- On the Nature and Relationship of Individual and Collective Justification.Simon Graf - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Evidentialism.Giada Fratantonio - forthcoming - In Kurt Sylvan, Ernest Sosa, Jonathan Dancy & Matthias Steup (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley Blackwell.details
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Doxastic justification through dispositions to cause.Julius Schönherr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-18.details
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Acting and believing on the basis of reasons.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12797.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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Everything is Self-Evident.Steven Diggin - 2021 - Logos and Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology 12 (4):413-426.details
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Skepticism Motivated: On the Skeptical Import of Motivated Reasoning.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):702-718.details
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The Priority of Propositional Justification.Erhan Demircioglu - 2019 - Estudios de Filosofía (Universidad de Antioquia) 59:167-182.details
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The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.details
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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Defeaters and Disqualifiers.Daniel Muñoz - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):887-906.details
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(1 other version)Propositional Justification and Doxastic Justification.Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Why We Really Cannot Believe the Error Theory.Bart Streumer - 2017 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Moral Skepticism: New Essays. New York: Routledge.details
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Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations.Patrick Bondy - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (4):542-569.details
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Why Worry about Epistemic Circularity?Michael P. Lynch & Paul Silva - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):33-52.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Does Doxastic Justification Have a Basing Requirement?Paul Silva - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):371-387.details
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The skeptic's dogmatism: a constructive response to the skeptical problem.Kaplan Levent Hasanoglu - 2011 - Dissertation, details
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Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.details
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Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Infinitism and epistemic normativity.Adam C. Podlaskowski & Joshua A. Smith - 2011 - Synthese 178 (3):515-527.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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What’s So Special About Reasoning? Rationality, Belief Updating, and Internalism.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Appreciating the need for autonomy, or recognizing the truth of evidentialism?Kevin McCain - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Misleading Higher-Order Evidence and Rationality: We Can't Always Rationally Believe What We Have Evidence to Believe.Wade Munroe - forthcoming - Episteme:1-27.details
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Imagination as a generative source of justification.Kengo Miyazono & Uku Tooming - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Can Infinitists Handle the Finite Mind Objection and the Distinction Objection?Bin Zhao - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2275-2291.details
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Reasoning beyond belief acquisition.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):416-442.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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Basing for the Bayesian.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3815-3840.details
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Epistemic Authority: Preemption or Proper Basing?Katherine Dormandy - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):773-791.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Problems for Mainstream Evidentialism.Tommaso Piazza - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):148-165.details
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No, We Cannot.Bart Streumer - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):537-546.details
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Irresolvable Conflicts and Begging the Question.Juho Ritola - unknowndetails
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A Meno Problem for Evidentialism.Daniel M. Mittag - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):250-266.details
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A New Evil Demon? No Problem for Moderate Internalists.Kevin McCain - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):97-105.details
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Testimonial Knowledge from Lies.Kevin McCain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (2):459-468.details
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The interventionist account of causation and the basing relation.Kevin McCain - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):357-382.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Ideal rationality and the relation between propositional and doxastic justification.Bada Kim - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):1-16.details
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Can the Epistemic Basing Relation be a Brain Process?Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Global Philosophy 33 (2):1-19.details
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The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann.Jonathan Matheson & Valerie Joly Chock - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (8):36-42.details
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The Superstitious Lawyer's Inference.J. Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy - 2019 - In Joseph Adam Carter & Patrick Bondy (eds.), Well Founded Belief: New Essays on the Epistemic Basing Relation. New York: Routledge.details
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The peculiar case of Lehrer’s lawyer.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1615-1630.details
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(1 other version)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.details
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AI and the need for justification (to the patient).Anantharaman Muralidharan, Julian Savulescu & G. Owen Schaefer - 2024 - Ethics and Information Technology 26 (1):1-12.details
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On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.details
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