- Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.details
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Bonjour, Externalism and The Regress Problem.José L. Zalabardo - 2006 - Synthese 148 (1):135-169.details
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Idealization, epistemic logic, and epistemology.Audrey Yap - 2014 - Synthese 191 (14):3351-3366.details
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Why There are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue: The Canadian Philosophical Review 46 (1):115-136.details
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Why There Are No Epistemic Duties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2007 - Dialogue 46 (1):115-136.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1873-1895.details
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Systematic Epistemic Rights Violations in the Media: A Brexit Case Study.Lani Watson - 2018 - Social Epistemology 32 (2):88-102.details
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Truly Justified Belief.G. Vision - 2005 - Synthese 146 (3):405-446.details
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Belief isn’t voluntary, but commitment is.Nicholas Tebben - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):1163-1179.details
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Biological Function and Epistemic Normativity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):94-110.details
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Proper functioning and warrant after seven vodka martinis.Matthias Steup - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 72 (1):89 - 109.details
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The contrast between permissions to act and permissions to believe.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (1):21-34.details
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In Defense of Moral Evidentialism.Sharon Ryan - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (4):405-427.details
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Hume’s Doxastic Involuntarism.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):53-92.details
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A reflection on critical realism and ethics.Douglas V. Porpora - 2019 - Journal of Critical Realism 18 (3):274-284.details
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Veritistic Teleological Epistemology, the Bad Lot, and Epistemic Risk Consistency.Raimund Pils - forthcoming - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-21.details
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Scientific Realism and Blocking Strategies.Raimund Pils - 2022 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 36 (1):1-17.details
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A Satisficing Theory of Epistemic Justification.Raimund Pils - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (4):450-467.details
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Strong internalism, doxastic involuntarism, and the costs of compatibilism.Timothy Perrine - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):3171-3191.details
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Deontological evidentialism and ought implies can.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2567-2582.details
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Deontological evidentialism, wide-scope, and privileged values.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):485-506.details
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Relieving Pain and Foreseeing Death: A Paradox About Accountability and Blame.Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay - 2000 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 28 (1):19-25.details
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Relieving Pain and Foreseeing Death: A Paradox about Accountability and Blame.Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay - 2000 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 28 (1):19-25.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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Why W. K. Clifford was a Closet Pragmatist.Veli Mitova - 2008 - Philosophical Papers 37 (3):471-489.details
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Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire.Emily C. McWilliams - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):965-982.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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À la défense du déontologisme doxastique.Daniel Laurier - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (1):37.details
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Perspectives and Good Dispositions.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Aesthetic obligations.Robbie Kubala - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (12):e12712.details
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Two notions of epistemic normativity.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2009 - Theoria 75 (3):161-178.details
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Epistemic Obligation and Rationality Constraints.Charlotte Katzoff - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 34 (4):455-470.details
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Non‐Moral Evil.Allan Hazlett - 2012 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 36 (1):18-34.details
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Beyond belief: On disinformation and manipulation.Keith Raymond Harris - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Reasons for Belief and Normativity.Glüer-Pagin Kathrin & Wikforss Åsa - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 575-599.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.details
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The Duty to Edit the Human Germline.Parker Crutchfield - 2022 - Res Publica 29 (3):347-365.details
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Epistemic norms without voluntary control.Philippe Chuard & Nicholas Southwood - 2009 - Noûs 43 (4):599-632.details
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The Epistemic Dimensions of Civil Disobedience.Alexander Bryan - forthcoming - Journal of Political Philosophy.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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Epistemic Teleology and the Separateness of Propositions.Selim Berker - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):337-393.details
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Internalism empowered: how to bolster a theory of justification with a direct realist theory of awareness.Benjamin Bayer - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.details
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On knowledge and obligation.Can Başķent, Loes Olde Loohuis & Rohit Parikh - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):171-188.details
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Three Independent Factors in Epistemology.Guy Axtell & Philip Olson - 2009 - Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (2):89–109.details
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Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?Scott F. Aikin - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217.details
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