A letter replying to Bayne et al. "Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond", 2024, arguing that the search for consciousness "beyond" healthy adult humans should begin with other animals.

Clarke and Beck assume that approximate number system representations should be assigned referents from our scientific ontology. However, many representations, both in perception and cognition, do not straightforwardly refer to such entities. If we reject Clarke and Beck's assumption, many possible contents for ANS representations besides number are compatible with the evidence Clarke and Beck cite.

One of Clayton’s major contributions to our understanding of animal minds has been her work on episodic-like memory. A central reason for the success of this work was its focus on ecological validity: rather than looking for episodic memory for arbitrary stimuli in artificial contexts, focussing on contexts in which episodic memory would serve a biological function such as food caching. This review aims to deepen this insight by surveying the numerous functions that have been proposed for episodic memory, articulating (...) a philosophically grounded framework for understanding what exactly functions are, and drawing on these to make suggestions for future directions in the comparative cognitive psychology of episodic memory. Our review suggests four key insights. First, episodic memory may have more than one function and may have different functions in different species. Second, cross-disciplinary work is key to developing a functional account of episodic memory. Third, there is scope for further theoretical elaboration of proposals relating episodic memory to food caching and, in particular, future-oriented cognition. Finally, learning-related functions suggested by AI (artificial intelligence)-based models are a fruitful avenue for future behavioural research. (shrink)

This chapter deals with Thomas Browne’s most famous work, Religio Medici, and especially with his account of Charity. The first paragraph focuses on Browne’s specific account of the relationship between natural and supernatural. This view is inspired by Bacon, Sebunde, and Montaigne, and is crucial to understand the background of Browne’s view about the virtue of Charity. The second paragraph is about Browne’s specific understanding of Charity, which seems to be a middle stage between the traditional, Scholastic doctrine, and the (...) Kantian idea of moral law, independent from the practical law and the desire of the subject. The third paragraph deals with Religio Medici’s reversal of the traditional “order” of Charity, as well as Browne’s accounts of abnegation and friendship as an effective way for a charity to the self which meets many aspects of Foucault’s ἑπιμέλεια έαuτου. The fourth paragraph is about Browne’s analogical understanding of medicine and morality, as well as his use of the meditatio mortis. (shrink)

This paper asks whether a necessity can be the source of necessity. According to an influential argument due to Simon Blackburn, it cannot. This paper argues that although Blackburn fails to show that a necessity cannot be the source of necessity, extant accounts fail to establish that it is, with particular focus on Bob Hale’s essentialist theory and Christopher Peacocke’s ‘principle-based’ theory of modality. However, the paper makes some positive suggestions for what a satisfactory answer to the challenge must (...) look like. (shrink)

