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  1. Consciousness, Origins.Gregory Nixon - 2016 - In Harold L. Miller Jr (ed.), The SAGE Encyclopedia of Theory in Psychology. Thousand Oaks, CA, USA: Sage Publications. pp. 172-176.
    To explain the origin of anything, we must be clear about that which we are explaining. There seem to be two main meanings for the term consciousness. One might be called open in that it equates consciousness with awareness and experience and considers rudimentary sensations to have evolved at a specific point in the evolution of increasing complexity. But certainly the foundation for such sensation is a physical body. It is unclear, however, exactly what the physical requirements are for a (...)
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  2. Inference as Consciousness of Necessity.Eric Marcus - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.
    Consider the following three claims. (i) There are no truths of the form ‘p and ~p’. (ii) No one holds a belief of the form ‘p and ~p’. (iii) No one holds any pairs of beliefs of the form {p, ~p}. Irad Kimhi has recently argued, in effect, that each of these claims holds and holds with metaphysical necessity. Furthermore, he maintains that they are ultimately not distinct claims at all, but the same claim formulated in different ways. I find (...)
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  3. Genetic Phenomenology and Empirical Naturalism.Andrea Pace Giannotta - 2018 - Teoria 38 (2):149-160.
    Husserl’s phenomenology is developed in explicit contrast to naturalism. At the same time, various scholars have attempted to overcome this opposition by naturalizing consciousness and phenomenology. In this paper, I argue that, in order to confront the issue of the relationship between phenomenology and naturalism, we must distinguish between different forms of naturalism. In fact, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology is developed in contrast to a metaphysical form of naturalism, which conceives of nature as a mind-independent ontological domain that can be known (...)
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  4. Artificial Qualia, Intentional Systems and Machine Consciousness.Robert James M. Boyles - 2012 - In Proceedings of the DLSU Congress 2012. pp. 110a–110c.
    In the field of machine consciousness, it has been argued that in order to build human-like conscious machines, we must first have a computational model of qualia. To this end, some have proposed a framework that supports qualia in machines by implementing a model with three computational areas (i.e., the subconceptual, conceptual, and linguistic areas). These abstract mechanisms purportedly enable the assessment of artificial qualia. However, several critics of the machine consciousness project dispute this possibility. For instance, Searle, in his (...)
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  5. Knowledge, Explicit Vs Implicit.David Kirsh - 2009 - Oxford Companion to Consciousness:397-402.
    In the scientific study of mind a distinction is drawn between explicit knowledge— knowledge that can be elicited from a subject by suitable inquiry or prompting, can be brought to consciousness, and externally expressed in words—and implicit knowledge—knowledge that cannot be elicited, cannot be made directly conscious, and can- not be articulated. Michael Polanyi (1967) argued that we usually ‘know more than we can say’. The part we can articulate is explicitly known; the part we cannot is implicit.
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  6. Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation, and Function.David Rosenthal - 2012 - Higher-Order Awareness, Misrepresentation and Function 367 (1594):1424-1438.
    Conscious mental states are states we are in some way aware of. I compare higher-order theories of consciousness, which explain consciousness by appeal to such higher-order awareness (HOA), and first-order theories, which do not, and I argue that higher-order theories have substantial explanatory advantages. The higher-order nature of our awareness of our conscious states suggests an analogy with the metacognition that figures in the regulation of psychological processes and behaviour. I argue that, although both consciousness and metacognition involve higher-order psychological (...)
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  7. Consciousness.Joel Krueger - 2007 - In John Lachs & Robert Talisse (eds.), Encyclopedia of American Philosophy. Routledge.
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  8. Consciousness and Free Will: A Critique of the Argument From Introspection.Gregg Caruso - 2008 - Southwest Philosophy Review 24 (1):219-231.
