Results for 'Michael McKinsey'

(not author) ( search as author name )
965 found
Order:
  1. (1 other version)Michael Devitt, Designation Reviewed by Michael McKinsey[REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 1983 - Philosophy in Review 3 (3):112-116.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. (1 other version)Anti-individualism and privileged access.Michael McKinsey - 1991 - Analysis 51 (1):9-16.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   174 citations  
  3. Mental anaphora.Michael McKinsey - 1986 - Synthese 66 (1):159 - 175.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  4. Causality and the Paradox of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):491-515.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  5. Understanding proper names.Michael McKinsey - 2010 - Linguistics and Philosophy 33 (4):325-354.
    There is a fairly general consensus that names are Millian (or Russellian) genuine terms, that is, are singular terms whose sole semantic function is to introduce a referent into the propositions expressed by sentences containing the term. This answers the question as to what sort of proposition is expressed by use of sentences containing names. But there is a second serious semantic problem about proper names, that of how the referents of proper names are determined. This is the question that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  6. Externalism and privileged access are inconsistent.Michael McKinsey - 2023 - In Jonathan Cohen & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  7. Levels of obligation.Michael McKinsey - 1979 - Philosophical Studies 35 (4):385 - 395.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  8. The semantics of belief ascriptions.Michael McKinsey - 1999 - Noûs 33 (4):519-557.
    nated discussion of the semantics of such verbs. I will call this view.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  9. Apriorism in the philosophy of language.Michael McKinsey - 1987 - Philosophical Studies 52 (1):1-32.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  10. Divided reference in causal theories of names.Michael McKinsey - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 30 (4):235 - 242.
    Gareth evans has proposed a type of case which shows that kripke's sketch of a causal theory of proper names is in need of modification. Kripke has himself suggested a way in which the modification might proceed, But I argue that this suggestion leads in the wrong direction. I consider a development of kripke's view by michael devitt which may overcome evans' case, But which is shown false by a different sort of case. The latter kind of case also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  11. (1 other version)Thought by description.Michael Mckinsey - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (1):83-102.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  12. Transmission of warrant and closure of apriority.Michael McKinsey - 2003 - In Susana Nuccetelli (ed.), New Essays on Semantic Externalism and Self-Knowledge. MIT Press. pp. 97--116.
    In my 1991 paper, AAnti-Individualism and Privileged Access,@ I argued that externalism in the philosophy of mind is incompatible with the thesis that we have privileged , nonempirical access to the contents of our own thoughts.<sup>1</sup> One of the most interesting responses to my argument has been that of Martin Davies (1998, 2000, and Chapter _ above) and Crispin Wright (2000 and Chapter _ above), who describe several types of cases to show that warrant for a premise does not always (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  13. Names and intentionality.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (2):171-200.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  14. (1 other version)Forms of externalism and privileged access.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:199-224.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  15. Accepting the consequences of anti-individualism.Michael McKinsey - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):124-8.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  16. The semantic basis of externalism.Michael McKinsey - 2015 - In Sorin Costreie & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Meaning and Truth. Pro Universitaria.
    1. The primary evidence and motivation for externalism in the philosophy of mind is provided by the semantic facts that support direct reference theories of names, indexi- cal pronouns, and natural kind terms. But many externalists have forgotten their sem- antic roots, or so I shall contend here. I have become convinced of this by a common reaction among externalists to the main argument of my 1991 paper AAnti-Individual- ism and Privileged Access.@ In that argument, I concluded that externalism is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  17. (1 other version)Truths Containing Empty Names.Michael McKinsey - 2016 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk & Luis Fernandez Moreno (eds.), Philosophical Approaches to Proper Names. Peter Lang. pp. 175-202.
    Abstract. On the Direct Reference thesis, proper names are what I call ‘genuine terms’, terms whose sole semantic contributions to the propositions expressed by their use are the terms’ semantic referents. But unless qualified, this thesis implies the false consequence that sentences containing names that fail to refer can never express true or false propositions. (Consider ‘The ancient Greeks worshipped Zeus’, for instance.) I suggest that while names are typically and fundamentally used as genuine terms, there is a small class (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. (1 other version)On Knowing Our Own Minds.Michael McKinsey - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):107-116.