HISTÓRIA DA SOCIOLOGIA: O DESENVOLVIMENTO DA SOCIOLOGIA I -/- A SOCIOLOGIA BRASILEIRA -/- HISTORY OF SOCIOLOGY: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY I -/- THE BRAZILIAN SOCIOLOGY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected] WhatsApp: (82)9.8143-8399. -/- PREMISSA -/- Como na França de Émile Durkheim, os primeiros passos da Sociologia no Brasil, em termos institucionais, ocorreram a partir de iniciativas para a inclusão dessa disciplina no ensino secundário (hoje, ensino médio). A primeira tentativa ocorreu (...) em 1890, logo após a proclamação da República, com a reforma educacional de Benjamin Constant, que defendia o ensino laico em todos os níveis. O ensino secundário tinha por objetivo a formação intelectual dos jovens fora do contexto religioso, então predominante. Mas, sem nunca ter sido de fato incluída nos currículos escolares, a Sociologia foi expurgada pela Reforma Epitácio Pessoa, em 1901. Somente em 1925 a Sociologia retornou ao currículo do ensino secundário por meio da Reforma de Rocha Vaz, que tinha os mesmos objetivos da de Benjamin Constant. Em decorrência dessa reforma, o Colégio Pedro II, na cidade do Rio de Janeiro, implantou a Sociologia regularmente no seu currículo. Em 1928, a disciplina foi introduzida nas escolas de vários estados brasileiros, notadamente em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Pernambuco. -/- Desde 1925, podem-se destacar alguns intelectuais que contribuíram para o ensino de Sociologia no ensino secundário, lecionando e escrevendo manuais para esse nível: Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987), Carneiro Leão (1887-1966) e Delgado de Carvalho (1884-1980), em São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro e Recife. Eles tinham por objetivo preparar intelectualmente os jovens das elites dirigentes, elevando o conhecimento daqueles que chegavam às escolas médias. Esses autores, em sua maioria, foram influenciados pela Sociologia desenvolvida na Europa e nos Estados Unidos. -/- Em 1931, a reforma de Francisco Campos, no governo de Getúlio Vargas, introduziu a Sociologia nos cursos preparatórios ao ensino superior nas faculdades de Direito, Ciências Médicas, Engenharia e Arquitetura, além de mantê-la nos cursos normais (de formação de professores). -/- No final do Estado Novo, em 1942, o governo de Getúlio Vargas, através de seu ministro da Educação, Gustavo Capanema, implantou a Reforma Capanema, que excluiu a Sociologia do ensino secundário brasileiro. Assim, a Sociologia fez parte do currículo do ensino secundário por 18 anos (1925-1942). Ela, contudo, permaneceu como matéria obrigatória do currículo das Escolas Normais, de nível secundário, destinadas à formação de professores do antigo ensino primário (o que corresponderia aos atuais 2º a 5º anos). -/- 1. A SOCIOLOGIA NO ENSINO SUPERIOR: INÍCIO DO SÉCULO XX -/- Nas primeiras décadas do século XX, a Sociologia no ensino superior estava presente de forma embrionária em vários estados brasileiros (Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo) e principalmente nos cursos de Direito. Desenvolveu-se de forma mais consistente, contudo, nos estados que passavam por um processo de industrialização e urbanização crescente desde o final da década de 1910. -/- Essas transformações da estrutura econômica e social repercutiram nas esferas culturais e educacionais, propiciando um crescente interesse pelos estudos científicos da realidade social da época. -/- Em decorrência disso, foram publicados importantes trabalhos que contribuíram para o desenvolvimento das ciências sociais no Brasil. Uma das preocupações dos pensadores daquele período era a busca do entendimento do Brasil por meio de seus componentes históricos, tendo por base as muitas vertentes europeias e estadunidenses das ciências humanas. -/- Esses pensadores defendiam a ideia de que havia uma ligação entre o passado colonial e a configuração social em que viviam. Para eles, esse condicionamento do passado deveria ser superado para que o país saísse do atraso. As preocupações desses pensadores giravam em torno do futuro do Brasil e das possibilidades de mudança social e das resistências a elas. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Francisco José de Oliveira Vianna (1883 -1951), Caio da Silva Prado Júnior (1907-1990), Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1902-1982), Gilberto Freyre (1900-1987) e Fernando de Azevedo (1894-1974). -/- Pode-se afirmar que foi entre as décadas de 1920 e 1940 que a Sociologia fincou alicerces no Brasil. Nesse período, procuraram-se definir mais claramente as fronteiras entre a Sociologia e as áreas do conhecimento afins, como a Literatura, a História e a Geografia, e institucionalizou-se o curso de Sociologia e/ou Ciências Sociais em faculdades e universidades. Foram fundadas a Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política (ELSP) em São Paulo, em 1933, e as Universidades de São Paulo (USP) e do Distrito Federal (UDF), esta no Rio de Janeiro, respectivamente em 1934 e 1935, nas quais foram instituídos cursos de Ciências Sociais. -/- Vários professores estrangeiros vieram ao Brasil para trabalhar nessas universidades e contribuíram de modo significativo para o desenvolvimento da Sociologia no Brasil. Entre outros, podem ser citados: Donald Pierson (1900-1995), Alfred Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), Claude Lévi -Strauss (1908-2009), Georges Gurvitch (1894-1965), Roger Bastide (1898-1974), Charles Morazé (1913-2003) e Paul-Arbousse Bastide (1901-1985). -/- A revista Sociologia, da Escola Livre de Sociologia e Política, foi um exemplo da produção sociológica da época. Criada em 1939 e publicada até 1981, em São Paulo, constituiu um verdadeiro marco de estudo, pesquisa e divulgação das Ciências Sociais no Brasil. -/- 1.1 De 1940 a 1960: disseminação da Sociologia na universidade -/- A partir do final da Segunda Guerra Mundial até meados da década de 1960, disseminaram-se as Faculdades de Filosofia, Ciências e Letras no Brasil, em universidades ou fora delas, e a Sociologia passou a fazer parte do currículo dos cursos de Ciências Sociais ou a apresentar-se como disciplina obrigatória em outros cursos. -/- Uma nova geração de cientistas sociais passou a ter presença marcante no Brasil. Entre eles, podem ser citados: Florestan Fernandes (1920-1995), Antonio Candido (1918-2017), Maria Isaura Pereira de Queiroz (1918-2018), Juarez Rubens Brandão Lopes (1925-2011), Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1915-1982), Luiz Aguiar da Costa Pinto (1920-2002) e Hélio Jaguaribe (1923-2018), que influenciaram muitos cientistas sociais em todo o território nacional. -/- Os principais temas de pesquisas, análises e discussões nesse período foram: imigração e colonização, estudos de comunidades, educação, folclore, questão rural e urbana, teoria e método das Ciências Sociais, estratificação e mobilidade sociais e sociologia da arte e da literatura. Cabe um destaque para o tema das relações étnico-raciais envolvendo a questão do negro no Brasil, graças a um projeto de pesquisa financiado pela Unesco. -/- Nesse período, a Sociologia tornou-se disciplina hegemônica no quadro das Ciências Sociais no Brasil, e a primeira a formar uma “escola” ou uma “tradição” em São Paulo, tendo em Florestan Fernandes um dos seus mentores. -/- 1.2 De 1960 a 1980: consolidação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- Mesmo sob a ditadura civil-militar no Brasil, a partir de 1964, a Sociologia começou a se expandir, principalmente nos grandes centros urbanos, e a se relacionar com outros campos das ciências humanas. As discussões sobre o processo de industrialização crescente no país foram o centro das atenções. -/- Um dos temas de discussão era o desenvolvimento, incluindo as teorias da dependência e da modernização. Outros temas de debates e pesquisas da época foram o trabalho industrial e o sindicalismo, a formação da classe trabalhadora, a urbanização crescente e as transformações no campo, os problemas da marginalidade social, a presença do capital estrangeiro e a indústria nacional. A questão educacional também esteve presente, pois de alguma forma os problemas sociais estavam vinculados à precariedade do setor. Foram bastante debatidos, ainda, o autoritarismo, principalmente depois do golpe militar de 1964, e o planejamento, criando-se uma interface com a ciência política. Além disso, destacaram-se, nesse momento, os estudos sobre a América Latina. -/- Em razão desses debates, foram incluídas nas universidades disciplinas como: Sociologia do Desenvolvimento, Sociologia Urbana, Sociologia Rural, Sociologia Industrial e do Trabalho (incluindo a questão sindical), Sociologia do Planejamento, Sociologia