- Aesthetic Evaluation and First-Hand Experience.Nils Franzén - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):669-682.details
|
|
Skepticism about Naturalizing Normativity: In Defense of Ethical Nonnaturalism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (4):559-588.details
|
|
Recent work on ethical realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):746-760.details
|
|
Ontology for an Uncompromising Ethical Realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2016 - Topoi 37 (4):537-547.details
|
|
Truthmaking and the is—ought gap.Kit Fine - 2018 - Synthese 198 (2):887-914.details
|
|
Recent work on normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):331-346.details
|
|
Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.details
|
|
Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.details
|
|
Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.details
|
|
What good is a diachronic will?Luca Ferrero - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 144 (3):403-430.details
|
|
Talking with Vultures.Filippo Ferrari & Crispin Wright - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):911-936.details
|
|
The expressive function of folk psychology.Victor Fernandez Castro - 2017 - Filosofia Unisinos 18 (1).details
|
|
An expressivist approach to folk psychological ascriptions.Víctor Fernández Castro - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations (1):86-105.details
|
|
Is metaethics morally neutral?Jeremy Fantl - 2006 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):24–44.details
|
|
Practice-dependence and epistemic uncertainty.Eva Erman - 2017 - Journal of Global Ethics 13 (2):187-205.details
|
|
A World of Possibilities: The Place of Feasibility in Political Theory.Eva Erman & Niklas Möller - 2020 - Res Publica 26:1-23.details
|
|
Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.details
|
|
Explaining Disagreement: A Problem for (Some) Hybrid Expressivists.John Eriksson - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):39-53.details
|
|
Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.details
|
|
Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude.John Eriksson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794.details
|
|
How is Moral Disagreement a Problem for Realism?David Enoch - 2009 - The Journal of Ethics 13 (1):15-50.details
|
|
Kantian Cognitivism.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):711-725.details
|
|
There’s Something Funny About Comedy: A Case Study in Faultless Disagreement.Andy Egan - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):73-100.details
|
|
Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value: Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value.Andy Egan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.details
|
|
Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.details
|
|
Supervenience Arguments and Normative Non‐naturalism.Billy Dunaway - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):627-655.details
|
|
Reasoning beyond belief acquisition.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):416-442.details
|
|
Meta‐ethics and the problem of creeping minimalism.James Dreier - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.details
|
|
Disagreeing (about) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism.Jamie Dreier - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714-721.details
|
|
Explaining our Moral Reliability.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):71-86.details
|
|
Ethical Evidence.Steven Diggin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-24.details
|
|
Attitude and Social Rules, or Why It's Okay to Slurp Your Soup.Jeffrey Kaplan - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (28).details
|
|
Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
|
|
The Puzzle of Pure Moral Motivation.Adam Lerner - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:123-144.details
|
|
No Coincidence?Matthew S. Bedke - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:102-125.details
|
|
Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding Options to the Expressivist Marketplace.Matthew Bedke - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13:48-70.details
|
|
The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Realism.Alexandern D. Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Epistemic Planning, Epistemic Internalism, and Luminosity.Karl Schafer - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Structuring reality.Naomi Margaret Claire Thompson - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
|
|
Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin Goldman & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
|
|
Thinking Together: Advising as Collaborative Deliberation.Joshua Habgood-Coote - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.details
|
|
Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
A Hybrid Theory of Ethical Thought and Discourse.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Connecticutdetails
|
|
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
|
|
Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Charles Leslie Stevenson.Daniel R. Boisvert - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|