Aristotle: Soul

Edited by Caleb Cohoe (Metropolitan State University of Denver, University of Colorado Denver)
View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

31 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. added 2020-05-23
    Aristotle on Divine and Human Contemplation.Bryan Reece - 2020 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7 (4):131–160.
    Aristotle’s theory of human happiness in the Nicomachean Ethics explicitly depends on the claim that contemplation (theôria) is peculiar to human beings, whether it is our function or only part of it. But there is a notorious problem: Aristotle says that divine beings also contemplate. Various solutions have been proposed, but each has difficulties. Drawing on an analysis of what divine contemplation involves according to Aristotle, I identify an assumption common to all of these proposals and argue for rejecting it. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. added 2019-10-31
    Living Without a Soul: Why God and the Heavenly Movers Fall Outside of Aristotle’s Psychology.Caleb Cohoe - 2020 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 65.
    I argue that Aristotle's science of the soul only covers sublunary living things. Aristotle cannot properly ascribe soul to unmoved movers since they do not have any capacities that are distinct from their activities or any matter to be structured. Heavenly bodies do not have souls in the way that mortal living things do, because their matter is not subject to alteration or generation. These beings do not fit into the hierarchy of soul powers that Aristotle relies on to provide (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. added 2019-06-04
    Aristotle's Peculiarly Human Psychology.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2019 - In Nora Kreft & Geert Keil (eds.), Aristotle's Anthropology. Cambridge University Press. pp. 60-76.
    For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. added 2019-01-11
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary, Christopher Shields. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):192-193.
    Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Commentary. By Shields Christopher.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. added 2018-09-11
    Why De Anima Needs III.12-13.Robert Howton - manuscript
    The soul is an explanatory principle of Aristotle’s natural science, accounting both for the fact that living things are alive as well as for the diverse natural attributes that belong to them by virtue of being alive. I argue that the explanatory role of the soul in Aristotle’s natural science must be understood in light of his view, stated in a controversial passage from Parts of Animals (645b14–20), that the soul of a living thing is a “complex activity” of its (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. added 2018-09-11
    Aristotle's Case for Perceptual Knowledge.Robert Howton - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Toronto
    Sense experience, naïvely conceived, is a way of knowing perceptible properties: the colors, sounds, smells, flavors, and textures in our perceptual environment. So conceived, ordinary experience presents the perceiver with the essential nature of a property like Sky Blue or Middle C, such that how the property appears in experience is identical to how it essentially is. In antiquity, as today, it was controversial whether sense experience could meet the conditions for knowledge implicit in this naïve conception. Aristotle was a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. added 2018-07-10
    Review of Erick Raphael Jiménez, Aristotle's Concept of Mind[REVIEW]Noell Birondo - 2019 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 57 (1):162-163.
    In this ambitious first book, Erick Raphael Jiménez argues that a good model for understanding Aristotle’s concept of mind (nous) lies in Aristotle’s account of the perception of time. This “time-perception model” of mind and its activity, thinking, bridges a gap between Jiménez’s unorthodox readings of Aristotelian mind and its objects. The book will attract the interest of specialists in Aristotle’s psychology, as well as other scholars interested in Aristotle’s concept of mind and its influence, for instance, theologians interested in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. added 2018-04-22
    Die aristotelische Substanz als Wendepunkt in der Ontologie der Antike.Gianluigi Segalerba - 2010 - Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte (Sonderheft 8):161-172.
    This study shows that Aristotle’s introduction of the concept of substance represents a caesura in the history of ontology. The study takes two values for substance into consideration, which are a) substance as an organism (as a biological entity) and b) substance as essence, nature, form of an organism. Substances as organisms are biological concretized properties. Substance as form is the soul directing the organism and the development of the organism; the soul is both the principle of life of the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. added 2018-04-21
    Aristotle’s Critique of Timaean Psychology.Jason W. Carter - 2017 - Rhizomata 5 (1):51-78.
    Of all the criticisms that Aristotle gives of his predecessors’ theories of soul in De anima I.3–5, none seems more unmotivated than the ones directed against the world soul of Plato’s Timaeus. Against the current scholarly consensus, I claim that the status of Aristotle’s criticisms is philosophical rather than eristical, and that they provide important philosophical reasons, independent of Phys. VIII.10 and Metaph. Λ.6, for believing that νοῦς is without spatial extension, and that its thinking is not a physical motion.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. added 2018-04-21
    Merely Living Animals in Aristotle.Refik Güremen - 2015 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 9 (1):115.