    This is an anthology of ?fteen papers concerning various philosophical problems related to the topic of self-knowledge. All but one of the papers were previously unpublished, and all but two are descendants of presentations at a conference on self-knowledge held at the University of St Andrews in 1995. The collection.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  19. The internal basis of meaning.Michael McKinsey - 1991 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (June):143-69.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  20. A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2005 - In Michael O'Rourke & Corey Washington (eds.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. MIT Press. pp. 469.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21. Obligations to the starving.Michael McKinsey - 1981 - Noûs 15 (3):309-323.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  22. Direct Reference and Logical Truth: a Reply to Lasonen‐Aarnio.Michael McKinsey - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):447-451.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  23. The ambiguity of definite descriptions.Michael Mckinsey - 1979 - Theoria 45 (2):78-89.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  24. Psychologism in Semantics.Michael McKinsey - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (1):1 - 25.
    According to grice, Semantic concepts like meaning and reference should be explicated in terms of the propositional attitudes. In this paper, I argue that grice's program is mistaken in principle. I first motivate a gricean strategy for defining denotation, Or semantic reference, In terms of rules that govern what speakers may refer to with the terms they use. I then express three paradigm gricean theories of denotation and introduce considerations which show that these theories are false.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. The grammar of belief.Michael McKinsey - 1998 - In William J. Rapaport & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Thought, Language, and Ontology, Essays in Memory of Hector-Neri Castaneda. Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. Curing folk psychology of arthritis.Michael McKinsey - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):323-36.
    Tyler Burge's (1979) famous thought experiment concerning 'arthritis' is commonly assumed to show that all ascriptions of content to beliefs and other attitudes are dependent for their truth upon facts about the agent's social and linguistic environment. It is also commonly claimed that Burge's argument shows that Putnam's (1975) result regarding natural kind terms applies to all general terms whatever, and hence shows that all such terms have wide meanings.1 But I wish to show here, first, that neither Burge's initial (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  27. Individuating beliefs.Michael McKinsey - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8:303-30.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  28. Kripke's Objections to Description Theories of Names.Michael McKinsey - 1978 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):485 - 497.
    In “Naming and Necessity” Saul Kripke describes some cases which, he claims, provide counterexamples both to cluster theories and, more generally, to description theories of proper names. My view of these cases is that while they do not provide counterexamples to cluster theories, they can be used to provide evidence against single-description theories. In this paper I shall defend both of the claims involved in my view.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  29. Beyond Formalism. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):709-713.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Searle on proper names.Michael McKinsey - 1971 - Philosophical Review 80 (2):220-229.
    Searle has proposed a "presupposition-Theory" of proper names in which he maintains that names are not short for descriptions and which, He claims, Solves frege's puzzle as to how an identity-Sentence containing co-Referential names can be informative. Two possible interpretations of searle's view are proposed, And it is argued that neither interpretation can be used to solve frege's puzzle and that, On the most plausible interpretation of his view, Searle is committed to the thesis that names are short for descriptions (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Critical Notice of Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):169-178.
    In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does indeed go ‘beyond rigidity’ in many ways. Among other things, Soames does the following in the course of the book. He persuasively argues that the main thesis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity—that ordinary names are rigid designators—can be extended (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  32. (1 other version)Beyond Rigidity. [REVIEW]Michael McKinsey - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):149-168.
    In this admirable book, Scott Soames provides well defended answers to some of the most difficult and important questions in the philosophy of language, and he does so with characteristic thoroughness, clarity, and rigor. The book's title is appropriate, since it does indeed go ‘beyond rigidity’ in many ways. Among other things, Soames does the following in the course of the book. He persuasively argues that the main thesis of Kripke's Naming and Necessity—that ordinary names are rigid designators—can be extended (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.
    Dretske is a “conciliatory skeptic” on self-knowledge. Take some subject S such that S thinks that P and S knows that she has thoughts. Dretske’s theory can be put as follows: S has a privileged way of knowing what she thinks, but she has no privileged way of knowing that she thinks it. There is much to be said on behalf of conciliatory skepticism and Dretske’s defense of it. We aim to show, however, that Dretske’s defense fails, in that if (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Externalismo y autoridad de la primera persona: McKinsey vs. Davidson.Marc Jiménez Rolland - 2009 - Euphyía. Revista de Filosofía 3 (4):75-88.
