- Reasonable standards and exculpating moral ignorance.Nathan Biebel - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):1-21.details
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Moral intuitionism and disagreement.Brian Besong - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2767-2789.details
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The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):363-378.details
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Religious Disagreement and Epistemic Intuitions.Michael Bergmann - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81:19-43.details
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Anecdotal Pluralism, Total Evidence and Religious Diversity.Daniele Bertini - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (1):155-173.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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Dealing With Disagreement: Distinguishing Two Types of Epistemic Peers.Benjamin Elliott Wald - 2009 - Spontaneous Generations 3 (1):113-122.details
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Disagreement and Dispute.Delia Belleri - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):289-307.details
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The Problem of Peer Demotion, Revisited and Resolved.Endre Begby - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (2):125-140.details
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From Belief Polarization to Echo Chambers: A Rationalizing Account.Endre Begby - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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Evidential Preemption.Endre Begby - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):515-530.details
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Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-24.details
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Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists.James R. Beebe & Jonathan Matheson - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3):426-449.details
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Deep Disagreement and the Virtues of Argumentative and Epistemic Incapacity.Jeremy Barris - 2018 - Informal Logic 38 (3):369-408.details
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Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement.Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):1-13.details
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Verbal Disagreements and Philosophical Scepticism.Nathan Ballantyne - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):752-765.details
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Conciliationism and Uniqueness.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):657-670.details
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The significance of unpossessed evidence.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260):315-335.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.details
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Debunking Biased Thinkers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2015 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1 (1):141--162.details
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Counterfactual Philosophers.Nathan Ballantyne - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):368-387.details
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How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
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Non-accidental piety: reliable reasoning and modally robust adherence to the divine will.Joona Auvinen - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 91 (1):43-61.details
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Jury Theorems for Peer Review.Marcus Arvan, Liam Kofi Bright & Remco Heesen - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Morality as an Evolutionary Exaptation.Marcus Arvan - 2021 - In Johan De Smedt & Helen De Cruz (eds.), Empirically Engaged Evolutionary Ethics. Synthese Library. Springer - Synthese Library. pp. 89-109.details
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Social Epistemology and Validation in Agent-Based Social Simulation.David Anzola - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):1333-1361.details
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Disagreement in discipline-building processes.David Anzola - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 25):6201-6224.details
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“Let Me Double-Check That”: A Challenge for Conciliationism.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Theoria 88 (3):545-557.details
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“Absent Contrary Indication”: On a Pernicious Form of Epistemic Luck, and its Epistemic Agency Antidote.Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2341-2364.details
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Environmental Epistemology.Dallas Amico-Korby, Maralee Harrell & David Danks - 2024 - Synthese 203 (81):1-24.details
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Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
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Framing how we think about disagreement.Joshua Alexander, Diana Betz, Chad Gonnerman & John Philip Waterman - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2539-2566.details
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Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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Epistemic Abstainers, Epistemic Martyrs, and Epistemic Converts.Scott F. Aikin, Michael Harbour & Robert B. Talisse - 2010 - Logos and Episteme 1 (2):211-219.details
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How to Treat Machines that Might Have Minds.Nicholas Agar - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (2):269-282.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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Teaching drunk: Work, the online economy, and uncertainty in action.Max F. Kramer - 2021 - Philosophy 96 (3):387-408.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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The zetetic turn and the procedural turn.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
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Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2024 - Abingdon: Routledge.details
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How Low Can You Go? A Defense of Believing Philosophical Theories.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg (eds.), Philosophy with Attitude. OUP.details
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Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Gnostic Disagreement Norms.Domingos Faria - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A2)5-22.details
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Religious Disagreement.Bryan Frances - 2015 - In Graham Robert Oppy (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of Religion. London: Routledge.details
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Epistemic Value and Epistemic Compromise, A Reply to Moss.Amir Konigsberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):87-97.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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Argumentation and the epistemology of disagreement.Harvey Siegal - unknowndetails
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Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
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