- Book Review: Problems of Religious Luck by Guy Axtell. [REVIEW]Hans Van Eyghen - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (4):209-213.details
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Trust and the value of overconfidence: a Bayesian perspective on social network communication.Aron Vallinder & Erik J. Olsson - 2014 - Synthese 191 (9):1991-2007.details
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Religious Diversity.Hamid Vahid - 2018 - Faith and Philosophy 35 (2):219-236.details
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Some Problems With Steadfast Strategies for Rational Disagreement.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):89-107.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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Epistemic Akrasia, Higher-order Evidence, and Charitable Belief Attribution.Hamid Vahid - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (4):296-314.details
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Against Methodological Gambling.Borut Trpin - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):907-927.details
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Standpoint Epistemology and Epistemic Peerhood: A Defense of Epistemic Privilege.Briana Toole - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-18.details
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Aesthetic Disagreement with Oneself as Another.Uku Tooming - forthcoming - Estetika: The European Journal of Aesthetics 60 (2):145-161.details
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One’s own reasoning.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):208-232.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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Explaining Rationalist Weak Conciliationism: A Challenge.Joshua C. Thurow - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (4):297-310.details
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Why Disagreement-Based Skepticism cannot Escape the Challenge of Self-Defeat.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Episteme:1-18.details
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How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
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Self-Intimation, Infallibility, and Higher-Order Evidence.Eyal Tal - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):665-672.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Why the Method of Cases Doesn’t Work.Christopher Suhler - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):825-847.details
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Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.details
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Testimony as Evidence: More Problems for Linear Pooling. [REVIEW]Katie Steele - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):983-999.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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The Archimedean Urge.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):325-362.details
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The Method of Cases in Context. [REVIEW]Alison Springle - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):597-608.details
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Consensual Decision-Making Among Epistemic Peers.Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini & Jan Sprenger - 2009 - Episteme 6 (2):110-129.details
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Open‐Mindedness and Disagreement.James S. Spiegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):175-189.details
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Mind Misreading.Shannon Spaulding - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1).details
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Mindreading beyond belief: A more comprehensive conception of how we understand others.Shannon Spaulding - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12526.details
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On Sinnott-Armstrong’s Case Against Moral Intuitionism.Jonathan Smith - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):75-88.details
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Respecting all the evidence.Paulina Sliwa & Sophie Horowitz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2835-2858.details
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In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.details
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Denialism as Applied Skepticism: Philosophical and Empirical Considerations.Matthew H. Slater, Joanna K. Huxster, Julia E. Bresticker & Victor LoPiccolo - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):871-890.details
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Wise groups and humble persons: the best of both worlds?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-10.details
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Reconciling Enkrasia and Higher-Order Defeat.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (6):1369-1386.details
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Group disagreement: a belief aggregation perspective.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4033-4058.details
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Higher-Order Defeat Without Epistemic Dilemmas.Mattias Skipper - 2018 - Logos and Episteme 9 (4):451-465.details
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Does rationality demand higher-order certainty?Mattias Skipper - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11561-11585.details
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Rational supererogation and epistemic permissivism.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):571-591.details
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Reasonable Trust.Evan Simpson - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):402-423.details
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Practical Reasonableness: Some Metaethical Issues.Evan Simpson - 2013 - Journal of Value Inquiry 47 (4):425-437.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
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Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-20.details
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Does Moral Theory Corrupt Youth?Kieran Setiya - 2010 - Philosophical Topics 38 (1):205-222.details
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Kuhn’s two accounts of rational disagreement in science: an interpretation and critique.Markus Seidel - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6023-6051.details
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Plato's Phaedo on Disagreement and Its Role in Epistemic Improvement.Tonguc Seferoglu - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):24-44.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Rationality, uncertainty, and unanimity: an epistemic critique of contractarianism.Alexander Schaefer - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (1):82-117.details
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Problems with Publishing Philosophical Claims We Don't Believe.Işık Sarıhan - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):449-458.details
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Fine-Tuning Should Make Us More Confident that Other Universes Exist.Bradford Saad - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1):29-44.details
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