    En décadas recientes se ha considerado que una formulación adecuada del autoconocimiento (AC) debería ser consistente con la tesis del externalismo (E). Michael McKinsey es uno de los personajes que ha enfatizado con mayor ahínco que la conjunción de ambas posturas es inconsistente. En este trabajo defiendo la idea de que las objeciones presentadas por McKinsey no afectan de manera importante la formulación davidsoniana de la autoridad de la primera persona (AC3) en conjunción con (E); señalo, además, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Incompatibility Arguments and Semantic Self Knowledge.Henry Jackman - 2007 - Southwest Philosophy Review 23 (1):173-180.
    There has been much discussion recently of what has been labeled the “Brown-Boghossian-McKinsey”, “Brown-McKinsey” or sometimes just “McKinsey” arguments for the incompatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, while the three author's arguments have been treated as interchangeable, they are not identical. In particular, Brown’s and Boghossian’s arguments have a fairly serious flaw that cannot so easily be attributed to McKinsey. In what follows, I’ll (1) present a version of the ‘received’ “Brown-Boghossian-McKinsey” argument, (2) outline what (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Liberal Thinking.John Turri - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):515-533.
    When you think about a particular object, what makes your thought about that object? Roderick Chisholm, Ernest Sosa and Michael McKinsey have defended 'latitudinarian', 'descriptivist', or what I call 'liberal' answers to that question. In this paper I carefully consider the motivation for these liberal views and show how it extends in unanticipated ways to motivate views that are considerably more liberal.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements.Michael Koenigs, Liane Young, Ralph Adolphs, Daniel Tranel, Fiery Cushman, Marc Hauser & Antonio Damasio - 2007 - Nature 446 (7138):908-911.
    The psychological and neurobiological processes underlying moral judgement have been the focus of many recent empirical studies1–11. Of central interest is whether emotions play a causal role in moral judgement, and, in parallel, how emotion-related areas of the brain contribute to moral judgement. Here we show that six patients with focal bilateral damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPC), a brain region necessary for the normal generation of emotions and, in particular, social emotions12–14, produce an abnor- mally ‘utilitarian’ pattern of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  38. A Perceptual Theory of Hope.Michael Milona & Katie Stockdale - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.
    This paper addresses the question of what the attitude of hope consists in. We argue that shortcomings in recent theories of hope have methodological roots in that they proceed with little regard for the rich body of literature on the emotions. Taking insights from work in the philosophy of emotions, we argue that hope involves a kind of normative perception. We then develop a strategy for determining the content of this perception, arguing that hope is a perception of practical reasons. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  39. A liberal realist answer to debunking skeptics: the empirical case for realism.Michael Huemer - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1983-2010.
    Debunking skeptics claim that our moral beliefs are formed by processes unsuited to identifying objective facts, such as emotions inculcated by our genes and culture; therefore, they say, even if there are objective moral facts, we probably don’t know them. I argue that the debunking skeptics cannot explain the pervasive trend toward liberalization of values over human history, and that the best explanation is the realist’s: humanity is becoming increasingly liberal because liberalism is the objectively correct moral stance.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   48 citations  
  40. The Markov blankets of life: autonomy, active inference and the free energy principle.Michael David Kirchhoff - 2018 - Journal of the Royal Society Interface 15 (138).
    This work addresses the autonomous organization of biological systems. It does so by considering the boundaries of biological systems, from individual cells to Home sapiens, in terms of the presence of Markov blankets under the active inference scheme—a corollary of the free energy principle. A Markov blanket defines the boundaries of a system in a statistical sense. Here we consider how a collective of Markov blankets can self-assemble into a global system that itself has a Markov blanket; thereby providing an (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  41. Systematizing the theoretical virtues.Michael N. Keas - 2017 - Synthese 1 (6):1-33.
    There are at least twelve major virtues of good theories: evidential accuracy, causal adequacy, explanatory depth, internal consistency, internal coherence, universal coherence, beauty, simplicity, unification, durability, fruitfulness, and applicability. These virtues are best classified into four classes: evidential, coherential, aesthetic, and diachronic. Each virtue class contains at least three virtues that sequentially follow a repeating pattern of progressive disclosure and expansion. Systematizing the theoretical virtues in this manner clarifies each virtue and suggests how they might have a coordinated and cumulative (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  42. An Abductive Theory of Constitution.Michael Baumgartner & Lorenzo Casini - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):214-233.
