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Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience

Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley-Blackwell. Edited by P. M. S. Hacker (2003)

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  1. What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Cognition?: Human, cybernetic, and phylogenetic conceptual schemes.Carrie Figdor - 2023 - JOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 4 (2):149-162.
    This paper outlines three broad conceptual schemes currently in play in the sciences concerned with explaining cognitive abilities. One is the anthropocentric scheme – human cognition – that dominated our thinking about cognition until very recently. Another is the cybernetic-computational scheme – cybernetic cognition – rooted in cognitive science and flourishing in such fields as artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience, and biocybernetics. The third is an evolutionary biological scheme – phylogenetic cognition – that conceptualizes cognition in terms of the phylogeny-based approach (...)
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  • (1 other version) النزعة الخارجية الدلالية Semantic externalism.Salah Ismail - 2020 - منصة معنى، 8 فبراير.
    Semantic externalism Are the meanings of natural kind words, such as “water” or “tiger,” in the head or in the world? This question is pressing and controversial in contemporary philosophy. The nature of the meaning related to propositional contents and words of the natural kind raises a fundamental disagreement between two groups of philosophers: defenders of internalism and defenders of externalism. The two groups differ on how to define meaning. Internalists say that meaning is determined entirely by aspects that are (...)
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  • On the alleged explanatory impotence/conceptual vacuity of substance dualism.James Moreland - 2023 - Ratio 36 (3):180-191.
    In the last decade, there has been a notable upsurge in property (PD) and generic substance dualism (SD). By SD I mean the view that there is a spiritual substantial soul that is different from but variously related to its body. SD includes Cartesian, certain forms of late Medieval hylomorphic (e.g., Aquinas'), and Haskerian emergent SD. Nevertheless, some form of physicalism remains the majority view in philosophy of mind. Several fairly standard objections have been raised against SD, and SDists have (...)
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  • Rethinking Logic: Logic in Relation to Mathematics, Evolution, and Method.Carlo Cellucci - 2013 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.
    This volume examines the limitations of mathematical logic and proposes a new approach to logic intended to overcome them. To this end, the book compares mathematical logic with earlier views of logic, both in the ancient and in the modern age, including those of Plato, Aristotle, Bacon, Descartes, Leibniz, and Kant. From the comparison it is apparent that a basic limitation of mathematical logic is that it narrows down the scope of logic confining it to the study of deduction, without (...)
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  • Empirical Conceptual Analysis: An Exposition.Hristo Valchev - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):757-776.
    Conceptual analysis as traditionally understood can be improved by allowing the use of a certain kind of empirical investigation. The conceptual analysis in which the kind of empirical investigation in question is used can be called “empirical conceptual analysis”. In the present inquiry, I provide a systematic exposition of empirical conceptual analysis, so understood, considering what exactly empirical conceptual analysis is, the different kinds of empirical conceptual analysis, and the main application of the method within philosophy. It can be defined (...)
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  • Wittgenstein and Folk Psychology.Yi Jiang - 2021 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 9 (4):38-47.
    Various writings by the later Wittgenstein on the philosophy of psychology, published posthumously, express his basic critical attitude toward certain concepts and issues in the philosophy of psychology. His attitude towards folk psychology is negative in principle, leaving him opposed to the foundation of current psychological research. This critique of folk psychology and of the philosophy of psychology in general is in accord with the general method of his later philosophy, that is, dealing with philosophical problems by dissolving them. However, (...)
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  • Minds, Brains, and Capacities: Situated Cognition and Neo-Aristotelianism.Hans-Johann Https://Orcidorg909X Glock - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This article compares situated cognition to contemporary Neo-Aristotelian approaches to the mind. The article distinguishes two components in this paradigm: an Aristotelian essentialism which is alien to situated cognition and a Wittgensteinian “capacity approach” to the mind which is not just congenial to it but provides important conceptual and argumentative resources in defending social cognition against orthodox cognitive science. It focuses on a central tenet of that orthodoxy. According to what I call “encephalocentrism,” cognition is primarily or even exclusively a (...)
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  • The Psychological Speciesism of Humanism.Carrie Figdor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178:1545-1569.
