality problem. The things that (...)
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  43.  78
    Self-Interest, Justification, and Moral Belief.Samuel Kahn - forthcoming - Res Publica.
    In Nicholas Smyth’s recent article, “When Does Self-Interest Distort Moral Belief,” he argues that self-interest undermines justification for moral belief if it justifies itself. In so doing, he opposes the standard account, which says that, to the extent that a person’s moral belief is explained by her egoistic or parochial interests, that belief is less justified. However, Smyth’s attack on the standard account, and the principle that he proposes to replace it with, do not withstand critical scrutiny, and (...)
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  44.  75
    Self-abduction; oracles, eco-cognition and purpose in life.Jeffrey White - forthcoming - In Selene Arfini (ed.), Essays in Honor of Lorenzo Magnani: Volume 2 - Scientific Cognition, Semiotics, and Computational Agents. Springer.
    This chapter follows Lorenzo Magnani's observation that ongoing commercialization of science and academia impoverishes human potential for discovery. The chapter reviews Magnani on affordance, wonders what is accessible when "good" affordances appear absent, and answers self-affordance. Ecologies optimized for discovery should be optimized for self-affordance. The chapter considers the role of oracle as leading vision for discovery, and proposes a naturalized account of self that is essentially propositional, in pursuit of an inner oracle, seeking salvation through routine (...)
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  45. Epistemic Self-Trust: It's Personal.Katherine Dormandy - 2024 - Episteme 21 (1):34-49.
    What is epistemic self-trust? There is a tension in the way in which prominent accounts answer this question. Many construe epistemic trust in oneself as no more than reliance on our sub-personal cognitive faculties. Yet many accounts – often the same ones – construe epistemic trust in others as a normatively laden attitude directed at persons whom we expect to care about our epistemic needs. Is epistemic self-trust really so different from epistemic trust in others? I argue that (...)
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  46. Self-knowledge failures and first person authority.Mark Mccullagh - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):365-380.
    Davidson and Burge have claimed that the conditions under which self-knowledge is possessed are such that externalism poses no obstacle to their being met by ordinary speakers and thinkers. On their accounts. no such person could fail to possess self-knowledge. But we do from time to time attribute to each other such failures; so we should prefer to their accounts an account that preserves first person authority while allowing us to make sense of what appear to be true (...)
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  47. Conscious Self-Evidencing.Jakob Hohwy - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (4):809-828.
    Self-evidencing describes the purported predictive processing of all self-organising systems, whether conscious or not. Self-evidencing in itself is therefore not sufficient for consciousness. Different systems may however be capable of self-evidencing in different, specific and distinct ways. Some of these ways of self-evidencing can be matched up with, and explain, several properties of consciousness. This carves out a distinction in nature between those systems that are conscious, as described by these properties, and those that are (...)
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  48. (1 other version)Self-Knowledge and the Transparency of Belief.Brie Gertler - 2011 - In Anthony Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    In this paper, I argue that the method of transparency --determining whether I believe that p by considering whether p -- does not explain our privileged access to our own beliefs. Looking outward to determine whether one believes that p leads to the formation of a judgment about whether p, which one can then self-attribute. But use of this process does not constitute genuine privileged access to whether one judges that p. And looking outward will not provide for access (...)
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  49. The Self‐Evidencing Brain.Jakob Hohwy - 2014 - Noûs 50 (2):259-285.
    An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the (...)
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  50. Finite rational self-deceivers.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):191 - 208.
    I raise three puzzles concerning self-deception: (i) a conceptual paradox, (ii) a dilemma about how to understand human cognitive evolution, and (iii) a tension between the fact of self-deception and Davidson’s interpretive view. I advance solutions to the first two and lay a groundwork for addressing the third. The capacity for self-deception, I argue, is a spandrel, in Gould’s and Lewontin’s sense, of other mental traits, i.e., a structural byproduct. The irony is that the mental traits of (...)
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