- The knowledge Norm for assertion.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):89-103.details
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Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism and the Knowledge Norm for Practical Reasoning.Jessica Brown - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):167-189.details
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Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.details
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Intuitions, evidence and hopefulness.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2021-2046.details
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In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'.Berit Brogaard - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):439 – 459.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Doubt, circularity and the Moorean response to the sceptic.Jessica Brown - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):1–14.details
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Cognitive diversity and epistemic norms.Jessica Brown - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):326-342.details
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Contextualism and warranted assertibility manoeuvres.Jessica Brown - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):407 - 435.details
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Feminist epistemology, contextualism, and philosophical skepticism.Evelyn Brister - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (5):671-688.details
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Evidentielle Einzigkeit in klassischer und formaler Erkenntnistheorie.Jochen Briesen - 2017 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 71 (2):183-222.details
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Contextualism, relativism, and the semantics of knowledge ascriptions.Elke Brendel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (1):101-117.details
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Now you know who Hong oak yun is.David Braun - 2006 - Philosophical Issues 16 (1):24-42.details
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Logical Foundations of Evidential Support.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy of Science 73 (5):500-512.details
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Knowledge, Achievement, and Manifestation.Gwen Bradford - 2014 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):97-116.details
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Epistemología craiguiana Y el rol de las intuiciones en el teorizar epistemológico.Leandro De Brasi - 2018 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140):533-552.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemically Responsible Action.Kenneth Boyd - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).details
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Knowledge in an uncertain world * by Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath. [REVIEW]Kenneth Boyd - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):189-191.details
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The diachronic threshold problem.Rodrigo Borges - 2021 - Philosophical Studies.details
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On synchronic dogmatism.Rodrigo Borges - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3677-3693.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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Knowledge Under Threat.Tomas Bogardus - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):289-313.details
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A Defense of Explanationism against Recent Objections.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - forthcoming - Episteme:1-12.details
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The indexicality of 'knowledge'.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (1):29 - 53.details
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Subject-sensitive invariantism, high-stakes/low-stakes cases, and presupposition suspension.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Episteme 17 (2):249-254.details
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Sensitivity Actually.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (3):606-625.details
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Knowledge and implicatures.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4293-4319.details
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Knowledge and Presuppositions.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):241 - 294.details
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Impurism, pragmatic encroachment, and the Argument from Principles.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):975-982.details
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Contextualism, Subject‐Sensitive Invariantism, and the Interaction of ‘Knowledge’‐Ascriptions with Modal and Temporal Operators.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):315-331.details
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Contextualism and the Knowledge Norms.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2013 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (1):89-100.details
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Higher-order knowledge and sensitivity.Jens Christian Bjerring & Lars Bo Gundersen - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):339-349.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse.Nathan Biebel - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3005-3028.details
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Not Knowing a Cat is a Cat: Analyticity and Knowledge Ascriptions.Bart Bezooijen, Martin Peterson & J. Carter - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (4):817-834.details
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The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.details
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The signaling function of sharing fake stories.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2021 - Mind and Language (1):64-80.details
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Rollercoasters are not Fun for Mary: Against Indexical Contextualism.Justina Berškytė - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):315-340.details
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Knowledge from Falsehood and Truth-Closeness.Sven Bernecker - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (4):1623-1638.details
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On the Pragmatic Explanation of Concessive Knowledge Attributions.Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (3):225-237.details
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Knowledge, Hope, and Fallibilism.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - Synthese 198:1673-1689.details
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God and Interpersonal Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):421-447.details
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Epistemology Personalized.Matthew A. Benton - 2017 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (269):813-834.details
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Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.details
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Dubious objections from iterated conjunctions.Matthew Benton - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):355-358.details
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Backwards causation still impossible.Hanoch Ben-Yami - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):89-92.details
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The knowledge norm of assertion in dialectical context.Endre Begby - 2020 - Ratio 33 (4):295-306.details
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Surprising connections between knowledge and action: The robustness of the epistemic side-effect effect.James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):689 - 715.details
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