    One of the main libertarian arguments in support of free will is the argument from introspection. This argument places a great deal of faith in our conscious feeling of freedom and our introspective abilities. People often infer their own freedom from their introspective phenomenology of freedom. It is here argued that from the fact that I feel myself free, it does not necessarily follow that I am free. I maintain that it is our mistaken belief in the transparency and infallibility (...)
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  9. Consciousness.Bakytzhan Oralebkov - manuscript
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Philosophy of Consciousness, General Works
  1. The History and Philosophy of the Postwar American Counterculture: Anarchy, the Beats and the Psychedelic Transformation of Consciousness.Ed D'Angelo - manuscript
    This is a greatly expanded version of my article "Anarchism and the Beats," which was published in the book, The Philosophy of the Beats, by the University Press of Kentucky in 2012. It is both an historical and a philosophical analysis of the postwar American counterculture. It charts the historical origins of the postwar American counterculture from the anarchists and romantic poets of the early nineteenth century to a complex network of beat poets and pacifist anarchists in the early decades (...)
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  2. A Experiência Consciente Enquanto Produto da Memória.Glaupy Fontana Ribas - 2018 - In Felipe Rocha L. Santos, José Leonardo Ruivo & Waldomiro José da Silva Filho (eds.), Anais da v Conferência da Sociedade Brasileira de Filosofia Analítica. Pelotas: Editora UFPEL. pp. 188-194.
    O objetivo do presente trabalho é contrapor duas teorias que buscam explicar quais processos neurais dão origem a experiência consciente. Em um primeiro momento apresentarei a teoria de Peter Carruthers, que afirma que o fluxo de consciência surge a partir da memória de trabalho. Posteriormente apresentarei a teoria de Matt e Bill Faw, na qual a consciência é equivalente a uma memória, surgindo, portanto, dos mecanismos formadores da memória episódica. Mesmo que ambas sejam teorias afirmem que a consciência surge a (...)
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  3. Quantum Mechanics of 'Conscious Energy'.Syed Ismyl Mahmood Rizvi - 2018 - International Journal of Mind, Brain and Cognition 9 (1-2):132-160.
    This paper is aiming to investigate the physical substrate of conscious process. It will attempt to find out: How does conscious process establish relations between their external stimuli and internal stimuli in order to create reality? How does consciousness devoid of new sensory input result to its new quantum effects? And how does conscious process gain mass in brain? This paper will also try to locate the origins of consciousness at the level of neurons along with the quantum effects of (...)
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  4. Representationalism About Consciousness.Adam Pautz - forthcoming - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    Discusses recent work on representationalism, including: the case for a representationalist theory of consciousness, which explains consciousness in terms of content; rivals such as neurobiological type-type identity theory (Papineau, McLaughlin) and naive realism (Allen, Campbell, Brewer); John Campbell and David Papineau's recent objections to representationalism; the problem of the "laws of appearance"; externalist vs internalist versions of representationalism; the relation between representationalism and the mind-body problem.
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  5. Aspects in Dual‐Aspect Monism and Panpsychism: A Rejoinder to Benovsky.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2019 - Philosophical Investigations 42 (2):186-201.
    Neutral monism aims at solving the hard problem of consciousness by positing entities that are neither mental nor physical. Benovsky has recently argued for the slightly different account that, rather than being neutral, natural entities are both mental and physical by having different aspects, and then argued in favour of an anti-realist interpretation of those aspects. In this essay, operating under the assumption of dual-aspect monism, I argue to the contrary in favour of a realist interpretation of these aspects by (...)
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  6. Solving Tye’s ‘Philosophical Problems of Consciousness’ (and Some More).J. H. Van Hateren - manuscript
    A recently developed computational and neurobiological theory of phenomenal consciousness is applied to a series of persistent philosophical problems of consciousness (in recent formulations by Tye, Searle, and Chalmers). Each problem has a clear solution, as is briefly explained here.