    Humanists argue for assigning the highest moral status to all humans over any non-humans directly or indirectly on the basis of uniquely superior human cognitive abilities. They may also claim that humanism is the strongest position from which to combat racism, sexism, and other forms of within-species discrimination. I argue that changing conceptual foundations in comparative research and discoveries of advanced cognition in many non-human species reveal humanism’s psychological speciesism and its similarity with common justifications of within-species discrimination.
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  • Unconscious Inference Theories of Cognitive Acheivement.Kirk Ludwig & Wade Munroe - 2019 - In Anders Nes & Timothy Hoo Wai Chan (eds.), Inference and Consciousness. London: Routledge. pp. 15-39.
    This chapter argues that the only tenable unconscious inferences theories of cognitive achievement are ones that employ a theory internal technical notion of representation, but that once we give cash-value definitions of the relevant notions of representation and inference, there is little left of the ordinary notion of representation. We suggest that the real value of talk of unconscious inferences lies in (a) their heuristic utility in helping us to make fruitful predictions, such as about illusions, and (b) their providing (...)
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  • Welcoming Robots into the Moral Circle: A Defence of Ethical Behaviourism.John Danaher - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2023-2049.
    Can robots have significant moral status? This is an emerging topic of debate among roboticists and ethicists. This paper makes three contributions to this debate. First, it presents a theory – ‘ethical behaviourism’ – which holds that robots can have significant moral status if they are roughly performatively equivalent to other entities that have significant moral status. This theory is then defended from seven objections. Second, taking this theoretical position onboard, it is argued that the performative threshold that robots need (...)
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  • The Fallacy of the Homuncular Fallacy.Carrie Figdor - 2018 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 31 (31):41-56.
    A leading theoretical framework for naturalistic explanation of mind holds that we explain the mind by positing progressively "stupider" capacities ("homunculi") until the mind is "discharged" by means of capacities that are not intelligent at all. The so-called homuncular fallacy involves violating this procedure by positing the same capacities at subpersonal levels. I argue that the homuncular fallacy is not a fallacy, and that modern-day homunculi are idle posits. I propose an alternative view of what naturalism requires that reflects how (...)
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  • Inquiries into Cognition: Wittgenstein’s Language-Games and Peirce’s Semeiosis for the Philosophy of Cognition.Andrey Pukhaev - 2013 - Dissertation, Gregorian University
    SUMMARY Major theories of philosophical psychology and philosophy of mind are examined on the basis of the fundamental questions of ontology, metaphysics, epistemology, semantics and logic. The result is the choice between language of eliminative reductionism and dualism, neither of which answers properly the relation between mind and body. In the search for a non–dualistic and non–reductive language, Wittgenstein’s notion of language–games as the representative links between language and the world is considered together with Peirce’s semeiosis of cognition. The result (...)
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  • Philosophie der Neurowissenschaften.Holger Lyre - 2017 - In Simon Lohse & Thomas Reydon (eds.), Grundriss Wissenschaftsphilosophie. Die Philosophien der Einzelwissenschaften. Hamburg: Meiner.
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  • Ethical Challenges of Simulation-Driven Big Neuroscience.Markus Christen, Nikola Biller-Andorno, Berit Bringedal, Kevin Grimes, Julian Savulescu & Henrik Walter - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (1):5-17.
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  • Panentheism, Panpsychism and Neuroscience : In Search of an Alternative Metaphysical Framework in Relation to Neuroscience, Consciousness, Free Will, and Theistic Beliefs.Oliver Li - unknown
    This thesis philosophically examines, critically discusses, and proposes how a plausible philosophical framework of consciousness and free will should be formulated. This framework takes into account contemporary scientific research on human consciousness and free will and its possible challenges; also it is examined how this framework should be related to theistic beliefs – especially those connected to human and divine consciousness and free will. First, an overview of important research within the natural sciences about the conscious mind is presented together (...)
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  • Disease or Developmental Disorder: Competing Perspectives on the Neuroscience of Addiction.Wayne Hall, Adrian Carter & Anthony Barnett - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):103-110.