da Educação e da Juventude e Sociologia da Arte e Literatura. -/- Muitos foram os estudiosos que, em diferentes áreas do pensamento sociológico, desenvolveram pesquisas nessas décadas. Alguns dos que formaram a segunda geração de sociólogos no Brasil são: Octavio Ianni (1926-2004), Marialice M. Foracchi (1929-1971), Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1931-), Leôncio Martins Rodrigues (1934-), Heleieth Saffioti (1934-2010), Maurício Tragtenberg (1929-1998), Francisco de Oliveira (1933-), Luiz Pereira (1933-1985), Luiz Eduardo W. Wanderley (1935-), José de Souza Martins (1938-), Gabriel Cohn (1938-), Roberto Schwarz (1938-), Elide Rugai Bastos, Luiz Werneck Vianna (1938-) e Simon Schwartzman (1939-). -/- 1.3 Diversificação da Sociologia no Brasil -/- A partir da década de 1980, ampliam-se os cursos de graduação e pós-graduação (mestrado e doutorado) em Ciências Sociais e, em particular, de Sociologia em todo o território nacional, elevando o nível, em número e em qualidade, das pesquisas e do ensino da área. Os estudos sociológicos passaram a ser mais específicos, ocorrendo uma fragmentação dos temas/objetos, como: violência, gênero e sexualidade, corpo e saúde, religião, cotidiano, comunicação e informação, indústria cultural, representações sociais, consumo, cidadania, direitos humanos, questão ambiental, globalização, ciência e tecnologia, urbanização, juventude, família, trabalho, classes e mobilidade social, questões étnico-raciais, Estado e sociedade civil. -/- Novas gerações de sociólogos se formam nas universidades em quase todos os estados da federação, e há centros de ensino e pesquisa na maioria das universidades, disseminando-se assim a formação de sociólogos, sob diversas influências teóricas. A formação em Sociologia, que havia se estabelecido a partir de São Paulo e Rio de Janeiro, na década de 1930, expandiu-se para todo o território nacional em pouco mais de 50 anos. -/- 1.4 O retorno da Sociologia ao ensino médio -/- Oficialmente extinta do currículo do ensino médio em 1942, a Sociologia voltou a marcar presença em um ou outro estado da federação, de modo intermitente, a partir da década de 1980, com os primeiros ensaios de democratização da sociedade brasileira, conforme diz o sociólogo brasileiro Amaury C. Moraes, na esteira de mudanças na legislação educacional realizadas pelo governo ditatorial pós-1964. A Lei n° 7.044/82 flexibilizou o ensino médio (então 2º grau) e profissionalizante, abrindo espaço para a presença da Sociologia, não em caráter obrigatório, mas por escolha das escolas. Nesse sentido, ela começou a ter uma presença crescente nos currículos escolares. -/- Aqui cabe citar as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio, (p. 104-105). -/- Há uma interpretação corrente que (...) deve ser bem avaliada criticamente; ela afirma que a presença ou a ausência da Sociologia no currículo está vinculada a contextos democráticos ou autoritários, respectivamente. No entanto, se se observar bem, pelo menos em dois períodos isso não se confirma, ou se teria de rever o caráter do ensino de Sociologia para entender sua presença ou ausência. Entre 1931 e 1942, especialmente após 1937, a Sociologia está presente e é obrigatória no currículo em um período que abrange um governo que começa com esperanças democratizantes e logo se tinge de autoritarismo, assumindo sua vocação ditatorial mais adiante. Em outro momento, em plena democracia, o sentido do veto do Presidente da República (2001) à inclusão da Sociologia como disciplina obrigatória traz uma certa dificuldade para essa hipótese. O que se entende é que nem sempre a Sociologia teve um caráter crítico e transformador, funcionando muitas vezes como um discurso conservador, integrador e até cívico – como aparece nos primeiros manuais da disciplina. Não se pode esquecer que a Sociologia chegou ao Brasil de mãos dadas com o positivismo. No caso recente, deve-se entender que a ausência da disciplina se prende mais a tensões ou escaramuças pedagógico-administrativas que propriamente a algum conteúdo ideológico mais explícito (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- Paralelamente, algumas associações de sociólogos, em diferentes estados brasileiros – mas principalmente em São Paulo –, iniciaram um movimento pela volta da Sociologia ao ensino médio, almejando a ampliação de espaço de trabalho para os formandos dos cursos de Ciências Sociais. Apesar de não haver a obrigatoriedade da disciplina, os cursos de Ciências Sociais continuavam a formar professores de Sociologia. Em alguns estados brasileiros, ao longo dos anos, foram abertos concursos para professores de Sociologia. -/- Com a Constituição de 1988 e a consequente formulação das constituições estaduais, sociólogos em todo o país passaram a reivindicar a presença da Sociologia no ensino médio. Assim, leis estaduais de alguns estados e as constituições estaduais do Rio de Janeiro e de Minas Gerais tornaram a Sociologia obrigatória no ensino médio. -/- A partir do ano 2000, organizações representativas de sociólogos (sindicatos e associações de sociólogos e de cientistas sociais) de várias tendências, assim como pequenos grupos nas universidades do país, começaram a desenvolver um movimento em defesa da obrigatoriedade do ensino da Sociologia no nível médio, considerando que os conteúdos dessa disciplina contribuíam para melhor formação do jovem estudante. -/- O movimento estendeu-se ao início do século XXI, conquistando o apoio de instituições de ensino, associações científicas, intelectuais, sindicatos e associações de categorias profissionais. Finalmente, pela Lei n° 11.684, de 2 de junho de 2008, que alterou a Lei de Diretrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional, a Sociologia retornou oficial e obrigatoriamente ao currículo do ensino médio brasileiro. -/- A título de conclusão, e ainda refletindo sobre a Sociologia e sua contribuição para a formação dos estudantes, é importante destacar o que as Orientações Curriculares para o ensino médio afirmam com muita clareza: -/- A presença da Sociologia no currículo do ensino médio tem provocado muita discussão. Além dessa justificativa que se tornou slogan ou clichê – “formar o cidadão crítico” –, entende-se que haja outras mais objetivas decorrentes da concretude com que a Sociologia pode contribuir para a formação do jovem brasileiro, quer aproximando esse jovem de uma linguagem especial que a Sociologia oferece, quer sistematizando os debates em torno de temas de importância dados pela tradição ou pela contemporaneidade. A Sociologia, como espaço de realização das Ciências Sociais na escola média, pode oferecer ao aluno, além de informações próprias do campo dessas ciências, resultados das pesquisas as mais diversas, que acabam modificando as concepções de mundo, a economia, a sociedade e o outro, isto é, o diferente – de outra cultura, “tribo”, país etc. Traz também modos de pensar (...) ou a reconstrução e desconstrução de modos de pensar. É possível, observando as teorias sociológicas, compreender os elementos da argumentação – lógicos e empíricos – que justificam um modo de ser de uma sociedade, classe, grupo social e mesmo com unidade. Isso em termos sincrônicos ou diacrônicos, de hoje ou de ontem. -/- Um papel central que o pensamento sociológico realiza é a desnaturalização das concepções ou explicações dos fenômenos sociais. Há uma tendência sempre recorrente a se explicarem as relações sociais, as instituições, os modos de vida, as ações humanas, coletivas ou individuais, a estrutura social, a organização política etc. com argumentos naturalizadores. Primeiro, perde -se de vista a historicidade desses fenômenos, isto é, que nem sempre foram assim; segundo, que certas mudanças ou continuidades históricas decorrem de decisões, e essas, de interesses, ou seja, de razões objetivas e humanas, não sendo fruto de tendências naturais (BRASIL/MEC, 2006). -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- BRASIL. Secretaria de Educação Básica. Orientações curriculares para o ensino médio: ciências humanas e suas tecnologias. Brasília: Ministério da Educação/Secretaria de Educação Básica, 2006. -/- FILHO, E. D. L. A sociologia no Brasil: história, teorias e desafios. Sociologias , Porto Alegre, n. 14, p. 376-437, dezembro de 2005. -/- MARTINS, C. B.; MICELI, S. (Org.). Sociologia brasileira hoje. São Paulo: ateliê editorial, 2017. -/- SILVA, A. Sociologia em movimento. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. -/- -/- SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 - Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected] -/- Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- ©2019 - Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva. (shrink)

