In this article, I examine the moral dimensions of gender affirmation. I argue that the moral value of gender affirmation is rooted in what Iris Murdoch called loving attention. Loving attention is central to the moral value of gender affirmation because such affirmation is otherwise too fragile or insincere to have such value. Moral reasons to engage in acts that gender affirm derive from the commitment to give and express loving attention to trans people as a way of challenging their (...) marginalization. In the latter part of the paper, I will discuss how my arguments bear on recent arguments by Robin Dembroff and Daniel Wodak (2018) on the use of gender-neutral language. They argue that we have a duty not to use gender-specific pronouns for anyone. Their conclusion turns, in part, on a rejection of gender affirmation as a moral duty. The value of gender affirmation, rooted in our moral perception of trans people, should make us skeptical of this conclusion, in favor of a more nuanced and pluralistic approach to the ethics of gendering. (shrink)

I argue that a standard formulation of hinge epistemology is host to epistemic relativism and show that two leading hinge approaches (Coliva’s acceptance account and Pritchard’s nondoxastic account) are vulnerable to a form of incommensurability that leads to relativism. Building on both accounts, I introduce a new, minimally epistemic conception of hinges that avoids epistemic relativism and rationally resolves hinge disagreements. According to my proposed account, putative cases of epistemic incommensurability are rationally resolvable: hinges are propositions that are the objects (...) of our belief-like attitudes and are rationally revisable in virtue of our overarching commitment to avoid systematic deception in our epistemic practices. (shrink)

I argue against the Standard View of ignorance, according to which ignorance is defined as equivalent to lack of knowledge, that cases of environmental epistemic luck, though entailing lack of knowledge, do not necessarily entail ignorance. In support of my argument, I contend that in cases of environmental luck an agent retains what I call epistemic access to the relevant fact by successfully exercising her epistemic agency and that ignorance and non-ignorance, contrary to what the Standard View predicts, are not (...) modal in the sense that knowledge is. After responding to objections, I conclude by sketching an alternative account of ignorance centered on the notions of epistemic access and epistemic agency. (shrink)

Recently, the concept of "gender identity" has enjoyed a great deal of attention in gender metaphysics. This seems to be motivated by the goal of creating trans-inclusive theory, by explaining trans people's genders. In this paper, we aim to unmotivate this project. Notions of "gender identity" serve important pragmatic purposes for trans people, such as satisfying the curiosity of non-trans people, and, relatedly, securing our access to important goods like legal rights and medical care. However, we argue that this does (...) not mean that "gender identity" is a metaphysically substantial thing that deserves extensive theoretical attention. There are reasons to be skeptical of such a concept. We trace the history of "gender identity," primarily to identify its roots in trans-antagonistic medical theory and its connections to the problematic "wrong-body" model--a legacy that has pathologized and flattened trans experience. Moreover, we argue that trans people primarily use "gender identity" to explain ourselves to non-trans people, rather than to discuss ourselves among ourselves. Thus, we urge theorists to resist the urge to substantiate gender identity. Instead, we encourage the development of new and better concepts, ones that attend to the lived realities of trans community and the flourishing gender terms and practices that are constructed there. If these lived realities are taken seriously, there is no need to “explain” trans people’s genders; we can simply see them as they are. (shrink)

With increased visibility of trans people comes increased philosophical interest in gendered language. This chapter aims to look at the research on gendered language in analytic philosophy of language so far, which has focused on two concerns: (1) determining how to define gender terms like ‘man’ and ‘woman’ such that they are trans inclusive and (2) if, or to what extent, we should use gendered language at all. We argue that the literature has focused too heavily on how gendered language (...) can harm trans people, and has not considered how trans people use gendered language to create meaning and joy for ourselves. Pulling from the literature in sociolinguistics, we look at examples of how trans people use language to make their lives better by gaining recognition, playing with gendered language, finding joy in gendered language, and taking control of definitional power, concluding that debates about gendered language need to consider not only how such language harms trans people but also how trans people use it for our own liberation. (shrink)

Longtermism should not be wrongly defined as the view that we should act so that the future is as good as possible for human beings and their descendants; rather, longtermists should be concerned with what the long-term future may be like for all sentient beings. This includes nonhuman animals, as different risks of future suffering may afflict them. Indifference toward their interests could lead to the worsening of their use as resources, quantitatively and qualitatively. It could also help expand wild (...) animal suffering, a process that may have already begun. (shrink)

Entiendo la acción filosófica como un proceso doble de crítica axiomática y construcción teórica. Cuando esta acción se aplica a las construcciones simbólicas de nuestra identidad, la llamo mitopoética. Por motivos evidentes, este libro no puede sino aspirar a ser el bosquejo de un mapa epistemológico a gran escala de las narraciones de la identidad humana, esquema que he dividido en tres partes. En las dos primeras, defino una estructura conceptual que será utilizada en la tercera para desarrollar una teoría (...) de la acción mítica. La primera es una introducción general a los problemas de la mitología tal y cómo han sido tratados desde el punto de vista de la filosofía de la religión, la lingüística, la historia, la estética y la epistemología, fundiendo todos en un concepto más general de antropología filosófica. La segunda parte está dedicada a la definición de las emociones y a la comprensión de su centralidad en relación a la racionalidad y la estructura de los mitos. A partir de los procesos de desarrollo semántico-emocional del lenguaje, construyo una teoría de la racionalidad continua, en la que los ritos animales son entendidos como protomitos, y los rituales y mitos humanos como un desarrollo simbólico enario de unos protocolos generales de supervivencia. Ambas partes son, entonces, una discusión sobre los elementos conceptuales necesarios para comprender las estructuras mítico-rituales, definidas y tratadas en la tercera sección, en la que defino las propiedades de las acciones miméticas interpretativas, o acciones míticas, y examino las diferentes configuraciones que han tomado a lo largo de nuestro desarrollo simbólico. El libro concluye con un análisis de los condicionamientos generales para el desarrollo de futuras estructuras míticas. Mi punto de partida ontoepistemológico es evolucionista, emergentista y constructivista, una postura que queda mejor expresada a partir de la teoría de la racionalidad continua, de inspiración aristotélica, que parte de que los procesos vitales muestran -en diferentes estados de complejidad- la propiedad de la inteligencia. (shrink)