    Lewis’ neurodevelopmental model provides a plausible alternative to the brain disease model of addiction that is a dominant perspective in the USA. We disagree with Lewis’ claim that the BDMA is unchallenged within the addiction field but we agree that it provides unduly pessimistic prospects of recovery. We question the strength of evidence for the BDMA provided by animal models and human neuroimaging studies. We endorse Lewis’ framing of addiction as a developmental process underpinned by reversible forms of neuroplasticity. His (...)
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  • The View from Vector Space: an account of conceptual geography.Joshua Stein - 2014 - Journal of Cognition and Neuroethics 2 (1):71-91.
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  • Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory.Michael McEachrane - 2009 - Theory and Psychology 19 (1):33-53.
    According to psychological emotion theories referred to as appraisal theory, emotions are caused by appraisals (evaluative judgments). Borrowing a term from Jan Smedslund, it is the contention of this article that psychological appraisal theory is “pseudoempirical” (i.e., misleadingly or incorrectly empirical). In the article I outline what makes some scientific psychology “pseudoempirical,” distinguish my view on this from Jan Smedslund’s, and then go on to show why paying heed to the ordinary meanings of emotion terms is relevant to psychology, and (...)
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  • Representing the past: memory traces and the causal theory of memory.Sarah Robins - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (11):2993-3013.
    According to the Causal Theory of Memory, remembering a particular past event requires a causal connection between that event and its subsequent representation in memory, specifically, a connection sustained by a memory trace. The CTM is the default view of memory in contemporary philosophy, but debates persist over what the involved memory traces must be like. Martin and Deutscher argued that the CTM required memory traces to be structural analogues of past events. Bernecker and Michaelian, contemporary CTM proponents, reject structural (...)
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  • Review of "Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory" by Leonidas Tsilipakos. [REVIEW]Robert Vinten - 2015 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 4 (2):153-156.
    Book review of Tsilipakos, Leonidas: Clarity and Confusion in Social Theory: Taking Concepts Seriously. Farnham : Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2015.
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  • Reality as simulation : A comparative study of the selfmodel theory of subjectivity and biological realism.Laboni Huq - unknown
    The empirical study of consciousness is a young field still in its pre paradigmatic stage and so in need of a unifying framework. This comparative literature review examines two theories of consciousness, Thomas Metzinger’s the self-model theory of subjectivity and Antti Revonsuo’s Biological realism, theories which both try to provide such a framework for the science of consciousness. This paper gives an overview of some of the more central parts of each theory, along with criticism directed towards them. The paper (...)
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  • Making enactivism even more embodied.Shaun Gallagher & Matthew Bower - 2013 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies (2):232-247.
    The full scope of enactivist approaches to cognition includes not only a focus on sensory-motor contingencies and physical affordances for action, but also an emphasis on affective factors of embodiment and intersubjective affordances for social interaction. This strong conception of embodied cognition calls for a new way to think about the role of the brain in the larger system of brain-body-environment. We ask whether recent work on predictive coding offers a way to think about brain function in an enactive system, (...)
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  • An Informational Ontology and Epistemology of Cognition.Wu Kun & Joseph E. Brenner - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (3):249-279.
    Despite recent major advances in the neuroscience underlying cognition, the processes of its emergence and evolution are far from being understood. In our view, current interrelated concepts of mind; knowledge; epistemology; perception; cognition and information fail to reflect the real dynamics of mental processes, their ontology and their logic. It has become routine to talk about information in relation to these processes, but there is no consensus about its most relevant qualitative and functional properties. We present a theory of human (...)
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  • The Philosophy of Ordinary Language Is a Naturalistic Philosophy.Jonathan Trigg - 2010 - Essays in Philosophy 11 (2):197-215.
    It is argued that the only response to the mereological objections of the ordinary language philosopher available to the scientistic philosopher of mind requires the adoption of the view that ordinary psychological talk is theoretical and falsified by the findings of brain science. The availability of this sort of response produces a kind of stalemate between these opposed views and viewpoints: the claim that attribution of psychological predicates to parts of organisms is nonsense is met with the claim that it (...)
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  • Why the Radical Behaviorist Conception of Private Events Is Interesting, Relevant, and Important.Jay Moore - 2009 - Behavior and Philosophy 37:21 - 37.
    For radical behaviorists, talk about "private events" could be about any of four things: (a) private behavioral events, (b) physiology, (c) dispositions, or (d) explanatory fictions. Talk about private events as behavioral engages the influence of feelings, sensations, and covert opérant behavior. Analyses based on private behavioral events allow radical behaviorists to understand how those events contribute to contingencies controlling subsequent operant behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal. Talk about private events in physiological terms risks confounding explanatory categories. Although physiology necessarily (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.
    Das Buch verschafft einen Überblick über die neuere Willensfreiheitsdebatte, wobei es auch die Konsequenzen der Hirnforschung für das Freiheitsproblem erörtert. Ferner entwickelt der Autor eine eigene Position, die er 'fähigkeitsbasierten Libertarismus' nennt. Er widerspricht dem breiten philosophischen Konsens, dass jedenfalls eine Art von Freiheit mit einem naturwissenschaftlichen Weltbild unverträglich sei, nämlich die Fähigkeit, sich unter gegebenen Bedingungen so oder anders zu entscheiden. Im Buch wird argumentiert, dass der libertarischen Freiheitsauffassung, die wir im Alltag alle teilen, bei näherer Betrachtung keine Tatschen (...)
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  • The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
    The Two Selves takes the position that the self is not a "thing" easily reduced to an object of scientific analysis. Rather, the self consists in a multiplicity of aspects, some of which have a neuro-cognitive basis (and thus are amenable to scientific inquiry) while other aspects are best construed as first-person subjectivity, lacking material instantiation. As a consequence of their potential immateriality, the subjective aspect of self cannot be taken as an object and therefore is not easily amenable to (...)
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  • The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.
    In this paper, I claim that the personal/subpersonal distinction is first and foremost a distinction between two kinds of psychological theory or explanation: it is only in this form that we can understand why the distinction was first introduced, and how it continues to earn its keep. I go on to examine the different ontological commitments that might lead us from the primary distinction between personal and subpersonal explanations to a derivative distinction between personal and subpersonal states. I argue that (...)
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  • Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination. [REVIEW]Jan Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):51-77.
    The neurosciences not only challenge assumptions about the mind’s place in the natural world but also urge us to reconsider its role in the normative world. Based on mind-brain dualism, the law affords only one-sided protection: it systematically protects bodies and brains, but only fragmentarily minds and mental states. The fundamental question, in what ways people may legitimately change mental states of others, is largely unexplored in legal thinking. With novel technologies to both intervene into minds and detect mental activity, (...)
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  • Bounded Mirroring. Joint action and group membership in political theory and cognitive neuroscience.Machiel Keestra - 2012 - In Frank Vandervalk (ed.), Thinking about the Body Politic: Essays on Neuroscience and Political Theory. Routledge. pp. 222--249.
    A crucial socio-political challenge for our age is how to rede!ne or extend group membership in such a way that it adequately responds to phenomena related to globalization like the prevalence of migration, the transformation of family and social networks, and changes in the position of the nation state. Two centuries ago Immanuel Kant assumed that international connectedness between humans would inevitably lead to the realization of world citizen rights. Nonetheless, globalization does not just foster cosmopolitanism but simultaneously yields the (...)
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  • Thinking and Feeling: A Buddhist Perspective.Padmasiri de Silva - 2011 - Sophia 50 (2):253-263.
    The work ‘Thinking and Feeling’ edited by Robert C. Solomon may be considered as a landmark in the history of the philosophy of the emotions. The work also has assembled together some of the best minds in the Anglo American Traditions. The central focus in this work is to mediate between the physiological arousal theories of emotions and the cognitive appraisal theories of emotions. My article is an attempt to mediate from my Asian background and in specific terms using the (...)
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  • What Müller's Law of Specific Nerve Energies Says about the Mind.Howard Rachlin - 2005 - Behavior and Philosophy 33:41 - 54.
    Johannes Müller's law of specific nerve energies (LOSNE) states that the mind has access not to objects in the world but only to our nerves. This law implies that the contents of the mind have no qualities in common with environmental objects but serve only as arbitrary signs or markers of those objects. The present article traces the implications of LOSNE for non-physical theories of mind and for modern neural identity theory (that mental events are identical with their neurological representations) (...)
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  • (1 other version)Problems of representation I: nature and role.Dan Ryder - 2009 - In Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 233.
    Introduction There are some exceptions, which we shall see below, but virtually all theories in psychology and cognitive science make use of the notion of representation. Arguably, folk psychology also traffics in representations, or is at least strongly suggestive of their existence. There are many different types of things discussed in the psychological and philosophical literature that are candidates for representation-hood. First, there are the propositional attitudes – beliefs, judgments, desires, hopes etc. (see Chapters 9 and 17 of this volume). (...)
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  • Movement is our mother tongue: Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, The Corporeal Turn: An Interdisciplinary Reader. Exeter, UK, and Charlottesville, VA, USA: Imprint Academic. ISBN 9 781845 401535.Søren Overgaard - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):139-143.
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  • Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy.Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen & Tero Tulenheimo (eds.) - 2009 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer Verlag.
    This volume presents mathematical game theory as an interface between logic and philosophy.
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  • Not Even Wrong - a view of current science of the mind.John Yates - unknown
    Present progress in mind science is racing away in the direction of denying the existence of human freewill and animal and human sentience. This brief paper attempts to summarise a few brief reasons why areas of present work by prominent authors have departed from fact to the realms of folk psychology and summarises some of the ways in which present work can be put right. An experiment is described and carried out in an attempt to breach a little more of (...)
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  • Are we our brains?Stephen Burwood - 2009 - Philosophical Investigations 32 (2):113-133.
    My aim in this paper is to destabilise the brain-is-self thesis, something that is now regarded in some quarters as philosophical commonsense. My contention is that it is the epithelial body that enters into the formation of our sense of self and that largely bears the burden of personal identity as well as playing the key role in grounding our psychological ascriptions. Lacking any sensorimotor or social presence of its own, the brain by itself cannot "underlie" selfhood, but only as (...)
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  • Situated normativity: The normative aspect of embodied cognition in unreflective action.Erik Rietveld - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):973-1001.
    In everyday life we often act adequately, yet without deliberation. For instance, we immediately obtain and maintain an appropriate distance from others in an elevator. The notion of normativity implied here is a very basic one, namely distinguishing adequate from inadequate, correct from incorrect, or better from worse in the context of a particular situation. In the first part of this paper I investigate such ‘situated normativity’ by focusing on unreflective expert action. More particularly, I use Wittgenstein’s examples of craftsmen (...)
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  • Sensory and perceptual consciousness.Austen Clark - 2007 - In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. New York: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Asked on the Dick Cavett show about her former Stalinist comrade Lillian Hellman, Mary McCarthy replied, "Every word she says is a lie, including 'and' and 'the'." The language used to describe sensory and perceptual consciousness is worthy of about the same level of trust. One must adapt oneself to the fact that every ordinary word used to describe this domain is ambiguous; that different theoreticians use the same words in very different ways; and that every speaker naturally thinks that (...)
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  • Embedded cognition and mental causation: Setting empirical Bounds on metaphysics. [REVIEW]Fred Keijzer & Maurice Schouten - 2007 - Synthese 158 (1):109 - 125.
    We argue that embedded cognition provides an argument against Jaegwon Kim’s neural reduction of mental causation. Because some mental, or at least psychological processes have to be cast in an externalist way, Kim’s argument can be said to lead to the conclusion that mental causation is as safe as any other form of higher-level of causation.
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  • The evolving fortunes of eliminative materialism.Paul M. Churchland - 2007 - In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • (1 other version)Neuroscience and Normativity: How Knowledge of the Brain Offers a Deeper Understanding of Moral and Legal Responsibility.William Hirstein - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 16 (2):327-351.
    Neuroscience can relate to ethics and normative issues via the brain’s cognitive control network. This network accomplishes several executive processes, such as planning, task-switching, monitoring, and inhibiting. These processes allow us to increase the accuracy of our perceptions and our memory recall. They also allow us to plan much farther into the future, and with much more detail than any of our fellow mammals. These abilities also make us fitting subjects for responsibility claims. Their activity, or lack thereof, is at (...)
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  • Modeling intentional agency: a neo-Gricean framework.Matti Sarkia - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7003-7030.