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  7. What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  8. Animal Consciousness (Routledge Handbook of Consciousness Ch.29).Sean Allen-Hermanson - 2018 - In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
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  9. Can You Believe It? Illusionism and the Illusion Meta-Problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.
    Illusionism about consciousness is the thesis that phenomenal consciousness does not exist, but merely seems to exist. Embracing illusionism presents the theoretical advantage that one does not need to explain how consciousness arises from purely physical brains anymore, but only to explain why consciousness seems to exist while it does not. As Keith Frankish puts it, illusionism replaces the “hard problem of consciousness” with the “illusion problem.” However, a satisfying version of illusionism has to explain not only why the illusion (...)
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  10. Why Biology is Beyond Physical Sciences?Bhakti Niskama Shanta & Bhakti Vijnana Muni - 2016 - Advances in Life Sciences 6 (1):13-30.
    In the framework of materialism, the major attention is to find general organizational laws stimulated by physical sciences, ignoring the uniqueness of Life. The main goal of materialism is to reduce consciousness to natural processes, which in turn can be translated into the language of math, physics and chemistry. Following this approach, scientists have made several attempts to deny the living organism of its veracity as an immortal soul, in favor of genes, molecules, atoms and so on. However, advancement in (...)
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  11. A questão do livre-arbítrio em John R. Searle: uma contraposição do naturalismo biológico ao fisicalismo e ao funcionalismo.Daniel P. Nunes & Everaldo Cescon - 2015 - Cognitio-Estudos 12 (2):179-190.
    This paper compares the theses of physicalism and functionalism – particularly the computacionalist line – with the biological naturalism of John Searle regarding the possibility of free will. In such contrast, each line is decomposed into its statements so that they can be reviewed. It is argued that the searlean biological naturalism can explain more than the other two philosophies on how free action can have the source of its motivation in what is external to the mental state that makes (...)
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  12. On the Matter of Robot Minds.Brian P. McLaughlin & David Rose - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.
    The view that phenomenally conscious robots are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one we call “nomological behaviorism.” The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious; indeed it would have all and only the states of phenomenal consciousness that the phenomenally conscious being in question has. We experimentally (...)
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  13. Reassessing the Nature of IS.David Kreps - 2016 - AIS Electronic Library.
    This paper draws upon the work of three different philosophers, from America (Thomas Nagel), France (Henri Bergson) and Britain (Alfred North Whitehead), to argue for (i) the reality of subjectivity, (ii) the nonphysical nature of subjective consciousness that is dependent upon but not determined by the physical nature of the body, and (iii) the potential unity of a new concept of nature-on-the-move, as distinct from the bifurcation of nature that views only the objective as real. It then presents arguments for (...)
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  14. Über Freiheiten des Menschen: Mit dem Gehirn zur Welt-, und dann zur Gotterkenntnis.Paul Gottlob Layer - 2009 - In Georg Souvignier, Ulrich Lüke, Jürgen Schnakenberg & Hubert Meisinger (eds.), Gottesbilder - an der Grenze zwischen Naturwissenschaft und Theologie. Darmstadt: WBG. pp. 144-160.
    Der erste Teil dieses Aufsatzes befasst sich mit der Tatsache, dass neben der Stammesgeschichte des Menschen (Phylogenese) und seiner je individuellen genetischen Ausstattung für seine Persönlichkeitsentwicklung besonders wichtig ist, dass sein Gehirn bei der Geburt noch unausgereift ist. In dieser Phase kommen Umwelteinflüsse (Lernen jeglicher Art) besonders stark zum Tragen, so daß die „Freiheit des Menschen“ hier wesentlich begründet wird. Soviel uns das Studium der Frühentwicklung des Gehirns (Ontogenese) über seine Organisation und seine Funktionen hat verstehen lassen, bleibt doch fraglich, (...)
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  15. Consciousness, Free Will, Moral Responsibility.Caruso Gregg - forthcoming - In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Consciousness. Routledge.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. To properly assess what, if anything, these empirical advances can tell us about free will and moral responsibility, we first need to get clear on the following questions: Is consciousness necessary for free will? If so, what role or (...)