In this paper I provide a preliminary account of weakness of political will (political akrasia). My aim is to use theories from the weakness of will literature as a guide to develop a model of the same phenomenon as it occurs in collective agents. Though the account will parallel the traditional view of weakness of will in individuals, weakness of political will is a distinctly political concept that will apply to group agents such as governments, institutional actors, and other political (...) collectives. I further argue that blaming inaction by collective political agents on a “lack of political will” should be understood as blaming a kind of akratic break within the deliberative process, leading to an inability of the collective agent to capitalize on existing group attitudes in order to translate them into policy or legislation. My primary example throughout will be U.S. political inaction with respect to the climate crisis. (shrink)

This essay proposes a reductive account of robust macro-regularities. On the view proposed, regularities can earn their elite scientific status by featuring in good summaries of restricted regions in the space of physical possibilities: our “modal neighborhoods.” I argue that this view vindicates “nomic foundationalism”, while doing justice to the practice of invoking physically contingent generalizations in higher-level explanations. Moreover, the view suggests an explanation for the particular significance of robust macro-regularities: we rely on summaries of our modal neighborhoods when (...) reasoning hypothetically about “agentially accessible” possibilities. (shrink)

Many pragmatist and non-representational approaches to cognition, such as the enactivist, have focused on the relations between actions, affectivity, and habits from an intersubjective perspective. For those adopting such approaches, all these aspects are inextricably connected; however, many questions remain open regarding the dynamics by which they unfold and shape each other over time. This paper addresses a specific topic that has not received much attention: the impact on future behavior of not fulfilling possibilities for social interaction even though their (...) fulfillment is desirable within a given context. Inspired by Gibson’s theory of affordances and Dewey’s account of habits, these situations will be characterized as events where an agent does not act upon an inviting affordance for social interaction due to a conflict which he or she experiences between given concerns, needs, and social norms. This conflict leads to a sense of unfulfillment that may eventually bring about a crisis and revision of habits. Through specific examples, this work presents the potential impact of the connection between affordances, habits, and affectivity on everyday situations. It therefore represents an exploration of the common ground between pragmatism and enactivism and an attempt to contribute to a process-based approach to social interaction. (shrink)

When asked which of our concepts are normative concepts, metaethicists would be quick to list such concepts as GOOD, OUGHT, and REASON. When asked why such concepts belong on the list, metaethicists would be much slower to respond. Matti Eklund is a notable exception. In his recent book, Choosing Normative Concepts, Eklund argues by elimination for “the Normative Role view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of having a “normative role” or being “used normatively”. One view that Eklund aims (...) to eliminate is “the Metaphysical view” that normative concepts are normative in virtue of referring to normative properties. In addition to arguing that Eklund’s objection looks doubtful by its own lights, we argue that there are several plausible versions of the Metaphysical view that Eklund doesn’t eliminate, defending various claims about normative concepts and their relationships to deliberation, competence, reference, and possession along the way. (shrink)

There are two aims of this paper: (1) to explore the affective dimensions of moral shock and how it relates to normative marginalization of those furthest from dominant society, but also, more specifically; (2) to articulate the trans experience of constantly being under moral attack because the dominant “world” normatively defines you out of existence. Toward these ends, I build on Katie Stockdale’s recent work on moral shock, arguing that moral shock needs to be contextualized to “worlds” of sense to (...) understand how marginalized people affectively experience shocking events. My focus is the trans experience of moral shock due to the way trans people are positioned outside of dominant society, creating the conditions to experience cyclical, chronic shock. These affective conditions point to a collective responsibility to ease the affective stress that the most marginalized experience. (shrink)

A constitutive theory of representation must address two challenges. The content determination challenge requires specifying why a particular state has a given content. The job description challenge requires spelling out the explanatory role that representational notions play in that theory. Recently, Nicholas Shea has advanced *varitel semantics* as a hybrid approach to representation to answer those challenges, supplementing teleosemantics with non-historical features –namely, exploitable relations and robustness. In this paper, I critically assess the hybrid theory’s answers to both challenges, arguing (...) that their hybrid nature undermines their merits. In each case, I will show that it is hard to establish how the alleged complementariness of the hybrid account components works. I will conclude that internal problems beset Shea’s theory of representation. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to outline a pragmatist image of science following Rorty’s discussions and critics of epistemology and to develop some consequences of it in the philosophical analysis and its relations to culture. I will deal with some aspects of how scientific practice is construed and understood, and also outline the shift in Philosophy of Science from epistemological to ethical-political concerns that are implied in his proposal. I will contend that this perspective suggests an interesting way of (...) analysing scientific practices, theories, and public policies of it. Furthermore, I will suggest that it successfully connects the most interesting proposals of contemporary scientific views in philosophy. Finally, I will use some examples in physics and biology to illustrate my assertions. (shrink)