    This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary type of intentional agency, which is used as a model for other agential types. Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about intentional agency in (...)
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  • From reflex to reflection: Moving from the space of causes to the space of reasons and back.Ariel Furstenberg - 2020 - Open Philosophy 3 (1):681-693.
    This article proposes to narrow the gap between the space of reasons and the space of causes. By articulating the standard phenomenology of reasons and causes, we investigate the cases in which the clear-cut divide between reasons and causes starts to break down. Thus, substituting the simple picture of the relationship between the space of reasons and the space of causes with an inverted and complex one, in which reasons can have a causal-like phenomenology and causes can have a reason-like (...)
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  • Reading the Human Brain: How the Mind Became Legible.Nikolas Rose - 2016 - Body and Society 22 (2):140-177.
    The human body was made legible long ago. But what of the human mind? Is it possible to ‘read’ the mind, for one human being to know what another is thinking or feeling, their beliefs and intentions. And if I can read your mind, how about others – could our authorities, in the criminal justice system or the security services? Some developments in contemporary neuroscience suggest the answer to this question is ‘yes’. While philosophers continue to debate the mind-brain problem, (...)
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  • Can Reasons and Values Influence Action: How Might Intentional Agency Work Physiologically?Raymond Noble & Denis Noble - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (2):277-295.
    In this paper, we demonstrate (1) how harnessing stochasticity can be the basis of creative agency; (2) that such harnessing can resolve the apparent conflict between reductionist (micro-level) accounts of behaviour and behaviour as the outcome of rational and value-driven (macro-level) decisions; (3) how neurophysiological processes can instantiate such behaviour; (4) The processes involved depend on three features of living organisms: (a) they are necessarily open systems; (b) micro-level systems therefore nest within higher-level systems; (c) causal interactions must occur across (...)
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  • Connecting Twenty-First Century Connectionism and Wittgenstein.Charles W. Lowney, Simon D. Levy, William Meroney & Ross W. Gayler - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):643-671.
    By pointing to deep philosophical confusions endemic to cognitive science, Wittgenstein might seem an enemy of computational approaches. We agree that while Wittgenstein would reject the classicist’s symbols and rules approach, his observations align well with connectionist or neural network approaches. While many connectionisms that dominated the later twentieth century could fall prey to criticisms of biological, pedagogical, and linguistic implausibility, current connectionist approaches can resolve those problems in a Wittgenstein-friendly manner. We present the basics of a Vector Symbolic Architecture (...)
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  • O que é Behaviorismo sobre a mente?Filipe Lazzeri - 2019 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 23 (2):249-277.
    It is common to find depictions of behaviorist approaches to the mind as approaches according to which mental events are “dispositions for behavior.” Moreover, it is sometimes said that for these approaches the dispositions are for publicly observable behaviors, or even “purely physical movements,” thereby excluding from being constitutive of mental events any internal bodily happening, besides any movement not taken as “purely physical.” In this paper I aim to pinpoint problems in such widespread depictions of behaviorism about the mind, (...)
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  • Norwood Russell Hanson’s account of experience: an untimely defense.T. Raja Rosenhagen - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5179-5204.
    Experience, it is widely agreed, constrains our thinking and is also thoroughly theory-laden. But how can it constrain our thinking while depending on what it purports to constrain? To address this issue, I revisit and carefully analyze the account of observation provided by Norwood Russell Hanson, who introduced the term ‘theory-ladenness of observation’ in the first place. I show that Hanson’s account provides an original and coherent response to the initial question and argue that, if suitably developed, his account provides (...)
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  • An enactive approach to pain: beyond the biopsychosocial model.Peter Stilwell & Katherine Harman - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (4):637-665.
    We propose a new conceptualization of pain by incorporating advancements made by phenomenologists and cognitive scientists. The biomedical understanding of pain is problematic as it inaccurately endorses a linear relationship between noxious stimuli and pain, and is often dualist or reductionist. From a Cartesian dualist perspective, pain occurs in an immaterial mind. From a reductionist perspective, pain is often considered to be “in the brain.” The biopsychosocial conceptualization of pain has been adopted to combat these problematic views. However, when considering (...)
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