    : In Parts of Animals II.10, 655b37-656a8, Aristotle tacitly identifies a group of animals which partake of “ living only”. This paper is an attempt to understand the nature of this group. It is argued that it is possible to make sense of this designation if we consider that some animals, which are solely endowed with the contact senses, do nothing more than mere immediate nutrition by their perceptive nature and have no other action. It is concluded that some of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. added 2018-04-21
    Review of The Science of the Soul. The Commentary Tradition on Aristotle’s De Anima, C. 1260–C. 1360 by Sander W. De Boer. [REVIEW]Eric W. Hagedorn - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):168-169.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  12. added 2018-04-21
    The Powers of Aristotle's Soul.Anna Marmodoro - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (1):174-178.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. added 2018-04-21
    Not Properly a Person: The Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism’.Christina Van Dyke - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (2):186-204.
    Like Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas holds that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. In so doing, he takes himself to be rejecting a Platonic version of substance dualism; his criticisms, however, apply equally to a traditional understanding of Cartesian dualism. Aquinas’s own peculiar brand of dualism is receiving increased attention from contemporary philosophers—especially those attracted to positions that fall between Cartesian substance dualism and reductive materialism. What Aquinas’s own view amounts to, however, is subject to debate. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  14. added 2018-04-21
    The Problem of the Soul in Aristotle's De Anima.Marian Hillar - 1994 - Essays in the Philosophy of Humanism 3.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. added 2018-04-21
    The Soul and Its Parts: A Study in Aristotle and Brentano.Barry Smith - 1988 - Brentano Studien 1:75–88.
    The piece of wax takes on the form of the seal; but this occurs in a way that is largely indifferent to the particular constitution of the seal. Similarly, Aristotle says, ‘the sense is affected by what is coloured or flavoured or sounding, but it is indifferent as to what in each case the substance is’. We show that Brentano takes this Aristotelian account of the relation between sense and its objects as the basis for his theory of mind in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  16. added 2018-03-27
    Review of Aristotle, De Anima: Translation, Introduction, and Notes, C.D.C. Reeve. [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews:1.
    This is an excellent translation of Aristotle's De Anima or On the Soul, part of C.D.C. Reeve's impressive ongoing project of translating Aristotle's works for the New Hackett Aristotle. Reeve's translation is careful and accurate, committed to faithfully rendering Aristotle into English while making him as readable as possible. This edition features excellent notes that will greatly assist readers (especially in their inclusion of related passages that illuminate the sections they annotate) and an introduction that situates the work within Aristotle's (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. added 2018-02-17
    Aristotle and Alexander on Perceptual Error.Mark A. Johnstone - 2015 - Phronesis 60 (3):310-338.
    Aristotle sometimes claims that the perception of special perceptibles by their proper sense is unerring. This claim is striking, since it might seem that we quite often misperceive things like colours, sounds and smells. Aristotle also claims that the perception of common perceptibles is more prone to error than the perception of special perceptibles. This is puzzling in its own right, and also places constraints on the interpretation of. I argue that reading Alexander of Aphrodisias on perceptual error can help (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18. added 2018-02-02
    Does the Soul Weave? Reconsidering De Anima 1.4, 408a29-B18.Jason W. Carter - 2018 - Phronesis 63 (1):25-63.
    In De Anima 1.4, Aristotle asks whether the soul can be moved by its own affections. His conclusion—that to say the soul grows angry is like saying that it weaves and builds—has traditionally been read on the assumption that it is false to credit the soul with weaving and building; I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of psychological motions implies his belief that the soul does in fact weave and build.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19. added 2017-11-22
    O Problema do Pensamento no De Anima de Aristóteles.Fernanda Pereira Augusto da Silva - 2016 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal da Paraíba, Brazil
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20. added 2017-11-20
    Aristóteles: De Anima.Maria Cecília Gomes dos Reis - 2006 - São Paulo, Brazil: Editora 34.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  21. added 2017-11-20
    Aristóteles: De Anima Livros I-III (trechos).Lucas Angioni - 1999 - Campinas, Brazil: Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas da Universidade de Campinas.
    Translation of passages of Aristotle's De Anima into Portuguese. The passages are these: I.1, I.4 (the 'Rylean passage'); II.1-6; III.1-8. The translation is preliminary.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  22. added 2017-09-19
    Why the View of Intellect in De Anima I 4 Isn’T Aristotle’s Own.Caleb Cohoe - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (2):241-254.