The intuitive distinction between natural and unnatural properties (e.g., green vs. grue) informs our theorizing not only in fundamental physics, but also in non-fundamental domains. This paper develops a reductive account of this broad notion of naturalness that covers non-fundamental properties: for a property to be natural, I propose, is for it to figure in a law of nature. After motivating the account, I defend it from a potential circularity charge. I argue that a suitably broad notion of lawhood can (...) be defined independently of naturalness, if we help ourselves to the notion of a fundamental physical property. I end by showing how the notions of naturalness and lawhood that my account delivers help illuminate a number of other important philosophical notions, like causation, reference/meaning, and rational induction. (shrink)

Este artigo apresenta um quadro conceitual para examinar a questão do especismo. Começa definindo-o como a consideração ou tratamento desfavorável injustificado daqueles que não pertencem a uma determinada espécie. A seguir, esclarece alguns dos mal-entendidos comuns acerca do que é e do que não é o especismo. Depois disso, argumenta contra a confusão entre (1) os diferentes modos em que se pode defender o especismo; e (2) as diferentes posições que assumem o especismo como uma de suas premissas. Dependendo se (...) essas últimas aceitam ou não outros critérios para a consideração moral à parte do especismo, podem ser posições especistas simples ou combinadas. Mas o especismo segue sendo em todos os casos a mesma ideia. Finalmente, este artigo examina o conceito de antropocentrismo, que define como o tratamento ou consideração desfavorável daqueles que não são membros da espécie humana. O conceito de antropocentrismo difere do de especismo e do de misoteria (animadversão para com os animais não humanos). Não obstante, pode-se concluir que o antropocentrismo é uma forma de especismo, à luz do que indicam, entre outros, o argumento da sobreposição de espécies e o argumento da relevância. (shrink)

Accounting for the epistemic contribution of deduction has been a pervasive problem for logicians interested in deduction, such as, among others, Jakko Hintikka. The problem arises because the conclusion validly deduced from a set of premises is said to be “contained” in that set; because of this containment relation, the conclusion would be known from the moment the premises are known. Assuming this, it is problematic to explain how we can gain knowledge by deducing a logical consequence implied by a (...) set of known premises. To address this problem, we offer an alternative account of the epistemic contribution of deduction as the process required to deduce a conclusion or a theorem, understanding such a process not only in terms of the number of steps in the derivation but also, more importantly, in terms of the reason for or justification for every step. That is, we do not know a proposition unless we have a justification or proof of that proposition. With this goal in mind, we develop a justification logic system which exhibits the epistemic contribution of a deductive derivation as the resulting justified formula. (shrink)

Resumen: Este trabajo tiene como principal objetivo el de lograr una comprensión de la la filosofía en cuanto fundamento insoslayable para la teología. Sostiene, en primer lugar, la necesidad de desarrollar una teología más autocosciente en el sentido racional del σὺν λόγω, es decir, desde el programa plenamente actual de la fides quarens intellectum. Defiende, en segundo lugar, que la filosofía solo puede entenderse partiendo de la pretensión que la ha animado desde el comienzo de su andadura: la búsqueda de (...) la verdad de las cosas (veritas rerum). Y para este fin tendrá necesariamente que dotarse de densidad metafísica suficiente y apostar por las tesis de un sano realismo cognoscitivo. Este estudio concluye con una reflexión, en tercer lugar, sobre el uso teológico de la filosofía. La tesis que se defiende es que sin el fundamento filosófico, la fe y la teología pierden lo más nuclear de su misión, la posibilidad misma de presentarse todavía con algún rastro de significatividad para el hombre de hoy. Palabras clave Filosofía, Teología, Universidad, Facultad Eclesiástica, Fe, Razón Summary: This work has as principal objective the achievement of an understanding of philosophy in such as it forms an inescapable foundation for theology. It sustains, in the first place, the need to develop a more self-aware theology in the rational sense of the σὺν λόγω, that is to say, from the fully current program of the fides quarens intellectum. It defends, in the second place, that philosophy can only be understood parting from the pretension that has animated it from its outset: a search for the truth of things (veritas rerum). And to this end, it must necessarily equip itself with the sufficient metaphysical density and wager upon the thesis . (shrink)

El propósito de Levinas coincide con el intento moderno de recuperación de la verdad y del sentido aunque en una dirección y contenidos distintos. Si en Hegel la Aufhebung tendía a la Totalidad y lo Mismo , para Husserl será esencial la apertura de Mundo que tiene lugar ya en la experiencia de conciencia del ego trascendental, mientras que Heidegger, por su parte, primará la pregunta por el Ser. El intento de Levinas, en cambio, no será recomponer la relación entre (...) el yo, por un lado, y el mundo, lo absoluto, las cosas o el ser, por el otro, sino la recuperación de la relación entre yo-y-otro. No es un simple cambio en la dirección o en el contenido del sentido de la reflexión filosófica, sino un intento serio de encontrar una nueva significación, «otra manera que ser» que no termine siendo otro proyecto más de integración y síntesis. Lo que propone Levinas es una auténtica salida para la que traza el itinerario que va del ser al otro, recurriendo sencillamente a la experiencia que cotidianamente se nos impone a cada uno de nosotros con un peso incontestable, a saber: la presencia de las diferencias, de lo asimétrico, en definitiva, la manifestación del otro en tanto que otro. Es esta experiencia heterónoma ordinaria, esta vivencia diaria de la alteridad como dato primordial del fenómeno de la intersubjetividad el ámbito que ha intentado explorar nuestro autor. ¿Acaso es esta responsabilidad así sentida conjugable con una experiencia filosófica universal? ¿La responsabilidad puede llevarse hasta el límite de la substitución por el otro, hasta la de-posición del Yo sin identidad? ¿Qué tipo de relación puede darse con algo absolutamente asimétrico, exterior, previo e irreductible? ¿De dónde viene esa asignación apremiante de responsabilidad que llega hasta arrojarme en la obsesión y el asedio? ¿Cómo puede ser éticamente plausible un mandato tan traumatizante y violento que termina por convertir al sujeto en rehén, sustituido ya por los otros? ¿Es posible conciliar la libertad y la autónoma decisión del sujeto con una consideración de la subjetividad como «heme aquí», absoluta pasividad expuesta a los otros y vulnerabilidad de una piel que se ofrece al ultraje y la herida?. En definitiva: ¿es la subjetividad algo de lo que partimos o a lo que llegamos? (shrink)

There is a curious phenomenon where people from marginalized populations are taken to be arrogant when they show no signs of superiority. In effect, their actions are misconstrued, and their attitudes are rendered unintelligible. Given that arrogance is standardly taken to be a flaw in one’s moral character, understanding such misattributions should give us insight into the affective marginalization many people face. This talk aims to give a thorough exploration of arrogance under oppression. I argue that arrogance is a kind (...) of self-preoccupation that involves projecting one’s values, goals, and concerns onto others as if they were objective values, goals, and concerns. When the affectively marginalized communicate their self-respect through things like protest, people mistake that self-respect as self-preoccupation given how the affectively marginalized are constructed. Furthermore, given how affective marginalization not only inhibits how the marginalized are understood by others, but inhibits their own affective lives, I argue that taking up an arrogant attitude is not always morally vicious, but can be a beautiful form of political resistance but all things considered good. (shrink)

This doctoral thesis examines the phenomenon of Filipinization, specifically understood as the ideological construction of a “Filipino identity” or ‘Filipino subject-consciousness” within the highly determinate context provided by the Filipino ilustrado nationalists such as José Rizal, Marcelo H. del Pilar and their fellow propagandists inasmuch as it leads to the nineteenth (19th) century construction of the modern Philippine nation. Utilizing Jacques Derrida’s deconstructive thinking, this study undertakes a genealogical critique engaged on the concrete historical examination of what is meant by (...) the term “Filipino” across a select historical timeline (1864-1898) and the various notions of Filipino identity implied by the different contexts within which the term “Filipino” has been employed. More specifically, it undertakes a selective philosophical excavation of three seminal texts in the history of Filipinization, viz.: 1) the Manifiesto of Padre Jose Burgos; 2) the writings of the Filipino ilustrados in La Solidaridad; and 3) Jose Rizal’s Annotations on Dr. Antonio de Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas. -/- The philosophical claim of this work is the idea that Filipinization, taken as the differential construction of Filipino identity, is the effective translation of the colonial epistemic violence of Eurocentric racism and its consequent “horror of absolutism” into the homo-hegemony of Filipino nationalisms. By fetishizing the notion of a carefully constructed and essential “Filipino-identity,” Filipinization and the current nationalist discourses that utilize them, unwittingly, stands complicit with the same colonial violence and hegemony that they wish to combat. This happens precisely when the very structures of colonial oppression, on the ideological and practical levels, are transmogrified into nationalist ideals that assume legal and political power unto themselves in a self-referential and self-legitimating fashion. -/- Three processes will demonstrate the above thesis: first, by examining historical texts and setting itself against established nationalist historiographies, a genealogical analysis of the term “Filipino” reveals it as a pliable signifier whose semantics have evolved through time. From its originary referent in the Spanish criollo (creole), it has come to refer to people who would have been otherwise entirely alien to this class, viz., the mestizos (both Spanish and Chinese), the principalia (native elite), and eventually, the lowland Catholicized natives themselves. The historical hermeneutic of this identity-discourse in Padre José Burgos’ Manifiesto yields the fact that what gives the term “Filipino” its semantic consistency as a class concept is its essential constitution as a Hispanic and Catholic identity. -/- Second, from this semantic identification of the term “Filipino” as a Hispano-Catholic identity, we proceed to clarify the meaning of Filipinization in terms of the nationalist propaganda carried out by the Filipino ilustrados in the fortnightly periodical La Solidaridad. Here, the specific ilustrado construction of Filipino identity as a Spanish citizen (ciudadano Español) is revealed precisely as a political and legal construct that served as the basis for their own politics of social inclusion/exclusion. Filipinization can only be applied to those who have been hispanized and Christianized and never to those tribes who have resisted and remained outside Spanish colonial authority. Filipinization is thus revealed as a process of Hispanization and Christianization whereby the recipients of Spanish colonial hegemony are transformed into the religiously docile bodies of the Spanish Empire. -/- From this highly determinate context, the study proceeds to examine Rizal’s ontological grounding of collective Filipino-ness in the mythological construction of the pre-hispanic past as the source of a unique Filipino ancestrality. In his work on de Morga’s Sucesos, what is revealed is a mythologization that grounds a native, essential Filipino identity within a past unscathed by the Spanish colonial experience. Such mythologization, however, can only be possible through an anachronistic nationalist interpretation of historical data. Here, Filipinization is revealed as an exclusive prerogative, a nationalist program by which Rizal and the ilustrado class can combat the evils and excesses of the Spanish colonial enterprise. Ironically, though, this same struggle for emancipation also became an instrument by which the ilustrado class can retain their unjustified position of power over those who belonged to the colonial underside, thus, securing the possibility of perpetuating their own ilustrado bourgeois class interests. -/- Such discursive complicity is the essence of the myth of Filipinization: it presents nationalist identity discourse as an anti-colonial enterprise while being underlined by an economy of motives designed to cater primarily to the exclusive interests of the elite and ilustrado class. Thus, instead of securing the genuine, inclusive emancipation of all colonial subjects and a more humane existence for the poor and suffering majority, ilustrado nationalism has, ironically, merely reinforced those operative structures of colonial discrimination and oppression when the ilustrados: 1) grounded their racial theory upon the very same discourse of Eurocentric superiority that they are precisely supposed to question and 2) claimed a patrimony over Filipinas as their exclusive sovereign inheritance. These two factors illustrate how the manifest transfer of power from the Spanish Empire to the Philippine sovereign nation (and later as a nation-state) illustrate how Filipinization merely has transmogrified the face of Spanish colonialism into its new, subtle, and worse form in Filipino nationalism. -/- In this vein, the existence of the 19th century modern Philippine nation merely masked and deferred the crisis that was supposed to transfer power from the Spanish Empire to the multitude of the poor and suffering native indio majority. This crisis became all the more difficult to address be-cause of the duplicitous character of the discourse of Filipinization itself. It has not only effectively transferred power into the hands of the nationalist elite but also captured authentic emancipatory discourse within the identity-trap against which it can only hope to get out. This study concludes with the claim about the impossibility of ever escaping and overcoming the epistemic and practical violence necessarily contained within the historical discourse of colonialism. Or simply, we have no language or discourse that would enable us to overcome the complicity of Filipinization with the very (epistemic) violence against which it has set itself. (shrink)

Una de las tesis que tradicionalmente han sido defendidas por la tradición del positivismo jurídico es la tesis coactiva, según la cual el derecho consiste en un conjunto de normas coactivas, en el sentido de impuestas por medio de la fuerza. Pero, sin abandonar esta corriente, ha habido históricamente diversas maneras de entender las relaciones entre derecho y fuerza. Si, pues, hasta comienzos del s. XX era opinión común la idea de que el derecho constituía un conjunto de mandatos o (...) normas de conducta cuya eficacia se garantizaba a través de la amenaza del uso de la fuerza coactiva a los transgresores de aquéllas; a lo largo del siglo pasado, empero, algunos autores muy destacados dieron en sostener la opinión de que la fuerza disponible por jueces y funcionarios venía a constituir sustancialmente el objeto mismo de toda regulación jurídica. Según esta última concepción, el derecho tendría primordialmente la función de articular las condiciones de legitimidad para el uso de la fuerza, designando a los sujetos a los que se encomienda tal uso y determinado los casos y modalidades en los que pueda utilizarse. Entre quienes sustentan la primera tesis, que afirma que la fuerza constituye la garantía del derecho, es lugar común citar a Austin y, a menudo, se cita también a Jhering. Entre los defensores de la segunda tesis común es habitual mencionar a Kelsen, Olivecrona y Ross, habiéndose sustanciado una polémica entre Bobbio y Olivecrona en punto a determinar si fuera menciona Olivecrona o fue Kelsen el primero en adoptarla. Sin embargo, es problemático incluir a Jhering dentro del primer grupo y no dentro del segundo, en cuyo caso habría que atribuirle la primera formulación histórica de la tesis. Este trabajo, de carácter histórico, parte de la citada polémica y trata de verificar la constancia de la segunda tesis en las obras no sólo de Kelsen y Olivecrona, sino sobre todo de Jhering. (shrink)

One challenge faced by aesthetics is the development of an account able to trace out the continuities and discontinuities between general experience and aesthetic experiences. Regarding this issue, in this paper, I present an enactive model of some raw cognitive dynamics that might drive the progressive emergence of aesthetic experiences from the stream of general experience. The framework is based on specific aspects of John Dewey’s pragmatist philosophy and embodied aesthetic theories, while also taking into account research in ecological psychology, (...) cognitive sciences, and dynamic systems theory. The model focuses on dynamically relevant nodes at the pre-reflective and the reflective side of experience that would work as nested rhythmic constraints at different cognitive timescales with the potential to shunt experiences toward the aesthetic in everyday situations. My proposal constitutes a way to explore aesthetic experiences from an enactive perspective that regards them as transformative events in which cognitive processes entrain and are entrained by changes taking place in the environment, the brain, and the body. (shrink)

This article examines and rejects the view that nonhuman animals cannot be recipients of justice, and argues that the main reasons in favor of universal human rights and global justice also apply in the case of the international protection of the interests of nonhuman animals. In any plausible theory of wellbeing, sentience matters; mere species membership or the place where an animal is born does not. This does not merely entail that regulations of the use of animals aimed at reducing (...) their suffering should be implemented. It actually supports the end of such use, as well as other positive steps to provide help and to promote what is good not only for domesticated animals, but also for those living in the wild. Another reason to bring the protection of animals' interests into the international arena is that it is at this level that numerous animal exploitation industries enjoy the protection of different agreements and institutions. It does not follow from this that changing international law should be animal advocates' first priority, but it does follow that they should conduct their work internationally and not limit it to their own countries. (shrink)

