- How to be an uncompromising revisionary ontologist.David Mark Kovacs - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2129-2152.details
|
|
Against Conservatism in Metaphysics.Maegan Fairchild & John Hawthorne - 2018 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 82:45-75.details
|
|
Two Geometrical Models for Pixelism.Fabio Patrone - 2020 - Metaphysica (1):99-113.details
|
|
It’s All in your Head: a Solution to the Problem of Object Coincidence.Graham Renz - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (4):1387-1407.details
|
|
Fundamental non-qualitative properties.Byron Simmons - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6183-6206.details
|
|
Fictionalist Strategies in Metaphysics.Lukas Skiba & Richard Woodward - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge.details
|
|
Mathematical anti-realism and explanatory structure.Bruno Whittle - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6203-6217.details
|
|
Counterpossibles.Alexander W. Kocurek - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (11):e12787.details
|
|
Restricted Diachronic Composition and Special Relativity.Stephan Torre - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (2):235-255.details
|
|
Fictionalism, the Safety Result and counterpossibles.Lukas Skiba - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):647-658.details
|
|
Counting and Countenancing.Achille C. Varzi - 2014 - In Aaron J. Cotnoir & Donald L. M. Baxter (eds.), Composition as Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 47–69.details
|
|
Philosophical Renegades.Bryan Frances - 2013 - In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 121-166.details
|
|
Two Physicalist Arguments for Microphysical Manyism.Simon Thunder - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
|
|
An epistemological problem for minimalist views about composition.Dean Da Vee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9649-9668.details
|
|
Dorr on the language of ontology.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3301-3315.details
|
|
Animalism and Deferentialism.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):605-609.details
|
|
No Simples, No Gunk, No Nothing.Sam Cowling - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):246-260.details
|
|
One's a Crowd: Mereological Nihilism without Ordinary‐Object Eliminativism.Gabriele Contessa - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):199-221.details
|
|
Emergence for Nihilists.Richard L. J. Caves - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):2-28.details
|
|
An Extensional Mereology for Structured Entities.Ilaria Canavotto & Alessandro Giordani - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87:2343-2373.details
|
|
The contingency of composition.Ross P. Cameron - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):99-121.details
|
|
Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18.details
|
|
Quantum Ontology and Extensional Mereology.Claudio Calosi, Vincenzo Fano & Gino Tarozzi - 2011 - Foundations of Physics 41 (11):1740-1755.details
|
|
Composition as a Kind of Identity.Phillip Bricker - 2016 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (3):264-294.details
|
|
Science and the special composition question.Andrew Brenner - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):657-678.details
|
|
Material Objects and Their Parts.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Metaphysica (1).details
|
|
Mereological nihilism and the special arrangement question.Andrew Brenner - 2015 - Synthese 192 (5):1295-1314.details
|
|
Mereological Nihilism and Personal Ontology.Andrew Brenner - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268).details
|
|
Monism, Emergence, and Plural Logic.Einar Duenger Bohn - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (2):211-223.details
|
|
The Moral Parody Argument Against Panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1821–1852.details
|
|
The moral parody argument against panpsychism.Zach Blaesi - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1821-1852.details
|
|
We Need Non-factive Metaphysical Explanation.Michael Bertrand - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):991-1011.details
|
|
The world is either digital or analogue.Francesco Berto & Jacopo Tagliabue - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):481-497.details
|
|
Construction area (no hard hat required).Karen Bennett - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):79-104.details
|
|
Why the debate about composition is factually empty.Mark Balaguer - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3975-4008.details
|
|
Why Composition Matters.Andrew M. Bailey & Andrew Brenner - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (8):934-949.details
|
|
Anaxagoras, the Thoroughgoing Infinitist: The Relation between his Teachings on Multitude and on Heterogeneity.Miloš Arsenijević, Saša Popović & Miloš Vuletić - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (1):35-70.details
|
|
Can Metaphysical Structuralism Solve the Plurality Problem?Sophie R. Allen - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (5):722-746.details
|
|
Two Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):177-204.details
|
|
Kantian Monism.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - Philosophical Papers 41 (1):23-56.details
|
|
No Physical Particles for a Dispositional Monist?Baptiste Le Bihan - 2015 - Philosophical Papers 44 (2):207-232.details
|
|
Perceptual variation and ignorance.John Morrison - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5145-5173.details
|
|
The Many and the One: A Philosophical Study of Plural Logic.Salvatore Florio & Øystein Linnebo - 2021 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Simples and gunk.Kris McDaniel - unknowndetails
|
|
Many, but one.Evan T. Woods - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 18):4609-4626.details
|
|
Fictionalism and inferential safety.Richard Woodward - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):409-417.details
|
|
Why paraphrase nihilism fails.Shane Maxwell Wilkins - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2619--2632.details
|
|
Working parts: Reply to Mellor.Robert Williams - 2008 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 62:81-106.details
|
|
Illusions of gunk.J. Robert G. Williams - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):493–513.details
|
|
Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.details
|
|