    The first part of this paper finds Craver’s (2007) mutual manipulability theory (MM) of constitution inadequate, as it definitionally ties constitution to the feasibility of idealized experiments, which, however, are unrealizable in principle. As an alternative, the second part develops an abductive theory of constitution (NDC), which exploits the fact that phenomena and their constituents are unbreakably coupled via common causes. The best explanation for this common-cause coupling is the existence of an additional dependence relation, viz. constitution. Apart from adequately (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  43. Where there is life there is mind: In support of a strong life-mind continuity thesis.Michael David Kirchhoff & Tom Froese - 2017 - Entropy 19.
    This paper considers questions about continuity and discontinuity between life and mind. It begins by examining such questions from the perspective of the free energy principle (FEP). The FEP is becoming increasingly influential in neuroscience and cognitive science. It says that organisms act to maintain themselves in their expected biological and cognitive states, and that they can do so only by minimizing their free energy given that the long-term average of free energy is entropy. The paper then argues that there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  44. Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.
    For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  45. When Rational Reasoners Reason Differently.Michael G. Titelbaum & Matthew Kopec - 2019
    Different people reason differently, which means that sometimes they reach different conclusions from the same evidence. We maintain that this is not only natural, but rational. In this essay we explore the epistemology of that state of affairs. First we will canvass arguments for and against the claim that rational methods of reasoning must always reach the same conclusions from the same evidence. Then we will consider whether the acknowledgment that people have divergent rational reasoning methods should undermine one’s confidence (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  46. Grieving Our Way Back to Meaningfulness.Michael Cholbi - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 90:235-251.
    The deaths of those on whom our practical identities rely generate a sense of disorientation or alienation from the world seemingly at odds with life being meaningful. In the terms put forth in Cheshire Calhoun’s recent account of meaningfulness in life, because their existence serves as a metaphysical presupposition of our practical identities, their deaths threaten to upend a background frame of agency against which much of our choice and deliberation takes place. Here I argue for a dual role for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  47. On the Best Accuracy Arguments for Probabilism.Michael Nielsen - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (3):621-630.
    In a recent paper, Pettigrew reports a generalization of the celebrated accuracy-dominance theorem due to Predd et al., but Pettigrew’s proof is incorrect. I will explain the mistakes and provide a correct proof.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  48. (1 other version)Horizontal Surgicality and Mechanistic Constitution.Michael Baumgartner, Lorenzo Casini & Beate Krickel - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85:417-430.
    While ideal interventions are acknowledged by many as valuable tools for the analysis of causation, recent discussions have shown that, since there are no ideal interventions on upper-level phenomena that non-reductively supervene on their underlying mechanisms, interventions cannot—contrary to a popular opinion—ground an informative analysis of constitution. This has led some to abandon the project of analyzing constitution in interventionist terms. By contrast, this paper defines the notion of a horizontally surgical intervention, and argues that, when combined with some innocuous (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  49. Metaphysical Explanation by Constraint.Michael Bertrand - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1325-1340.
    It is often thought that metaphysical grounding underwrites a distinctive sort of metaphysical explanation. However, it would be a mistake to think that all metaphysical explanations are underwritten by metaphysical grounding. In service of this claim, I offer a novel kind of metaphysical explanation called metaphysical explanation by constraint, examples of which have been neglected in the literature. I argue that metaphysical explanations by constraint are not well understood as grounding explanations.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  50. (1 other version)Force, content and the varieties of unity.Michael Schmitz - 2021 - In Gabriele Mras & Michael Schmitz (eds.), Force, Content and the Unity of the Proposition. New York: Routledge. pp. 71-90.
    In this paper I propose three steps to overcome the force-content dichotomy and dispel the Frege point. First, we should ascribe content to force indicators. Through basic assertoric and directive force indicators such as intonation, word order and mood, a subject presents its position of theoretical or practical knowledge of a state of affairs as a fact, as something that is the case, or as a goal, as something to do. Force indicators do not operate on truth- or satisfaction evaluable (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
1 — 50 / 965