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  16. Människan; den medvetna biologiska maskinen.Robin Ernstsson - manuscript
    I detta dokument ger jag mina teorier, idéer och förklaringar till hur jag tror att medvetandet fungerar, vad det är och varför vi har det. Enligt mig är alla levande varelser bara biologiska maskiner, skulpterade av evolutionen för att bli så anpassad som möjligt till den miljö som de befinner sig i. Allt fungerar på ett speciellt sätt, det går att förklaras och förstås, det finns ingen magi, och medvetandet är inget undantag, det finns där av en anledning.
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  17. Quantum Anthropology: Man, Cultures, and Groups in a Quantum Perspective.Radek Trnka & Radmila Lorencova - 2016 - Charles University Karolinum Press.
    This philosophical anthropology tries to explore the basic categories of man’s being in the worlds using a special quantum meta-ontology that is introduced in the book. Quantum understanding of space and time, consciousness, or empirical/nonempirical reality elicits new questions relating to philosophical concerns such as subjectivity, free will, mind, perception, experience, dialectic, or agency. The authors have developed an inspiring theoretical framework transcending the boundaries of particular disciplines, e.g. quantum philosophy, metaphysics of consciousness, philosophy of mind, phenomenology of space and (...)
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  18. Subjectivity: A Case of Biological Individuation and an Adaptive Response to Informational Overflow.Jakub Jonkisz - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.
    The article presents a perspective on the scientific explanation of the subjectivity of conscious experience. It proposes plausible answers for two empirically valid questions: the ‘how’ question concerning the developmental mechanisms of subjectivity, and the ‘why’ question concerning its function. Biological individuation, which is acquired in several different stages, serves as a provisional description of how subjective perspectives may have evolved. To the extent that an individuated informational space seems the most efficient way for a given organism to select biologically (...)
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  19. Passive Frame Theory: A New Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
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  20. Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture.Gavin Keeney - 2014 - Cambridge Scholars Press.
    Not-I/Thou: The Other Subject of Art and Architecture is a series of essays delineating the gray areas and black zones in present-day cultural production. Part One is an implicit critique of neo-liberal capitalism and its assault on the humanities through the pseudo-scientific and pseudo-empirical biases of academic and professional disciplines, while Part Two returns to apparent lost causes in the historical development of modernity and post-modernity, particularly the recourse to artistic production as both a form of mnemonics and periodic (and (...)
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  21. How a Materialist Can Deny That the United States is Probably Conscious – Response to Schwitzgebel.François Kammerer - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1047-1057.
    In a recent paper, Eric Schwitzgebel argues that if materialism about consciousness is true, then the United States is likely to have its own stream of phenomenal consciousness, distinct from the streams of conscious experience of the people who compose it. Indeed, most plausible forms of materialism have to grant that a certain degree of functional and behavioral complexity constitutes a sufficient condition for the ascription of phenomenal consciousness – and Schwitzgebel makes a case to show that the United States (...)
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  22. Pretty, Dead: Sociosexuality, Rationality and the Transition Into Zom-Being.Steve Jones - 2014 - In Steve Jones & Shaka McGlotten (eds.), Zombies and Sexuality: Essays on Desire and the Living Dead. McFarland. pp. 180-198.
    The undead have been evoked in philosophical hypotheses regarding consciousness, but such discussions often come across as abstract academic exercises, inapplicable to personal experience. Movie zombies illuminate these somewhat opaque philosophical debates via storytelling devices – narrative, characterization, dialogue and so forth – which approach experience and consciousness in an instinctively accessible manner. This chapter focuses on a particular strand of the subgenre: transition narratives, in which human protagonists gradually turn into zombies. Transition stories typically centralize social relationships; affiliations and (...)