This paper argues that, although Margaret Cavendish’s main philosophical contributions are not in philosophy of religion, she makes a case for a defense of God, in spite of the worst sorts of harms being present in the world. Her arguments about those harms actually presage those of contemporary feminist ethicists, which positions Cavendish’s scholarship in a unique position: it makes a positive theodical contribution, by relying on evils that contemporary atheists think are the best evidence against the existence of God. (...) To demonstrate that Cavendish’s work should be considered as early modern feminist theodicy, this paper will briefly introduce the contemporary feminist worry about theodicy as a project, show that Cavendish shares the contemporary feminist view about situated evil, and argue that her theodicy aims for agreement about how to eradicate great moral evils while preserving free will—and so, carves out a space for future female philosophers of religion who aim to be agents of healing in the face of such evil. (shrink)

Abstract Nowadays, there is a deep and widespread feeling of discomfort among academics due to the psychological and labor pressures that universities exert upon their researchers by demanding endless publications. In this paper, I offer numerous pieces of evidence of this crisis, which affects primarily those who inhabit academic ecologies. First, I argue that it is convenient to understand the current situation as an expression of technologies and individual apparatuses shaped by subjectivizing ideologies, and mechanisms of exclusion, stigmatization, and replacement. (...) Second, I examine two proposals against the crisis produced by the pace of academic production framed by the Slow movement. Lastly, after making explicit some of the assumptions that undergird the university’s epistemological machine, I propose to complement Ulmer and Mountz’s project with two suggestions. On the one hand, I extend an invitation to reflect on and with students as a means to redirect the university’s teleology. On the other hand, I suggest incorporating an ontogogic approach as a resistance apparatus against the pressure from the university’s production machine. The article’s point of departure is anti-dicotonegative because it is based on a summative approach rather than in an agonistic procedure. In other words, I propose two additional tools that can be put to the test to contribute to solving the university publication crisis. (shrink)

La ciudadanía y lo político. Ciudadanía y crisis de la democracia liberal en un mundo en transformación es un texto provocador, que desafía directamente a las esferas de poder económico, político y social en el marco de la corrupción. Deja al descubierto las entrañas cancerígenas de una política enferma de poder, donde priman los intereses particulares o políticos sobre los intereses del pueblo. El libro es una lanza que atraviesa las profundidades que erosionan nuestra sociedad, realizando así un análisis riguroso (...) desde distintas aristas, que tienen un elemento común: la corrupción política. A lo largo de las páginas se ofrece un enorme panorama sobre el papel de la ciudadanía dentro de la sociedad, que reclama a gritos una revolución desalienante frente a la cleptoestructura. Es así como, el papel de la ciudadanía es el centro de la reflexión analítica que nos presenta Joan Lara Amat y León. (shrink)

'Computationalism' is a relatively vague term used to describe attempts to apply Turing's model of computation to phenomena outside its original purview: in modelling the human mind, in physics, mathematics, etc. Early versions of computationalism faced strong objections from many (and varied) quarters, from philosophers to practitioners of the aforementioned disciplines. Here we will not address the fundamental question of whether computational models are appropriate for describing some or all of the wide range of processes that they have been applied (...) to, but will focus instead on whether `renovated' versions of the \textit{new computationalism} shed any new light on or resolve previous tensions between proponents and skeptics. We find this, however, not to be the case, because the 'new computationalism' falls short by using limited versions of "traditional computation", or proposing computational models that easily fall within the scope of Turing's original model, or else proffering versions of hypercomputation with its many pitfalls. (shrink)

In this text we try to summarize the axiological and ethical theories, as well as its relation with human rights -HR- that is developed from scientific philosophy: a philosophy that seeks to construct general conceptual systems that are clear and exact, and tries to adjust itself to the sciences of its time, to feed back with them. In this way, it is investigated in the practical philosophy faced with the maximum possible rigor and focused on achieving certain objectivity; a technical (...) philosophy. All along this work we develop the central concepts, hypothesis and prescriptions of the practical philosophy on the scientific substrate available. It also proposes some ideas critical of ‘human rights’ that may be of interest to jurists and legal theorists. The final objective of these critics it is not the refutation or suppression of HR, but just the opposed: their strength reaffirmation with the improvements and readjustments required. (shrink)

El presente texto intenta establecer algunas bases de la filosofía social de Søren Kierkegaard. Para ello, toma el concepto de lo demoníaco, que se desarrolla en Sobre el concepto de ironía y El concepto de la angustia. En ellas, Kierkegaard señala las determinaciones de este concepto y lo enmarca dentro de las posibilidades de la subjetividad en su relación con los otros y consigo misma. En la primera, la figura de Sócrates da cuenta de lo demoníaco en el sentido del (...) surgimiento y repliegue de la subjetividad que no participa de los asuntos públicos de la polis griega. En la segunda, Kierkegaard trata la situación demoníaca como un estado psicológico donde la conciencia da cuenta de su relación forzada con el bien y de su mantenimiento en la posición del mal, que lleva al individuo a un estado de endemoniamiento caracterizado por su incomunicación, vacuidad y aburrimiento. Este diagnóstico establece, pues, que los demonios kierkegaardianos son tanto la imposibilidad de la configuración social de los individuos, como su posibilidad a través de la formación de una fuerte subjetividad. (shrink)

This paper explores the ancient philosophical school of Cynicism, its key principles, and its most famous proponent, Diogenes of Sinope. It asserts that George Carlin, a modern comedian, embodies the spirit of Cynicism through his sharp social commentary, fearless critique of societal norms, and advocacy for self-sufficiency and freedom. Drawing parallels between Diogenes and Carlin, the paper highlights three core Cynic values: self-sufficiency, living according to nature, and parrhesia (fearless speech). Diogenes, known for his ascetic lifestyle and provocative public actions, (...) championed the rejection of societal conventions and materialism, advocating for a life in harmony with nature. Similarly, Carlin's comedy, marked by irreverence and critique of societal hypocrisies, challenges cultural norms and exposes contradictions in political and ideological systems. Through his routine, Carlin exemplifies parrhesia by boldly confronting taboos and speaking truth to power, much like Diogenes did through his radical actions. The paper argues that Carlin’s satirical humor and philosophical reflections align with the Cynic tradition, using comedy as a tool for philosophical inquiry and societal critique. By comparing Carlin to Diogenes, the paper posits that Carlin’s comedic legacy should be recognized as a modern continuation of the ancient Cynic ethos, making him a contemporary counterpart to the father of Cynicism. The study underscores the relevance of Cynic philosophy in modern society, emphasizing its role in challenging conformity and promoting critical reflection on societal values. (shrink)

Como es sabido, en el ámbito de la ética biomédica, se han formulado diversas propuestas metodológicas que tratan de ofrecer una serie de pautas para la toma de decisiones. Estas metodologías son útiles, en la medida en que aportan criterios, pero son esencialmente insuficientes. En efecto, tomar una buena decisión requiere un tino especial, que va más allá de la mera técnica, y que tradicionalmente se ha denominado prudencia. No en el sentido más común y periférico de precaución, sino en (...) el sentido más central de phrónesis o prudentía. Aunque no es una noción nueva, sí se trata de una noción que suele aparecer desdibujada, ocupando un lugar equivocado, marginal o indefinido en la teoría de la toma de decisiones biomédicas. A partir de esta constatación se pretende dos cosas. En primer lugar, señalar la necesidad de comprender el papel troncal que tiene la prudencia en el ámbito de la toma de decisiones, para lo que se partirá de algunas de las metodologías más influyentes en nuestro entorno. Y, en segundo lugar, recuperar los colores originales de la noción aristotélica de prudencia. Por razones de espacio, en el presente trabajo la segunda cuestión es sólo parcialmente abordada. (shrink)

Una pandemia ha golpeado a millones de familias en el mundo. Este problema global parecía que cuestionaba todas nuestras formas de vida. No obstante, los malos hábitos y las viejas estructuras corruptas comenzaron a aprovecharse de esta situación. Y la corrupción volvió a la escena, en la sobrevaloración de medicamentos o equipos médicos, en la mala repartición de víveres o de dinero, en el cobro de dinero por ingreso a una unidad de cuidado intensivo, aprovecharse de su posición política para (...) vacunarse antes, etc. ¿Se ha normalizado la corrupción en la vida nacional? (shrink)

"El ser es uno con la comida; ser significa comer; es (ist) lo que come (isst) y lo que ha comido. Comer es la forma subjetiva, activa, siendo lo comido la forma objetiva, pasiva, pero ambas son inseparables. Por tanto, únicamente comiendo se llena el concepto vacío del ser y se revela el carácter absurdo de la pregunta: ¿el ser y el no ser son idénticos, es decir, comer y pasar hambre son idénticos?".

Whipple disease is a rare, infectious, disease first described from a single case by Whipple in 1907. As well as characterising the clinical and pathological features of the condition, Whipple made two suggestions regarding its aetiology. These were either than the disease was caused by an infectious agent, or that it was of metabolic origin. As the disease is now thought to be caused by infection with the bacterium Tropheryma whipplei, historical reviews of the history of the disease typically mention (...) only the first of these suggestions. In this paper, we therefore revisit Whipple’s other theory. We argue that a diverse and often successful research programme was developed around this mechanism of disease causation which gave rise to many useful findings on the condition. In the later parts of this article, we then turn to discuss the surprising neglect of this period of Whipple disease research in the current literature, and conclude by offering a brief reconstruction of this early history suitable for use in a technical context. (shrink)

ABSTRACT‘Exaltation views’ of humility are grounded on a kenotic view of humility, such that divine blessing comes proportionate to the extent to which an agent humbles herself. This article rejects exaltation views of humility which define humility kenotically, justify their arguments from a divine hiddenness perspective, and which conclude that divine concurrence with evil is justified as long as all humble believers eventually are exalted and blessed. Rather, I will contend that exaltation views misunderstand the meaning of both ‘humility’ and (...) ‘exaltation,’ even from their own Christian standpoint. I ultimately offer an alternate response to the problem of evil based on an existentially grounded conception of ‘humility’, which provides for a transmuted turn away from individual kenotic acts and toward community to transform those who suffer from atrocities. (shrink)

The mind and brain sciences influence how human beings understand one another. Histories of the concepts of repression, implicit bias, ADHD, IQ, and personhood reveal that scientific psychology has played a role, not just in shaping people's thinking about minds, but also (and thereby) in shaping minds themselves. These case studies may thus be seen as supporting the contentious thesis that science aids in the social construction of minds. Three considerations are relevant to determining how seriously we should take that (...) contention: (1) to what extent was it inevitable that socially sophisticated animals would come to describe minds in the ways that 21st century humans do?; (2) to what extent do human sociocognitive practices accurately describe the inherent structure of the mind?; (3) to what extent can historical stability in descriptions of minds be chalked up to the fact that people are accurately describing the structure of the mind? (shrink)