This paper addresses what we consider to be the most pressing challenge for the emerging science of consciousness: the measurement problem of consciousness. That is, by what methods can we determine the presence of and properties of consciousness? Most methods are currently developed through evaluation of the presence of consciousness in humans and here we argue that there are particular problems in application of these methods to nonhuman cases—what we call the indicator validity problem and the extrapolation problem. The first (...) is a problem with the application of indicators developed using the differences between conscious and unconscious processing in humans to the identification of other conscious vs. nonconscious organisms or systems. The second is a problem in extrapolating any indicators developed in humans or other organisms to artificial systems. However, while pressing ethical concerns add urgency to the attribution of consciousness and its attendant moral status to nonhuman animals and intelligent machines, we cannot wait for certainty and we advocate the use of a precautionary principle to avoid causing unintentional harm. We also intend that the considerations and limitations discussed in this paper can be used to further analyze and refine the methods of consciousness science with the hope that one day we may be able to solve the measurement problem of consciousness. (shrink)

‘Sentience’ sometimes refers to the capacity for any type of subjective experience, and sometimes to the capacity to have subjective experiences with a positive or negative valence, such as pain or pleasure. We review recent controversies regarding sentience in fish and invertebrates and consider the deep methodological challenge posed by these cases. We then present two ways of responding to the challenge. In a policy-making context, precautionary thinking can help us treat animals appropriately despite continuing uncertainty about their sentience. In (...) a scientific context, we can draw inspiration from the science of human consciousness to disentangle conscious and unconscious perception (especially vision) in animals. Developing better ways to disentangle conscious and unconscious affect is a key priority for future research. (shrink)