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  23. Descartes' Model of Mind.Ray Scott Percival - 2015 - In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Rene Descartes (1596 – 1650) is considered the founder of modern philosophy. Profoundly influenced by the new physics and astronomy of Kepler and Galileo, Descartes was a scientist and mathematician whose most long-lasting contributions in science were the invention of Cartesian coordinates, the application of algebra to geometry, and the discovery of the law of refraction, what we now call Snell’s law.His most important books on philosophy were The discourse on method(1637) and The meditations(1642). Descartes’ writings display an exemplary degree (...)
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  24. Self Awareness and the Self-Presenting Character of Abnormal Conscious Experience.Pablo López-Silva - 2014 - BoD Germany.
    Some philosophers suggest that a minimal form of self-awareness is an integral element of the way in which all experiences are given (SPC: self-presenting claim). The main argument for this is that the phenomenological quality of ‘mineness’ of the experience reveals the self as a part of all experiences. Since the sense of mineness is taken as intrinsic to the givenness of the experience, it counts as an argument for the SPC. In this essay, I assess this claim and its (...)
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  25. die physik, das leben und die seele.Alfred Gierer - 1985 - Muenchen, Germany: piper.
    This book (in German) on "Physics, life and mind" is on the physical foundations of modern biology. The basic features of living systems, reproduction, mutation and metabolism, can be explained in terms of molecular processes involving nucleic acids as genetic material, and proteins as catalysts. The generation of structure and form in each generation results from spatiotemporal gene regulation in conjunction with the de novo formation of spatial order in which interplays of activation and inhibition play a crucial part. Brain (...)
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  26. If Consciousness is Necessary for Moral Responsibility, Then People Are Less Responsible Than We Think.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):49-60.
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  27. Précis of Neil Levy’s Consciousness and Moral Responsibility.Gregg Caruso - 2015 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8):7-15.
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  28. "The Choreography of the Soul": Recursive Patterns in Psychology, Political Anthropology and Cosmology.Edward D'angelo - 1988 - Dissertation, State University of New York at Stony Brook
    The component structures of two distinct neuropsychological systems are described. "System-Y" depends upon "system-X" which, on the other hand, can operate independently of system-Y. System-X provides a matrix upon which system-Y must operate, and, system-Y is transformed by the operations of system-X. In addition these neuropsychological structures reverberate in political history and in the cosmos. The most fundamental structure in the soul, in society, and in the cosmos, has the form of a conical spiral. It can be described mathematically as (...)
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  29. Two Types of Qualia Theory.Pär Sundström - 2014 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 20:107-131.
    This paper distinguishes two types of qualia theory, which I call Galilean and non-Galilean qualia theories. It also offers considerations against each type of theory. To my mind the considerations are powerful. In any case, they bring out the importance of distinguishing the two types of theory. For they show that different considerations come into play—or considerations come into play in quite different ways—in assessing the two types of theory.
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  30. Consciousness and Mental Qualities for Auditory Sensations.Adriana Renero - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (9-10):179-204.
    The contribution of recent theories of sound and audition has been extremely significant for the development of a philosophy of auditory perception; however, none tackle the question of how our consciousness of auditory states arises. My goal is to show how consciousness about our auditory experience gets triggered. I examine a range of auditory mental phenomena to show how we are able to capture qualitative distinctions of auditory sensations. I argue that our consciousness of auditory states consists in having thoughts (...)
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  31. When Actions Feel Alien: An Explanatory Model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  32. Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.Cheryl E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.
    Higher-order thought theories maintain that consciousness involves the having of higher-order thoughts about mental states. In response to these theories of consciousness, an attempt is often made to illustrate that nonhuman animals possess said consciousness, overlooking an alarming consequence: attributing higher-order thought to nonhuman animals might entail that they should be held morally accountable for their actions. I argue that moral responsibility requires more than higher-order thought: moral agency requires a specific higher-order thought which concerns a belief about the rightness (...)