    In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. added 2017-08-13
    Sobre o Hílemorfismo: corpo e alma como condição de possibilidade do viver.Suelen Pereira da Cunha - 2016 - Clareira: Revista de Filosofia da Região Amazônica 3 (2):22-34.
    O presente trabalho visa demonstrar como a relação entre corpo e alma são indispensáveis para o viver. Para tanto, considera a tese de que o ser animado é uma substância composta de matéria e forma, que também pode ser analisada sob a perspectiva de potência e ato. Neste sentido, o trabalho inicia com a compreensão sobre o que é uma substância, qual tipo de substância é o ser vivo para, em seguida, mediante as definições de alma presentes no livro Β (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. added 2017-04-17
    A Noção de Alma no De Anima de Aristóteles.Douglas Vieira Ramalho - 2017 - Dissertation, UFRJ, Brazil
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. added 2017-01-29
    O CONCEITO DE NOUS E SUA RELAÇÃO COM O CONCEITO DE DIANÓIA NA FILOSOFIA DE ARISTÓTELES.Alexandre Guedes Barbosa - 2015 - Inquietude 6 (2):52-74.
    Aristóteles, em sua obra De anima, além de apresentar uma intrigante teoria sobre intelecto (nous), que dá margem a uma compreensão bipartida do mesmo em ativo (nous poiētikos) e passivo (nous pathetikon), afirma que as afecções do intelecto são distintas das afecções de quem o possui. Uma das afecções deste que possui o intelecto, segundo o filósofo, é o raciocínio. Ademais, diz que este é perecível, ao passo que aquele é impassível e eterno. Desta maneira, longe de aclarar, acaba por (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. added 2016-04-18
    A noesis como intelecção dos indivisíveis em Aristóteles.Juliana Peixoto - 2010 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. added 2016-03-30
    When and Why Understanding Needs Phantasmata: A Moderate Interpretation of Aristotle’s De Memoria and De Anima on the Role of Images in Intellectual Activities.Caleb Cohoe - 2016 - Phronesis: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy 61 (3):337-372.
    I examine the passages where Aristotle maintains that intellectual activity employs φαντάσματα (images) and argue that he requires awareness of the relevant images. This, together with Aristotle’s claims about the universality of understanding, gives us reason to reject the interpretation of Michael Wedin and Victor Caston, on which φαντάσματα serve as the material basis for thinking. I develop a new interpretation by unpacking the comparison Aristotle makes to the role of diagrams in doing geometry. In theoretical understanding of mathematical and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  28. added 2014-03-07
    Nous in Aristotle's De Anima.Caleb Murray Cohoe - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (9):594-604.
    I lay out and examine two sharply conflicting interpretations of Aristotle's claims about nous in the De Anima (DA). On the human separability approach, Aristotle is taken to have identified reasons for thinking that the intellect can, in some way, exist on its own. On the naturalist approach, the soul, including intellectual soul, is inseparable from the body of which it is the form. I discuss how proponents of each approach deal with the key texts from the DA, focusing on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. added 2013-10-01
    Review of "Alexander of Aphrodisias on the Soul, Part I,” Trans. Victor Caston". [REVIEW]Caleb Cohoe - 2014 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 52 (1):163-164.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. added 2013-07-05
    The Soul and Its Parts: Varieties of Inexistence.Barry Smith - 1992 - Brentano-Studien 4:35–51.
    From the point of view of Brentano’s philosophy, contemporary philosophy of mind presupposes an over-crude theory of the internal structures of mental acts and states and of the corresponding types of parts, unity and dependence. We here describe Brentano’s own account of the part-whole structures obtaining in the mental sphere, and show how it opens up new possibilities for mereological investigation. One feature of Brentano’s view is that the objects of experience are themselves parts of mind, so that there is (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  31. added 2013-05-13
    Why the Intellect Cannot Have a Bodily Organ: De Anima 3.4.Caleb Cohoe - 2013 - Phronesis 58 (4):347-377.
    I reconstruct Aristotle’s reasons for thinking that the intellect cannot have a bodily organ. I present Aristotle’s account of the aboutness or intentionality of cognitive states, both perceptual and intellectual. On my interpretation, Aristotle’s account is based around the notion of cognitive powers taking on forms in a special preservative way. Based on this account, Aristotle argues that no physical structure could enable a bodily part or combination of bodily parts to produce or determine the full range of forms that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations