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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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Setting Things before the Mind: M.G.F. Martin.M. G. F. Martin - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:157-179.details
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Pain signals are predominantly imperative.Manolo Martínez & Colin Klein - 2016 - Biology and Philosophy 31 (2):283-298.details
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Varieties of representation in evolved and embodied neural networks.Pete Mandik - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):95-130.details
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The boundaries and location of consciousness as identity theories deem fit.Riccardo Manzotti - 2021 - Rivista Internazionale di Filosofia e Psicologia 12 (3):225-241.details
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Supervenience and neuroscience.Pete Mandik - 2011 - Synthese 180 (3):443 - 463.details
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Qualia, space, and control.Pete Mandik - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Materialism and the First Person.Geoffrey Madell - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:123-139.details
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Taxonomising the Senses.Fiona Macpherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (1):123-142.details
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Theories of mind and 'the commonsense view'.Cynthia Macdonald - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (5):467-488.details
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Novel colours and the content of experience.Fiona Macpherson - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (1):43-66.details
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Is the Sense‐Data Theory a Representationalist Theory?Fiona Macpherson - 2014 - Ratio 27 (4):369-392.details
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‘‘In My ‘Mind’s Eye’: Introspectionism, Detectivism, and the Basis of Authoritative Self-Knowledge.Cynthia Macdonald - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15).details
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Colour inversion problems for representationalism.Fiona Macpherson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):127-152.details
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Semantics for Subjective Measures of Perceptual Experience.Pessi Lyyra - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.details
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Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'.Pessi Lyyra - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):67-87.details
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Response to Polger and Flanagan.William G. Lycan - 2001 - Minds and Machines 11 (1):127-132.details
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The mind-body problem: An overview.Kirk Ludwig - 2002 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Philosophy of Mind. Malden, MA, USA: Blackwell. pp. 1-46.details
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The Location and Boundaries of Consciousness: a Structural Realist Approach.Kristjan Loorits - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):523-537.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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Belief ascriptions and social externalism.Ronald Loeffler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):211-239.details
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Molyneux’s question and the individuation of perceptual concepts.Janet Levin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):1 - 28.details
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In Defense of Cognitive Phenomenology: Meeting the Matching Content Challenge.Preston Lennon - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2391-2407.details
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What are empirical consequences? On dispensability and composite objects.Alex LeBrun - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13201-13223.details
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Editorial: Self-Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field.Stefan Lang & Klaus Viertbauer - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):257-276.details
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Higher Order Thought and the Problem of Radical Confabulation.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):69-98.details
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Editorial: Self-Consciousness Explained—Mapping the Field.Stefan Lang & Klaus Viertbauer - 2022 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (2):257-276.details
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Do unconscious emotions involve unconscious feelings?Michael Lacewing - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (1):81-104.details
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What is What it’s Like? Introducing Perceptual Modes of Presentation.John Kulvicki - 2007 - Synthese 156 (2):205-229.details
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Perceptual content, information, and the primary/secondary quality distinction.John Kulvicki - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 122 (2):103-131.details
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Some arguments against intentionalism.John-Michael Kuczynski - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):107-141.details
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The Veil of Abstracta.Uriah Kriegel - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.details
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Temporally Token-Reflexive Experiences.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (4):585-617.details
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The phenomenologically manifest.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):115-136.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.details
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PANIC theory and the prospects for a representational theory of phenomenal consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2002 - Philosophical Psychology 15 (1):55-64.details
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Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.details
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Intentionality and Normativity.Uriah Kriegel - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):185-208.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.details
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Consciousness as sensory quality and as implicit self-awareness.Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):1-26.details
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No Pain, No Gain (in Darwinian Fitness): A Representational Account of Affective Experience.Benjamin Kozuch - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):693-714.details
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Prefrontal lesion evidence against higher-order theories of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):721-746.details
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The liberation of nature and knowledge: a case study on Hans Reichenbach’s naturalism.László Kocsis & Adam Tamas Tuboly - 2021 - Synthese 199 (All Things Reichenbach):9751-9784.details
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The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.details
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What’s so Transparent about Transparency?Amy Kind - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (3):225-244.details
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Restrictions on representationalism.Amy Kind - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):405-427.details
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Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
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