Recent years have seen a heightened focus on the study of minimal forms of awareness during sleep to advance the study of consciousness and understand what makes a state conscious. This focus draws on an increased interest in anecdotical descriptions made by classic Indian philosophical traditions about unusual forms of awareness during sleep. For instance, in the so-called state of witnessing-sleep or luminosity sleep, one is said to reach a state that goes beyond ordinary dreaming and abide in a state (...) of just awareness, a state in which one is not aware of anything else other than one’s own awareness. Moreover, for these traditions, this state is taken to be the essence or background of consciousness. Reports on such a state opens the door to exciting new lines of research in the study of consciousness, such as inquiry into the so-called “objectless” awareness during sleep—states of awareness that lack an ordinary object of awareness. In this two-staged research project, we attempted to find the phenomenological blueprints of such forms of awareness during sleep in 18 participants by conducting phenomenological interviews, informed by a novel tool in qualitative research, the micro-phenomenological interview (MPI) method. Following a phenomenological analysis, we isolated a similar phase across 12 reported experiences labelled as ‘nothingness phase’ since it described what participants took to be an experience of ‘nothingness’. his common phase was characterised by minimal sense of self—a bodiless self, yet experienced as being ‘somewhere’—, the presence of non-modal sensations, relatively pleasant emotions, an absence of visual experience, wide and unfocused attention, and an awareness of the state as it unfolded. (shrink)

The present paper tries to answer the question _Is religious education compatible with the purposes of liberal education?_ This work argues that it is possible, and desirable, that democratic states built on liberal ideals include religious education in all schools since increasing the number of options among which the future citizen may choose the conception of the good with which he or she wishes to live is a condition for autonomy as one of its educational purposes. However, the proposal is (...) not based on religious confessional education, which by itself does not satisfy the liberal educational goals, but is redefined from the common noahide principles compatible both religious confessions and non-religious views of morality and citizenship. (shrink)

En este texto nos proponemos abordar la última clase del semanario de Deleuze sobre el poder en Foucault a partir de dos momentos. El primero tiene que ver con el concepto de imagen y la interpretación sobre el cine que ya venía siendo una constante —aunque marginalmente— en estas clases de Deleuze. Seguidamente, el segundo momento tiene que ver con la relación entre poder y resistencia que arroja como resultado una interpretación del pensamiento de Foucault por parte de Deleuze como (...) una obra viva y en constante construcción. Así, cumpliremos con la exigencia de una lectura que invita a pensar en los conceptos como herramientas de análisis integradas al desarrollo de situaciones donde el poder se presenta como noción central. (shrink)

Existen conceptos clave en las diversas ciencias (ya sean formales, naturales, biosociales o sociales) como “teoría” o “modelo” que están aún hoy sujetos a un amplio debate epistemológico, i.e. desde la teoría del conocimiento, y centrada en el estudio del conocimiento científico en particular. Los científicos, pues, construyen y utilizan diferentes nociones que cargan tras de sí realmente con un exhaustivo debate extracientífico sobre su naturaleza. En este trabajo se ofrecerán algunas aclaraciones y propuestas formales de definición sobre tales nociones (...) desde la filosofía de la ciencia del astrofísico y filosofo Gustavo Esteban Romero (G. E. Romero). En concreto se ensayaran unas definiciones formales de “teoría” y “modelo”, para las ciencias actuales (y otras disciplinas pasibles de su aplicación), y se contextualizarán estas ideas en el debate sobre la estructura y organización de los saberes científicos. (shrink)

This paper explores various notions of aesthetic affordance recently developed through embodied, situated and enactive approaches to aesthetic experience by Maria Brincker and Shaun Gallagher, and the similarities and differences between them and the idea of affective affordance put forward by Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti. This discussion is a way to try to offer some answers to the question of what aesthetic affordances particularly afford compared to affective affordances. I will focus on the affordances that we perceive during various (...) aesthetic experiences in which we find ourselves more moved by the object, event or person(s) causing the experience than we had anticipated. I will argue that these experiences emerge as opportunities to carry out an active exploration of aspects of the narrative self that we feel is related to features of the experience; and that one particular brain network likely to be involved in these experiences – i.e. the default network – might help us to understand how these experiences meaningfully change our relationship with ourselves and with the social context of which we are a part. (shrink)

In this essay I analyze a passage from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s On Certainty. This excerpt contains the expression “O, rubbish!” (Ach Unsinn), which I consider to be closely related to the notions of “bullshit” developed by Harry Frankfurt and Gerald A. Cohen. The relevance of this essay is illustrated with lively examples, both related to contemporary society and identified by Wittgenstein about 70 years ago. The paper is organized in six sections containing 1) an introduction to the topic, 2) an explanation (...) of “bullshit” as found in the works of Frankfurt and Cohen, 3) an explanation of Wittgenstein’s work on certainty and propositions beyond doubt, 4) an identification of reasonable and unreasonable doubt and their connection to “bullshit”, 5) an explanation of the different kinds of “bullshit” with the intention of mapping them in relation to each other, and 6) a summarizing conclusion. The main purpose of this paper is to expound on Wittgenstein’s views on “bullshit” and relate them to contemporary philosophy of nonsense. (shrink)