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  33. What Is It Like to Be a Brain Simulation?Eray Özkural - 2012 - LNCS: Artificial General Intelligence 2012 (7716):232-241.
    We frame the question of what kind of subjective experience a brain simulation would have in contrast to a biological brain. We discuss the brain prosthesis thought experiment. Then, we identify finer questions relating to the original inquiry, and set out to answer them moving forward from both a general physicalist perspective, and pan-experientialism. We propose that the brain simulation is likely to have subjective experience, however, it may differ significantly from human experience. Additionally, we discuss the relevance of quantum (...)
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  34. Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science Since 1980.Elizabeth Schier & John Sutton - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. New York: Springer.
    If Australasian philosophers constitute the kind of group to which a collective identity or broadly shared self-image can plausibly be ascribed, the celebrated history of Australian materialism rightly lies close to its heart. Jack Smart’s chapter in this volume, along with an outstanding series of briefer essays in A Companion to Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand (Forrest 2010; Gold 2010; Koksvik 2010; Lycan 2010; Matthews 2010; Nagasawa 2010; Opie 2010; Stoljar 2010a), effectively describe the naturalistic realism of Australian philosophy (...)
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  35. A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts.Martina Fürst - 2014 - In Andrea Lavazza & Howard Robinson (eds.), Contemporary Dualism. A Defense. 112-135. Routledge. pp. 112-135.
    The phenomenal concept strategy is considered a powerful response to anti-physicalist arguments. This physicalist strategy aims to provide a satisfactory account of dualist intuitions without being committed to ontological dualist conclusions. In this paper I first argue that physicalist accounts of phenomenal concepts fail to explain their cognitive role. Second, I develop an encapsulation account of phenomenal concepts that best explains their particularities. Finally, I argue that the encapsulation account, which features self-representing experiences, implies non-physical referents. Therefore, the account of (...)
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  36. Having It Both Ways: Consciousness, Unique Not Otherworldly.Andreas Elpidorou - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1181-1203.
    I respond to Chalmers’ (2006, 2010) objection to the Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS) by showing that his objection is faced with a dilemma that ultimately undercuts its force. Chalmers argues that no version of PCS can posit psychological features that are both physically explicable and capable of explaining our epistemic situation. In response, I show that what Chalmers calls ‘our epistemic situation’ admits either of a phenomenal or of a topic-neutral characterization, neither of which supports Chalmers’ objection. On the one (...)
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  37. Sounding Depth with the North Atlantic Right Whale and Merleau-Ponty: An Exercise in Comparative Phenomenology.Jennifer McWeeny - 2011 - Journal for Critical Animal Studies 9 (1-2):144-166.
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  38. Consciousness: A Four-Fold Taxonomy.J. Jonkisz - 2012 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (11-12):55-82.
    This paper argues that the many and various conceptions of consciousness propounded by cognitive scientists and philosophers can all be understood as constituted with reference to four fundamental sorts of criterion: epistemic (concerned with kinds of consciousness), semantic (dealing with orders of consciousness), physiological (reflecting states of consciousness), and pragmatic (seeking to capture types of consciousness). The resulting four-fold taxonomy, intended to be exhaustive, suggests that all of the distinct varieties of consciousness currently encountered in cognitive neuroscience, the philosophy of (...)
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  39. Reality and Concepts (in French).Francois-Igor Pris - forthcoming - AL-MUKHATABAT المخاطبات Revue Philosophique de Logique Et d'Epistémologie مجلّة فلسفية في المنطق و الإبستمولوجيا Philosophical Journal For Logic and Epistemology.
    I present the new realist philosophy by Jocelyn Benoist, in particular, his solution to the problem of the explanatory gap in the philosophy of mind.
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  40. Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...)
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  41. The Scientific Study of Consciousness: Searle’s Radical Request.Mahesh Ananth - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (2):59-89.
    John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the theoretical tenets (...)
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