- Refined Invariantism.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2020 - Theoria 86 (1):100-127.details
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Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-11.details
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Fallibilism and the Certainty Norm of Assertion.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):133-139.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Against zetetic encroachment.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Synthese 203 (6):1-23.details
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Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Caught in the Language-Game.Nuno Venturinha - 2022 - Topoi 41 (5):1043-1055.details
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The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker.Juliette Vazard - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):45-60.details
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The doxastic profile of the compulsive re-checker.Juliette Vazard - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (1):45-60.details
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Friendship and the grades of doxastic partiality.Hamid Vahid - 2024 - Theoria 90 (1):122-133.details
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Evidence of factive norms of belief and decision.John Turri - 2015 - Synthese 192 (12):4009-4030.details
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Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
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A New Paradigm for Epistemology From Reliabilism to Abilism.John Turri - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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A Puzzle about withholding.John Turri - 2012 - Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):355-364.details
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Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.details
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Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):625-637.details
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Demarginalizing Standpoint Epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):47-65.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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Intentionality and partial belief.Weng Hong Tang - 2014 - Synthese 191 (7).details
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Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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The epistemic analysis of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):319-334.details
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Strict moderate invariantism and knowledge-denials.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2029-2044.details
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Principles of Interpretive Charity and the Semantics of Knowledge Attributions.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):153-168.details
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In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5099-5113.details
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Luck as an epistemic notion.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):361-377.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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Replies.Jason Stanley - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):497-511.details
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Is Epistemology Tainted?Jason Stanley - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (42):1-35.details
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Expert or Esoteric? Philosophers Attribute Knowledge Differently Than All Other Academics.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (7):e12850.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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The logic of epistemic justification.Martin Smith - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3857-3875.details
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The Epistemology of Religion.Martin Smith - 2014 - Analysis 74 (1):135-147.details
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Belief, Rational and Justified.Wes Siscoe - 2021 - Mind 130 (517):59-83.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Knowledge and reasoning.Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):10371-10388.details
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Assertion: The context shiftiness dilemma.Mona Simion - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (4):503-517.details
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The evil demon in the lab: skepticism, introspection, and introspection of introspection.Nicholas Silins - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9763-9785.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Time constraints and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Joseph Shin - 2014 - Episteme 11 (2):157-180.details
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Thick credence and pragmatic encroachment.Jeremy Shipley - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):339-361.details
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Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence.Michael J. Shaffer - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment, Religious Belief and Practice By Aaron Rizzieri.Michael Scott - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):530-532.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):875-896.details
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Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath, Pautz, and Neta.Susanna Schellenberg - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):929-946.details
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Knowledge and decision: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Moritz Schulz, Patricia Rich, Jakob Koscholke & Roman Heil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-13.details
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Genericity and Inductive Inference.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-18.details
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Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment.Javiera Perez Gomez & Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):593-613.details
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The Ambiguity Theory of “Knows”.Mark Satta - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):69-83.details
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