- Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.details
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The Mirage of Motivation Reason Internalism.Saleh Afroogh - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56:1-19.details
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Might-beliefs and asymmetric disagreement.Benjamin Lennertz - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4775-4805.details
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Subjective Disagreement.Beddor Bob - 2018 - Noûs 53 (4):819-851.details
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Weak and Strong Necessity Modals: On Linguistic Means of Expressing "A Primitive Concept OUGHT".Alex Silk - 2021 - In Billy Dunaway & David Plunkett (eds.), Meaning, Decision, and Norms: Themes From the Work of Allan Gibbard. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Maize Books. pp. 203-245.details
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
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Needing and Necessity.Guy Fletcher - 2011 - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 170-192.details
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Neutralité scientifique.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2018 - Encyclopédie Philosophique.details
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Parfit, Derek. On What Matters. Vol. 3. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 488. $45.00 .Singer, Peter, ed. Does Anything Really Matter? Essays on Parfit on Objectivity. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 288. $45.00. [REVIEW]Nicholas Laskowski - 2018 - Ethics 128 (2):496-505.details
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The sense of incredibility in ethics.Nicholas Laskowski - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (1):93-115.details
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'Must', 'Ought' and the Structure of Standards.Gunnar Björnsson & Robert Shanklin - 2016 - In Olivier Roy, Allard Tamminga & Malte Willer (eds.), Deontic Logic and Normative Systems. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 33–48.details
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Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
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The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Disagreement Lost and Found.Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics 12. Oxford University Press. pp. 187-205.details
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Defining Normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2019 - In Toh Kevin, Plunkett David & Shapiro Scott (eds.), Dimensions of Normativity: New Essays on Metaethics and Jurisprudence. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 62-104.details
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Quasi-Expressivism about Statements of Law: A Hartian Theory.Stephen Finlay & David Plunkett - 2018 - In John Gardner, Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law Volume 3. Oxford University Press. pp. 49-86.details
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Conceptual Analysis in Metaethics.N. G. Laskowski & Stephen Finlay - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 536-551.details
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Right in some respects: reasons as evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2191-2208.details
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Skepticism about Ought Simpliciter.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Deflationary Pluralism about Motivating Reasons.Daniel Fogal - 2017 - In Veli Mitova (ed.), The Factive Turn in Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Projection, indeterminacy and moral skepticism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2018 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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How to embed an epistemic modal: Attitude problems and other defects of character.Alex Silk - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (7):1773-1799.details
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Contextualism about Epistemic Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Kurt Sylvan - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. New York: Routledge.details
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Agency and Reasons in Epistemology.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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Normative reasons as good bases.Alex Gregory - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2291-2310.details
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The Significance of Ethical Disagreement for Theories of Ethical Thought and Talk.Gunnar Björnsson - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 275-291.details
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Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.details
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Distributive Justice and Access to Advantage; Edited by Alexander Kaufman: Cambridge University Press, 2014, Pp. viii + 278. [REVIEW]Kyle Johannsen - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (268):633-5.details
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Confusion of Tongues: A Theory of Normative Language, by Stephen Finlay. [REVIEW]J. L. Dowell - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):585-593.details
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Deontic Modals and Probability: One Theory to Rule Them All?Fabrizio Cariani - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Reasons, Reason, and Context.Daniel Fogal - 2016 - In Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.), Weighing Reasons. New York, NY: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Reason to promotion inferences.Joshua DiPaolo & Jeff Behrends - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-10.details
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Is Knowledge Normative?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):379-395.details
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Hybrid Accounts of Ethical Thought and Talk.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 243-259.details
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In defence of good simpliciter.Richard Rowland - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1371-1391.details
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Non-Analytical Naturalism and the Nature of Normative Thought: A Reply to Parfit.Nicholas Laskowski - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (1):1-5.details
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'Ought': OUT OF ORDER.Stephen Finlay - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement, correctness, and the evidence for metaethical absolutism.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalism in Metaethics.Jussi Suikkanen - 2015 - In Kelly James Clark (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Naturalism. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 351-368.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
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Feasibility and Normative Penetration.Matthew Lindauer & Nicholas Southwood - forthcoming - Journal of Moral Philosophy.details
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The pragmatics of all-purpose pejoratives.Víctor Carranza-Pinedo - 2021 - Proceedings of the 2021 Workshop on Context.details
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Normative Reference as a Normative Question.Camil Golub - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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On the Agent-Relativity of 'Ought'.Junhyo Lee - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
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The Axiology of Pain and Pleasure.Alycia LaGuardia-LoBianco & Paul Bloomfield - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-24.details
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