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience (...) in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use. (shrink)

In this essay, we discuss Simona Ginsburg and Eva Jablonka’s The Evolution of the Sensitive Soul from an interdisciplinary perspective. Constituting perhaps the longest treatise on the evolution of consciousness, Ginsburg and Jablonka unite their expertise in neuroscience and biology to develop a beautifully Darwinian account of the dawning of subjective experience. Though it would be impossible to cover all its content in a short book review, here we provide a critical evaluation of their two key ideas—the role of Unlimited (...) Associative Learning in the evolution of, and detection of, consciousness and a metaphysical claim about consciousness as a mode of being—in a manner that will hopefully overcome some of the initial resistance of potential readers to tackle a book of this length. (shrink)

Animal welfare is a concept that plays a role within both our moral deliberations and the relevant areas of science. The study of animal welfare has impacts on decisions made by legislators, producers and consumers with regards to housing and treatment of animals. Our ethical deliberations in these domains need to consider our impact on animals, and the study of animal welfare provides the information that allows us to make informed decisions. This thesis focusses on taking a philosophical perspective to (...) answer the question of how we can measure the welfare of animals. Animal welfare science is an applied area of biology, aimed at measuring animal welfare. Although philosophy of animal ethics is common, philosophy focussing on animal welfare science is rare. Despite this lack, there are definitely many ways in which philosophical methods can be used to analyse the methodologies and concepts used in this science. One of the aims of the work in this thesis is to remedy this lack of attention in animal welfare. Animal welfare science is a strong emerging discipline, but there is the need for conceptual and methodological clarity and sophistication in this science if it is to play the relevant informative role for our practical and ethical decision-making. There is thus is a strong role here for philosophical analysis for this purpose. The central aim of this thesis is to provide an account of how we can measure subjective animal welfare, addressing some of the potential problems that may arise in this particular scientific endeavour. The two questions I will be answering are: what is animal welfare, and how do we measure it? Part One of the thesis looks at the subjective concept of animal welfare and its applications. In it, I argue for a subjective welfare view - that animal welfare should be understood as the subjective experience of individuals over their lifetimes - and look at how the subjective welfare concept informs our ethical decision-making in two different cases in applied animal ethics. Part Two of the thesis looks more closely at the scientific role of welfare. Understanding welfare subjectively creates unique measurement problems, due to the necessarily private nature of mental states and here I address a few of these problems, including whether subjective experience is measurable, how we might validate indicators of hidden target variables such as welfare, how we can make welfare comparisons between individual animals and how we might compare or integrate the different types of experience that make up welfare. I end with a discussion of the implications of all these problems and solutions for the practice of welfare science, and indicate useful future directions for research. (shrink)

The performance of natural behavior is commonly used as a criterion in the determination of animal welfare. This is still true, despite many authors having demonstrated that it is not a necessary component of welfare –some natural behaviors may decrease welfare, while some unnatural behaviors increase it. Here I analyze why this idea persists, and what effects it may have. I argue that the disagreement underlying this debate on natural behavior is not one about which conditions affect welfare, but a (...) deeper conceptual disagreement about what the state of welfare actually consists of. Those advocating natural behavior typically take a “teleological” view of welfare, in which naturalness is fundamental to welfare, while opponents to the criterion usually take a “subjective” welfare concept, in which welfare consists of the subjective experience of life by the animal. I argue that as natural functioning is neither necessary nor sufficient for understanding welfare, we should move away from the natural behavior criterion to an alternative such as behavioral preferences or enjoyment. This will have effects in the way we understand and measure welfare, and particularly in how we provide for the welfare of animals in a captive setting. (shrink)

Scepticism about ought simpliciter is the view that there is no such thing as what one ought simpliciter to do. Instead, practical deliberation is governed by a plurality of normative standpoints, each authoritative from their own perspective but none authoritative simpliciter. This paper aims to resist such scepticism. After setting out the challenge in general terms, I argue that scepticism can be resisted by rejecting a key assumption in the sceptic’s argument. This is the assumption that standpoint-relative ought judgments bring (...) with them a commitment to act in accordance with those judgments. Instead, I propose an alternative account of our normative concepts according to which only ought simpliciter judgments commit one to acting in accordance with those judgments. In addition to answering the sceptical challenge, the proposal offers an independently motivated account of what makes a concept normatively authoritative. (shrink)

Katz (2022) provides a range of arguments drawn from the environmental philosophy literature to criticize the conceptualisation and practice of de-extinction. The discussion is almost completely de...

Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There's much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we'd have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious (...) dualism. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines, including the quantitative social sciences, especially economics, and philosophy. My interest is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory -- in particular, for believe and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief. (The Lockean Thesis says that there is such an account.) I take up the parallel task for wanting, which has received far less attention. I propose necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of decision theory, for when you're truly said to want; I give an analogue of the Lockean Thesis for wanting. My account is an alternative to orthodox accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)), which I argue are false. I argue further that want ascriptions are context-sensitive. My account explains this context-sensitivity, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which 'want' has multiple senses (e.g. all-things-considered vs. pro tanto). (shrink)

The keeping of captive animals in zoos and aquariums has long been controversial. Many take freedom to be a crucial part of animal welfare and, on these grounds, criticise all forms of animal captivity as harmful to animal welfare, regardless of their provisions. Here, we analyse what it might mean for freedom to matter to welfare, distinguishing between the role of freedom as an intrinsic good, valued for its own sake and an instrumental good, its value arising from the increased (...) ability to provide other important resources. Too often, this debate is conducted through trading intuitions about what matters for animals. We argue for the need for the collection of comparative welfare data about wild and captive animals in order to settle the issue. Discovering more about the links between freedom and animal welfare will then allow for more empirically informed ethical decisions regarding captive animals. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic has created a unique set of challenges for national governments regarding how to deal with a major international pandemic of almost unprecedented scope. As the pandemic consti...

You want to see the concert, but don’t want to take a long drive (even though the concert is far away). Such *strongly conflicting desire ascriptions* are, I show, wrongly predicted incompatible by standard semantics. I then object to possible solutions, and give my own, based on *some-things-considered desire*. Considering the fun of the concert, but ignoring the drive, you want to see the concert; considering the boredom of the drive, but ignoring the concert, you don’t want to take the (...) drive. (shrink)

Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) argue that it is wrong, both scientifically and morally, to dismiss the evidence for sentience in invertebrates. They do not offer any examples, however, of how their welfare should be considered or improved. We draw on animal welfare science to suggest some ways that would not be excessively demanding.

Which political principles should govern global politics? In his new book, Simon Caney engages with the work of philosophers, political theorists, and international relations scholars in order to examine some of the most pressing global issues of our time. Are there universal civil, political, and economic human rights? Should there be a system of supra- state institutions? Can humanitarian intervention be justified?

Metaethical expressivism is typically characterised as the view that normative statements express desire-like attitudes instead of beliefs. However, in this paper I argue that expressivists should claim that normative statements express beliefs in normative propositions, and not merely in some deflationary sense but in a theoretically robust sense explicated by a theory of propositional attitudes. I first argue that this can be achieved by combining an interpretationist understanding of belief with a nonfactualist view of normative belief content. This results in (...) a view I call ‘interpretative expressivism’. I then argue that traditional arguments employed by expressivists that normative statements express noncognitive attitudes can just as well support the claim that normative statements express nonfactual or nonrepresentational beliefs. Finally, I argue that this view has a number of advantages to versions of expressivism that deny that normative statements express non-deflationary normative beliefs. (shrink)

Birch’s criterion for the precautionary principle imposes a high evidential standard that many cases will fail to meet. Reliable, relevant anecdotal evidence suggestive of animal sentience should also fall within the scope of the precautionary principle. This would minimize potential suffering (as happened in the case of cephalopods) while further evidence is gathered.

One of the biggest ethical issues in animal agriculture is that of the welfare of animals at the end of their lives, during the process of slaughter. Much work in animal welfare science is focussed on finding humane ways to transport and slaughter animals, to minimise the harm done during this process. In this paper, we take a philosophical look at what it means to perform slaughter humanely, beyond simply reducing pain and suffering during the slaughter process. In particular, we (...) will examine the issue of the harms of deprivation inflicted in ending life prematurely, as well as shape of life concerns and the ethical implications of inflicting these harms at the end of life, without the potential for future offsetting through positive experiences. We will argue that though these considerations may mean that no slaughter is in a deep sense truly ‘humane’, this should not undermine the importance of further research and development to ensure that while the practice continues, animal welfare harms are minimised as far as possible. (shrink)

Close attention to Kant’s comments on animal minds has resulted in radically different readings of key passages in Kant. A major disputed text for understanding Kant on animals is his criticism of G. F. Meier’s view in the 1762 ‘False Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures’. In this article, I argue that Kant’s criticism of Meier should be read as an intervention into an ongoing debate between Meier and H. S. Reimarus on animal minds. Specifically, while broadly aligning himself with (...) Reimarus, Kant distinguishes himself from both Meier and Reimarus on the role of judgement in human consciousness. (shrink)

To 'consequentialise' is to take a putatively non-consequentialist moral theory and show that it is actually just another form of consequentialism. Some have speculated that every moral theory can be consequentialised. If this were so, then consequentialism would be empty; it would have no substantive content. As I argue here, however, this is not so. Beginning with the core consequentialist commitment to 'maximising the good', I formulate a precise definition of consequentialism and demonstrate that, given this definition, several sorts of (...) moral theory resist consequentialisation. My strategy is to decompose consequentialism into three conditions, which I call 'agent neutrality', 'no moral dilemmas', and 'dominance', and then to exhibit some moral theories which violate each of these. (shrink)

Kant’s discussion of the highest good is subject to continuous disagreement between the proponents of two interpretations of this concept. According to the secular interpretation, Kant conceived of the highest good as a political ideal which can be realized through human agency alone, albeit only from the Critique of the Power of Judgement onwards. By way of contrast, proponents of the theological interpretation find Kant’s treatment of the highest good in his later works to be wholly coherent with the discussions (...) of this concept found in the second Critique. In their view, however, Kant never conceived of the highest good as a political ideal, and some go as far as to argue that it is the work of God alone. In this article, I defend a theologico-political account of the highest good that avoids the pitfalls of both readings. (shrink)

One of the biggest problems in applications of animal welfare science is our ability to make comparisons between different individuals, particularly different species. Although welfare science provides methods for measuring the welfare of individual animals, there’s no established method for comparing measures between individuals. This problem occurs because of the underdetermination of the conclusions given the data, arising from two sources of variation that we cannot distinguish – variation in the underlying target variable (welfare experience) and in the relationship of (...) measured indicators to the target. In this paper I describe the similarity assumptions that underlie our current applications of interspecies comparisons and examine in which cases they are justified, as well as describing alternative methods we may use when they are not. In the end, all our available options for making interspecies comparisons are imperfect, and we need to make explicit context-specific decisions about which will be best for the task at hand while acknowledging their potential limitations. Future developments in our understanding of the biology of sentience will help strengthen our methods of making welfare comparisons. (shrink)

The conditions of transport and slaughter at the end of their lives are a major challenge to the welfare of agricultural animals. • End-of-life experiences should be of a greater ethical concern than others of similar intensity and duration, due to their position in the animal’s life. • End-of-life welfare can have both internal importance to the animals and external ethical importance to human decision-makers. • We should pay extra care to ensure that the conditions during transport and slaughter are (...) as positive as possible. (shrink)

The relationship of part to whole is one of the most fundamental there is; this is the first and only full-length study of this concept. This book shows that mereology, the formal theory of part and whole, is essential to ontology. Peter Simons surveys and criticizes previous theories, especially the standard extensional view, and proposes a more adequate account which encompasses both temporal and modal considerations in detail. 'Parts could easily be the standard book on mereology for the next twenty (...) or thirty years.' Timothy Williamson, Grazer Philosophische Studien. (shrink)

hroughout medieval Christianity, religious works of art emerged to illustrate the teachings of the Bible for the largely illiterate population. What, then, is the significance of the psychoactive mushrooms hiding in plain sight in the artwork and icons of many European and Middle-Eastern churches? Does Christianity have a psychedelic history? -/- Providing stunning visual evidence from their anthropological journey throughout Europe and the Middle East, including visits to Roslyn Chapel and Chartres Cathedral, authors Julie and Jerry Brown document the (...) role of visionary plants in Christianity. They retrace the pioneering research of R. Gordon Wasson, the famous “sacred mushroom seeker,” on psychedelics in ancient Greece and India, and among the present-day reindeer herders of Siberia and the Mazatecs of Mexico. Challenging Wasson’s legacy, the authors reveal his secret relationship with the Vatican that led to Wasson’s refusal to pursue his hallucinogen theory into the hallowed halls of Christianity. -/- Examining the Bible and the Gnostic Gospels, the authors provide scriptural support to show that sacred mushrooms were the inspiration for Jesus’ revelation of the Kingdom of Heaven and that he was initiated into these mystical practices in Egypt during the Missing Years. They contend that the Trees of Knowledge and of Immortality in Eden were sacred mushrooms. -/- Uncovering the role played by visionary plants in the origins of Judeo-Christianity, the authors invite us to rethink what we know about the life of Jesus and to consider a controversial theory that challenges us to explore these sacred pathways to the divine. (shrink)

This paper examines the general prospects for conceptual role expressivism, expressivist theories that embrace conceptual role semantics. It has two main aims. The first aim is to provide a general characterisation of the view. The second aim is to raise a challenge for the general view. The challenge is to explain why normative concepts are not a species of defective concepts, where defective concepts are those that cannot meaningfully embed and participate in genuine inference. After rejecting existing attempts to answer (...) the challenge, I propose an alternative solution. However, the solution leaves conceptual role expressivism a far less distinctive and interesting position than its proponents claim. I conclude that we should be sceptical about how much expressivists gain by appealing to conceptual role semantics. (shrink)

Are properties perfectly natural (or not) relative to worlds, or are they perfectly natural (or not) tout court? That is, could there be a property P that is instanti-ated at worlds w1 and w2, and is perfectly natural at w1 but not at w2? Here, we offer an original argument for the non-world-relativity of perfect naturalness. Along the way, we reply to a prima facie compelling argument for the contin-gency of perfect naturalness, based upon the connection between natural prop-erties and (...) laws of nature. (shrink)

According to the Desiderative Lockean Thesis, there are necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in the terms of decision theory, for when one is truly said to want. What one is truly said to want, it turns out, varies remarkably by context—and to an underappreciated degree. To explain this context-sensitivity, and closure properties of wanting, I advance a Desiderative Lockean view that is distinctive in having two context-sensitive parameters.

Algorithms wield increasing control over our lives—over the jobs we get, the loans we're granted, the information we see online. Algorithms can and often do wield their power in a biased way, and much work has been devoted to algorithmic bias. In contrast, algorithmic neutrality has been largely neglected. I investigate algorithmic neutrality, tackling three questions: What is algorithmic neutrality? Is it possible? And when we have it in mind, what can we learn about algorithmic bias?

In this paper I argue that a priori arguments fail to present any real problem for physicalism. They beg the question against physicalism in the sense that the argument will only seem compelling if one is already assuming that qualitative properties are nonphysical. To show this I will present the reverse-zombie and reverse-knowledge arguments. The only evidence against physicalism is a priori arguments, but there are also a priori arguments against dualism of exactly the same variety. Each of these parity (...) arguments has premises that are just as intuitively plausible, and it cannot be the case that both the traditional scenarios and the reverse-scenarios are all ideally conceivable. Given this one set must be merely prima facie conceivable and only empirical methods will tell us which is which. So, by the time a priori methodology will be of any use it will be too late. (shrink)

This paper develops an information-sensitive theory of the semantics and probability of conditionals and statements involving epistemic modals. The theory validates a number of principles linking probability and modality, including the principle that the probability of a conditional If A, then C equals the probability of C, updated with A. The theory avoids so-called triviality results, which are standardly taken to show that principles of this sort cannot be validated. To achieve this, we deny that rational agents update their credences (...) via conditionalization. We offer a new rule of update, Hyperconditionalization, which agrees with Conditionalization whenever nonmodal statements are at stake but differs for modal and conditional sentences. (shrink)

One popular approach to theorizing about phenomenal consciousness has been to connect it to representations of a certain kind. Representational theories of consciousness can be further sub-divided into first-order and higher-order theories. Higher-order theories are often interpreted as invoking a special relation between the first-order state and the higher-order state. However there is another way to interpret higher-order theories that rejects this relational requirement. On this alternative view phenomenal consciousness consists in having suitable higher-order representations. I call this ‘HOROR’ (‘Higher-Order (...) Representation Of a Representation’) theory to distinguish it from relational versions of higher- order theory. In this paper I make the case that HOROR theory is a plausible account of the real nature of phenomenal consciousness whatever one’s views are about whether it is physical/reducible or not. I first clarify HOROR theory and compare it to the more traditional same-order and higher-order thought theories. Afterwards I move to presenting some considerations in favor of HOROR theory. (shrink)

Philosophy Compass, Volume 17, Issue 5, May 2022.

Recent research has identified a tension between the Safety principle that knowledge is belief without risk of error, and the Closure principle that knowledge is preserved by competent deduction. Timothy Williamson reconciles Safety and Closure by proposing that when an agent deduces a conclusion from some premises, the agent’s method for believing the conclusion includes their method for believing each premise. We argue that this theory is untenable because it implies problematically easy epistemic access to one’s methods. Several possible solutions (...) are explored and rejected. (shrink)

Joshua Matthan Brown contrasts the concept of God assumed by most analytic philosophers, what he refers to as theistic personalism, with that of the apophatic conception of God endorsed by Eastern Christian thinkers. He maintains that the most powerful and economical response to contemporary arguments for atheism is to reject theistic personalism and adopt apophatic theism. Apophatic theists believe there is a lot we cannot say about God, taking the divine nature to be completely ineffable. Brown develops a (...) coherent account of divine ineffability and provides reasons for adopting this oft misunderstood view. Importantly, he draws upon apophatic theology, and its commitment to divine ineffability, to proffer an undercutting defeater for virtually every contemporary argument for the nonexistence of God. Along the way he anticipates and responds to several significant objections. (shrink)

This selective and opinionated overview of English-language scholarship on the philosophical method(s) of Plato's Socrates discusses whether this Socrates has any expertise or method, how he examines others and why, and how he exhorts others to care about wisdom and the state of their soul.

Being sure of each other is the blossoming of Kimberley Brownlee’s earlier work on the intrinsic value and qualities of human connection (2013, 2016c, 2016b), opening with a scene from A. A. Milne’s House at Pooh Corner: lost in the woods together, Piglet takes Pooh’s paw ‘just to be sure’ of his friend. The importance of social connection is often overlooked because it is central to our lives, like breathable air. Brownlee’s work highlights the need for social connection, as deserving (...) of more philosophical attention and practical protection through rights. But her key insight is that receiving relational goods isn’t all that matters: being able and permitted to provide relational goods to others, as Piglet and Pooh receive and offer each other reassurance, is just as essential for our wellbeing. Brownlee argues these interests are strong enough to ground rights (2016c: 28). (shrink)

Simon Cushing conducted the following interview with Elizabeth Anderson on 18 June 2014.

This is a study of Plato's use of the character Socrates to model what philosophy is. The study focuses on the Apology, and finds that philosophy there is the love of wisdom, where wisdom is expertise about how to live, of the sort that only gods can fully have, and where Socrates loves wisdom in three ways, first by honoring wisdom as the gods' possession, testing human claims to it, second by pursuing wisdom, examining himself as he examines others, to (...) achieve a more well justified set of beliefs about how to live, and third by trying to live wisely, insofar as he can, which includes exhorting others to care about living wisely than anything else. The essay also includes some suggestions about how Plato criticizes and revises this model of philosophy outside the Apology. (shrink)